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Haybron-Happiness-And-Pleasure.Pdf International Phenomenological Society Happiness and Pleasure Author(s): Daniel M. Haybron Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 62, No. 3 (May, 2001), pp. 501-528 Published by: International Phenomenological Society Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/2653534 Accessed: 22-12-2018 23:56 UTC JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at https://about.jstor.org/terms International Phenomenological Society is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Philosophy and Phenomenological Research This content downloaded from 147.8.31.43 on Sat, 22 Dec 2018 23:56:41 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Vol. LXII, No. 3, May 2001 Happiness and Pleasure1 DANIEL M. HAYBRON Rutgers University This paper argues against hedonistic theories of happiness. First, hedonism is too inclu- sive: many pleasures cannot plausibly be construed as constitutive of happiness. Second, any credible theory must count either attitudes of life satisfaction, affective states such as mood, or both as constituents of happiness; yet neither sort of state reduces to plea- sure. Hedonism errs in its attempt to reduce happiness, which is at least partly disposi- tional, to purely episodic experiential states. The dispositionality of happiness also undermines weakened nonreductive forms of hedonism, as some happiness-constitutive states are not pleasures in any sense. Moreover, these states can apparently fail to exhibit the usual hedonic properties; sadness, for instance, can sometimes be pleasant. Finally, the nonhedonistic accounts are adequate if not superior on grounds of practical and theoretical utility, quite apart from their superior conformity to the folk notion of happiness. "And does his philosophy make you happy?" "I have never searched for happiness. Who wants happiness? I have searched for pleasure. " Oscar Wilde, The Picture of Dorian Gray (p. 209) 1. Introduction Some unlucky soul might, over a period of time, be depressed, despondent, beset with anxiety, "stressed out," seething with rage, overwhelmed by fear, worried sick, heartbroken, grief-stricken, lonely, in low spirits, burdened with shame, overcome with boredom, deeply dissatisfied with life, haunted by a sense of dread or by feelings of emptiness, or simply be melancholy. A more fortunate counterpart might be in high spirits, joyful, exhilarated, elated, jubilant, carefree, deeply contented, at peace, delighted with her life, or blessed with a profound sense of fulfillment or well-being. Persons of the For helpful discussion and comments on earlier drafts of this paper, I wish to thank Bengt Brulde, Irwin Goldstein, Douglas Husak, Barry Loewer, Colin McGinn, Brian McLaugh- lin, Alex Michalos, Jonathan Schaffer, George Sher, T. L. S. Sprigge, Stephen Stich, L. W. Sumner, Barry Ward, and Robert Woolfolk, as well as audiences at the April 2000 Pacific Division conference of the'American Philosophical Association and the May 1999 conference of the New Jersey Regional Philosophy Association, where I presented excerpts from this paper. HAPPINESS AND PLEASURE 501 This content downloaded from 147.8.31.43 on Sat, 22 Dec 2018 23:56:41 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms former sort we naturally deem unhappy. Those of the latter we call happy. Indeed, these would seem to be prototypical cases of unhappiness and happi- ness, at least in one important sense of these expressions. Concerned parents probably have circumstances like these in mind when they inquire as to whether their children are happy. Likewise for young job seekers who worry that they may not be happy if they choose the wrong vocation. Let 'hedonism' denote the venerable doctrine that happiness, so construed, reduces completely to a subject's balance of pleasure over displeasure: happi- ness is merely the condition of having a favorable balance of pleasure over displeasure. I wish to argue that this theory is false. Indeed, it never had a chance of being true, for it fundamentally misconstrues the nature of the mental states that could constitute anything plausibly called happiness. I shall not defend a particular conception of happiness, but I will suggest that there are two basic candidates for such a theory: the affective state and life satisfaction views. As we shall see, these accounts appear to share key features that the hedonistic theory lacks. There are other problems with hedo- nism as well. 2. Preliminaries 2.1 The different things called happiness We can mean any number of things by 'happiness'.2 In such cases as the foregoing-henceforth the "paradigm cases"-we typically intend to denote nothing more profound than a state of mind. In our more lyrical moments, we might refer to it as a condition of the soul or spirit. Though such talk bears unfortunate connotations of cheap New Age sentimentality, these