North : Map and Chart Yongbyon Nuclear Research Center. Site of a 5-MWe experimental nuclear power reactor;* a partially completed plutonium extraction facility;* a fuel fabrication plant;* fuel storage facilities;* and a Soviet- supplied IRT research reactor** and critical assembly.** 50 MWe power reactor also under construction. Under the Oct. 21, 1994, U.S.-North Korean “Agreed Framework,” activities at the 5-MWe gas-graphite reactor, the fuel fabrication facility, and the reprocessing plant have been frozen; construction also has been halted on the 50-MWe gas-graphite reactor. U.S. intelligence agencies believe that has used the 5-MWe reactor and extraction plant to produce plutonium (possibly enough for 1 or 2 nuclear weapons). Wastes from the extraction process are believed to be stored at two undeclared sites near the Center.

Hwaedae-Gun missile testing range CHINA and production NORTH facilities. Site of two KOREA 1,000-MWe, light- 200-MWe Taechon Shinpo water reactors nuclear financed by KEDO power Yongbyon according to the reactor; terms of the construction Pakchon “Agreed halted Framework;” under construction began U.S.-N.K. in August 1997. “Agreed Framework.” Pyongsan Uranium mining, and uranium concentrate production plant. Uranium concentrate production plant, using Sub-critical assembly. ore from -Wolbingson Seoul Soviet-supplied laboratory-scale “hot cells” that mine (50 km to the south). may have been used to extract small quantities of plutonium. (Similar cells may exist at other locations.) Yellow Sea

* Subject to IAEA safeguards as of May 1992 pursuant to Sea of North Korea's obligations Japan under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT); future application of safeguards uncertain. ** Under IAEA safeguards pursuant to NPT obligations JAPAN and a trilateral U.S.S.R.-North 0 50 Korea-IAEA agreement. Miles

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Tracking Nuclear Proliferation, 1998

158 TRACKING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION NORTH KOREA: Nuclear Infrastructure

NAME/LOCATION IAEA OF FACILITY TYPE/STATUS SAFEGUARDS POWER REACTORS Sinpo (Kumho) Light-water, 1000 MWe; ground broken in August 1997. Yes Yongbyon Gas-graphite, natural U, 5 MWe; operations frozen. IAEA verifying freeze in operations. Yongbyon Gas-graphite, natural U, 50 MWe; construction halted. IAEA verifying construction freeze. Taechon Gas-graphite, natural U, 200 MWe; construction halted. IAEA verifying construction freeze. RESEARCH REACTORS IRT, Yongbyon Pool-type, HEU, 4 MWt; operating. Yesa Yongbyon Critical assembly. Yesb Pyongyang Sub-critical assembly. Yes REPROCESSING (PLUTONIUM EXTRACTION)c Yongbyon Partially completed; operations frozen. Yesd Pyongyang Soviet-supplied laboratory-scale ‘‘hot cells.’’ No URANIUM PROCESSINGe Pyongsan Uranium mining; status unknown. N/A (Not Applicable) Pakchon (Sunchon- Uranium mining; status unknown. N/A Wolbingson mine) Pyongsan Uranium milling; status unknown. N/A Pakchon Uranium milling; status unknown. N/A f Yongbyon Uranium purification (UO2) facility; operating. Yes Yongbyon Fuel fabrication facility; operations frozen. Yesg Yongbyon Pilot-scale fuel fabrication facility; dismantled, according to No North Korean officials.h

Abbreviations: highly enriched uranium ס HEU low-enriched uranium ס LEU natural uranium ס nat. U millions of watts of electrical output ס MWe millions of watts of thermal output ס MWt thousands of watts of thermal output ס KWt

NOTES (North Korea Chart) aThis facility is covered by the 1992 IAEA safeguards agreement percent of its civil engineering had been completed and only 40 and an earlier trilateral U.S.S.R.-North Korea-IAEA agreement. percent of its equipment installed. U.S. officials believe, however, bThis facility is covered by the 1992 IAEA safeguards agreement that the facility was designed to handle all the spent fuel from both and an earlier trilateral U.S.S.R.-North Korea-IAEA agreement. the 5 MWe reactor and the 50 MWe reactor at Yongbyon. They c theorize that, even in its incomplete state, the plant had the capacity There have been allegations that North Korea is constructing a to process all the spent fuel produced by the smaller reactor and uranium enrichment facility, but U.S. officials discount these reports. thus could have separated one to two bombs’ worth of plutonium dNorth Korea has consistently maintained that the 600-foot-long prior to 1992 from the spent fuel thought to have been discharged plutonium separation facility at Yongbyon should be characterized from the 5 MWe unit in 1989. During their March 1994 inspection as a ‘‘radiochemical laboratory’’ because it had not been fully tested of this facility, lAEA inspectors made certain observations that led and because, when first observed by the IAEA in mid-1992, only 80 them to believe that, since their previous inspection a year earlier,

159 North Korea had built and possibly operated a second, unsafe- yellowcake, and IAEA inspectors are monitoring the facility to guarded plutonium separation line. (See Mark Hibbs and Naoaki ensure this. Usui, ‘‘Second, Hidden Reprocessing Line Feared Opened at Yong- gAssociated with this plant are fuel storage facilities that are byon Plant,’’ Nucleonics Week, March 24 1994, p. 1; Mark Hibbs, covered by North Korea’s 1992 safeguards agreement with the IAEA. ‘‘North Korea Needs 6-9 Months to Reprocess Discharged Core,’’ hIn the August 1996 IAEA Director General’s report, mention Nucleonics Week, May 2 1994, p. 17.) All operations at the facility was made of this pilot-scale facility. An IAEA official noted in a are currently frozen, pursuant to the U.S.-North Korean Agreed February 1998 interview that North Korean nuclear officials have Framework, and the IAEA has verified this status. claimed that the facility, part of the Yongbyon complex, was e The mining and milling operatings at Pakchon and Pyongsan destroyed in a fire prior to the initial IAEA inspections in 1991. are not subject to the ‘‘freeze’’ agreement between the IAEA and Apparently, in this fire, all records of the facility were destroyed, North Korea, and inspectors have no authority to see these facilities. including record of the manufacture of the first reactor core for the According to one IAEA official interviewed in February 1998, inspec- 5 MW reactor, making it impossible for inspectors to determine this tors have not visited these facilities for a considerable amount of piece of North Korea’s proliferation story. Implementation of the time and have no information on their operational status. Agreement Between the Agency and the Democratic People’s Repub- fAccording to an IAEA official interviewed in February 1998, the lic of Korea for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with uranium processing facility at Yongbyon is permitted to operate the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Report by under the terms of the ‘‘freeze’’ agreement between the IAEA and the Director General to the General Conference, GC (40)/16, August North Korea. However, the facility is only permitted to produce 20, 1996, p. 4.

160 TRACKING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION