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The Demographic Change & Forced Displacement

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JUNE 2017 DESCRIPTIVE RESEARCH Photo By : Mohannad Alkhalidiya 20 /06/ 2017 The Demographic Change & Forced Displacement in Syria Homs - Damascus & its Rural - Aleppo & its rural 1 Table of Content Homs Governorate Forced Displacement 01 Baba Amr 03 Karm Al-Zeitoun 04 Al-Bayada & Al-Khalidiya 05 Al-Qusayr 06 Al-Wa’er 07 Damascus Rural Governorate Forced Displacement 09 Az-Zabadani 10 Madaya and Baqin 12 Al-Kalamoon 13 Qudsaia 14 Al-Moadamiyeh 15 Darayya 16 Wadi Barada 17 Damascus Governorate Forced Displacement 18 Barzeh 19 Al-Qaboun 20 Aleppo Forced Displacement 21 Eastern Neighborhoods 22 Descriptive Research- The demographic change and forced displacement in Syria وحدة تنسيق الدعم 2 The Demographic Change & Forced Displacement This report was produced by the Advocacy and Communication department in collaboration with the Information Management Unit IMU, in the Assistance Coordination Unit applying its complementary humanitarian response to the Syrian crisis, including the most urgent needs and approximate number of forced displaced people who are in need. Please note that numbers mentioned in this report are used as official documents by the Information Management Unit (IMU). The cover photo represents the farwell moment by Al-Wa’er neighborhood’s inhabitants in Homs governorate heading to Jarablus. The estimated number of the first displacement wave is 2000 persons. This report was issued on June 20, 2017 The forced displacement agreements included in this report, are only the official ones signed with the Syrian regime, nevertheless there are many forced displacement cases caused by bombardment and starvation applied by the regime over the Syrian people. 3 It is worth mentioning that the forced displacement targeted mainly the opposition component in Homs city, then the northern, western and southern countrysides. Depopulation was applied through many tools, mainly: Massacres Blockade Sexual violence Changing property & reconstruction Intense shelling Arbitrary arrest 2 Descriptive Research- The demographic change and forced displacement in Syria Damaged buildings in Juret al-Shayah in Homs, on July 16, 2012. Province Homs Since the revolution was triggered in 2011, Al-Assad regime has had a clear vision of the demographic change, where Homs province was an example of this early demographic change. According to many experts, the concept of demographic change dates to many years before the revolution, particularly Homs dream project, which was declared by the former The population of Homs before 2011 Homs governor Iyyad Ghazal who required to gulp was approximately the city center and many of its old neighborhoods. Homs is the largest Syrian province, although most of it is an uninhabited desert. It is the only province that has boundaries with three countries (Jordan – MILLION INDIVIDUALS Iraq – Lebanon), its western rural is the only passage 2.2 between Damascus, Tartus and Lattakia provinces. 1.2 million individuals Since 2011, Homs has been suffering from extreme of them were from Homs city. violence by the regime; it witnessed many massacres and a continuous shelling which caused the destruction of many of its neighborhoods at the time the supporters’ neighborhoods remained untouched. 1 Civilians carry their belongings as they walk towards a meeting point to be evacuated from a besieged area of Homs February 7, 2014. REUTERS Photo / Yazan Homsy Displacing Karm Al-Zeitoun’s Inhabitants 12 March Morning of Monday 2012 The regime forces arrested dozens Karm Al-Zeitoun neighborhood to of oppositionists arbitrarily, and the east of Homs city was mortar kept them in a building. Those shelled which caused the incidence prisoners underwent torture for of 16 civilians, and the entrance of two complete hours. regime supporting civil fighters to the neighborhood. Prisoners were divided; men were put in a room, children and women were in another room. They poured gasoline on men, torched Karm Al-Zeitoun Neighborhood some of them, and shot others Massacre. dead. Children were slaughtered This horrific massacre claimed the with knives before their mothers, lives of 43 people and then soldiers raped women including minors before shooting them dead. Inhabitants started to leave the for fear of similar العام نهايةneighborhood massacres until the neighborhood was completely deserted by its inhabitants - who had been around 50,000 people before 43 people the revolution - and moved to other neighborhoods like Al- Wa’er, Al-Ghouta and Al-Hamra, they haven’t returned till now. 4 Descriptive Research- The demographic change and forced displacement in Syria Syrian women walk past the ruins of a shelled street in the Baba Amr district of Homs. Photograph: Joseph Eid/AFP/Getty Images