Correct as at: 16 Dec 05

UNIVERSITY COLLEGE UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE ACADEMY

THE TORCH AND THE SWORD A HISTORY OF THE ARMY CADET MOVEMENT IN AUSTRALIA 1866-2004

CRAIG A.J. STOCKINGS STUDENT NUMBER 9193110

THESIS PREPARED IN REQUIREMENT FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

2006 I hereby declare that this submission is my own work and to the best of my knowledge it contains no material previously published or written by another person, nor material which to a substantial extent has been accepted for the award of any degree or diploma at UNSW or any other educational institution, except where due acknowledgement is made in the thesis. Any contribution made to the research by others, with whom I have worked at UNSW or elsewhere, is explicitly acknowledged in the thesis.

I also declare that the intellectual content of this thesis is the product of my own work, except to the extent that assistance from others in the project’s design and conception or in style, presentation and linguistic expression is acknowledged.

Craig Stockings

February 2006 ABSTRACT

The aim of this thesis is to provide a general history of the army cadet movement in Australia from 1866 to 2004 by tracing the interactions between four fundamental forces that have stood as its foundation for almost 140 years. In various guises military, educational, social, and financial factors are the pillars on which the cadet movement has always rested. Over time the balance and relative dominance of each has determined the shape and state of the cadet organisation and will continue to do so in the future. When these four forces have been aligned the movement has thrived but when they have pulled in disparate directions it has faltered. Throughout the thesis, contextualising these four key concepts, are two more general themes concerning the influence of conservative politics and a recurring state school/private school divide. The history of army cadets, and therefore this thesis, is an investigation into the interplay of these dynamics.

With such a purpose and methodology the thesis begins by tracing the development of the movement from its nineteenth century origins by identifying issues and circumstances that led some colonies to maintain thousands of cadets while others struggled to field any. It goes on to examine the formation, five years after Federation, of a Commonwealth cadet scheme birthed only to be swamped by the era of compulsory military training in Australia from 1911-29 which saw, at its peak, almost 100,000 schoolboys in khaki. The thesis analyses the re-organised voluntary cadet system in place from 1930-38 which, matching the circumstances of the adult army, faltered in numbers and support as it was restructured into dual ‘Regimental’ and ‘School’ branches. It goes on to assess the impact of the Second World War and the renewed impetus it provided to the cadet organisation before investigating the prosperity of the movement throughout the 1950s and 1960s in spite of the complexities raised by National Service and Australian involvement in conflicts in Korea, Vietnam, Malaya and Borneo. Particular attention is paid to the early 1970s and the machinations surrounding the unexpected decision to disband the cadet organisation announced by the Labor government on 26 August 1975. The cadet story does not conclude at this point, however, with Vice Regal controversy and a subsequent Liberal-National election victory resurrecting the movement. The re-styled cadet scheme of 1976-83 is investigated followed by twelve years of division and distress under consecutive Labor federal governments between 1984-95. The thesis concludes by examining the reversal of fortunes for the movement from 1996-2004 which saw the cadet system develop, by the end of the period, into a well led, resourced and motivated organisation of almost 17,000 members.

The research informing this thesis is based on documents held in National Archives of Australia offices in all state capitals, as well as those held in the Australian War Memorial. In addition, all state public record offices have yielded significant material, as have a wide range of private and school-based archives. More recent primary source information has been gathered from sources within the Department of Defence Archives, Queanbeyan, NSW, while select active and closed files from Headquarters Australian Army Cadets and the Directorate of Defence Force Cadets were graciously provided to the author. The study has also been informed by a wide selection of official, privately published and unpublished secondary sources spanning more than a century.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Acknowledgements i

List of Tables iii

List of Figures v

Abbreviations vi

Chapter One – Introduction 1

Chapter Two – Colonial Genesis 1866 - 1905 5

Chapter Three – Commonwealth Cadets 1906 - 1910 44

Chapter Four – Conscripts 1911 - 1929 74

Chapter Five – A Dual System 1930 - 1938 112

Chapter Six – Cadets & the Second World War 1939 - 1945 141

Chapter Seven – The Australian Cadet Corps 1946 - 1957 173

Chapter Eight – Ascent & Descent 1958 - 1974 205

Chapter Nine – Death & Rebirth 1975 - 1982 240

Chapter Ten – The Great Divide 1983 - 1995 273

Chapter Eleven – Healing, Harmony & Hope 1996 - 2004 304

Chapter Twelve – Conclusion 347

Appendices 351

Bibliography 384

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The completion of this doctoral thesis, like most I suspect, required input from three essential sources. The first was the guidance of my academic supervisor Professor Jeffrey Grey, and assistant supervisor, Dr David Blaazer, both of the Humanities and Social Science Department at the Australian Defence Force Academy. Professor Grey’s knowledge, experience and encouragement have been invaluable. I have known him since my undergraduate days in the early 1990s and sought his tutelage for two reasons. He has the mind and energy of one of this country’s leading military historians mixed with an affinity for frank, direct and candid critique. Though I have known Dr Blaazer for a shorter period his time, effort and advice have been very much appreciated. Through consistent reminders for ‘relevance, context and evidence’ he is responsible, in no small measure, for turning a story into a thesis.

The second crucial ingredient for the successful completion of this work was the goodwill and generosity of a wide range of individuals who went out of their way to assist my research. I am especially indebted to Mr Gerry Walsh, accomplished historian, long-time teacher, and friend. His editing expertise and knowledge of Australian history were as valuable now as they were when he supervised my Honours thesis almost a decade ago. I also offer my sincere thanks to the staff at the Australian Defence Force Academy Library, particularly Ms Mary-June Burk, whose patience and commitment to fulfil literally hundreds of inter-library loans and other requests has been admirable. So too, the amity of archivists from all state offices of the National Archives and the Australian War Memorial was greatly appreciated while cheerful support from the various state public record offices was indispensable. I must make special mention of the staff at the Department of Defence Archives, Headquarters Australia Army Cadets and the Directorate of Defence Force Cadets whose files informed the latter chapters. Thanks also to Air Vice Marshal David Dunlop, Head Cadet Policy, for his careful editing and advice concerning Chapter 10. Finally, I am most grateful to the long list of schools and school archivists who gave of their time and records freely in the preparation of this thesis. Although I cannot name them all I hope that my efforts prove worthy of their expectations.

i The third, and for me at least, the most important factor in the completion of this dissertation has been the unremitting support of my family. My wife, Emma, has been by my side every step of the way. She is a true partner and without her commitment there is no doubt that this thesis would forever have remained an unfulfilled dream. She has endured not only the financial burden of a being married to a student but has also borne the emotional strain and obsessiveness of a PhD candidate with grace, love and good humour. As my first draft editor Emma weathered uncountable typographic errors and provided insightful and practical advice at all stages. Last of all I must thank my children. Georgia, who was born three weeks after this project was begun and Charlotte who arrived near its end. Your laughs and smiles have made hard days easy. This thesis belongs to the four of us.

ii LIST OF TABLES

Chapter 2 Table 2A Organisation of the Victorian Volunteer Cadet Corps, 1886 p. 18. Table 2B Numbers of School Cadets in NSW and Victoria, 1900-07 p. 31. Chapter 3 Table 3A Strength of the Cadet Corps in Australia, December 1904 p. 46. Table 3B Geographic Allocation of Cadet Units, 1908-09 p. 52. Table 3C Defence Expenditure as a Percentage of GDP, 1905-10 p. 58. Table 3D Establishments and Strengths of Cadets, June 1907 - June 1910 p. 70. Chapter 4 Table 4A Senior Cadets Registered, Exempted & Undergoing Training, 1913-21 p. 83. Table 4B Establishment Strength of a Company of Senior Cadets, 1911 & 1912 p. 83. Table 4C Trends in Army Expenditure against GDP, 1911-29 p. 90. Table 4D Efficiency of Senior Cadet Brigades and Training Areas, 1913 p. 95. Table 4E The Syllabus of Training for Senior Cadets, 1913 p. 102. Chapter 5 Table 5A Establishment and Strength of Cadets, 30 December 1931 p. 120. Table 5B Regimental Cadets within the 3rd Division, 12 July 1932 p. 121 Table 5C Efficiency Return for Regimental Cadets, 30 June 1937 p. 122. Table 5D Number of Regimental Cadets, 31 June 1930 - 30 September 1931 p. 125. Table 5E Establishment & Strength of Regimental Cadets, 30 September 1931 p. 125. Table 5F Regimental Cadet Numbers, 1932-39 p. 126. Table 5G Distribution of School Cadets, 31 March 1936 p. 128. Table 5H School Cadet Numbers, 1930-39 p. 128. Table 5I Trends in Army Expenditure against GDP, 1929-39 p. 131. Chapter 6 Table 6A Trends in Army Expenditure against GDP, 1939-45 p. 151. Table 6B Cadet Numbers, 1939-45 p. 156. Table 6C School Cadets in Australia, 30 September 1943 p. 157. Table 6D School Cadet Units at the Outbreak of the Second World War p. 158. Table 6E Detailed Syllabus of Training Recommended to Cadet Units, 1942 p. 161. Chapter 7 Table 7A Strength of Regimental Cadets, 30 June 1952 p. 177. Table 7B Regimental Cadet Numbers, February 1950 – September 1957 p. 179. Table 7C Former Cadets Admitted to the RMC, Duntroon, 1945-49 p. 183. Table 7D Trends in Army Expenditure against GDP, 1946-57 p. 186. Table 7E Cadet Numbers, 31 December (1945-50) p. 188. Table 7F Location of Cadet Units, 16 August 1949 p. 188. Table 7G Strength of the ACC, 1950-57 p. 190. Table 7H School Cadet Numbers, 1951-57 p. 191. Table 7I Disposition of School Cadet Detachments, 1 January 1953 p. 191.

iii Table 7J Ceiling & Actual Strength of Schools Cadets, 30 September 1955 p. 193. Chapter 8 Table 8A Cadet Unit Establishments, 1967 p. 211. Table 8B Trends in Defence Expenditure against GDP, 1957-65 p. 217. Table 8C Trends in Defence Expenditure against GDP, 1967-74 p. 218. Table 8D Composition by Unit of the ACC, September 1974 p. 224. Table 8E School Cadet Numbers, 1957-73 p. 225. Table 8F Strength of Cadet Brigades, 31 March 1974 p. 228. Table 8G Schools with Waiting Lists for Cadet Units, August 1973 p. 228. Table 8H Distribution of Students Compared with Distribution of Cadets, 1974 p. 228. Table 8I Block Syllabus for Non-Specialist Training, 1961 p. 229. Chapter 9 Table 9A ARA Manpower Allocation to the ACC, 1974 p. 245. Table 9B Trends in Defence Expenditure against GDP, 1975-82 p. 260. Table 9C Cadet Enrolments, 1975 & 1978 p. 264. Table 9D Falling ACC Numbers, 1973-82 p. 265. Table 9E Cadet JNCO Course Training Objectives, 1980 p. 270. Table 9F Cadet Warrant Officer & SNCO Course Training Objectives, 1980 p. 270. Chapter 10 Table 10A Breakdown of the ACC, 30 June 1989 p. 279. Table 10B Breakdown of the ACC, 30 October 1990 p. 285. Table 10C Strength of the ACC, 1989-95 p. 286. Table 10D Ex-Cadet Enlistees into the ARA, 1989-92 p. 288. Table 10E Defence Expenditure as a Percentage of GDP, 1983-95 p. 290. Chapter 11 Table 11A Cadet Wing Staff, September 1998 p. 308. Table 11B Strength of the ACC, 16 September 1998 p. 312. Table 11C Cadet Numbers by Region, 1997-2000 p. 312. Table 11D ACC Gender Distribution, 1995-99 p. 313. Table 11E ACC Gender Distribution in NSW, 1997-2001 p. 313. Table 11F AAC Strength and Manning, 31 March 2002 p. 328. Table 11G ACC/AAC Numbers, 2000-04 p. 328. Table 11H Defence Expenditure as a Percentage of GDP, 1996-2004 p. 329. Table 11I Typical Five Year Cadet Progression, 2001-04 p. 337. Table 11J Progression of Cadet Weapon Training, 2003 p. 340.

iv LIST OF FIGURES

Chapter 3 Figure 3A Syllabus of Training for the Senior Cadet First Aid Course, 1909 p. 64. Chapter 4 Figure 4A Examination for the Rank of 2nd Lieutenant, 1912 p. 92. Chapter 8 Figure 8A Organisational Structure of a Category C1 Cadet Unit, 1967 p. 210. Figure 8B ACC Organisation and Command Structure, 1974 p. 212. Figure 8C Block Syllabus for the First Appointment Course, 1958 p. 213. Figure 8D Impressions of Cadet Service, 1961 p. 230. Figure 8E Tactical Lessons within the Cadet Training Syllabus, 1961 p. 236. Chapter 9 Figure 9A Structure and Organisation of the ACC, 1980 p. 258. Figure 9B Cadet Unit Organisations, 1982 p. 259. Chapter 10 Figure 10A Organisation of the ACC, 1990 p. 284. Chapter 11 Figure 11A AAC Outline Organisation and Channels of Communication, 2001 p. 319. Figure 11B Command and Control Model of the AAC, 1 July 2002 p. 320. Figure 11C AAC Organisational Structure (Proposed), July 2004 p. 322. Chapter 12 Figure 12A The Rise and Fall of Cadet Movement 1904-2004 p. 348.

v ABBREVIATIONS

AAC Australian Army Cadets ACC Australian Cadet Corps ACRES-A Assistant Chief of the General Staff – Army Reserve ADF Australian Defence Force ADFA Australian Defence Force Academy ADFC Australian Defence Force Cadets AIF Australian Imperial Force AMF Australian Military Forces ANA Australian Natives Association APA Army Personnel Agency ARA Australian Regular Army ASCS Australian Services Cadet Scheme ATC Air Training Corps CA Chief of Army CDF Chief of the Defence Force CEP Cadet Enhancement Program CGS Chief of the General Staff CGSAC Chief of the General Staff Advisory Committee CHSP Cadets in High Schools Program CMCC Commonwealth Military Cadet Corps CMF Citizen Military Forces CO Commanding Officer COSC Chiefs of Services Committee CSU Cadet Support Unit DCGS Deputy Chief of the General Staff DDFC Directorate of Defence Force Cadets GDP Gross Domestic Product HQTC-A Headquarters Training Command – Army IOC Instructor of Cadets LSU Limited Support Unit MMG Medium Machine Gun NCO Non-commissioned Officer OACRES-A Office of the Assistant Chief of the General Staff – Army Reserve OC Officer Commanding OCC Officer Commanding Cadets OOC Officer of Cadets

vi

PIR Papua New Guinea Infantry Regiment PMF Permanent Military Forces PNG Papua New Guinea PNGVR Papua New Guinea Volunteer Rifles RCU Regional Cadet Unit RMC Royal Military College (Duntroon) RSL Returned and Services League RSM Regimental Sergeant Major SCO Senior Cadet Officer SBU School Based Unit SLR Self-loading Rifle SNCO Senior Non-commissioned officer SO2 Cadets Staff Officer Grade Two - Cadets SOC Staff Officer Cadets VDC Volunteer Defence Corps VYDP Victorian Youth Development Program WO Warrant Officer YAP Youth Action Program (Queensland)

vii Correct as at: 16 Dec 05

Word Count: 1,534 CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

Within Australian libraries, between bookshelves stacked with accounts of past military exploits and those lined with works on the history of education, there is something missing. For well over a century the story the army cadet movement, as a significant social institution with enduring implications for both the army and the secondary schooling sector, has been neglected. Since the 1860s hundreds of thousands of school-aged children have undergone military, pseudo-military and youth development training as part of various cadet schemes yet the historical record of this movement is small, scattered and insufficient.1 Specifically lacking is any unified attempt to chronicle their story across both time and space in a single narrative of 140 years. This thesis aims to close the historiographical gap by presenting a general history of the army cadet movement in Australia from 1866 to 2004.

The dearth of historical writing on the cadet movement in Australia is perplexing given the sheer number of past and present cadets and the importance placed upon the organisation over time by politicians, military officers, teachers, educational administrators and the public. Growing out of the practice of military ‘drill’ in schools, the first organised cadet unit was raised in 1866 and, after a listless beginning, colonial cadet organisations grew to a combined total of around 21,000 members by 1906. By 1911, on the eve of universal military service for all Australian

1 Depending on the thoroughness of the search, or the tenacity of the researcher, scattered accounts of individual army cadet units may be found. Some noteworthy examples are K.G. Mortensen, An Australian Army Cadet Unit 1945 – 1977 and David Cooper, Barker College Cadet Unit: 100 Year History 1900 – 2000. Beyond these deliberately narrow publications are articles of varying accuracy and intent concerning the movement at various stages of its history in professional military or educational periodicals like the Army Journal or School and Society. So too, incidental references to the army cadet story exist in a number of books concerned primarily with other aspects of Australian military history, while there are a few that focus on cadets within specific timeframes or locations. Prime examples are publications like John Barrett, Falling In, Australians and ‘Boy Conscription’ 1911-1915 and P.C. Candy, The Victorian Cadet Movement: An Outline History From 1867 to 1969. To round out the published sources concerning the army cadet movement in Australia are scattered articles that have appeared in newspaper clippings from the colonial era to the present; although these speak more of cadet-related issues of public interest rather than being representative of any scholarly attempt at history. Perhaps, if determined, one might unearth some unpublished dissertations dealing with certain aspects of the movement within specific timeframes. D.J. Jones, ‘The Military Use of State Schools 1872 – 1914’ and Craig Laffin, ‘The Australian Cadet Corps in Secondary Education’ are two appropriate examples. Unfortunately, however, this style of work has usually been shaped by educational rather than historical perspectives and practice.

1 males aged 14-25, there were more than 24,000 active army cadets under a voluntary Commonwealth scheme, while at the height of the compulsory era the figure approached 100,000. In 1939, immediately prior to the Second World War, the once again voluntary system held around 9,000 members with numbers growing to well over 22,000 by 1945. Following the war the movement swelled to more than 42,000 cadets in 1966 before settling at around 38,000 prior to the dramatic and unexpected disbandment of the entire organisation by the Whitlam Labor government in 1975. From the ashes of the old system a new cadet scheme emerged with 20,500 members in 1983 before slowly and painfully transforming itself to resemble the organisation of around 17,000 cadets of 2004.

The scale of the cadet system over time, in the context of a relatively small army and situated (for the most part) within secondary schools, serves to emphasise the importance of the movement in the military and educational heritage of the nation. Furthermore it is self-evident, given the proportion of eligible youth to have experienced cadethood in their formative years, that the movement has exerted a tangible and lasting influence upon Australian society. These considerations make the cadet organisation, as a nexus of military, educational and social history, an important object of study. This thesis is an account of the development of the army cadet system and therefore a foundation for further study. It is ‘input’ rather than ‘output’ oriented. It shows how and why the cadet movement has developed as it has over time rather than investigating its impact on Australian community, military or educational culture. Such analysis remains the subject of future research. Nor does this dissertation attempt to provide an account of the personal experiences of cadets or their staff. Although such human dimensions may well have provided colourful additions, the records and sources required to do so in any balanced way simply do not exist over the date range covered.

Throughout cadet history, four fundamental forces have shaped the structure and character of the movement. Two of these pressures are institutional while the other two are more general in nature. The first and most obvious player has been the army. From military traditions of ‘volunteerism’ that factored cadets into the defence and mobilisation plans of some nineteenth century colonies, ideas of cadet contributions to Australian citizen soldiery were entrenched up to the late 1920s.

2

From this point military considerations tended to focus upon the recruiting potential of the movement with a particular emphasis on manning the officer and non- commissioned officer corps of both the permanent and citizen forces. The army has always sought to make use of the cadet force for its own purposes; quite understandably given that it has traditionally borne the cost of the organisation. The second institutional influence on the cadet movement over time has been from ‘educationalists’ in state education departments or among bureaucrats, headmasters, teachers or any union thereof. Such individuals and groups have long sought to use cadets to further pedagogical, disciplinary or other educational ends. Again, given that the school structure has provided the physical setting of the movement for much of its history, this is no surprise. The enduring influence of the education system and teaching philosophies over time should not be underestimated. Superimposed upon these institutional considerations have been fluctuating social attitudes concerned with the moral, ethical, physical and attitudinal disposition of Australian youth. The movement’s history is steeped in rhetoric concerning character development issuing from political, religious, military, educational and parental sources. The key decisions made with respect to the cadet organisation have been made, and are made still, under the influence of such social constructs. The final feature or factor that has shaped the course of the army cadet system is more mundane: finance. Throughout its long history the movement has remained subject to the whims of economy such that when the coffers have been full and the government of the day generous then the organisation has thrived. When the fiscal situation has tightened the movement has suffered and, at times, been preyed upon by its military and educational patrons in the name of cost cutting. The relative dominance of each of these four foundation forces has changed through time and, on different occasions, they have pulled either in parallel or in disparate directions. Nonetheless, their relationships have always defined the cadet organisation. This thesis then, in describing the story of army cadets in Australia, is in many ways an extended exploration of their interplay.

Quite conveniently, given the aim of this thesis, the history of the cadet movement divides itself into discrete periods, usually around a decade or two in length, in which the organisation held a unique set of defining characteristics. With uncommon regularity, at the end of each era changes were wrought that reshaped the look and function of the cadet system. As a consequence, this dissertation is structured

3 chronologically and devotes a single chapter to each of the ten distinct period of its development.

It is, of course, beyond the scope of this thesis to attempt to record every aspect of the cadet movement since 1866. A number of key themes therefore describe what the movement has looked like, what it has done, and why, throughout its history. Running through each chapter, alongside unique issues or phenomena specific to the timeframe under investigation, are common issues of purpose, organisational structure, administration, leadership, material support and cadet training. In addition, connections between the fortunes of the movement and conservative politics, and the effect of a consistent state school/private school divide, are enduring themes. Such ideas link the chapters and provide common ground for tracing and describing the cadet story from one era to the next. Again, in all cases their analysis reveals the lasting influence of social, military, educational and financial factors in shaping the movement over time. These forces are the foundations of cadet history and the heart of this thesis.

Around 1800 years ago the ancient Greek philosopher, Diogenes Laertius, proclaimed that ‘the foundation of every state is the education of its youth.’ Since the 1860s the army cadet movement has played a considerable role in developing generations of young Australians. There is no doubt that its history is worthy of analysis.

4

Correct as at: 16 Dec 05

Word Count: 12,065 / 12,881 CHAPTER TWO

Colonial Genesis 1866 - 1905

The army cadet movement in Australia has a mid-nineteenth century genesis. This chapter begins by examining the conditions present in Australia in this era that encouraged the establishment of the earliest cadet units. Particular attention is paid to the role of school-based military drill in facilitating the development of these nascent detachments. It marks the physical founding of the movement in each colony before tracing the fortunes of the six disparate cadet systems within Australia to 1906, with a specific focus on the impact of the economic Depression of the 1890s. With this structural framework laid, attention moves to an investigation of cadet training and activities before concluding with a broad analysis of their underlying purpose.

Unlike the Australian army, the cadet organisation in this country did not descend directly from its British counterpart. Although predated by its English equivalent, the Australian movement developed independently, and concurrently, with it. In 1859 several prominent English Public Schools including Eton, Harrow, Winchester and Rugby, raised cadet detachments with the idea of supplementing the militia in the likelihood of clashes with the forces of Napoleon III who, it was feared, intended to pick up where his uncle left off at Waterloo. Such developments in England, building on residual fear of Russian attack inspired by the Crimean War (1854-56), had a degree of influence on the origins of the movement in the Australian colonies.1 Indeed, the example of British Regiments in Australia and military deployments like the Maori Wars (1860-64) also helped rouse an interest in cadets. Contemporary newspapers raised public consciousness of defence issues by debating the merits of the New Zealand deployment while at the same time graphically describing the novelty and festivity of troop departures.2 Equally, it is certain that

1 The Crimean War brought issues of security and defence to the forefront of public debate in the colonies. As the Sydney Morning Herald reported on 29 March 1856 ‘not even the elections can prevent the feelings of impatience and mortification at the long absence of news from escaping from every man’s lips … it is of great importance that we should have some knowledge of what is going on.’ Sydney Morning Herald (SMH), 29 March 1856. 2 The social impact of the Maori Wars on the Australian colonies should not be underestimated. Over 2,400 volunteers were sent from NSW, Victoria, Tasmania and Queensland to fight in Waikato and Taranaki in 1863-64 alone. The experience represented the first major taste of military recruitment in Australia and debate over the deployments in the colonial press was significant. The Sydney Morning Herald maintained consistent support for the deployment reporting, in August 1863, that the ‘law of

5 distinctly Australian social developments, such as the popularity of rifle shooting competitions in the colonies, also helped encourage the founding of cadet units. Ultimately, a key factor in promoting the establishment of the movement was the introduction of military drill into the curricula of many schools, both elementary and secondary, from the late 1850s onwards. With an active drill program the step to the formation of true cadet detachments in many schools was a small one.3 Finally, of particular importance, was the appointment of headmasters to prominent private schools in the colonies, men who believed earnestly in the moral aims of the British Public School system ‘to produce boys fit to take leadership in a Christian State and Empire’ which, tacitly at least, made them more than receptive to the concept of cadets.4 From the very beginning, therefore, before any cadet units had been raised, three of the four forces that would come to define the movement were active in laying its foundations. Military, social and educational factors converged to facilitate the establishment of colonial cadets.

The study of the origins of the cadet movement in Australia is complicated by the requirement to first define the difference between the terms ‘cadet’ and ‘drill’. Certainly the latter was used as early as the 1850s, and quite extensively prior to Federation, in most colonies to describe a section of the school syllabus that demanded pupils perform certain prescribed movements of the body. Usually these actions were executed simultaneously by a class directed by a teacher, and often resembled military manoeuvres. In NSW this drill was copied directly from British army training manuals but, generally speaking, it was concerned with educational or physical outcomes rather than military instruction. Messers Johnson and Allpass, inspectors for the NSW Council of Education in 1871, wrote that ‘the introduction of military drill into our schools during the year cannot fail to raise the character of the

self-preservation will justify the use of all means in its power.’ The Argus in Melbourne, however, had an alternate point of view in that ‘Victoria is giving to New Zealand what she can very ill afford.’ A war of words between the tabloids ensued which fuelled already considerable levels of public interest. Indicative of such attention, at the departure of 409 Victorians on 1 September 1863, the Argus described Spencer Street Station as ‘crowded during the morning with people, desirous of seeing the volunteers start.’ SMH, 15 August 1863; Argus, 20 August 1863, & 1 September 1863. 3 Candy, P.C., The Victorian Cadet Movement: An Outline History from 1867 to 1969, P.C. Candy, Melbourne, 1969, p. 24-3 & Kitney, P., ‘The History of the Australian School Cadet Movement to 1893’, in Defence Force Journal, No 12, September-October, 1978, p. 53. 4 Kitney, ‘Australian School Cadet Movement’, p. 54.

6 students … schools now show a more even and a more healthy discipline.’5 Such drill, then, had a military ancestry but did not have a military rationale. Indeed, the use of the term drill in this context became obsolete by the late 1920s, transforming into ‘Physical Training’, ‘Physical Culture’ and ‘Physical Education’.

The definition of the term ‘cadets’ during the colonial period, at least for the purpose of this thesis, goes significantly further than that encompassed by ‘drill’. Commonly, cadet training had a military function of some sort and cadets were arranged as ‘corps’, ‘units’ or ‘detachments’ along military lines. These units were, in theory, permanent and consisted of groups of boys voluntarily engaging on a part-time basis in basic military activities. They were expected to wear a uniform, usually at their own expense, and were provided with weapons and equipment by the colonial military authorities. They were formally recognised by the government, and in many cases were actually considered to be a part of the volunteer defence forces which, after 1870 and apart from the Royal Navy, were the colonies’ only means of defence. Such a distinction will be applied throughout this chapter. The two terms were not, however, entirely independent. In many cases military drill was a precursor to true cadet units and the depth of its influence must, therefore, be taken into account.

The presence of drill in Australian schools from the mid-nineteenth century provided a powerful military and educational stimulus for the colonial cadet movement. Victoria provided a useful example of the origins of this activity when, in 1851, a sergeant-major of the British 12th Regiment stationed in Australia began to drill boys at Scotch College. Seven years later the headmaster of the state high school at Korong wrote to the Chief Secretary of the Victorian Military Forces and suggested that schoolboys be instructed in the military art as ‘a form of outdoor amusement’. He went on to propose that with a mere four hours training per week, the boys of Victoria could form the nucleus of a fine militia force.6 In 1867 Ballarat College began to exercise its boys in military drill and the activity proved so successful that the headmaster included it in the curriculum, reporting that ‘for the last few months all of

5 NSW Legislative Assembly Votes and Proceedings (NSW L.A. V&P), 1872, Report of the Minister of Public Instruction for the Year 1871, p. 230. 6 Candy, Victorian Cadet Movement, p. 24-3.

7 the boys have been regularly trained.’7 The Victorian Board of Education strongly encouraged the subject and reported in 1870 that ‘military drill is becoming more general in the schools, and is found to be an important aid to discipline. We attach much importance to this subject, and shall not fail to see if anything can be done to extend it’8 The Victorian example was mirrored in the other colonies with minor variations of style. The advent and growth of military drill was an important early step towards the establishment of a cadet movement in Australia.

Throughout the 1870s, as the first true cadet units consolidated themselves in NSW and Queensland, the educational expectations and military characteristics of school-based drill continued to underpin them, while working to lay the foundations of the movement in the other colonies. Drill was made compulsory in NSW state schools in 1870, and in late 1872 the NSW Council for Education directed teachers take formal instruction in order to properly drill their students.9 In Victoria, it was made a mandatory school subject under the Education Act (1872).10 The colony’s Military Commandant, Colonel W. A. Anderson, even produced a Manual of Drill at the request of the Education Department for issue to all Victorian schools.11 The creation of the Queensland Education Department in 1875 entrenched military-style drill in that colony’s schools while in the same year it was listed as a compulsory subject when universal education was introduced to South Australia.12 The Grote Street Model School in Adelaide recorded an excellence in drill in 1877 that was ‘strictly carried out in all departments.’ Although in actual fact a drill team, the school claimed for itself a ‘cadet corps of fifty that could perform all ordinary drill with arms, including skirmishing.’ 13

7 Ballarat College, The Minervan, 1973, p. 36, & Kitney, Australian School Cadet Movement, pp. 55- 56. 8 Department of Defence, Journal of the Australian Cadet Corps (Cadet Journal), No 2, 1951, pp. 48- 49. 9 Jones, D.J., The Military Use of State Schools 1872 – 1914, Thesis (PhD), La Trobe University, pp. 186 & 192. 10 ibid., p. 95. 11 Victorian Parliamentary Papers (VPP), 1876, Vol 3, Report of the Minister for Public Instruction 1875-76, p. x. 12 Qld Legislative Assembly Votes and Proceedings (Qld L.A. V&P), 1888, Vol 2, Part 1, Report of the Board of General Education for the year 1888, p. 106; South Australian Parliamentary Papers (SAPP), 1877, Vol 2, Report of the Council of Education, 1876, Appendix A, p. 12, & SAPP, 1882, Vol 2, Progress Report on the Commission on the Working of the Education Acts, p. 228. 13 Later to become Adelaide High School. Thiele, C., Grains of Mustard Seed, Department of Education, South Australia, 1975, p. 24.

8 The cadet movement continued to be anchored to a social, military and educational investment in school-based drill in all colonies throughout the 1880s. In Victoria in 1884, on the cusp of the formation of the first cadet units in that colony, military-style drill was thriving with 195 qualified instructors training 11,464 students. Its importance to the movement in Victoria, even after a cadet scheme was formally inaugurated, was clear with the officers in charge of the new Victorian cadet organisation, Major W.H. Snee and Lieutenant D.L. Henry, appointed as Inspectors of Military Drill in Victorian schools with or without cadet units in 1888.14 There was no doubt that in creating a Victorian cadet system the Minister of Defence, Lieutenant Colonel F.T. Sargood, was reacting to the extensive institutionalisation and success of drill programs within Victorian schools.15

Even in the Depression and post-Depression periods (1891-1905) school- based drill influenced the development of the movement, particularly in Tasmania, South Australia and Western Australia. Although cadet units grew independently from Education Department control in Tasmania, from 1885 drill was taught in Tasmanian schools by military instructors and teachers. In South Australia in the 1890s school- based drill, mimicking military parade ground manoeuvres, remained a key mechanism to promote school and individual discipline. It became virtually universal in the colony’s state schools and continued to set conditions conducive to the establishment of true cadet units.16 In Western Australia the advancement of a cadet system was very closely allied to the existence of school-based military drill. Compulsory drill was ingrained from the days of British direct rule, and even after self-government was attained it was a requirement in all state schools where there were a sufficient number of boys to make it practical. At least one Western Australian parliamentarian believed that such drill would provide the required basis for a true cadet movement, since well-drilled schoolboys could ‘be worked into a cadet corps and become the defenders of their country later on.’17 At the same time, however, it is also important to recognise that this period marked the last in which such drill exerted

14 VPP, 1877-78, Vol 2, Report of the Minister for Public Instruction for the Year 1876-77, p. x.; VPP 1889, Vol 4, Report of the Minister for Public Instruction for the Year 1888-89, pp. xxii-xxiii; & VPP 1883-84, Vol 2, Report of the Minister for Public Instruction for the Year 1876-77, pp x-xii. 15 Jones, Military Use of State Schools, p. 116. 16 Department of Education (South Australia), Education Gazette, Government Printer, September 1890, p. 37. 17 Western Australian Minutes, Votes and Proceedings of the Parliament (WA M.V&P), 1890-91, Report of the Commandant of the Local Forces of Western Australia for the Year 1889, p. 5.

9 significant influence over the cadet movement. As the 1890s drew to a close a move away from traditional military drill towards ‘physical education’ was evident in many Australian schools. From 1900 there are reports of schools replacing their drill with calisthenics and by 1905 it was being referred to directly as physical training in a number of states. In this way the long-term marriage of drill and cadets was finally broken.18

It was to the backdrop of the enduring social, military and educational influence of school-based drill that the first true cadet units appeared in each of the colonies. The earliest mention of any force potentially resembling cadets was a listing in the South Australian Government Gazette of 4 December 1862 which gave the results of a rifle shooting competition for units of the South Australian Military Forces. The entry listed two privates competing for the ‘Cadet Rifles’. Unfortunately, no collaborating evidence is available to confirm the existence or nature of this organisation, and the competitors may well have been nothing more than under aged shooters.19 The honour, therefore, of being the first unit to be raised on Australian soil must go to the St Mark’s Collegiate School (later The King’s School), at Macquarie Fields, Sydney. St Mark’s headmaster, Reverend G.F. Macarthur, who had previously been an army chaplain, was the originator and driving force behind the initiative. He had been at the school for six years when one of his masters, William Dalmas, upon returning from an overseas visit, told him of the cadet corps that had very recently sprung up in the private schools of England. Dalmas brought an enthusiasm for cadets back to the school and passed it quickly to his headmaster who instituted a corps with the approval of the colony’s military establishment on 29 March 1866.20

Reinforcing the social function of the original St Mark’s unit, christened ‘The Macquarie Fields Corps’, was its first public parade to commemorate the ‘Queens Birthday’ in 1866 with 39 cadets marching through the streets of Sydney.21 Bolstering the infant unit’s public popularity, in an atmosphere of general lawlessness in the early 1860s, was the belief that cadet training could instil Christian ethics and values

18 Report of the Minister of Education (SA) (1906). State Records of South Australia (SRSA), Series GRG18/93, Item Unit Id 2 & 3. 19 South Australian Government Gazette, 4 December 1862, p. 1007. 20 Bean, C.E.W., Here, My Son, Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1950, p. 56. 21 Bromham, K.W., ‘A Brief History of the School Cadet Corps in New South Wales – The First Forty Years’, MEd Thesis, University of Sydney, 1968, p. 13.

10 in colonial youth. Such an idea was promoted by an incident involving four brothers from Parramatta aged between 15 and 21 who were subject to a kidnap attempt by Ben Hall’s gang for the purpose of coercing a pardon from the colonial authorities. The boys managed to beat off their attackers and became heroes. They had all been members of the Parramatta Volunteers and St Mark’s shooting team and attributed their survival to their military training. This unlikely incident helped to ignite the movement in NSW.22 The creation of the first true cadet unit in Australia was inspired, therefore, by a clear convergence between educational, military and social considerations.

It was not long before these three factors exerted their influence beyond NSW. In 1867 a composite cadet unit was raised in Melbourne by the then Captain F.T. Sargood, Commanding Officer of the Victorian Volunteer Artillery, who was given responsibility for raising a body of cadets from Victorian secondary schools to assist in the reception of Prince Alfred, the Duke of Edinburgh.23 Sargood’s efforts marked the first attempt at an organised cadet force in Victoria. Although All Saints Grammar School and Wesley College were the only schools to respond with enthusiasm, their detachments were well prepared and on the occasion marched to the corner of St Kilda and Sandridge Roads for the honour of being the first military formation to salute the Duke as he entered Melbourne.24 Unfortunately this unit evaporated almost immediately, but for this early initiative Sargood would later be known as ‘the father of cadets.’

In Queensland the first cadet units appeared in 1870, at a time when British troops were withdrawing from the colony and as Europe seemed to be heading for a general war. Unfortunately these early detachments languished for want of official sanction or support. The Brisbane Grammar School unit, for example, was disbanded in 1874 and remained dormant until a more determined effort saw it re-raised as a volunteer cadet corps with a strength of 50 in 1878.25 Meanwhile, a number of other scattered cadet detachments struggled to survive in Queensland as the 1870s drew to a

22 Cummins, B., ‘TKS Lads Beat Feared Hall Gang in Running Gunfight’, Parramatta Advertiser, 19 March 1975. 23 Candy, Victorian Cadet Movement, pp. 24-2 & 24-3. 24 ibid. 25 Kitney, Australian School Cadet Movement, p. 54.

11 close. The most notable of these were small cadet companies attached to Brisbane and Toowoomba based adult volunteer units.26

In Tasmania the cadet movement gained a foothold in 1883 when the headmaster of Launceston Church Grammar School requested permission from the Military Commandant, Lieutenant Colonel W.V. Legge, to raise a detachment of between 45 and 50 boys. The unit was inaugurated, attached to the Launceston Volunteer Rifle Regiment, run by an officer and drilled by an NCO of that unit.27 In 1884 it was recognised by the Tasmanian government and voted a sum of 50s to outfit its members with uniforms, with arms and other equipment provided by the military.28 Legge commented in 1886 that this unit ‘respond[ed] well to the call of their Commanding Officer, Major Aikenhead, and mustered fifty-five when marched into camp. Their conduct was, on the whole, good and they bore the hardships of camp life very well.’29

Self-government was granted to Western Australia in 1890 and the colony’s Military Commandant, Lieutenant Colonel W.G. Phillmore, immediately signalled military support for cadets. In his final report of 1891, before the removal of permanent Military Commandants from the colony, Phillmore was firm in his conviction ‘that the government would do well to encourage, as much as possible, the formation of cadet corps’ as he saw such a movement as achieving social ends as well as supplementing the volunteer forces, but despite his call no units were actually raised for another four years.30 In 1895, with 112 of the 154 state schools in Western Australia conducting military drill, the new Commandant, Lieutenant Colonel Alex Wilson, again called for a cadet corps, suggesting a dual ‘Junior’ and a ‘Senior’ cadet scheme involving both the military and education systems. The former would be located within schools and the latter attached to volunteer units. This time a response

26 Units referred to by the ‘Scratchley Report.’ The report was memorandum written by Colonel Peter Scratchley for the Colonial Secretary with a number of proposals for the Queensland Defence Force. Pixley, N., ‘Queensland – One Hundred Years of Defence’, in Royal Historical Society of Queensland Journal, September 1959, p. 102. 27 Correspondence, Aikenhead to Legge (1883). Archives Office of Tasmania (AOT) Series CSD13, Item 67/1155. 28 Notes on the history of the cadet corps in Tasmania. Headquarters Australian Army Cadets (HQ AAC) File 123/1/32. 29 ibid. 30 WA M.V&P, 1890-91, Report of the Commandant of the Local Forces of Western Australia for the Year 1889, p. 5.

12 was forthcoming, and by 1897 Wilson controlled 212 Junior Cadets and 90 Senior Cadets enrolled in units in Perth and Fremantle.31

True cadets at last appeared in South Australia in 1899 as the final consequence of a long history of school-based drill and stimulated by the patriotic and martial feeling aroused by the Boer War. Thanks to the agitation of Lieutenant Hugo Leschen, teacher and a part-time military officer, a small battalion of cadets was organised around a nucleus of Prince Alfred College and St Peter’s College students and officered by old boys of the two schools who accepted volunteer commissions. With the moral backing of the colonial military, which extended to the provision of weapons and waist belts, the new battalion was described by the Acting Military Commandant, Colonel John Stuart, as having attained by the end of 1899 a ‘fair degree of proficiency’ with a strength of 232 cadets.32 In 1900 the unit invited a number of ‘old boy’ university students to join under the command of Leschen's brother, Lieutenant William Leschen, and from this point ‘A’ (University) Company marched alongside of ‘B’ Company (St Peter’s) and ‘C’ Company (Prince Alfred).33 The life of the South Australian cadet battalion was, however, short lived for when the various colonial military forces were handed over to Commonwealth control in 1901 no provision whatsoever was made in South Australia for a continuance of cadets. The organisation passed away only to be remembered as ‘that splendid battalion … bright while it shone; what a pity its spark went out.’34

Having examined the conditions that encouraged the founding of the cadet movement, noting the particular importance of school-based drill, and after identifying the first appearance of true cadet units in each colony, it is possible to analyse the early development of the various colonial cadet schemes in terms of a single theme. Harmony between competing military, educational, social and financial forces defined the fortunes of the colonial cadet organisations from their inception. Where it was achieved the movement thrived but, conversely, with disharmony came disappointment. In NSW, following the establishment of the St Mark’s unit in 1866,

31 WA M.V&P, 1897, Report of the Commandant of the Local Forces of Western Australia for 1897, p. 4. 32 SAPP, 1900, Vol. 2, Report of the Military Acting Commandant for the Year 1899-1900, pp. 3-4. 33 Horner, D. M., Prince Alfred College Cadet Unit: Extracts from Unit History, Prince Alfred College, Adelaide, 1964, p. 3. 34 Gibbs, R.M., A History of Prince Alfred College, Peacock Publications, Kent Town, 1984, p. 137.

13 and buttressed by a continuing environment of positive military, social and educational attitudes, cadets prospered. Camden College in Newtown, Sydney formed a unit in 1868 (although the detachment was disbanded when the school was forced to relocate in 1876). It was quickly followed by Newington College in 1869 and Sydney Grammar School in 1870, where a unit of 79 cadets was raised, making it the largest in the colony, and whose membership rapidly grew to over 200. In this case the headmaster, the 26 year old A.B. Weigall, led the detachment and convened regular marches along College Street in Sydney as well as initiating a range of cadet concerts and camps. Reiterating his educational aspirations for the unit, in 1871 Weigall reported that ‘the corps has tended in no small way to enhance the general good feeling amongst the boys, and to strengthen their attachment to the school.’35 Importantly for the embryonic cadet movement in NSW, the colonial military forces gave both moral and bureaucratic backing to units and acknowledged them by way of Volunteer Force Brigade Orders. One such order of 15 November 1870, for example, decreed that

His Excellency the Governor having been pleased on behalf of Her Majesty to accept the services of the pupils of the Sydney Grammar School for the formation of a Volunteer Cadet Corps, the same is taken on the strength of the Volunteer Force in New South Wales from the 12th instant inclusive.36

From 1871, still enjoying broad-based support, the cadet movement in NSW underwent rapid expansion with the number of cadets rising from fewer than 200 in 1870, to 850 by the end of the following year. The private school cadet force grew to include detachments from country areas when, in 1878, a unit at All Saints College in Bathurst was raised. So too, the early 1870s, coinciding with the premiership of Henry Parkes and his commitment to public education, saw government-run schools begin to show an interest.37 Despite their late start, in quick time the state schools of NSW came to dominate the movement in the colony. The distinction, however, of being the first state school unit is a little ambiguous. On 27 September 1872, when the

35 Bean, Here, My Son, p. 119. 36 Sydney Grammar School, The Sydneian, 1957, p. 48. 37 Henry Parkes stood for Parliament and was elected for the seat of East Sydney on 10 June 1859 on a platform that included the extension of state education. In 1866 he introduced The Public Schools Act whose provision for teacher training marked a significant advance in educational methods. A Council of Education was formed and for the first four years after the passing of the Act Parkes filled the office of president. Despite fears expressed by some religious bodies the Act worked well and many new schools were established across the colony.

14 headmaster of ‘Sauchie House’, the predecessor of Maitland Boys’ High School, was granted a Commission as a captain in the Royal NSW Volunteer Rifles he was permitted to raise the Sauchie House Detachment of that unit. The school and its cadet unit, however, were only taken over by the government, and thus made truly public, in 1883.38 The honour therefore must go to Fort Street Model School when it formed a detachment in 1873. Almost immediately Fort Street was followed by Paddington House and Lyceum Schools while a Cleveland Street School unit came into being soon afterwards.39

An organisation known as the NSW Public School Cadets was tentatively born when the Fort Street unit appeared publicly for the first time at a field day on the occasion of the Queen’s birthday in 1873. In August of the same year 240 cadets of this fledgling organisation paraded in Sydney and as a result many more state school units began to spring up in the city and the surrounding areas.40 In 1874, detachments were formed at Orange and Mudgee and by 1875 Liverpool, Parramatta and Richmond High Schools all had their own units. In the following year cadets appeared at Newcastle Superior Public School, and there is evidence of a number of state school detachments competing in shooting competitions in and around Sydney at the time.41

NSW colonial authorities of the 1870s permitted the expansion of the cadet force in state schools on the strict understanding that it would not cost them anything beyond the issue of weapons and limited quantities of ammunition. Despite this frugal attitude, support from teachers and students strengthened and by 1873 2,000 boys were enrolled in the Public School Cadets.42 Such growth necessitated an effort to impose an administrative structure over the almost autonomous state school units, and Frederick Bridges, a teacher at Fort Street, took it upon himself to assume the management of the organisation. Predictably, he was soon overwhelmed and a meeting of teachers was subsequently called to rectify issues of command and

38 Maitland Boys High School, Submission 433 to the Committee of Inquiry, in Laffin, C.A., ‘The Australian Cadet Corps in Secondary Education’, Thesis (M.Ed. Hons.), University of Sydney, Appendix 2, p. 289. 39 Kitney, Australian School Cadet Movement, p. 55. 40 SMH, 5 August 1873. 41 Kitney, Australian School Cadet Movement, p. 55, & Horan, R.S., Fort Street, Honeysett Publications, Leichardt, NSW, 1989, pp. 69-70. 42 Jones, Military Use of State Schools, p. 191.

15 administration. The meeting recommended handing control to Lieutenant Colonel J.S. Richardson, the Military Commandant, and that a permanent military officer, Lieutenant H.W. Strong, be placed in command of the Public School Cadets. Richardson agreed and Strong was immediately appointed as Commanding Officer.43 Although the transfer of responsibility was an administrative necessity it had the important effect of placing the future of the force in the hands of army officers rather than teachers. Nevertheless, the growth of the cadet movement in NSW in the period 1866-73 was characterised by cooperation and success. It was a balance, however, that proved impossible to sustain.

Equally indicative of the importance of harmony between military, educational, social and financial pressures was the establishment and development of the Victorian cadet organisation. Between 1883-86, the Premier of Victoria, James Service, was responsible for stimulating a range of military affairs in his colony, including cadets. He set up a Ministry and Council of Defence and appointed Lieutenant Colonel F.T. Sargood to the post of Minister for Defence, a crucial move with respect to the Victorian cadet movement. The new Minister, with cadet experience from 1867 and at the same time conscious of developments in NSW, resolved to create a cadet system in Victoria. In 1884, as Minister for both Defence and Education, he called a meeting of the principals of colleges and prominent head teachers of state schools for this purpose. Sargood hastily approved the resolutions of this committee and in doing so the ‘Victorian Volunteer Cadet Corps’ was inaugurated with its first units gazetted on the 23 January 1885.44

A second committee was formed to administer the new Victorian cadet organisation but, as had been the case in NSW, it soon became apparent that the expanding scheme was beyond its ability to manage and the Department of Defence was asked to take control.45 In August 1885 all Victorian cadets were officially placed under the command of the colony’s Military Commandant, Lieutenant Colonel H.S.

43 Memo, Deputy Chief Inspector to Commandant, dated 10 July 1889. State Records of NSW (SRNSW), Series CGS3038, Item 20/12655. 44 The very first unit gazetted was the Golden Square State School Cadet Unit and among the first six detachments listed were four state schools from Bendigo. Kitney, Australian School Cadet Movement, p. 56, & Henry, D.L., ‘The Victorian Cadet System’, in Journal of the Royal United Services Institute, Vol 3, No 7, December 1894, pp. 5-6. 45 Henry, Victorian Cadet System, pp. 5-6.

16 Brownrigg.46 Although the military assumed responsibility for the Corps the Department of Education, in whose schools the majority of units existed, remained intimately involved. This potentially awkward duality resolved itself in 1891 when Sargood again held both portfolios. His tenure guaranteed a spirit of compromise and cooperation which, as was the case in NSW up to 1873, underpinned the success of the movement. 47

A second fortunate circumstance for the Victorian cadet movement was the strong support provided by Lieutenant Colonel Brownrigg, whose assistance allowed cadet regulations to be framed, published and gazetted in 1886, followed by standing orders in 1889.48 These instructions detailed a dual structure consisting of Junior Cadet units situated in secondary schools, and Senior Cadet detachments affiliated with adult militia units. The implementation of these instructions represents the first effectively administered cadet force in Australia, and as such warrants a deeper investigation. The Victorian Defence Department appointed a full-time cadet staff consisting of two officers; Major W.H. Snee as Commanding Officer and Lieutenant J.C. Hoad as Adjutant.49 With such foundations and characterised by harmony between military, educational, social and financial factors, the movement in Victoria thrived. By the 30 June 1885 it boasted 1,850 members and 47 Junior Cadet units.50 Table 2A shows how these units were organised.

46 Candy, Victorian Cadet Movement, p. 24-10. 47 Daley, C., ‘The Story of the Victorian Junior Cadet Corps (1855 - 1912)’, in The Victorian Historical Magazine, Vol 20, No 1, June 1943, p. 17. 48 ibid., pp. 18 -21. 49 Lieutenant Hoad latter became a Major General and the Commonwealth Military Force’s first Inspector General. He was a rival of the famous Major General William Throsby Bridges and a significant military figure in Australia prior to the First World War. ACC Journal, No 2, 1951, p. 51. 50 This figure represented 40 per cent of the number in the adult soldiers in the colony. Daley, Victorian Junior Cadet Corps, pp. 18-21.

17 Table 2A - Organisation of the Victorian Volunteer Cadet Corps, 1886

1st Battalion 2nd Battalion 3rd Battalion 4th Battalion 5th Battalion Independent Units Castlemaine State Melbourne C of E Geelong College Caulfield Ballarat Central Warrnambool School Grammar School Grammar State School Grammar Taradale State All Saints Geelong C of E Brighton East State Ballarat East State Belfast State School Grammar Grammar School School School Castlemaine Scotch College Geelong State South Yarra State Grenville College Warrnambool Grammar School School State School Sandhurst State Wesley College Geelong South Prahran State St Arnaud State Chiltern State School State School School School School Golden Square Queens College Flinders State Carlton State Carisbrook State Beechworth State State School School School School School Gravel Hill State Alma Road Carlton Grammar Maryborough State School Grammar School Eagle Hawk State St James Grammar Kings College, Urquart State School Fitzroy School Sandhurst Central St Kilda State Ararat State & East State School School Schools Echuca State Stawell State School School Kangaroo Flat State School

Source: Candy, P.C., The Victorian Cadet Movement, pp. 24-28.

In terms of organisational structure, Junior detachments were permitted at any school with at least 20 boys prepared to obtain the proper uniform, who were of the required age and height, and where a teacher was qualified to act as the officer in charge or where the services of non-commissioned officers (NCOs) of the Permanent (Military) Staff were available for at least one hour a week.51 Indicative of solid financial commitment, the government provided rifles and ammunition to these detachments at a subsidised rate with units formed for administrative purposes into companies and battalions.52 Representing a successful integration of the military and educational systems, Junior Cadet battalions were commanded by captains appointed

51 In Colleges and Grammar schools no boy could join under the age of 12 while in state schools, due to the tendency for boys to leave at younger ages thus limiting the pool of potential recruits, cadets below this age were allowed so long as they were physically fit and taller than 4ft 6in. From 1890 these rules were changed to a minimum age of 12 years in state schools and 13 years in private schools. Although cadets could remain a part of their detachment after leaving school up until the age of 19 years few did so for two reasons. First, after the introduction of Senior Cadet units there was little incentive and second, as the minimum age for enlistment in the colony’s militia was 17 years, and given the fact that two years service in the Cadet Corps abrogated the need for militia recruit training, most chose to enlist in the adult service rather than continuing in their old cadet units upon leaving school. In any case, no cadet could stay in the corps without parental consent or after the age of 19 years. Victorian Volunteer Cadet Corps Revised Standing Orders (p. 3.). Commonwealth Record Service (CRS), Series A1194, Item 20.42/6623. 52 Department of Defence (Victorian), Standing Orders for Instructions Together with Regulations for Victorian Volunteer Cadet Corps, Government Printer, 1887, pp. 4 & 17-20.

18 by the Commandant, while teachers qualified as drill instructors were commissioned as lieutenants and appointed as Officers Commanding individual cadet units. Sargood, in his capacity as both Minister for Defence and Education, formed classes of military instruction for teachers who wished to become cadet officers and over 400 availed themselves in the first year. Within individual units NCOs were appointed from cadets considered ‘intelligent, smart and respected by their comrades’ after they had passed requisite examinations.53 A Victorian Junior Cadet company in 1890 was manned by three lieutenants, one colour sergeant, three sergeants, four corporals, one bugler and 60 cadets (four of whom could be lance corporals if required) with officers and NCOs allocated on a pro-rata basis.54 Under these well-organised structural arrangements, during 1886-87 Junior Cadet numbers swelled from 1,850 to 3,404.55

The formation of Senior Cadet units in Victoria was further evidence of military commitment driven by a perceived need to connect the junior system with the colony’s militia. The first class for the military instruction of older boys was held at Toorak and consisted of a group of 40 who had recently left school. This was followed by similar groups at North Melbourne, Brunswick, and West Melbourne and in 1888 these four detachments, about 180 strong, were recognised by the government and formed the nucleus of the Senior Cadets.56 From this point, Senior Cadet units (with a minimum of 20 members) were formed by motivated militia officers from boys between 15-20 years of age who were taller than 5ft 4in. They were attached directly to adult units.57 Senior Cadets who were older than 17, were recommended by their Commanding Officer, and who had served for more than a year, were encouraged to enrol in any corps of militia with minimal extra training.58 By 1890 Victoria possessed eight Senior Cadet detachments, formed into companies, under the mantle of a single battalion.59

53 ibid., & Victorian Volunteer Cadet Corps Revised Standing Orders (1889) (pp. 19-20.). CRS A1194, Item 20.42/6623. 54 ibid., p. 6. 55 Henry, Victorian Cadet System, p. 8. 56 Daley, Victorian Junior Cadet Corps, p. 22. 57 Victorian Volunteer Cadet Corps Revised Standing Orders (1889) (p. 7.). CRS A1194, Item 20.42/6623. 58 ibid. 59 Candy, Victorian Cadet Movement, p. 24-11.

19 It is worth reinforcing the point, before this examination turns from the Victorian example, that the whole system, even though it was run out of the Department of Defence, was in many ways underpinned by the cooperation of the Department of Education. The Victorian Inspectors of Education, for example, were deeply involved from the beginning which minimised friction between the two departments. They regularly acted as cadet battalion commanders and thereby solved the question of educational versus military seniority for teacher-officers. One of the first, W.M. Gamble, went on to become the commander of all Victorian cadets when a national cadet system was established in 1906. As far as the cadet movement was concerned, the Inspectors were ‘all in favour of its extension’ and provided a strong and consistent impetus. 60 Under such circumstances the Victorian cadet force reached a strength of over 4,000 by the end of 1891.61

The importance of military, educational, social and fiscal harmony, embodied by success for the cadet movement in NSW up to 1873 and in Victoria from 1885 was mirrored in the other colonies. The movement stagnated in Queensland until 1889 when educational and military figures at last committed themselves. Frustrated at the slow growth in cadet numbers, the Queensland Military Commandant, Lieutenant Colonel G.A. French, called for the involvement of the Education Department by encouraging teachers to form cadet units at state schools.62 The Department responded enthusiastically to the Commandant’s call. Many Queensland teachers availed themselves of classes in drill instruction offered by the military and new cadet units began appearing in many of the colony’s state schools. The organisation that resulted was known as the Queensland State School Cadet Force, established quite deliberately along the lines as its NSW equivalent. One significant difference, however, was that unlike NSW (from 1884), but in imitation of the Victorian scheme, the Queensland force came under the control of the Department of Defence rather than the Education Department. As a consequence of newfound commitment by military and educational authorities, the State School Cadet Force flourished in

60 VPP, 1891, Vol 4, Report of the Minister for Public Instruction for the Year 1890-91, p. xx, Appendix D(2), & VPP 1901, Vol 3, Report of the Minister for Public Instruction for the Year 1900- 01, Appendix C, p. 47. 61 Henry, Victorian Cadet System, p. 11. 62 Qld L.A. V&P, 1889, Vol 1, Report of the Commandant of the Queensland Defence Force, 1888-89, p. 2.

20 metropolitan areas before spreading into the countryside, such that by June 1890 it included 597 cadets training in eight regional areas in addition to Brisbane.63

In February 1903 the original military-administered Western Australian cadet system was supplanted by an entirely new and fundamentally different scheme. The Western Australian Public School Cadet Force was raised, again in imitation of the NSW scheme, and again with educational support central to the organisations’ success. Captain H.J. Hunt, of the Education Department, was appointed as Inspector of Cadets to oversee the new system, and throughout its lifetime the cost of the scheme was borne by his Department. Teacher and student response to the new organisation was overwhelming, with 1,208 cadets enrolling in 27 schools within the first twelve months of operation. With sound military, educational and financial foundations the Western Australian Public School Cadet Force remained vigorous up to 1905, at which time it held 1,310 cadets representing a total of 46 per cent of the eligible male age group.64

As success for the various colonial cadet systems was marked by cooperation between military, educational, social and financial factors, so too disharmony among them characterised its failures. The prime example of such destructive dissonance was the NSW Public School Cadet organisation in the period 1873-89 as military and educational authorities ceasing to collaborate effectively in the face of increasing financial pressure. After initially supporting the idea of cadets, the Commandant, Lieutenant Colonel Richardson, slowly came to revise his opinion in the years following 1873, and a bureaucratic battle unfolded with the Education Council over who would continue to command, administer and pay for the cadet organisation. Eventually Richardson came to support the ‘doing away with the Cadet Corps’ and would have seen them replaced by a ‘general system of drill instruction in the public schools.’65 It is likely that he became unenthusiastic about the concept of cadets, as a continuing embodiment of traditional notions of volunteerism, at a time when he was attempting to promote the idea of a militia force in NSW. The military was also short of money and as a result Richardson recommended in 1876 that cadet commissions be

63 Qld L.A. V&P, 1890, Vol 3, Report of the Secretary of Public Instruction for the Year Ending 31 December 1889, p. 278. 64 WA M.V&P, 1906, Vol 2, Report of the Secretary for Education for the Year 1905, p. 71.

21 cancelled and that the Council for Education appoint its own cadet supervisors. The next year the Commandant campaigned for the salary of the Officer Commanding the force, Lieutenant Strong, to be paid by the Council, and recommended that all cadet responsibilities be transferred to the Department of Public Instruction. These moves were not welcomed by the Council of Education which, up to that point, had pointedly refused to acknowledge that the cadet force fell within its mandate. Although it was not until January 1884 that Cabinet officially ordered the transfer of cadet responsibilities from the military to the educational authorities, the whole episode was representative of the destructive ramifications of friction between military, educational and fiscal forces.66

The lack of cooperation between military and educational forces continued to undermine the movement in NSW throughout the 1880s. Despite the almost unanimous protests of the colony’s school inspectors, on 30 September 1881 Lieutenant Strong was appointed the Superintendent of Drill by the Minister for Public Instruction, F.B. Suttor, in addition to his role as Commanding Officer of the NSW Public School Cadets.67 He was immediately tasked to draft a set of orders governing the functioning of the state school force with the idea of expanding and reinvigorating the organisation and, on 8 August 1884, the Governor-in-Council approved his draft regulations.68 Against expectation, however, Strong’s new regulatory framework did not result in the successful expansion of the force. The strength of the organisation in 1884 was 1,009, and although growing to 1,486 in 1885, by 1886 to the great disappointment of Strong and his new Minister, W. J. Trickett, the number of cadets remained below the 2,000 mark. The Minister lamented that

65 Letter, Commandant to Colonial Secretaries Office, dated 4 March 1878. SRNSW CGS906, Item 5/7029.7. 66 ibid. 67 The inspectors resented Strong’s newfound control of school drill which previously had been their responsibility. NSW Journal of the Legislative Council (NSW JLC), 1880-81, Vol 31, Report of the Minister of Public Instruction for the Year 1881, Appendix L, p. 34. 68 NSW JLC, 1885, Vol 34, Report of the Minister of Public Instruction for the Year 1884, p. 15. Strong’s instructions stipulated a force of two battalions, one from the metropolitan and one from country areas, with the raising of units contingent upon the approval of the Minister and under his department’s direction. Detachments were required to have a minimum strength of 50 in the city and 30 in the country and Strong, as the Officer Commanding the force, retained the power to appoint adult officers (lieutenants) to command each cadet unit. To be enrolled boys needed to be 12 years or older

22 some twelve years ago, much zeal and activity were displayed in the formation of a cadet corps in connection with public schools. Several Corps were established in the metropolitan district and other parts of the colony … and for about three years the cadet corps flourished. For some reason, however … in a short time they collapsed.69

In truth, following the release of the 1884 regulations, the NSW Public School Cadet organisation was a shadow of what its Commanding Officer had hoped for and expected. A 50 cadet minimum detachment size prevented many schools from participating, and they were not encouraged by school inspectors who were still feuding with Strong. Compounding these problems was the cost of uniform, which tended to militate against wholesale and enthusiastic enrolment. Many large schools that could have raised units chose not do so, and throughout 1885 only five adult officers were listed as belonging to the organisation. Without large scale involvement by teachers at the officer level the force was destined to falter.70 So long as military and educational forces pulled in opposite directions, difficulties were destined to ensue.

By 1886 the Minister for Public Instruction, Trickett, could no longer brook the ‘poor and disappointing’ state of affairs and promised an inquiry to ascertain how greater momentum could be provided to the movement in NSW.71 Strong, pre- empting the Minister’s investigation, concluded that the problems of the cadet force were a result of heavy, old and unsuitable weapons, an overly expensive uniform, and a lack of knowledge and enthusiasm on the part of teachers.72 When responding to the Minister’s enquires, however, many educators gave markedly different interpretations. They reported that cadet regulations were not enforced and, to the disappointment of all, rifle shoots were rarely conducted. Playground drill alone simply could not maintain interest. In addition, teachers recognised that they were unable to be promoted should they take commissions, and were therefore powerless to shape the force in any way. Factors such as these, they explained, led to widespread disillusionment and prevented the increase in numbers that Trickett had anticipated.73

and pupils of the school from which the unit was drawn. List of Proposed Cadet Regulations, dated February 1883. SRNSW CGS3830, Item 20/12655. 69 NSW JLC, 1885, Vol 34, Report of the Minister of Public Instruction for the Year 1884, p. 24. 70 ibid. 71 NSW JLC, 1885-86, Vol 40, Report of the Minister of Public Instruction for the Year 1886, p. 19. 72 ibid., p. 141. 73 Correspondence (various), Headmasters to Chief Inspector, dated December 1886. SRNSW CGS3830, Item 20/12655.

23 By the end of 1886 the Minister had seen enough and concluded that the existing NSW Public School Cadet system was defective.74 He agitated for sweeping changes and convened an official Departmental Committee which recommended the institution of rifle drill training for all male teachers; a simple, universal and subsidised uniform; a Senior Cadet Corps to bridge the gap between school cadet training and the militia and, importantly, a paid staff responsible to a Commanding Officer of the rank of lieutenant colonel.75 The new Minister for Public Instruction, J.H.M. Carruthers, concurred with the Committee’s findings and the NSW Public School Cadet organisation, along with the services of the now Captain Strong, were dispensed with in late 1889 in favour of a newly styled ‘Public School Cadet Force’ under the command of a volunteer officer, Lieutenant Colonel Alfred Paul.76

Only from 1890, as a result of the adoption of the reforms of the new Public School Cadet Force, and in accordance with increasing material prosperity, population growth and school enrolments, did the NSW cadet movement regain momentum. Cadets in government-run schools grew to number 6,888 by the end of 1891, compared with the 1,084 in 1889.77 The Minister for Public Instruction, Carruthers, invested energy and personal prestige in the performance of the state school force at this time, and he was not disappointed. Under Lieutenant Colonel Paul’s stewardship harmony was regained with teachers and students flocking to the cadet cause. A large measure of Paul’s success lay in his ability to perceive the importance of the education system and to court teacher interest, something Strong had been unable or unwilling to do, with Carruthers’ report for 1890 noting that to the teachers’ ‘well directed efforts that so marked a development was largely due.’78

The military, educational, social and financial disharmony that produced such difficulties in NSW in the period 1873-89 was replicated, at various times, in Queensland, South Australia and Tasmania. The fate of the first cadet units in

74 NSW L.A. V&P, 1887, Vol 2, Report of the Minister of Public Instruction for the Year 1886, p. 17. 75 NSW L.A. V&P, 1887-88, Vol 4, Report of the Minister of Public Instruction for the Year 1887, pp. 1-5. 76 Bromham, ‘Cadet Corps in NSW’, p. 30. 77 This force consisted of the Training College Battalion of teachers under instruction (216), Senior Cadets (576), School Cadets in nine battalions (5,684), cadet bands (358) a cadet Ambulance Corps (45) and the cadet staff (9). Bromham, ‘Cadet Corps in NSW’, p. 34. 78 NSW L.A. V&P, 1891-92, Vol 4, Report of the Minister of Public Instruction for the Year 1890, p. 15.

24 Queensland, from 1870 until the advent of the State School Cadet Force in 1889, was an obvious example. Despite positive school inclinations, the early Queensland units were not provided with organisational or material support by the colony’s military forces. Nor were they bolstered by sustained community commitment as interest in defence gradually subsided in the colony. Not surprisingly these early cadet units soon disappeared in most locations.79 In 1884, the Queensland Defence Act, in its provision for raising cadet units in order to supplement volunteer and militia forces, represented an incremental commitment by the military and, as a result, new units were gradually and intermittently formed across the colony.80 Southport, Gympie and Maryborough Cadet Corps were formed in 1885, followed in early 1886 by a Roma detachment. As had been the case in the 1870s, however, once again little organisational support was provided and such growth was stilted. By July 1886 only six units existed with a combined strength of six officers and 141 cadets (of which Brisbane Grammar fielded 41).81 From 1887-89 further sluggish progress was evident with regional units emerging at Woolloongabba and Townsville along with state school detachments formed at Ipswich, Indooroopilly, Rockhampton and Toowoomba.82 Nonetheless, the lack of money and adequate military/educational support hamstrung the movement in Queensland up to 1889.

The first steps towards true cadets in South Australia in the 1880s were similarly frustrated by an unsympathetic military under significant financial pressure. In June 1885 the Premier, John Colton, wrote to Whinham, Prince Alfred and St Peter’s Colleges with a proposal to form a school cadet corps with two companies of 50 pupils each, an idea which appealed to the Premier’s interest in education and his wider conservative (and Methodist) social attitudes. The initiative came to nothing, however, when Colton was defeated at the ballot box by J.W. Downer who was more occupied by a growing government deficit than the purported benefits of cadet training.83 Neither was the establishment of a South Australian cadet movement made easy by a military Commandant, Brigadier John Owen, who made his feelings clear: ‘it is distinctly understood that cadet corps, in regard to the general force, are of little

79 Kitney, Australian School Cadet Movement, p. 54. 80 Extracts from Qld Defence Act (1884). CRS A1194, Item 20.21/6404. 81 Qld L.A. V&P, 1886, Vol 2, Report of the Commandant of the Queensland Defence Force, 1885-86, p. 9, & Qld L.A. V&P, 1887, Vol 2, Report of the Commandant of the Queensland Defence Force, 1887-88, p. 2. 82 Pixley, Queensland – 100 Years of Defence, p. 113.

25 moment one way or the other.’84 In addition, a Defence Bill passed in 1886 discouraged the movement for although it made official provision for a cadet corps it was to be restricted to older boys who had left school; thereby marginalising the education system. The Bill also required cadets to pay for their own instructors which did not make service attractive, especially in the context of an economic downturn that severely affected the colony at the time.85

In a final example of the vulnerability of the movement to internal disharmony in the colonial era, the Tasmanian government withdrew its support for cadets after helping establish the original Launceston Church Grammar detachment in 1883. From this point units received neither organisational, structural nor any other form of assistance beyond the loan of antiquated muzzle loading rifles, in spite of a Commandant who had actively signalled his support for the concept of cadets, and who wrote that ‘every encouragement should be given to the formation of this cadet corps.’86 As a result, Tasmania was never able to raise or sustain the interest that was present in the eastern colonies. Although a small number of schools followed the Launceston example in the 1880s, with the Hutchins School and Christ College forming units in 1885, as was the case in Queensland, the movement was sporadic. In 1887 the Launceston Church Grammar unit went into recess for eleven years while the Hutchins detachment was suspended in 1889.87 The lack of money, military commitment, or effective organisational framework meant that in 1888 cadet strength in the colony stood at 120, in two regionally based companies attached to adult volunteer units, as well as a few small detachments at private schools.88

Beyond the wider issue of the importance of balance between military, educational and social factors in shaping the development of the colonial cadet systems, the specific and critical influence of finance was well illustrated by the impact of severe drought and economic Depression in Australia in the 1890s. Across

83 Department of Education (South Australia), Education Gazette, March 1901, p. 50. 84 SAPP, 1886, Vol 2, Report of the Select Committee of the House of Assembly on the Defence Forces Bill, 1886, p. 4. 85 The situation became so desperate in South Australia in the late 1880s that, for a short time, emigration exceeded immigration. 86 Correspondence, Aikenhead to Legge (1883). AOT CSD13, Item 67/1155. 87 Memo, 6th Military District Headquarters (internal), dated July 1926. CRS B1535, Item 849/3/395. 88 Tasmania, Journals and Papers of Parliament (TJJP), 1888-89, Vol 14, Report by the Commandant of the Tasmanian Defence Force, p. 9.

26 the board retrenchments and down-sizing adversely affected colonial military forces, education departments, general community life and, a result, the various cadet schemes. From 1892, the newly reinvigorated cadet system in NSW broke down almost completely and in 1893, despite the Public School Cadet Force reaching its peak strength, the NSW government, on grounds of economy, withdrew all support. 89 Disastrous bank failures in NSW deepened the Depression and caused the cadet budgetary allocation to fall from £13,483 to £5,869 in only twelve months. Consequently during 1893 alone enrolment fell away by 667 cadets. In addition to 50 per cent staff retrenchments, including the removal of Lieutenant Colonel Paul as Commanding Officer, camp funds and money for combined parades was removed. Balancing the budget became such a problem for the Department of Education that the Senior Cadets were taken from the Public School Cadet Force, placed under the direct control of military authorities, and affiliated with adult militia regiments.90

Compounding these difficulties in NSW was the fact that during this period organised sport became a very strong competitor to the cadet movement. For private schools the Athletic Competition of the Greater Public Schools (GPS) was established and grew rapidly in popularity, placing schools in direct competition with each other in a range of sports. From the outset it had an enormous appeal and became a central element of school pride and esprit de corps; roles previously accorded to the cadet unit. The GPS sporting competitions were mirrored in state schools by the Public Schools Athletic Association, which although established in 1888, began to flourish in the mid-1890s. It is not surprising that many teachers and pupils made the choice to devote their time to school sport rather than become involved in the equipment shortages and rising costs characteristic of cadet training.91 State school cadet enrolment in NSW fell to 3,819 in 1894, and to 3,164 by 1896.92

Private school units in NSW managed to weather the Depression better than their state school counterparts. There were some casualties, including A. B. Weigall’s famous Sydney Grammar detachment but, generally speaking, cadet units lived on through many of the larger boarding schools. In 1895 there were cadet detachments at

89 Candy, Victorian Cadet Movement, pp. 11 & 24-2. 90 NSW JLC, 1894, Vol 52, Report of the Minister of Public Instruction for the Year 1893, p. 24. 91 Bromham, ‘Cadet Corps in NSW’, p. 44. 92 NSW L.A. V&P, 1900, Vol 4, Report of the Minister of Public Instruction for the Year 1899, p. 407.

27 Sydney and Windsor Grammar schools, St Ignatius’ College, The Kings School, Newington College and Cooerwull Academy at Bowenfels. By 1900, whilst losing the Sydney and Windsor Grammar School units, the private school cadet system had grown to include University College, Manly, The Armidale School, The Scots College, Mudgee Grammar School, Crofton and Barker College (single cadet unit), and Ashfield Grammar School units.93 Provided their headmasters remained committed to their cadets the independent wealth of such schools acted as a shield against the general economic situation. Unlike their government-run counterparts, private schools were able to continue to offer rifle practices, bivouacs and camps. In 1902, for example, Sir Henry Rawson presented several trophies for cadet shooting between private schools in Sydney, which stimulated interest and helped maintain enthusiasm.94

The Depression was more severely felt in Victoria than any other colony although, paradoxically, it did not damage the Victorian Volunteer Cadets Corps to the same extent as its NSW counterpart.95 Major D.L. Henry, commander of the organisation, wrote in 1894 that ‘strength shows only a small falling off from that of the “boom” years’.96 Such organisational resilience was largely a legacy of a well-run cadet system with efficient administrative procedures. The obvious competence of the Victorian scheme encouraged community support and, testament to the organisation’s reputation, the Victorian Department of Education willingly paid for cadet officers’ allowances (5s per unit) in 1895 and 1896 when the Department of Defence refused; such was the perceived educational value of the system.97 Nevertheless the Depression did impact upon cadet numbers and at its height enrolment fell to 2,328, of whom 1,511 were from state schools.98

As a result of the Depression in Queensland in 1893, the Military Commandant, Lieutenant Colonel G.A. French, recommended that no new units be

93 NSW Military List (1895). CRS A1194, Item 03.06/8772 & NSW Military List (1900). CRS A1194, Item 03.06/1492. 94 Shore School, The Torch Bearer, 4 May 1939, p. 22. 95 Boehms, E.A., Prosperity and Depression in Australia 1887-1897, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1971. 96 Henry, Victorian Cadet System, p. 5. 97 VPP, 1893, Vol 3, Report of the Minister for Public Instruction for the Year 1892-93, p. xxvi., & Department of Education Memo (1896). Victorian Public Record Service (VPRS), Series 794, Item Box 933. 98 VPP, 1896, Vol 4, Report of the Minister for Public Instruction for the Year 1895-96, Appendix B, p. 19.

28 added to the State School Cadet Force and despite the continuing enthusiasm of teachers, prevailing economic conditions ensured the subsequent demise of the force.99 Of the twelve cadet units in existence in 1892 none remained in state schools by 1897. The movement in Queensland was particularly vulnerable to military and educational cut backs which removed what little organisational support the force had enjoyed. Hopes, for instance, of replacing its old-fashioned and overly heavy weapons in the mid-1890s evaporated under sustained financial pressure.100

Of all the colonies Tasmanian cadets were least affected by the Depression, although given they received so little from the government they had much less to lose. The small scale of the movement in the colony, and the fact that from 1883 any growth that was achieved was largely independent of government support, meant that a greater degree of self-sufficient resilience had developed. In 1890 the Launceston Artillery raised a detachment of 13 cadets, and in 1891 Launceston High School also established a unit. In the following year another was begun at Horton College, Ross, and in 1896 a detachment was re-raised at Launceston Grammar School. In 1897 the cadets in the south of the island were formed into the Southern Tasmanian Cadet Corps, consisting of five units of 50 cadets although by 1899, in the absence of a general or consistent military or educational commitment, its numbers had fallen to 140.101

As the Depression eased in the late 1890s the colonial cadet schemes in NSW, Victoria and Queensland recovered quickly. The NSW government was once again able to invest in the Public School Cadet Force and Lieutenant Colonel Paul was re- appointed as the Officer Commanding Cadets and Superintendent of Drill. He reported that numbers were picking up so rapidly by the beginning of 1898 that the rate of enrolment had to be limited due to residual financial restrictions.102 The still limited cadet budget of £3,415 in 1899, while certainly an improvement on years past, was the only factor preventing Paul from expanding the force well beyond the 3,452 cadets in 103 units that existed at the time. Confirming the enduring importance of

99 Qld L.A. V&P, 1890, Vol 2, Part 2, Report of the Commandant of the Queensland Defence Force, 1892, p. 6. 100 Qld L.A. V&P, 1899, Vol 1, Report of the Commandant of the Queensland Defence Force, 1896-97, p. 7. 101 Notes on the history of the cadet corps in Tasmania. HQ AAC File 123/1/32.

29 finance, the Chief Inspector of NSW schools commented in 1899 that the state school force could grow to 20,000 if an adequate supply of money, rifles and uniforms could be found.103

With the end of the Depression the vigour of Victorian cadet organisation was also restored. It grew by 1,000 members in 1899 alone while in 1901 steady post- Depression growth saw 4,425 all ranks enrolled.104 In contrast to NSW, during this period the overwhelming majority of cadets in the Victorian force were from government schools; in 1906, for example, 5,000 of its 6,000 rank and file.105 This trend was the end result of a history of mutual cooperation and support between Victorian educational and military authorities. The commitment and encouragement of the Department of Education was reflected in the continuing popularity of cadets in government-run schools that had been forced to temporarily suspend their units during the Depression. It was only natural that once financial conditions eased this commitment would translate into renewed numbers, especially as the military cadet vote in Victoria was never subject to the same level of frugality imposed by the NSW Education Department.

As economic conditions improved in Queensland in 1898, the state school cadet organisation was resurrected under the new title of the ‘State School Cadets’. A number of important factors contributed to its renewed success, including the provision of a free uniform and an administrative allowance of 20s paid to each detachment per annum per cadet.106 In addition, educational commitment was greater than at any time in the past, with the force formally attached to the Queensland Teachers’ Volunteer Corps, whose popularity and vitality became a key source of strength. The Commanding Officer of the Teacher’s Corps was dual-hatted as the Commanding Officer of the cadet force and, more importantly, the Adjutant of the adult formation was seconded to the Queensland Education Department to act as a staff officer of cadets, thus giving the cadet movement in Queensland an organisational umbrella that it had previously lacked. So successful was the alignment

102 NSW L.A. V&P, 1898, Vol 2, Report of the Minister for Public Instruction for the Year 1897, Appendix XVIII, p. 100. 103 NSW L.A. V&P, 1900, Vol 4, Report of the Minister for Public Instruction for the Year 1899, Appendix XVIII, p. 102. 104 VPP, 1900, Vol 2, Report of the Minister for Public Instruction for the Year 1899-1900, p. 23. 105 ACC Journal, No 2, 1951, pp. 30 & 53.

30 of military, educational and fiscal circumstance in Queensland after the Depression that by the late 1890s most existing units held waiting lists of up to 50 boys wishing to join.107 By 1901 the State School Cadet force had also added a ‘Senior Cadet Corps’ of six companies to complement its school-based units.108

In general terms, the cadet movement in Australia weathered the Depression and drought of the 1890s and survived, battered but recovering, into the next phase of its history when the Commonwealth Department of Defence assumed control of a new national cadet organisation from 1906. Table 2B shows cadet numbers in NSW and Victoria from 1900 and confirms a gradual if unsteady resurgence to this date. Nonetheless, the impact of the Depression remained a specific and poignant reminder of the importance of balance between military, educational, social and financial considerations.

Table 2B - Numbers of School Cadets in NSW and Victoria, 1900-07 1900 1901 1902 1903 1904 1905 1906 1907 NSW 3,436 2,663 2,782 2,815 3,919 3,919 3,600 5,088 Victoria 3,231 5,189 5,149 3,522 3,599 3,169 3,513 6,405

1.2 % of cadets against eligible males in NSW 1.0 % of cadets against eligible males in Victoria 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.0 1900 1901 1902 1903 1904 1905 1906 1907

Source: Strength Returns of NSW and Victorian Cadets 1900-07. CRS MP84/1, Item 1832/10/20, & Official Yearbook of the Commonwealth of Australia (Commonwealth Yearbook) No 1 (1908), p. 148 & No 6 (1913), p. 119.

106 Qld L.A. V&P, 1898, Regulations Under the Defence Act 1884 – 1896, p. 13. 107 Department of Education (Queensland), Queensland Education Journal, March 1898, Vol 3, Issue 12, & October 1900, Vol 6, Issue 7, as quoted in Jones, Military Use of State Schools, pp. 299-300. 108 Two of these Senior Corps units were based in Brisbane, and one each in Toowoomba, Bundaberg, Rockhampton and Townsville. In the late 1890s a second cadet structure rose to shadow the State School Cadets in Queensland. These were the private school units at Brisbane Grammar and Maryborough Grammar Schools which, by 1899, were collectively known as the Grammar School Cadet Corps. Like the State School Cadets these private school units enjoyed a period of sustained prosperity up to 1905. Queensland Military List (1901). CRS A1194, Item 03.06/1504, & Queensland Military List (1897). CRS A1194, Item 03.06/8780.

31 Although secondary to the influence of harmony between the four foundation forces of the cadet movement, and with less immediate impact than the Depression, the political climate and inclinations of certain Premiers was critical at key stages in the growth and development of the infant colonial cadet schemes. From this early stage there grew a strong correlation between conservative politics and organisational achievement. Henry Parkes in NSW and James Service in Victoria were Free Trade and socially conservative Premiers, in 1873 and 1885 respectively, and watched over the creation of the Public School Cadets and Victorian Volunteer Cadet Corps. Similarly, it was another conservative Premier, John Colton, who first advocated a cadet system in South Australia in 1885. Even Queensland, with a long history of inconsistent support for its cadets, reversed this trend with the creation of the State School Cadet Force in 1889 during the Premiership of the conservative B.D. Morehead. Despite the factionalism that dominated politics in the colonial era, the alignment of conservative political, social and educational values with the basic philosophies of cadet training was evident. This relationship permeated the history of the cadet movement throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and continues to this day.

A second recurring and socially driven theme originating in the colonial era was the division of the cadet movement between state and private schooling sectors. In NSW, for example, cadets appeared first in private schools, and no sooner had they spread in any substantial sense to the state system then a divide was formally codified in the establishment of the Public School Cadet organisation. This systemic split was replicated in similar Queensland and Western Australian schemes. Conversely, bereft of large scale support from the education system, the development of the movement in Tasmania was very much reliant on private school initiatives while no state school cadet units existed at all in South Australia. Perhaps the only exception to this rule was the Victorian system, which successfully integrated the two types of units. Like the influence of conservative politics, the state/private school schism outlived the colonial era and became a long-term feature of the cadet movement.

In addition to exploring the origins and development of the colonial cadet organisations, in order to get a fuller sense of the movement it is useful to conduct an analysis of cadet training and activities of the era. Across the country foot and rifle

32 drill, shooting, ceremonial parades, and annual camps formed the bulk of the cadet training curricula in most locations. Again, it is possible to trace the influence of military and social considerations in these activities while, to a lesser extent, fiscal and educational forces also had a role to play. The State School Cadets in Queensland provided a reasonable representation of cadet training across Australia up to 1906. They paraded for one hour two afternoons per week at school locations and attended drill on one Saturday afternoon each month. Units regularly participated in ceremonial events, and conducted an annual camp.109 Similarly, state school cadets in NSW participated in three day and six night parades each quarter with attendance at an annual Easter camp made compulsory from 1889.110

Military tradition dominated parade ground drill for colonial cadets despite education department control of the movement in some colonies. It occupied a significant proportion of training time and, in the context of military tactics of the time, constituted both ceremonial and combat training functions. In NSW, for example, permanent military staffs were occasionally loaned to units to conduct formal drill lessons and from 1883 cadets received 45 minutes of such training per week, while a half-day holiday was given on the first Friday of each month for battalion parades.111 In all the colonies cadets were trained in the rifle and drill exercises laid down for adult infantry including

the rifle in the march, manual exercises in the ranks and piling arms, paying compliments with arms, company on parade drills, firing exercises by numbers and quick time, standing, sitting, kneeling and lying down, volleys and independent firing in single and two ranks, preparing for cavalry, skirmishing, and sentry duty.112

Although the application of rifle drill varied in each colony its essence remained consistent. In Victorian units many ex-British regulars drilled cadets at school locations for about one hour per week and gave battalion exercises at least six

109 Department of Education (Queensland), Queensland Education Journal, March 1898, Vol 3, Issue 12, as quoted in Jones, Military Use of State Schools, p. 299. 110 Memo, Officer Commanding Cadets for Dissemination, dated 23 July 1891. SRNSW CGS3864, Item 1/2119. 111 Memo, Officer Commanding Cadets to Artillery Staff, dated 19 July 1890. SRNSW CGS3864, Item 1/2119, & List of Proposed Regulations, dated February 1883. SRNSW CGS3830, Item 20/12655. 112 Memo, Officer Commanding Cadets to Battalion Commanders, dated 2 February 1893. SRNSW CGS3864, Item 1/2119.

33 times each year.113 Drill for Junior Cadets in Western Australia after 1897 was entirely the responsibility of the colonial military with teacher-officers tasked only to ‘march units to and from the nearest parade grounds.’114 In Tasmania, by contrast, detachments affiliated with volunteer units drilled in accordance with the practices of their parent units while in the main school units paraded as they saw fit. The Hutchins School in 1885, for example, concentrated on exercises designed for ‘fighting at the open order’.115

Quite removed from the monotony of drill, cadet rifle shooting competitions were without doubt the most popular form of training prior to 1906.116 Although sanctioned by the military, the driving force behind these contests was the widespread popularity of the sport in the community, the acceptance of the place of weapons in society, and a healthy dose of school pride. Units competed in local events, special invitation contests, inter-school challenges and even inter-colonial matches. In 1886- 87, for example, an annual competition was established between Australian and New Zealand cadets with the Brisbane Grammar School unit claiming the first four consecutive victories.117 In the earliest years of the movement in NSW many Sydney schools competed in rifle shooting matches such as the Challenge Trophy.118 Indicative of the esteem accorded to such matches, along with support provided them by the education system in NSW, in the 1870s and 1880s the Minister of Education regularly granted days off school for cadets to compete.119 Under such influences in 1905 interest is rifle shooting peaked in NSW with 2,869 of the 3,342 Public School Cadet Force members passing their annual musketry course for that year.120

Shooting competitions were equally prevalent in Victoria and the other colonies. They were held in similar social esteem and with the full blessing of the

113 Memo, Gamble to Cadet Battalion Commanders (1900). VPRS 794, Item Box 951/00/7089. 114 WA M.V&P, 1897, Report of the Commandant of the Local Forces of Western Australia for 1897, p. 4. 115 Notes on the history of the cadet corps in Tasmania. HQ AAC File 123/1/32. 116 It was also the most popular adult sport in the country at that time. 117 Kiddle, J. & Jukes, R., Liber Melburniensis, 1848-1936, Griffin Press, Adelaide, 1965, p. 740. 118 The Challenge Trophy was initially a silver bugle won in its inaugural year in 1875 by Newington College. Thereafter it was renamed the Challenge Shield. The competition was terminated some years later when Sydney Grammar won it three times running. Kitney, Australian School Cadet Movement, p. 58. 119 NSW JLC, 1885, Vol 34, Report of the Minister of Public Instruction for the Year 1884, p. 15. 120 NSW L.A. V&P, 1906 Vol 1, Report of the Minister for Public Instruction for the Year 1905, Annex H, p. 86.

34 various education systems. In 1884, for example, the Victorian Education Department placed £200 on its estimates to encourage rifle shooting in state schools.121 Representative of a military influence, and with the idea of creating a pool of skilled marksman for the volunteer forces, target shooting was made compulsory for cadets in Victoria from 1885, and in Western Australia from 1903, with mandatory range practices a common feature in both colonies.122 In Western Australia the popularity of target shooting went a long way to maintaining the high levels of enrolment in that state’s cadet force immediately prior to 1906.123 As was the case in NSW, it was not, however, these statutory shooting requirements that generally inspired cadets but rather representative competition that excited them. In Victoria a wide range of contests were conducted for prestigious and highly sought after prizes like the George Trophy, Sargood Trophy, Senior and Junior Shields and McCullough Cup.124 From this point large scale gatherings were regularly held at the Williamstown rifle range with often more than 1,000 cadets gathering to shoot. From 1886-94 no less than 2 million rounds were expended by cadets in Victoria for this purpose.125

The third significant cadet pursuit in the colonial era concerned ceremony. Although conducted as military events, cadet ceremonial activities fit comfortably into nineteenth century social expectations and were well aligned with prevailing community attitudes. In Sydney and Melbourne in particular, cadet formations were a central feature of most civic celebrations. As early as 1869, the St Mark’s unit in Sydney, in association with Camden College, began a tradition of parading along the streets with Sydney Grammar and Newington College joining this annual occasion in 1871 and 1872 respectively. The Sydney state schools were included in this event from 1873 and for the next decade ceremonial occasions involving cadets, like the farewell of the NSW contingent to Sudan in 1885, were a regular occurrence.126 The ceremonial pace picked up considerably in NSW from the beginning of the 1890s and, injecting educational influences into the mix, on 23 August 1890 the Public School

121 Henry, Victorian Cadet System, p. 6. 122 ibid., p. 21. 123 WA M.V&P, 1906, Vol 2, Report of the Secretary for Education for the Year 1905, p. 71. 124 The George Trophy was a life-sized suit of amour. The McCullough Cup was named after the Victorian Minister for Defence. The first Sargood Trophy was won by Brighton State School cadet unit under the command of Lieutenant J.C. Hoad (later Major General Hoad). Candy, Victorian Cadet Movement, pp. 24-9. 125 Henry, Victorian Cadet System, p. 13. 126 Kitney, Australian School Cadet Movement, p. 59.

35 Cadet Force conducted a massed parade in Moore Park, Sydney, at the insistence of the Minister of Public Instruction, J.H.M. Carruthers, who was determined to assert civil rather than military control over the occasion and, by extension, the cadet organisation. Some 4,800 cadets mustered and a crowd of 30,000 spectators cheered as the Governor inspected the parade and as Lady Carrington presented the Queens and Regimental Colours, made by the Lady Teachers Association of NSW, to the assemblage.127

Following the Moore Park parade the NSW public school force became a useful tool to engage civic pride. In January 1891, 1,188 cadets paraded to mark the arrival of the new Governor, Lord Jersey, and 1,500 cadets attended a church parade that followed. A general parade of city and suburban cadets was held on 13 December 1890 and another, of the Metropolitan units, followed on 14 February, 1891.128 After a short lull, as the Depression eased, NSW cadets began once again to become involved in large scale ceremonial activities and in 1897, for example, two battalions paraded for the Governor in Centennial Park while in 1901 cadets were gathered to mark the arrival of the Duke and Duchess of Cornwall and York in Sydney on their visit for the opening of the first Commonwealth Parliament.129

The commitment to civic ceremonial activities that existed in NSW was replicated in Victoria and the smaller colonies. Fittingly, the first general parade of Victorian cadets was held at the residence of Lieutenant Colonel Sargood in 1885 and the first public parade under arms was held in August 1886 with a total of 912 cadets mustered. 130 On 19 November 1886, 2,016 cadets turned out for inspection by the Governor at Albert Park with the parade considered a successful publicity exercise for in its wake boys flocked to join the corps.131 From this date, Victorian cadet involvement in ceremonial events continued to grow at a steady pace. In 1901, the Duke of Edinburgh inspected 4,000 Victorian cadets lined up for review at the steps of Parliament House followed by a ‘grand review and march-past’ at Flemington

127 Audley, R., ‘New South Wales Cadet Encampment, August 1890’, in Despatch, Vol 15, pp. 64-5. 128 ibid. 129 NSW L.A. V&P, 1898, Vol 2 Report of the Minister for Public Instruction for the Year 1897, Appendix XVIII, p. 99, & Minute, Officer Commanding Cadets to Cadet Staff (1901). CRS A6, Item 1901/1368. 130 Daley, Victorian Junior Cadet Corps, p. 18. 131 Candy, Victorian Cadet Movement, p. 24-10

36 Racecourse involving 4,900 boys.132 The scene was described as ‘an immense procession of keen, soldierly lads, who bore themselves with the spring and alertness of trained troops.’133 Interestingly, the first public inspection by the Queensland Military Commandant of the State School Cadets represented a distinctive convergence of military, educational and social factors when the force was mustered in conjunction with a public Volunteer Teachers’ Corps parade in May 1898.134

The final significant aspect of cadet training in the colonial era were annually conducted training camps which highlighted military influence on the movement. Dating back to the 1870s the fledgling private school cadet units of NSW regularly took themselves to camp with Sydney Grammar holding its first at Wiseman’s Ferry in 1872. Illustrating the spirit and martial flavour of these activities, an incident occurred when the Sydney Grammar unit ‘encountered the King’s School (St Mark’s) cadets strongly posted in the Domain.’ A small body of Sydney Grammar School cadets ‘by dint of concealing their own weakness and great shouting, drove the enemy back in confusion on their main body … the enemy was totally surrounded and surrendered.’135 Early NSW camps also showed the educational importance associated with them for private school headmasters looking to develop collegiate school spirit. Sydney Grammar School recorded that

nothing pleased the chief (Weigall) more than to march out with his company a hundred strong … white canvas, red coats, the buglers, the boy sentries challenging, the night attack by King’s School in which both sides always claimed victory … what a happy memory of boyhood for many a Sydney merchant and barrister.136

Conversely, public school units in NSW did not initially conduct annual camps and rarely combined with other school units for anything other than rifle competitions. Again highlighting the impact of education department support (and finance) this situation changed dramatically in 1889 with the advent of the re-styled Public School Cadet Force. From this point camps for cadets at government-run schools were conducted en masse. The camp of August 1890 was an effective case

132 ibid., p. 24-13. 133 Daley, Victorian Junior Cadet Corps, p. 28. 134 Department of Education (Queensland), Queensland Education Journal, March 1898, Vol 3, Issue 12, as quoted in Jones, Military Use of State Schools, p. 299. 135 Bromham, ‘Cadet Corps in NSW’, p. 16. 136 Sydney Grammar School, The Sydneian, 1957, p. 49.

37 study of the strength and style of the ‘state school’ aspect of the cadet movement in NSW at the time. The activity was commanded by a colonel with four full cadet battalions in attendance; each with a strength from 286-334 rank and file. This gave the camp a total of 1,266 personnel of which 67 were officers. In itself, although quite large, this camp held only four of the nine active state school cadet battalions in NSW.137

In Victoria military dominance of annual cadet camps was even further pronounced than in NSW. Camps were held from 1887 onwards, with the first drawing an impressive 843 cadets and 86 officers, participating in battalion movements, drill, camp duties, guard mounting, and sentry duties; with limited rifle shooting also carried out. In the following year a second Victorian camp was held at Langwarrin that included a ‘sham fight’ in which three battalions were detailed to defend the camp site from five battalions of attackers. In the 1890s most Victorian camps built up to a mock battle fought on the last day to the delight of the participating cadets.138 Victorian camps continued up to 1906 in much the same manner as they began. There was, however, some interesting variation in late 1899 when, again illustrating their distinctly military flavour, one cadet battalion was deployed for a full day to give cadets practice in the capturing of defensive positions that an enemy attacking Melbourne might use to bombard the city.139

Cadet camps in the other colonies, where they were conducted, followed the basic patterns set in NSW and Victoria. Little evidence remains available as to the detail of such camps in Western Australia or Tasmania although Colonel P.R. Ricardo, the military Commandant in the west, indicated his commitment to them with the provision of equipment and six permanent NCOs to support the cadet camp of 1903.140 The State School Cadets of Queensland usually came together for annual camps of four days duration held in conjunction with the annual Volunteer Teachers’ Corps activity. During these periods cadets from Brisbane units joined those from Roma and Ipswich to conduct mock battles and skirmishes against one another.141

137 Audley, NSW Cadet Encampment, pp. 37-41. 138 Candy, Victorian Cadet Movement, p. 24-11 139 Letter, Officer Commanding Cadets to Department of Education (Victoria), dated 18 November 1899. VPRS 794, Item Box 947. 140 WA M.V&P, 1906, Vol 2, Report of the Secretary for Education for the Year 1905, p. 66. 141 Kitney, Australian School Cadet Movement, p. 59.

38 Camp activities were not a significant feature of the fleeting and small-scale cadet units of South Australia from 1899-1901.

Beyond cadet training and activities, three common elements of purpose linked the various cadet schemes from 1866-1905. The rationale behind the establishment of army cadet units, regardless of colony, was again linked directly to the interplay of military, educational and social forces. In the first instance, cadet units were raised either for direct military purposes or as part of wider recruiting initiatives usually with the idea of helping keep down the cost of defence. Secondly, considerations concerning the moral education of boys helped to establish and promote the concept of cadets within the schools systems while lastly, general community and social benefits were deemed likely to follow from cadet training and activities. These three ideas, however, rarely stood in isolation and most supporters of the movement felt a mixture of motivations.

Real defence issues helped many early colonial cadet units to establish themselves. The last British garrison left Australia in 1870 and traditional fears of the Germans in New Guinea, of the French generally and then of a Russian invasion from Vladivostok in the mid-1860s gave both the volunteer military forces and the cadet movement significant momentum. Many influential thinkers saw cadets as a useful supplement to the citizen forces as an unpaid but trained reserve, an idea that meshed comfortably in the 1870s and 1880s within a general imperative in all the colonies to try to create effective defence forces without the expense and social ramifications of the standing armies and conscript forces of Europe. Some insight into such thinking can be gleaned from Reverend G.F. Macarthur’s request to the Officer Commanding the Volunteer Force in NSW in 1866 to establish the original St Mark’s cadet unit

to create in the minds and habits of our youth a desire and aptitude for the service of the country … the use of rifles in the corps would promote an interest in drill … a spirit whereby the lads would become valuable members of the Volunteer Force.142

This military theme continued to Federation, with the Chief Inspector of Education in NSW writing in 1899 that ‘it is generally admitted that a thorough military training to public school boys would be the best way of providing for the

39 defence of our country.’143 Similarly, in building the Victorian cadet organisation, Lieutenant Colonel Sargood wished to ‘bind together in one patriotic brotherhood the youth of this country so that, should occasion arise, they may be able in after years to defend their country with the most telling effect.’144 A step beyond the concept of a semi-trained reserve were the ideas of Major General A.B. Tulloch, the Commandant of Victorian Military Forces in 1894, who was in no doubt about the military utility of the cadet force and actually included them in his schemes of defending the colony from invasion. He believed that

young fellows … are being trained to become a valuable addition to the defences. So highly do I think of the quality of these Senior Cadets, that I have appointed them to their place in the scheme of mobilisation for defence in the event of war.145

Of course many individual cadets saw their efforts linked directly to colonial security. The cadets of the original Tasmanian cadet unit at Launceston Church Grammar School, for example, wrote in their school magazine, The Pardophone, in May 1886 that ‘if any quarrel should arise in which Tasmania’s help is needed we would be ready to serve.’146

As an indirect military outcome, the idea of using cadets as a means to encourage recruiting into the adult forces (a concept that persists to this day), was also conceived in the colonial era. The Tasmanian Commandant revealed in 1884 that he saw cadets as a ‘means of increasing the Force in the colony, and a source of recruiting.’147 In Victoria, the value of the cadet corps was said to have been in inculcating a ‘military not militant spirit in youth’ being designed to ‘encourage further service in the senior branches of defence.’148 In NSW the Sydney Morning Herald described the Public School Cadet Force in 1890 as ‘the foundation upon which to build up our Australian standing army of civilians.’149

142 ibid., pp. 54-55. 143 NSW L.A. V&P, 1900, Vol 3, Report of the Minister for Public Instruction for the Year 1899, p. 407. 144 Kitney, Australian School Cadet Movement, p. 556. 145 Henry, Victorian Cadet System, p. 18. 146 Notes on the history of the cadet corps in Tasmania. HQ AAC File 123/1/32. 147 TJPP, 1884, Vol 3, Report by the Commandant on the Reorganisation of the Defence Force, p. 3. 148 Daley, Victorian Junior Cadet Corps, p. 29. 149 SMH, 22 August 1890.

40 Apart from these military and pseudo-military objectives, the idea of the establishment of cadet units for educational and moral purposes was imported from England as part of the ‘Arnoldian Tradition’, in which ‘Rifle Corps’ were a fundamental aspect of many of the Great Public Schools. Moral education was therefore a widespread theme for the cadet movement in its infant years. A report written on the movement in 1887 by Trickett, the NSW Minister for Public Instruction, noted that cadets were ‘taught practically the value of discipline … many boys will be thus kept from forming bad associations and pernicious habits at a critical point in their lives.’150 Similarly, Weigall, of Sydney Grammar School wrote in 1870 that ‘the first step towards a corporate school life was taken by the formation of a cadet corps.’151 All of these sentiments reflected a firm conviction that cadet activities formed a medium for moral education.

In addition to military and educational outcomes it was generally considered that the various cadet systems would, through the effects of physical fitness, discipline and patriotism, have a positive effect on the social fabric of the community. In NSW the Minister for Public Instruction, Carruthers, while making a number of recommendations in 1892 ‘as to the best means of placing the corps on an efficient footing’, expressed the view that

by the more extended military training proposed, the boys will be improved physically, imbued with patriotic ideas, taught practically the value of discipline, trained to handle firearms with safety, and provided with healthy and useful occupation during hours of relaxation.152

The Commanding Officer of the Launceston Volunteer Rifles, Major William Aikenhead, in describing the usefulness of his attached cadet unit, commented that it was

calculated to improve the physique of the rising generation, and also benefit the young people intellectually, morally and socially. The lessons of order, obedience, submission to authority, smartness and manliness … must prove of great advantage.153

150 NSW L.A. V&P, 1887-88, Vol 4, Report of the Minister of Public Instruction for the Year 1887, pp. 1-5. 151 Bromham, ‘Cadet Corps in NSW’, pp. 3-5. 152 NSW L.A. V&P, 1892-93, Vol 3, Report of the Minister for Public Instruction for the Year1892, p. 1077. 153 Correspondence, Aikenhead to Legge (1883). AOT CSD13, Item 67/1155.

41

There was a conscious sense that military training contributed to the socialisation process for boys for through it they could learn the established values of the society in which they lived: order, obedience and loyalty. The Minister for Public Instruction in NSW in 1885, Trickett, supported cadets in his colony as they ‘conferred benefits not merely on the young persons who joined it but in the colony generally’, and saw cadets as ‘one of the best means of checking disorder.’154 Such sentiments were echoed in South Australia in 1900 by the Adelaide Register, which commented that ‘the advantage of a cadet corps cannot be overlooked. Individually, a boy, by a regular course of drill and military discipline is straightened up mentally and physically.’155

Most commonly, however, those responsible for promoting the cadet movement before 1906 viewed its purpose as a combination of military, educational and social factors. The four objectives of the Victorian colonial cadets, for example, were to benefit the physical development of boys, to improve school discipline, to train future citizens of Victoria and to create a trained service force for defence purposes.156 Each objective tended to receive different emphasis depending on the dominant personalities involved. Educators tended to view the first two aims as paramount, while military figures regarded cadets as a legitimate element of the colonial defence programs. The Minister for Education in Victoria in 1894, J.B. Wilson, displayed such a mixture of sentiment in his belief that cadets were educationally

of the highest value. Habit forms character, and where drill is thorough and efficient, the habits of prompt attention and subordination to authority are so ingrained as in after life not to be readily thrown aside…In case of war we should rejoice to know that we have thousands of young men … who could be rapidly formed into efficient soldiers.157

Similarly, his NSW counterpart, in a speech in August 1890, outlined his colony’s multi-facetted hopes for cadets in that to

train the youth of the colony in the habits of obedience and respect to those set over them, to discipline them, to accustom them to the use of

154 NSW JLC, 1885, Vol. 34, Report of the Minister of Public Instruction for the Year 1884, p. 15. 155 Lee, M.J. and Williams, S.J., A History of St Peter’s College Cadet Unit, unpublished, 1963, p. 1. 156 Candy, Victorian Cadet Movement, p. 24-13. 157 Henry, Victorian Cadet System, p. 17.

42 arms and military drill, would be the broadest and safest base on which to build up our Australian standing army of civilians … Australia’s best defence would be that army of sturdy sons she was now rearing.158

So, too, the Western Australian military Commandant, Lieutenant Colonel Phillmore, expressed a dual motivation for supporting the cadet movement in 1889 as ‘productive of much good in the community socially, besides forming valuable adjuncts to Volunteer Corps.’159 The synthesis of these aspects of purpose; military, educational and social, begun in the colonial period, were destined to continue well into the future.

The army cadet movement in Australia began in a school yard at Macquarie Fields and grew over the following four decades to become an accepted and important component of the military, education and social structure of the nation. The interplay of the four fundamental factors, discussed in the introduction to this thesis, and their influence in shaping the organisation’s colonial history were clear. Educational forces, especially the promotion of military drill in schools, set appropriate conditions for the cadet movement and moulded its growth. The public school cadet schemes in NSW, Western Australia and Queensland were further evidence of educational influence. So too, the colonial military establishments, through the provision of organisational structure, equipment, and training methods, manipulated the cadet organisations just as assuredly as military and security fears had stimulated their establishment in the first place. In any case, neither would have succeeded in creating a cadet movement without a general public belief in the social capital that cadet training would provide by instilling qualities of obedience, discipline and other civic virtues of the nineteenth century. Equally, the impact of the Depression is an obvious example of the initial and continuing vulnerability of cadet organisations to fiscal circumstance. As the movement advanced towards the next phase of its history these four themes persisted. The balance of military, educational, social and financial forces remained the foundation of cadethood from 1906.

158 SMH, 25 August 1890. 159 WA M.V&P, 1890-91, Report of the Commandant of the Local Forces of Western Australia for the Year 1889, p. 5.

43 Correct as at: 16 Dec 05

Word Count: 8,886 / 9.588

CHAPTER THREE

Commonwealth Cadets 1906 – 1910

With the Australian colonies united into a nation the era of the colonial cadets had passed. This chapter begins by examining the military and political manoeuvring which moulded the shape and style of the first Commonwealth cadet scheme leading up to its formation in 1906. An investigation of the purpose of this fledgling force then precedes a study of its structural and administrative organisation. Exploration of issues related to adult cadet staff, the provision of material support, and the nature of cadet training follows. Finally, an analysis of the demise of the first national cadet system, as a case study of the destructive potential of misalignment between the four military, educational, social and financial foundations of the cadet movement, concludes the chapter.

From 1 January 1901 the defence of Australia became the responsibility of the Commonwealth, although it was a duty the infant federal government came into only gradually. As far as the various colonial cadet corps were concerned, from Federation they fell under the jurisdiction of the Commonwealth Military Forces under the command of the military Commandant of Victoria. In practical terms, however, each organisation continued to be administered, structured and run along individual state lines.1 The first steps towards the introduction of a truly national cadet movement were made during the preparation of the original Commonwealth Defence Bill by the Federal Military Committee in March 1901. The interplay of military and educational agendas was clearly evident during deliberations concerning the question of cadets. The Committee recommended, on the advice of the Officer Commanding the NSW Public School Cadet Force, Lieutenant Colonel Alfred Paul, that boys below the age of 14 ought to receive military training under the control of the Education Departments in each state while those aged 14-17 years should be formed into voluntary Senior Cadet units armed, trained, equipped and commanded by the military.2

1 All Australian land forces came under the control of the Victorian Commandant as that colony was the only one to have raised a Defence Department prior to 1901. The Commonwealth Department of Defence, therefore, grew out of the established Victorian colonial bureaucracy. 2 French, G.A., Federal Military Conference, 1901, Government Printer, Sydney, NSW, 1901, pp. 7 & 41.

44 Thanks largely to the Federal Military Committee, provision was made for the establishment of a Commonwealth cadet system in the first Defence Act (1903-04). Part V of the Act, entitled ‘Cadets’, empowered the Governor General to establish a ‘Military Cadet Corps’ of boys over 12 years in schools and youths aged 14-19 who had left school.3 Importantly, for the future of the movement, and in response to mounting community concern, when the Defence Bill had earlier gone in front of the Senate a proposal was made for the mandatory military training of all boys aged between 14-17. The idea received considerable support, particularly from the Labor Party, with a motion to include a scheme of compulsory cadets only defeated by 15 votes to 10.4 W.M. Hughes, Labor parliamentarian and future Prime Minister, was vocal in his support for universal cadet training in the debates that surrounded the Bill and although defeated at this time, his continuing agitation, and the line of thought it represented, had significant future implications. 5

Public support for the concept of military training for male youth, and therefore for a Commonwealth cadet system, was widespread from 1901 and enjoyed the general backing of a federal parliament containing many serving and retired members of the volunteer military. Large public crowds still attended cadet parades and press support was substantial. Indeed, state government proposals linking a national cadet system to state schools in post-Federation cadet discussions showed considerable philosophical support from educators as well. The only key organisation not generally supportive of a national cadet force was the army. Among a range of key military figures, most state Commandants feared that their already meagre votes would be wasted on a cadet system likely to drain limited supplies of permanent officers, instructors and equipment. Fortunately, the first General Officer Commanding the Commonwealth Military Forces, Major General Sir Edward Hutton, was a staunch supporter of cadets and overruled such sentiments when he recommended in 1902 that the cadet scheme ‘so successful in Victoria under military control, be similarly developed throughout the Commonwealth.’6

3 Extract from Regulations under the Defence Act 1903-12. CRS A1194, Item 12.11/4338. 4 Notes on the Defence Act 1909. CRS A5954, Item 1282/1. 5 Tanner, T.W., ‘The Introduction of Compulsory Military Training in Australia 1901 – 1914’, in Armidale and District Historical Society Journal & Proceedings, No 10, 1967, p. 21. 6 Commonwealth Parliamentary Papers (CPP), 1901-02, Vol 2, Minute Upon the Defence of Australia, E.T.H. Hutton, 7 April 1902, p. 58.

45 Despite Hutton’s clear intention, four years after Federation no uniform national cadet system had been established. His annual report for 1903 lamented this fact and attributed it to restricted finances and the priority of restructuring and equipping the adult forces. Hutton continued, however, to resist attempts from the wider military to subvert the idea of a national cadet force into a school-controlled activity under the auspices of Departments of Education which would, in his eyes, have had the effect of ‘lowering the status of military service.’7 In any case the strength of the still state-based cadet movement in Australia at the end of 1904 was a healthy 20,070 (Table 3A shows their distribution). The situation was, however, becoming an embarrassment to the federal authorities and a string of events, from March 1904, at last began a process of resolution.

Table 3A - Strength of the Cadet Corps in Australia, December 1904

State Cadets Battalions Detachments NSW 7,500 15 200 VIC 6,000 12 160 QLD 2,600 5 80 SA 1,870 4 60 WA 1,200 3 40 TAS 900 2 30 TOTAL 20,070 41 510 8,000 7,000 6,000 5,000 4,000 3,000 2,000 1,000 0 NSW Victoria Queensland SA WA Tasmania Source: Department of Defence, Minutes of the Cadet Conference: 17 November 1905, Government Printer, p. 16.

The essential elements of the Commonwealth cadet movement were derived from the recommendations of two crucial cadet conferences and their implications at ministerial and bureaucratic levels in 1904 and 1905. The first of these ran from 16-23 March 1904, when a select committee was assembled at Victoria Barracks,

7 CPP, 1903, Vol 2, Annual Report upon the Military Forces of the Commonwealth, E.T.H. Hutton, 1 May 1903, pp. 62-64.

46 Melbourne, with the aim of formulating the basis of a federal cadet scheme. Of crucial importance, the committee delineated military and educational responsibilities in that it rejected the idea of a state-based, Education Department administered organisation, and supported Hutton’s preference for national military control. It recommended that the new system be structured to include Senior Cadets (out of school) and School Cadets (within primary and secondary schools) with educational authorities relegated to a consultancy and cooperative role. Local command of cadet units would remain in the hands of teachers, or members of the community acting as cadet officers, answerable to a permanent military cadet cadre staff raised within each Military District headquarters.8 This early marginalisation of educational authorities, however, while successful in laying a base for a military-styled national system, had serious future repercussions.

Although unanimously agreed upon by committee members, the 1904 recommendations did not remove the ever-present problem of finance. Indeed, they were lost on the Minister for Defence, J.W. McCay, who was dismayed at the potential price of the proposed solution. The Minister wanted a cadet system that cost as little as possible and for this he was prepared to shed expensive military trappings like uniforms and parades in favour of compulsory school-based instruction resembling the military drill of the colonial era. McCay’s last real chance to rally support for his alternate concept of cadets was at the Premier’s Conference in February 1905 where he outlined his counter-plan. The Minister, however, failed to sway general opinion, with the Premiers instead recommending that another conference be held to finalise the cadet question. Interestingly, McCay’s position was not backed by the Prime Minister, G.H. Reid, who was likely keen, given his government held a majority of one in the House of Representatives and was outnumbered in the Senate, to avoid taking on the Premiers over the issue of cadets. In any case state educational representatives and federal military figures were invited to convene in Sydney for a second cadet conference from 17-18 November 1905. 9

8 It was recommended that NSW and Victoria be allocated a permanent Staff Officer Cadets supported by an Adjutant and two sergeant instructors. The Staff Officer Cadets in the remaining states were to operate without the Adjutant, while Western Australia and Tasmania were restricted to a single sergeant instructor. CPP, 1904, Vol 2, Annual Report upon the Military Forces of the Commonwealth, p. 373. 9 Department of Defence, Minutes of the Cadet Conference: 17 November, 1905 (Conference 1905), Government Printer, p. 1.

47 Despite McCay’s continuing position, the cadet conference of 1905 supported the recommendations of March 1904 which, in effect, meant no further obstacles remained in the way of a national, military administered and traditionally structured cadet force. The 1905 conference determined upon a Commonwealth scheme providing for 20,070 School Cadets and 3,000 Senior Cadets (including a small proportion of Mounted Cadets) and went as far as drafting regulations and standing orders for the proposed system.10 With their detailed organisational planning and written output the 1905 conference representatives went a long way to ensuring the hasty adoption of a Commonwealth cadet system based on their recommendations.11 When the details of their plan were formally submitted to the federal and state governments they were accepted in all but the most minor details.

At last, on 1 May 1906, by stroke of the Governor-General’s pen, a set of provisional regulations established the new Commonwealth Military Cadet Corps (CMCC) which finally integrated the state-based cadet forces into a truly national system.12 A wave of enthusiasm for cadets swept the country following the organisation’s inauguration which fuelled governmental belief that ‘under the recently introduced system great expansion is [to be] expected.’13 Such positive sentiments were replicated, for the most part, in all states. Sir George Strickland, Governor of Tasmania, captured the mood when addressing a cadet parade in Hobart in 1907: ‘the cadets of today are the foundation of the future army of Australia, a branch of the great Imperial system of defence, on which the continuation of the British Empire is dependant.’14 Enthusiasm and unbridled optimism were not, however, universal. Some military figures still harboured concerns about the movement and many educators had their doubts about the future of a system administered by the military. In the parting words of the NSW Chief Inspector of Schools in 1906, ‘it remains to be seen whether under the aegis of military officers and in accordance with their ideas, the force will flourish.’15 Despite the confidence and expectation surrounding the inauguration of the CMCC, the four pillars of the cadet movement at this time were not strong. Military doubts, fiscal pressure, educational concern and the seeds of

10 ibid., p. 2. 11 ibid. 12 Originally christened the Commonwealth Cadet Corps but changed to Commonwealth Military Cadet Corps in 1907. 13 Commonwealth Yearbook, No 1 (1908), p. 894. 14 NSW L.A. V&P, 1907, Vol 1, Report of the Minister for Public Instruction for the Year 1906, p. 50. 15 ibid.

48 community acknowledgement of the necessity of universal military training undermined the CMCC from the beginning.

The era of the CMCC saw the purpose of the cadet movement mature from its colonial origins yet retain the characteristics of competing military, social and educational agendas. Expectations of a direct military role for cadets diminished in favour of their recruiting potential for the adult military, a concept supported by the assertions of individuals such as the Officer Commanding Cadets in NSW, Lieutenant Colonel Alfred Paul, who, with an admittedly vested interest, claimed with respect to the Boer War that he ‘had it on good authority that 80 per cent of the men who left the colony for the front (from NSW) were formerly identified with the Public School Cadet Force.’16 Post-Federation debates concerning the Defence Act demonstrated the depth of political support for the concept of citizen soldiery in Australia and a range of prominent figures of the era considered cadet training to philosophically and practically underpin the concept. Against this construct the idea of cadets as ‘the tap- root of our defence system’ is more easily understood and it explains why parliamentarian and future Prime Minister, Andrew Fisher, described cadets in 1903 as ‘a very laudable objective’ to which he proposed expending no less than ten per cent of the military vote.17 In accordance with such notions the Senior Cadets of the CMCC were ‘to provide elementary military training for boys over 14 years of age and thus minimalise the period of recruit training of those who subsequently enter the Defence Force.’18

As Senior Cadet units were raised to provide a link between school-based training and service in the citizen army, so too it was hoped that Mounted Cadets would ‘form a useful recruiting ground for the mounted branches of the service.’19 Indeed, in accordance with such objectives, Senior and Mounted Cadets who were 17 years or older were eligible to transfer directly to any corps of the militia provided that their Commanding Officer wrote a letter of recommendation on their behalf.20

16 NSW L.A. V&P, 1901, Vol 3, Report of the Minister of Public Instruction for the Year 1900, Appendix XVII, p. 101. 17 Fisher, A., in Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates (CPD), Vol. 15, 7 August 1903, pp. 3268-73. 18 Department of Defence, Commonwealth Military Cadet Corps Regulations and Standing Orders 1909 (Regulations 1909), Government Printer, Melbourne, p. 22. 19 Commonwealth Yearbook, No 1 (1908), p. 895. 20 Department of Defence, Commonwealth Military Cadet Corps Regulations and Standing Orders 1907 (Regulations 1907), Government Printer, Melbourne, 1907, p. 11.

49 Major General Harry Finn, Inspector General of Commonwealth Military Forces in 1906, supported this function and thought that the establishment of a federal system was a ‘big stride in the right direction’ and ‘that the training in arms of the youth of the Commonwealth will materially strengthen the country’s defensive powers goes without saying.’21 At the same time Finn emphasised the move away from concepts of cadets possessing a direct military role when he explained that ‘it must ever be remembered that the most thorough cadet training can only be regarded as preparation for the training of men.’22

Apart from purely military considerations, the cadet movement after 1906 was still considered a force for bestowing physical, educational, moral and social advantages by improving the character and behaviour of boys. School Cadets, for example, were conceived to provide for the ‘the physical improvement of all boys between 12 and 14 years of age, and such elementary drill as may be of use to them as citizens.’23 Cadet textbooks advised members of the corps to ‘let your behaviour in the street be such as to show, not only your officers, but the general public, that you fully estimate the responsibilities of a young soldier.’24 Similarly, in 1907, the Tasmanian Minister for Education spoke about the ‘value of drill in making lads responsive to orders, and of moulding their characters, and making them better citizens’, while the headmaster of the Shore School in Sydney, at the inauguration of that school’s cadet unit in 1908, maintained that ‘there can be no doubt that if the cadet work is continued … it will prove a lasting benefit, not only for the boys … but for the Commonwealth.’25

The organisational structure of the new CMCC reflected a non-official delineation between school and military spheres of influence. In line with the 1905 cadet conference recommendations, a triple construct was established made up of School, Senior and Mounted cadets. Such a structure, however, required implementation across the range of disparate cadet systems that had developed across

21 Report of the Inspector General Commonwealth Military Forces for 1906. CRS A1194, Item 20.15/6697. 22 ibid. 23 Department of Defence, Regulations 1909, p. 22. 24 Dodds, T.H., Cadet Rifle Exercises and Musketry Instructions: Adapted for the Westley-Richards and Francotte Rifles, J.H. Thompson, Brisbane, 1908, p. 47. 25 Extract from Hobart Mercury, dated 19 August 1907. CRS MP84/1, Item 1532/1/14, & Shore, The Torchbearer, 1989, p. 129.

50 the country in the colonial era and was complicated by the fact that the Departments of Education in NSW and Western Australia had previously administered cadets in those states. The immediate task, therefore, was to provide unity to the movement. This was achieved by catering for the range of existing state-based cadets within the triple structure of the CMCC. The first branch, the School Cadets, consisted of detachments formed from boys 12-14 years old (14 being the general minimum school leaving age) raised and maintained within educational establishments and therefore exposed to significant educational influence.26 The second were Senior Cadets, whose units could be established in any location recommended by a Military District Commandant, with the approval of the Military Board, from boys aged 14-19. If there was sufficient interest Senior Cadet detachments could be raised within schools for boys continuing their education but they remained distinct and separate from any School Cadets that may also have been present. School-based Senior detachments represented only a small proportion of overall Senior Cadet numbers. Lastly, limited numbers of Mounted Cadets were permitted in each state and were trained, equipped and styled upon the adult Mounted Infantry. By virtue of the fact that most Senior and Mounted Cadet units were raised independently of schools, they were subject to greater military influence than School Cadet detachments. All CMCC units were grouped geographically into companies and battalions, initially established with strengths of 60 and 509 cadets respectively, although in 1907 the strengths of School and Senior Cadet battalions were increased to 669 and 610 (see Appendix 1 for details).27 Initially, a total of 41 School Cadet battalions and ten Senior Cadet battalions were raised and distributed across the country.28 Table 3B shows their geographic allocation in 1908-09.

26 The approval the Education Departments was required in the case of state schools. Department of Defence, Regulations 1907, p. 12. 27 Commonwealth cadet regulations set the height requirements for entry into School and Senior units at 4ft 6in and 5ft 2in respectively. The minimum manning required for any detachment was 20 (reduced to 15 in 1909). Department of Defence, Regulations 1907, pp. 2-23. 28 Department of Defence, Conference 1905, pp. 5-7.

51 Table 3B - Geographic Allocation of Cadet Units, 1908-09 1908 1909 JUNIOR SENIOR MOUNTED JUNIOR SENIOR MOUNTED BATTALIONS BATTALIONS SQUADRONS BATTALIONS BATTALIONS SQUADRONS NSW 14 5 1 15 5 2 VIC 13 5 2 14 7 4 QLD 6 2 2 7.5 2 2 SA 5 1 1 5 1 1 WA 5 1 1 5 1 1 TAS 2 1 1 2 1 1 TOTAL 45 15 9 48.5 17 11

Source: Department of Defence, Commonwealth Military Cadet Corps - Report of the Director General for Year Ending 30 June 1909, & Candy, Victorian Cadet Movement, p. 24-19.

In conjunction with CMCC regulations, draft standing orders were produced to address issues of discipline in the new corps as well as outlining expectations, duties, and directions for battalion Commanding Officers, Adjutants, cadet detachment commanders, officers, NCOs, and individual cadets. These rules reflected certain social expectations by, for example, stipulating that a cadet on parade was to be ‘clean and tidy, arms and accoutrements in good order, and hair cut short.’ In the words of cadet standing orders, 1907

the constant duty of a cadet is to respect the uniform he wears by becoming conduct on all occasions, strict silence and steadiness in the ranks, and implicit obedience to orders. Those best fitted ultimately to command are those who have shown they can obey … Obedience is the first duty of a soldier, young or old.29

The higher command structure of the CMCC was dominated by the military, beginning at Army Headquarters, where the organisation was placed under the control of the Director General of Medical Services and Cadets (Surgeon General). This was, however, an administrative position, with real command vested in the Military Commandants in each state. The Commandants directed their cadets through an Officer Commanding Cadets, of the rank of lieutenant colonel (or major) with an Instructor of Musketry of the rank of major (or captain) appointed to assist him.30 An Officer Commanding Senior Cadets was also appointed at each District headquarters,

29 Department of Defence, Regulations 1907, p. 23. 30 For most of the period the Officers Commanding Cadets in the Commonwealth Military Cadet Corps were Lieutenant Colonels Alfred Paul in NSW, W.M. Gamble in Victoria, W.H. Halstead in Queensland, A.H. Neale in South Australia, C.R.P. Andrews in Western Australia and Major D.M. Davis in Tasmania. Cadet Forces List, 1910. CRS A1194, Item 03.06/1543.

52 although from time to time these positions were vacant and in such instances Senior Cadet responsibilities fell back to the Officer Commanding Cadets.31 All officers placed in command of cadet battalions, companies and detachments were positioned on the recommendation of the Officer Commanding Cadets with the approval of the Military Board (and the Department of Education if the officer was also a teacher).32 In addition, each District headquarters contained a small ‘Cadet Administrative and Instructional Staff’ to administer subordinate battalions.

Senior Cadet numbers were much lower than their School Cadet counterparts throughout the period. This was primarily due to the fact that in this era boys generally left school at around 14 years of age and long hours of work, combined with sporting activities, tended to discourage continued cadet involvement. Nonetheless, the initial authorised establishment strength of Senior Cadets in 1906 represented an underestimation of their popularity. Original enrolment limits were as follows: NSW and Victoria 1,020, Queensland 510, South Australia 120, Western Australia 120 and Tasmania 60, giving a national total of 2,850.33 Demand for more places increased the number of battalions by five which allowed enrolment to swell to over 5,000 in the twelve months to June 1908. By this time interest in Senior Cadets was high enough that a specialist branch, the Mounted Cadets, was formed. Mounted squadrons and troops were attached to adult Light Horse Regiments with two squadrons of four troops raised in Victoria, one squadron of four troops in both NSW and Western Australia, two troops in Queensland and one troop in Sheffield, Tasmania.34 From 1908, however, despite an increase in available positions, actual numbers of Senior and Mounted Cadets began to fall with establishment ceilings not matched by real numbers anywhere except in Queensland.35 In 1909 NSW, Victoria, South Australia, Western Australia and Tasmania were 915, 944, 514, 436 and 270 Senior Cadets short of their enrolment limits respectively and there were no school-based Senior Cadet detachments in Western Australia or South Australia at all (the downturn in enrolled numbers is discussed later in this chapter).36

31 Department of Defence, Regulations 1909, p. 16. 32 Department of Defence, Regulations 1907, p. 14. 33 State Cadet Establishment Tables (1906). CRS CP697/41, Item 1912/12. 34 Candy, Victorian Cadet Movement, p. 24-17. 35 Report of the Director General for 1908. CRS MP84/1, Item 1832/1/296, & Department of Defence, Commonwealth Military Cadet Corps – Report of the Director General for Year Ending 30 June, 1909 (CMCC Report 1909), Government Printer, 1909, p. 4. 36 Cadet Strength Returns (various), dated June 1908. CRS MP84/1, Item 1832/15/3.

53 An unforeseen result of the Senior Cadet structure was the perpetuation of the colonial state school/private school divide. Both NSW and Victorian Senior Cadet battalions, for example, were grouped together based on geography and school heritage. For instance the 1st Battalion in NSW was comprised entirely of state school detachments in the Sydney area while the 3rd Battalion consisted solely of private school units. This unofficial ‘Greater Public School (GPS) Battalion’ was raised as a direct result of a reaction by prominent Sydney private schools against what was perceived as ‘unnecessary department intrusion onto school affairs’ stemming from the NSW Education Department’s strong connections with the cadet corps hierarchy.37 Similarly, in Victoria, Senior Cadet private school detachments were all held within the 2nd and 3rd Battalions while the 1st Battalion, based in Melbourne, contained only state school units. Indeed the 5th Battalion was made up entirely of Marist and Christian Brothers detachments. There was, however, no overall bias in favour of state or private schools numbers in the Senior Cadet organisation. In absolute terms the majority of school-based detachments existed in state schools in NSW and Victoria but in relative terms the proportions were roughly equal.38

Although Mounted Cadet conditions of service were the same as for Senior Cadets in non-school based detachments, they were considered to be discrete units and not officially part of the Senior Cadet battalion structure. As such Mounted Cadet units came under the direct command of each District’s Officer Commanding Senior Cadets. To be formed, a potential troop required a minimum of 18 boys between 14- 18 years old who were at least 4ft 8in tall and prepared to supply their own uniforms, mounts and horse gear.39 Perhaps as a result of such requirements, combined with varying local circumstances, the number of Mounted Cadets across the country was always small. In 1909, there were only two squadrons each in NSW and Victoria while there was one squadron in Queensland, Western Australia and Tasmania. South Australia at this time could not manage to enrol a single troop.40 By mid-1910 it was proving difficult to raise and maintain Mounted Cadets in any location and in NSW, for example, there existed but one troop at Durham College, Dungog.41

37 Sherington, G., Shore: A History of Sydney Church of England Grammar School, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1983, p. 294. 38 ibid. 39 Department of Defence, Regulations 1909, p. 11. 40 Cadet Forces List, 1910. CRS A1194, Item 03.06/1543. 41 Minute, Military Board to Commandants, dated March 1910. Queensland State Archives (QSA) Series RSI15191, Consignment 1, Item 423.

54 The third component of the Commonwealth cadet system, the School Cadets, were around seven times more numerous than their Senior Cadet counterparts and, existing only in schools, faced a unique set of challenges. In 1908, for example, the Minister for Defence, Joseph Cook, received complaints that in many detachments rifles were left lying about schools without proper protection. As a result the Minister instituted a program of equipping schools with rifle racks from 1909. The significant sum of £1,190 was earmarked for this endeavour and a total of 124 schools were outfitted in that year.42 Similarly, to facilitate School Cadet miniature rifle shooting, the government was forced to embark on an ambitious program of miniature ranges construction in schools and, on 19 March 1907, £3,000 was allocated to this end.43 A further example of the complications arising from the placement of School Cadets within state education systems was the perpetual difficulty of teacher-officers transferred away from their units.44

Like the organisational structure of the Senior Cadets, a sharp decline in the number of School Cadet units in government-run schools from 1906-10 tended to deepen the state school/private school divide by providing disproportional representation to the latter. For example, in 1906 state schools accounted for 83 per cent of all Victorian school-based cadets but by the end of 1907 this figure had shrunk to 63 per cent. This is not to underestimate the level of enthusiasm in individual schools, like Melbourne High School which at the time boasted 131 pupils of whom 130 were enrolled in the cadet unit, but a trend was evident.45 Diminishing state school involvement was caused by a range of issues associated with the eventual demise of the CMCC.

Although the military dominated the executive of the CMCC, school teachers and educational bureaucrats continued to exert significant influence at a grass roots level. Many continued their service from the colonial cadet organisations and, as far as practicable, military authorities abrogated responsibility for command and administration to these volunteers. They filled positions from Officer Commanding Cadets in each state down to the commanders of, and staff within, individual cadet

42 Department of Defence, CMCC Report 1909, pp. 14-15. 43 Memo, Director General Cadets, dated 19 March 1907. CRS MP84/1, Item 1975/7/7. 44 Commonwealth Yearbook, No 6 (1913), p. 936. 45 Candy, Victorian Cadet Movement, p. 24-15.

55 units.46 In the overwhelming majority of cases cadet officers were drawn from the ranks of male teachers working in the school in which a cadet detachment was situated. Although commissioned, they were considered junior in grade to other military officers such that no cadet officer could find himself in command of equally ranked officers from another branch of the Commonwealth Military Forces. Promotion was contingent upon passing qualifying examinations run bi-annually and there being an establishment vacancy in the organisation.47 These teacher-officers were assisted by cadet NCOs appointed by battalion Commanding Officers on the recommendation of unit staff. 48

Maintaining positive relationships between the Defence and Education Departments, especially when teachers-officers were appointed to ranking administrative positions beyond the unit level, was always a difficult issue for the CMCC. In July 1907, for example, Tasmania’s Director of Education wished to see a number of cadet bands raised within a particular cadet battalion. The battalion Commanding Officer did not approve and was within his rights to refuse. Frustrated, the Director approached the Officer Commanding Cadets and demanded that the Commanding Officer be overruled. The original decision was upheld, however, and the infuriated Director appealed to the acting Secretary of the Department of Defence directly. Complicating the matter, and perhaps providing the original perceived insult, was the fact that the Officer Commanding Cadets and Commanding Officer in question were both members of the Director’s department and subordinate to him within it.49 This time the Director got his way and the original decision was reversed. The Secretary appeased the Director because he recognised that the Defence and Education Departments needed to work harmoniously for the CMCC to operate effectively. He wrote, ‘I must add that to make the cadet movement a success it is necessary that the Officer Commanding Cadets, battalion Commanding Officers and

46 The only notable exception being the occasional use of permanent officers as staff officers to the state cadet commanders. Memo, Army Headquarters (internal) (1906). CRS CP697/41, Item 1912/12. 47 Department of Defence, Regulations 1909, p. 17. 48 Except in unusual circumstances the first appointment for an officer of the CMCC was as a lieutenant with a probation period of six months. The syllabus for the theory and practical examinations required to receive an appointment included a thorough knowledge of rifle exercises and musketry, responsibilities in company drill, the manner of mounting guard, postings and relieving sentries, and the regulations and standing orders of the corps. To be promoted to captain battalion drill was added, and to major a knowledge of brigade drill was required. For officers of Senior or Mounted Cadets a knowledge of ‘skirmishing’ and ‘scouting’ was also mandatory. Department of Defence, Regulations 1909, p. 32, & Report of the Director General of Cadets for 1910. CRS A1194, Item 20.15/6719.

56 yourself should be in perfect harmony’, and would not risk this key relationship over such a trivial matter. The extinguishing of this particular spot-fire, however, did not address an underlying current of friction between educational and military forces that proved damaging in the longer term.

The relationship between financial support, represented by the availability of uniforms, weapons and equipment for the CMCC, and the difficulties faced by the cadet movement at this time was revealing. Certainly, on the surface at least, the organisation was not starved of money. Indeed, the cadet force accounted for £20,055 of a defence budget increase of £61,474 in 1907-08 and absorbed £50,429 (7.6 per cent) of a total defence vote of £659,012 in the 1908-09 financial year.50 For the first time in most states uniforms were universally subsidised, although still not standardised, while from 1 July 1907 Senior Cadets in non-school based detachments received an allowance of £1 per cadet per annum, while school-based Senior Cadets and School Cadet detachments received 7s 6d per head per annum, and a detachment allowance varying from £3 to £6 depending on their strength (see Appendix 2 for a physical description of cadet uniforms, 1866-2004).51 Such a picture of wealth, however, was an illusion. The CMCC was receiving a relatively large slice of a very small defence pie which accounted for less than half a per cent of national Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for most of the period (see Table 3C). In real terms in 1909 cadets were funded at around £1 10s per capita as compared to around £3 10s for cadets of the NSW Public School Cadet Force in 1893.52

49 Correspondence, Director of Education to Secretary of Defence, dated July 1907. CRS MP84/1, Item 1832/12/26. 50 CPP, 1908, Vol 2, Memorandum of the Minister of State for Defence on the Estimates for the Financial Year 1908-09, p. 353, & CPP, 1909, Vol 2, Part 1, Memorandum of the Minister of State for Defence on the Estimates for the Financial Year 1909-10, p. 116. 51 In the following year many School Cadet detachments were issued with free uniform tunics but trousers and other items were still purchased from detachment allowances. Bean, Here, My Son, p. 121, & Report of the Director General of Cadets for 1907. CRS MP84/1, Item 1832/1/296. 52 NSW JLC, 1894, Vol 52, Report of the Minister of Public Instruction for the Year 1893, p. 24, & CPP, 1909, Vol 2, Part 1, Memorandum of the Minister of State for Defence on the Estimates for the Financial Year 1909-10, p. 116.

57 Table 3C – Defence Expenditure as a Percentage of GDP, 1905-10 0.95 0.85 0.75 0.65 0.55 0.45 0.35 1905/06 1906/07 1907/08 1908/09 1909/10 1910/11 Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Year Book Australia Defence Resources, ABS Homepage, www.abs.gov.au.

The effect of limited finance was clear. The Inspector General of Commonwealth Military Forces, Major General Sir John Hoad complained in his 1907 report that there were not enough serviceable rifles to be issued to all cadets.53 Senior Cadets, and the ‘largest’ 20 per cent of School Cadets were entitled to Martini- Enfield rifles from 1908 but the allocation was hampered by the limited number available in Australia at the time (only 26,000 existed in 1908 for all the military forces and half of these were on loan to Rifle Clubs).54 The remainder of the School and the Mounted Cadets used either the .230 calibre Francotte (previously used in Victoria and Western Australia) or .310 calibre Westley-Richards weapons.55 By 1908 the Francotte had been all but phased out as a general purpose rifle and in total 19,202 Westley Richards weapons were on issue to School Cadet units. This was, however, still fewer than the 21,353 School Cadets actually enrolled at the time.56

Compounding the fact that there were not enough weapons to equip all School Cadets was their unequal distribution across the states. On 19 August 1907, 313 Tasmanian cadets paraded in Hobart and, of all the School Cadets in attendance, only the detachment from the Hutchins school possessed weapons.57 In NSW cadet units in 1909 were issued with rifles at a scale of one per two cadets and many detachments had to rely on a quantity of ‘loaned’ weapons for use on miniature ranges.58 As late as 1909 some states were still having difficulty in supplying Senior Cadet detachments

53 Report of the Inspector General Commonwealth Military Forces for 1907. CRS A1194, Item 20.15/6697. 54 Report of the Director General of Cadets for 1908. CRS MP84/1, Item 1832/1/296. 55 Department of Defence, Conference 1905, p. 2. 56 Report of the Director General of Cadets for 1908. CRS MP84/1, Item 1832/1/296. 57 Extract for the Hobart Mercury, dated 19 August 1907. CRS MP84/1, Item 1532/1/14. 58 Cadet Weapon Returns Schedules (NSW) (1909). CRS CP697/41, Item 1912/12.

58 with their full quota of rifles.59 Such shortages were acute enough to convince a number of cadet officers to make very public statements airing their concerns. Captain Andrew Rushall, Commanding Officer of the volunteer Melbourne Cavalry and Officer Commanding a squadron of Mounted Cadets resigned his commission in the latter out of frustration with the lack of equipment provided. His comment, used later to challenge the Minister for Defence, G.F. Pearce, in parliament was that ‘the boys have no rifles, no belts, no bayonets, no haversacks, and no capes. They have nothing except their horses, saddles, bridles, and uniforms, all of which they have themselves provided.’60

The net effect of such shortages was captured in the 1908-09 report of the NSW Minister for Public Instruction, J.A. Hogue. He explained that financial and resource issues directly prevented establishment numbers from being reached and that the size and capacity of the corps was held in check by the lack of additional arms and equipment. He believed that should these become available then ‘the cadet corps could, and would, be largely increased.’61 It is clear that despite the relative size of the cadet budget there was simply not enough money to properly support the newly nationalised movement.

The development of cadet training and activities after 1906 was a direct reflection of social, military and educational expectations of the movement at the time. Most units trained at home locations at least twice a week for around half an hour. In addition, schools of instruction were regularly run by the military to prepare cadet officers and cadets seeking examination for appointment or promotion within the organisation. Cadet companies were expected to parade as a battalion four times each year and on two of these occasions half yearly inspections occurred.62 At these inspections detachments were deemed to be ‘efficient’, and therefore entitled to their allowances, if 80 per cent of their cadets had passed a compulsory annual musketry course and attended a sufficient proportion of parades.63

59 Department of Defence, CMCC Report 1909, p. 9. 60 Brief, Army Headquarters (internal), dated November 1910. CRS MP84/1, Item 332/14/14. 61 Department of Defence, Cadet Journal, No 2, 1951, p. 54. 62 ibid., p. 15. 63 The schools of instruction were military oriented and usually concluded with an examination considered ‘in some instances, equal in standard to that held at the termination of Schools of Instruction (Infantry) for officers of the Citizen Forces.’ The schools taught rifle exercises, company and battalion drill, guards and sentries, with lectures on regimental duties, the principles of modern infantry fire,

59 A number of training practices were common to all branches of the CMCC. The first, as it had been in the colonial era, was rifle shooting. The activity remained underpinned by social acceptance of the pursuit, school infatuation with the importance of competition, and military expectations of what it ought to produce. The army attempted to harness the popularity of cadet range practices with the Inspector General of Commonwealth Military Forces, Major General Finn, concluding in 1906 that the greatest advantage of the federal scheme would be that it would teach the youth of the country to shoot. He believed that marksmanship training would ‘ensure in manhood a much higher shooting standard, and of a description far more likely to be of supreme value to the nation in the day of trouble than that which at present exists in the force.’64 Subsequently, when CMCC provisional regulations were framed, all cadets were required to pass an annual musketry course conducted as early as possible between 1 July and 31 December.65 The course for Senior Cadets consisted of two days of training. On the first lectures in musketry were given, while on the second day participants fired a practice in five parts from a number of positions at ranges from 200-600 yards. Cadets were scored as ‘marksmen’, ‘1st class’, ‘2nd class’ or ‘3rd class’ shots with those scoring lower than 60 deemed to have failed.66 The course for School Cadets was a simplified version at reduced target ranges.67

The mandatory nature of the musketry course did not, however, make it a successful enterprise. The average score of all Victorian cadets in their annual course of 1909, for example, was 48 (12 below the pass mark).68 In the same year a total of 1,988 of 3,949 (50 per cent) of cadets in Queensland did not attempt the course at all, although range availability and access was an issue in the state at the time.69 As a result of this unacceptable level of achievement, in July 1909, the Minister for Defence, Joseph Cook, relaxed the shooting component of annual efficiency by allowing state Commandants to approve exceptions when ‘for local or other reasons it

elementary attack/defence theory and outposts. Indicative of their popularity, in the year ending 30 June 1909, 512 trainees (43 per cent of all cadet officers) attended various military schools of instruction. Department of Defence, Conference, 1905, pp. 7-10; Report of the Director General of Cadets for 1909. CRS A1194, Item, 20.15/6719, & Department of Defence, Regulations 1909, p. 34. 64 Report of the Inspector General Commonwealth Military Forces for 1906. CRS A1194, Item 20.15/6697. 65 Dodds, Cadet Rifle Exercises, p. 43. 66 Badges were issued to cadets who qualified as ‘marksmen’ with the required scores reviewed and slightly reduced in 1909. 67 Department of Defence, Regulations 1907, p. 24. 68 Schedule of Victorian Cadet Musketry Results (1909). CRS MP84/1, Item 1832/16/5. 69 Schedule of Queensland Cadet Musketry Results (1909). CRS MP84/1, Item 1832/16/7.

60 may not be possible to carry out the musketry course.’ In real terms this meant Commandants were empowered to reduce or dispense with the musketry course and therefore avoid embarrassing statistics.70 Inevitable disappointment at such an outcome was a factor in weakening long-term military commitment to the CMCC.

Despite the problems associated with the cadet musketry course, most schools with Senior or School Cadets reported that there was ‘great enthusiasm for rifle shooting’ as it pertained to competition rifle matches.71 The prestigious annual Empire-wide Earl Roberts Trophy, inaugurated in 1907, allowed teams of eight cadets under the age of 16 to compete against others from across the British Empire in home locations using .303 calibre service weapons.72 From 1910 the ‘Imperial Challenge Shield Competition’ evolved from the Earl Roberts Trophy as basically the same contest divided into two parts - a national stage (between District teams) whose winners received a local trophy (the Governor-General’s Trophy in Australia) and an international event. In the latter, the scores of the best national teams were sent to the National Rifle Association at Bisley, England, where they were collated and compared to determine the winner.73 In addition to the .303 contests a number of miniature rifle competitions were also popular. First among them was the Empire Day Challenge Cup, a contest open to cadet detachments of 20 shooters, and always fired on Empire Day in each state by representative teams.74 Like the Earl Roberts Trophy the results of the Empire Day Challenge Cup were forwarded to England for consideration for the award of the Empire-wide Meath Cup. A second Empire

70 Enthusiasm for musketry courses was further eroded in 1910 and 1911 following a series of range fatalities. In 1910 a Western Australian cadet was shot and killed at a range accident at Karrakatta while in Melbourne the following year another cadet was killed while acting as a range marker despite the practice being contrary to cadet regulations. Extract of Military Board Order, dated July 1909. CRS MP84/1, Item 1832/12/39, & Cook, J., CPD, Vol 54, 25 November 1909, p. 6369. 71 Adelaide High School, 50th Anniversary Commemorative Book, 1958, p. 15. 72 The shoot itself consisted of two squads of four cadets firing a ‘snapshot’ of seven rounds from behind cover at a range of 200 yards, followed by a five round deliberate shoot at 500 yards. Finally an ‘attack’ shoot was conducted at advancing ranges from 500 to 200 yards involving limited ‘fire and movement’. In Australia the competition was run in each Military District with cadet units nominating their best one or two marksmen to assemble and participate in a District trial match. The highest scoring 20 competitors then re-assemble for another shoot with the best placed sent to represent their state as part of the Commonwealth team (with the next eight highest scorers formed a state team). The seven Australian teams then conducted their formal competition match with results recorded and sent to the National Rifle Association in England to be compared and ranked against other provincial and national teams of the Empire. Extract of conditions for the Lord Roberts Competition (1907). CRS MP84/1, Item 2024/6/241; Memo, Director General to Districts (1910). CRS MP84/1, Item 2024/6/167, & Report of the Director General of Cadets for 1909. CRS MP84/1, Item 1832/1/296. 73 Department of Defence, Cadet Journal, No 1, 1950, p. 48. 74 Department of Defence, CMCC Report 1909, p. 7.

61 miniature shooting contest, the Schools of the Empire Shooting Competition, was conducted for teams of ten School Cadets under 15 years of age.75

Further indication of the depth of social and educational commitment to rifle competition were the wide range of state and regional competitions, trophies, shields and even monetary prizes donated by councils, groups, and interested individuals. The Major Whitney Competition, for example, was inaugurated in 1908 and awarded a gold medal for the School Cadet in each state that achieved the highest score each year in the annual musketry course (when it was conducted).76 Similarly, Senior Cadets participated in individual shooting competitions based on their scores at the annual musketry courses in each Military District with the best shot receiving a state medal and the right to compete against the other winners for the Commonwealth award.77 Intra-state competitions were also prevalent. Cadets in Queensland, for example, competed for the Minister’s Cup, donated by the Minister for Public Instruction in 1909, for marksmanship excellence.78

The second general training activity, pertaining to all three branches of the CMCC, was participation in annual camps conducted in a much more standardised fashion than their colonial predecessors. Again, military influences, along with the impact of financial restrictions, were well illustrated by these camps. In the defence estimates of 1907, £4,948 was set aside for cadet camps which, by the following year, assumed such proportions as to draw as many as 5,000 spectators in the metropolitan

75 Any number of teams from each state could enter. In 1909, for example, seven teams from NSW, one from Victoria, three from Western Australia and one from Tasmania competed for the prize. Memo, Army Headquarters (internal) (1909). CRS MP84/1, Item 2024/6/125. 76 Report of the Director General of Cadets for 1908. CRS MP84/1, Item 1832/1/296. 77 Department of Defence, CMCC Report 1909, p. 8. 78 Rifle shooting matches were not the only competitions in which Commonwealth cadets were involved. One notable alternative was the Lady Dudley Banner contest, instituted in 1910 by the Countess of Dudley, as an award for the most efficient Senior Cadet battalion (or company in the one- battalion states of South Australia, Western Australia and Tasmania) in each Military District. Winners were judged on the basis of ‘drill, discipline, field exercises, general turn-out and musketry.’ A second important non-shooting competition was a cadet essay contest inaugurated in 1908. Participants wrote on military topics chosen by army authorities with essays judged by a federal parliamentary committee. Prize money was awarded to the first three place getters from the School and Senior Cadets in each state and all six place getters (36 in total) were invited to compete for a handsome Commonwealth award of £50. Minute, Officer Commanding Cadets (Queensland) to Cadet Detachments (1909). QSA RSI115181, Consignment 1, Item 423; Report of the Director General of Cadets for 1910. CRS A1194, Item 20.15/6719, & Letter, Essay Competition Committee to Officer Commanding Cadets (Queensland), dated 21 October 1908. QSA RSI115181, Consignment 1, Item 423.

62 areas.79 A total of 25 camps were held across the country in 1908 catering for 10,271 cadets of all types.80 From 1909, however, camp training for School Cadets was severely curtailed due to financial restrictions with only one camp, held in Tasmania, conducted at all in the twelve months to July 1909. Senior Cadet camps faired a little better in the financial year 1908-09 when a total of 14 camps, involving 210 officers and 3,887 cadets, were held in all states except Western Australia where, again, a lack of available funds prevented them.81 When cadet camps were held military procedure was rigid and army influence at its height. Senior Cadets were taught the normal routine of military field life including sentry duty and skirmishing. At one such camp, at Cheltenham Racecourse, Adelaide, from 10-14 May 1909, Senior Cadets were drilled for six hours every day in squad drill, company drill and rifle exercises. Lectures were given after tea each evening with a practical examination held on the last day.82

Just as there were some activities common to all CMCC branches, there were others unique to each. Senior Cadet training, for example, was dominated by adult- style infantry instruction to a far greater extent than their younger School Cadet counterparts, and included combat drills up to and including a battalion level and field training at a company level.83 Senior Cadets were instructed on all aspects of weapon- craft including loading, aiming, firing, firing positions, collective firing, marksmanship principles, and even elementary ballistics.84 In addition to infantry instruction, select Senior Cadets were trained as buglers and stretcher bearers with 107 receiving the full suite of army medical instruction by June 1910.85 The syllabus of first aid training for Senior Cadet stretcher-bearers is a useful example of the intensive military style of instruction provided to Senior Cadets at the time. It was delivered on ten separate parades, of no more than 90 minutes, each over 10 days (Figure 3A lists the subjects taught). Continuing the military orientation, from 1910 two Senior Cadets per company (or Mounted Cadets per squadron) were trained as

79 Report of the Inspector General Commonwealth Military Forces for 1907. CRS A1194, Item 20.15/6697. 80 Report of the Director General of Cadets for 1908. CRS MP84/1, Item 1832/1/296. 81 Department of Defence, CMCC Report 1909, p. 12. 82 Adelaide High School, Magazine, Mid-winter, 1909, p. 26. 83 Department of Defence, CMCC Report 1909, p. 4. 84 Dodds, Cadet Rifle Exercises, pp. 20-30. 85 Minute, Director General Cadets to Army Headquarters, dated November 1909. CRS MP84/1, Item 1832/15/30.

63 signalers and, once qualified by way of practical and written examinations, they were permitted to wear signalling badges of the same pattern as the adult forces.86

Figure 3A - Syllabus of Training for the Senior Cadet First Aid Course, 1909

Time Subject 1st Day • Anatomical & Physiological Outlines and Stretcher Exercises. 2nd Day • Bandaging and Bandages. • Anatomical & Physiological Outlines and Stretcher Exercises. 3rd Day • Bandaging and Bandages. • Anatomical & Physiological Outlines and Stretcher Exercises. 4th Day • Fractures and Apparatus for their Treatment. • Stretcher Exercises. 5th Day • Fractures and Apparatus for their Treatment. • Wounds and Stretcher Exercises. 6th Day • Dislocations & Sprains and Stretcher Exercises. 7th Day • Bleeding or Haemorrhage and Stretcher Exercises. 8th Day • Drowning and Stretcher Exercises. 9th Day • Shock, Loss of Consciousness & Fits. • Stretcher Exercises. 10th Day • Dressing of Wounds. • Lime in the Eye etc.

Source: Department of Defence, Commonwealth Military Cadet Corps Regulations and Standing Orders 1909, Government Printer, Melbourne, p. 37.

Although holding much in common with their Senior counterparts, School Cadet activities diverged in a number of key areas. They inherited, from the colonial era, a socially driven enthusiasm for ceremony with state and federal governments using them as a cost-effective way of providing a uniformed ceremonial parade whenever such a presence was required. The largest such assembly in the lifetime of the CMCC was on the occasion of the American ‘Great White Fleet’ visiting Australia in September 1908 with the event drawing around 7,400 Victorian cadets to parade at Flemington racecourse.87 Equally, in all other states it did not take much encouragement to justify a School Cadet parade. In NSW, the Officer Commanding Cadets, Lieutenant Colonel Alfred Paul, staged an event in Sydney on 6 July 1909, for example, for no better reason than the manager of the visiting American Boys’ Band

86 They were also awarded ‘Signalling Certificates.’ To achieve this distinction, in addition to a ten- question written test, cadets were required to send 78 letters on the ‘large flag’ at four words per minute whilst reading them at six. On the ‘small flag’ a sending rate of six words and a reading rate of eight per minute was required. Semaphore was required to be sent at the rate of eight words per minute and received at six. ibid. 87 Argus, 4 September 1908.

64 expressed a desire to see it.88 Apart from special ceremonial occasions, School Cadet battalion parades were held monthly in the metropolitan areas and quarterly in the country which, apart from practicing drill, allowed a concentration of instructional staff who, by virtue of their small numbers, were never in a position to regularly visit all school detachments.89

In a second important divergence from the Senior Cadets, from 1906 School Cadet training began a gradual but inexorable movement away from its traditional, military orientation towards an educationally engendered emphasis on physical fitness.90 The instigation of a School Cadet conference in 1907 by the Prime Minister, Alfred Deakin, to discuss the nature of future cadet training was partly motivated by this developing trend, coupled with a desire from the Defence Department to achieve military control and standardisation over emerging schemes of physical training coming out of various state Departments of Education. There is no doubt that the idea also fitted comfortably with Deakin’s desire, made public in the same year, to see a system of universal military service introduced in Australia where cadet training would play a key physical role in preparing boys for their adult military commitments. In any case the proceedings of the 1907 conference signalled the beginning of a formal move away from a military conception of cadets within schools by focusing more on the idea of a uniform system of physical education. This was noticeably contrary to the founding philosophies of the CMCC.91

The shaping of School Cadet training away from a military orientation represented another point of friction between army and educational agendas and personalities. It was predictably resisted by cadet officers who wished to retain the original character of their organisation and the military prestige of their commissions. These officers were initially challenged by Major General Finn who, like McCay in 1905, preferred to withhold money for uniforms and other military accoutrements in

88 Letter, Officer Commanding Cadets (NSW) to Minister for Defence, dated 27 June 1909. CRS MP84/1, Item 2024/6/71. 89 Memo, Director General of Cadets to School Cadet Battalion Commanders (1909). CRS MP84/1, Item 1832/1/266. 90 Department of Defence, Regulations 1909, p. 22. 91 CPP, 1909, Vol 2, Military Cadet Corps, Report of the Director-General for the Year Ending 30 June 1909, p. 468.

65 favour of more practical pursuits.92 The champion of the cadet officers and the traditional concept of School Cadets, turned out to be Major General Sir John Hoad, who replaced Finn as Inspector General in 1907, and became the army’s Chief of the General Staff (CGS) in 1909. Given his colonial cadet heritage Hoad was firmly wedded to the idea of military-style School Cadet training and as such locked horns with McCay, and then the Senator G.F. Pearce in his first tenure as Minister of Defence in 1908. Pearce, picking up on his predecessor’s theme, believed the chief aim of the School Cadets should be to physically prepare boys for life (and the rigours of future military service) and he maintained that fitness should be its focus. Indeed, the minister so rattled the Military Board in his claims that the requirement to contribute to the purchase of uniforms had turned the School Cadets into a ‘classist’ organisation that the Board withdrew the statutory requirement for School Cadets to wear them from late 1907. This order, however, was almost universally resisted and units regularly turned boys without uniforms away from parades despite the Military Board’s direction.93

Having won, at least on paper, the battle over uniforms, Pearce threw his weight behind fitness training for School Cadets at the expense of other military activities by espousing the principle that ‘the object of the cadet force should be the physical training of the lad, and not his military training.’94 Major General Hoad, however, remained determined to foil the Minister and on return from England in 1909 steadfastly set about rolling back many of Pearce’s initiatives. He began in June 1909 with a parade of 6,000 cadets on the Yarra bank in Victoria and had intended the activity to include a ‘route march’ before bad weather intervened. Hoad then attempted to provide a continuing military impetus to the School Cadets by visits to many detachments and schools that were followed, in each large suburban centre, by more massed cadet parades.95 Hoad’s actions, although flying in the face of Pearce’s intent, were only a short-term anomaly for the die had been cast. As a result of the policies adopted by Pearce, supported by the Military Board, and subsequently picked up by Joseph Cook, Minister for Defence in the new Deakin government, by 1911 the

92 CPP, 1906, Vol 2, Part 1, Report of the Inspector General of the Commonwealth Military Forces, H. Finn, 1 September 1906, p. 183. 93 Pearce, G., CPD, Vol 49, 1 July 1909, p. 660. 94 ibid. 95 Report of the Inspector General Commonwealth Military Forces for 1909. CRS A1194, Item 20.15/6697.

66 principles of School Cadet training had transitioned to the ‘physical improvement of boys up the age of fourteen years.’ The battle was over and the scene set for the pseudo-military, classroom structured and non-uniformed system of ‘Junior Cadets’ inaugurated in 1911.96

The final demise of the CMCC, after only six short years, was the end result of a history of friction and open conflict between all four foundation forces of the cadet movement. Competing social, educational and military agendas, within the context of limited financial support, were the essential ingredients of its failure. The Defence Act (1909), passed on 13 December 1910 and proclaimed on 1 January 1911, made Australia the first modern English-speaking country to demand universal and mandatory military training in times of peace. Its compulsory provisions spelt the end of the CMCC. Social factors were of central importance in this respect for as the first decade of Federation drew to a close there was a discernable souring of the global security environment that significantly strengthened proponents of the idea of peacetime conscription, a concept that was antithetical to the voluntary cadet system. The atmosphere of fear that led to the passing of the 1909 Act was, in essence, the same force that ensured the demise of the Commonwealth cadets. When mixed with continuing concern over the cost of defence, ‘the cadet force, which had owed its colonial origins to defence fears and the belief that it could save the government money, now fell victim to vastly enhanced fears, and the perception that it was an expensive liability.’97

A second social factor contributing to the demise of the CMCC was the influence of the federal political climate in the period 1906-10. Although more difficult to trace than in the colonial era, the connection between political conservatism and the fate of the cadet movement was maintained. In this case, however, it was the absence of a consistent conservative influence at a Federal level that left the cadet movement open to attack from alternative political viewpoints. The CMCC was shaped by four ministries: a Free Trade/Protectionist coalition (1904-05), a Protectionist (1905-08), a Labor (1908-09) and a Fusion government (1909 onwards). First, the government under which McCay strove to subvert the nature of the movement away from a traditional concept of cadets in 1904-05, was a ‘liberal’

96 Pearce, G., CPD, Vol 49, 1 July 1909, p. 686.

67 administration. The social attitudes of the Prime Minister, G.H. Reid, were evidenced in his claims that he was the first man in New South Wales to make the wealthy pay a fair share towards the burdens of the community, and the first legislator to bring in laws to break up the virtual land monopoly. Similarly, it was under a Labor government that Pearce again tried to twist the nature of the CMCC, before presiding over its forced decline in late 1908 and the first half of 1909. As the era of compulsory service loomed, however, and in the context of the bi-partisan political support it enjoyed, the link between the political orientation of the incumbent federal government and the fortunes of the cadet movement was weakened as cadet issues were overtaken by a wider defence and security agenda.

Apart from the socio-political popularity of the idea of mandatory military training, there were a number of other more immediate factors that helped tip the government’s hand against the CMCC. Of these, certain military influences were key determining factors. The army had always been divided as to the value of the national cadet force and influential figures like Brigadier General J.M. Gordon, Military Commandant of NSW, criticised the very idea of a voluntary system as a ‘red herring thrown across the scent’ in being wasted on boys not compelled to enlist in the adult forces. Colonel E.T. Wallack, the army’s Deputy Assistant Adjutant General and a member of the Military Board in 1908, regularly voiced his doubt as to the worth of the scheme, as did Colonel P.R. Ricardo, Victorian Commandant in 1906, despite previously being an ardent supporter of the colonial cadet movement.98 Most damaging of all, Colonel D.L. Henry, a long-time enthusiast of cadets in Victoria and the first Adjutant of the Victorian Volunteer Cadet Corps in 1886, wrote a memorandum in 1908 seeking to abolish the Commonwealth system altogether in favour of some sort of compulsory scheme. Among many criticisms he concluded that musketry training was of a poor standard and ‘very perfunctorily carried out’ and roundly criticised teacher-officers who he considered to be ‘of little practical use.’ Henry’s censures, as a man with a formidable cadet reputation and intimate involvement in the movement in Australia from the beginning, were telling.99

97 Jones, Military Use of State Schools, p. 447. 98 ibid., pp. 458-459. 99 Memo, Henry to Army Headquarters (1908). CRS MP84/1, Item 1856/7/51.

68 So too, educational forces undermined the CMCC with a number of senior teachers, not enamoured with their association with the military since the beginning of the national system, actively contributing to its downfall. The movement suffered from perpetual hostility between military officers on one side, and state education authorities on the other. Embodying this antagonism was an ongoing dispute between the Education Departments and the Military Board over proposed cadet standing orders in 1907. State educational representatives claimed that they had given their support to the CMCC on the basis of mutual cooperation and consultation and they saw it as a Commonwealth betrayal for regulations they did not agree to at the 1905 cadet conference to be published without their consent only two years later. They complained bitterly that ‘the regulations just promulgated are distinctly at variance with the agreement upon which the consent of the states to the formation of a cadet corps was given.’ Not even conciliatory letters from the Minister for Defence, T.T. Ewing, could soothe their ruffled feathers. Above all, educationalists resented the military’s insistence that the Governor-General (re Military Board) had the power to decide where detachments could be raised and that unit allowances be paid directly to them rather than into central Department of Education funds.100 Such rules threatened both plans to expand cadet units, in line with the expanding state education system in Australia, and the coffers of the departments. The dispute was at its heart, however, over control. Educationalist thought, perhaps rightly after the 1904 and 1905 conferences, that they would have a greater say while the military, as reluctant owner of the force, was determined to see them have less. In the end this friction tended to sour both parties. 101

One clear manifestation of the combined effect of mounting educational, military and social antipathy to the movement (along with the financial shortcomings previously addressed) were its increasingly disappointing recruiting statistics. Those predisposed against the CMCC saw the cadet investment, yielding such mediocre enrolment returns, as further vindication of their criticisms. In general terms, and across the three cadet branches, despite a period of initial growth the organisation generally failed to attract the numbers that had been anticipated. Defence estimates for 1907-08 provided for a strength of 30,774 School and 5,352 Senior Cadets giving an

100 Extract from Revised Cadet Regulations (1907). CRS MP84/1, Item 1832/8/28. 101 Minutes and Notes of Cadets Conference (1907). VPRS 892, Item Box 75/Unit 1008.

69 aggregate of 36,126.102 By the end of August 1908, however, there were only 21,877 School Cadets enrolled (although the Senior Cadets exceeded establishment at 7,967) for a combined total of 29,844 (73 per cent of vacancies). The following year’s estimates budgeted for 49,429 cadets of all types but the aggregate enrolled never exceeded 32,188 (65 per cent). Table 3D provides establishment and actual numbers of cadets from 1907-10.

Table 3D - Establishments and Strengths of Cadets, June 1907 - June 1910

State Estab. Strength Estab. Strength Estab. Strength Estab. Strength June 1907 June 1907 June 1908 June 1908 June 1909 June 1909 June 1910 June 1910 Senior Cadets NSW 1,020 752 3,320 2,218 3,320 2,380 4,152 3,687 Victoria 1,020 690 4,150 3,232 4,150 3,473 4,152 3,662 Qld 510 450 1,233 953 1,660 1,002 1,660 1,251 SA 120 109 830 472 830 591 830 725 WA 120 117 830 506 830 545 830 602 Tasmania 60 60 424 232 830 313 830 329 TOTAL* 2,850 2,178 10,787 7,413 11,620 8,304 12,454 10,255 Mounted Cadets NSW N/A** N/A 144 67 144 85 144 53 Victoria N/A N/A 144 136 144 144 144 114 Qld N/A N/A 72 - 144 106 144 69 SA N/A N/A 72 - 72 nil 72 Nil WA N/A N/A 72 - 72 68 72 69 Tasmania N/A N/A 72 - 72 35 72 29 TOTAL* N/A N/A 576 203 648 438 648 334 School Cadets NSW 7,637 4,336 9,368 5,959 10,038 6,193 9,369 6,983 Victoria 6,110 5,715 8,689 6,863 8,700 7,557 8,700 7,270 Qld 2,547 2,499 4,016 3,691 4,017 3,985 4,017 3,949 SA 2,038 1,637 3,347 1,956 3,347 2,231 3,348 2,355 WA 1,529 1,235 3,347 1,633 3,347 2,366 3,348 2,381 Tasmania 1,020 1,010 1,340 1,251 1,340 1,314 1,340 1,278 TOTAL* 20,881 16,432 30,117 21,353 30,789 23,646 30,122 24,216

* Includes cadet staff ** Mounted Cadets were raised from 1 July 1907

Source: Reports of the Director-General for the Years Ending 30 June 1908, 1909 & 1910. CRS A1194, Item 20.15/6719.

102 Report of the Director General for 1908. CRS MP84/1, Item 1832/1/296.

70 These recruiting shortfalls were not evenly spread across the states. In 1908, in Queensland, the full School Cadet establishment of 4,014 was met.103 Conversely, South Australia, as the state with the thinnest colonial cadet tradition, always struggled to attract sufficient numbers. The state’s Senior Cadet battalion, for example, had a strength of only 50 with no officers in October 1906 and in December 1907 the Minister for Defence, Ewing, called on the South Australian Commandant to explain his unsatisfactory cadet statistics.104 Out of an establishment ceiling of 72 Mounted Cadets, 670 Senior Cadets and 3,345 School Cadets, South Australia managed to sustain no Mounted Cadets, 110 Senior and 1,714 School Cadets (45 per cent of available positions).105 Again, in the following year South Australia was described as ‘a very poor show’ by the Director of Medical Services and Cadets for enrolling only 86 Senior Cadets out of an establishment of 670.106

It would be incorrect to suggest that the increasingly obvious push to dismantle the CMCC went completely without challenge, particularly from teacher- officers. The Sydney Morning Herald noted that a ‘protest was growing’ that could ‘assume large proportions’ as many teachers felt that the new Defence Act was the end of ‘real’ cadets within Australian schools. 107 Ironically, given the state’s recruiting problems, protestors were also vocal in South Australia where not only did a conference of teachers write to the Premier in complaint, but the Officer Commanding Cadets, Lieutenant Colonel A.H. Neale, corresponded directly to the Military Board protesting the potentially reduced status of School Cadet officers in any new scheme that should arise.108 So too, the Western Australian Inspector General of Education and Officer Commanding Cadets, Lieutenant Colonel C.R.P. Andrews, wrote to the Prime Minister concerning the fate of the CMCC while the Queensland Argus lamented that cadets were to be ‘quietly legislated out of existence’

103 Annual Report of Officer Commanding Cadets (Queensland), dated 5 April 1909. QSA RSI15191, Consignment 1, Item 423. 104 Strength Return of South Australian Cadets, dated October 1906. CRS MP84/1, Item 1832/10/8. 105 Memo, Director General to Commandant (South Australia), dated December 1907. CRS MP84/1, Item 1832/10/20. 106 Minute, Director General Cadets, dated December 1908. CRS MP84/1, Item 1832/10/19. See Chapter 7 for an explanation of the tradition of poor South Australian enrolment figures, 1906-47. 107 SMH, 27 October 1909. 108 Letter, Neale to Military Board, dated 9 June 1910. CRS MP84/1, Item 1832/4/21.

71 and that the ‘far away Commonwealth capital’ did not understand the depth of support for traditional cadets in the northern state.109

In the end such agitation came to nothing as the CMCC was forcibly wound down from October 1909 with a Military Board instruction directing that ‘pending the introduction of universal training of cadets it is not proposed to form any new corps under the present organisation.’110 By mid-1910 there remained 157 Senior, 21 Mounted and 651 School Cadet detachments in operation across the country.111 The annual report of the Director of the CMCC, in June 1910, concluded with a cheerful summary of the year’s progress in full awareness that his report would be the last

in view of the increase in the Senior Cadets, amounting to 1,951, the results of the schools of instruction for cadet officers and camps of training, the number of rifle competitions entered into and relative position attained, and the additional number of cadet miniature rifle ranges constructed, it is considered that the CMCC, as a whole, has made very satisfactory progress for the year.112

Despite this optimism, the CMCC ceased operations from 1 January 1911, and the Government’s resolution to pursue a compulsory cadet training system in Australia from 1 July 1911, a decision almost eight years in the making, was the end of a short- lived but very important period in the general history of the cadet movement.

The CMCC, like its colonial forebears, emphasised the importance of the interactions between the four foundation forces of the cadet movement. The first national scheme faced difficulties, and eventual downfall, as a consequence of friction and disharmony between social, military, educational and fiscal factors. Insufficient money, for example, led to shortages in weapons and equipment and in some cases prevented the conduct of cadet camps. Such factors, in turn, discouraged enrolment which poisoned the perceptions (or preconceptions) of many influential military figures. Subsequent military criticism of the cadet system, combined with perpetual friction between army officers and teacher-officers, caused ill-feeling between the Defence and Education Departments which eroded the commitment of these two key

109 Letter, Milton to Fisher, dated 23 June 1903. CRS MP84/1, Item 1832/13/90, & Extract from the Argus, dated 15 March 1910. CRS MP84/1, Item 1832/1/275. 110 Military Board Instruction, dated October 1909. QSA RSI15191, Consignment 1, Item 423. 111 Report of the Director General of Cadets for 1910. CRS A1194, Item 20.15/6719. 112 ibid.

72 stakeholders. Finally, such weakness existed in the context of a society willing to sacrifice, faced with what was perceived as an overwhelming defence necessity, the voluntary heritage of all Australian defence institutions in favour of peacetime conscription. The era of the CMCC was at an end and it was almost twenty years before a voluntary national cadet organisation was reinstituted.

73 Correct as at: 16 Dec 05

Word Count: 11,558 / 12,380 CHAPTER FOUR

Conscripts 1911 - 1929

The period 1911-29 was an important era for the cadet movement as a conscript force rose to replace the volunteers of the Commonwealth Military Cadet Corps. This chapter begins with an examination of the system of compulsory cadet training prescribed by the Defence Act (1909). The impact of the First World War, and the question of how universal service affected the purpose of the cadet movement, are then considered. An analysis of the structural and administrative arrangements of the new system follows, with a particular focus on issues of material support, adult staff, and cadet training (including its inherent problems in this era). Finally, the chapter concludes with a study of circumstances precipitating the decline and fall of the compulsory cadet organisation.

The passing of the Defence Act (1909), with its provisions for universal military training, was a profound development for the cadet movement. With bi- partisan support the government exacted compulsory service from all 12-25 year old males in the context of a voluntary defence system considered inadequate in a decade of growing security concerns.1 Despite a general consensus in principle, however, significant political manoeuvring surrounded the drafting, debating and introduction of the new Act. The Prime Minister, Alfred Deakin, was attacked by the leader of the opposition, G.H. Reid, who favoured compulsory training for cadets only and, as a result, the amended Defence Act of 1908 was not passed before the Deakin government was defeated in November. A second draft Act, drawn up by the new Fisher government in May 1909, proposed compulsory membership in the ‘Junior Cadets’ for 10-14 year old boys and in the ‘Senior Cadets’ for 14-18 year olds, although it too could not be introduced before Andrew Fisher’s electoral defeat in June 1909.2 A final draft, prepared by the new Deakin (Fusion) government detailing

1 For five years prior to 1909 growing fear for the safety of ‘White Australia’, coupled with the erosion of British naval supremacy, had forced defence issues into the public domain. Japan’s victory over Russia in 1905, followed by a much publicised Anglo-German naval race from 1906, a series of international crises, and the visit of the American Fleet, clearly illustrated the power of a modern military to the Australian public. In particular, the revelation by the Melbourne Age in March 1909 that Germany would have more battleships than England by 1912 precipitated real and widespread defence concern. Tanner, Compulsory Military Training, p. 25. 2 ibid., p. 24.

74 obligatory cadet training for boys aged 12-18, was submitted to parliament in September, and accepted in December 1909.3 Like Fisher’s earlier plan, Section 62 of Deakin’s Act required all 12-14 year old boys to become Junior Cadets and all 14-18 year olds to serve in the Senior Cadets. This was to be followed, by men aged 18-25, by compulsory membership in the Citizen Military Forces (CMF).4 A study of the Junior Cadet component of this scheme is outside the scope of this thesis since, as a non-uniformed, classroom-based activity they were positioned outside the definition of true cadets provided in Chapter 2. Junior Cadets were not organised as military bodies and were, in effect, nothing more than classes of schoolboys undergoing compulsory pseudo-military instruction during school hours.5 (A synopsis of the Junior Cadet scheme is at Appendix 3).

Empowered by the new Act, the military asserted itself immediately over the remnants of the old CMCC. Army authorities ordered registration for compulsory cadet service to commence at the beginning of 1911 with actual training initially limited to boys turning 17 in that year. Importantly, it was only after these decisions had been made that that the Defence Minister, G.F. Pearce, announced that the famous British military figure, Field Marshal Lord Kitchener, had been invited to visit Australia to advise the government on matters relating to the organisation and efficiency of the army.6 Having already decided on compulsory military service, the government hoped that the imperial warlord would lend credibility to its plans whilst raising public confidence and interest in defence. Lord Kitchener’s judgement that Australia’s forces were ‘inadequate in numbers, training, organisation and the munitions of war’, was precisely the exercise in public relations the government required to launch the compulsory scheme, while his reputation as a military organiser ensured that the new defence measures would not likely be faulted.7 Despite its true political purpose, Kitchener’s report was influential in determining some important aspects of the administrative structure of the universal system. It was he, for example, who recommended that the country be divided into Training Areas administered by

3 Notes on the Defence Act 1909. CRS A5954, Item 1282/1. 4 26 year-olds were required to attend an annual muster parade. ibid. 5 White, K., ‘Compulsory Military Training in Australia in 1914’, in Sabretache, Vol 18, 18 January 1977, p. 16. 6 ibid. 7 Tanner, Compulsory Military Training, p. 27.

75 Area Officers responsible for the organisation and training of CMF and Senior Cadet units.8

In 1911, following Kitchener’s recommendations, another change in government, and an amendment to the Defence Act, compulsory cadet training commenced under firm military control. For administrative and command purposes the country had already been divided into Military Districts, roughly corresponding to state boundaries, and on 1 January 1911 these Districts were further divided into 93 geographically based Battalion Areas, each of which was to provide one CMF and one Senior Cadet battalion.9 Each Battalion Area was divided into two or three smaller Training Areas, depending on whether they were metropolitan or country based, with each Training Area furnishing one or more Senior Cadet companies. For example, the 92nd Senior Cadet Battalion of the 23rd Brigade in Hobart had four Training Areas known as ‘92 A’, ‘92 B’, ‘92 C’, and ‘92 D’ with the first three containing three Senior Cadet companies each and the last a single company. The battalion thus contained 10 cadet companies spread over four separate Training Areas.10

To support such an unprecedented military structure scores of new army officers were appointed, predominantly as provisional captains and lieutenants, as Area Officers tasked to administer each of the 224 Training Areas.11 With them an additional 58 permanent officers and 425 NCOs of the Administrative and Instructional Staff were also recruited. Typically, two officers of the latter were allocated to each Brigade Area to act as Brigade Major and Assistant Brigade Major, responsible to the District Commandant, while both Brigade Majors and Area Officers were allotted permanent NCO instructors to help train their Senior Cadets and CMF

8 Kitchener’s recommendations were made public on 10 February 1910. Kitchener, H.H., Memorandum on the Defence of Australia, Government Printer, p. 11. 9 This was reduced to 92 Battalion Areas in 1912. Battalion Areas were generally grouped by fours into Brigade Areas (23 in total). 10 To cope with this demand 206 Area Officers had been trained in Albury in 1910. Staff and Regimental Lists of the Military Cadet Forces (1911). CRS A1194, Item 03.06/1536. 11 Barrett, J., Falling In: Australians and Boy Conscription 1911-1915, Hale and Iremonger, Sydney, 1979, p. 70.

76 soldiers.12 Area Officers were also appointed as cadet battalion Adjutants responsible for registering, clothing, equipping and arming their units.13

Senior Cadet training operated on a ‘quota’ system with a quota defined as the set of boys who became eligible for registration when they turned 14 in any given year. In 1917, for example, there were four cadet quotas under training: the 1900 (17 year olds); 1901 (16 year olds); 1902 (15 year olds) and the 1903 (14 year olds). So long as the scheme had four quotas running then boys were trained for four years. When two quotas were running they trained for two years and so forth. This system was implemented in two phases with the first running from 1 January to 1 June 1911. During this period the previous cadet organisation continued to function (albeit barely) while medical examinations were conducted for boys turning 14-17 in 1911. The second phase ran from 1 July 1911 to 1 June 1912 with the registration of boys turning 14 in 1912 and the beginning of actual training for those already enrolled.14

Revealing the ambitious scope of the conscript cadet scheme, in January 1911, the army’s Quartermaster-General, Lieutenant Colonel J.G. Legge, began a national lecturing tour to explain and provide advice to military personnel tasked to administer it. He predicted that of the 188,000 males in the country aged 14-18 years, 100,000 of them would be under training when the scheme matured.15 Legge estimated that the average Area Officer would be working with between 300-550 Senior Cadets and that the cost of the universal training system, once it was fully up and running (in its seventh year), would approach £161,000 per annum.16 The end of his tour coincided with the beginning of Senior Cadet activities in July 1911 and thus inaugurated the third epoch of the history of the cadet movement.

12 219 Training Areas were established by 1 January 1912. Notes of Lectures by Lieutenant Colonel J.G. Legge (1911). CRS A1194, Item 12.11/4880. 13 Commonwealth Yearbook, No 10 (1917), p. 983. 14 ibid., No 4 (1911), p. 1090. 15 Notes of Lectures by Lieutenant Colonel J.G. Legge (1911). CRS A1194, Item 12.11/4880. For additional information on Legge’s role in the implementation of the universal military training scheme see Coulthard-Clark, C.D., No Australian Need Apply: The Troubled Career of Lieutenant-General Gordon Legge, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1987. 16 Commonwealth Yearbook, No 4 (1911), p. 1085, & Notes of Lectures by Lieutenant Colonel J.G. Legge (1911). CRS A1194, Item 12.11/4880.

77 Any study of the cadet movement in the period 1911-29 requires due consideration of the military and social impact of the First World War. There is no doubt that wartime circumstances had a significant effect on issues such as the provision of adult cadet officers and military instructional staff. Certain elements of training were also influenced by the war. More significantly, the social effect of the conflict, including the debates over conscription in 1916 and 1917, was of considerable importance in shaping public opinion as to the continuing appropriateness of universal service. Indeed, changing community attitudes contributed appreciably to the eventual fate of the compulsory system (an issue discussed at length later in this chapter). In relative and general terms, however, the direct influence of the war on the movement was limited and much less, by comparison, than the Second World War. There were three reasons for this. First, the cadet scheme was compulsory and therefore issues relating to recruiting and retaining cadets during the war were all but irrelevant. Second, the scheme was part of the wider system of universal military training. Government and public commitment to this system from 1914-18 meant that the cadet movement was far less vulnerable to changing wartime priorities than it would have been had it stood alone. Lastly, the First World War was never about immediate national survival for Australia, which dulled its potential impact compared to the situation on the home front in Australia in 1942. The war was an important undercurrent for the cadet movement in 1914-18 but it was by no means a defining factor. As such it does not assume centre stage within this investigation and commands commensurately less attention than that accorded the Second World War in Chapter 6.

As noted, one aspect of the Senior Cadet system that was heavily influenced by the war was its voluntary adult staff. The social and military status of cadet officers rose considerably during the conflict. In 1912, for example, the Military Board forbade them from attending CMF camps and courses except if dual qualified as CMF officers. Primarily as a result of agitation from a number of motivated cadet officers, however, military regulations were amended in February 1914 allowing them to fill CMF vacancies during camps of continuous training.17 Furthermore, on 13 July 1914, a circular was released from Army Headquarters to all District Commandants stating

17 Memo, Military Board to GOC 1st Division (1914). CRS MP84/1, Item 1102/2/118.

78 that it had been brought to the attention of the Minister for Defence that cadet officers were not being ‘treated with the respect due their rank by members of the Instructional Staff and the Militia.’18 The headquarters reminded Commandants that Senior Cadet officers were entitled under the Defence Act to all of the marks of respect due to officers holding corresponding ranks in the adult military forces. Also helping to promote the social standing of cadet officers was the fact that during the war many of them volunteered for service with the Australian Imperial Force (AIF) and in scores of cases were transferred, without a reduction in rank, to serve as regimental officers in combat units. This course of action, however, had the unfortunate effect of leaving the cadet movement in the later war years with a high proportion of adult staff who were too old, incapacitated, or not inclined to volunteer for service abroad. It was thus from 1918 that the first serious complaints about the performance of cadet officers began to be raised in military circles.

Towards the end of 1918 a growing number of Area Officers began voicing concerns that the adult staff remaining within the cadet organisation were neither reliable nor competent. They were entirely satisfactory when on parade but ‘they are so seldom on parade that they can seldom be relied upon’ and the balance of workload regularly fell back onto the Area Officers.19 Most criticisms revolved around their commitment for although cadet detachments were, on paper, organised as battalions, in practice where adult staff were not effective they were run more as Training Areas without any true battalion structure. If Commanding Officers or company staffs were less than enthusiastic or proficient the reality was that cadets were administered by their Area Officer and were ‘led to regard their own particular sergeant-major as the chief military executive officer of the Commonwealth.’20 In some cases this resulted in an almost complete absence of battalion identity and esprit de corps. The fact that something like this situation existed in 1911 was understandable, given the inexperience of many cadet officers, but the capitulation of command responsibility to Area Officers from the later war years became an institutional weakness of the system.

18 Memo, Army Headquarters to Military Commandants, dated 14 July 1914. CRS A2023, Item A60/7/4. 19 Report of Cadet Training in Area 5A, dated November 1918. CRS MP376/1, Item 629/16/1176. 20 Goldsmith, J.A., ‘Suggestions for Improvement in Cadet Training’, in Australian Military Journal, Vol 5, 5 July 1914, p. 472.

79 The conduct of Senior Cadet training also suffered as a result of wartime circumstances. From 1914 many units were stripped of army instructional staff called to duty training reinforcements for the AIF. So too, the pressures of war meant that from July 1915 to June 1917, parade requirements were reduced significantly with compulsory drills suspended for three months from the 1 November 1915, and yearly training targets reduced from 64 hours to 48 hours (revised back up to 64 hours from July 1917). There was a rapid turnover of attached army personnel as they were promoted or posted to meet wartime requirements and, compounding these demands, from July 1918 to June 1920 portions of cadet training were cancelled altogether as a result of the Spanish Influenza epidemic.21 An important outcome of these wartime difficulties, and a theme discussed in greater detail at a later stage, was a necessary change of focus from purely military training to other forms of instruction not so reliant on army support including physical education, swimming lessons and so forth.22 This move away from a wholly military emphasis continued after the war with unit training programs by 1925 regularly describing route marches, physical, signals, sports and ‘general’ activities where fourteen years earlier drill and musketry exercises dominated. 23

Despite the long-tern transition of training orientation encouraged by the war, in many ways the compulsory cadet scheme, as an integral part of the wider system of universal service, twisted the purpose of the movement by making military objectives central. The whole rationale for Senior Cadets rested upon a perceived requirement for a stockpile of young men with basic military training that could be fed into the CMF without undue time being wasted on elementary instruction. Although never officially endorsed as a substitute for adult recruit training, the scheme was clearly interpreted by many military figures with this outcome in mind. Lieutenant Colonel N.M. Brazier, writing in the Australian Military Journal in 1914, answered the question ‘why are we training our youth?’ by explaining that it was ‘to prepare them to take their place in the army, full of life and patriotism and so defend our country from those foreign nations whose eyes are ever on our fertile shore.’24 Indeed as late as 1925, the Commanding Officer of the 29th Senior Cadet Battalion, Lieutenant

21 Army Headquarters Notes on Senior Cadet Training 1911-18 (Table). CRS A5954, Item 895/9. 22 Ballarat High School, The Minervan, 1915, p. 15. 23 Senior Cadet Battalion Training Programs (various) (1925). AWM 62, Item 55/3/226.

80 Colonel M.J. Ulrich, wrote to his Brigade Headquarters describing his quarterly training program as having ‘been drawn up to cover as far as possible elementary recruit training as preparation for entering the ranks of the Citizen Force Unit.’25 Interestingly, one of the few voices in opposition to this principle was the man used by the government to ease the passage of universal training legislation in the first place. Lord Kitchener never envisaged cadets as replacing adult recruit training, claiming that ‘while cadet training is valuable as a preparation, it cannot … replace recruit training, which is a necessary preliminary to the production of an efficient and trained citizen soldier.’26

Conceding the dominance of military purpose in the compulsory era, to conclude that educational and social outcomes had disappeared completely from the cadet agenda would be inaccurate. The pedagogical importance of cadethood remained entrenched in the minds of many teachers. Canon W.P.F. Morris, founder of Brisbane Church of England Grammar School, for instance, believed vehemently in the character-building aspects of mandatory training. He announced, when his school was established in 1912, that ‘in my own formula – chapel, cadets, rugby and prefects – the cadets have the higher priority … leadership in the cadet corps is on a broader basis.’27 In the same way there remained clear social outcomes identified for the compulsory cadet scheme in the context of widespread community concern about the degeneracy of youth, particularly in the cities, which characterised the era. As early as the debates surrounding the Defence Act (1903) the benefits of obligatory military training were espoused as a means to ‘improve the health, physique and discipline of Australian youth.’28 It would help overcome the ‘degrading, unhealthy and immoral influences of city life’, while in the country it would make life ‘more enjoyable through fellowship.’ Official government sources after 1911 recorded that

a marked improvement has been quite lately apparent in the general conduct and bearing of the youths of Australia, and it is claimed that this is the effect

24 Brazier, N.M., The Australian Military Journal, Vol 5, No 3, 1914, p. 450. 25 26th Senior Cadet Battalion Quarterly Training Program (1925). Australian War Memorial (AWM) Series 62, Item 55/3/226. 26 Kitchener, Memorandum, p. 6. 27 Bean, Here, My Son, p. 142. 28 Tanner, Compulsory Military Training, p. 21.

81 of universal training … a general tendency towards a sense of responsibility and a desire to become a good citizen.29

Although the military had ostensibly taken control of the objectives of the cadet movement, below the surface ideas of social and educational purpose endured.

Leaving ideas of purpose for the cadet movement to one side, the sheer scale of the scheme made it a considerable social phenomenon. Senior Cadet training began each July for all eligible boys turning 14 at any time during the year.30 Detachments, therefore, contained cadets between 13½ and 18½ years old. From 1 January to 31 July 1911, a total of 102,194 cadets were medically examined and of these only 3,725 were rejected as unfit for service with another 2,697 deemed temporarily unsuitable.31 By 31 December, six months after the commencement of the system, 155,132 Senior Cadets were registered with 93 per cent of these adjudged fit for training. Of these, 57,949 exemptions were granted leaving a total of 89,138 Senior Cadets in uniform at the end of 1911.32 Table 4A provides details of registrations, exemptions and numbers under training from 1913-21 (see Appendix 4 for a break down of these numbers by state). This enormous cadet body was organised into 92 battalions, each containing 8- 16 companies (a total of 905), with unit strength varying considerably due to the unequal size and population distribution of Training Areas.33 The establishment strength of a company of Senior Cadets in 1911, along with the significant changes made to it in 1912, are shown at Table 4B.34 From 1913 cadet companies were divided into platoons with strengths of 40-80 each and this arrangement remained in place without significant change up to 1922.35

29 The government ran its own inquiry in 1914, in conjunction with police authorities in each of the states, concluding that ‘the behaviour of youth who were subject to the training is vastly improved.’ Commonwealth Yearbook, No 9 (1916), p. 982. 30 Notes of Lectures by Lieutenant Colonel J.G. Legge (1911). CRS A1194, Item 12.11/4880. 31 Correspondence, Army Headquarters to ANA, dated August 1911. CRS MP84/1, Item 1964/1/7. 32 Commonwealth Yearbook, No 9 (1916), p. 977. 33 Report on the Progress of Universal Training (1912) (p. 8.). CRS A5954, Item 1208/7, & Notes of Lectures by the Quartermaster-General (1912) (p. 26.). CRS A1194, Item 12.11/4336. 34 In 1913 this establishment changed slightly to provide for 106 cadets per company with anything below 80 organised as a platoon. This structure was again varied upwards in 1915 to 160-210 cadets per company. Defence Act 1903-1912 – Regulations and Instructions (p. 56.). CRS A1194, Item 12.11/4338. 35 The only exception occurred in 1918 with a minor reorganisation of battalion designations. Defence Act 1903-1912 – Regulations and Instructions (p. 57.). CRS A1194, Item 12.11/4338, & Bendigo High School, Old Gold, 1918, p. 12.

82 Table 4A - Senior Cadets Registered, Exempted & Undergoing Training, 1913-21

Year Registered Exempted* In Training 1913 - - 88,708 1914 146,045 56,180 86,698 1915 136,568 46,248 88,245 1916 103,620 11,754 89,704 1917 103,731 11,361 90,057 1918 108,855 10,253 96,599 1919 110,179 9,328 98,580 1920 117,819 17,061 98,950 1921 123,947 23,361 98,997 * The large number of cadets exempted in 1914-15 was due largely to the delay in providing local drill halls in regional areas with those too distant from existing training locations temporarily excused. Increasing numbers of exemptions in 1920-21 were caused by alterations to the quota system and relaxing military attitudes to compulsion (discussed later).

100,000 Senior Cadets 95,000

90,000

85,000

80,000 1913 1914 1915 1916 1917 1918 1919 1920 1921 Source: Commonwealth Yearbooks No 7 (1914) p. 945; No 8 (1915) p. 944; No 9 (1916) p. 984; No 10 (1917) p. 988; No 11 (1918) p. 1021; No 12 (1919) p. 1010; No 13 (1920) p. 1003; No 14 (1921) p. 921; No 15 (1922) p. 620.

Table 4B - Establishment Strength of a Company of Senior Cadets, 1911 & 1912

RANK 1911 1912 major (officer commanding) 1 - captain 1 1 subalterns (lieutenants) 4 2 company sergeant major (CSM) 1 1 company quartermaster sergeant (CQMS) 1 - sergeants 8 4 corporals 10 4 lance corporals - 4 buglers 4 2 privates (cadets) 210 102 TOTAL 240 120

Source: Candy, Victorian Cadet Movement, p. 24-22, & Stupart, R., The Cadet Handbook and Section Roll, Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1912, p. 7.

83 Not surprisingly, the first challenge for the Senior Cadet organisation was finding enough adult officers to man the multitude of new units and, again indicative of widespread initial community support, the fact that the system began to function at all was attributed to ‘the patriotic assistance of those citizens who volunteered, not only from the militia and from the old cadets, but from the population generally.’36 By 1912 the cadet battalions were short only five Commanding Officers and 804 regimental officers (from an overall requirement of 2,712). The Inspector General of the Australian Military Forces, Major General G.M. Kirkpatrick, considered the Senior Cadet system to be successfully established by 1913 and commented on its satisfactory progress in his annual report.37 Despite Kirkpatrick’s optimistic remarks, however, the scheme was not implemented as smoothly as official sources claimed. In an attempt to improve the profile and reputation of the organisation, a conference of militia officers in 1912 recommended that ceremonial parades be implemented to mark the passage of the first Senior Cadets into the CMF. Similarly, to raise cadet morale, the conference recommended territorialising units such that, for example, the 21st Senior Cadet Battalion, would become the 21st Woollahra Senior Cadets. Although neither initiative was widely implemented, they indicated a measure of dissatisfaction with the initial conduct of the scheme.38

Exemptions from Senior Cadet training were granted to those deemed by the military authorities to be temporarily or permanently unfit for service, those who were not ‘substantially of European origin or descent’, members of the permanent military forces, and theological students. In addition, the Governor General could grant a temporary exemption of up to one year to boys residing outside areas in which training was carried out or those living at such a distance from training locations that compulsory attendance would cause ‘great hardship.’39 The latter provision was applied to cadets residing more than five miles from a training centre. The exclusion of boys from areas deemed too inaccessible was lamented in many country areas at the time. An Inspector of Public Schools in NSW, for example, wrote in 1915 that

36 Report of the Inspector General of the Australian Military Forces (1912) (p. 13.). CRS A1194, Item 20.25/6698. 37 Report of the Inspector General of the Australian Military Forces (1913) (p. 13.). CRS A1194, Item 20.15/6699. 38 Department of Defence, Report of the Conference of Militia Officers, 22-25 October 1912, Government Printer, 1912, p. 10.

84

the pity of it is that in this district there is no compulsory training so that the lad who reaches 14 years of age is prevented from continuing. When the railway is completed compulsory training will be enforced at towns like Port Macquarie, Wauchope, Kempsey, Macksville, Bellingen and Dorrigo, and the sooner this happens the better for the lads of the country.40

Emphasising military dominance over the compulsory system, cadets, in uniform, were subject to military law and regulations dealing with adult forces.41 Those who did not show up for registration or for training parades were investigated by their Area Officer and army provost staff and were liable for prosecution as guilty of an offence under the Defence Act.42 Financial penalties could be levied against employers or parents who prevented their sons from attending mandatory parades, and any cadet who evaded training, in addition to being classed as non-efficient, was liable for a fine of between £5-£100. On top of this penalty, or in lieu of it, a court could commit an offender into custody and confinement for the time corresponding to the length of service missed. This confinement was not usually in a gaol but rather a prescribed institution, such as a military barracks, and it did not have to be continuous. A convicted cadet attempting to escape from custody, or seriously breeching discipline whilst under confinement, could be sentenced to an additional 20 days. Finally, until all such penalties were discharged, an offender remained ineligible for employment with the Commonwealth public service.43

Although military control severely curtailed direct educational influence within the movement, it managed to survive in two ways. First, in addition to community-based Senior Cadet detachments parading out of local drill halls or other public facilities, a number of units were raised and maintained by schools provided there were more than 60 cadets present (later lowered to 30) and where at least one

39 Such provisions were similar to those in place for later National Service schemes in the 1950s and 1960s. ibid., p. 5. 40 Report of Department of Education Inspector (North East NSW Region) (1915). SRNSW CGS3830, Item 20/12534. 41 Department of Defence, The Defence Act 1903-1927 and Regulations and Orders for the Australian Military Forces and Senior Cadets (Regulations 1927), Government Printer, 1927, p. 324. 42 Department of Defence, The Defence Act 1903-1915 and Regulations for the Military Forces and Senior Cadets of Australia (Regulations 1915), Government Printer, 1916, p. 315. 43 Stupart, R. (ed.), Rifle Exercises and Musketry Instruction for Cadets: for Officers and Non- Statement Commissioned Officers in the Commonwealth Cadet Corps, Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1914, pp. 12-13.

85 officer was a teacher. Cadets within these school-based units remained enrolled for so long as they were pupils. In 1911 many schools that had not previously maintained cadet units raised them to provide students with suitable environments in which to fulfil their obligatory training requirements. Adelaide High School was one such example when, in July 1911, two companies were formed and over 300 cadets paraded under the supervision of officers drawn exclusively from the school.44 Alternatively, many schools that had maintained cadets under the previous voluntary system transformed them to school-based Senior Cadet units. A typical example was the Shore School in Sydney. The first cadet detachment in the school was raised in 1908 as ‘G’ Company, 3rd Battalion, CMCC, and remained a voluntary unit until 1911 when it became ‘A’ and ‘B’ Company of the 18th Senior Cadet Battalion.45 Understandable self interest motivated such schools since it meant that compulsory military activities could be tailored to fit school requirements and not intrude overly upon students’ work or examination results. In support of such flexibility cadet battalion Commanding Officers were authorised to grant leave to Senior Cadets from school-based units when examinations drew near, while Brigade Majors could vary parade lengths and timings to suit local requirements.46

To some extent school-based Senior Cadet detachments ensured a limited continuance of the state school/private school divide that had characterised the movement from the colonial era. As a case study of how units were structured in 1922, for example, the cadet company of the 33rd Battalion (CMF) in NSW, ‘E’ Company, consisted of four separate platoons. The make up of these platoons showed how divisions were decided on the basis of quota, locality, and whether the cadets were from school-based or community-based detachments. 1 Platoon consisted of cadets from Armidale (1906 & 1907 quotas), 2 Platoon was formed from detachments at The Armidale School, De La Salle College and Armidale High School, while 3 and 4 Platoons were made up of cadets from Tamworth from the 1906 and 1907 quotas respectively.47 In this way school identity was preserved. Additionally, on the whole it was proportionally far more common for private schools to maintain detachments of Senior Cadets then it was for pubic schools. Furthermore, independent school-based

44 Adelaide High School, 50th Anniversary Book, 1958, p. 15. 45 Shore, The Torch Bearer, 4 May 1939, p. 22. 46 Stupart, Rifle Exercises and Musketry Instruction, p. 9.

86 companies were permitted provided a minimum strength of four platoons was reached. Of course, the only schools with the resources and inclination to maintain such sizeable autonomous detachments were the larger and wealthier private schools.48

Despite their potential as an avenue for sustaining educational influence within the movement, school-based units only ever represented a small fraction of the total number of Senior Cadets. Evidence of this was provided by the types of people applying for cadet commissions at the time. In Victoria, in 1911, of 296 applications only 38 came from teachers compared to 100 from clerks of various types.49 Nor was the military content to cede ground back to educationalists and discouraged school- based Senior Cadets units despite the fact that their attendance rates were consistently better than community units. The headmaster of Brisbane Central Boys School in April 1912, for example, despite having over 100 boys of Senior Cadet age at his school, felt his Area Officer was blocking attempts to establish a school detachment and sought ministerial intervention to rectify the situation. He may have been correct, given that a 1st Military District memorandum of the time spoke of school-based units as causing extra work for Area Officers because boys generally left the school at 15 and required transfers to community detachments.50

The second manner in which schools were able to exert limited influence on the compulsory system was through tenancy. Many headmasters without school-based units allowed their playgrounds to be used by Area Officers to train community detachments and some made facilities available as office space on account of an initial national shortage of drill halls. Such arrangements, however, did not always end well and were reminiscent of the military/educational friction of the CMCC. Numerous records exist concerning complaints by schools that Area Officers had outlived their welcome and were either trying to interfere with school business, that cadets were causing the destruction of school property, or were behaving in an unruly manner before and after parades. The headmaster at Ithica High School in Queensland complained that ‘cadets drilling in the locality are not under control’ for they had

47 Return, Organisation of the 33rd Battalion (1924). AWM 61, Item 507/4/46. 48 Return, Organisation of the 1st Battalion (1922). CRS MP367/1, Item 612/25/3843. 49 Barrett, Falling In, pp. 78-79.

87 broken an office window and ‘knocked a hole in the bottom of a full tank and let the water out’ as well as ‘annoying a poor girl in a nearby shop with filthy language.’51 In the majority of such cases the military response was to relocate the offending Area Officer for fear of causing a general movement against the tenancy of community- based detachments in school premises. By September 1913, of the 49 schools in the country that had originally offered their schoolyards for use by Senior Cadets, nine had withdrawn the invitation due to alleged misconduct including three of the seven schools in Queensland, three of the four schools in Victoria, and the only school to have made such an offer in Tasmania.52

The power of changing military circumstances, combined with the effect of budgetary pressure, shaped the cadet movement in the compulsory era just as they had done in years past. A fundamental reorganisation of the Senior Cadet system was wrought in 1922 which heralded a series of upheavals and general turbulence that plagued the scheme for the next seven years. On 13 September 1922, in an effort to bring about greater cooperation between cadets and the CMF, to remove the expensive separate allotments of instructional staff, and to redefine the confusing duties of Area Officers, Senior Cadet battalions ceased to exist as independent units. From this point cadets were attached as companies to parent CMF battalions and designated ‘E’ or ‘F’ Senior Cadet Company of, for instance, the 1st Battalion (CMF). Each cadet company was organised into platoons consisting of one officer and 60 other ranks with, depending on the number of cadets present, strengths varying from one to six platoons. Only three years later in July 1925, with control of the movement placed in the hands of a newly formed Directorate of Physical Training and Cadet Services under Colonel F.J. Anderson, the practice of cadet companies attaching to CMF battalions was replaced by a system of appending individual cadet platoons to CMF companies.53 This reorganisation was fully instituted by 31 May 1926.54 From 1927, each time the CMF battalions were reorganised or reduced in strength (a regular occurrence), so too their attached cadet platoons had to be restructured and from this

50 Correspondence, Headmaster to Minister of Defence, dated April 1912. QSA RSI15191, Item 426. 51 Reports of schools damaged by Senior Cadets (various). CRS A2023, Item B223/1/34. 52 ibid. 53 Colonel Anderson remained the Director until the disestablishment of the position in August 1944. Typically, Battalion Headquarters had the 1st (Senior Cadet) Platoon attached, A Company had the 2nd Platoon, B Company the 3rd Platoon and so forth. Essay on the History of Army Cadets (1939-45). AWM 54, Item 147/2/1, & Memo, 1st Division (internal) (1925). AWM 61, Item 507/3/91.

88 point even the platoon-based system seemed to be unravelling.55 In that year, for example, permission was granted for select school-based detachments to drill at home locations rather than with the rest of their platoons at CMF training localities.56 Instability and degradation of the Senior Cadet system were the direct results of financially motivated military reorganisations from 1922-29.

Further evidence of the perpetual problem of finance were difficulties associated with clothing and arming the Senior Cadets. From the outset the cost of providing free uniforms was a concern for government and military authorities alike. A conference of militia officers in 1912, for example, recommended that for reasons of economy cadets should not be issued with boots.57 Notwithstanding this frugal proposal, they were issued with footwear but were ordered not to wear it except when on parade, an order that was, of course, ignored by many boys whose families were not in a position to buy quality shoes. Under conditions of war the military supply system found it even more difficult to outfit the enormous number of cadets rotating through the organisation. Cadets at Adelaide High School only received their uniforms in mid-1913 and a report on cadet training in Area 5A (South Melbourne) revealed that in November 1918, of a parade state of around 500 cadets, 30 attended parade in civilian clothes and about 150 wore civilian shoes.58 Nor were uniforms easily replaced if damaged or worn out with the single issue of woollen breeches supposed to last a growing cadet for four years.59 In the end the financial burden of cadet uniforms convinced military authorities to replace them in 1922 with a more practical garb consisting of a brown jersey, brown shoes and socks, khaki shorts and hats. In the words of a Senior Cadet at Scotch College in Tasmania, ‘it leaves much to be desired with regard to appearance [but] it is certainly more comfortable and sensible to drill in.’60

54 Report of the Inspector General Australian Military Forces (1926). CRS A1194, Item 20.25/15091. 55 Memo, 2nd Division (internal) (1927). AWM 61, Item 507/4/162. 56 Memo, 1st Division (internal) (1928). AWM 61, Item 507/3/91. 57 Department of Defence, Report of the Conference of Militia Officers, 22-25 October 1912, Government Printer, 1912, p. 13. 58 Ballarat High School, The Minervan, 1916, p. 16; Adelaide High School, Magazine, Midwinter, 1914, p. 21, & Report of Cadet Training in Area 5A, dated November 1918. CRS MP376/1, Item 629/16/1176. 59 Department of Defence, Regulations 1915, p. 335. 60 Scotch College (Tasmania), The Caledonian, 1922, p. 10.

89 Problems of finance and supply were also reflected in the provision of cadet weapons. The majority were issued with the .310 calibre Westley-Richards rifle, a sling, and a waist belt with pouch.61 In Military Districts where there were not enough of these rifles then service .303 calibre Lee Enfields were issued to make up the balance (not exceeding 10 per cent of strength).62 Again, however, the demands of war and fiscal constraint meant that in 1916 many units had their belts, pouches and rifles withdrawn by the military for use by the adult army.63 In 1918, in one Melbourne detachment, there were only enough weapons to arm 50 per cent of cadets on parade despite the fact that on average only around 75 per cent of them actually turned up for training.64 In 1923 virtually all weapons, except for a few to be used for instructional purposes, were withdrawn permanently from Senior Cadet units. This unhappy circumstance reflected not only a general downturn in the provision of support but also a changing training focus for the Senior Cadet system as the 1920s progressed.65 In general terms these difficulties mirrored the financial problems of the wider army with, excluding money spent on the AIF and the war effort from 1914-19, government funds failing to match increases in national GDP for the period 1911-29 (see Table 4C). It was not surprising that such restrictions led to inadequate material support for Senior Cadets.

Table 4C – Trends in Army Expenditure against GDP, 1911-29 2000 1800 1600 1400 1200 1000 Army Expediture (£'000) (less AIF) 800 GDP (at current prices ($'M)) 600 400

4 12 13 14 15 /16 17 18 21 22 2 25 26 27 30 5 1 9 1910/111911/ 1912/ 1913/ 1914/ 1 1916/ 1917/ 1918/19 1919/201920/ 1921/ 1922/23 1923/ 1924/ 1925/ 1926/ 1927/28 1928/291929/ Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Special Article: History of National Accounts in Australia, ABS Homepage, www.abs.gov.au & Beaumont, Australian Defence: Sources & Statistics, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 2001, p. 30.

61 The Westley Richards was a light version of the Martini-Henry with a range of 400 yards. 62 Notes of Lectures by Lieutenant Colonel J.G. Legge (1911). CRS A1194, Item 12.11/4880. 63 Penrose, Red, Black and Khaki, p. 18. 64 Report of Cadet Training in Area 5A, dated November 1918. CRS MP376/1, Item 629/16/1176. 65 Memo, Army Headquarters to Area Officers, dated 24 March 1920. CRS MP376/1, Item 629/16/1525 & Horner, PAC Cadet Unit (Extracts), p. 11.

90 Leaving aside the harmful impact of restricted material support, one constructive conduit for limited educational (and certain social) influences on the movement, for much of the compulsory era, was through the ideas and motivations of volunteer adult staff. In many cases these individuals had neither a army heritage nor an overly military orientation which tended to counter, to a limited degree, army dominance over the Senior Cadets. While most of the officers of the previous voluntary system continued to serve from 1911, those new to the cadet movement needed to be trained and, like the cadets they commanded, were required to pass examinations for initial commissioning and for all subsequent promotions.66 A significant attraction of cadet service for voluntary adult officers was the fact that those under 26 years of age could substitute it in lieu of their own universal training requirements.67 Apart from motivating many adult officers, this regulation meant that cadets who had reached the rank of 2nd lieutenant were often able to continue within the organisation after their 18th birthday. The proportion of officers under 26 years old in the Senior Cadet system was considerable with, in 1924, 292 individuals of CMF compulsory training age exempted as a result of cadet service.68 No doubt compounding the attraction were associated allowances paid at £7 per annum for battalion commanders, £5 for a company commanders, and £3 for other officers.69

Cadets themselves were a second important non-military influence on the nature and style of their units. Throughout the compulsory era they were chosen to fill

66 Report by the Minister for Defence on the Progress of Universal Training (1912) (p. 8.). CRS A5954, Item 1208/7. Appointments as battalion Commanding Officers were made for five years with additional service permitted in unusual circumstances. In general, officers were required to retire at the age of 60 years unless, again, unusual circumstances warranted an extension. In 1927 selection as an officer of Senior Cadets was permitted without having passed the examination for the rank to which the appointment was made and in such cases an officer was given 18 months to qualify or be removed. Retired officers, with greater than 15 years experience, were allowed to retain their rank upon retirement and wear the uniform of the Senior Cadets (with an R on the shoulder strap). Officers could also transfer between units and were placed on an ‘Unattached List’, if circumstances prevented a posting to a Senior Cadet unit, for a period of not more than 5 years. Department of Defence, Regulations 1927, p. 317, & Department of Defence, Regulations 1915, pp. 325-363. 67 Department of Defence, Regulations 1927, p. 316. 68 Department of Defence, Regulations 1915, p. 324, & Commonwealth Yearbook, No 18 (1925), p. 605. 69 A proposal to increase Senior Cadet officers’ allowances to £8 (Battalion Commanders), £6 (Company Commanders) and £5(other officers) was refused by the Military Board in 1913. In addition to these basic allowances officers attending continuous military activities of greater than eight days received a field allowance commensurate with their rank. Defence Act 1903-1912 – Regulations and Instructions (p. 76.). CRS A1194, Item 12.11/4338; Memo, Army Headquarters (internal) (1912). CRS MP84/1, Item 1532/17/2, & Department of Defence, Financial and Allowances Regulations for the Australian Military Forces and Senior Cadets, Government Printer, 1921, pp. 76-77.

91 the ranks up to and including that of 2nd lieutenant while adult cadet officers (or CMF officers from 1922) held the higher appointments of lieutenant and above.70 In 1911 select cadets were appointed as temporary NCOs and attended voluntary parades, with other hopefuls, in order to prepare themselves for qualifying examinations to make their rank substantive. Once the scheme was mature, however, cadets sat these competitive examinations before they were considered for promotion with the most successful usually afforded appointment to the next highest grade.71 Promotion (and reductions) of NCOs was the responsibility of cadet battalion Commanding Officers while boards consisting of at least three officers (including the Area Officer) conducted examinations for promotion to the rank of 2nd lieutenant. The syllabus of a sample examination is shown at Figure 4A. The importance of cadet 2nd lieutenants during this period should not be understated for although they numbered but a few in 1912 (146), posting orders from 1924 show that Senior Cadet platoons, from this date, were predominantly commanded by them.72

Figure 4A - Examination for the Rank of 2nd Lieutenant, 1912 REGIMENTAL DUTIES MAP READING DRILL & FIELD TRAINING • Defence Act Parts V, VII, • Identifying observer’s • Theory of rifle fire & practical application, VIII, XIV and XV position on a map Visual training & ranging • Regulations Parts I -III. • Definition of Map terms • Squad drill with arms • Conventional signs • Section drill • Recognising hill features • Company drill • Setting a map • Care of arms & musketry instruction • Measuring distances • Squad drill without arms

Source: Examination Syllabus for 2nd Lieutenant (1912) (pp.87-88.). CRS A1194, Item 12.11/4338.

From 1911-29 the nature of cadet training became a model example of the danger of excessive military influence within the movement. Indeed, in the final analysis military mismanagement of training proved to be a key weakness of the compulsory scheme. Amendments to the Defence Act (1909) had, by 1911, watered down the training requirements for Senior Cadets almost before they had begun. From

70 Approval was granted in July 1912 for two 2nd lieutenant positions to be made available in each Senior Cadet company. Memo, Army Headquarters to Military Districts, dated July 1912. CRS A2023, Item A100/9/1. 71 Appointments as lance corporals were made to promising candidates from the age of 14, while two years experience was required for promotion to corporal and three for promotion to sergeant or 2nd lieutenant. 72 Posting Orders 18th & 51st Battalions (1924). AWM 61, Item 507/3/33.

92 what was originally planned, the length of whole day drills was reduced from six to four hours, half-day drills were reduced from three to two and night drills became one rather than one and one half hours long. Thus total yearly training time by mid-1911 was pared down by almost a third from what was originally planned.73 What resulted was a system that prescribed 64 hours of cadet instruction per annum broken up into 4 whole day drills, 12 half-day drills and 24 night drills.74 In 1918 quarter-day drills, of not less than one hour and conducted in daylight, were introduced to replace an equivalent number of night drills at the discretion of the District Commandants.75 Actual training parades existed in two types: statutory (prescribed and compulsory training periods), or voluntary (where those slow to assimilate training, those who needed to make up for missed parades, or those preparing for promotion examinations were able to gain extra instruction.)76 At the highest levels responsibility for cadet training resided with District Commandants answerable to the Military Board. Answering to the Commandants, Brigade Majors supervised the training programs of cadet battalion Commanding Officers. Commanding Officers were assisted in the discharge of their training duties by their local Area Officers and permanent instructional staff, although, as discussed, in practice this staff did much more than merely assist and in 1912 it was estimated that half of all cadet training was physically conducted by them.77

In the early years of the compulsory cadet system training activities were focused on basic combat-related skills pertinent to all arms of the adult service to which cadets would graduate. In general terms this included marching, discipline, handling arms, musketry, physical drill, navigation, first aid, guards and sentries, tactical training as part of a company, elementary field work and basic battalion

73 Report of the Minister for Defence on the Progress of Universal Training (1912) (p. 9.). CRS A5954, Item 1208/7. 74 If a cadet resided more than two miles from an appointed place of training then an allowance was made for travelling time and less drill was expected. Leaves of absence were granted in the case of bad weather and, from 14 October 1921, cadets were dismissed with full credit for attendance if the temperature reached 100 degrees Fahrenheit in the shade. Department of Defence, Regulations 1915, p. 317, & Military Board Circular Number G 145, dated 14 October 1921. QSA RSI15191, Item 1-431. 75 Department of Defence, Regulations 1915, p. 317. 76 Notes of Lectures by the Quartermaster-General (1911) (p. 27.). CRS 1194, Item 12.11/4336. 77 Battalion commanders were also responsible for issuing monthly training programs, detailing the dates and types of upcoming parades, posted to all Senior Cadets and displayed at post-offices and drill halls. Department of Defence, Regulations 1915, p. 318, & Report of the Minister for Defence on the Progress of Universal Training (1912) (p. 9.). CRS A5954, Item 1208/7.

93 drill.78 That, at least, was the plan. Unfortunately, for the duration of the scheme the bulk of Senior Cadet training tended to revolve around parade ground drill with musketry training hardly begun and field training not conducted at all in 1912. The Brighton Grammar School Senior Cadet detachment reported in that year that its only activities were ‘company drill and rifle exercises.’79 To overcome the allure of the parade ground, which represented a cheap and ‘easy’ option for training staff, resolutions were passed at various militia officers’ conferences prior to 1914 recommending that Senior Cadets in their fourth year be trained in preparation to the arm of service to which they would soon be allotted. Despite repeated efforts, however, nothing came of such suggestions and the over-emphasis on drill remained.80

At the end of each year cadets continued to be classified as efficient or non- efficient as they had been prior to 1911. A non-efficient rating was caused by a failure to attend the prescribed number of parades, if a mandatory musketry course was not completed, or if a cadet was judged not to have attained a sufficient level of training with respect to his capacity and experience.81 In practice this meant that a cadet who was forced to miss a compulsory parade, and was given leave to do so, needed only to catch up on the parade that was missed. If, however, he was absent without leave then to catch it up he was required to attend two additional parades of equal value to achieve efficiency.82 The compulsory musketry course was conducted in much the same manner as it had been during the voluntary era. Again, it was a two part activity conducted over two days. The first consisted of practical tests and a 30 round miniature range shoot, where facilities existed, and the second required cadets to progress to an open range to complete a shoot at ranges of up to 400 yards.83 In 1911 cadets were required to repeat each year of training for which they were classed as non-efficient, but by 1927 this obligation was tempered such that additional training

78 Commonwealth Yearbook, No 5 (1912), p. 1094. 79 ‘Rifle Exercises’ (drill movements with weapons) were ‘thoroughly taught and be carried out with smartness and precision.’ Cadets were regularly drilled in close or extended order ‘by the numbers’. Brighton Grammar School, Grammarian, 1912, p. 48. 80 Goldsmith, Improvement in Cadet Training, p. 468. 81 Department of Defence, Regulations 1927, p. 285. 82 Stupart, Rifle Exercises and Musketry Instruction, p. 9. 83 The first serial was a grouping practice with five rounds fired at 100 yards from the prone position. The second (application) component consisted of one serial of five rounds followed by three serials of ten between 200-400 yards again from the lying position. The Senior Cadet musketry course inherited its predecessor’s point scoring system for classifying cadets. ibid., p. 54.

94 and parade attendance (conducted on top of continuing commitments), were used to abrogate the need to repeat a whole years effort.84

Despite full control over training methods and objectives, military expectations of cadet efficiency were consistently disappointed. To make sure that Senior Cadets (and CMF soldiers) were moving towards efficiency as the training year progressed, Captain J.L. Whitham was appointed as the Inspector of Universal Training in 1912 and in the following year he scrutinized 218 out of the 219 Training Areas.85 Whitman’s investigations revealed considerable difficulties in all cadet brigades (see by Table 4D). A Class I area contained greater than 90 per cent cadet attendance as well as efficient training and administration, a Class II area between 80- 90 per cent attendance and satisfactory training standards, while a Class III area was considered below standard in some respect. Only 15 of the 218 areas inspected (7 per cent) reported Class I cadet companies while 133 (61 per cent) were unsatisfactory. This issue was never resolved and cadet inefficiency plagued the compulsory system throughout its existence.

Table 4D - Efficiency of Senior Cadet Brigades and Training Areas, 1913

Military District Cadet Brigades Class I Areas Class II Areas Class III Areas 1st (QLD) 1st -3rd 2 10 19 2nd (NSW) 4th-11th 4 24 45 3rd (VIC) 12th-18th 8 27 30 4th (SA) 19th-20th nil 5 19 5th (WA) 21st-22nd 1 4 14 6th (TAS) 23rd nil nil 7 TOTAL 15 70 133

Source: Report of the Inspector General of the Australian Military Forces (1913) (p. 14.). CRS A1194, Item 20.15/6699.

The long-standing tradition of competition as a mainstay of cadet endeavour continued in the period 1911-29 although again, representing army encroachment into areas traditionally influenced by social and educational factors, the emphasis shifted away from rifle matches towards more general military contests. The most important of these was the Annual Military Competition designed to select the ‘Champion Cadet

84 Notes of Lectures by the Quartermaster-General (1911) (p. 28.). CRS 1194, Item 12.11/4336, & Department of Defence, Regulations 1927, p. 290. 85 Report of the Inspector General of the Australian Military Forces (1913) (p. 13.). CRS A1194, Item 20.15/6699.

95 Team of the Commonwealth.’ This competition was first conducted in 1912 with teams consisting of an officer, three NCOs and 40 cadets competing in a series of contests, through a process of elimination within each Military District, to select a team to go on to compete for the national title. At local, district and national stages the competition was designed to encourage voluntary effort in the attainment of high standards of drill, rifle shooting and other military skills.86 Up to 1926 the Annual Military Competitions were subject to minor alterations to team sizes, scoring systems, rules and procedures, while remaining styled with the same basic intent, objectives and components.87 Apart from official prizes and competitions, military and other forms of sports and games were encouraged and often combined with these annual contests.88

From 1926, army influence over cadet competition was diluted with a re-focus on sport over military skills. In October of that year Army Headquarters transformed both Senior Cadet and CMF military competitions into a single ‘Military and Athletic Competition for Senior Cadets and Military Forces.’ The scope of the new contest was given to be ‘of a military and athletic value to develop the physical efficiency of the individual.’ The new competition was still arranged in a cascading series and events including rifle shooting, signalling, and physical training along with ‘other competitions as may be decided by the District Athletic and Competitions Committee.’89 In most cases the latter consisted of sporting challenges. By 1929

86 The contests consisted of six individual sections. The first was military rifle shooting (370 marks) followed by an inspection (100 marks), physical training (150 marks), company drill (200 marks), skirmishing (250 marks), and a march-past (50 marks). Each team was given a total score out of 1,120 which ranked them from first to last in each series. Gold medals were awarded to the champion Commonwealth team and silver medals to the champion district teams. Competition medals were official awards, mounted on a green ribbon, depicting a map of Australia with the words, Commonwealth Military Competitions – Senior Cadets, on one side, and Champion Team – Commonwealth (or District) Competition, and the name of the winner on the other. Downey, M., ‘The Commonwealth Senior Cadets Competition Medal’, in Despatch, Vol 6, No 6 & 7, December-January, 1970-71, p. 76. 87 The battalion, brigade, district and Commonwealth series continued with prizes modified as follows: a silver embroidered badge for champion battalion teams, silver badges for champion brigade and district teams and gold badges for members of the champion national team. From 1914 the Commonwealth champions, in addition to badges, were awarded the ANA Challenge Trophy with the best shot in each winning district squad presented with ANA Gold Medals for Rifle Shooting. The Lady Dudley Banner was presented to the cadet battalion in each Military District that provided the champion team for that District. 88 ibid., p. 338. 89 The shooting element saw teams of ten cadets participating in ‘application’ and ‘sharpshooting’ practices at ranges from 100-300 yards at six different sized targets. The signalling event tested teams on individual and group semaphore with points awarded for turn out, smartness in drill, correct

96 Military and Athletic Competition for Senior Cadets and Military Forces had grown to include band, miniature rifle shooting, and various sports.

Throughout the compulsory era Senior Cadets continued to participate in international shooting contests although, with the reduction in school involvement, such events were accorded a far lower priority than in past years. In addition, a rule change in the Earl Roberts competition in 1912 meant that Australian teams became ineligible to compete. In its place the King George V Trophy was raised and first presented in 1925 with winners determined by the same competition scores sent to Britain as for the existing Imperial Challenge Trophy.90 In this case, however, the prize was awarded to the country with the highest average of the best 3,000 individual cadet scores. South Africa dominated this contest, winning it eighteen times in the first twenty-two years.91 The tradition of national and state shooting matches also continued, albeit on a decreased scale. One example, in May 1913, was the Victoria League’s presentation of a shooting trophy to the Senior Cadet company in the state with the highest aggregated score at the annual musketry course.92

Apart from the contests described above, numerous one-off or local non- shooting competitions in a range of disciplines were conducted by and for the Senior Cadets. On 26 December 1911, for example, the Governor General received a Vice Regal invitation from Canada for a squad of Australian cadets to visit and take part in the competitions held in connection with the Canadian National Exhibition. These contests included military skills, physical training and drill. Closer to home, in August 1920, boxing and wrestling were formally placed on the cadet physical training syllabus and almost immediately a Senior Cadet Boxing Championship was established in Victoria.93 Suffice to say that competition, and the enthusiasm it

positioning, accuracy and style. The physical training contest was designed to follow a choreographed script of exercises consisting of heel, arm and leg raises, stretches and marching. Memo, Army Headquarters to Military Districts (1926). CRS SP459/1, Item 441/1/429, & Military Board Instruction, dated October 1926. CRS SP459/1, Item 441/1/106. 90 Due to their being armed with the Westley-Richards rifle that was accurate only up to 400 yards while the competition called for shooting at longer ranges. Memo, Army Headquarters to Military Commandants, dated March 1912. CRS MP84/1, Item 2024/6/241. 91 Department of Defence, Cadet Journal, No 1, 1950, p. 48. 92 Memo, Rules and Conditions of the Victorian League Shooting Competition (1912). CRS MP84/1, Item 506/1/6. 93 Memo, Commandant 3rd Military District to Senior Cadet Battalions, dated 30 October 1920. CRS MP367/1, Item 629/16/1449.

97 inspired, although subjected to much higher levels of military imposition than in the past, was a successful element of Senior Cadet training system otherwise beset with difficulties.

Civic and military propensity to utilise cadets for public ceremonial occasions persisted from the days of the voluntary system and went hand-in-hand with an over- concentration on parade ground drill. In order to give a practical demonstration of the first year’s results of the compulsory system the Governor General, Lord Denman, suggested a review of Senior Cadets be held. Accordingly, a parade of Sydney metropolitan cadets was carried out in Centennial Park on 30 March 1912 with 18,642 turned out. After the event Denman sent a telegram to the Prime Minister, Andrew Fisher, suggesting that ‘the numbers, organisation, and good order maintained on this parade demonstrated the good results achieved after nine months of universal training.’94 Denman was surely an optimist as 50 per cent of the cadets at the Sydney parade still did not have rifles and some did not have uniforms. Nonetheless, similar parades were repeated in Adelaide, Brisbane and Melbourne.95

In more general terms Senior Cadets participated in a range of regular and unique civil and military parades up to 1929. They provided Guards of Honour on occasions like the opening of federal parliament each year as well as a range of other public functions including the visits of General Sir William Birdwood and the Prince of Wales to Australian capital cities in 1920.96 Detachments generally welcomed these sorts of ceremonial activities as they, like military and sporting competitions, provided some measure of relief from the general monotony of compulsory training parades. For school-based Senior Cadet detachments such occasions also involved issues of status, reputation and pride. The King’s School, for example, was quite keen on gaining an official place for its detachment at the opening of Parliament House by the Duke of York on 10 May 1927. The manner in which that the school’s request bounced around the corridors of power showed that the influence of large private

94 Report of the Minister for Defence on the Progress of Universal Training (1912) (p. 14.). CRS A5954, Item 1208/7. 95 Report of Senior Cadet Parade of 30 March 1912. CRS MP84/1, Item 139/3/89; Memo, 4th Military District to Senior Cadet Battalions (1912). CRS MP84/1, Item 1039/3/42, & Report on Senior Cadet Parade of 19 August 1912. CRS MP84/1, Item 739/3/59. 96 Adelaide High School, Magazine, Easter, 1920, p. 4.

98 schools and the units they represented was not completely blotted out by military control of the compulsory cadet system.97

An unfortunate by-product of military domination of cadet training was increased anticipation of what ought to be achieved. Augmented investment meant an enlarged expectation of return, particular with respect to marksmanship. As a fundamental requirement for efficiency, and a skill valuable to the adult military, rifle shooting was considered a key component of cadet training from the inception of the compulsory system. Cadets were taught musketry theory, fire discipline and combat shooting applications in the hope that this would make them better citizen soldiers when they graduated to the CMF. Such ambitions, however, were frustrated from the beginning. Senior Cadet marksmanship standards were so poor in 1911-12 that the Brigade Majors of the worst offending units were asked by the army’s Adjutant General to show cause why their next salary increments should not be withheld or promotions deferred. Queensland’s two Senior Cadet brigades could manage only a six per cent completion of the two-part prescribed musketry course with 16 per cent finishing part one only. Of the NSW brigades, the best attained a 28 per cent completion rate for part one while the worst managed only one per cent. The same brigades attained between zero and eight per cent completion of the second part of the course. Victoria fared no better with five of its six brigades possessing no cadets qualified in the full course while the two South Australian brigades managed an average of 17 per cent completion of part one and four per cent of part two. The Western Australian brigades performed to an even lower standard while the Tasmanians attained an unsatisfactory one per cent completion rate. Overall, in 1912 four per cent of all Senior Cadets passed and 16 per cent partially completed the ‘compulsory’ musketry course.98

The primary cause of such failure was insufficient range capacity, despite federal statutes forcing Rifle Clubs throughout the country to make their ranges available for cadet use.99 In addition, cadets who were not very good shots, or who did not assimilate marksmanship training well, were treated harshly in that it was

97 Correspondence, The Kings School to Minister for Defence, dated April-May 1927. CRS A6680, Item DY25/46. 98 Returns of Senior Cadet Musketry Results (all Districts) (1912). CRS MP84/1, Item 1832/16/20.

99 generally agreed that ‘unsteadiness may be traced back to a lack of determination, or to an illness, or to some habitual excess, such as cigarette smoking.’100 The result was summarised by the Commandant of the 4th Military District who concluded that the musketry course had ‘entirely failed in its object’, recommending that it be restricted to the oldest (1894) cadet quota in order to prepare them for the CMF and that exemptions for efficiency should be granted to the others.101 His advice was partially heeded and the course was modified on 6 September 1912 to restrict the actual range firing component to cadets in their last two years of training.102 As a result efficiency figures improved in 1913 with 13 per cent of cadets fully trained and 62 per cent partially trained.103

In a classic misunderstanding of the triple military/educational/social role of the cadet movement, one remarkably widespread disappointment felt by CMF officers (particularly Commanding Officers) was their expectation that the cadet scheme would produce, at 1 July each year, fully trained soldiers ready for integration into adult units without the need for further recruit training. Although the system was designed to equip boys with skills and knowledge that would make them better citizen soldiers and ease their transition into the CMF, such an aim was never officially sanctioned. Nonetheless, this expectation persisted in spite of a specific adult recruit training syllabus published and issued to CMF battalions in 1913. This misinterpretation of purpose was the cause of significant angst from 1911, with many CMF officers levelling harsh and unfair criticism at the Senior Cadet organisation on the grounds that graduates could not fully participate in adult battalion-level activities. There ‘was such a violent hurry to get on with collective company and battalion training’ within CMF units that ‘preliminary recruit training is overlooked and the whole fault passed on to unsatisfactory training given to Senior Cadets.’104 It was doubly unfair to charge an unsatisfactory state of CMF recruit training to poor standards attained by Senior Cadets up to 1915 as new CMF recruits, to this point, had

99 Memo, Army Headquarters to District Commandants (1916). CRS CP697/41, Item 1916/83. 100 Stupart, Rifle Exercises and Musketry Instruction, p. 58. 101 Memo, Commandant 4th Military District to Army Headquarters, dated July 1912. CRS MP84/1, Item 1832/16/23. 102 Memo, Army Headquarters to Military Commandants, dated 6 September 1912. CRS MP84/1, Item 2033/2/279. 103 Report of the Inspector General of the Australian Military Forces (1913) (p. 13.). CRS A1194, Item 20.15/6699. 104 Goldsmith, Improvement in Cadet Training, pp. 466-7.

100 not completed the full four year regime of cadet training. Nonetheless such criticisms, especially as 1914 approached, were loud and widespread and did little to ensure the success of the scheme in the longer term.

By far the most common criticism of cadet training, and a direct result of unhealthy military ascendency during the compulsory era, concerned its boring and repetitive style. As early as September 1911 many cadet officers were concerned about the monotony of training and a number of Brigade Majors felt that company drill, with or without arms, was simply not enough to stimulate cadets. They suggested the introduction of signalling, scouting, knotting and lashing and elementary field fortification but Army Headquarters did not support the idea on the grounds that the necessary instructors were lacking.105 The syllabus of cadet training, published as Appendix II of Part III of Universal Training Regulations, 1912 (see Table 4E) was harshly maligned as being the cause of many boredom-related cadet difficulties. It was described as ‘wearisome, monotonous, and interest-killing alike to cadets and cadet officers.’106 The problem was one of inflexibility and repetition as the objectives of the drills contained therein were rarely explained, cadet battalion commanders did not have the authority to vary the syllabus in accordance with their wishes or the ability of their cadets, and cadets were subjected to the same elementary training programs regardless of their experience or stage of training. A typical quarterly training program, for example, might see every parade containing musketry drill and every half-day parade or night drill begin with 20 minutes physical training. Even if cadets displayed an absolute knowledge of the material within a year, they faced the prospect of three more years of the same training. One cadet officer summarised the situation, noting ‘one teaches a child by starting with the alphabet; but one does not expect him to keep at the alphabet for four solid years.’ In short, ‘any appeal to the intelligent interest of the cadet is outside the syllabus, and the result is proportional.’107 Major J.S. Goldsmith, Commanding Officer of the 12th Battalion Senior Cadets wrote in 1914

their officers have become unenterprising because enterprise is not permitted. The cadets in all the ranks are ‘full up’ of squad and section

105 Memo, Adjutant General to Military Board, dated December 1911. CRS MP84/1, Item 1832/13/486. 106 Goldsmith, Improvement in Cadet Training, p. 471. 107 ibid., pp. 470-5.

101 drill, musketry exercises, and physical training, which, though excellent in themselves, become misunderstood and thoroughly disliked because of their continual and monotonous repetition. 108

What was boring often became a nuisance and what was a nuisance became a cause of dissent. One observer in 1914 concluded that ‘the present cadet cry of “the same old thing every time” is not only justified but is in itself responsible for more cadet crime (i.e. absence from drills) than all other causes put together.’109

Table 4E - The Syllabus of Training for Senior Cadets, 1913 Subject 1st Year 2nd Year 3rd Year 4th Year TOTAL (hrs) (hrs) (hrs) (hrs) (hrs) Physical Training 13 13 13 13 52 Squad drill without arms, and semaphore signalling 12 8 8 8 36 Squad drill with arms and care of arms 14 8 5 5 32 Section drill 10 8 8 8 34 Company drill - 12 12 12 36 Musketry instruction & exercises 15 15 10 10 50 TOTAL 64 64 64 64 256

Source: Syllabus of Training for Senior Cadets (1913) (p. 84.). CRS A1194, Item 12.11/4338.

The army tried unsuccessfully to address a number of these problems. Stirred by the declaration of war in late 1914, and in order to encourage higher shooting standards, 110 rounds of ammunition in addition to that required for annual musketry course was provided to each Training Area for cadet practices and competitions, while miniature rifle shooting, although not part of the Senior Cadet curriculum, was promoted by Area Officers able to make use of school-based ranges.110 Similarly, at the Minister for Defence’s direction, a report on cadet training in 1917 was commissioned that criticised the extant system for its lack of training variation. With few other options available it advocated an entirely new direction for the Senior Cadets centred upon fitness, coordination and ‘man-strength.’111 This initiative was acted upon in the 1920s when the government attempted to revive flagging enthusiasm by introducing the program of physical activity and athletic competition

108 ibid., p. 480. 109 ibid., p. 479. 110 Stupart, Rifle Exercises and Musketry Instruction, p. 55. 111 Army Headquarters Report of Study into Senior Cadet Training (1917). CRS B1535, Item 929/25/123.

102 previously discussed.112 In another effort to raise falling interest publications like The Cadet, written by and for Senior Cadets in Tasmania, were produced from 1920 aiming to encourage cadets to take a greater interest in their own training, and consequently, in their battalions.113 Similarly, ‘Encouragement Committees’ were raised in each state for the purpose of promoting the sporting, recreational and social aspects of cadets and to encourage parents to take an active interest in them. Association sub-committees had a part to play in organising Senior Cadet dances, sporting carnivals, competitions and social events.114 In the end, however, such initiatives were not generally successful for none recognised the need for balance between the four foundation forces of the movement. So long as the compulsory system persisted then disproportionate military influence ensured general dissatisfaction with Senior Cadet training.

During the compulsory era it was no longer possible to explain the difficulties faced by the cadet movement in terms of political orientation at a federal government level. The correlation between a lack of conservative political influence and strife for the cadet organisation was complicated and shrouded by political manoeuvring concerning the wider issue of universal service. The concept of cadets was not considered in isolation and the decisions taken in 1921 and 1924, by conservative Nationalist and Nationalist-Country Party coalition ministries to reduce Senior Cadet training quotas were all about manipulating the wider military system rather than having anything to do with the cadet movement as a singular entity. So too, although the Scullin Labor government ended the compulsory cadet scheme in 1929, it was as part of the dismantling of the general system of compulsory service. It was not, therefore, until the re-establishment of a volunteer cadet scheme from 1930 that the theme of conservative federal politics equating to success for the cadet movement would once again become identifiable and influential. A range of other factors therefore explain the decline and fall of the compulsory cadet system.

Just as surely as community attitudes facilitated the founding of a compulsory cadet scheme so too changes in the social climate undermined it. The fact that Senior

112 Department of Defence, Cadet Journal, No 2, 1951, p. 55. 113 The Cadet, dated 18 September 1920. CRS MP367/1, Item 629/16/1506. 114 ibid.

103 Cadet training was compulsory did not mean that it was universal, even accounting for those excused for various reasons, and throughout its existence the scheme faced a degree of dissent from cadets, parents and certain other elements of the community. Importantly, however, the traditional acceptance of the view that ‘Australians went against compulsory training, almost from the start of it’ was not the simple truth of the matter.115 Of the published material written on cadet conscription in Australia, and the wider scheme of universal training it supported, a large proportion is thematically incorrect. There is too much emphasis on the immediacy of protest, non-compliance and rejection of the scheme while too little attention is accorded its widespread community support.

In analysing social attitudes towards the compulsory cadet system, L.C. Jauncey’s work, The Story of Conscription in Australia, focuses almost completely on voices of protest which ‘stirred passive opposition to conscription in Australia into action.’116 Jauncey’s unbalanced account queries why, from 1911, ‘Australians did not show [an] interest in the question.’117 He equates interest, however, with opposition and therefore misses the point. It was overwhelming initial support for mandatory training that prevented widespread dissent. Jauncey’s undue concentration on complaint was followed by J.M. Main’s Conscription: The Australian Debate, 1901-1970, which again failed to present two sides to the debate.118 G.A. Withers picked up the theme in Conscription: Necessity and Justice, noting that there was ‘quite some resentment for the administration of the scheme.’119 At some stages, in some quarters, there certainly was but such generalisations fail to put the problem in context. Resistance to compulsion was slow to gather momentum, and took nearly twenty years to effect change, because it reflected a gradual movement of social opinion.

Accepted wisdom also suggests that, if not for the First World War, the immediate unpopularity of the compulsory training system would have seen it dismantled within a decade. T.W. Tanner, in Compulsory Citizen Soldiers, contended

115 Barrett, Falling In, p. 2. 116 Jauncey, L.C., The Story of Conscription in Australia, Macmillan, Melbourne, 1968, p. 65. 117 ibid., p. 77. 118 Main, J.M., Conscription: The Australian Debate, 1901-1970, Cassell Australia, Melbourne, 1970. 119 Withers, G.A., Conscription: Necessity and Justice, Angus and Robertson, Sydney, 1972, p. 3.

104 that its failure to ‘gain acceptance and popularity in the community’ meant that only the First World War prevented its demise.120 This idea seems to miss the fact that agitation for compulsory cadet training had existed in political circles since the drafting of the original Defence Act in 1903, the concept was supported widely when enacted in 1909, and the system continued to function for eleven years after the war had ceased. Unfortunately, general historians like Russel Ward have accepted similar positions without question in that ‘the government had misjudged popular feelings’ and that there was ‘little doubt that compulsory military training would be dropped if war had not broken out in 1914’.121 Ward points to ‘quiet, inarticulate, non- cooperation’ as the main challenge to the compulsory system and that from 1914 ‘military authorities had to work harder each year to secure an acceptable number of registrations and prosecutions for non-attendance.’122 While this is substantively true it is, however, a misrepresentation. The is no question that levels of Senior Cadet and CMF dissent increased with time but that is not the same as suggesting that ‘popular feelings’ were always set against it or that general opinion had changed to such a degree by 1914 that only the war prevented the end of the scheme.123

The truth of the matter, and the position supported by the research informing this thesis, is closer to that put forth by John Barrett in Falling In: Australians and Boy Conscription 1911-15. The system of universal training was instituted with overwhelming community support which only began to fade during the war and in the aftermath of peace that followed. It was the gradual shift of public attitudes and the slow growth of general dissent against mandatory training that marked important elements of the cadet story in this period. It is within this context that the movement against compulsory cadet training bears further examination.

Although in the very early stages there were some meek voices of opposition to the Senior Cadet system in that it seemed a little like militarism, there was an almost complete absence of organised resistance in 1911. More serious complaints

120 Tanner, Compulsory Military Training, p. 411. 121 Ward, R., A Nation for a Continent: The History of Australia 1901-1975, Heinemann Educational Australia, Victoria, 1977, pp. 85 & 87. 122 Tanner, Compulsory Military Training, p. 322. 123 Complicating the issue was the fact that many observers have looked on the anti-conscription debates of the war and taken them as evidence of widespread and general dissatisfaction with the

105 only found voice when small numbers started protesting the hardships involved as ‘rain and cold made the experience of training all the more disagreeable.’124 Indeed, it was a pre-emptive desire to mitigate this type of unpopularity that G.F. Pearce, as Minister for Defence, introduced the Defence Bill of 1911 reducing overall cadet training commitments. Despite Pearce’s amendments, problems of training evasion became almost immediately inherent. The issue of boys presenting themselves for registration but failing to appear for parades in the first quotas of 1911 was serious enough for military representations to find their way to the Attorney General for advice on the application of the truancy penalties prescribed by the Defence Act. The Brigade Major of the 20th Cadet Brigade in South Australia, for example, had 560 cadets absent on 28 October 1911 and complained of the ‘moral effect’ of these absences, believing that if immediate legal action were not taken it would cause a ‘serious falling off in attendance.’125

Resistance slowly gathered momentum in 1912. The registration of the new intake of 14 year olds proved problematic and by the end of May, four months after the due date, 10,000 were still unaccounted for.126 Importantly, on 18 April 1912, the Australian Freedom League came into being as the foremost organisation in opposition to compulsory training and began to harness the passive discontent generated by the sheer nuisance of compulsory drill.127 A second type of emergent anti-cadet agitation came from ‘international socialists’ who dissented on the basis of a rejection of militarism as it affected the working classes.128 As these forces gathered

concept of universal training. This is a mistake for opinion on compulsion to fight overseas and support for universal training at home were never the same thing. 124 Tanner, Compulsory Military Training, p. 185. 125 ibid., p. 203. 126 Department of Defence, Report of the Minister of Defence on the Progress of Universal Training (to 30 June, 1912), Government Printer, 1912, p. 7. 127 Tanner, Compulsory Military Training, p. 28, & Laffin, ‘Cadet Corps in Secondary Education’, p. 18. 128 An example of principled resistance to compulsory cadet training occurred in July 1912 when G.J. Croser, of Canterbury NSW, objected so vehemently to it that he refused to allow his son to bring his uniform into his home. Despite investigating the possibility of prosecuting Croser under the Defence Act, the military was forced to take no action in the matter on the advice of the Crown Solicitor. Croser was an ardent anti-militarist and, although he would not physically prevent his son from rendering service, he refused to facilitate it and instead chose to distribute anti-cadet leaflets in his Training Area on behalf of the ‘Industrial Workers of the World.’ Alternatively, representing a second type of moral resistance, a deputation led by representatives of the paradoxically named ‘Women’s Peace Army’ called on the Queensland Minister for Public Instruction in Brisbane in February 1917 to voice their concerns over the jingoistic aspects of the mandatory system. Tanner, Compulsory Military Training, p. 28; Pamphlet promoting the ‘Industrial Workers of the World’ (1912). CRS MP84/1, Item 2020/1/41,

106 opposing organisations like the Defence League, so crucial in convincing politicians to adopt universal training in the first place, began to lose public support after its implementation.

As the problem of cadet absenteeism grew ever more serious the military was finally forced to seek recourse in the legal provisions of the Defence Act. On 18 September 1911, the Adjutant General released a confidential memorandum to the state Commandants explaining that ‘the time has now arrived when the Crown Solicitor should be asked to initiate proceedings in each state against a number of those who have neglected to comply with the statutory requirements of the Act.’129 He did not wish to proceed in all cases but rather against the worst offenders as identified by the Commandants.130 Subsequently, from the beginning of 1912 until the middle of 1914, 27,749 court cases were launched against those failing to render cadet service and of these 5,732 resulted in confinement.131 What these numbers represented, in proportion to the size of the overall scheme, should not be overstated. Government statistics note that from 1911-13 6.9 per cent of boys eligible for training did not appear and were prosecuted, although the real figure was smaller as these numbers included multiple offenders and employers or parents that hindered training. In 1914 this tally was reduced to 5.4 per cent.132 In addition, those that were tried were treated with great leniency on behalf of the military who made every effort to provide offenders with the opportunity to make up for missed parades. Indeed, CMF officers complained about such ‘soft’ attitudes in 1912 insofar as that the non-enforcement of fines for non-attendance at drill for Senior Cadets was having a prejudicial effect on the parade attendance of adult units whose members naturally expected the same clemency to be extended to them.133

The military’s attempts to legally enforce the compulsory provisions of the Senior Cadet system were frustrated consistently by civil magistrates. A test case in

& Minutes of Meeting between Queensland Minister of Public Instruction and Deputation from the Women’s Peace Army, dated 8 February 1917. QSA RSI15191, Item 1-430. 129 Memo, Army Headquarters to Military Commandants, dated 18 September 1911. CRS D845, Item 1911/28. 130 ibid. 131 Tanner, Compulsory Military Training, p. 29. 132 Commonwealth Yearbook, No 9 (1916), p. 983. 133 Department of Defence, Report of the Conference of Militia Officers 1912, Government Printer, 1912, p. 11.

107 Footscray, Victoria, involving the prosecution of one R.A. Barkly, resulted in the magistrate rejecting the idea that any penalty could be imposed on a defaulting cadet if it could not recovered until a boy was 18. The Attorney General agreed with this ruling and declared that ‘until the Act is amended, or until the High Court decides the questions raised in this case, different magistrates will give different interpretations of this section.’134 Therein, with particular reference to inconsistency, lay the problem. There was no uniformity across the states as to how courts treated cases of defaulting cadets. The situation forced Senator Pearce, by mid-1912, to relent on the strict provision of punishments for cadets neglecting to comply with their training requirements. He wrote to the Attorney General on 25 July requesting that recently inflicted fines imposed on defaulters be reduced and ordered no action be taken against cadets who attended at least 54 hours of training per annum, despite this being ten hours less than stipulated.135

From 1913, even when penalties were enforced, they were done so reluctantly and gently. The military became so sensitive to criticisms directed at the confinement of offending cadets that it directed prosecutions to secure confinement only be instituted against those who ‘willfully neglected to obey an order of a court to make up deficiencies in drill.’136 In South Melbourne, for example, one offending cadet was found to be 182 training hours in arrears over 18 months and had made no effort to make up the missed parades. The defaulter was punished with a paltry sentence of 128 hours confinement.137 The net result of such military and magisterial policies was predictable. Absenteeism was endemic by 1920 and as the decade progressed, even with reduced training quotas, the authorities were increasingly unable to enforce universal training regulations.138 In 1928, the total number of missing cadets reached a proportional high point of 901 (out of around 16,000 eligible boys). See Appendix 5 for details on numbers Senior Cadets failing to attend training from 1921-29.

134 Correspondence, Army Headquarters to Attorney-General, dated February-March 1912. CRS A6006, Item 1911/12/31. 135 The Minister went on to request magistrates not impose fines for the first offenders and to adjourn cases for two months if cadets promised to make up their deficiencies. Correspondence, Minister for Defence to Attorney General, dated July-September 1912. CRS MP84/1, Item 1939/3/130. 136 Memo, Army Headquarters to Military Commandants, dated January 1913. CRS MP84/1, Item 1939/3/219. 137 Report of Cadet Training in Area 5A, dated November 1918. CRS MP376/1, Item 629/16/1176. 138 Memo, Army Headquarters to Military Commandants, dated February 1920. CRS MP376/1, Item 629/16/1332.

108

The Senior Cadet scheme, like the adult universal training system it paralleled, was gradually wound down from 1922 and finally dismantled on 31 October 1929.139 If changing social attitudes had set appropriate pre-conditions for this outcome, it was another of the foundation forces, finance, that helped crystallise government decision making. The beginning of the end for compulsory cadet training came out of Australia’s representation at the International Conference in Washington on 11 November 1921 when a choice was made by the government, primarily on financial grounds, to continue with universal military service in a reduced format. Directed to lower Senior Cadet costs and numbers, a meeting was called by the Military Board to reach a consensus with respect to how many cadets would continue to receive mandatory training. At this meeting the Board resolved to reduce the number of training quotas from four to two, which meant that from this point only 16 and 17 year old boys were to be trained.140 From 1 July 1922, when a boy presented himself for registration at age 14, he was issued with a Senior Cadet record book with a red notice slip inside that read: ‘you are not required to commence training until the 1st of July of the year in which you reach the age of sixteen years. You will report personally or in writing to the Area Officer, during the month of February, 19...’141

Two years later, in a report for the Inspector-General of the Australian Military Forces dated 31 May 1924, the CGS, Lieutenant General Sir Harry Chauvel, recommended that as the term of the CMF universal training requirement for adults was to be increased by one year, in order to save money the period of Senior Cadet service should be correspondingly reduced to one quota. Under this arrangement, training would begin in a cadet’s 17th year and would continue for twelve months before transfer to the adult forces. This, Chauvel believed, ‘would have the effect of reducing the strength of the Senior Cadet organisation by half and would enable it to be handled by the Area Staff with a minimum of outside assistance.’142 The Military Board agreed and from 1925-29 a single quota of Senior Cadets kept numbers at around the 16,000 mark. As a bi-product of such dramatically reduced numbers many

139 Military Board Order 146 of 1930. AWM 61, Item 426/1/177. 140 Military Board Order Number 14 of 1922. CRS A5954, Item 895/9. 141 Senior Cadet Record Book ‘Insert’ (1921). CRS A664, Item 629/401/3. 142 Report, Chief of the General Staff to Inspector General, dated 31 May 1924. CRS A664, Item 629/401/3.

109 school-based detachments were left chronically under strength. Seventeen were disbanded or combined with other units in the 2nd Division in NSW alone during 1926.143

The final blow for the compulsory cadet system, however, was political recognition that the mood of the population had changed. The message was delivered on 7 September 1929 when a senior Labor parliamentarian and unwavering pacifist, Frank Brennan, put a motion to the House of Representatives condemning the entire system of universal military training. This was the first occasion that the scheme had been attacked by a direct motion in the House with Brennan criticising it as morally wrong, wasteful of resources, and inefficient. The Minister for Defence, Sir William Glasgow, attempted to discredit the motion by focusing principally on his belief that Australia’s war effort, had it been based on the old volunteer and militia system, could not have assumed the proportion that it did. While Brennan’s motion did not pass it indicated the tide of changing opinion in that support for obligatory military training was fading fast.144 Finally, on 22 October 1929, the Scullin Labor government won office and on 1 November 1929 the mandatory provisions of the Defence Act were suspended. After 18 years the era of compulsory cadets ended.145

There were many factors which contributed to the eventual failure of the compulsory cadet scheme. Apart from cadet dissent and general community distaste for military activities following the war, the long-term effect of boring and repetitive training played a part insofar as it was not long after the cadet experience that men gained power at the ballot box and an ability to influence the future of the system. In this way the restrictive nature of cadet activities helped to gradually build a public perception that four years service did not provide an adequate return on investment. The abandonment of the Senior Cadet system was also influenced strongly by the belief that the AIF was still available for defence if required and the general neglect of the adult army in the 1920s was a clear precursor to its demise.146 Nor can factors of

143 Memo, 2nd Division (internal), dated June 1926. AWM 61, Item 507/4/128. 144 Draft Response to Parliamentary Motion for Minister of Defence, dated September 1929. CRS A664, Item 629/401/16. 145 Candy, Victorian Cadet Movement, p. 24-23. 146 Manning and resourcing of the regular army as a whole plummeted after the First World War with full-time troops numbering in the hundreds. Much more faith was invested in sea power to protect Australia’s shores.

110 economy be underestimated. From 1921-22, 9-10 per cent of the defence budget was expended on Senior Cadets and it was money that the military desperately wanted to spend elsewhere.147

So ended Australia’s singular experiment with compulsory cadet training and, although its value or success are very difficult to define or statistically gauge, its influence was enduring. Four key lessons were learned that helped determine the direction of the cadet movement in the years that followed. First, it became evident that schools were the best places for cadet training to be based; second, that voluntary enrolment ensured interest; third, that military control should not be applied too tightly and, finally, cadet officers ought to be given scope in planning and organisation.148 In these lessons the four social, military, educational and financial pillars of the movement were well represented. So too the negative effect of one of these forces gaining disproportionate influence, in this case the military, was clear. The problems associated with cadet training were an obvious case in point. Military dominance, even in the context of universal service, was destined to be both destructive and temporary. In the end, shifting social attitudes and financial pressure helped bring an end to the compulsory scheme made vulnerable by the absence of widespread educational involvement or support. The cadet movement, then and now, has four foundations and requires balance and harmony between them for success.

147 Commonwealth Yearbook, No 23 (1930), p. 410. 148 Candy, Victorian Cadet Movement, p. 24-23.

111 Correct as at: 16 Dec 05

Word Count: 7,834 / 8,898 CHAPTER FIVE

A Dual System 1930 – 1938

Following the demise of universal military service in 1929, a voluntary cadet scheme was quickly re-established. The new scheme mirrored the old Commonwealth Military Cadet Corps in its division of the movement into school-based and community-based units, although the split was far more pronounced than in the pre- 1911 system. This chapter commences with an examination of basic administrative and structural foundations of this ‘dual’ scheme from 1930-38. A study of how the transition back from cadet conscripts affected ideas of purpose for the movement proceeds an in depth analysis of the two parallel branches of the contemporary cadet organisation in terms of adult staff, equipment, training, and disbandment in the case of one of them. The chapter concludes by examining the social impact of the likelihood of war in the late 1930s, as it pertained to the cadet organisation.

On 5 November 1929, at a military conference attended by the Minister for Defence, A.E. Green, and the CGS, Lieutenant General Sir Harry Chauvel, the Prime Minister, J.H. Scullin, announced that ‘the Defence Committee shall submit a scheme for an alternative to compulsory training, showing the minimum strength and organisation essential for defence.’1 So ordered, the Committee met seven days later to derive a military system based on voluntary adult and cadet forces to replace the conscript organisation in place since 1911.2 As the Defence Committee deliberated many school-based Senior Cadet units chose to continue training on a voluntary basis until a new scheme could be formally inaugurated. The Shore School in Sydney, in an attitude representative of many large private schools, reported that

in spite of the suspension of compulsory training … there is a strong feeling in favour of the formation of a voluntary cadet corps at the school.3 most of the larger schools with well-defined traditions of sound cadet work … were most anxious that this tradition should be maintained.4

1 Report of the Inspector General of the Australian Military Forces (1929). CRS A1194, Item 20.15/17688. 2 ibid. 3 Shore, The Torch Bearer, December 1929, p. 131. 4 ibid., May 1930, p. 31.

112 They did not have long to wait, with a voluntary cadet scheme announced on 26 November 1929 with operations scheduled to commence in the new year.

The basic structure of the new system reflected competing military and educational influences in that it divided all units up into two categories. The first of these were regionally and community-based ‘Regimental Cadet’ units closely affiliated with the CMF, completely removed from schools, and open to any boy aged 16-18 years. Each Regimental detachment trained at a CMF parent unit location, maintained an establishment ceiling of 20 per cent of its host, and used its equipment and facilities.5 The second type of detachment were ‘School Cadet’ units formed exclusively within schools, consisting solely of students, and therefore subject to a far greater extent than their Regimental counterparts to educational considerations.6 School Cadet detachments, with a minimum enrolment age of 14 years, were usually named after their school and were neither integrally attached to, nor reliant upon, the CMF.7 Unlike Regimental units, School Cadets were restricted to infantry-type detachments during the 1930s, despite many representations to Army Headquarters between 1929-33 for permission to raise technical sections such as artillery, engineers and light horse.8 Nor were school detachments restricted in size, although the military did regulate overall numbers with its power to approve the raising and disbandment of school units. In this way the combined strength of the dual system was maintained at around 7,000 members.

To initiate the new scheme, on 31 January 1930, Colonel J.L. Whitham, Director of Army Organisation and Personal Services wrote to each District Commandant informing them that following the school vacation period steps were to be undertaken immediately to organise School Cadet detachments and encourage Regimental Cadet enrolment. To this end Colonel F.J. Anderson, the Director of Physical Training and Cadet Services, in recognition of the historical imperative to engage the state Departments of Education, was tasked to visit schools and colleges

5 In 1931 cadet regulations were modified to exclude Regimental detachments from affiliating with CMF light horse units while at the same time establishment ceilings were raised to 25 per cent of CMF infantry and signals units. Commonwealth Yearbooks, No 23 (1930), p. 408, & No 24 (1931), p. 412. 6 Essay on the History of Army Cadets (1939-45). AWM 54, Item 147/2/1. 7 Commonwealth Yearbook, No 23 (1930), p. 408. 8 Memo, AHQ to Military District Headquarters (1933). AWM 61, Item 426/1/239.

113 around the country to provide the required impetus.9 On 30 March 1930 the Department of Defence gave formal authority for the formation of School Cadet units and by mid-1930, at the behest of the military, the various Departments of Education had released memoranda to their school headmasters outlining the government’s desire to re-establish the voluntary cadet movement in state schools.10 Educational authorities were generally supportive and urged their schools to comply. The Under Secretary of Education in NSW, A.W. Hicks, for example, was quite clear when he informed headmasters that ‘your cooperation in the movement by the formation of a corps at your school is desired.’11

The private school sector, however, was not as immediately supportive of the new cadet organisation as the state Education Departments. A number of independent schools initially complained that the growth of organised sport presented a serious obstacle to the re-establishment of volunteer units. Despite advocating the raising of a unit in his school, the headmaster at the Shore school in Sydney explained in December 1929 that

the success of any plan in these schools at present depends on the maintenance of interest comparable with that aroused by games. The present time differs with that of 20 years ago in that games are much more general and the best boys have their time occupied by sport.12

Similarly reflective of unsteady early support for the new system from private schools, as well as emphasising the enduring legacy of past military/educational friction and financial constraint, was a meeting held between military authorities and the headmasters of the GPS schools in NSW in February 1930. School representatives voiced their concern over any system that required parents to pay for uniforms above and beyond their school fees, and some felt that this would exclude their state school counterparts (a prediction underscored in November of that year when no state school

9 Army Headquarters Circular (1930). AWM 61, Item 426/1/168. 10 Memo, Department of Education (Victoria) to Schools (1930). AWM 61, Item 426/1/206. 11 Such support in NSW rarely wavered and in 1936 the Department of Education went as far as directing state school headmasters to allow military officers onto school grounds for the purposes of eliciting support for potential cadet units. Memo, NSW Department of Education to Schools (1936). AWM 61, Item 426/1/207. 12 Letter, Headmaster Shore School to Headquarters 2nd Military District, dated December 1929. AWM 61, Item 426/1/208.

114 representatives were present at a parade of 850 cadets held in Sydney).13 The headmasters were also concerned over the provision of equipment, wished for an exclusive GPS Battalion, and wanted an army commitment to pay for the costs associated with annual camps. There was some concern, even before the scheme had commenced, over military control of the training syllabus and some uneasiness about the lack of direct association with the CMF. It seems that the private school representatives were happy with the independence but anxious about the lack of security the School Cadet system seemed to offer.14 When told their requests were impossible to fulfil due to ‘strict financial conditions at present’ the headmasters responded by suggesting that the chances of maintaining units at their schools would be seriously jeopardised.15 Army Headquarters, however, recognising the bluff for what it was, stood firm and a mini crisis of educational, military and fiscal intent was avoided.

Within the context of the basic structural division of the organisation, and despite the early support of the state school systems, the influence of the education sector was undermined somewhat by the nature of high-level cadet command arrangements. Importantly, when the dual cadet system was inaugurated it provided for no specific cadet hierarchical or bureaucratic organisation above a unit level leaving School and Regimental units reliant upon the wider military chain of command. This left teacher-officers with little influence beyond their own units. National control remained with Directorate of Physical Training and Cadet Services at Army Headquarters while regional command resided with the formation commanders of the CMF units to which cadet detachments were affiliated, in the case of Regimental Cadets, or of the geographic areas in which they were situated for School Cadet units.16 These were the CMF divisional commanders in NSW and Victoria and the Military Commandants in the other states. At the local level, School Cadet units, although answering directly to divisional/district military staff, were administered

13 The schools in question were Barker College, Cranbrook, Knox Grammar, Shore and the Scots College. The parade was reviewed by Brigadier F.B. Heritage, Military Commandant of NSW. Correspondence, (2nd Military District internal), dated October 1930. AWM 61, Item 447/1/1844. 14 Minutes of GPS Headmasters’ Meeting, dated 21 March 1930. AWM 61, Item 426/1/176. 15 Correspondence, NSW GPS Headmasters to Army Headquarters (various), dated February-March 1930. CRS B1535, Item 849/3/29. 16 Essay on the History of Army Cadets (1939-45). AWM 54, Item 147/2/1.

115 through their local CMF brigade headquarters while Regimental detachments were directed by the Commanding Officers of the CMF units to which they were attached.17

Disappointing initial enrolment statistics were an important consequence of limited educational influence (and therefore engagement) at the inception of the dual system combined, perhaps, with the effect of negative memories and experiences in the compulsory era. The movement languished, overall, in terms of numbers up to the late 1930s. At the end of compulsory training the upper limit of total cadet numbers was reduced from 16,000 to 7,000.18 From 1930-38 this official ceiling strength was never increased despite the fact that the CMF was incrementally expanded during the 1930s as the international situation deteriorated.19 In real terms, however, the numbers of cadets varied considerably during the decade. Although beginning strongly in 1932 with 7,356 boys enrolled, numbers fell to 5,414 in the following year and remained below 6,000 until 1937, after which time the prospect of war increased the popularity of the movement and stimulated enrolment considerably. Interestingly, up to the late 1930s, the proportion of School and Regimental Cadets was always fairly static. Although there tended to be slightly more School Cadets the two categories tended to rise and fall in proportion with each other (see Appendix 6 for details of Regimental and School Cadet numbers and geographic distribution).

Following the demise of universal training in 1929 alternate concepts of military purpose began to emerge alongside developing social and educational objectives for that cadet movement. While the idea that cadets possessed a direct military role by pre-training citizen soldiery dwindled, the notion of the movement as a basis of army recruiting, particularly of junior leaders, grew stronger than ever. A Military Board instruction of 1936 revealed the army’s expectations in that ‘it is hoped that these detachments will serve as a training ground to provide, to some extent, the future officers and NCOs of the militia forces, and as such they will occupy a foremost position in the scheme of national defence’.20 Many influential military figures of the era promoted the cadet organisation as a means to encourage CMF expansion.21 The

17 Memo, Department of Education (Victoria) to Schools (1930). AWM 61, Item 426/1/206. 18 Memo, Army Headquarters to Military District Headquarters (1929). CRS A6006, Item 1930/02/11. 19 Commonwealth Yearbook, No 30 (1937), p. 257. 20 Military Board Instruction (1936). CRS A5954, Item 895/11. 21 Essay on the History of Army Cadets (1939-45). AWM 54, Item 147/2/1.

116 CGS, Lieutenant General Chauvel, commented in 1930 that Regimental Cadet detachments would form ‘an important source for the supply of recruits and NCOs for militia training’; a prediction borne out in December 1931 with 1,255 Regimental Cadets, out of a total strength of 3,821, enlisting in the CMF.22 Similarly, in writing to Xavier College at the raising of its School Cadet unit in 1938, Brigadier E.A. Drake- Brockman, General Officer Commanding the 3rd Division, put forth his own belief in the importance of Senior Cadets as a source of adult recruits when he observed that ‘it is very important that youths of the type that attend Xavier College should receive a sound grounding in elementary military training, as it is from those … that the country must rely for leaders in times of emergency.’23 So too, Major General J.D. Lavarack, CGS in 1935, wrote that ‘it is becoming increasingly apparent each year that the supply of efficient and educated officers for the militia must eventually come in an increasing degree from this source’.24

Many individual School Cadet units shared Lavarack’s view. The Shore detachment in Sydney reported at the end of its first year of voluntary training that ‘we are beginning to learn here how to fight. An army cannot be suddenly improvised … leaders must be provided … we aim here to commence to train leaders.’25 As the Second World War approached the emphasis on the recruiting potential of the movement grew irresistible in many units. The Barker College cadets of 1937 were in no doubt as to their unit’s purpose when their headmaster described its role as ‘to provide a training ground for junior leaders, who may be available in a national emergency … to prepare cadets for service in the militia.’26

Despite the army’s perception of the movement as a military incubator in the period 1930-38, it is also possible to trace the growth and development of previously existing educational and social aspirations. In many ways these shifting attitudes represented a conservative response to the prevailing social fears of the era in the rise

22 Report of the Inspector General of the Australian Military Forces (1929). CRS A1194, Item 20.15/17688, & Minutes of Militia Officers’ Conference, dated 4 December 1931. AWM 62, Item 63/2/567. 23 Penrose, Red, Black and Khaki, p. 22. 24 Memo, Chief of the General Staff to Military Districts (1935). CRS B1535, Item 929/55/66. 25 Shore, The Torch Bearer, December 1930, p. 136. 26 Braga, S., Barker College: A History, John Ferguson, Sydney, 1978, p. 230.

117 of the political ‘left’ and the perceived moral impact of the Depression.27 Even Army Headquarters conceded that cadet units in schools would have a corollary effect of encouraging esprit de corps as well as inculcating ‘a feeling of loyalty and tradition valuable to society as a whole.’28 Many school units maintained faith that positive social and educational outcomes were derived from the cadet experience with respect to both the individual and the corporate life of the school. The history of the Xavier College cadets refers to the movement in this era as providing ‘opportunities for leadership, expressions of patriotism, and discipline’ and in this way it was an ‘important component in a boy’s Jesuit education.’29 Such convictions were not limited to private schools. The Maryborough State School cadet unit in Queensland in 1934, for example, maintained that its role was ‘to ensure that the future citizens of this country will be loyal.’30 Previously vague ideas of educational and social capital crystallised during the 1930s into firmer convictions concerning leadership, patriotism, loyalty, discipline, corporate school spirit, self-respect and a range of other educational and civic virtues.

Having outlined the general structure and purpose of the dual cadet system from 1930-38, it is necessary to delve a little deeper into the details of its constituent parts in order to show exactly how they were shaped by ever-present social, educational, military and financial pressures. To begin with the Regimental Cadet system, continuing a theme established in the compulsory era, was a clear example of the detrimental effects of too much military input. In 1929, to assist in establishing the Regimental Cadet force, the 1912 quota of ex-Senior Cadets, who were 17 years old when compulsory training was suspended, were all sent letters suggesting that they continue to render voluntary service under the new Regimental system. The letters described the conditions of service in the Regimental Cadets stressing the benefits of a high enrolment age (16-18), free uniforms, promotion prospects, a greater variation in activities resulting from affiliation with CMF units, and chances to train in riding, mechanical transport and supply. To compensate for the provision of these

27 The Depression was blamed for decreased moral standards, increased petty crime, desertion of families by fathers, gambling, and a range of other vices as ‘people were forced into all sorts of tricks and expediencies to survive.’ Lowenstein, W., Weevils in the Flour: An Oral Record of the 1930s Depression in Australia, 20th Anniversary Edition, Scribe, Melbourne, 1988, p. 2. 28 Memo, Army Headquarters (internal), dated December 1930. AWM 61, Item 426/1/208. 29 Penrose, Red, Black and Khaki, p. 4. 30 Maryborough High School, The Palma, 1934, p. 39.

118 opportunities each cadet was required to give a verbal assurance upon enrolling that he would serve with a CMF unit when he turned eighteen.

The nature of these Regimental detachments was wholly shaped by their military affiliations. Since they were an integral part of parent CMF units, with numbers in proportion with those units, their establishments and sizes varied considerably. So too the corps or type of detachment varied in accordance with its CMF ‘foster’ (the adult unit to which it was attached). A CMF infantry battalion, for example, was allowed a Regimental Cadet infantry detachment of three cadet sergeants, six corporals, six lance corporals and 52 cadets, totalling 67, while cadets attached to artillery, signals or medical units possessed altogether different structures.31 Regimental detachments, therefore, were organised as platoons, troops, companies or squadrons depending on the arm of service of their parent unit. In December 1929, the Adjutant General released establishment tables that gave organisational guidelines for cadets attached to standard CMF battalions which, given the number of CMF infantry units in comparison to other corps, provided for the bulk of Regimental Cadets. Within a CMF infantry division, Regimental Cadet attachment to arms and services other than infantry included up to 50 as part of divisional signals units, between 20-30 to brigade and divisional service corps and medical corps units, while fewer than ten could be attached to engineers units. No other corps were authorised to include Regimental Cadets at this time.32 Table 5A shows the establishments and actual strengths of Regimental (and School) Cadets as at 30 December 1931.

31 Candy, The Victorian Cadet Movement, p. 24-24. 32 Regimental Cadet Establishment Tables (AHQ) (1929). CRS SP459/1, Item 463/1/444.

119

Table 5A - Establishment and Strength of Cadets, 30 December 1931

Formation Establishment Regimental Cadets School Cadets Field Troops 1 MD 814 379 450 1st District Base 30 5 - 1st Cavalry Division 150 81 55 1 Division 924 338 340 2 Division 1,211 601 533 2nd District Base 283 178 - 2nd Cavalry Division 132 78 - 3rd Division 1,215 929 593 4th Division 880 389 234 3rd District Base 191 155 - Field Troops 4 MD 453 317 206 4th District Base 13 3 - Field Troops 5 MD 409 225 63 5th District Base 39 18 - Field Troops 6 MD 242 109 26 6th District Base 14 16 - TOTAL 7,000 3,821 2,500 6,321

* MD is Military District

Regimental Cadets School Cadets

Source: Regimental Cadet Establishment Tables (1931). AWM 62, Item 63/2/567.

As Regimental Cadets could not be attached to the mounted infantry arm of the service, units that came under the command of the 1st or 2nd (CMF) Cavalry Divisions were trained in other specialities. For instance, of the 69 cadets attached to the 2nd Cavalry Division in December 1937, 32 were classified as artillery, 23 as signals, seven as engineers and seven as service corps.33 Typically, Regimental detachments were distributed evenly across formations. In South Australia in 1935, for example, of

120 the 477 cadets attached to a number of different CMF units, 274 of them were affiliated with the three infantry battalions of the 3rd Brigade, 90 to garrison and field artillery units, 25 to a field engineering squadron, 20 to signals detachments, 18 to a field ambulance, four to an ordnance company, two to service corps troops, and two to a veterinary section.34 Another useful example of the spread of Regimental Cadet detachments were those of the Victorian 3rd Division in mid-1932 as shown at Table 5B.

Table 5B - Regimental Cadets within the 3rd Division, 12 July 1932

Formation Regimental Cadets 10 Brigade 24 Battalion (Bn) 92 37/52 Bn 99 39 Bn 51 4 Brigade 14 Bn 39 29/22 Bn 43 46 Bn 58 15 Brigade 59 Bn 41 58 Bn 65 57/60 Bn 102 Army Service Corps 48 Divisional Signals 32 Field Ambulance 4 Veterinary Section 2

Source: 3rd Division Strength Returns, dated July 1932. AWM 62, Item 63/2/595.

Like their organisational structure and corps alignment, Regimental Cadet unit training was dominated by military associations. Detachments enjoyed all of the privileges and amenities of their parent units and participated in the range of CMF home training activities. Indeed, they were restricted only insofar as they were prohibited from attending continuous CMF camps although selected cadets were, from time to time, permitted to attend voluntary weekend bivouacs run for adult soldiers. Annual training was set down as 15 whole day drills (the equivalent of 60 hours training) arranged by CMF Commanding Officers subject to approval by formation

33 Quarterly Strength Return 2nd Cavalry Division, dated December 1937. AWM 62, Item 63/2/771. 34 3rd Brigade Strength Returns (1934-35). CRS B1535, Item 763/3/221.

121 commanders who aimed at distributing them equally.35 In order to be deemed as efficient each year, a Regimental Cadet was required to attend 50 of the 60 allocated hours of training, to have successfully completed a musketry course, and to have satisfied his Commanding Officer that he was proficient and had assimilated a ‘reasonable’ amount of training.36 The reported standards of Regimental Cadet efficiency varied considerably and usually in accordance with the CMF arm to which a detachment was appended. Table 5C highlights such fluctuation in June 1937.

Table 5C - Efficiency Return for Regimental Cadets, 30 June 1937

Arm of Service Strength Efficient % Efficient Artillery 963 624 65% Engineers 364 268 74% Signals 283 163 58% Infantry 2,436 1,730 71% Tank Corps 10 10 100% Army Service Corps 182 143 79% Medical Corps 104 83 80% Ordnance Corps 25 24 96% Veterinary Corps 12 12 100% TOTAL 4,379 3,057 70%

Source: Efficiency Return of Regimental Cadets (1937). CRS B1535, Item 732/17/42.

Underscoring the military influence over Regimental Cadet activities, in 1933 the Australian Military Forces Instruction Manual for Training described the foremost consideration as being to prepare them to enter the CMF when they turned 18. As a result basic infantry training became the foundation of all Regimental Cadet activities irrespective of unit or affiliation. It generally consisted of physical instruction, drill, rifle training (including miniature and open range practices), field hygiene and sanitation. It was only after this elementary infantry training was completed that CMF Commanding Officers were permitted to extend their scope to more specialised subjects, especially in the case of detachments attached to technical arms and services.37 Following this basic training cadets attached to infantry units were given further instruction in section leading, the Lewis Gun and section minor tactics while those affiliated with artillery units were taught the organisation of a battery,

35 Department of Defence, Australian Military Forces and Senior Cadets Instructions for Training, 1933, (Instructions 1933), Government Printer, 1933, p. 64. 36 ibid. 37 ibid., p. 63.

122 descriptions of guns and carriages, gunnery, ballistics, recoil, recuperations, mechanisms and artillery ammunition. Engineer cadets were trained in the duties of divisional engineers in the field, engineering terms, tools, materials, knots, lashings, holdfasts, blocks, tackles and the use of spars, while signals corps cadets studied signals organisations and duties, signals instruments, Morse Code, flag drill and lamp signalling. Service Corps cadets were taught the workings of accounting, the system of supply in the field and the principles of the internal combustion engine and finally, medical corps cadets were trained in first-aid, stretcher exercises, field cooking, transporting wounded and advanced sanitation.38

Apart from this prescribed training, Regimental Cadets were encouraged to participate in a range of voluntary activities paid for by the CMF. Even these activities, however, reflected a preponderance of military objectives. They included, but were not limited to, courses in physical training, section and platoon tactics, and small arms. These courses were occasionally held in conjunction with CMF camps provided that cadets were segregated from adult soldiers. Regimental Cadets were also permitted to attend evening lectures and instructional periods conducted by their parent CMF units as well as participating in a wide raft of CMF sporting and shooting competitions.39

In the end it was the disproportionate influence of the army which sowed the seeds for the demise of the Regimental scheme. First and foremost, among a range of military inspired difficulties, was the fact that the success of individual detachments varied from one CMF unit to the next and was almost entirely dependant on the attitude of the Commanding Officer to whose unit they were attached. In some cases affiliated cadets were considered detrimental or even an embarrassment to their CMF units for a number of reasons. First, there was a lack of uniformity in conditions of service and administrative procedure between adult soldiers and cadets. Second, there were not always sufficient instructors to train both CMF soldiers and cadets, which meant the latter were often neglected. Accommodation problems often arose due to congestion at drill halls and, importantly, no provision was made to man Regimental detachments with dedicated cadet officers. Instead, CMF officers were dual hatted,

38 ibid., pp. 66-67. 39 ibid., p. 69.

123 sometimes involuntarily, to command both cadets and adult soldiers. Some simply were not suited while almost all were overtaxed. Understandably, their main effort was commonly directed to CMF soldiers not cadets. 40

Regimental units depended so much on the commitment of CMF officers that when it waned the consequences were ruinous. In December 1931, a conference of army formation and brigade commanders was held in Melbourne for the purpose of discussing recruiting and retention issues for the CMF. During the deliberations the gathered commanders re-affirmed their belief that the Regimental system was still their best recruiting ground although opinion generally favoured their removal from CMF units. It seems in 1931 many CMF officers did not see their Regimental Cadets as integral parts of their units, nor did they recognise the necessity of making the training and welfare of cadets a primary concern. This outlook was criticised by senior officers present at the conference as short-sighted for it was only by close contact with CMF units, they concluded, that cadets would be encouraged to go on to serve as volunteer soldiers. The CMF senior hierarchy feared that to separate Regimental Cadets from adult units was to invite a withdrawal of permanent staff from the latter to support them. For these reasons high ranking CMF officers resolved to bring Regimental Cadets in much closer contact with the their parent units whether regimental officers liked it or not.41

Despite this and other resolutions in support of the Regimental system, the unhealthy reliance on the military, and the difficulties it inspired, eventually took their toll. As Table 5D illustrates, in every quarter from their inception to the end of 1931 there was a steady decline in numbers. From a peak level on 31 May 1930, to the period ending 30 September 1931, enrolment fell by 46 per cent from 6,007 to 3,821. Echoing the sentiments of the CMF conference, the Military Board placed the blame for this disastrous trend squarely on the shoulders of CMF Commanding Officers and considered that ‘these figures give rise to doubt whether commanding officers generally attach the importance to Regimental detachments as recruiting agencies for

40 Essay on the History of Army Cadets (1939-45). AWM 54, Item 147/2/1. 41 Minutes of Militia Officers’ Conference, dated 4 December 1931. AWM 62, Item 63/2/567.

124 their units that was envisaged when approval was given for their formation.’42 Indeed, on 1 December 1931, only 52 per cent of authorised positions were actually manned ranging from a low of 2 per cent in the Army Veterinary Corps to a high of 97 per cent in Anti-Aircraft units (see Table 5E).

Table 5D - Number of Regimental Cadets, 31 June 1930 - 30 September 1931 Quarter ending 31 March, 1930 6,007 all ranks 30 June, 1930 5,915 30 September, 1930 5,516 30 December, 1930 5,240 31 March, 1931 4,774 30 June, 1931 4,421 30 September, 1931 3,821

6 ,500 6,000 5,500 5,000 4,500 4,000 3,500 3,000 Mar-30 May-30 Jul-30 Sep-30 Nov-30 Jan-31 Mar-31 May-31 Jul-31 Sep-31

Source: Regimental Cadet Strength Returns (March 1930 – September 1931). CRS D844, Item 142/1/8.

Table 5E - Establishment & Strength of Regimental Cadets, 30 September 1931 Branch Establishment Strength % of Establishment Field Artillery 1,007 575 57 Infantry 4,181 2,261 54 Medical Corps 248 67 27 Cavalry 0 24 N/A Field Engineers 279 181 65 Signals 354 180 51 Army Service Corps 314 153 45 Army Ordnance Corps 75 26 34 Army Veterinary Corps 20 5 2 Heavy Artillery 215 127 59 Medium Artillery 120 105 65 Artillery Survey 58 49 85 Anti-Aircraft Artillery 29 28 97 Fortress Engineers 65 34 52 Tank Corps 7 6 86

Source: Regimental Cadet Strength Returns (March 1930 – September 1931). CRS D844, Item 142/1/8.

42 Minutes (fragmented) of Military Board Proceedings, dated December 1931. AWM 62, Item 63/2/558.

125 From 1932-39 the nature and numbers of the Regimental system remained relatively static although a predicable boost in enrolment figures occurred from 1937 in accordance with growing community fears of the possibility of war (see Table 5F). In November 1939, however, mindful of the difficulties discussed and the immediate necessity for withdrawing regular army staff from CMF units to train the second AIF, military authorities decided to abandon the scheme altogether. So ended the army’s first experiment with voluntary, community-based cadet detachments completely removed from schools and intimately affiliated with adult units. Despite being another testament to the danger of disproportionate military influence, and of attempting to isolate educational influences from the movement, it was not the last time that such an idea was put into practice.

Table 5F - Regimental Cadet Numbers, 1932-39 Military Formation 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 Field Troops (1 Military District (MD)) 526 373 375 327 327 334 516 422 361 1 District Base (1 MD) 2 11 17 14 13 18 21 23 33 1 Cavalry Division 99 79 42 58 56 28 49 55 40 1 Division 398 416 403 318 257 280 449 434 499 2 Division 826 645 451 445 384 434 755 739 605 2 District Base (2 MD) 195 149 98 119 102 59 129 125 174 2 Cavalry Division 107 82 94 100 101 97 110 73 103 3 Division 1148 840 548 627 551 543 863 680 709 4 Division 543 363 266 389 424 399 557 516 568 3 District Base (3 MD) 162 123 91 110 77 44 73 68 83 Field Troops (4 MD) 354 240 160 231 239 226 320 270 375 4 District Base (4 MD) 3 2 2 10 13 6 13 9 15 Field Troops (5 MD) 267 185 164 122 103 111 303 276 285 5 District Base (5 MD) 16 15 8 19 13 10 33 36 63 Field Troops (6 MD) 113 90 125 144 140 150 222 212 192 6 District Base (6 MD) 15 15 21 13 5 8 18 19 14 TOTALS 3,628 2,582 2,865 3,046 2,805 2,747 4,431 3,957 4,119

4500 4000 3500 3000 2500 2000 1500 1000 500 0 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 Source: Commonwealth Yearbooks, No 24 (1931) p. 413; No 25 (1932) p. 427; No 26 (1933) p. 325; No 27 (1934) p. 334; No 28 (1935) p. 341; No 29 (1936) p. 344; No 30 (1937) p. 260; No 31 (1938) p. 263.

126 Despite an unsteady start, the School Cadet branch of the dual scheme outlived its Regimental counterpart primarily because, being situated within schools, it found a much healthier military/educational balance. Given historical precedent, it was no surprise that this led to success where the Regimental scheme found failure. In order to raise a School Cadet unit in the 1930s, a headmaster needed only to inform the military formation headquarters in his locality of his intention and submit a proposed uniform design for approval. Provided the school (or combination of schools) had more than 20 prospective cadets, and at least one adult cadet officer (or CMF officer) available for duty, the unit was established.43 School detachments were structured as infantry sub-units with organisational structures dependant on the number of cadets present. From 20-40 cadets formed a platoon with each 20 additional members allowing another platoon to be raised. If a detachment held between two and four platoons it was organised into a company. Each platoon was staffed with one adult lieutenant (or cadet lieutenant), one cadet sergeant, two corporals and two lance corporals. If a company was raised then its headquarters staff added two adult captains and one cadet warrant officer class two (WO2) to the unit’s establishment.44

In the early 1930s there were very few School Cadet detachments in existence. In 1930, for example, there were only six active units in Victoria. School Cadets did, however, gradually prosper as the decade progressed from a low point of just over 2,000 in 1930, to 3,478 in 34 schools across the country in March 1936. Due largely to the militaristic attitudes of its headmaster, L.A. Andrews, the largest unit at that time was Scotch College in Melbourne (298 Cadets) and the smallest at the Slade School, Warwick, Queensland (26 Cadets) (Table 5G shows School Cadet unit distribution in 1936). As shown in Table 5H, from 1936 the number of School Cadets began to rise more rapidly, through the creation of new units and the expansion of existing detachments, to 4,780 in 1938 (see Appendix 7 for a full break down and distribution details). The Xavier College Cadet unit in Victoria was a useful example of this late 1930s trend. In 1937 enrolments accounted for 59 per cent (142) of Xavier’s students but by the end of 1938 cadets formed for 81 per cent of the school population.45 In the end, with the approach of war, the vitality and independence of these units saw them

43 Memo, Military Board to Military Districts (1929). AWM 61, Item 426/1/163. 44 A drum and fife band could be raised at any time in lieu of a standard platoon. Memo, Department of Education (Victoria) to Schools (1930). AWM 61, Item 426/1/206.

127 move from strength to strength at the same time that military neglect encouraged the dismantling of the Regimental branch.

Table 5G - Distribution of School Cadets, 31 March 1936 State Commanding Formation Units Cadets % of Males Aged 14-16 Queensland 11th Mixed Brigade 7 542 2.0 NSW 1st Division 9 1,048 1.4 Victoria 2nd & 4th Divisions 8 1,285 2.7 SA Field Troops 4th Military District 3 303 1.8 WA Field Troops 5th Military District 4 207 1.7 Tasmania Field Troops 6th Military District 3 93 1.3 TOTAL 36 3,478

3

2.5 Cadets as % of Eligible Males

2

1.5

1

0.5

0 Queensland NSW Victoria SA WA Tasmania Source: Strength Return of School Cadets (March 1936). CRS B1535, Item 849/3/377.

Table 5H - School Cadet Numbers, 1930-39 Year State Qld NSW Vic SA WA Tas Total 1930 321 1,043 419 205 0 38 2,026 1931 479 945 836 218 63 27 2,568 1932 384 944 757 285 126 0 2,496 1933 381 986 873 264 134 0 2,638 1934 497 933 1,162 146 136 0 2,974 1935 452 1,040 1,079 233 206 109 3,119 1936 580 1,235 1,301 301 215 96 3,728 1937 657 1,505 1,355 403 252 132 4,304 1938 927 1,700 1,346 387 305 115 4,780 1939 903 1,700 1,300 300 300 100 4,603

45 Penrose, Red, Black and Khaki, pp. 23 & 26.

128 5500

4500

3500

2500

1500 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 Source: Strength Returns for School Cadets (1930-39). AWM 113, Item 15/8/3.

An important cause of stability and growth for the school branch was the achievement of a degree of administrative harmony between educational and military establishments. Military duties in connection with School Cadets were a special function of the CMF Brigade Major in the area in which the school unit was located. It was this officer who detailed instructors from the permanent Administrative and Instructional Corps, serving with the nearest CMF unit, for duty with school detachments.46 The resultant triangular relationship between school headmaster, unit Commanding Officer, and CMF brigade staff was complex but generally successful. The army considered a detachment to be under the control of its Commanding Officer, who, as a teacher, was answerable in a school sense to the headmaster. To overcome potential sensitivities, in all matters of administration and training the headmaster was usually consulted and ‘other than in actual training the wishes of the headmaster would normally be given effect to.’47 This meant that while military chains of administrative command were followed there was constant consideration of school authorities and correspondence, for example, was always sent with covering notes for them.

In contrast to such bureaucratic accord, the School Cadet branch of the dual system continued to embody a state school/private school divide driven, in the main, by financial circumstances. Despite some early misgivings, units at large private schools were raised and maintained almost immediately; certainly they were in place in most prominent NSW schools before the end of 1930.48 The popularity of cadet

46 Essay on the History of Army Cadets (1939-45). AWM 54, Item 147/2/1. 47 Memo, Army Headquarters to Military Districts (1931). AWM 61, Item 426/1/225. 48 Memo, Army Headquarters (internal), dated December 1930. AWM 61, Item 426/1/208.

129 units in private schools across the country rose steadily as time progressed such that their numbers dwarfed those in state schools by 1938. This trend was assisted by the fact that a significant number of private schools made service in their cadet units compulsory from around 1937. Generally, with less concern about costs than their state school counterparts, private schools expressed the type of positive attitude towards the scheme voiced by Scotch College (Tasmania) in 1935 when it wrote that ‘very encouraging support is received from the Department of Defence.’49

Conversely, and despite the early enthusiasm shown the Education Departments, most state schools that had maintained school-based detachments during the compulsory era abandoned them in the early years of the new dual scheme. Such under-representation was not helped by the federal government’s refusal to provide financial assistance to various Education Department cadet enrolment initiatives.50 The Department of Defence simply did not have the money to support the widespread expansion of cadet units into a significant proportion of government-run schools. There was no question of support in principle for state school cadets but the government was not prepared to pay for them for most of the decade. It was not until after 1937 that changing community attitudes encouraged state school cadet numbers to again increase to significant levels. The state school/private divide in the 1930s was, in many ways, a product of insufficient funds; a weakness in one of the four pillars of the movement and an issue with wider implications concerning general levels of governmental and military commitment to the movement.

Overall, throughout the 1930s, financial and material support to school-based cadet units was generally feeble and easily the most damaging single difficulty the branch faced. Restricted government spending during the Great Depression (1929-33) was unavoidable with expenditure on the wider army stagnating in parallel with national GDP up to 1936; after which time military funding, and by extension support to cadets gradually improved (see Table 5I). Importantly unlike their Regimental counterparts, School Cadets never received free uniforms.51 Indeed, the one real attempt to convince the government to provide them came in June 1936 when Major

49 Scotch College (Tasmania), The Caledonian, 1935, p. 9. 50 Hodge, B., The Magic Years: the Coffs Harbour High School Cadet Story 1939-45, Cambaroora Star Publications, Hill End, NSW, 1993, p. 31.

130 General Sir Charles Rosenthal, General Officer Commanding the 2nd Division, wrote to the army’s Quartermaster General imploring him for free or subsidised uniforms for school units. He explained that the most intelligent boys could not become Regimental Cadets as night drills interfered with study and examinations, and that many of these lads were prevented from joining school units as their schools often baulked at raising them because of uniform related expenses. Furthermore, even if a boy did attend a school with a cadet unit, the cost of privately funded uniforms often meant that his ability to join was determined by his parent’s financial situation, again subject to the Depression, rather than his desire, suitability or aptitude. Rosenthal considered that the fate of the CMF depended on the interest of ex-School Cadets and saw the lack of free uniforms as a significant and material factor acting against schoolboys, school units, and therefore the peacetime adult army. He received a reply two months later from Army Headquarters with a curt explanation that ‘owing to a lack of sufficient funds, your recommendation is not approved.’52

Table 5I – Trends in Army Expenditure against GDP, 1929-39 4400 3900 Army Expediture (£'000) GDP (at current prices ($'M) 3400 2900 2400 1900 1400 900 400 1929/30 1930/31 1931/32 1932/33 1933/34 1934/35 1935/36 1936/37 1937/38 1938/39 Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, History of National Accounts, www.abs.gov.au & Beaumont, Sources & Statistics, p. 30.

In parallel with the army’s refusal to subsidise uniforms, the School Cadet branch also suffered from a chronic lack of the equipment needed to facilitate advanced training. In 1931 School Cadets were issued nothing more than a belt, sling, a .303 calibre Lee Enfield rifle and 100 drill rounds with which to train.53 As time

51 Minute, Army Headquarters to Military Districts (1931). CRS A6006, Item 1930/02/11. 52 Correspondence, General Officer Commanding 2nd Division to Army Headquarters, dated June 1936. AWM 61, Item 436/4/34. 53 Essay on the History of Army Cadets (1939-45). AWM 54, Item 147/2/1.

131 passed the supply situation gradually improved such that by 1936 most schools detachments were provided with limited camp equipment and transport in competition, however, with CMF units.54 From this point, where possible, the army also supplied instructional material and a greatcoat to each cadet and by 1938 this still meagre level of support was extended to include text-books on rifle, bayonet, anti-aircraft, application of fire and light machine gun training.55 Taken in total, however, the period 1930-38 was characterised by scarcity of equipment and significant financial support for the vast majority of School Cadets.

It is clear that there was a political dimension to the problem of inadequate financial and material commitment which reflected a continuing philosophical division between conservative and Labor policy with respect to the cadet movement. It was, after all, a Labor Minister for Defence, A.E. Green, who presided over the establishment of a voluntary system characterised by inadequate support and, through the establishment of community-based Regimental Cadet units, the continuing marginalisation of educational influences. This contrasts, for example, with the enthusiastic support for the movement provided by the NSW Department of Education in 1930 under the conservative Bavin National-Country Party coalition. It is also worthy of note that although it took a number of years, when conditions slowly began to improve from 1936 with respect to government support (and cadet numbers), they did so under a conservative Lyons (UAP – Country Party) federal government.

On a more positive note, a key factor in maintaining some measure of necessary educational influence within the School Cadet branch remained its adult officers. A fortunate few, who had worked as officers in pre-1929 school-based Senior Cadet detachments, and whose schools continued to maintain units in the 1930s, were allowed, subject to the conditions of the new scheme, to continue serving.56 The second type of officers within the School Cadet branch of the dual organisation were student-cadets selected as ‘cadet lieutenants’, in the tradition of the 2nd lieutenants of the Senior Cadets that preceded them, appointed after passing mandatory examinations

54 Many schools with miniature ranges were issued with.22 calibre rifles. Scotch College (Tasmania), The Caledonian, 1936, p. 11. 55 Horner, PAC Cadet Unit (Extracts), p. 14. 56 Military Board Order Number 146 of 1930. AWM 61, Item 426/1/210.

132 and with the recommendation of their detachment commanders.57 School Cadet unit Commanding Officers were also empowered to test and promote cadet NCOs of all ranks and provisions were made for the appointment of select adult NCOs, although very few ever occupied these positions. Both types of officers were obliged to balance school requirements with military guidance. For example, there was no special syllabus for the assessment of cadet NCOs but rather unit commanders came up with their own, guided by the syllabi of equivalent CMF tests.58 Likewise, every assistance was given by the military to adult cadet officers, including special courses of instruction arranged mostly around school holidays, to qualify them for their rank in the CMF.59

In the main, unit administration and home training responsibilities were carried out by cadet officers, for in the majority of schools no regular assistance from permanent army staff was available. It was not until 1938, and then only in cases where the CMF brigades could spare them, that army instructors of the Administration and Instructional Corps were routinely allocated to assist school units.60 To compensate them for such responsibilities cadet officers received £3 per annum as an allowance regardless of rank, although they were not paid for attendance at camps or courses.61 Allowances were also made to school detachments at a rate of 15s per year per efficient cadet and a further 15s for each officer or cadet that attended a yearly training camp of not less than five days.62 In an atmosphere of imposed frugality it is not surprising that, given these incentives, detachments did all they could to ensure maximum levels of efficiency. In 1937, for example, the School Cadet units administered by the 3rd Division in Victoria had a total strength of 927 and of these

57 Although rank and insignia for commissioned cadets was that of a 2nd lieutenant, by convention they were called ‘cadet lieutenants’ in order that they not be confused for adult officers. The examinations for first appointment and promotion for both types of School Cadet officers were generally the same as those laid down for the CMF with cadet lieutenant examinations a truncated form of that prepared for CMF subalterns. Essay on the History of Army Cadets (1939-45). AWM 54, Item 147/2/1. 58 Department of Defence, Instructions 1933, p. 66. 59 Memo, Department of Education (Victoria) to Schools (1930). AWM 61, Item 426/1/206. 60 Military Board Instruction (1936). CRS A5954, Item 895/11. 61 Memo, Army Headquarters to Military Districts (1934). CRS MP742/1, Item 247/1/1934. 62 Like their Regimental counterparts, an ‘efficient’ School Cadet attended a total of 60 hours of training each year. Despite an obvious temptation to over-report efficiency individual units were responsible for submitting the appropriate returns to their CMF brigade headquarters. A formation commander’s representative inspected each detachment once a year to ensure a reasonable standardisation across schools.

133 only 57 were deemed as non-efficient for that year.63 The resultant allowances were used to defray the costs of uniforms, weapon maintenance, equipment repairs, camp expenses, and administrative costs.64

Inadequate material and financial commitment were not the only imbalances inherent in the School Cadet scheme from 1930-38. Cadet activities remained dominated by the army through the nature of the subject matter taught. Like Regimental detachments, annual training requirements for School Cadets consisted of 15 whole day drills or their equivalent (60 hours). In the case of school detachments, however, the distribution and duration of drills was decided by individual units, in conjunction with CMF brigade staff, in order to reduce the impact on the school curriculum.65 School Cadet training commitments were usually broken up, as in the compulsory era, into whole day, half day and night parades.66 In most units this translated to 30 minutes of physical training on each occasion followed by drill, infantry field training to the platoon level, instruction in small arms, and range practices on open or miniature range.67 Adult cadet officers, and attached army instructional staff if available, were usually engaged in training cadets prior to promotion examinations which left the bulk of the unit’s instructional and disciplinary work to cadet lieutenants and NCOs.68 High-level infantry training was attempted where possible, although it was dependent on instructor qualifications and availability, with the Lewis Gun the most common advanced subject.69

To provide some specific examples of the military character of training undertaken by School Cadet units of this era, in December 1930 the Shore unit in Sydney reported itself occupied with arms drill, rifle training, company drill, Lewis

63 3rd Division Efficiency Returns (1937). AWM 62, Item 58/3/97. 64 Such allowances rarely covered all cadet-related expenses. The Shore Cadet unit in 1935, for example, estimated its uniforms to cost £3 19s 6d each and its annual camp at 10s per cadet. Shore, The Torch Bearer, December 1935, p. 181. 65 Department of Defence, Instructions 1933, p. 64. 66 Military authorities recommended an annual break up of 20 hours of small arms training on a range, eight hours of physical training at school, and 32 hours worth of 40 minute lessons of which a proportion could be conducted at an annual camp. Memo, Department of Education (Victoria) to Schools (1930). AWM 61, Item 426/1/206. 67 Memo, 1st Military District (internal), dated September 1931. AWM 61, Item 426/1/208. 68 Military Board Instruction (1936). CRS A5954, Item 895/11. 69 Memo, Department of Education (Victoria) to Schools (1930). AWM 61, Item 426/1/206.

134 Gun training and bayonet fighting.70 In 1933 the same unit was engaged in infantry minor tactics, instruction on guards and sentries, and visits to the depot of the 7th Field Artillery Regiment to receive lectures and to view the guns.71 A useful example of advanced infantry training for School Cadets occurred in June 1937, at the Scotch College unit in Tasmania, whose cadets attended a whole day tactical exercise involving ‘platoon in attack’ scenarios in the morning and ‘trench manning’ and ‘platoon in defence’ activities in the afternoon.72 Some insight into the social acceptance of such militaristic endeavour was shown at Xavier College, Victoria, whose unit regularly conducted route marches around Kew which were remembered by one cadet as follows: ‘we create quite a stir on these occasions. People rush to open windows and gates and wave handkerchiefs and cheer us up by saying we looked well. We were impressive and impressed.’73

Apart from its military orientation, another common feature of School Cadet training in the 1930s was attendance at continuous instructional and promotion courses conducted, for the most part, within schools. Despite a near monopoly on these courses by the education systems, increasing military encroachment as the 1930s progressed was evident. In 1930 permission was granted for a limited number of cadet NCOs to attend continuous schools of instruction for NCOs of the CMF. One example was a ten-day course held by the 1st Anti-Aircraft Battery in NSW attended by a number of local School Cadets from 18-27 April 1930.74 In the same year the army ran a series of specific cadet promotion courses in select locations around the country. Such courses, however, could not yet cope with demand and typically school units sent only a few of their potential NCOs to participate.75 Nevertheless, army control of cadet courses was growing. In 1935, at the insistence of the CGS, Major General Lavarack, specific and tailored continuous courses for school cadet lieutenants and NCOs were authorised. The outward idea was to increase the efficiency of school units by raising the training levels of senior cadets, although a secondary agenda may well have been to help break school control of cadet courses.76 One such 10-day activity

70 Shore, The Torch Bearer, December 1930, p. 133. 71 ibid., December 1933, p. 189. 72 Scotch College (Tasmania), The Caledonian, 1937, p. 18. 73 Penrose, Red, Black and Khaki, p. 22. 74 Memo, Army Headquarters to Military Districts, dated April 1930. CRS B1535, Item 929/25/15. 75 Shore, The Torch Bearer, December 1930, p. 134. 76 Memo, Chief of the General Staff to Military Districts (1935). CRS B1535, Item 929/55/66.

135 was held in Liverpool, NSW, in May 1938 with attendees divided into junior and intermediate wings according to their levels of experience. The junior wing was instructed in section leading, the Lewis Gun, rifle drills and gas training while the intermediate wing dealt with navigation and compass work, map reading and making, gas training (where every cadet was exposed to tear gas), range finding and company drill. Military lectures were conducted each night and an examination was held on the afternoon of the final day.77

One area of school cadet training that managed to remain largely free of military control in this era were annual camps. From the re-inception of the voluntary system School Cadet detachments were permitted to conduct such activities although, in the early 1930s, they were rather spasmodic and only became widespread from 1936 as community concerns over security in Europe and the Far East grew.78 With time these camps were accorded increasing levels of significance but, as the 1930s concluded, they remained neither as rigorous nor as tactically focused as they would later become. Victorian School Cadet camps at Portsea, for example, included a free picture show, a dance, a visit to Fort Napean, cricket matches and ‘free time.’ Indeed, permission for rabbit shooting could even be obtained if so desired.79 The idea of ‘grouped’ camp activities also arose in the early 1930s when an ‘Associated Schools’ camp was conducted in Sydney in 1931 for five prominent private school units.80 Such grouped activities, however, were slow to gain popularity and again only began to spread from 1936.

The range of activities conducted during School Cadet camps varied considerably and, although generally built around military objectives, tended to reflect individual school priorities. In 1930, for example, the Shore School unit in Sydney arranged a camp of three days as a pseudo-social event, catering for over 130 boys, designed to conduct NCO promotion training for selected cadets and general infantry training for the remainder, with the whole affair concluding with a parade attended by parents and friends.81 Alternatively, with a far more serious military focus, in 1933 the

77 Shore, The Torch Bearer, September 1938, p. 124. 78 Department of Defence, Instructions 1933, p. 65. 79 Brighton Grammar School, Grammarian, 1934, p. 45. 80 Braga, Barker College: A History, p. 195. 81 ibid.

136 same unit went into camp at the army barracks in Liverpool, Sydney, for five days to conduct range work, combat practice and a mock battle. At the extreme end of the spectrum, from 1937 the cadets of the Xavier College, Victoria, trained with a distinct military orientation using .310 calibre rifles, Bren and Lewis machine guns, mortars and grenades. They also spend time patrolling, map reading and practicing infantry minor tactics.82

From 1930-38, highlighting the continued importance placed on the social and educational value of cadet competition, rifle contests were re-embraced by School Cadet units (and occasionally by Regimental detachments as well). As was the case prior to 1911, a multitude of local shooting trophies occupied the attention of most units and were presented by a variety of sporting bodies or interested associations.83 Units from the GPS schools in NSW, for example, ran their own competitions in conjunction with the National Rifle Association including the Rawson’s Cup, the N.R.A. Shield and the Buchanan Shield.84 The competitive shooting refocus also saw both School and Regimental Cadets once again participating enthusiastically in a number of Empire-wide contests like the Earl Roberts Trophy which was reinstated at the end of 1929.85 In support of this competition, in May 1930, the Military Board approved the limited issue of new Short Magazine Lee Enfield (SMLE) .303 inch rifles and extra ammunition for practice and use by cadet teams.86 The King George V Trophy and Imperial Challenge Shield small bore competitions continued in earnest on miniature ranges across Australia.87 Apart from shooting matches cadets continued to compete in the Military and Athletic Competitions for Militia Forces and Senior Cadets, inaugurated during the compulsory era, and by 1935 the military was granting £120 annually for the cadet component of these contests.88 In addition to these competitions unique local non-shooting contests were occasionally held between Regimental and School detachments. One example was the Corlette Cup held in

82 Penrose, Red, Black and Khaki, p. 22. 83 Essay on the History of Army Cadets (1939-45). AWM 54, Item 147/2/1. 84 Report of Newington College Cadet Detachment Rifle Club (1935). AWM 61, Item 411/5/82. 85 Results of the Earl Roberts Competition for 1929. CRS SP459/1, Item 441/1/510. 86 Department of Defence, Cadet Journal, No 2, 1951, p. 32. 87 Department of Defence, Instructions 1933, p. 71. 88 Memo, Army Headquarters (internal), dated February 1935. CRS SP459/1, Item 447/1/985.

137 Sydney from 1937 in which teams competed in squad drill, arms drill and field engineering.89

The importance of the social foundations of both branches of the cadet movement was no better exemplified in the late 1930s through the impact of the prospect of a second world war. Resultant public concern fundamentally shaped the organisation as 1939 approached. Obviously the dismantling of the Regimental branch was a direct outcome of the war. In addition, the disappointing recruitment statistics which characterised the School Cadets for most of the decade were dramatically reversed as it drew to a close. By 1937, although steady, the School Cadet system was not flourishing with 4,599 members restricted mostly to private schools. As the likelihood of war increased, however, the government was pressured to encourage the formation of detachments in state schools with the object of providing pre-emptive physical and elementary military training to boys who were soon likely to need it. It did this primarily through a commitment to ‘improving conditions regarding service and training equipment’.90 Additional advice was sought by government from the Military Board which recommended that the movement in state schools would be further promoted by an increase in uniform allowances from 10s to £1 per cadet, free fares to parades and subsidised camp costs. The Board stated pessimistically that without this type of expenditure no serious increase in numbers was expected but with these changes, it determined, a total of 12,000 cadets would be possible.91

What the Military Board had not counted on was the recruiting power of the martial spirit awakening in Australia at this time. Statistics illustrate this point. In 1935 the strength of the School Cadet branch was 2,918 but by 1938 this total had grown to 8,261 and by 1939 to 8,899; well beyond the paper ceiling of 7,000.92 The sharp increase in popularity at a unit level as the war approached can be seen, for example, in Melbourne Church of England Grammar School’s request to have its authorised establishment strength increased from 230 in June 1938 to 420 in December of that

89 Memo, Conditions for the Corlette Cup, dated 2 October 1937. CRS SP459/1, Item 441/1/886. 90 Commonwealth Yearbook, No 31 (1938), p. 237. 91 Military Board Instruction (1936). CRS A5954, Item 895/11. 92 The main increases came from the larger private schools notably the Church of England Grammar Schools in Sydney and Brisbane, All Souls School (Charters Towers), Prince Alfred College (Adelaide), The King’s School (Sydney), Knox College (Sydney), and the Hale School in Tasmania. Department of Defence, Cadet Journal, No 2, 1951, p. 30.

138 year.93 Similarly, the influx of cadet enrolments forced an expansion in establishments at Geelong College and Geelong Church of England Grammar School in Victoria from 89 and 250 in April 1937, to 126 and 337 respectively by the end of 1938.94

Changing public and community attitudes in favour of a strengthened School Cadet system as 1939 drew near were further illustrated by Major General J.L. Hardie, the NSW Military Commandant, when he wrote to the Coadjutor Archbishop of Sydney, N.T. Gilroy, on 29 July 1938, encouraging him to support the formation of units in the larger Catholic colleges in NSW. The Archbishop, who had witnessed the landings at Anzac Cove in 1915, was previously cool on the idea of cadet units in Catholic schools, but, in the context of a looming war, replied that he was ‘keenly interested in the matter.’95 Many schools also reported the effect of the approaching crisis. Shore, in Sydney, wrote that its standards of training were greatly improved in 1938 pointing to the ‘international situation’ as a reason for rising enthusiasm.96 Importantly, the decision taken by many large private schools after 1936 to make membership in their cadet units mandatory would have been impossible a few years earlier due to cost and widespread community apathy with respect to defence issues. By 1937, however, the country was becoming more militarily inclined, particularly in the context of the government’s scheme to enlist 75,000 CMF soldiers, and such compulsory regimes grew common.

The decade following the demise of the compulsory cadet training system in Australia saw the solidification of a dual philosophy, founded upon community and school-based units, which survives in a modified format to this day. The period 1930- 38 witnessed the maturing of social and educational aspirations for the movement while at the same time the reality of the threatening military crisis ensured the primacy of army recruitment objectives and in this way the trinity of military, educational and social objectives was maintained. Overall, the Regimental system suffered from an unhealthy reliance on military favour which, when it turned, spelt the end of the branch. At the same time the school-based scheme, with a greater sense of

93 Letter, Melbourne Church of England Grammar School to Army Headquarters, dated 3 December 1938. AWM 62, Item 63/1/579. 94 Memo, 3 Military District (internal) (1938). AWM 61, Item 63/1/633. 95 Correspondence, Commandant 2nd Military District to Catholic Coadjutor Archbishop, dated 29 July 1938. AWM 61, Item 426/2/3.

139 educational/military balance, endured and thrived as the decade closed. The influence of finance and social expectation exerted themselves in the late 1930s as increasing community concern and defence spending materially assisted the movement and overcame earlier problems associated with inadequate support. Thus, the four foundation forces of the movement continued to charter the course of cadet history in the 1930s and remained firmly in place as the Second World War approached.

96 Shore, The Torch Bearer, December 1938, p. 175.

140 Correct as at: 16 Dec 05

Word Count: 9,407 / 10,022 CHAPTER SIX

Cadets & the Second World War 1939 – 1945

The cadet movement in Australia was heavily influenced by the course and conduct of the Second World War; certainly to a far greater extent than by the conflict of 1914-18. This chapter begins with a study of the effect of the war on the purpose of the cadet scheme in the period 1939-45. This is followed by an examination of its organisation, structure, administration and staffing procedures during the war years, with a specific focus on recurring problems concerning uniforms and equipment. An analysis of fluctuating cadet numbers ensues before attention once again turns to training and related developments. The chapter concludes with an assessment of wartime pressure for a structural reorganisation of the cadet organisations which, although producing no net result before 1945, laid the foundation for future reform.

From 1939-45 the objectives of the cadet system were bound almost completely by the circumstances of war which, in a situation akin to that of the compulsory era, once again marginalised educational and social aims in favour of military outcomes. Throughout the period the focus of the movement narrowed appreciably towards preparing cadets for active service in the CMF or 2nd AIF. This was especially so after the onset of the Pacific War in late 1941, with Japanese aggression guaranteeing public commitment to this altered purpose commensurate with the fear it inspired. A headline in the Sydney Morning Herald in December 1941 captured the mood: ‘Cadet Corps Now Junior Schools For Army’, concluding that the ‘value of schools cadet corps is proved’ with ‘hundreds of boys being exposed to serious training with some knowledge of military routine’ who would ‘play a valuable part in defence if a serious emergency arose.’1 Even after feelings of immediate national peril began to subside by 1944 the acting Minister for the Army, J.M. Fraser, believed that ‘the existence of cadet detachments widens the fields of selection from which the Australian Military Forces can draw replacements of trained and semi- trained personnel.’2 Similarly, Cadet Standing Orders in 1944 resolved that ‘the formation of cadet detachments … will serve as a training ground to provide, to some

1 SMH, November 1941, as quoted in Penrose, Red, Black & Khaki, p. 26. 2 War Cabinet Agendum Number 20 of 1943. CRS A5954, Item 276/13.

141 extent, the future officers and non-commissioned officers of the military forces.’3 On the whole during the war the military was successful in using the cadet movement as a medium to prepare school-aged boys for active adult service. About five per cent of total male army personnel from 1939-45, and fifty per cent of officers, were ex- cadets.4

The army was not alone in supporting such a reorientation of purpose during the war. Even school teachers, the traditional fosterers of more lofty social and educational aspirations for cadet training, tended to subordinate them to military objectives. For most the war presented a duty of care responsibility to prepare their students as best they could for the likelihood of having to fight. The headmaster of Xavier College, Victoria, considered that his cadet unit existed ‘to send boys into the army with a knowledge of the fundamental principles of warfare.’5 Similarly, a detachment was raised in 1940 at Sacred Heart College, Toowoomba, as a result of ‘the desire by the College authorities to give the boys the fundamentals of military training.’6 This position was underwritten by an overwhelming majority of individual cadets who considered their efforts to be well and truly directed towards the war effort and their possible future role in it. At Brisbane Boys’ College ‘nearly 200 young lads are training earnestly … in case they are needed to defend the Empire when they grow to manhood.’7 In short, the reality of the conflict established the movement in the minds of many educators as an essential first step in preparing young men for wartime responsibilities.

Social and educational objectives, while forced into the background, were not, however, driven completely from the cadet agenda. Albeit in a subsidiary role the alternate purposes of inspiring loyalty, leadership, civic responsibility, and other character-building traits survived. Many headmasters still believed that military training by definition would lead to greater levels of discipline and self-discipline, as well as a strengthening of mind and spirit in the individual, while at the same time

3 Department of Defence, Standing Orders for Cadet Services (Standing Orders 1944), Government Printer, 1944, p. 2. 4 Essay on the History of Army Cadets (1939-45). AWM 54, Item 147/2/1. 5 Penrose, Red, Black & Khaki, p. 26. 6 Sacred Heart College, Downlands Magazine, 1940, p. 38. 7 Brisbane Boys College, The Portal, 1940, p. 32.

142 cadet units would help to foster morale and camaraderie within their schools.8 The Christian Brothers’ schools, for example, maintained the aim during the war of using cadets to provide ‘suitable spiritually inspired conservative leaders.’9 Surprisingly, it was sometimes left to the military to remind schools that their detachments remained useful tools in moulding character to produce ‘good citizens’. It was thought that through cadet training attitudes of unselfish service could be instilled to encourage ‘a lad to give his best service to the state throughout his life.’ Army Headquarters was clear in 1941 in that it was not the aim of cadets to ‘inculcate Prussianism nor to deify the martial spirit’ but rather to ‘conform to the educational ideal of fitting out the useful citizen.’ This was said, however, with the continuing expectation that the movement would ensure ‘that the forces be kept supplied.’10

The circumstances of the Second World War affected much more than the purpose of the movement. In contrast to the 1914-18 conflict, the cadet organisation from 1939-45 enjoyed solid support and commitment from the education sector. After the abandonment of Regimental Cadets in 1939, the movement consisted solely of School Cadet detachments and with the onset of hostilities the overwhelming proportion of these units continued to function.11 For the initial war period, however, they did so under trying circumstances, with all permanent military staff posted in support of cadets re-assigned to areas directly supporting the war effort.12 Nonetheless, school support to the cadet organisation grew considerably over the period with detachments becoming a central focus in many schools. Brisbane Boys’ College reported that ‘the size and activity of the cadet corps was the most obvious and visible manifestation of the war within the college.’13 Similarly, after disbanding their school Senior Cadet detachment at the conclusion of compulsory training, Christian Brothers’ College, Brisbane (later St Joseph’s), re-raised a unit of 50 volunteers in 1939 when the headmaster called for ‘all loyal and eligible Terracians to

8 Hodge, The Magic Years, p. 32. 9 Penrose, Red, Black & Khaki, p. 29. 10 Memo, Army Headquarters to Command Headquarters (distributed to schools) (1941). AWM 61, Item 426/2/369. 11 A few ex-Regimental Cadets continued to train with School Cadet units and were identifiable by a colour patch that they wore on their shoulders. 12 This particular situation was improved in 1941 when regular army staffs were re-introduced into the cadet system. Essay on the History of Army Cadets (1939-45). AWM 54, Item 147/2/1. 13 Quirke, N., Gentlemen of Honour, A History of Brisbane Boys’ College 1902 -2001, Brisbane Boys College, Brisbane, 2001, p. 116.

143 become members of our cadet corps.’14 As a consequence of such attitudes the status of cadets within schools increased markedly. Within many private schools, for example, for the first time the authority and prestige of cadets with rank rivalled that of prefects.15 Such educational commitment strengthened the movement during the Second World War where its absence had inspired weakness from 1914-18.

Along with increasing educational support, the war also provoked a sharp increase in social, and therefore political, interest in the cadet movement. As a result of sustained public pressure from a variety of sources many politicians, for the first time in some cases, were forced to consider the question of cadets. In its 1942 meeting, for example, the Returned Sailors’ Soldiers’ and Airmens’ Imperial League of Australia (later the RSL) passed a resolution urging greater government investment in cadets as well as the restoration of compulsory training. This type of agitation eventually compelled the Minister for the Army, Frank Forde, to commission the CGS, Lieutenant General John Northcott, in late 1942, to conduct an inquiry into ways and means of expanding the movement.16 This community attitude and its political repercussions saw the number of cadet units, particularly in state and Catholic schools, grow steadily from 1939 and then dramatically after the fall of Singapore in 1942 and again in 1944. Growing government interest was evidenced in January 1943 when recommendations were made by the army to improve the general conditions of service for cadets, including the issue of free uniforms, fully subsidised annual camps, and the construction of additional accommodation for cadet training purposes. An agendum to this effect was prepared for the War Cabinet but, on the grounds of overstretched army infrastructure, it failed to receive favourable consideration despite Cabinet commitment that cadet training should be encouraged as far as possible within limited resources and that any school prepared to organise a detachment should ‘be assisted by the army in any way possible.’17 The conditions of war conspired to cause an upsurge of social and political attention which itself stimulated vigour in a movement that, in the decade before 1939, had been notable for its lack.

14 Christian Brothers College (Brisbane) (St Joseph’s), Terrace – Quarterly Review, Vol 2, No 3, p. 1, & Quirke, Gentlemen of Honour, p. 113. 15 Quirke, Gentlemen of Honour, p. 121. 16 Hodge, The Magic Years, p. 79. 17 War Cabinet Agendum Number 20 of 1943. CRS A5954, Item 276/13.

144 The successful pre-war military/educational structural balance was generally maintained from 1939-45. Organisationally, the cadet system remained, with a few important exceptions, essentially unchanged from the School Cadets branch of the dual scheme of 1930-38. In one minor modification, finding an officer to command potential units was made a little easier during the war years when the army authorised any member of a school staff to be appointed to a provisional commission with the recommendation of the Commandant of the relevant Military District (renamed Commands in 1939 and Line of Communication Areas from 1942).18 Otherwise, cadet detachments remained organised on the basis of infantry sub-units with the number of companies in any one detachment limited only by the numbers of enrolled cadets (Appendix 8 shows the manning establishments for all cadet units in 1944).19 Boys still joined upon turning 14 subject to the approval of school headmasters who needed to satisfy themselves as to the physical fitness of candidates.20 So too, disciplinary regulations, training requirements and efficiency standards remained unchanged from 1938.

Despite these similarities there were a number of important socially-motivated organisational and regulatory developments during the war. For example, as a precursor to female cadets, following government permission to form the Australian Women’s Army Service and Women’s Australian Auxiliary Force in 1941, from 1942-46 Coffs Harbour High School raised a Girls’ Volunteer Corps of two platoons to mirror its male cadet unit. Once established the female unit trained its NCOs and members as cadets, even to the extent of .303 rifle shooting, bayonet training, and ‘fire and movement’ activities.21 In a second wartime innovation the Volunteer Defence Corps (VDC) was formed for the military training of men too old for regular military service or from those whose employment made them exempt from call-up. The VDC made provision to accept ‘cadets’ into its battalions during the war, although very few ever enrolled. These boys, all aged under 18, whilst not enlisted into the VDC attended parades and training activities. They were not true cadets as

18 The Commands were Northern (Queensland), Eastern (NSW), Southern (Victoria, South Australia & Tasmania) and Western Command (Western Australia). In 1942 Queensland, NSW, Victoria, Tasmania and South Australia were redesignated as ‘Line of Communication Areas’ while ‘Western Command’ remained unchanged. Department of Defence, Standing Orders 1944, p. 2. 19 ibid., 20 ibid., p. 3.

145 defined by this thesis and were neither supported nor acknowledged by government or the wider cadet organisation. They were, however, schoolboys under military training and deserve mention both to acknowledge their efforts and to avoid potential confusion.22

In contrast to the maintenance of basic cadet organisation and structure, fundamental changes with respect to its administrative system were wrought by wartime circumstances. These alterations, although initiated by bureaucratic difficulties, tended to refine the military/educational balance by transferring responsibility away from distracted army headquarters back towards schools. The cadet chain of command in 1939 still ran from the school unit, to local CMF brigade headquarters, to the Staff Officer Cadets in the headquarters of the relevant state Command, and finally to the Director of Physical Training and Cadet Services at Army Headquarters.23 By early 1941, however, it was clearly apparent that supervision of cadet training, staff duties, and management of stores and equipment was well beyond the ability or scope of CMF Brigade Majors under conditions of war. This was especially so in NSW and Victoria where brigade cadet responsibilities were dependant on the number of units and their geographic distribution. In NSW, for example, the 1st Brigade in the north of the state was responsible for 14 separate school detachments in late 1940 in addition to its normal duties. This system caused inefficiency and disorganisation as it was impossible for brigade staff to care adequately for their cadets, especially when CMF formations were encamped for extended periods (26 weeks in 1941). Subsequently, brigade supervision became increasingly non-existent as the simple result of justifiable prioritisation on the behalf of overworked CMF staff. With a rapid turnover of officers, incoming brigade personnel were often ignorant of cadet needs and last minute variations in allocated instructors or equipment regularly threw cadet unit training programs into complete disarray. The personal contact between CMF brigades and cadet officers, so vital in overcoming the natural difficulties of military bodies in educational institutions, was

21 Their uniform consisted of a khaki drill skirt, blouse and pleated shorts, long khaki socks, a brown leather belt and a blue forage cap. Hodge, The Magic Years, pp. 70-72. 22 Unknown, ‘The Volunteer Defence Corps’, in The Listening Post, Vol 21, No 3, 1942, p. 6. 23 Correspondence, Headquarters Eastern Command to Inverell High School, dated October-November 1941. AWM 61, Item 426/2/125.

146 lost. These issues, taken in total, inevitably led to feelings of abandonment and even resentment in some cadet units.

As a result of such concerns a meeting was held for cadet unit representatives in NSW on 13 March 1941 to discuss the general system of administration. Many issues were tabled including the effect of increasing numbers on an already over- burdened administrative system (another 40 detachments or 2,500 cadets were about to be authorised in Eastern Command alone in early 1941). These mounting problems prompted Lieutenant General C.G.N. Miles, General Officer Commanding Eastern Command, to write a sharply worded letter to the Military Board, pointing out the ‘very unsatisfactory situation’ and suggesting that, with respect to his 5,000 cadets,

the administration and supervision of detachments has become increasingly difficult … through no fault of the brigades concerned, the supervision of training by Infantry Brigades had almost ceased to exist, and as regards administration the situation is very little better. 24

In a key recommendation Miles suggested that the administration and supervision of cadet units be made a direct responsibility of the Staff Officer Cadets at each Command headquarters. Not surprisingly, this idea was enthusiastically supported by CMF brigade staff and as a result of their agitation, on 17 December 1941, the Military Board gave direction to remove all cadet responsibilities from the CMF brigades.25 Action was immediately taken to appoint a small staff to supplement the Staff Officer Cadets in each Command headquarters for the purpose of assuming full administrative control of the cadet movement.26 With the CMF brigades out of the loop, school and unit responsibility inevitably increased.

The system of cadet command and administration at the highest level was also restructured during the war years. Until August 1944 strategic control of the movement was coupled at Army Headquarters with physical training under the Director Physical Training and Cadet Services. From this date, however, the two sections of the directorate were separated with responsibility for cadet administration

24 Letter, General Officer Commanding Eastern Command to Army Headquarters, dated 15 April 1941. CRS MP508/1, Item 96/703/43. 25 Memo, Army Headquarters to Command Headquarters, dated 17 December 1941. AWM 61, Item 426/2/366. 26 Memo (Army Headquarters internal), dated May 1941. AWM 61, Item 426/2/474.

147 passed to the Adjutant General’s Branch while cadet training issues fell under mandate of the Directorate of Military Training. The change was only temporary, however, and in December 1944 overall command of the movement was assumed by the Directorate of the Volunteer Defence Corps and Rifle Clubs under Brigadier T.E. Weavers.27

It is important to note that despite the immediate difficulties that wartime administrative problems presented, particularly the frequent unannounced removals of army support, they did tend to enforce upon units a degree of independence and self- containment. While restructures at the Command and Army Headquarters levels eventually overcame many of these problems by the end of the war, hard-earned feelings of self-sufficiency persisted well beyond 1945.28 Having achieved, in their eyes, a more acceptable and successful administrative equilibrium many schools were loathe to relinquish it back to the military after the war.

The system of schools providing officers and NCOs to cadet units during the war continued to be a useful mechanism to promote educational input and influence over the movement. Roles, responsibilities and conditions of service for adult cadet officers did not alter dramatically from 1939-45 with unit commanders, for example, retaining the power to appoint, promote and reduce cadets to any warrant officer or NCO rank up to the number authorised in their unit’s establishment. Reflecting the military’s desire to win back some influence in this area, however, was a new requirement during the war years for provisionally appointed adult officers to complete a cadet officer’s course of instruction, usually held at the Command headquarters in which the appointment took place. Fulfilling this requirement was not always easy in the first few years of the war as many such courses were curtailed with only one, for example, held in NSW in 1941.29 Serving another military purpose, in August 1939 all cadets with rank were issued certificates from their unit commanders upon discharge specifying their qualifications and competence. These certificates

27 Essay on the History of Army Cadets (1939-45). AWM 54, Item 147/2/1. 28 Memo, Army Headquarters to Formation, dated 17 December 1941. AWM 61, Item 426/2/366. 29 Basic training requirements, for example, were reduced significantly with ex-cadets given accreditation for a range of rudimentary skills such as marching and weapon handling. Return of Cadet Courses in Eastern Command (1941). AWM 61, Item 426/2/365.

148 were then used when ex-cadets joined the CMF to obtain certain privileges and training exemptions.30

More significant military imposition was directed at commissioned cadets during the war years. In 1941 the army ruled that cadets were not to be commissioned before they turned 16, although in practice this rank was rarely achieved before a cadet turned 17 or 18 in his final year of training and his last year of school.31 From this date cadets aspiring to commissioned rank were required to hold NCO qualifications before they could present themselves for cadet lieutenant examinations which were arranged and conducted in a more systematic manner than in the past by Command headquarters staff at ‘potential officer’ camps.32 In 1944, to encourage cadet lieutenants to seek commissions in the adult army upon attaining enlistment age, provision was made for them to be placed on the Reserve of Officers List. What this meant was that when former cadet lieutenants were called up for service and had completed their normal recruit training, the List was used to ensure vacancies were reserved for them at the various Officer Training Units which ran special courses to commission them in the CMF or AIF.33 This practice was discontinued with the cessation of hostilities and resultant demobilisation of the army.34

Apart from the alterations to conditions of service already discussed, the circumstances of war, as was the case from 1914-18, created opportunities and challenges for adult cadet staff. Notably, and no doubt of considerable importance to some individuals, cadet officers were spared conscription and could not be called up for compulsory CMF service.35 The war also took many capable officers away from schools to serve in the AIF or in other areas of the war effort. In 1940 at Brisbane Boys’ College, for example, five of the six officers in the cadet unit of 170 boys departed ‘to turn their energies to the struggle which concerns our whole empire’, leaving the Officer Commanding as the lone adult staff member. This, in turn, meant that increasing demands were made of cadet lieutenants and NCOs to maintain order

30 Memo (internal), 4th Division, dated August 1939. AWM 62, Item 105/6/133. 31 Memo, Army Headquarters to Headquarters Eastern Command (1941). AWM 61, Item 426/2/369. 32 Department of Defence, The Defence Act 1903-1939 and Regulations and Orders for the Australian Military Forces and Senior Cadets, Government Printer, 1940, p. 341. 33 The course ran for 16 weeks for infantrymen and longer for the other arms. Memo, Army Headquarters to Line of Communication Area Headquarters (1944). CRS MP742/1, Item 48/1/745. 34 Department of Defence, Standing Orders 1944, p. 5.

149 and provide instruction.36 In tribute to the perceived value and status of adult cadet officers during the war years, in 1945 all were placed on the official Army Reserve List for five years.37

As an inevitable result of wartime demands, the provision of material support for the cadet organisation suffered from 1939-45. Issues associated with uniforms and equipment during this period, for example, once again highlighted the power of finance to shape the nature of the cadet organisation and its activities.38 Despite massive increases in army spending (see Table 6A), the requirements of the 2nd AIF and a range of other war-related necessities left the cadet organisation critically short of supplies. A significant and continuing problem was that many units (particularly from state schools), found it difficult to afford uniforms even though for much of the period they were able to buy ‘reconditioned’ or part-worn stock from the army at half price.39 In 1942, for instance, the newly raised New Town High School Cadet unit in Hobart attended its inaugural camp at the Elwick Showground in civilian attire as it could not afford to clothe its cadets in khaki.40 Problems of cost were exacerbated when wartime rationing of clothing was introduced, with cadets required to expend valuable coupons to procure their uniforms. This necessity was very unpopular, with most families reluctant or resentful of having to spend ration allocations on military attire. After significant public outcry, in August 1942 the War Cabinet sensibly revoked the requirement.41 Also accentuating uniform-related dissatisfaction at the time was the fact that members of the air force cadet organisation, the Air Training Corps, received theirs for free.42 Such obvious discrimination inevitably led to army cadet agitation for equivalent treatment.

35 Memo, Victorian Line of Communication Headquarters (internal) (1943). AWM 61, Item 426/2/114. 36 Brisbane Boys’ College, The Portal, 1931, p. 31. 37 Memo, Army Headquarters to Headquarters Line of Communication Areas (1945). CRS MP742/1, Item 48/1/1585. 38 Similarly, the system of cadet officer allowances illustrated the impact of limited finance at this time. In 1944, for example, the Staff Officer Cadets in Hobart, Captain A.B. White, after spending £1,400 on allowances, ran out of money and was unable to pay for the fares required to get the Tasmanian cadets together for an annual camp. Similarly, Victorian and NSW cadet authorities requested an additional £2,000 above their allocations in 1944 to pay for allowances and other costs. Army Headquarters Estimates of Expenditure on Cadet Units, 1943-44. CRS MP742/1, Item 105/3/240. 39 Memo, Army Headquarters to Command Headquarters (1939). CRS MP742/1, Item 61/17/161. 40 Essay, History of the Cadet Corps in Tasmania. HQ AAC File 123/1/32. 41 Memo, Army Headquarters to Line of Communication Headquarters, dated 25 August 1942. AWM 61, Item 436/4/38. 42 Essay on the History of Army Cadets (1939-45). AWM 54, Item 147/2/1.

150 Table 6A – Trends in Army Expenditure against GDP, 1939-45 350400 300400 Army Expediture (£'000) GDP (at current prices ($'00,000)) 250400 200400 150400 100400 50400 400 1939/40 1940/41 1941/42 1942/43 1943/44 1944/45 Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, History of National Accounts, www.abs.gov.au & Beaumont, Sources & Statistics, p. 31.

On 29 November 1943 the CGS, Lieutenant General Northcott, wrote to the Minister for the Army, Forde, recommending approval be given for the free issue of Service Dress uniforms to cadets. The idea received Ministerial support on 4 December 1943, pending approval by the Treasurer and War Cabinet, and on 19 February 1944 a message was sent to India requesting the release of uniform stocks held in Australia as part of the Eastern Supply Group Council. This request was assented to on 24 February but with the proviso that the uniforms be replaced within three months. Unfortunately, the Australia Director of Clothing and Textiles made it clear that such a replacement would be impossible and the initiative was therefore blocked.43 Northcott’s efforts, however, were not in vain for they created an attitude in government that cadet uniforms should and would be provided when they became available.44 Subsequently, on 7 December 1944 the War Cabinet finally decided to issue free uniforms to cadets from 1 January 1945.45 This decision, however, reflected an expected over-abundance of ex-AIF uniforms as much as any marked increase in government generosity.

Following the outbreak of war the inadequate provision of military equipment to cadet units was an issue of equally serious concern. Cadet units in 1939 were

43 Correspondence, Chief of the General Staff (various), dated December 1943 – March 1944. CRS MP742/1, Item 61/17/161. 44 The idea of free uniforms so frightened the Director of Rationing, H.C. Coombs, that he wrote to the Ministers for the Army and for Customs warning that such a move would require over one million square yards of material and that he strongly recommended against any such decision. Letter, H.C. Coombes to Minister for the Army, dated 5 March 1944. CRS MP5/42, Item 52.

151 entitled to a block scale issue of equipment that included Mk III Lee Enfield .303 rifles and accoutrements such as belts, ammunition pouches, bayonets, bugles, and sandbags. Free ammunition was approved at the rate of 75 rounds of .22 calibre per cadet for miniature rifle shooting, along with 120 rounds of .303 ammunition for open range practices.46 In addition, units in 1939 were authorised to hold one Lewis Gun each or per hundred cadets in larger units. The reality of war, however, with the requirement to equip rapidly expanding adult military forces, rendered such entitlements meaningless and resulted in immediate, and grave, across the board equipment shortages for most cadet detachments.

In late 1939 many service .303 rifles, along with most other items of military equipment, were withdrawn from units in order to equip the VDC, and on 26 July 1940 the Master-General of the Ordnance, Major General T.R. Williams, ordered the immediate withdrawal of all remaining weapons, bayonets and associated items.47 To compensate, a limited number of antiquated .310 rifles were re-issued for drill purposes but no ammunition was available for them.48 Units such as the Shore School were forced to ‘make do without rifles, no ammunition, dummy bayonets and a mock Bren Gun.’49 In response to a number of ministerial complaints, the army acknowledged that the .310 rifles were a poor substitute but it maintained that the needs of the AIF and CMF justified the decision. Nonetheless, the withdrawal of service rifles remained a bitter pill for many units to swallow. In the end, however, they had little choice as Major C.E. McConnell, the Eastern Command Staff Officer Cadets, clearly illustrated in response to Sydney Grammar School’s complaints when he wrote ‘if the boys are losing interest in their training at Sydney Grammar School I

45 The provision of free uniforms reduced the annual efficiency allowance from 15s to 5s per cadet and cost the government an initial £105,404 pounds in 1945 and £10,401 pounds per annum thereafter. War Cabinet Agendum Number 20 of 1943. CRS A5954, Item 276/13. 46 An extra 40 rounds of .22 calibre ammunition was allocated to cadets in teams entered in the Empire Challenge Shield Competition with 200 additional rounds per cadet available at a reduced cost. Similarly, 100 .303 calibre rounds per cadet were issued to team members entered in the Earl Roberts Trophy competition. Department of Defence, Standing Orders (Provisional) for the Equipment of the Australian Military Forces and Senior Cadets. Part 1. General, (Standing Orders for Equipment), Government Printer, 1940, pp. 151-4. 47 Essay on the History of Army Cadets (1939-45). AWM 54, Item 147/2/1. 48 Letter, Eastern Command to Cadet Units, dated 30 July 1940. CRS SP4459/1, Item 544/2/3040. 49 Sherington, Shore: A History, p. 158.

152 suggested that Mr Jones should make his representation to the headmaster as the shortage of rifles is a fact that cannot be altered.’50

Apart from rifles, the provision of general military equipment remained problematic, with cadets forced to compete with the VDC for the small quantities that could be spared. The resultant frustrations were eloquently captured by the headmaster of Knox Grammar School, who wrote a letter that found its way to Lieutenant General H.D. Wynter, General Officer Commanding Eastern Command, in December 1941. The headmaster complained that he was unable, at any time, to procure Lewis or machine guns of any type and his requests for a short-term issue of gas masks were continually frustrated. He feared that such shortages caused boredom and encouraged boys to leave the cadet unit and join organisations like the Air Training Corps. Army authorities responded to this letter in the same way they responded to all such complaints, by suggesting that the basic scope of fieldcraft and platoon tactics could be made interesting enough to keep cadets keen so long as officers were creative and progressive in their thinking. In any case, the military maintained, wartime demands prevented any additional issue of equipment.51 Such military/school friction over the availability of equipment continued in 1942 and was given voice by individuals like N.H. McNeil, headmaster at Wesley College in Western Australia, in his report of a ‘chronic lack of equipment’ which, he concluded, proved that the Minister for the Army was ‘unsympathetic to the cadet movement as a whole.’52 Even as late as 1943, shortages were still causing difficulties with the Lithgow High School unit, for example, writing to Captain A.N. McKenzie, the Staff Officer Cadets in NSW, begging for a single Bren Gun in order to conduct weapon lessons.53

Despite such outcries the overall situation was, perhaps, not always as bad as some schools maintained and many units, rather than expending energy in complaint, continued to train as best they could given the circumstances. In most locations a

50 Letter, Staff Officer Cadets (Eastern Command) to Headmaster Sydney Grammar School, dated 12 August 1940. AWM 61, Item 426/2/139. 51 Letter, Eastern Command to Headmaster Knox Grammar School, dated 3 December 1941. AWM 61, Item 426/2/469. 52 Candy, The Victorian Cadet Movement, p. 24-25. 53 Letter, Lithgow High School to Staff Officer Cadets (Eastern Command), dated 21 April 1943. CRS SP459/1, Item 426/2/1683.

153 greater concentration on fieldcraft and map reading, for example, replaced arms drill and Bren Gun instruction without adversely effecting morale or motivation. In other cases, as equipment availability worsened in line with the deteriorating fortunes of war, mounting community concern ensured enthusiasm for cadet activities was maintained or even increased and training was continued, such as was practicable, with whatever equipment could be borrowed from adjacent CMF units.54 Some headmasters were quite inventive in their efforts to protect limited equipment stocks. The headmaster of Coffs Harbour High School, for example, in completing an official stocktake of weapons prior to relinquishing his rifles, bought his unit some time by substituting a full-stop for a zero on his accounting ledger. This unusual initiative, however, provided only a short-term reprieve.55

With the darkest days of the war left behind, and many ex-soldiers returning to the industrial workforce, from the beginning of 1944 cadet equipment shortages began to ease. From this point up to four .22 calibre rifles were issued to any unit that requested them and had access to a miniature range.56 In addition, small quantities of .310 calibre ammunition at last became available and detachments, where possible, were issued with free camp stores and transport.57 From the end of 1944 material support continued to improve with general stores becoming more plentiful and training facility availability extended in support of cadet camp activities. Significantly, service .303 rifles were re-issued during late 1945 as weapons from war service became increasingly accessible. The provision of these weapons was, perhaps, expedited by the headmaster of Brighton Grammar School and Officer Commanding its cadet unit, the Reverend P. StJ. Wilson, who corresponded regularly his brother, Brigadier A.S. Wilson, Deputy Master General of Ordnance (Maintenance), about the issue.58 Importantly, on 11 May 1945 the War Cabinet ordered that cadet detachments be provided with the same scale of camp equipment, rations and other service items provided for any unit of the CMF, thus inaugurating an era of much-improved material support to the movement as a whole.59 Overall, the difficulties associated

54 Essay on the History of Army Cadets (1939-45). AWM 54, Item 147/2/1. 55 Hodge, The Magic Years, p. 57. 56 Department of Defence, Standing Orders 1944, p. 13 & pp. 152-3. 57 Ground sheets were also issued at a scale of 10 per cent of unit strength and a greatcoat was provided to each cadet. Department of Defence, Standing Orders for Equipment, pp. 148-9. 58 Mortensen, An Australian Army Cadet Unit, p. 4. 59 Essay on the History of Army Cadets (1939-45). AWM 54, Item 147/2/1.

154 with cadet uniforms and equipment during the war years were model examples of the vulnerability of the movement to the whims of finance and the resource availability it represented. Even in the context of strong military, educational and social commitment, three of the four pillars of the movement, the cadet organisation remained beholden to fiscal circumstance.

Despite financial and resource constraint, as a direct consequence of a general strengthening of military, educational and particularly social commitment to the cadet organisation, enrolled numbers increased by 500 per cent in the period 1939-45. In 1939 there existed 57 cadet detachments with a combined strength of 4,603. Stimulated by the conditions of war this total increased to 10,600 by October 1941 and to 22,338 by 1945 (see Table 6B).60 Indeed, the number of schools waiting to raise new units by 1941 was so high that serious pressure was placed on establishment ceilings. In June 1941, for example, Tasmania was at 94 per cent of its maximum authorised number of cadets and Victoria was at 99 per cent.61 The Military Board was subsequently forced to instigate a policy discouraging units at Intermediate, Junior and Junior Technical High Schools in order to restrict them to schools whose average student leaving age was 17, thus obtaining continuity of service and commensurate value for money for the army. The rule, however, was never fully implemented with many such schools either exempted or granted permission to form detachments despite the Military Board’s intent.62 So eager were schools and pupils to be involved in cadet training during the war that many became frustrated with military bureaucracy and the time taken to approve new units. One NSW schoolboy, for example, wrote a lengthy letter to the Sydney Morning Herald on 13 June 1940 which captured the spirit of similar discontent around the country in its lament that 300 boys at North Sydney Boys’ High School were unable to ‘learn how to defend their country’ due to delays in forming a unit.63

60 ibid. 61 Cadet Unit Strength Returns by State, dated 31 June 1941. CRS MP508/1, Item 96/703/59. 62 Memo, Army Headquarters to Command Headquarters, dated July 1941. AWM 61, Item 426/2/96.

155 Table 6B - Cadet Numbers, 1939-45 Year Qld NSW Vic SA WA Tas Total 1939 903 1,700 1,300 300 300 100 4,603 1940 1,200 3,000 2,400 400 500 500 8,000 1941 1,600 4,100 3,000 400 700 800 10,600 1942 1,600 4,100 3,000 400 700 800 10,600 1943 2,000 5,000 3,500 700 800 1,000 13,000 1944 2,000 5,000 3,500 700 800 1,000 13,000 1945 3,832 10,876 4,223 813 1,253 1,341 22,338 25000

20000 Cadet Numbers

15000

10000

5000

0 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945

1939 1945

QLD NSW VIC SA WA TAS

Source: Tables of School Cadet Strength Returns (1939-45). AWM 113, Item 15/8/3.

Although frustrated by army-imposed ceilings of 10,600 cadets in 1942 and 13,000 in 1943, the drive from schools to expand the system often caused real numbers to exceed official limits. Although capped at 1,000, for example, there were actually 1,234 cadets in Tasmania in late 1943 with the organisation across the country exceeding its authorised maximum total by 3,159 as at 30 September that year (Table 6C shows the numbers by state).64 Nor had expansion ceased by 1944 with 143 units in operation by the end of that year.65 At the close of the war the cadet movement consisted of 180 units containing approximately 23,000 all ranks. This

63 SMH, 13 June 1940 in AWM 61, Item 426/1/287. 64 Strength Return for Cadet Units in Tasmania, dated November 1943. CRS MP742/1, Item 96/2/86. 65 Laffin, ‘Cadet Corps in Secondary Education’, p. 21.

156 figure dwarfed the 4,603 cadets of 1939; such was the effect of military, educational and social alignment.66

Table 6C - School Cadets in Australia, 30 September 1943 Formation Detachments Officers Other Ranks TOTAL

QLD L of C Area 21 90 2,906 2,996 NSW 54 228 6,031 6,259 Victoria 27 154 3,954 4,108 SA 3 19 477 496 WA 9 36 1,030 1,066 Tasmania 13 45 1,189 1,234 TOTAL 127 572 15,587 16,159

7000 6000 5000 4000 3000 2000 1000 0 Queensland NSW Victoria SA WA Tasmania Source: Tables of School Cadet Strength Returns by State, dated 30 September 1943. CRS MP742/1, Item 323/1/603.

A significant consequence of drastic wartime increases in cadet numbers was a decrease in the statistical divide between state and private schools. Continuing a 1930s trend, at the outbreak of war only nine state school units were in operation across the country. These units represented a paltry 16 per cent of all detachments with none at all in South Australia, Western Australia or Tasmania (see Table 6D).67 Over the next six years, however, this situation was reversed with the vast majority of new units raised in government-run schools. The Military Board laid the groundwork for the influx of state school cadets in 1940 when it requested state Departments of Education to encourage their schools to form units. Across the country this initiative was met by varying but generally positive degrees of enthusiasm. The NSW Minister for Education, D.H. Drummond, for example, wrote to Eastern Command in June 1940 explaining that ‘in view of the present national emergency this Department is

66 Expansions were not uniform across the states. On 17 May 1945 there were 26 detachments in Queensland (up from 18 in 1941), 55 in NSW (up from 39), 28 in Victoria (up from 18), 13 in Tasmania (from 11), ten in Western Australia (from six) and only four in South Australia (from three). Regimental and Officers’ List, 1945. CRS A1194, Item 03.06/27278. 67 Essay on the History of Army Cadets (1939-45). AWM 54, Item 147/2/1.

157 desirous of assisting in any way possible.’68 What was not anticipated, either by the army or the education departments, was the immediate and overwhelming response from state school students. Between June and August 1940, for example, 35 applications to raise detachments were sent to the Staff Officer Cadets at Eastern Command from NSW state schools alone, and by 1941 there were 23 state school units in the state (from five in 1939) with a total of 2,400 cadets.69 Similarly, Northern Command had 15 new state school units approved in one day on 31 March 1941.70

Table 6D - School Cadet Units at the Outbreak of the Second World War Queensland New South Wales Maryborough Grammar The Armidale School Toowoomba Grammar Sydney Grammar Southport School Sydney Church of England Grammar Brisbane Church of England Grammar Barker College Scots College (Warwick) Knox Grammar Warwick State and Technical High * Camden Church of England Grammar Slade School Scots College Townsville Grammar The Kings School All Souls School Newington College Brisbane Grammar Cranbrook School Rockhampton Boys’ Grammar Sydney Boys’ High School * Brisbane Boys’ College Canterbury Boys’ High School * Victoria Hurlstone Agricultural High School * Melbourne Church of England Grammar Trinity Grammar Scotch College Parramatta High School * Xavier College North Sydney Boys’ High School * Brighton Grammar South Australia Camberwell Grammar St Peter’s College Carey Baptist Grammar Prince Alfred College Haileybury College Scotch College Caulfield Technical School * Western Australia Geelong Church of England Grammar Guildford Grammar Hamilton & Western District College * Hale School Melbourne Boys’ High School * Scotch College Ballarat Church of England Grammar Aquinas College Geelong College Wesley College Wesley College Tasmania Ballarat College Launceston Church of England Grammar St Patrick’s College Scotch College Caulfield Grammar Devonport High School Hutchins School * State schools. Source: Essay on the History of Army Cadets (1939-45). AWM 54, Item 147/2/1.

68 Letter, Minister of Education (NSW) to General Officer Commanding Eastern Command, dated 15 June 1940. AWM 61, Item 426/1/289. 69 A total of 10 new detachments (587 cadets) from 42 applications were approved in the month of April alone. Hodge, The Magic Years, p. 79, & Eastern Command Return of Cadet Units Raised January-June 1941. AWM 61, Item 426/2/176. 70 Northern Command Return of Cadet Units Raised January – March 1941. CRS MP508/1, Item 96/703/39.

158 Although not as dramatic as the sharp increase in state school unit numbers, cadet detachments in private school also responded to wartime circumstances with increased enrolment. This was particularly evident in smaller Catholic schools that had previously faced the same financial obstacles to raising and sustaining cadet units that had beset their state school counterparts in the 1930s. Under wartime conditions, however, by April 1941 there were 26 applications (1,915 cadets), from Marist and Christian Brothers Schools pending approval at Army Headquarters.71 There was no doubt that, under the conditions of war, the state school/private school balance, at least in terms of relative numbers, was restored. Whether it would remain so when peace broke out, however, was an entirely different proposition.

Predictably, traditional military domination of cadet training and activities continued and even intensified during the war. Many key elements remained unchanged from the 1930s with, for example, parade requirements remaining at 60 hours per year exclusive of attendance at an annual camp.72 So too efficiency obligations were constant although, as a result of the withdrawal of weapons from units for most of the war, the traditional musketry course was modified into a miniature range practice with units possessing a ‘reasonable opportunity’ expected to complete it.73 Other than weapon and physical training, and dependant on the availability of equipment, cadets were still instructed in a range of general infantry- based military subjects including fieldcraft, map reading, camouflage and drill. On average around two hours training were attempted per week during school terms (40 weeks a year) and around five days were spent annually at camp under school arrangements. The Christian Brothers College, Brisbane, (St Joseph’s) cadet unit, for example, filled such requirements with a parade of one and one half hours each Friday

71 Correspondence inviting Catholic schools in NSW to raise cadet units flowed freely and directly between the Catholic Archbishop of Sydney and the Staff Officer of Cadets at Eastern Command headquarters. As a result by March 1941 there were 12 applications from NSW Catholic schools pending approval. Army Headquarters Establishment Tables of Potential Cadet Units, dated April 1941. AWM 61, Item 426/2/366, & Correspondence, Archbishop of Sydney to Eastern Command, dated March – April 1941. AWM 61, Item 426/2/90. 72 Memo, Army Headquarters to Command Headquarters (distributed to schools) (1941). AWM 61, Item 426/2/369. 73 Those units unable to access miniature ranges were granted exemptions and still received the 15s per cadet per year efficiency allowance. From 1945 a badge of efficiency (the CMF crossed rifles marksmanship badge) was worn by ‘efficient’ cadets. Memo, Army Headquarters to Command Headquarters, dated 2 August 1940. CRS SP4459/1, Item 546/1/3967, & Essay on the History of Army Cadets (1939-45). AWM 54, Item 147/2/1.

159 afternoon along with a four and a half day annual camp.74 Such commonality aside, however, wartime circumstances shaped cadet training in a number of other new and important directions.

The first point of divergence from pre-war training regimes was a military drive to curtail the wide variation in content and methods between cadet units in favour of standardisation and systematisation. Within the context of war the army considered that ‘if cadet training is to take its place in the general plan of military training, a considerable increase of uniformity of standard and knowledge is essential.’75 At this time cadets typically spent three or four years in their units which meant that training and rank progression followed a characteristic pattern of basic recruit training in the first year, more advanced or possibly NCO training in the second, appointment as an NCO in the third with perhaps attendance at a SNCO or officers’ course and an appointment to these ranks in the final year. Due to turnover this left an average platoon with five fourth year, seven third year, nine second year and ten first year cadets.76 Any attempt, therefore, to achieve true training uniformity required the imposition of a single blanket syllabus to cater for recruit, advanced and combined training for all groups.77 As complex as this task was, it is exactly what the army set out to achieve.

In January, 1942, the first real attempt to standardise cadet training was made with the publishing of guidance for unit training programs with a view to ‘the implementation of a basic system of cadet training under war conditions and allowing for difficulties in regards to equipment.’78 (Table 6E shows the detailed syllabus for 1st, 2nd and 3rd year cadets recommended by the army at this time). The idea was to establish a common basis for instruction that could be carried out in all units while at the same time remaining elastic in nature and capable of wide variation in detail. To

74 St Joseph’s, Terrace, 1940, p. 29. 75 During the war, in framing cadet training requirements, army authorities assumed that because cadets were boys who chose to stay at school then a ‘higher mental attainment’ could be supposed for them. This, in addition to the fact that cadets, as school pupils, were accustomed to learning meant that ‘training in a cadet detachment can proceed at a much higher rate than in the militia.’ Memo, Army Headquarters to Command Headquarters (distributed to schools) (1941). AWM 61, Item 426/2/369. 76 A number of the largest school units separated themselves into companies based on years, with first years focusing upon elementary training while second and third years pursued progressively more advanced activities. 77 Memo, Northern Command (internal), dated 16 October 1941. CRS SP4459/1, Item 546/1/8285. 78 ibid.

160 achieve this purpose it was suggested that unit syllabi must be viewed as a complete two or three year program. If basic training was covered first then periods of collective training could achieve a multitude of objectives at once, especially during annual camps.79

Table 6E - Detailed Syllabus of Training Recommended to Cadet Units, 1942 Subject 1st Year 2nd Year 3rd Year Detail Time Detail Time Detail Time Drill Ceremonial 18 Revision & 7 Revision 7 Improvement .310 Rifle Parts & Recognition, 5 Revision & Fire 4 Revision 1.5 cleaning, fire positions, Orders aiming instruction .303 Rifle Nomenclature, loading, 4 Revision, Mechanism, 12 Aiming-Off, 4 aiming, firing, Tests of Marksmanship Revision, Range Elementary Training Theory, Range Practices Practices .22 Rifle Range practices 2 Range Practices 0.5 Nil 0.5 Infantry Field Signals & 16 Concealment & 32 Revision, Advanced 8 Tactics Formations, Using Cover, Stalks, Section Stalks & Ground, Individual in Attack & Defence, Competitions Movement, Section in Scouting, Patrols, Attack & Defence Observation Messages Nil 0 Forms & Procedure 6.5 Appreciations & 6 Orders Guards & Ceremonial procedures, 11 Ceremonial & 0 Ceremonial & 0 Sentries duties in the field Collective Training Collective Training Collective Section and Platoon I 20 Advanced Section & 18 Advanced Exercises 9 Training attack and defence Platoon in Attack & & Outposts Defence March Introduction and Route 4 Route Marches & 4 Route Marches & 2 Discipline March Protection Protection Lectures Discipline & 10 Revision Lectures & 6 Revision Lectures & 4 Organisation Demonstration Demonstration Specialist Nil. 0 Nil 0 Signals, Medical, 48 Training NCO Training Total 60 60 60

Source: Memo, Northern Command (internal), dated 16 October 1941. CRS SP4459/1, Item 546/1/8285.

Military incentive to achieve training standardisation during the war was due, according to army sources, to a widely held feeling that adult cadet staff in the past had lacked a clear view of the objectives to be achieved which had resulted in activities organised without any definite plan. Consequently, there was a

79 ibid.

161 ‘considerable loss of efficiency, waste of effort and the resultant product was not as soundly trained as possible.’80 While this may have been the case in many units the true motivation for uniformity seems to have been less about reducing variation in training standards as an end in itself and more to do with preparing cadets for CMF of AIF duties. Indeed, the published syllabus of cadet training in use up to the end of 1944 commented that, if followed correctly, cadets at the end of their second year should be trained to the army’s ‘DP 1’ (deployable) standard.81 Military efforts to regulate cadet training continued for the remainder of the war. In February 1945 a new and complete cadet syllabus was released ‘on the lines of the training given to reinforcements of the Australian Military Forces.’82 This curriculum was organised on the principle of one year’s basic training for all cadets followed by two years advanced instruction. The first year syllabus was, therefore, purely elementary infantry training with subjects as diverse as drill, weapon and marksmanship instruction, fieldcraft, map reading, range practices, military lectures and hygiene. Second and third year activities continued along more advanced lines, with periods including ‘application of fire’, Bren Gun and 2 inch mortar training.83

The imposition of standardised syllabi did not, however, succeed in removing all training variation between units. Ironically, the same conditions of war that encouraged to army to implement such measures forced a degree of innovation as a significant number of units geared themselves towards a civil defence role. At St Peter’s College, South Australia, lessons included ‘incendiary bombs burning and being dealt with … and air raid drill in the parklands’, while cadets at Xavier College in Melbourne dug their own air raid trenches in the first few months of 1942.84 In other units different types of ‘national service’ were undertaken by cadets who collected waste paper, rubber, aluminium and other salvage, saved money in war

80 ibid. 81 Department of Defence, Syllabus of Training: Senior Cadet Detachments, Government Printer, 1944, pp. 4-5. 82 Department of Defence, Syllabus of Training: Senior Cadet Detachment: Non-Specialist and Specialist Training, (Period: Three Years), Government Printer, 1945, pp. 5, 27 & 45. 83 A Trained Cadet Badge was awarded to cadets who completed one year of training under the 1945 syllabus, attended 30 weekly parades and an annual camp, passed a miniature rifle practice, and were recommended by the unit commanders. ibid. 84 Lee & Williams, St Peter’s College Cadet Unit, p. 4, & Penrose, Red, Black & Khaki, p. 27.

162 certificates, sent comfort packages to soldiers on the front, and generally backed every available patriotic effort.85

To help overcome the problem of keeping cadets interested in their training programs in the context of the scarcity of equipment and facilities previously discussed, the army made a key decision at the end of 1941 in advancing a two-fold solution of ‘specialist’ and ‘fieldcraft’ activities. In the first instance the military reversed its long-held position that school units be restricted to infantry-type training. This reconsideration was based primarily on an Eastern Command report that found that detachments containing boys with a variety of interests must have a wider scope of training to maintain enthusiasm. This fact was recognised with the introduction of cadet ambulance and signals sections within a number of units at the end of 1941.86 To cater for mechanically minded boys, medium machine gun (Vickers Gun) training was recommended and there is evidence of cadet mortar sections being raised as early as Easter 1942.87 These ‘specialist’ sections, at a scale of one per platoon, rapidly became popular and entrenched components of most units.88 By the end of 1945 virtually all detachments contained at least one specialist section, manned by second or third year cadets, trained in artillery, tank attack, signals, medical, mortar or the Vickers Gun. So institutionalised had these specialists become by the end of the war, and consistent with army efforts at standardisation, that full training syllabi were released for each type.89

85 Bean, Here, My Son, p. 198. 86 A total of 22 signals and 19 ambulance sections were raised in NSW in 1941. Eastern Command Report on Cadet Training (1941). AWM 61, Item 426/2/123. 87 Hodge, The Magic Years, p. 88. 88 Memo, Army Headquarters to Command Headquarters (1941). AWM 61, Item 426/2/474. 89 Artillery training involved the 25 pounder gun and concerned itself with drills, mechanisms, maintenance, ammunition and instrument training. Tank Attack instruction concerned the 6 pounder anti-tank weapon and covered similar topics to artillery training with sighting, range practices, field engineering and field exercises also conducted. Signals sections studied the WT Set 108 radio, cabling, lamp, flag and switchboard drills, wireless procedure, and ‘signal office’ working. Mortar specialists were taught the employment of the 3 inch mortar including maintenance, handling drills, lectures on fuses and bombs, fire control, smoke missions, overhead and flanking fire as well as the use of the military rangefinder. Medical trainees learned anatomy, physiology, first aid, stretcher exercises, drugs, lotions, hygiene, treating wounded and the care of fractures, sprains and dislocations. Cadet Vickers Gun sections received training in gun drills, mounting, stripping, maintenance, aiming, traversing, stoppage drills, day and night firing alone and in sections, direct fire, indirect fire, range practices and other machine gun skills. Department of Defence, Syllabus of Training: Senior Cadet Detachment: Non-Specialist and Specialist Training, (Period: Three Years), Government Printer, 1945, pp. 62, 83, 101, 121, 141-145, 159-163, 195-200, 215-219, 233-237, 251-258, 271-275.

163 The army’s second training solution to wartime limitations on equipment and instructors was an increased focus on fieldcraft. Although beginning as something like scoutcraft, fieldwork quickly evolved into serious tactical training which increasingly immersed cadets in simulated combat scenarios. While such a transition was understandable given the realities of the war, which saw most schools decorated with air-raid shelters or slit-trenches, Army Headquarters, initially at least, sought to temper it by delineating the difference between cadet activities and purely military training as follows: ‘cadet training may be said to aim at acquainting cadets with military procedure as part of their general education whereas militia training is designed to specifically teach men to take their place in a fighting force in a time or war.’90 The army was not, however, successful in making the point as schoolmasters sought to prepare their cadets as best they could should they be called up at a later stage.91 In any case, it did not labour the point and was soon actively encouraging combat training activities for cadets. Indeed, in 1942 tactically oriented field training were described by the Military Board as being ‘the main object of cadet training.’92

As the military situation worsened in the Pacific the army became even more supportive of combat training for cadets recommending that a greater concentration be placed on the ‘general toughening of the cadet to take his place in the fighting forces in the near future.’93 As technical training was provided in the adult forces upon enlistment, emphasis was shifted even further towards field work and leadership development. This was so much so that the army advised units that ‘those who do not possess the qualities of leadership should be bluntly regarded as training aids for potential officers’, that is, cadets with SNCO or commissioned rank.94 In short, by the end of their cadethood cadet lieutenants and SNCOs were, in addition to being developed leaders, supposed to be able to instruct in squad and arms drill, the use of a service rifle, fieldcraft, section leading, patrolling, basic field engineering, and be able to put into practice platoon attack and defence procedures.95

90 Memo, Army Headquarters to Command Headquarters (distributed to schools) (1941). AWM 61, Item 426/2/369. 91 ibid. 92 Letters (various), Army Headquarters to Potential Cadet Detachments (1942). AWM 61, Item 426/2/113. 93 Memo, Army Headquarters to Command Headquarters (distributed to schools) (1941). AWM 61, Item 426/2/369. 94 ibid. 95 ibid.

164 Cadet tactical and combat training during the war took a variety of forms depending on the unit concerned. In 1942 Knox Grammar School described its ‘field training’ as exercises ranging from elementary section leading to advanced platoon exercises. During home training periods the Knox platoons would march into open country and carry out pre-arranged tactical scenarios under the supervision of cadet platoon commanders and adult officers.96 At the same time cadets at Prince Alfred College, South Australia, were taught unarmed combat and bayonet fighting during their twice-weekly parades.97 Similarly, of the four cadet companies at the Shore School, Sydney, in 1943, the two senior sub-units conducted section and platoon movement drills and patrolling exercises and trained using the German Spandau machine gun and bayonets.98 As the war progressed combat training continued with, in many locations, VDC units regularly engaging in tactical deployments and even pitched battles against local cadet detachments. Interestingly, from 1943 onwards, following the fortunes of the war, many units tailored their activities towards jungle- style operations.99

The 1930s trend of army incursion into the conduct of cadet courses, the majority of which were previously run by schools, became even more pronounced during the war. In line with field training developments, courses of continuous instruction aimed at improving officers and cadets in their appointments, became tougher and tactically oriented.100 At the same time the nature of cadet promotion courses changed. As was the case in the pre-war years cadets became eligible for promotion by passing the appropriate examination at the conclusion of an army-run promotion course or by undertaking similar tests at school locations after receiving all necessary instruction. As the war progressed, however, shortages of instructors and equipment restricted the conduct of school-run courses which meant a greater reliance

96 ibid. 97 Horner, PAC Cadet Unit (Extracts), p. 15. 98 Shore, The Torch Bearer, December 1943, p. 70. 99 Hodge, The Magic Years, p. 39. 100 A typical example was that held from 23-30 August 1940 at Hurlstone Agricultural High School. The course was neither compulsory nor for promotion but rather to ‘assist junior sergeants and section commanders.’ It taught fieldcraft, simple tactical exercises, map reading, rifle drill and small arms handling. A total of 146 cadets attended with places offered to detachments on the basis of unit strength. The course itself could not have been easy as, in addition to the work laid down in the syllabus, cadets marched five miles each day and engaged in night patrolling competitions. Report of Number 2 Cadet Course, dated August 1940. AWM 61, Item 426/2/36.

165 was necessarily placed on the combined army-run activities.101 Generally, courses for potential Junior Non-commissioned Officers (JNCOs) were held in August (and regularly instructed upon by cadet lieutenants) while in December ten-day courses for potential SNCOs and cadet lieutenants were conducted.102 Emphasising the army’s anticipated return on this investment, in 1944 that the qualification of the rank of cadet sergeant automatically carried an exemption from the infantry components of recruit training when enlisting into the CMF.103 The trend towards large, standardised, military-controlled promotion courses at the expense of school-run activities continued after 1945.

While army influence on cadet courses increased, financial and resource restrictions curtailed any similar attempts to dominate cadet camps, in the early war years at least. Indeed, all army-run combined camp activities were suspended entirely from 1939-41, and although military-run camps resumed in 1942 they suffered from a critical lack of material support.104 Succumbing to fiscal pressure the army reduced the authorised duration of all annual camps in 1943, including those run by individual schools, from seven to five days despite unit desires to the contrary.105 In the face of such difficulties, however, underlying social and educational commitment saw detachments continue to attempt their own camp activities. Although supported in principle by the army in most cases these school ventures were planned and conducted from within individual unit resources.106 In April 1942, the cadet planning staff for a combined St Ignatius’ College and St Aloysius’ College camp for 120 cadets at Canley Vale, NSW, for example, were told by Headquarters NSW Line of Communication Area that ‘in regard to equipment … it is strongly recommended that

101 Memo, Army Headquarters to Formation Headquarters, dated 17 December 1941. AWM 61, Item 426/2/366. 102 Army support staff were often impressed by the rigour of training and standards achieved during the conduct of cadet promotions courses. On 10 February 1943, for instance, Major E.H. Ironmonger, Chief Instructor of the Army Junior Leader School at Balgownie, wrote to Headquarters, NSW Line of Communication Area, to express his appreciation and amazement at the high level of accomplishment and attitude of 30 cadets that had attended a JNCO course earlier in that year. He believed that the cadets had forced his adult trainees to be ‘put on their mettle’ and to achieve more than they might have as a result of being pushed by their junior counterparts. Letter, Ironmonger to Staff Officer Cadets (Eastern Command), dated 10 February 1943. AWM 61, Item 426/1/395. 103 Department of Defence, Standing Orders 1944, p. 6. 104 Report of Eastern Command Annual Cadet Camp of 9-17 December 1942. AWM 61, Item 426/2/708. 105 Memo, Army Headquarters to Headquarters Line of Communication Area Headquarters, dated April 1943. AWM 61, Item 426/2/815. 106 Department of Defence, Standing Orders 1944, p. 4.

166 a syllabus be drawn up without the use of equipment … In regard to instructors, it is impossible to allocate instructors at the present time.’107

Against all odds many units refused to be daunted, and there are records of a number of detachments during the war years conducting two or even three school-run camps per year rather than the one approved by the army. A typical example of this type of small scale individual unit-run camp was that conducted by Tamworth High School from 5-11 May 1943. The camp consisted of two adult staff and 39 cadets and was run at a CMF training depot making use of borrowed huts and stores. Instructional assistance was provided by members of the local VDC unit who were using the same accommodation blocks. Military training was intense and ran from 7am to 8pm daily with lessons including physical training, drill, rifle exercises, map reading, small arms theory as well as section and platoon fighting and reconnaissance patrols. The camp culminated in a bullring exercise on the final day that tested all the instruction given and demonstrated infantry minor tactics like patrolling and the construct of defensive positions. At the completion of the camp the small Tamworth detachment reported itself as being ‘exhausted but satisfied.’108

In 1944, as the pressure of the war eased, the army was at last able to assert its influence and army-run annual camps improved in both frequency and scale. From this point most were multi-unit activities catering for between three and ten schools. A military controlled camp at Dapto, NSW, from 6-12 November 1944, illustrated the growing importance of such activities with 1,062 cadets from seven schools converging for the occasion.109 By late-1944 combined army-run cadet camps had developed into substantial events with, in the single month between 17 August and 17 September, four activities conducted in NSW for 22 units and 2,240 cadets.110 At this stage the army could also afford to staff annual camps at reasonable levels and they were regularly supplemented by military cooks and uniformed general duties personnel. An annual camp in September 1944 for 1,550 cadets at Narellan, NSW, for example, was allocated 34 regular army staff (not including instructors) to act as

107 Letter, Staff Officer Cadets (Eastern Command) to Headmaster St Ignatius College, dated 13 April 1942. AWM 61, Item 426/2/815. 108 Report on Tamworth High School Cadet Camp, dated 21 May 1943. CRS SP459/1, Item 426/2/910. 109 Report on NSW Combined Annual Camp, Dapto, dated July 1944. CRS SP459/1, Item 426/2/2295. 110 Return of NSW Combined Cadet Camps, August-September 1944. CRS SP459/1, Item 426/2/2163.

167 cooks, butchers and labourers.111 To complete the reinvigoration, approval was finally given in May 1945 for all expenses in connection with camps to be paid from public funds, thus paving the way for a continuing commitment to large, grouped, military- controlled annual cadet camps in the post-war era.

At the outbreak of war, despite a heritage of educational commitment to them, the army curtailed most large organised inter-unit cadet shooting competitions. One contest series that did continue, however, was the ANA Challenge Shield conducted annually in each state to determine both the best cadet shooting team and individual shot. This competition was modified in January 1941, after the withdrawal of rifles from units, to be conducted on miniature rather than open ranges.112 Meanwhile, although never a widespread endeavour from 1939-45, the Empire Cadets Small Bore Rifle Competition (incorporating the King George V Trophy and Imperial Challenge Shield) continued to be contested by a few motivated units.113 Many traditional cadet shooting competitions were re-established in 1945 as service rifles once again became available, although they did not return to pre-1939 levels of popularity until well after the war.114

As the prospect of war approached a number of the more prestigious non- shooting cadet competitions were also cancelled, although this did not stop small scale or local initiatives. In 1939 in Sydney, for example, disappointed about the cancellation of the ANZAC Day Military Gymkhana, a committee representing six private schools approached the military authorities about arranging a substitute. Permission was granted provided that all arrangements were made, and costs borne, by the cadet units involved. The contest was staged on 29 April 1939 with events including drill and a miniature rifle shooting judged by permanent army officers. This particular event was considered successful by military and education authorities alike.115

111 Report of NSW Annual Cadet Camp, Narellan, dated 19 September 1944. CRS SP459/1, Item 426/2/2060. 112 Revised Rules and Conditions of the ANA Shield Shooting Competition, dated January 1941. CRS SP4459/1, Item 441/1/1038. 113 Memo, Army Headquarters to Command Headquarters (1939). CRS SP1008/1, Item 441/3/1623. 114 Essay on the History of Army Cadets (1939-45). AWM 54, Item 147/2/1.

168 The social role of cadet parade and ceremonial activities continued throughout the war years with the only real difference from past circumstances being that, in most cases, such activities were conducted in direct support of the war effort or associated with it in some other manner. On 5 December 1940, for instance, around 1,000 cadets (along with around 1,300 Air Training Corps members) marched through the streets of Melbourne in support of the Austerity Loan campaign.116 Similarly, on Youth Day (10 October) 1941, 2,000 cadets from private schools in Sydney took part in a march through the city in connection with the War Loan Drive.117 Alternatively, cadet units during the war, particularly in the large cities, often participated in combined parades organised by Command staff to ‘release the energies and patriotic feeling of the boys and the community during troubled years.’118 There is also no doubt that ANZAC Day commemorations took on special significance during the war, and it is safe to conclude that there was not a unit in the country that did not involve itself in ANZAC Day activities in some way, in the form of a parade or in the provision of guards or cenotaph parties. Certainly in 1945 cadets had a significant part to play in the multitude of post-war victory marches that took place in all capital cities.

Leaving aside developments in cadet training, the fact that the form, structure, regulations and conditions of service of the cadet organisation remained relatively static during the war years does not disguise the considerable pressure applied by social, educational and military forces to alter the nature of the movement during this period. Such factors, although generally unsuccessful up to 1945, worked to produce significant results in the post-war period. As early as November 1940, for example, representations were made by a number of teachers, and the Australian Natives’ Association, to the Prime Minister urging a re-introduction of the Junior Cadet training scheme abolished as a Department of Defence activity in 1931 (see Appendix 3). These petitions were denied on the grounds that it would be impossible to support additional youth training when a dearth of arms and equipment was already hampering existing cadet activities.119 More influential was the acknowledgment by military authorities from 1941 that a problem had grown out of the vacuum left by the

115 Correspondence (various), Staff Officer Cadets (Eastern Command) to Cadet Units, dated 3 April 1939. CRS SP4459/1, Item 441/1/1003. 116 Article in Army Public Relations Bulletin, dated 2 December 1940. CRS A8681, Item 1942/1902. 117 Shore, The Torch Bearer, December 1941, p. 121. 118 Memo, Southern Command (internal), dated 15 November 1940. CRS SP459/1, Item 447/1/2103.

169 abandonment of the Regimental Cadets. There was a discontinuity of training whereby a boy who left school had no means of continuing his military education until liable for CMF service at 18. In July 1941 Colonel F.J. Anderson, the Director of Cadet Services, wrote to the various state Staff Officers of Cadets and asked for their input into an idea to form a Cadet Reserve for the purpose of bridging this gap. The concept, in theory, received almost unanimous support in principle from school units although a large proportion of headmasters deemed it impractical given equipment and instructor shortages and the fact that after they finished school boys tended to scatter widely. These reasons were enough to put an end to this initiative before any serious progress was made.120

Nevertheless, the concern over the 16-18 year old training gap persisted and the Military Board continued to contemplate the re-introduction of a Regimental Cadet system. A push for this outcome was narrowly defeated in late 1941, after considerable investigation, by the combined pressure of CMF training programs and a shortage of trained instructors. The matter was reluctantly and temporarily shelved.121 A further attempt to overcome the problem occurred in October 1942 when consultations took place between representatives of Victorian state schools and Army Headquarters. Suggestions were put forward by the former for an extension of the system of cadet training to include boys up to the age of 18 and a report was submitted to the CGS, Lieutenant General Northcott, setting out such a plan. The proposal was submitted for consideration to the War Cabinet but once again nothing materialised due to manpower, equipment and instructor shortages.

A final source of pressure for the restructuring of the cadet system came from the media with many articles in late 1942 calling for a re-introduction of a compulsory cadet scheme like that in place from 1911-29. Responding to such agitation, three alternate cadet schemes were put to the War Cabinet in 1943.122 Scheme ‘A’ was the compulsory training of all boys 14-18 years in and out of school. Scheme ‘B’ was the voluntary training of all boys 14-17 at school and closely resembled an expanded

119 Essay on the History of Army Cadets (1939-45). AWM 54, Item 147/2/1. 120 Correspondence, Army Headquarters to Staff Officer Cadets (various), dated July 1941. AWM 61, Item 426/1/321. 121 Essay on the History of Army Cadets (1939-45). AWM 54, Item 147/2/1. 122 War Cabinet Agendum Number 20 of 1943. CRS A5954, Item 276/13.

170 version of the extant system with the exception that the ceiling number of cadets would be increased to 30,000 and control of the movement would be centralised with companies and detachments rationalised into battalions linked to VDC units. Scheme ‘C’ resembled the pre-war dual Regimental/School Cadet system catering for the voluntary training of 14-15 year old boys at school and 16-17 olds who had left school, and it was this scheme that was chosen for further investigation. Not only would such a system bridge the training gap to the CMF but it would also provide an avenue of cadet training for boys who had not attended a school with a detachment. The establishment of a new and independent Directorate of Cadets was also recommended, along with a formal battalion structure to fill the void between units and the Line of Communication Area headquarters. Despite the work that was done to develop this option, it was not implemented before 1945 due to associated manpower and supply difficulties and the fact that from a political angle it would have been highly undesirable, so soon after the Defence Act was amended to compel the CMF to serve outside of Australia, for the government to extend any form of military training. What these suggestions and proposed new schemes did ensure, however, was that the cadet movement was destined for significant reform after the pressures of war eventually subsided.

The fortunes of the cadet movement during the war years retained the political dimension identified throughout its earlier history although, in the same way that the wider issue of universal training obscured the correlation between federal political conservatism and support for the cadet movement in 1911-29, conditions of war in 1939-45 acted to disguise, but not remove, the link. It was the conservative Menzies UAP and UAP-Country Party governments that permitted the movement to expand by a considerable 57 per cent between September 1939 and October 1941. Alternatively, although admittedly under pressure from competing wartime priorities, it was the Curtin Labor government in January 1943 that refused army recommendations for improved conditions, uniforms, camp funds and accommodation for cadet units. Such policies were only reversed when war driven surpluses made them inevitable in 1945. The demands of war may have forced Labor’s hand with respect to many cadet decisions in the period 1939-45, but they did not completely mask an underlying political intent.

171 In general terms, the balance of military, educational, financial and social forces acting to shape the cadet movement from 1939-45 altered noticeably from the previous decade. While financial (and resource) fluctuations continued to influence many aspects of the organisation, the circumstances of war ensured an increased military emphasis across the movement. This was clearly evidenced by overwhelming army involvement and control over cadet training and activities throughout the period. The important point, however, is that the destructive ramifications of military pre- eminence over social and educational considerations were avoided by the fact that, due to the circumstances of war, such dominance was embraced by both the education sector and the wider community. While these three pillars may have been out of balance they were in alignment and with military, educational and social backing the movement grew to a position of considerable strength by 1945. Such harmony, however, was temporary and contingent upon the war. It therefore remained to be seen whether the movement could transplant its success into the post-war period.

172 Correct as at: 16 Dec 05

Word Count: 8,513 / 9,289 CHAPTER SEVEN

The Australian Cadet Corps 1946 - 1957

From 1946-57 the cadet movement capitalised on the enthusiasm of the Second World War to grow stronger and more stable than it had ever been. This chapter commences with a survey of the post-war cadet system to 1950 before focusing on the reorganised ‘School’ and ‘Regimental’ components of what once again became a dual scheme between 1950-57. In the context of social concern over the threat of international communism, the Korean War (1950-53) and the Malayan Emergency (1948-60), the organisation’s relationship with the National Service scheme from 1951 is then examined, along with issues of staff, resources, and enrolment. The chapter concludes by examining how such factors combined to influence developments in cadet training during the period.

In the years following the Second World War the voluntary school-based cadet movement thrived. Deep-rooted community fear of Communist expansion in Asia, sharpened by incidents like the Petrov Affair in 1954 along with military deployments to Korea and Malaya, ensured that military matters remained on the public and political agenda which, in turn, encouraged a climate of continuing army, educational and social commitment. Although the fundamentals of the cadet scheme remained essentially unchanged from 1946-50, this did not mean that pressure for reform was non-existent. Throughout 1946, for example, repeated representations were made to the Minister for Defence, J.A. Beasley from teachers, parents and members of the public, accusing schools of not observing cadet regulations in that pressure was being applied to force boys, sometimes below the required age, to enrol. There was a grain of truth here as a number of private schools in the post-war era considered cadet training as a compulsory part of their syllabi. On the other hand, there is no doubt that parents were aware of this fact before sending their sons to such schools and thus, according to the army at least, the voluntary nature of the movement was preserved. Nevertheless, such complaints were serious enough for the Department of Defence to draft an instruction to all units re-affirming the voluntary spirit of the scheme.1

173 More significantly, in 23 October 1946 the Director of Senior Cadets, Lieutenant Colonel W.H. Gray, began a critical examination of the structure of the organisation. With the unanimous support of army formation headquarters he found that the existing system of units answering directly to the Staff Officer Cadets in each Command, although necessary during the Second World War, was unwieldy and inefficient under peacetime circumstances.2 In an effort to promote decentralisation and delegation of responsibility, Gray recommended a cadet brigade and battalion structure be introduced between Command headquarters and individual detachments. Under the plan the six Staff Officers would be appointed as the commanders of state- based cadet brigades numbered in accordance with traditional Military Districts.3 Beneath each brigade, cadet battalions were to be established and numbered sequentially from 1 to 35 across the country. Each battalion was then to be charged with administering between 8-15 individual school detachments.4

Gray’s proposal was accepted by the Military Board at the end of 1947 and, re-affirming the movement’s binding military ties, was progressively implemented during the following year in line with a general post-war army restructure.5 As a result, by January 1948 all 226 cadet units were grouped into 23 battalions forming 5 brigades, with one in each state except in South Australia, where small numbers meant that a single battalion was formed.6 The new brigades were commanded by Australian Regular Army (ARA) majors who now held the dual titles of brigade commander and Staff Officer Cadets within their Commands. The only exceptions were brigades containing more than 40 units where a lieutenant colonel was given

1 Correspondence (various) to Minister for Defence (1946). CRS A663, Item O214/1/69. 2 The geographic Commands were re-established after the war with Southern Command containing three subordinate Military Districts (3 MD – Victoria, 4 MD – South Australia & 6 MD – Tasmania). This structure was, however, again replaced by the traditional state-based Military District system between 1950-60. From 1960 the Commands were re-raised, with Southern Command now encompassing 3 and 6 Military Districts, and this system remained in place until a non-geographic arrangement of functional commands was set up in 1972. 3 A cadet brigade required two or more subordinate battalions. 1 Cadet Brigade was raised in Queensland, 2 Cadet Brigade in NSW, 3 Cadet Brigade in Victoria, 4 Cadet Brigade in South Australia (from 1950), 5 Cadet Brigade in Western Australia and 6 Cadet Brigade in Tasmania. 4 Memo, Army Headquarters to Command Headquarters (1946). CRS SP459/1, Item 507/1/1756. 5 The CMF and the ARA were restructured under a post-war plan in June 1947. The new CMF was built primarily around two infantry divisions, two independent infantry brigades and the nucleus of two armoured brigades. CMF soldiers were required to attend 14 days of continuous training in camp, 12 days obligatory home training, and an equal amount of voluntary home training each year. Unknown, ‘Australia’s Citizen Army’, in Army Quarterly, Vol 62, No 1, April, 1951, p. 218. 6 In this case the Staff Officer Cadets acted as the Battalion Commander.

174 command (this applied initially only in NSW).7 The battalions were led by ARA Commanding Officers of the rank of captain (who were also Adjutants and Quartermasters) supported by a small staff of SNCOs.8 Beneath the new battalions cadet detachments, still organised as infantry companies and platoons, continued to be raised at any school, or combination of schools, so long as a minimum strength of 30 was attained.9

Along with the implementation of brigade and battalion structures at a state level, cadet command arrangements at Army Headquarters faced a string of reorganisations in the post-war period. With the cessation of hostilities in 1945, and the dismantling of the Directorate of the VDC and Rifle Clubs, responsibility for the strategic management of the movement was transferred to the Directorate of Senior Cadets within the CGS Branch. The new Directorate was charged with the implementation of policy and for the coordination of action relative to raising, equipping and training cadet units.10 Almost immediately, however, it was transferred to the Adjutant General’s Branch and, with effect from 1 January 1948, the renamed Directorate of Cadet Services was again repositioned, this time under the control of the Directorate of Military Training, for the performance of its functions. 11

The beginning of the new decade brought two new and important developments for the cadet movement. The first occurred on 1 January 1950 when Regimental Cadet detachments were re-raised across the country which, as between 1930-39, once more divided the organisation into School and Regimental branches. The second development was published in the Australian Commonwealth Gazette which repealed the conditions relating to cadets in the old Defence Act and made official the title of Australian Cadet Corps (ACC) with the announcement that ‘there

7 Apart from the commander, other cadet brigade headquarters staff included a WO1, two WO2s, a sergeant (clerk) and a corporal (storeman). If necessary, a Medical Corps WO2 and a Catering Corps WO2 could be attached. Cadet Brigade Establishment Table (1948). AWM 54, Item 327/23/3. 8 SNCO staff included a WO1, a WO2, a corporal (clerk) and a private (storeman) with extra staff allocated if the number of cadets in the battalion exceeded 1,000. Three chaplains and a medical officer could be attached as required. 9 In 1951 a decision was made to increase brigade headquarter staff manning with the addition of a major, a captain and WO2 if the number of subordinate units exceeded 100 or total numbers of cadets exceeded 15,000. Department of Defence, Standing Orders for Cadet Units Raised at Educational Establishments (Standing Orders 1949), Government Printer, 1949, p. 2, & Cadet Battalion Establishment Table (1948). CRS MP742/1, Item 96/1/3650. 10 Department of Defence, Standing Orders 1949, p. 2.

175 shall be an Australian Cadet Corps, which shall consist of persons under the age of eighteen years who are voluntarily enrolled in the corps.’12

Like its 1930s predecessor, the second Regimental scheme, which ran from January 1950 to August 1957, represented an overt case of military manipulation of the cadet movement. Its re-introduction was a direct result of the army’s desire to stimulate recruiting for the CMF by bridging the age gap between former school cadets and volunteer adult soldiers and providing for those who lived in areas without school units.13 The first hint of such a move was a paper submitted in July 1947 by Colonel L.G. Canet, Director of Coordination within the Adjutant General’s Department at Army Headquarters, for the post-war Army Planning Committee. The Committee, however, was reluctant to support the idea at this time and ordered further investigation.14 More than a year later, in August 1948, the Military Board approved the raising of Regimental units but did not pressure the Military District Commands to act on its decision. It was therefore left up to the Minister for the Army, Cyril Chambers, to provide the required impetus by publicly announcing his support of a re- born Regimental scheme from the beginning of 1950.15

The organisational structure of the Regimental branch in the 1950s parallelled its 1930s incarnation. This time ceiling numbers were set at 5,000 with 700 positions in Queensland, 2,000 in NSW, 1,200 in Victoria, 500 in Western Australia, 400 in South Australia and 200 in Tasmania (Table 7A shows actual enrolments as at 30 June 1952).16 Again, Regimental detachments were aligned to the CMF such that cadets considered themselves ‘posted’ to parent adult units. They were manned by boys aged 14-18 and it was left up to CMF unit enrolling officers to ensure candidates were physically fit ‘British subjects domiciled in Australia.’17 Units were appended as full cadet companies to CMF infantry battalions or as individual platoons attached to

11 Memo, Army Headquarters (internal) (1947). CRS MP742/1, Item 48/1/457. 12 The title had been in unofficial use since 1945. Essay on the History of Army Cadets (1939-45). AWM 54, Item 147/2/1, & Laffin, Cadet Corps in Secondary Education, p. 21. 13 Memo, Army Headquarters (internal) (1950). CRS SP459/1, Item 507/1/1756. 14 Army Headquarters Report, dated 29 July 1947. CRS MP742/1, Item 48/1/1467. 15 Ministerial Release, dated December 1949. CRS MP742/1, Item 48/1/1467. 16 Strength Returns (various) of Regimental Cadet Detachments (1950). CRS MP742/1, Item 247/1/1880. 17 Memo, Headquarters 2nd Military District to Subordinate Units (1950). CRS MP742/1, Item 247/1/1880.

176 CMF companies depending on local circumstances. Squadrons and troops were raised as applicable to CMF armoured, signals and engineer units. In an effort to assuage the feelings held by some regimental CMF officers in the pre-war period that Regimental Cadets had been a burden to their units, from 1 August 1950 efficient cadets were allocated an annual ‘Welfare and Betterment Fund’ allowance of 3s each paid directly to parent CMF units to be used to ‘build up amenities for cadets.’18

Table 7A - Strength of Regimental Cadets, 30 June 1952

QLD NSW VIC SA WA TAS Total 627 939 1,024 322 357 85 3,354

Source: Department of Defence, Cadet Journal, No 4, 1951, p. 22.

One significant improvement over the Regimental system of the 1930s concerned the provision of adult officers. Although they were still supplied by parent CMF units, this time members of the Reserve of Officers’ List were permitted to take on Regimental Cadet responsibilities thus freeing up busy active CMF personnel for other duties.19 Initially, as in the past, cadets could be promoted up to the rank of sergeant with no cadet lieutenant positions available in the Regimental organisation. Furthermore, up to 25 July 1951, former School Cadets entering Regimental units were forced to relinquish their rank and start again as private equivalents (although CMF Commanding Officers were instructed to keep former rank in mind when considering promotions).20 From this date, however, these rules were reversed and members were permitted to qualify and serve as cadet lieutenants within their detachments while ex-School Cadet lieutenants were able to transfer and retain their rank on a provisional basis until they passed a special examination.21 This change of heart was made primarily to overcome the reluctance of former school-based cadet lieutenants to join the Regimental organisation and forego the rank they had laboured to earn.

18 Memo, Headquarters 1st Military District to Subordinate Units (1950). CRS MP742/1, Item 10/1/413. 19 Memo, Army Headquarters to Military Districts (1950). CRS A5799, Item 26/1950. 20 Memo, Headquarters 2nd Military District to Subordinate Units (1950). CRS MP742/1, Item 247/1/1880. 21 Those who did not pass were presented with the choice of accepting a lesser rank, as determined by the CMF Commanding Officer, or resigning. School Cadet NCOs were still required to relinquish rank

177 Regimental Cadet training in the 1950s once again followed the basic pattern laid down for parent CMF units which meant parades were usually conducted at night and on weekends.22 On 28 November 1949, immediately before the scheme was launched, Lieutenant General S.F. Rowell, Vice Chief of the General Staff, ordered that all Regimental Cadets were to be classified as ‘efficient’ or ‘non-efficient’ in accordance with regulations in place prior to 1939, with the notable exception that they were now obliged to attend an annual camp of at least seven days.23 In most cases this camp requirement was completed concurrently with CMF unit camps so long as cadet and adult sleeping quarters and messes remained separate. Alternatively, Military District Commandants were empowered to arrange special yearly camps for their Regimental detachments which were also permitted to attend schools and courses organised for School Cadets.24

A key weakness of the Regimental Cadets of the 1950s, as it had been for their 1930s forebears, was an over-reliance on army patronage. The absence of educational involvement or focused community backing left the branch vulnerable to changing military agendas. It was rendered helpless, therefore, in the face of the army’s decision to cease all further enrolments from April 1953 and, without any new members from that date, was powerless to prevent its inevitable atrophy up to 1957 as cadets progressively left the organisation at 18 (see Table 7B).25 There were a number of factors that caused the abandonment of the second Regimental Cadet scheme. The most important was the introduction of National Service in 1951 despite the fact that Rowell, now a lieutenant general and CGS, specifically directed that the Regimental system not be adversely affected by it.26 He could not, however, single-handedly hold back the tide of military opinion summed up by Colonel C.N. Peters, the Director of Cadet Services, when he wrote on 5 March 1953 that

upon enrolling in Regimental detachments. Military Board Instruction 85 of 1950, dated 25 July 1950. CRS MP742/1, Item 48/1/1467. 22 Memo, Army Headquarters to Military Districts (1950). CRS A5799, Item 26/1950. 23 Headquarters 1st Military District to Subordinate Units (1950). CRS MP742/1, Item 10/1/413. 24 Memo, Headquarters 3rd Military District to Subordinate Units (1950). CRS A5799, Item 26/1950. 25 From 1953 Regimental Cadet numbers represented only previously enrolled cadets continuing their service until forced out of the organisation at 18 years of age. Given that the youngest cadets could join at 14 the scheme was destined not to survive past 1957. 26 Notes (various) on National Service and the Regimental Cadet Scheme (1951). CRS MP742/1, Item 323/20/558.

178 it is suggested that, now that the CMF unit strengths have been built up by the absorption of National Service trainees, there is no longer any necessity or justification for Regimental Cadets and that enrolment of youths in Regimental Cadet units should be discontinued immediately.27

Table 7B - Regimental Cadet Numbers, February 1950 – September 1957 Date Number of Cadets February 1950 2,425 February 1951 3,270 September 1951 3,784 (peak) February 1952 3,578 December 1952 3,211 March 1953 3,067 June 1953 2,719 December 1953 1,992 March 1954 1,528 June 1954 1,236 September 1954 847 June 1955 477 September 1955 382 March 1956 189 September 1956 123 March 1957 122 September 1957 0 4000 3500 3000 2500 2000 1500 1000 500 0 Feb- Aug- Feb- Aug- Feb- Aug- Feb- Aug- Feb- Aug- Feb- Aug- Feb- Aug- Feb- Aug- 50 50 51 51 52 52 53 53 54 54 55 55 56 56 57 57 Source: Regimental Cadet Strength Returns (Army Headquarters) February 1950- September 1957. CRS MP927/1, Item A48/1/182.

National Service was not, however, the sole cause of the demise of the Regimental branch. The demands of the Korean War, and the likelihood of future involvement in Malaya, detracted from the army’s ability (and willingness) to support the scheme. In addition, correspondence to the Directorate of Cadets from prominent military figures of the era suggest that high ranking CMF officers seized upon

27 Memo, Director of Cadet Services to Cadet Brigades, dated 5 March 1953. CRS MP927/1, Item A48/1/182.

179 National Service as a way to be rid of the training and administrative burdens represented by the Regimental Cadet organisation. Major General S.H.W.C. Porter, the CMF Member of the Military Board, complained that the CMF was ‘unable to train them properly because they present a different training problem’ and that ‘I would be glad to be rid of them.’28 In any case, from 1957 the ACC was once again a school-based movement and the repeating folly of a cadet system without a balance between military, educational and social forces was re-affirmed.

Overall numbers of Regimental Cadets only ever represented a small fraction of those enrolled in schools and, therefore, although an important component of the ACC in the 1950s the Regimental branch should not be considered in the same terms or on the same scale as its school-based counterparts. Although School Cadet structure and regulatory framework in the period 1950-57 remained relatively static, a number of important issues unique to the School Cadet branch emerged. The first of these again concerned the question of National Service. In 1951 the National Service Act was passed requiring all 18 year old men to register for military service. From time to time a period of some months was chosen to make this registration operative and all those with birthdays within the specified months were called up for 98 days training in their first year followed by routine service with the CMF for the next three years.29 The difficulty, therefore, for School Cadet units was to keep boys interested despite the realisation that many of them would be compelled to re-learn most of their training after they left school. This challenge was exacerbated by the military’s decision that no consideration for cadet training, including exemptions or promotion, would be afforded to ex-cadets when undergoing National Service obligations. This position was taken in 1950 on the advice of Colonel R.E. Wade, a former Director of Cadet Services, who suggested that ‘the standard reached by a member of the school cadet corps is negligible in comparison with that which is expected the National Service trainee will reach.’30

The controversy surrounding the non-recognition of School Cadet experience within the National Service system reflected the continuing influence and

28 Letter, Porter to Director of Cadet Services (1953). CRS MP927/1, Item A48/1/182. 29 Unknown, Australia’s Citizen Army, p. 219. 30 Memo, Army Headquarters (internal) (Colonel Wade) (1950). CRS MP742/1, Item 323/20/424.

180 commitment of the education sector to the school branch of the organisation. Responding to pressure from their constituents, a number of politicians repeatedly queried the Minister for the Army, Josiah Francis, in Parliament over this issue.31 Indeed, pressure to acknowledge the cadet service of those balloted into National Service, particularly from headmasters of large private schools, was sufficient to prompt Major General Roy Kendall, Military Commandant in South Australia, to write to headmasters in his state in an effort to diffuse their anger. Kendall acknowledged that former cadets would be familiar with the National Service recruit training syllabus and would possess significant advantages over recruits with no military experience, but he rejected ideas of segregation or exemption from the full training program. Similarly, on 22 May 1951, the Military Board’s CMF member, Major General W.J.V. Windeyer, was dispatched to speak to the NSW GPS Headmasters’ Conference on this issue warning that it would not be prudent to assume any level of knowledge to the extent of significantly modifying the National Service program for ex-cadets. He contended that if cadets were well-trained or gifted then they would naturally rise to the top without interference on their behalf.32 Former cadets and their school supporters, however, were unconvinced.

The period 1950-57 was significant for adult School Cadet staff and reflected continuing army confidence in the school-based branch. First, with the publication of revised standing orders in 1949, an important adjustment in terminology was introduced renaming adult cadet officers as ‘officers of cadets’. From this point the term ‘cadet officer’ was reserved for cadet lieutenants.33 There were also a number of noteworthy improvements to their conditions of service. Many units, for example, had the benefit of being led by men with AIF or CMF experience and as a result, from 1947, time-in-rank requirements for promotion were waived if candidates had seen sufficient operational service.34 Additionally, on 1 February 1950, a Cadet Forces Medal was instituted to honour adult staff involved with cadets in Britain and an invitation to extend this award to the Dominions was accepted by the Australian

31 Extract from Hansard, dated 4 July 1951. CRS MP742/1, Item 323/20/558. 32 Minutes from meeting between Windeyer and GPS Headmasters, dated 22 May 1951. CRS D844, Item 101C/13/2. 33 Department of Defence, Standing Orders 1949, p. 3. 34 Memo, Army Headquarters to Command Headquarters (1947). CRS MP742/1, Item 48/1/297.

181 government on 18 November 1951.35 Last, revised and appreciably more generous allowances were provided to officers of cadets in the post-Second World War era.36 The only real dissatisfaction expressed by adult staff in this period was, like their cadets, the fact that if called up for National Service training they were not entitled to any consideration of their ACC rank. Many served concurrently as captains or majors in the ACC and private National Servicemen.37

A serious but necessary disappointment was imposed on cadet lieutenants of both School and Regimental branches from 1 January 1953 with the abolition of their rank and its replacement by the non-commissioned appointment of cadet under officer (CUO) with its own distinctive insignia of a large lozenge or diamond of white chevronels on a khaki background. The decision came as a result of the rank of 2nd lieutenant (with the same insignia as the cadet lieutenant) being re-introduced into the wider army with the opening of the Officer Training School, Portsea. Existing cadet lieutenants in School or Regimental detachments were allowed to continue wearing commissioned rank until the end of 1954 but this date marked the last time ‘commissioned’ cadets were a feature of the movement.38 In an attempt to ease the disillusionment of current and future CUOs, the army published a memorandum on the changeover that stressed ‘everything possible should be done to make it apparent that cadet under officers are regarded as potential officers and that they are being trained to take their place as leaders during their subsequent adult service.’39

35 The medal was hung from a green ribbon trimmed in yellow with narrow stripes of dark blue, red and light blue superimposed. To qualify for the decoration an individual was required to have served with cadets for at least 12 years from 3 September 1926. A total of 24 years service earned a clasp with another awarded at the 36 year mark. Minutes of Defence Committee Meeting, dated 18 November 1951. CRS A5954, Item 2326/10. 36 On 31 August 1950, after 20 years of stagnation and countless letters of complaint, the Minister for the Army, Chambers, finally revised the allowances provided to adult officers of cadets and cadet lieutenants. The Home Training Allowance had previously been granted at a rate of £7 per annum for majors and captains with lieutenants receiving £5 and cadet lieutenants £3. New rates were set at £20 per annum for lieutenant colonels, and £16, £12, £10 and £4.10s for majors, captains, lieutenants and cadet lieutenants respectively. Other updated post-war allowances included payments to officers of cadets for attendance at camps and courses authorised at the same rate and scale as their CMF counterparts with married men receiving an additional 4s 9d per day when away from home. A bivouac allowance of 6s 8d per day per cadet was also paid to detachments conducting overnight activities. Memo, Army Headquarters to Command Headquarters, dated 31 August 1950. CRS MP742/1, Item 247/1/1934 & Department of Defence, Standing Orders 1949, p. 37. 37 Report (Army Headquarters) (1953). CRS MP927/1, Item A48/1/720. 38 All of the duties, requirements and allowances for new CUOs were the same as had been for their predecessors with the exception that they could be appointed and dismissed by District Commandants and did not have to be ‘gazetted’ as cadet lieutenants had been. 39 Memo, Army Headquarters to Cadet Brigades (1953). CRS D844, Item 133/2/7.

182 Turning from the details of the two branches of the second ‘dual’ system to focus on more general themes, the period 1946-57 was notable for the return to a more appropriate balance between military, educational and social objectives for the cadet movement. Free of the circumstance of the Second World War, its military purpose transitioned from preparing future soldiers for operational service to a situation akin to that of the 1930s where cadets were considered a key source of recruits, particularly of NCOs and officers. As early as 1946 the Military Board instructed the Commands that the ‘cadet corps is a most important source of potential officers for both the Regular Army and the CMF.’40 Hopes that cadets would go on to form the heart of the army’s leadership were largely fulfilled in this era with 80 per cent of entrants to RMC Duntroon in 1946 and 87 per cent in 1949 possessing cadet experience (see Table 7C). In 1953, the Minister for the Army, Francis, identified a ‘very important element’ of cadet activities as being the identification of potential leaders expected to fill the officer and NCO ranks of the CMF and thus provide ‘the hard core of trained volunteers who constitute the foundations on which the CMF is erected.’41 Indeed, in 1957 over 90 per cent of newly appointed lieutenants in the ARA were ex-cadets.42

Table 7C - Former Cadets Admitted to the RMC, Duntroon, 1945-49 Year Total Entry Ex-Cadets Percentage 1945 50 38 76% 1946 50 40 80% 1947 29 18 62% 1948 61 44 72% 1949 43 37 87% 45 40 Ex-Cadets 35 Others 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 Source: Tables (various) Indicating Ex-cadet Numbers Entering RMC 1945-49. CRS SP459/1, Item 426/2/5680.

40 Memo, Military Board to Command Headquarters (1946). CRS SP459/1, Item 426/2/4797. 41 Department of Defence, Cadet Journal, No 4, 1951, p. 1. 42 ibid., No 8, 1957, p. 8.

183 There was certainly no doubt that recruiting objectives were the foundation upon which the Regimental Cadet branch was reconstituted. On 6 June 1949 the Director of Cadet Services, Colonel R.F. Wade, noted that ‘Regimental Cadets should be regarded as unpaid recruits of the CMF.’ Similarly, a Military Board Instruction of 25 March in the same year, introducing the Regimental Cadet scheme, referred to them as ‘the very best source of partially trained recruits for the CMF.’43 The intent could not have been put more clearly than by an Army Headquarters memorandum of 1 September 1949 which described the simple purpose of the branch as ‘to provide continuity of training for a cadet until he reaches the age when he may join the Permanent or Citizen Military Forces.’44 Overall, the recruiting appeal of the movement continued to enamour the army and elicit its support throughout the 1950s.

In line with shifting military ambitions, and following the dominance of military objectives from 1939-45, the post-war period marked a resurgence of social and educational aspirations for the cadet movement. Teachers began to re-consider military training as a means to develop boys mentally and physically rather than as a wartime end in itself. This change of philosophy was felt most deeply in the private schooling sector with the Headmaster of Chevalier College in NSW, for example, introducing a unit to his school in 1948 to ‘occupy students idle time’ and to ‘build self-confidence, discipline and self-control.’ The focus here was definitely on leadership development; the school’s 1949 Yearbook remarked that ‘to them [cadets] is committed the instruction of their comrades, a task that requires not only knowledge and skill, but also a vigour of personality, selflessness, devotion to routine duties, will power.’45 Time and again cadets were told that their training made them better citizens with increased self-respect and sense of responsibility. A circular sent to parents of boys at Xavier College, Victoria, in 1949 urged them to enrol their sons in the cadet unit as ‘membership assists considerably in the formation of a boy’s character, in teaching the right attitude towards authority, and a confident, courteous

43 Lieutenant Colonel Gray remained Director until he was replaced by Colonel R.E. Wade in January 1949. Wade himself replaced by Colonel C.N. Peters in June 1950. Memo, Headquarters 2 Military District to Subordinate Units (1950). CRS MP742/1, Item 247/1/1880. 44 Memo, Army Headquarters to Military Districts, dated 1 September 1949. CRS A5799, Item 26/1950. 45 Reid, Look Back With Thanks, pp. 2 & 9.

184 and upright bearing.’46 The headmaster of Christian Brothers College, Kalgoorlie, shared this viewpoint in 1953 when he wrote that

we are sometimes asked why we, a Christian school, train our boys to be military minded. First and foremost, the objective is not to make good soldiers out of fourteen year old boys. Its primary objective is to make good citizens out of them; training given in these organisations has great moral value.47

Interestingly, some Catholic authorities had an additional objective in mind in promoting cadet units within their schools, as correspondence from the Christian Brothers’ Training College to the Western Australian Provincial Office in 1953 revealed. One letter maintains that ‘the Bishops set a very high value on them, primarily to be certain of a quota of Catholic officers.’ The church hierarchy, it seemed, in an era of increasing Catholic anti-Communist sentiment, appreciated that cadet units in Catholic schools ensured an ‘appropriate’ denominational balance was maintained in the officer corps of the adult army.48

With a renewed focus on the recruitment dividend of a healthy cadet system, the military provided high levels of material support throughout the post-war period despite a fall in overall army funding relative to the national GDP (see Table 7D). Such commitment was exemplified by uniform and equipment related developments. From 1946 free Service Dress uniforms continued to be issued along with summer uniforms for units in areas requiring them and, so encouraged, many detachments began agitating for a number of other improvements including berets, extra boots, an army jersey and a kit-bag.49 By June 1948 these requests had expanded to include an issue of Battle Dress instead of the old Service Dress and a new, lighter type of

46 Penrose, Red, Black and Khaki, p. 30. 47 Christian Brothers College (Kalgoorlie) Annual Report 1953. Christian Brothers Private Archives (CBA) Series HSP0000176/03, Item: Annual Reports for 1953, 1971, 1974. 48 Letter, Brother Casimir to Brother Mackay, dated 21 February 1953. CBA HSP0000176/07, Item: Continuance of Cadets in Kalgoorlie; Cadet Units on the Goldfields. 49 Requests by a number of private schools (Melbourne Grammar, Geelong Grammar, Scotch College (Victoria), Aquinas College, Christian Brothers College, Perth and Scotch College (Western Australia)) to buy and wear unique uniforms were granted in September 1948. Memo, Army Headquarters to Cadet Brigades, dated September 1948. CRS SP1008/1, Item 436/4/320, & Memo, Army Headquarters to Cadet Brigades, dated 10 October 1946. CRS SP1008/1, Item 436/4/203.

185 boot.50 That the army could accommodate such requests was due largely to a wealth of redundant military equipment and infrastructure available and eagerly inherited by cadets after the Second World War. By 14 December 1945 all .310 calibre rifles and ammunition had been replaced with .303 calibre Lee Enfields, and detachments were even issued with mortars and modern .22 calibre miniature range rifles to replace aging stocks.51

Table 7D – Trends in Army Expenditure against GDP, 1946-57 1200 GDP (at current prices ($'10M)) 1000 Army Expenditure ($'M) 800

600

400

200

0 1945/46 1946/47 1947/48 1948/49 1949/50 1950/51 1951/52 1952/53 1953/54 1954/55 1955/56 1956/57 Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, History of National Accounts, www.abs.gov.au, & Beaumont, Sources & Statistics, p. 31.

The only real equipment-related cause of concern for units from 1946 was the fact that some elements of the community did not wish to be reminded of the horrors that they had so recently endured. One manifestation of such feelings involving a backlash of complaint about the provision of rifles to cadets in uniform to take home after their parades. From late 1945 the Minister for the Army, F.M. Forde, was forced to answer complaints by various organisations concerning this issue. The Dee Why Progress Association in Sydney, for example, was relentless in its efforts to remove cadet weapons from homes, fearing ‘there is nothing stopping a younger member of the family getting at the rifle and causing tragedy.’ Such fears were fuelled by incidents like the death of a 13 year old boy in 1946, accidentally shot in the stomach by a cadet at Manly Junior High School who was playing with his weapon and had

50 Berets were issued in October 1947 and jerseys on 1 August 1949. Correspondence (various), 3 Cadet Brigade (1948). CRS SP459/1, Item 436/1/6576, & Memo, 2 Cadet Brigade to Subordinate Battalions (1948). CRS SP1008/1, Item 436/4/353. 51 Memo, Army Headquarters to Cadet Brigades (1945). CRS SP1008/1, Item 484/10/209, & Memo, 2 Cadet Brigade to Battalions. CRS SP459/1, Item 410/2/4501.