terms are here used in a common secular and naturalistic sense, and are meant to suggest something psychologically deep, intimate and important to us. To distinguish our subject from other things commonly called happiness, we may call this state of mind psychological happiness. So construed, happiness is a purely psychological, nonevaluative kind.3 Philosophers often use 'happiness' with other meanings, most frequently to denote a particularly enviable condition in life: a type of well-being or flourishing. Thus we commonly see the patently evaluative Greek expression 'eudaimonia' translated as 'happiness'. This evaluative kind I refer to as 2 To simplify matters I shall generally refer only to happiness, assuming that whatever is said of happiness also applies, mutatis mutandis, to unhappiness. 3 Philosophers who appear to accept hedonism about psychological happiness include, among many others, such historical thinkers as Bentham, Locke, and Sidgwick; and more recently, Brandt (1959; 1979; 1989; 1992); Campbell (1973); Carson (1978a; 1978b; 1979; 1981); Davis (1981b; 1981a); Ebenstein (1991); Griffin (1979; 1986); Mayerfeld (1996; 1999); Sen (1987); Sprigge (1987; 1991); and Wilson (1968). Casual references to happiness in the philosophical literature frequently assume it to be hedonistic. Hedonism has adherents in psychology as well, such as Allen Parducci (1995) and Daniel Kahne- man (1999). 502 DANIEL M. HAYBRON This content downloaded from 147.8.31.43 on Sat, 22 Dec 2018 23:56:41 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms prudential happiness. Whereas a correct theory of prudential happiness is determined by asking what sorts of lives make us better off, the task of providing a theory of psychological happiness-our task-is to determine the nature of a certain type of psychological state.4 We can distinguish other senses of 'happiness', but the foregoing remarks should suffice for our purposes.' Of more immediate concern is the possibility that there may be no single psychological kind answering to the psychological sense of 'happiness'. Or maybe the vernacular notion is so ill-defined that it admits of no satisfactory analysis. Maybe there is no well-defined folk notion to analyze. No doubt such worries have led many philosophers to conclude that happiness is not a worthwhile object of study. Let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that these concerns are well-founded. It hardly follows that there is no subject matter worth studying. There are clearly aspects of our psychology that we denote, however imprecisely or confusedly, under the guise of happiness. These aspects are almost universally taken to be immensely valuable- indeed, to comprise a central element of human well-being. We have no reason to doubt this belief. We therefore ought to learn something about these phenomena. Even if they simply reduce to familiar psychological cate- gories, we shall have discovered something important; and then we can determine just how valuable happiness is. Maybe, when all is said and done, we will find that happiness is not so valuable after all. And if the resulting kind or kinds do not correspond neatly to our vernacular notion of happiness, we may need to revise our concept somewhat. If more than one kind answers to the name, then we may wish to distinguish further senses of 'happiness', restrict its proper use to just one of the kinds, or dispense with the term altogether. But the idea that such weighty matters do not deserve serious philosophical scrutiny at all is simply obtuse. I shall employ some intuitional evidence in making my case. This may make some readers nervous in light of the foregoing concerns. However, the intuitions exploited appear to be both firm and widely held if any are in this realm. Should anyone's intuitions differ nonetheless, or should worries arise I use terms like 'kind' and 'category' very loosely here, with no particular metaphysical commitments in mind. For instance, the relevant psychological kinds may have no place in scientific, versus folk, psychology. I talk of psychological kinds only to distinguish the present concept from evaluative notions such as that of prudential happiness. To illustrate: one might wish to argue that psychological happiness is the proper measure of well-being-and many have done so (mistakenly, in my view). But this is different from making an a priori stipulation that happiness-whatever it is-must char- acterize what it is to have an especially enviable life. The theorists who do so are not involved in the same business that engages us here. Thus even if well-being consists solely in the psychological state of pleasure, well-being is still an evaluative, and not psychological, kind. i For more on the uses of 'happiness' and cognates, see my (2000; unpublished ms-c), as well as Davis (1981b), Goldstein (1973), and Thomas (1968).
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