Displacing Baba Amr’s Inhabitants 3 February 2012 The regime has started a military operation in Baba Amr neighborhood using all kinds of weapons (rockets – artillery – airstrike), which caused the destruction of the neighborhood 2012 1 March over the heads of its inhabitants and displacing the total population The military operation ended of about 35,000 people to other when FSA fighters retreated from neighborhoods surrounding Baba the neighborhood and the regime Amr. forces entered after 26 days of violent military escalation. The regime did not allow inhabitants to return to their houses 2015 The end of the year The provincial council of Homs declared an organizational chart for reconstructing Baba Amr, Al-Sultania & Jobar neighborhoods, which deprived thousands of families of returning to their houses. 3 Vehicles abandoned by Syrian opposition fighters in Dabaa, north of Qusayr, in Syria's central Homs province as regime forces sought to mop up pockets of rebel resistance north of Qusayr, on June 7, 2013. Displacing Al-Qusayr’s Inhabitants Al-Qusayr city subordinating to Homs Province near the Lebanese borders is a linking point between Damascus and the Syrian coast. 2013 19 May The regime forces, supported by hundreds of Hezbollah fighters, started a military operation over the city from various interlocutors 2013 , evacuating the city completely, 19 May and after 18 days, the regime forces and Hezbollah militias The population of Al-Qusayr were able to take control over city before the revolution had the city. been 65,000 people , most of them moved toward Arsal city in Lebanon and Al-Kalamoon district. They could not come back to their city so far. Hezbollah is now resettling its loyalists in the invaded city. 6 Descriptive Research- The demographic change and forced displacement in Syria Damaged cars are piled up, used as cover from snipers in the Khaldiyeh area of Homs, on February 19, 2013 Reuters Yazan Homsy Displacing Al-Bayadah & Al-Khalidiya Inhabitants March 2012 After the news of Karm Al-Zeitoun massacre, the regime took control over Baba Amr neighborhood, and the attention turned to the rebel fighters’ 2012 stronghold “Al-Khalidiya neighborhood”, March which was shelled heavily the thing that pushed the inhabitants - who had The same case is applied to Al- been around 90,000 people before the Bayadah neighborhood whose revolution - to leave the neighborhood inhabitants had been around in March 2012, and they haven’t returned 100,000 individuals. They left till now. their houses in the same month and haven’t returned till now. 5 Smoke rises behind damaged buildings as the Khalid bin al Walid Mosque is seen on right in the besieged area of Homs March 9, 2014. REUTERS Yazan Homsy TO SUM UP The regime did not allow the inhabitants to return to every neighborhood under its control. On the other hand, it started resettling other families aligned to it, like what happened in Karm Al-Zeitoun, Al-Abbasiyya, Bab As-Siba’ neighborhoods and others, whereas the local inhabitants have become refugees or IDPs. 8 Descriptive Research- The demographic change and forced displacement in Syria Syrian oppositions and their families walk to get into a bus during an evacuation from the al-Waer neighborhood in the western outskirts of the central city of Homs Syria on / March 18 2017 Photo by Ridvan Hindi Anadolu Agency Displacing Al-Wa’er’s Inhabitants Al-Wa’er neighborhood is located to the west south of Homs city. 2012 Large numbers of IDPs fled to it coming from Homs neighborhoods 2013 that underwent a violent military October operation by the regime until its inhabitants have become 700,000 The regime started a military escalation individuals. against the neighborhood and applied a crippling blockade before large numbers 2016 of the inhabitants started to leave it, then Later the regime undertook a violent military operation over the neighborhood in Negotiations started between the regime addition to the crippling blockade that and a delegation of the neighborhood’s almost led the inhabitants to starvation. inhabitants that continued over many 2017 rounds and led partly to the reduction Beginning of Year of the blockade, but the regime violated the agreements many times reapplying This number kept falling till it became blockade until the inhabitants of the 30,000 individuals at the beginning of neighborhood became around 50,000 2017 when the regime started a massive individuals in 2016. military operation using air forces and committing many massacres. 2017 18 March Inhabitants had to sign agreements, 2017 under a Russian guarantee, requiring Later taking the rebel fighters and their families out of the neighborhood in Till the date of this report, 12 batches addition to everybody who did not want have got out of the neighborhood to to carry out reconciliation
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