May It Please the Twitterverse: the Use of Twitter by State High Court Judges
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Journal of Information Technology & Politics ISSN: 1933-1681 (Print) 1933-169X (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/witp20 May it please the twitterverse: The use of Twitter by state high court judges Todd A. Curry & Michael P. Fix To cite this article: Todd A. Curry & Michael P. Fix (2019) May it please the twitterverse: The use of Twitter by state high court judges, Journal of Information Technology & Politics, 16:4, 379-393, DOI: 10.1080/19331681.2019.1657048 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/19331681.2019.1657048 Published online: 17 Aug 2019. Submit your article to this journal Article views: 155 View related articles View Crossmark data Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=witp20 JOURNAL OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY & POLITICS 2019, VOL. 16, NO. 4, 379–393 https://doi.org/10.1080/19331681.2019.1657048 May it please the twitterverse: The use of Twitter by state high court judges Todd A. Curry and Michael P. Fix ABSTRACT KEYWORDS This article examines the extent to which Twitter has been adopted by judges on state supreme Twitter; judges; state courts, and how these judges use the platform. While social media usage by other politicians has supreme courts; judicial been examined in a variety of contexts, judges have been universally ignored. We find that elections elected judges are more likely to use Twitter, primarily to engage with the public. Additionally, while they do not engage with the public like traditional politicians, they increase Twitter use overall and tweet more election-related rhetoric in election years. This work extends the audi- ences literature in judicial politics to extra-judicial behavior of judges. During his time on the Texas Supreme Court, Justice independence, either giving their judges life tenure, Don Willet was perhaps the most well-known judge or limiting them to one non-renewable term. Judges not on the U.S. Supreme Court. Dubbed the Twitter serving on the courts of last resort across the various Laureate of Texas by the Texas House of states are markedly different. We find that variations Representatives, Judge Willet amassed over 100k in Twitter adoption and usage are dependent upon followers on the social media platform. When he how judges are retained. Social media usage specifi- was active, he posted multiple times a day on topics cally is linked to whether or not judges need to cater ranging from the Constitution, the musical to a specific audience in order to be re-elected Hamilton, or tributes to his various family members. (Baum, 2006; Romano & Curry, 2019). However, on September 28, 2017, the tweets Across the 52 state courts of last resort, 40 of stopped. The radio silence coincided with Judge them subject their judges to some type of public Willet’s nomination to the Fifth Circuit Court of retention process. Of the remaining twelve courts, Appeals by President Trump. Judge Willet himself only three give their justices life tenure, with the had not changed, but his constituency had. United remaining nine placing reappointment in the hands States Senators are not the voters of Texas. of the governor or legislature. Thus, the vast major- This paper seeks to examine the extent to which ity of judges on state courts of last resort are either Twitter has been adopted by judges on state supreme explicitly accountable to the electorate, or to indi- courts, and if so, how these judges primarily use the viduals standing for the electorate and acting in platform. While social media usage by other politi- their proxy. Put more simply, these judges are cians has been examined in a variety of contexts representatives. Like other representatives, we ranging from United States Congressional elections should expect judges to use the tools available to (Vaccari & Nielsen, 2013), German Federal elections connect with their electorates. Twitter and other (Stier, Bleier, Lietz, & Strohmaier, 2018), the Catalan social media platforms have proven to be a cheap Parliament (Bravo & Esteve Del Valle, 2017), and the and effective format for politicians to engage the Japanese Parliament (Kobayashi & Ichifuji, 2015), public directly, we see no reason why this should be judges have been universally ignored (but see different for state high court judges, especially those Browning, 2014 &Singh,2016 for normative treat- who must stand of reelection periodically. That ments). This is not shocking as the method by which said, we expect judges that do adopt twitter will most judges are chosen internationally mirrors the use it in some systematically different ways than United States federal system in prioritizing judicial other representatives. CONTACT Todd A. Curry [email protected] Political Science, The University of Texas at El Paso, 500 W. University, El Paso 79968, USA Color versions of one or more of the figures in the article can be found online at www.tandfonline.com/WITP. © 2019 Taylor & Francis 380 T. A. CURRY AND M. P. FIX In this article, we