Extensions of Remarks

October 31, 1989 EXTENSIONS OF REMARKS 26695 EXTENSIONS OF REMARKS CONFLICT IN CAMBODIA Cambodian population is clearly more con the Khmer Rouge, will we not be morally cerned over the reappearance of the Khmer obliged, in the end, to encourage the Viet Rouge. And the willingness of Hun Sen to namese to return? HON. BOB McEWEN arm a popular militia is evidence of his con OF OHIO fidence in the population's attitude. A DOZEN ANOMALIES IN U.S. POLICY TOWARD IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES There is no other choice, today, except CAMBODIA Tuesday, October 31, 1989 that between Hun Sen and Pol Pot. The two other aspirants, represented by Prince Si <By Jeremy J. Stone> Mr. McEWEN. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to hanouk and Son Sann, are by all estimates (1). Grandstanding: The U.S. announces discuss the conflict in Cambodia, which in the too weak to determine the outcome, much at Paris that it is adamantly opposed to wake of the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops, less to prevail. At most, they can provide le having the Khmer Rouge in any future presents the tree world with a foreign policy gitimacy to whoever wins. Cambodian Government and will even de dilemma. The Vietnamese occupation forces In this regard, history may be repeating crease its support to any such future Gov itself. Just as Prince Sihanouk is fronting ernment in such proportion as the Khmer had been engaged in a guerrilla war for years for the Khmer Rouge today, as leader of Rouge are, indeed, represented in such with a coalition of Cambodian factions, which their so-called Coalition Government of future Government. included forces supplied in part by the United Democratic Kampuchea, so also was he It makes these statements knowing full States. Unfortunately, the Khmer Rouge, one their putative leader from 1970 to 1975. well that the Chinese Government wants of the most detestable and genocidal regimes Many young Khmer joined the Khmer the Khmer Rouge represented and that the world has every known, provided a signifi Rouge in 1970 precisely because their Prince Sihanouk-as he advised Vice Presi cant portion of the military impetus to the Viet prince, Sihanouk, issued a call for them to dent Quayle at Jakarta-will insist on namese withdrawal. Allowing the Khmer join with the Khmer Rouge to overthrow Khmer Rouge representation if the Chinese Rouge to take part in the post-Vietnamese Lon Nol, with a view to putting Sihanouk do. Government of Cambodia is a mistake that back in power. Among these patriotic young So when the U.S. Government adds that it Khmer who rallied to the prince's call was will reluctantly support Prince Sihanouk in the world cannot afford to make. This betrayal an 18 year-old schoolboy named Hun Sen. his desire to have the Khmer Rouge in of the memories of the 2 million Cambodians According to credible reports, he defected volved in the future Government if he in murdered by the cold-blooded followers of Pol from the Khmer Rouge seven years later to sists on it, how can such statements be un Pot must be avoided. avoid an order from Pol Pot to destroy a Vi derstood except as grandstanding? The following articles, the first which was etnamese village. Sihanouk's and Son (2). Reneging: Not much more than a year printed in the Los Angeles Times of October Sann's factions are also filled with former ago, the Department of State was explain 23, 1989, and the second from the Federation Khmer Rouge who defected in either fear ing that it would normalize relations with of American Scientists, shed light on the or revulsion. the Vietnamese Government if only that What can be done? The key may lie with Government would remove its forest from proper course of American policy in post-Viet the Thais. Not long ago, Hun Sen's defense Cambodia. U.S. intelligence reports confirm namese Cambodia: minister said, "If the Thais gradually reduce that this was done in late September. But [From the Los Angeles Times, Oct. 23, 1989] their support to the Khmer Rouge, we can the U.S. now says that it is no longer plan THAILAND CAN BECOME THE KEY TO prevail easily. If they continue the support, ning to normalize relation with Vietnam RESTRAINING KHMER ROUGE it will be difficult for us though we still without a full settlement in Cambodia. <By William E. Colby and Jeremy J. Stone) think we can win." (3). Scapegoating: In the interim, the De In the wake of the Vietnamese withdrawal This is a plausible assessment. It is no partment has changed its line to insisting from Cambodia, civil war is moving from secret that the Thais have, for the last 10 that the Vietnamese withdraw "in the con simmer to boil between the genocidal years, helped the Khmer Rouge. They have text of an acceptable settlement". And in Khmer Rouge, still led by Pol Pot, and the provided them with sanctuaries on Thai ter light of our reluctant support of Sihanouk government of Hun Sen, who has adminis ritory, funneled weapons supplied by China, in 1 ), what this really means is that Hanoi tered the country for 10 years. given the Khmer Rouge information and has failed to insist that Phnom Penh accept But all that the outside powers can bring advice and permitted them to maintain un the Khmer Rouge in an interim Govern themselves to say is that the "best solution" supervised refugee camps. ment-Something which we declare at Paris would be negotiation and power-sharing. Es In sum, in the Thai effort to persuade the we did not really want! So Hanoi is to be pecially after the failure of the Paris negoti Vietnamese to leave Cambodia, they have blamed, and an embargo maintained on ations, this is a wholly irrelevant observa worked with the devil. Vietnam <and the Cambodian population) tion, akin to asking Mikhail S. Gorbachev to But new ideas are arising in Thailand. for Hanoi's not pressing its ally in Cambodia negotiate with Josef Stalin over the future Prime Minister Chatchal Choonhawan now to accept an outcome which we say we don't of Russia and to work with him for free has friendly relations with Hun Sen, whom want. This seems to reflect anti-Vietnamese elections. he has brought to Bangkok several times in feelings more than it does any plausible use These two groups of Cambodians hate his laudable effort to turn Indochina into a of political power to achieve desired goals. each other. From the point of view of Hun marketplace rather than a battlefield. He is 4). Double-standard: The U.S. Secretary of Sen and his colleagues, the Pol Pot-ists be trying to slow the pace of the civil war and State says that he is just following the haved like monsters while, from the point of to substitute commercial forces for military ASEAN line in justifying many attitudes view of Pol Pot, the Hun Sen group is a trai ones. He is trying, in the wake of Vietnam's which are anti-Hun Sen. But, in fact, Thai tor to his movement. withdrawal, to move the Assn. of Southeast land-the front-line ASEAN state-has been There is proof that these former Khmer Asian Nations from policies opposing Viet much friendlier to Hun Sen than the U.S. Rouge of Hun Sen do have a different ideol nam's invasion to policies opposing a Khmer For example, Hun Sen has been invited to ogy. No visitor to Cambodia today can mis Rouge return to power. Thailand three times, and by the Thai take the present government of Hun Sen for Prime Minister Chatchal needs and de Prime Minister, while the U.S.-a second the concentration-camp government of Pol serves help. In particular the Thais should line state in this matter-does not permit Pot. It may be a one-party state, as are not be required to confront alone the hard Hun Sen's chief foreign policy assistant, many others we deal with, but it is a normal line Chinese determination to keep support Ambassador Hor Namhong, to speak to pri government with money, music, religion, ing their proxy, Pol Pot. We should be vate groups in America on a private visit. time off for relaxation, family life, and, standing with our ally, Thailand, and urging <This double standard is kept in place indeed, a considerable amount of free enter China to cease and desist. through the double-talk of ASEAN which prise. None of this could be said about Pol For Americans who detest Pol Pot, the al maintains a far more hawkish declaratory Pot's government. ternatives are few. If we are currently too policy than it follows. And this, in turn, re While the Hun Sen government was cer mired in past policies to support Hun Sen flects the fact that the Thai Prime Minister tainly established by the Vietnamese, the and if we cannot help the Thais to restrain cannot fire his super conservative Foreign e This "bullet" symbol identifies statements or insertions which are not spoken by a Member of the Senate on the floor. Matter set in this typeface indicates words inserted or appended, rather than spoken, by a Member of the House on the floor. 26696 EXTENSIONS OF REMARKS October 31, 1989 Minister, or even permit him to resign, lest Paris Peace Conference even on such nice ments involved came really to dislike Viet the Prime Minister's coalition government ties as whether to use the word "genocide" nam-if, indeed, they had not already collapse.

Load more