examine a novel dataset of all to many other interactions with audiences, includ- tweets by state high court judges since the birth of ing social media adoption and usage. the platform. We find that justices that are elected representatives are much more likely to use Twitter, primarily as a means to engage with the public. Yet, Twitter use among politicians consistent with our predictions, they do not engage Those who have examined Twitter use by tradi- with the public as traditional politicians. Justices that tional politicians and political candidates have use Twitter are much more likely to engage in self- noted that these individuals engage in different personalization activity than policy-based campaign- types of behaviors. First, there are traditional cam- ing activity. Given the non-salient nature of judicial paign behaviors: policy pronouncements, elections combined with the normative expectation announcement of endorsements, explanations of that judges be above politics, this allows them indir- votes, etc. In this vein, Twitter serves as an addi- ectly to advance their electoral goals by providing tional tool for behavior that would exist without a mechanism for building name recognition without the social media platform. Twitter just makes the engaging in the more distasteful aspects of overtly audience for this information larger, the act of political Twitter use. However, while we do not see spreading it cheaper, and the speed of the contact any evidence of the use of the type of policy-based or faster. Moreover, Twitter allows politicians to political charged rhetoric we would expect from access their constituents in an unfiltered fashion traditional politicians, we do see that state high and speak directly to them. Second, this access court judges do use more election-related language allows politicians to court a personal connection in years they face the voters. Additionally, we find by not tweeting about traditional political content, further support for this proposition based on who is but by personalizing themselves. These tweets will using Twitter. If judges had no electoral goals for strongly display the individual not as just using the platform, we would expect that the judges a politician or candidate, but as a person with who did so would largely be a random draw from the context to inspire feelings of familiarity. pool of all state high court judges; however, in prac- The first examinations of Twitter in the tice it is almost solely judges in states that use some United States looked at congressional elections type of election for selecting/retaining judges that and representative behavior in both the House use the platform and those judges tend to utilize in and Senate. Predicting early adoption and use more in election years than in non-election years. of Twitter in Congress proved partially idio- Various authors over the years have focused on syncratic. Electoral vulnerability seemed to how judges, especially those who sit on state have virtually no effect on early adoption and supreme courts, engage in a variety of representa- use, while being a member of the minority tive behaviors. Namely, Baum (2006) draws atten- party did (Lassen & Brown, 2011). Senators, tion to the idea that judges cater much of their those in House leadership, and members with behavior to engaging with, and seeking approval alargerconstituencywerelikelytoadoptand from, audiences they deem important for their use Twitter by 2010 (Lassen & Brown, 2011). career advancement or audiences they desire to However, within just six years, social media be accepted by. Looking exclusively at state adoption by members of Congress was nearly supreme court judges, scholars have found that total. All 100 Senators and nearly every mem- judges are primarily interested in the audience beroftheHouseofRepresentativeshad that is responsible for their retention, especially a Twitter account by 2016 (Straus & when they decide cases or write opinions (Brace Glassman, 2016). & Boyea, 2008; Langer, 2002; Romano & Curry, The story of early adoption of Twitter is 2019). This work demonstrates that these audience inconsistent across countries and institutions. effects found by previous scholars are not limited Examination of early adoption by United to traditional types of judicial behavior, but extend Kingdom MPs found that in 2010 only one in JOURNAL OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY & POLITICS 381 ten MPs utilized Twitter. Here the most likely to (2017) found that self-personalization strategies be early adopters were women and those below were certainly not uniform across candidacies, the age of 60 (Jackson & Lilleker, 2011). In with some candidates only engaging in traditional Australia, Twitter adoption by politicians policy related campaign activities. For example, appeared to be more uniform across demo- male candidates were more likely to use persona- graphic variables with no statistical differences lization in their campaigns, while women were across age, gender, or level of government more likely to invoke personal narratives in close (Grant, Moon, & Grant, 2010).