186 forgotten that he had previously placed a live round within it.52 Such concerns, however, did not undermine the considerable and continuing material investment in the movement by the military. In 1947, for example, cadet staff costs alone absorbed an annual expenditure of £264,000.53

The net effects of resolute army support (through structural, staff, and resource reform), of educational commitment (shown in debates concerning National Service), a background of general social acceptance (underpinned by ongoing overseas military deployments and fear of Asian Communists to the north), and an absence of serious financial stress, were predictable. Such alignment between the four foundation forces of the movement saw cadet numbers in the period 1946-50 continue to follow the upward trend established during the Second World War despite the concurrent and dramatic downsizing of the adult forces. From a military point of view the Director of Cadets, Lieutenant Colonel Gray, considered that ‘at the moment the Cadet Corps is a flourishing and efficient organisation’, while noting, from a school perspective that ‘the educational departments and private teaching staff are without exception satisfied with the present organisation.’54 As Table 7E shows, the organisation not only began strongly but grew steadily more formidable throughout the period. With an authorised establishment strength of 25,000 granted at the end of 1945, by 1946 actual numbers stood at 22,932 and, although stagnating for the next two years, they again increased to 24,667 in 1949 and exceeded the official establishment to reach 28,824 in 1950.55 Geographically, at 30 June 1948, there were 226 cadet units in Australia with NSW home to 119, Victoria 36, Queensland 31, Western Australia and Tasmania 17 each, and South Australia six.56 (Table 7F shows the distribution of cadet battalions in August 1949).

52 Army Headquarters Report (1946). CRS MP742/1, Item 17/2/660. 53 Brief, (Army Headquarters internal) (1947). CRS MP742/1, Item 48/1/446. 54 ibid. 55 When new cadet manning tables were issued by Army Headquarters on 28 June 1948, ordering a downsizing of 20 per cent (2,000 cadets in the case of Eastern Command), cadet brigade commanders across the country resisted and successfully lobbied for the maintenance of the status quo. Commonwealth Yearbook, No 36 (1944/45), p. 1016, & Army Headquarters Cadet Establishment Tables, dated 28 June 1948. CRS SP459/1, Item 463/1/8706. 56 Department of Defence, Cadet Journal, No 1, 1949, p. 31.

187

Table 7E - Cadet Numbers, 31 December (1945-50) Year Qld NSW Vic SA WA Tas Total 1945 3,832 10,876 4,223 813 1,253 1,341 22,338 1946 3,995 10,757 5,237 778 1,215 950 22,932 1947 4,127 10,204 4,814 839 1,475 1,126 22,585 1948 3,826 9,741 4,720 1,045 1,494 1,039 21,865 1949 4,645 10,056 5,411 1,028 2,366 1,157 24,663 1950 5,488 11,064 6,590 1,491 2,745 1,446 28,824

30000 25000 20000 15000 10000

5000

0 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 Source: Cadet Strength Returns (various) 1945-50. AWM 113, Item 15/8/3.

Table 7F - Location of Cadet Units, 16 August 1949 State Cadet Brigade Cadet Battalion HQ School Units QLD 1 Cadet Brigade (1st) Brisbane 13 (2nd) Toowoomba 8 (3rd) Rockhampton 5 (4th) Townville 8 NSW 2 Cadet Brigade (7th) South Head 13 (8th) Belmore 12 (9th) North Sydney 12 (10th) Homebush 13 (11th) Newcastle 9 (12th) Casino 12 (13th) Tamworth 13 (14th) Bathurst 13 (15th) Young 13 (16th) Goulburn 14 Victoria 3 Cadet Brigade (20th) Sandringham 10 (21st) Camberwell 10 (22nd) Kew 9 (23rd) Westgarth 11 S.A. no brigade (28th) Adelaide 10 W.A. 5 Cadet Brigade (30th) Perth 15 (31st) Perth 16

188 Tasmania 6 Cadet Brigade (33rd) Hobart 8 (34th) Launceston 10 Source: Cadet Unit Location Statement (Army Headquarters), dated 16 August 1949. CRS D844, Item 105A/1/11. The only issue of concern with respect to cadet enrolment involved South Australia and the traditional recruiting difficulties faced by the state. In an attempt to remedy disproportionately low numbers, the District Commandant, Brigadier L.E.S. Barker, wrote to the state Minister of Education, R.J. Rudall, in September 1948 pointing out that South Australia was unique for having virtually no cadets outside of large private schools and urging him to support initiatives to remedy the situation. Brigadier Barker claimed that since the inception of a national cadet system in 1906 neither the Department of Education nor the South Australian Teachers’ Union had looked on the movement with favour. In fact, he believed ‘that the attitude of the South Australian Teachers’ Union was one of passive resistance.’57 With the army’s decision to pay teachers for time spent at officers’ courses in mid-1947 Barker believed this position was finally changing, and with it he saw the possibility of raising a number of new South Australian state school units. Subsequently, and in line with consistent social and educational acceptance of the movement, after eighteen months of negotiations with the state government, in April 1950 Rudall issued a directive that all secondary schools were to take an active interest in cadets.58 Momentum was at last achieved in South Australia when 14 schools responded and, on 9 June 1950, 4 Cadet Brigade was finally raised with three subordinate battalions. With success in South Australia, the rest of 1950 saw continuing national growth for the movement with 40 potential units awaiting military approval across the country by the end of the year. Additional cadet battalions were raised in NSW and Western Australia and the army was pleased enough with cadet numbers that the Defence Committee recorded that ‘the continuance along present lines and the expansion of the cadet organisation are to be encouraged.’59

Leaving aside Regimental Cadet numbers, which have been discussed earlier and which were reflective of direct army policy rather than the combined effect of

57 Letter, Commandant 4 Military District to Minister for Education (South Australia), dated August 1948. CRS D844, Item 133/4/10. 58 Memo, South Australian Department of Education to Schools, dated 21 April 1951. CRS D844, Item 133/1/79. 59 Defence Committee Minutes (fragmented) (1950). CRS A5799, Item 26/1950, & Memo, Army Headquarters to 2 Cadet Brigade (1950). CRS MP742/1, Item 48/1/1084.

189 military, educational, social or fiscal forces, the school branch of the ACC remained robust from 1950-57 (see Table 7G). By the end of 1952 there were six cadet brigades, commanding 29 battalions, tasked to administer 277 schools detachments varying in authorised strengths from a low of 54 cadets at a number of smaller and regional schools to a high of 591 at Scotch College (Melbourne) (see Table 7H for the break down by state of School Cadet numbers from 1951-57) (Appendix 9 shows the locations and establishments of all School Cadet units 1952).60 Senior Cadets became so popular that by July 1953 the strength of the ACC approached the national establishment ceiling of 35,000 set in 1947 in the ‘Post-War Plan for the Army’ (see Table 7I for the disposition of School Cadet detachments as at 1 January 1953). As a result of a Military Board decision not to increase this upper limit, itself prompted by the ongoing burden of involvement in Korea, Army Headquarters was forced to impose across the board restrictions on further enrolments and detachments’ strengths were frozen on 30 June 1953. Headmasters were told that organisational and fiscal limitations necessitated the decision and were asked to implement it, without exception, as part of a ‘whole of army’ plan.

Table 7G - Strength of the ACC, 1950-57 Year School Units School Cadets Regt Cadets 1950 274 29,426 2,993 1951 276 30,515 3,784 1952 277 31,123 3,354 1953 268 31,914 2,719 1954 265 29,875 1,236 1955 265 30,050 382 1956 273 32575 382 1957 276 33,081 5

60 Of the 29 battalions 2 Cadet Brigade (NSW) held 11 of them, 1 Cadet Brigade (Queensland) five, 3 Cadet Brigade (Victoria) four, while 4, 5 and 6 Cadet Brigades (South Australia, Western Australia and Tasmania) possessed three each. ACC Strength Return (all states) (1952). AWM 54, Item 147/2/3.

190 35,000 30,000 25,000

20,000 School Cadets 15,000 Regt Cadets 10,000 5,000 0 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 Source: Department of Defence, Cadet Journal No 2, p. 33, No 3, 1952, No 4, 1953, p. 23, & p. 63, No 5, 1954, p. 19, No 6, 1955, p. 15, No 7, 1956, p. 13, No 8, 1957, p. 14.

Table 7H – School Cadet Numbers, 1951-57

Year Qld NSW Vic SA WA Tas Total 1951 5,627 11,843 6,986 1,860 2,863 1,770 30,949 1952 5,967 11,851 6,951 1,952 3,015 1,785 31,518 1953 6,559 12,230 7,041 1,851 3,021 1,790 32,492 1954 6,325 11,045 6,785 1,760 2,786 1,604 30,305 1955 6,309 11,324 7,144 1,966 2,882 1,387 31,012 1956 6,933 11,964 7,146 2,004 2,996 1,532 32,575 1957 6,979 12,050 7,417 1,923 3,151 1,561 33,081

14000 QLD NSW 12000 VIC 10000 SA WA 8000 TAS 6000

4000

2000

0 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 Source: Cadet Strength Returns (various) 1951-57. AWM 113, Item 15/8/3.

Table 7I - Disposition of School Cadet Detachments, 1 January 1953

State Cadet Brigade Cadet Battalion No. of Cadet Units Strength Queensland 1 1,2,3,4,5 38 6,444 NSW 2 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17 105 11,934 Victoria 3 20, 21, 22, 23 51 6,999 SA 4 26, 28 17 1,847 WA 5 30, 31, 32 31 2,927

191 Tasmania 6 33, 34, 35 26 1,763 6 28 (in total) 268 31,914

QLD NSW VIC SA WA TAS

Source: History of the ACC (Draft Manuscript). AWM 113, Item MH1/228. The overt frustration of detachments forced to draw up waiting lists for new members from mid-1953 was indicative of the depth of educational (and by extension social) commitment to the school branch of the movement. Wesley College, Victoria, simply ignored the directive and trained as many cadets as it saw fit without ever formally enrolling them. This practice was mirrored at The King’s School, Sydney, until stopped in 1960 to the dismay of the unit Officer Commanding who could not understand army’s concern over compensation, legal, and duty of care responsibilities to ‘unofficial’ members.61 Many other schools, like Swan Hill High in Victoria and Albury Grammar in NSW, by mistake or design, enrolled numbers well beyond their authorised limits.62 Most schools, however, like Christian Brothers College, Kalgoorlie, which had its cadet numbers capped at 47 despite an establishment strength of 70, reported ‘much upset to school administration and discipline’ as a result but reluctantly obeyed.63 These manning limitations posed additional dilemmas for many private schools that had made cadet training mandatory as it meant, in effect, that either whole year groups could be cadets or none at all. Eastern Goldfields High School in Western Australia, for example, not being permitted to expand its unit but with rising pupil enrolments in 1954, had to drop its first-year cadets altogether.

61 Notes, Army Headquarters (various fragmented). CRS MT1131/ 1, Item A48/1/1150. 62 Return of Cadet Battalion Manning (3rd Military District), dated July 1953. CRS MT1131/ 1, Item A48/1/348. 63 Letter, Headmaster Christian Brothers College (Kalgoorlie) to 30 Cadet Battalion, dated 13 February 1954. CBA HSP0000176/03, Item: Enrolment and Staffing figures for Cadet Unit; Report on Cadet Camp at Northam 9-20 December 1953.

192 This meant that cadet numbers at the school fell from 166 to 75 despite the fact that both interest and potential numbers were on the rise.64

At last, on 6 September 1954, as a result of a fall in Regimental Cadet numbers, and a freeing of military resources following the cessation of hostilities in Korea, the authorised enrolment ceiling for the School Cadet branch was raised to 33,500. (see Table 7J).65 The figures in this table represent an overall fullness in the organisation as it was impossible for real strengths to match authorised figures due to yearly graduations, fluctuations, and the fact that where schools possessed numbers between establishment entitlements they were allocated the higher scale which gave them ‘vacancies’ that could not be filled. After 1954, while overall cadet numbers remained restrained, School Cadet enrolments were again allowed to increase in proportion to a decrease in the Regimental Cadet branch. In this way schools like Xavier College were able to raise their detachment sizes from 141 in 1952 to 288 by the end of 1957.66 Similarly, after the complete demise of the Regimental system, 3 Cadet Brigade was permitted to raise a fifth battalion in March 1957 and in the same year the School Cadet branch achieved its peak total for the period of 33,081.67 Such impressive enrolment statistics did not come about by chance.

Table 7J – Ceiling & Actual Strength of Schools Cadets, 30 September 1955

State Ceiling Strength Actual Strength Queensland 6,700 6,348 NSW 12,200 11,073 Victoria 7,700 6,979 SA 2,000 1,915 WA 3,100 2,693 Tasmania 1,800 1,435 33,500 30,443

Source: ACC Strength State & Manning Tables, dated 30 September 1955. CRS MT1131/1, Item A48/1/348.

Despite impressive overall numbers, one disturbing enrolment-related trend for the movement in this period was a return to pre-1939 levels of state school/private

64 Letter, Headmaster to 5 Cadet Brigade (1954). CRS MT1131/ 1, Item A48/1/348. 65 Actual establishment strength stood at 35,000 but instructor and administrative issues prevented enrolment up to this figure. Department of Defence, Cadet Journal, No 5, 1954, p. 18. 66 Penrose, Red, Black and Khaki, p. 37. 67 Memo, Army Headquarters to 3 Cadet Brigade, dated March 1957. CRS MP927/1, Item A48/1/797.

193 school division. The degree of government school participation achieved during the Second World War was not carried into the post-war era. Although in 1945 state school cadets easily outnumbered their private school counterparts, by 1950 it was the private school units that dominated by a ratio of around four to one (a proportion that was reduced only in NSW and Victorian country areas where state schools continued to embrace the movement to a greater extent than in the cities). Indeed, in 1949 Adelaide High School was the only government-run school in South Australia with a cadet detachment.68 The decline of state school involvement was the result of two factors. First, the period saw private school teachers embrace the purpose of the movement to a greater extent than educators and administrators in the state school systems. Second, and more importantly, the explosion of popularity for cadets within state schools between 1939-45 was a social and educational phenomenon inspired by conditions of war. With peace this stimulus was lost and the situation returned to something akin to that of the 1930s. Thus, the state school/private school divide outlived the temporary anomaly of the Second World War.

A second recurring theme, the recurring correlation between conservative federal governments and periods of growth for the cadet movement, was also clear in the post-war period. Four years of the Chifley Labor government from 1945 saw cadet numbers fall from 22,338 to 21,865. From 19 December 1949, however, the Menzies Liberal/Country Party coalition held power and the situation was immediately reversed with the prevailing political environment encouraging military, educational, social and fiscal harmony within the ACC. There is no doubt that during this era the Prime Minister, Robert Menzies, and his party were able to draw significant political capital from widespread community fear during the Cold War and in doing so helped shape a society supportive of a range of military investments; including the cadet movement. In 1950 the ACC expanded by 4,161 cadets and by 1957, under the continuing stewardship of the Menzies government, numbers grew to 33,081 (a 25 percent increase from 1949). It was a continuing commitment to the foundations of the movement that induced successive conservative ministries to provide the political climate, ensure the military commitment, and encourage the educational enthusiasm that allowed the movement to grow strong. With no sign of a Labor revival in 1957,

68 Cadet Strength Returns (all states) (1949). CRS D844, Item 105A/1/11.

194 thanks to a Party split following the Petrov incident, the beneficial effects of political conservatism at the federal government level were destined to continue.

Cadet training was the one aspect of the movement that remained seriously out of balance in the period 1946-57. Its mechanics had altered little from the previous era except that in addition to traditional schedules of weekly home parades, annual camps and promotions courses, overnight bivouacs appeared on the training programs of individual or small groups of units.69 Annual efficiency requirements were also adjusted to include mandatory participation in an annual camp and the completion of a modified annual range practice.70 Overall, however, changes in purpose for the ACC away from direct military objectives were not reflected in any of these activities with cadets continuing to work and be treated as miniature infantrymen by many of their veteran officers and instructors. No doubt influenced by a Cold War context and the army’s operational experiences in Korea and Malaya, the bulk of training continued to be harsh, combat oriented, realistic and dominated by military considerations. The tactical focus was highlighted by Lieutenant Colonel Ian Hutchinson, the commander of 3 Cadet Brigade in 1955, who in opening his first training remarked: ‘gentlemen, you will consider yourselves an AIF battalion on a kindergarten basis.’71 Certainly, in 1948 combat training was of a sufficient standard at Sacred Heart College, Toowoomba, for that unit to conduct a battalion attack activity replete with blank ammunition, simulated grenades and smoke bombs.72 There was even evidence of

69 Cadets continued to train on infantry weapons including the .303 Lee Enfield rifle, Bren Gun, 2 and 3 inch mortars, Vickers machine gun, and the 6 pounder anti-tank gun. In addition, foot drill, fieldcraft, application of fire, map reading, field sketching and infantry minor tactics all featured in the extant syllabus of training. Extracts from Cadet Standing Orders (1944). CRS D844, Item 105/5/80, & Department of Defence, Standing Orders 1949, pp. 6-7. 70 The obligatory shoots now included .22 calibre rifle, .303 calibre rifle, and Bren Gun components that requiring specific group sizes and overall scores at ranges out to 300 yards. The requisite scores rose in a cadet’s second and third year of training and were also used to determine the award of cadet marksmanship badges. The first step in passing this course was the completion the .22 calibre miniature practice. Cadets fired grouping, application and snap shooting serials and a score of 50 out of a possible 75 was required to pass. First year cadets were then required to shoot a .303 calibre practice on the 30 yards range. Again, grouping, application and snap shooting were conducted with a pass score of 40 out of 75. Repetitions were allowed for failures. Each cadet then had to pass a Bren Gun shoot again at thirty yards with 60 rounds and in this case a score of 80 or above out of a possible 137 was required to pass. Second year cadets were expected to pass slightly more complex .303 serials between 100 and 200 yards with a score of 50 out of 100 needed while a score of 65 or above labelled the firer as a first- class shot. Third year cadets fired more difficult practices at ranges extended to 200 and 300 yards with a highest possible score of 125. A score of 62 or more meant a pass, 80 or more a first class shot, and 100 or more a marksman. Department of Defence, Standing Orders 1949, pp. 14-26. 71 Mortensen, An Australian Army Cadet Unit, p. 29. 72 Sacred Heart College, Downlands Magazine, 1948, p. 49.

195 ACC joint manoeuvres with its naval and air force cadet counterparts. The Royal Australian Naval Reserve from HMAS Leeuwin, for example, invaded a beach at Swanbourne, Western Australia, defended by Perth Junior Technical High School cadets on 20 September 1953.73 Again, in early 1958 another combined operation was conducted with the Air Training Corps defending a camp area from a sea-borne landing of ACC cadets embarked upon HMAS Terrible and HMAS Bulldog with naval cadets helping to man the vessels. A beach assault followed with the army cadets storming the air force position to a hail of machine gun fire.74 In all elements of cadet training the tactical military focus, established during the war years, continued unabated in the post-war period. The inadequate provision of disposable training funds was another factor at odds with a general theme of harmony between the four fundamental forces of the movement. In line with general defence downsizing after the Second World War, on 1 December 1948 the cadet training vote was reduced significantly. In NSW, for example, funding was cut from £12,000 to £8,000 which prompted the commander of 2 Cadet Brigade, Lieutenant Colonel J.P. O’Sullivan, to write to Army Headquarters to describe the amount as ‘totally inadequate for the program proposed.’75 This trend, combined with the manpower implications the National Service scheme and military commitments in Korea and Malaya, meant that army had no choice but to wind back the level of instructor support that had been provided to cadet units in 1945. Concerns over available instructors were further fuelled by the method used to distribute the few that remained. Military Districts were unfairly allocated such staff on the basis of the number of detachments in each state rather than the total number of cadets. In 1947, for example, Victoria had an entitlement of 20 instructors for approximately 5,000 cadets while NSW was allocated 70 instructors for around 7,000.76 The frustration felt by many units as a result of declining levels of army instructional support was voiced by the Prince Alfred College detachment in South Australia when it complained that insufficient ARA personnel were available for training, camps and parades and that the unit subsequently suffered from a lack of organisation and information. This was so much so that specialist training could not be carried out at the school and all NCO

73 Department of Defence, Cadet Journal, No 5, 1954, p. 88. 74 ibid., No 9, 1958, pp 75-76. 75 ACC Financial Statistics (2 Cadet Brigade) (1948). CRS SP459/1, Item 426/2/1458. 76 ACC Instructor Allocation Tables (fragmented) (1947). CRS SP459/1, Item 546/1/10111.

196 classes conducted during periods of home training were done without any army assistance.77

The training activities that suffered most from reduced army personnel support were annual camps. The problem was exacerbated by the fact that such activities were quite manpower intensive with a camp of 3,590 cadets in Victoria in 1947, for example, requiring the full-time services of 10 ARA officers and 17 other ranks.78 At the same time the steady reduction of regular army numbers after 1945 led to ‘a drive to comb out all personnel surplus to immediate requirements’ which, for example, led Major J.S. Nancarrow, the Director of Army Catering, to predict in 1947 that ‘it will be impossible to provide from within army resources the necessary cooks for future cadet camps’; especially problematic given the 5 Cadet Brigade Quartermaster’s description of a cadet of the era as ‘a large appetite shaped like a young soldier.’79 To help overcome manpower shortages at camps, from April 1948 the army employed civilians as cooks, batmen, waiters, butchers and labourers. Unfortunately, this solution was only ever partially successful. In 1950 Lieutenant Colonel O’Sullivan of 2 Cadet Brigade reported that satisfactory civilian employees numbered about 10 per cent of those hired. He maintained that the service of about 30-40 per cent of them was fair until they received pay at which time they ‘became troublesome.’ The remaining 50-60 per cent were unsatisfactory and described as ‘the drunken rejects of the present day over-full labour markets.’80

The inevitable post-Second World War reduction of army manpower support to cadet training activities was not reflective of its commitment to the movement as a whole and its impact should not, therefore, be overstated. Cadet units in the 1950s remained vocal in their praise for the ARA instructors when they were free to assist

77 Letter, Prince Alfred College to 3 Cadet Brigade, dated October 1952. CRS D844, Item 48/1/3. 78 Report of 3 Cadet Brigade Continuous Camps (1947). CRS MP742/1, Item 49/1/164. 79 At an annual camp held at Northam, Western Australia, in August of that year, around 1,000 cadets consumed 1,960 pounds of sugar, 6,320 pounds of bread, and 1,000 pounds of milk. NSW and Victorian camps often required as many as 80 cooks in order to function. Department of Defence, Cadet Journal, No 4, 1953, p. 76; Memo, Director of Catering to Director of Cadet Services (1947). CRS MP742/1, Item 49/1/164, & Report of 3 Cadet Brigade Continuous Camps (1947). CRS MP742/1, Item 49/1/164. 80 Memo, Commander 2 Cadet Brigade to Army Headquarters (1950). CRS SP1008/1, Item 460/1/1118.

197 schools.81 This problem, like issues concerning a disproportionate military emphasis, was restricted to cadet training; it did not have the destructive effect it might have if inadequate military commitment characterised the movement as a whole. Indeed, the army demonstrated its loyalty to the ACC through its ongoing development of the system of annual camps in spite of the difficulty of supporting them. An example of such camp innovation was official approval for overnight or weekend detachment bivouacs. Such events became popular and regular components of most unit training calendars with 2,312 cadets from NSW participating in them in 1948 alone.82 A typical multi-unit bivouac was run by 28 Cadet Battalion in South Australia from 8-11 December 1949 with all units sending small contingents totalling 103 cadets. Training was conducted in small arms with emphasis placed on developing the ability to instruct. Lessons covered weapon drills, the proper employment of the .303 rifle and the Bren Gun with cadets given formal lectures, films, demonstrations and practical tests. In a show of educational support the activity was visited by R.J. Rudall, the South Australian Minister for Education.83

Cadet bivouacs, however, were dwarfed in scale and significance by traditional annual cadet camps of the era which, in a further testament to school and military dedication, also defied the difficulties associated with a declining ARA instructor base. The sheer numbers of cadets participating in annual brigade controlled 7-12 day camps from 1946-57 reflected their perceived value. As the pinnacle of the cadet training year, they developed from inconsistent local affairs into substantial, centralised, state-wide activities. In 1946, a NSW camp conducted at Ingleburn drew more than 2,000 cadets as one of four similar activities held across the state.84 By 1949 camps in NSW and Victoria had grown even larger with the Ingleburn camp alone hosting 6,743 while 3,583 cadets from 36 separate units attended the annual 3

81 These personnel were almost invariably veterans, many of two wars, and the knowledge and guidance they provided was invaluable. This was especially the case in schools where the only adult cadet officer was the unit commander and where all other commissioned appointments were held by cadets. At this time there was no sign of the friction between ARA cadre staff and officers of cadets that became noticeable in the 1970s. 82 The vast majority did this at the South Head Bivouac Area at the mouth of Sydney Harbour. Department of Defence, Cadet Journal, No 1, 1949, p. 11. 83 Report of 28 Cadet Battalion Bivouac, dated 15 December 1951. CRS D844, Item 17/1/157. 84 The others were in country areas such as Coffs Harbour, Newcastle and Tamworth. Report on NSW Cadet Camp (Ingleburn) (2 Cadet Brigade) (1946). CRS SP1008/1, Item 538/1/370.

198 Cadet Brigade activity at Puckapunyal, Victoria.85 This trend was reflected, on a smaller scale, in all states.86 As the 1950s progressed annual cadet camps continued to expand with six held in NSW in 1957, for example, catering for more than 9,660 cadets from 103 units.87

Activities at annual cadet camps during this period continued to reflect a strong military influence. They aimed at imparting military knowledge and skills and encouraging self-reliance through hardship.88 Almost all camps contained weapon training and range practices for rifle and specialist weapons (including mortar, Bren and Vickers machine guns) while specialist lectures in first aid, signals and intelligence were conducted where appropriate. First-year cadets were usually restricted to basic weapons and tactics training such as learning to live in the field as an infantryman, while second and subsequent years were taught advanced military skills like reconnaissance, planning for manoeuvres and sophisticated infantry minor tactics.89 Often night lessons and route marches were endured with the highlight of the camp typically involving a tactical manoeuvre which usually took the form of an attack or some other engagement involving one sub-unit against the other. One company of cadets, for example, might defend a hill while another attacked it with a winner judged by the attached army staff. 90 In all cases these camps were serious military activities with demonstrations of close air support and airdrops provided regularly by air force Meteor, Sabre and DC-3 aircraft.

The annual 4 Brigade camp held from 9-16 May 1952, at Warradale in South Australia, was a typical example of a combined brigade-run camp. Cadets, divided

85 Annual Cadet Camps in Victoria during this period were usually held at Puckapunyal (1947-52, 1957-67), Mildura (1953-56) or Watsonia (1945-46). In NSW they were held at Ingleburn, Holsworthy or Singleton. Department of Defence, Cadet Journal, No 1, 1949, pp. 11-12. 86 The partial exception was Queensland where camps faced the perpetual difficulty posed by a huge geographic spread of units which tended to act against the style of large multi-detachment camps held in the eastern states. As such, from 1947 three separate camp areas were used in Queensland to conduct battalion rather than brigade activities. Nevertheless, despite the distances, more than 2,500 Queensland cadets entered camp between 1 July 1947 and 30 June 1948. Camp areas included Southport, a tented camp about 100 kilometres from Brisbane catering for units from Brisbane, Ipswich, Warwick, Toowoomba, Rockhampton and Yeppoon; Enoggera, a hutted Camp in a Brisbane suburb; and Sellheim, a hutted Camp 30 kilometres from Charters Towers and almost 1,800 kilometres from 1 Cadet Brigade headquarters. Department of Defence, Cadet Journal, No 1, 1949, p. 11 87 ibid., No 9, 1958, p. 29. 88 ibid., No 8, 1957, p. 8. 89 Reports of Cadet Camps (2 Cadet Brigade various). CRS SP1008/1, Item 441/3/1678. 90 Mentone Grammar School, Mentonian, 1952, p. 36.

199 into junior and senior companies depending on their levels of experience, were allocated into battalion areas for sleeping and basic training. The junior companies were instructed in foot and arms drill and weapon training with the .303 Lee Enfield rifle and Bren Gun while the senior companies concentrated on specialist weapons and fieldwork (including day and night lectures) and a 24 hour field exercise. An entire day was devoted to the rifle range where cadets fired practices with the .22 and .303 calibre rifles, Bren Guns and Owen Guns.91 Other combined army-run camps across the country followed similar patterns. 92

Aside from annual camps, the army’s commitment to cadet training was further demonstrated in the conduct of cadet promotion courses. From 1946 the practice of school units running individual courses was curtailed in favour of large combined battalion or brigade activities. Again, this was done in spite of Korean, Malayan and National Service induced army manpower shortages. Indeed ARA unavailability in NSW in early 1948 meant that an NCO all ranks promotion course, held for approximately 1,000 cadets, required 2 Cadet Brigade to utilise the services of 28 cadet lieutenants to act as instructors.93 Nonetheless, the army remained committed to monopolising cadet courses. Just as surely as their conduct was indicative of army dedication so too their content confirmed the depth of its influence on how cadets were trained. A CUO course run by 5 Cadet Brigade at the Swanbourne Army Camp near Perth from 8-18 December 1956, for example, used a program of drill, rifle exercises, fieldcraft, map reading and Bren Gun instruction. The main thrust of the course was to show potential CUOs how to present military lessons to younger cadets and to give them the confidence to do so effectively. Candidates practiced this skill by a form of mutual instruction where they were asked to take over from each other during practice lessons, as well as by presenting formal lessons in which one presenter had control throughout. Examinations were held on the evening of the seventh day and the top scoring cadet was awarded command of the graduation parade

91 Report of 4 Cadet Brigade annual Camp, dated 25 May 1952. CRS D844, Item 48/1/3. 92 Sacred Heart College, Downlands Magazine, 1952, p. 33; Cadet Recruit Syllabus Program (1948). CBA HSP0000137/13, Item: Recruit Syllabus Serial 4 – Camp Programme; Armidale High School, The Acorn, 1954, p. 37, & Shore, The Torch Bearer, December 1955, p. 8. 93 As a result of the scarcity of available training places selection became competitive and prestigious. The Brighton Grammar School unit in Victoria, for example, reported in 1956 that ‘competition was fierce to be selected to go on course.’ Correspondence (various), Cadet Brigades to Army Headquarters. CRS SP1008/1, Item 427/6/17573; Brighton Grammar School, Grammarian, 1956, p. 22, & Department of Defence, Cadet Journal, No 1, 1949, p. 11.

200 conducted the following afternoon. After the parade the second last day of the course was spent practicing a simulated platoon attack on a nearby hill followed by a detailed discussion on platoon tactics. Qualified cadets departed back to their school locations the next morning.94

The army’s decision to offer specialist training courses from 1947 was further proof of commitment within the context of serious manpower shortages. In January of that year a signals course was run at Singleton, NSW, heralding a range of similar activities for all cadet specialisations across the country. The aim of such courses was to train cadets in the organisation, function and methods of their specialisations so that they might be employed properly at home locations and at annual camps. By the end of 1957 these courses were significant undertakings with, for example, specialist training of all types held at Glenfield, NSW, in 1958, for 602 cadets.95 The home training of specialist sections was also influenced by the army’s continuing infatuation with moulding cadets as junior infantrymen. On the basis of its restriction to detachments situated with access to appropriate CMF units, and a fear that it might detract from the infantry-based foundation of the ACC, cadet artillery training was removed as a specialist option from the end of 1946.96 Changes were also wrought to cadet Tank Attack sections when, from 1946, they were renamed Anti-Tank sections and progressively issued with the 6 pounder gun and a new syllabus of training that introduced the latest generation rocket weapons.97 In a further attempt to shape cadet units into replicas of adult army battalions, and despite a complete initial unavailability of ARA instructors, on 29 June 1949 a decision was made to expand the range of available specialisations by raising intelligence sections at selected units.98 Cadet intelligence specialists were trained in such military-oriented subjects as the sources and functions of military intelligence, operational intelligence in battalions,

94 Department of Defence, Cadet Journal, No 8, 1957, pp. 27-8. 95 ibid., No. 9, 1958, p. 29, & No. 10, 1959, p. 19. 96 Memo, Army Headquarters to Cadet Brigades, dated July 1946. CRS SP459/1, Item 546/3/1282. 97 This was the Projector Infantry Anti Tank (PIAT) weapon designated ‘PITA’ in Australia. The PITA was a combination projection/charge assisted weapon that launched a 3 pound bomb out to 90 yards. Anti-Tank Training Syllabus (1946). CRS SP459/1, Item 546/1/10016. 98 The Director of Cadet Services, Colonel Wade, announced on 20 May 1949 that cadet specialist training would be restricted to the infantry specialisations. The decision was the a result of pressure from other army corps for cadet representation with the Royal Australian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers Corps, for example, attempting to introduce its speciality into a technical school in Brisbane earlier that year. Wade was afraid any expansion beyond infantry specialisations ‘would cause

201 brigades and divisions, handling prisoners and captured documents, military security, staff duties, report writing, advanced map reading and the interpretation of air photography.99

With social attitudes influenced by ongoing overseas military deployments and an ever-present fear of a communist domino effect to the north, traditional cadet civic and ceremonial activities remained central to the post-war ACC with a notable rise in frequency and scale of annual march-out parades for cadets leaving their schools and units. These annual unit parades grew into significant occasions with, on 13 October 1952, for example, all of the eastern goldfields cadet units in Western Australia mustered together to march down the lined streets of Kalgoorlie to present trophies and honour graduating cadets.100 Apart from unit march-outs, ceremonial events continued to mark the cadet calendar; one singularly important occasion being the Queen’s visit to Australia in 1954. Early that year a selective camp was held in Canberra for the royal opening of parliament with cadets parading on 15 February, in front of Parliament House for the occasion of Her Majesty’s arrival, with a march-past conducted to conclude the occasion.101 Across the country detailed preparations for cadet involvement in royal visits to capital cities dominated training programs.102

From 1946-57 the range of Empire and domestic cadet rifle competitions regained the popularity the war had temporarily stifled although, in line with the weight of army presence within other areas of cadet training in this era, impetus was derived from military sources rather than from school-based rivalries and pride as it had been in the past. Indeed, so strong was the importance placed on shooting contests by the army that the Director of Cadets, Colonel Peters, wrote to the State Rifle Associations on 16 August 1950 suggesting that to improve contest results units should become formally affiliated to their local rifle club.103 The prestigious Earl

administrative difficulties which will adversely effect the efficiency of the Australian Cadet Corps.’ Memo, Director of Cadet Services to Command Headquarters (1949). CRS MP742/1, Item 48/1/881. 99 Memo, Army Headquarters to Cadet Brigades. CRS SP459/1, Item 546/1/10128. 100 These ceremonies usually took the form of formal drill parades inspected by senior army officers at which awards and certificates of efficiency were presented to graduating cadets. Department of Defence, Cadet Journal, No 4, 1953, p. 78. 101 ibid., No 5, 1954, p. 65. 102 Penrose, Red, Black and Khaki, p. 38. 103 Letter, Director of Cadet Services to Rifle Associations, dated 16 August 1950. CRS MP742/1, Item 48/1/1391.

202 Roberts Imperial Cadet Trophy Competition was reinstituted in 1947, after having been suspended in Australia from 1939 and, similarly, Empire miniature rifle contests continued after the war with increasing profiles and participation rates.104 Domestically, national .303 calibre ANA Shield and Plaque competitions grew into popular events linked to the annual cadet efficiency shoot while a plethora of state, regional and local shooting contests re-sprouted.105 In NSW, for example, these included the Fraunfelder Shield in the New England area, the Mewing Trophy in the north coast, the Turner Cup for miniature range shooting in the Lismore district, the Bathurst Shield, the Wellington RSL Trophy, the Riverina RSL Shield, the Northern Rivers District Miniature Rifle Competition, the Yass Shield and the Wollongong AH&I Shield to name but a few.106

All facets of cadet training in the period 1946-57 were affected by two key difficulties. Limited available army manpower was a feature and military considerations remained overtly and overly dominant. In turn, two important considerations acted to counter these weaknesses and allowed the movement to prosper in spite of them. First, steadfast army commitment ensured that the bivouac and camp systems, centralised courses, specialist training, ceremonial activities and competitions were endorsed, and in some cases expanded, in spite of the pressure of overseas commitments and associated manpower difficulties. At the same time

104 These contests included the King George V Trophy, The Junior and Senior Imperial Shields, the Swords of Admiral Jellicoe and Field Marshal Haig, the Lord Milner Trophy and the Trophy of the Governor General of the Commonwealth. In this era only one competition shoot was required to qualify for all of these contests and any number of teams could enter a score provided an fee of 2½d was paid per firer. The rules were altered so that one team of four cadets, one of whom was an NCO and non-firing team captain, could represent any ‘cadet area’ or colony of the Empire. The minimum strength of a team was eight firers with all scores to count. Cadets aged between 15-19 fired as seniors with under 15 year olds classified as juniors. The King Gorge V Trophy was awarded to the country whose highest scoring team achieved the best average per firer. The other awards depended on the efficiency of all shooters within a single unit. The Governor General’s Trophy was presented to the Australian unit with the highest figure of merit. From 1946-57 between 4,200-5,200 Australian cadets competed annually in these competitions. Correspondence (various), Army Headquarters. CRS MP742/1, Item 67/1/72; Department of Defence, Standing Orders 1949, pp. 28-29; Department of Defence, Cadet Journal, No 2, 1951, p. 32, No 7, 1956, p. 13 & No 8, & 1957, p. 21. 105 The ANA Shield being held for twelve months by the unit that obtained the highest average score from 70 per cent of its total strength. A ‘Plaque’ was presented to the cadet in each state who achieved the highest individual score while competing for the ‘Shield’. In 1950 the Shield was won by the cadet unit from Brisbane Industrial High School, with a corporal from the same unit winning the Plaque with a perfect score of 100 points. Department of Defence, Standing Orders 1949, pp. 29-30, & Department of Defence, Cadet Journal, No 2, 1952, pp. 65-66. 106 Memo, 2 Cadet Brigade (internal). CRS SP1008/1, Item 441/3/1643, & Department of Defence, Cadet Journal, No 1, 1949, pp. 11-12; No 6, 1955, p. 13 & p. 21; No 7, 1956, pp. 40-43, & No 9, 1958, p. 31.

203 enduring educational and social-philosophical support for the movement was prepared, for the time being, to tolerate military control of cadet activities. In some ways this situation represented an opportunity for the ACC for if such imbalances could be remedied then a healthy movement might yet grow stronger still.

Notwithstanding a second unsuccessful experiment with Regimental Cadets, the period between 1946-57 represented a phase of continuing growth, development and success for the ACC. By the end of the era the organisation boasted significant and increasing numbers, an evolved sense of purpose and a robust organisational and administrative framework. These achievements were a result of harmony and alignment between the four ever-present foundation forces of the cadet movement. Although with different outcomes in mind, both the military and educational establishments displayed a consistent commitment to the ACC while the perceived implications of Communist expansion in Asia ensured community attitudes remained generally supportive. To a large extent these factors, and an abundance of post-war equipment and material resources, overcame limited problems of manpower support, finance and military orientation associated with cadet training. With such foundations the movement was able to build on the enthusiasm of the previous era to forge a strong and stable organisation positioned for further success.

204 Correct as at: 16 Dec 05

Word Count: 8,588 / 10,376 CHAPTER EIGHT

Ascent & Descent 1958 – 1974

Within the social and military context of the Cold War, the voluntary cadet movement reached the height of its achievement in the period between 1958-74. In 1966 the organisation boasted 42,265 members (13 per cent of all eligible males), as a result of the most successful balance between competing military, educational, social and financial forces yet experienced, before suffering a gradual decline over the next eight years. This chapter explains such an ascent and descent by first reviewing an evolution in the perceived purpose of the cadet organisation in the period. This is followed by an examination of organisational and administrative developments for the ACC, including the spread of the movement to Papua New Guinea (PNG), prior to an analysis of the impact of sharp variations in the levels of army material support provided to it. The chapter concludes by measuring the net effect of these factors in terms of cadet enrolment figures and changing training philosophies.

In July 1957 the Minister for the Army, J.O. Cramer, set the scene for continuing prosperity for the ACC when he opened the inaugural conference of cadet brigade commanders. Following the meeting Cramer ordered that the minutes reflect his opinion that ‘boys should be given the opportunity to receive the benefit of cadet training’ and that he was ‘whole-heartedly behind the movement.’1 Such political support was mirrored by continuing encouragement and commitment from the education sector and a wider public still fearful of the spread of Communism in Asia and well aware of regional security issues. Apart from setting a solid foundation for the movement up to the mid-1960s, sustained military, educational and social interest encouraged a considerable evolution of purpose for the ACC. Although the army continued to view the organisation as an important source of potential recruits, as time progressed it also began to accord increasing levels of importance to social and educational outcomes over traditional military aims. The transition, however, was gradual as Cramer attested on 15 November 1961 when he informed all cadet units that

205 the army still has the same need for leaders and will continue to rely on the cadet corps for preparing a large proportion of them ... a school cadet who subsequently joins the CMF or ARA is a much more valuable recruit than a youth with no military training.2

The new Minister for the Army, A.J. Forbes, declared in 1965 that ‘it is up to you [cadets] to see that this expenditure is not wasted and I invite you to consider seriously continuing some form of military service on leaving school.’3 This perspective was echoed as late as 1967 by senior army officers like Brigadier S.J. Bleechmore, General Officer Commanding Central Command, when he reminded South Australian cadets that ‘we expect and we do get a pay off – your interest later by service in the regular army or CMF.’4 Nor did the ACC disappoint such expectations with, in the same year, 67 per cent of officer candidates at Duntroon and Portsea coming from the ranks of ex-cadets.5 Indeed, in 1974, 41 per cent of all CMF soldiers and 62 per cent of their officers had cadet experience.’6

Such attitudes and expectations, however, became less pronounced as the period progressed and did not disguise the reality of a changing military philosophy. As early as 1961 the army conceded that ‘cadets who apply themselves … will perform a service to themselves, and to the nation, regardless of whether they enter the armed forces.’7 In the same year 5 Cadet Brigade informed the parents of its cadets that the movement was ‘undoubtedly of great assistance in fitting them to become decent men and good citizens.’8 Two years later the military officially conceded there was value in cadet training in ‘developing desirable leadership qualities as well as a sense of citizenship and patriotism’. A final indication of the army’s growing acceptance of the non-military outcomes of the movement was the fact that by 1973, in the context of significant changes in public attitudes regarding

1 Minutes of Cadet Brigade Commanders Conference (1967). CRS MT1131/1, Item A65/1/598. 2 Mortensen, An Australian Army Cadet Unit, p. 100. 3 Department of Defence, Cadet Journal, No 16, 1965, p. 1. 4 Adelaide High School (AHS), Magazine, 1967, p. 13. 5 Candy, The Victorian Cadet Movement, p. 24-26. 6 Of these ex-cadets, 84 per cent of officers and 85 per cent of soldiers claimed that their experiences were of either ‘some’ or ‘great’ value. Indeed, in the CMF, 55 per cent of officers and 57 per cent of soldiers with cadet experience believed that this experience had influenced them to join. Department of Defence, Committee of Inquiry into the Citizen Military Forces: Report on the Army Cadet Corps (Millar Report – Cadets), Government Printer, 1974, pp. C-9, D-9 & E-1. 7 Department of Defence, School Cadet Standing Orders (Standing Orders 1959), Army Headquarters, 1959, p. xii. 8 Letter, 5 Cadet Brigade to Parents of Cadets (1961). CRS MT1131/1, Item A65/1/878.

206 military matters inspired by the anti-Vietnam War movement, all official reference to recruitment was dropped, with the ACC tasked solely ‘to develop qualities of leadership, citizenship and self-reliance in a framework of military activities.’ Such a framework was to be interpreted, according to the Director of Cadets, Colonel C.E.M. Newton, as nothing more than ‘in a disciplined environment.’9

The gradual shift in army attitudes away from military aspirations for the ACC contrasted with a rapid movement of ideas in the education sector. Building on post- war thinking, this period saw the widespread adoption of the concept of cadet training as fundamentally a vehicle for youth development. Military objectives were all but forgotten by most educators. The headmaster of Sydney Grammar School in 1958 voiced the opinion of many schoolmasters when he stated that ‘the cadet corps … provides opportunities for teaching self-control, obedience, the techniques of leadership … no other school activity can do all this so efficiently.’10 Similarly, in 1967 Armidale High School, NSW, claimed that ‘the net result of this training is to produce a person who can think, decide and act quickly and responsibly, and who can work cooperatively in any community.’11 Importantly, the social ramifications of Vietnam and the anti-militarism it encouraged moved school attitudes towards their cadets yet further away from traditional modes of military thought. In 1971, for example, the Sacred Heart College (Downlands), Queensland, hoped that in the future it would ‘not have to continually defend the movement against the would-be protestors, but that we can get on with the real business of cadets: the character training … leadership, comradeship and the citizenship it implies.’12 So too, the principal of Christian Brothers College, Kalgoorlie, explained in 1973 that ‘personally, I am not an advocate of militarism in schools, but I do believe that boys should be given the opportunity to stand on their own two feet and to develop initiative and self-reliance.’13

9 Department of Defence, Standing Orders 1959, p. 1; Department of Defence, Annual Report 1963, Government Printer, 1963, p. 26, & Department of Defence, Millar Report – Cadets, Government Printer, 1974, p. 2. 10 Department of Defence, Cadet Journal, No 10, 1959, p. 58. 11 Armidale High School, The Acorn, 1967, p. 9. 12 Sacred Heart College, Downlands Magazine, 1971, p. 38. 13 Christian Brothers College (Kalgoorlie) Annual Report of 1973, CBA HSP0000136/01, Item: Senior School Speech Annual Report 1976; Junior School Annual Report 1975; Modifications to 1975 Report Possibly for 1976; Annual Report 1973 and 1972; Junior School Report 1971.

207 By 1974 teachers generally agreed that the army was a significant factor in cadet training only insofar as it provided a useful vehicle through which moral/ethical instruction could be delivered. The Christian Brothers College (St Joseph’s), Gregory Terrace, Brisbane, made it clear that it saw the army solely as a means to achieve these ends. The headmaster was not focusing on military objectives when he wrote

cadet training is concerned with developing the qualities of leadership, citizenship and self-reliance within a military framework. There need be no apology for the latter – the army is a most suitable organisation to supply the clothing, accommodation, equipment etc, which the parents and the school would not be able to provide.14

The perceived purpose of the movement had come full circle since the days of the Second World War as educational and social imperatives matched and surpassed military considerations. Not only was this newfound strength of purpose a key factor explaining the success of the movement up to the mid-1960s but it had significant implications for other aspects of the organisation; especially in the area of cadet training.

Developments in purpose were matched by structural reform for the ACC from 1958. Outwardly, the organisation remained stable and continued to consist of school-based detachments formed as infantry companies, platoons, and specialist sections. Teachers acting as officers of cadets remained in command and administrative appointments at the company level whilst cadet CUOs, having achieved the highest rank available to them, generally commanded platoons.15 They were supported by cadet warrant officers and NCOs, appointed at the discretion of unit commanders, after successfully completing relevant training courses. Cadet sergeants, usually aged 16, were seconds-in-command of platoons and were responsible for roll books, stores, instructing and understudying CUOs while cadet corporals, generally turning 15 in the year of their promotion, commanded and instructed sections of 7-11 cadets. Individual units remained grouped as battalions and

14 Christian Brothers College (St Joseph’s), Terrace, 1974, p. 46. 15 The army institutionalised the practice of saluting CUOs in November 1972. The execution of this directive, however, varied from unit to unit. Australian Military Force Routine Orders, dated 1 November 1972. CRS J2810, Item R133/1/2.

208 brigades commanded by the Staff Officer Cadets within each Military District (Command) headquarters.16

Despite this continuity there were a number of notable organisational modifications of the cadet organisation during this period.17 In early 1958, for example, permission was granted for specialist medical sections to be raised and in May of that year an Honorary Colonel was appointed to each cadet brigade.18 These officers were required to visit camps, help resolve problems between army staff and schools, and to suggest improvements to cadet training. Their function was inspirational and their presence, rather than direct participation in cadet affairs, was supposed to achieve these ends.19 At the Army Headquarters level the cadet brigades, from 1959, became answerable to the Directorate of the Australian Cadet Corps, commanded by Colonel N.R. Forrest, situated within the CGS Branch. The re- modelled directorate was responsible for the implementation of policy concerning cadets and for the coordination of all action relative to the raising, equipping, and training of units.20

In a potent example of continuing military manipulation, and persistent desire to mould school detachments into replicas of adult infantry units, in 1962 the cadet brigades were ordered to align themselves with the new military concept of ‘pentropic’ battle groups. This idea, as it pertained to the adult army, was based on expanded infantry battalions designed to replace traditional brigade organisations. At the cadet company level, regardless of school and unit wishes, it meant that platoons were rearranged to have four rifle sections rather than three and specialist sections

16 The cadet brigade commander (Staff Officer Cadets) possessed a staff of regular officers and NCOs including a Deputy Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster General, who was a major in charge of administration and quartermaster’s activities, and a General Staff Officer Grade 3, another major, who was responsible for training matters. In a sense the brigade commander had nothing to command and was more intimately involved in staff work, planning, and the delicate and often demanding task of dealing with school headmasters. 17 One significant potential reform never actually implemented was a third attempt at a Regimental Cadet system. Concerned about the supply of suitable officers in the event of war, in 1957 the army seriously considered re-raising the Regimental branch until a formal study, conducted by Colonel D.J. Vincent, the Director of Staff Duties at Army Headquarters, found that any advantages were ‘quite outweighed by the disadvantages.’ As a result, on 7 November 1957, the idea was once again abandoned. Correspondence (internal), Army Headquarters (1957). CRS 927/1, Item A48/1/182. 18 Department of Defence, Cadet Journal, No 9, 1958, pp. 27-28. 19 Memo, 1 Cadet Brigade to Battalions (1958). CRS MT1131/1, Item A107/1/97. 20 From 1948-59 the Directorate of Cadet Services was under the control of the Directorate of Military Training at Army Headquarters. Department of Defence, Standing Orders 1959, p. 4.

209 were grouped together.21 Importantly, structural reviews in Tasmania and Western Australia, inspired by the pentropic reorganisations, resulted in the disbandment of the cadet battalions in these states with units becoming directly answerable to their brigade headquarters.22

A second attempt by the army to impose its will came in 1967 through efforts to standardise individual cadet unit structures and to prevent schools attempting to maintain larger detachments than they were authorised. From this point all detachments were given alpha-numeric designations which determined both their strength and shape. A detachment of 50 cadets, for instance, was designated as ‘Category A’ and was to consist of a single company with two lieutenants, two CUOs, one WO2, one staff sergeant, two sergeants and a balance of JNCOs and cadets. Alternatively, a unit of 450 was designated ‘Category G1’ and maintained five cadet companies with a commensurately larger staff (see Figure 8A for an example of the structure of a typical Category C1 unit at this time and Table 8A for the range of unit categories).23

Figure 8A - Organisational Structure of a Typical Category C1 Cadet Unit, 1967

Commanding Officer (headmaster)

Officer Commanding (captain)

Quartermaster 2IC/Training Officer Bandmaster Coy Sergeant Major (lieutenant) (lieutenant) (lieutenant) (WO2 - cadet)

Stores Sect Signal Sect Band 1 Platoon 2 Platoon 3 Platoon (cadets) (cadets) (cadets) (cadets) (cadets) (cadets) - 1 x WO2 - 1 x SGT - 1 x CUO - 1 x CUO - 1 x CUO - 1 x CUO - 1 x LCPL - 1 x LCPL - 2 x SGTS - 1 x SGT - 1 x SGT - 1 x SGT - 3 x CDTS - 3 x CDTS - 2 x CPLS - 2 x CPLS - 2 x CPLS - 2 x CPLS - 2 x LCPLS - 2 x LCPLS - 2 x LCPLS - 2 x LCPLS - 14 x CDTS - 24 x CDTS - 24 x CDTS - 24 x CDTS Source: Laffin, ‘Cadet Corps in Secondary Education’, p. 237.

21 Commonwealth Yearbook, No 47 (1961), p. 1097. 22 The Tasmanian battalions were later restored but those in South Australia were disbanded by 1974. Department of Defence, Cadet Journal, No 13, 1962, p. 48. 23 Department of Defence, Australian Cadet Corps Standing Orders 1967 (Standing Orders 1967), Government Printer, 1967, p. 30.

210

Table 8A – Cadet Unit Establishments, 1967

staff CUO WO1 major captain colonel sergeant sergeant unit type lieutenant lieutenant companies 1 platoons (5 sections) 1 A 2 1 - 2 2 - - - 2 platoons (6 – 8 sections) 1 B 4 1 - 2 2 - - - 3 platoons (9 – 11 sections) 1 C1 6 1 - 3 3 1 - - 4 platoons (12 – 14 sections) 1 C2 8 1 - 4 3 1 - - 5 platoons (15 – 17 sections) 2 C3 10 1 - 5 3 1 - - 6 platoons (18 – 20 sections) 2 D1 13 2 2 6 3 2 - - 7 platoons (21 – 23 sections) 2 D2 15 2 2 7 3 2 - - 8 platoons (24 – 26 sections) 2 D3 17 2 2 8 3 2 1 - 9 platoons (27 – 29 sections) 3 E1 19 3 2 10 4 4 1 - 10 platoons (30 – 32 sections) 3 E2 21 3 2 11 4 4 1 - 11 platoons (33 – 35 sections) 3 E3 23 3 2 12 4 4 1 - 12 platoons (36 – 38 sections) 4 F1 25 4 2 13 5 5 1 - 13 platoons (39 – 41 sections) 4 F2 27 4 2 14 5 5 1 - 14 platoons (42 – 44 sections) 4 F3 29 4 2 15 5 5 1 - 15 platoons (45 – 47 sections) 5 G1 31 5 2 16 6 6 1 1 16 platoons (48 – 50 sections) 5 G2 33 5 2 17 6 6 1 1 17 platoons (51 – 53 sections) 5 G3 35 5 2 18 6 6 1 1 18 platoons (54 – 56 sections) 6 H1 37 6 2 19 7 8 2 1 19 platoons (57 – 59 sections) 6 H2 39 6 2 20 7 8 2 1 20 platoons (60 – 62 sections) 6 H3 41 6 2 21 7 8 2 1

Source: Department of Defence, Australian Cadet Corps Standing Orders 1967, Government Printer, 1967, Annex B.

In the early 1970s the movement was again subjected to structural reorganisation as a direct result of decisions affecting the adult army. In 1972-73 the state-based Military District/Command system was dissolved in favour of a new ‘functional’ command arrangement. This meant that strategic command of the ACC was vested in the Director of Cadets, Colonel C.E.M. Newton, who was now dual- hatted as the Colonel (Training Doctrine) at Headquarters Training Command - Army (HQTC-A). Figure 8B describes the ACC organisation and command structure in 1974 while Appendix 10 provides an example of the detailed composition of a cadet brigade (2 Cadet Brigade) at the time.

211

Figure 8B - ACC Organisation and Command Structure, 1974

HQTC-A Director Cadets (Colonel) SO2 Cadets (major)

1 Cadet Bde 2 Cadet Bde 3 Cadet Bde 4 Cadet Bde 5 Cadet Bde 6 Cadet Bde Officers 4 Officers 6 Officers 7 Officers 3 Officers 4 Officers 1 WOs 4 WO 12 WO 21 WOs 12 WOs 15 WOs 1 Other Ranks 3 Other Ranks 4 Other Ranks 9 Other Ranks 7 Other Ranks 10 Other Ranks 2

5 Battalions 9 Battalions 2 Battalions 2 Battalions Officers 2 Officers 2 Officers 2 Officers 1 WOs 6 WOs 6 WOs 7 WOs 5 Other Ranks 2 Other Ranks 2 Other Ranks 3 Other Ranks 3 (each) (each) (each)* (each)

* 3 Cadet Brigade also commanded a ‘Melbourne Area Group’ which was, in effect, a small battalion headquarters supervising Melbourne units.

Source: ACC Organisation and Command Structure Tables (1974). Defence Archives File 74/4/10.

In contrast to these structural rearrangements there were relatively few administrative alterations for the ACC with the exception, in 1963, of the Duke of Edinburgh, becoming its Colonel-in-Chief.24 Other than this honorary appointment the only other noteworthy change concerned financial arrangements. Paralleling efforts to standardise unit structures, the army sought to exert its influence over schools and their detachments through tighter control of unit finances. Claiming frustration with poor accounting procedures and unauthorised expenditure the army removed responsibility for administering allowances from headmasters (or school representatives) and transferred it to cadet battalion staff. The move was not entirely a smokescreen to mask greater army intrusion into school affairs as the positive responses to the decision by cadet brigade headquarters in all states, given they were supporting an increase in workload for their subordinate staff, indicated that the issue

24 Department of Defence, Cadet Journal, No 14, 1963, p. 4.

212 was real and systemic.25 At the same time, however, the decision was aligned with an agenda of increased military control.

The final area of military intrusion upon what was traditionally an educationally oriented aspect of the movement concerned adult ACC staff. From 1958 all existing and newly appointed officers of cadets of the rank of lieutenant and captain were required to attend mandatory re-styled military courses of instruction to equip them to administer and train their units. This First Appointment Course ran for nine days with an additional course of nine days required for promotion to captain (the block syllabus for the First Appointment Course is shown at Figure 8C).26 In addition, the army began to run a limited number of voluntary Unit Command Courses for the purpose of preparing (and influencing) detachment commanders.27

Figure 8C - Block Syllabus for the First Appointment Course, 1958

Subject Lessons (40 min) Infantry Weapons 9 Drill – Ceremonial 9 Navigation 18 Infantry Minor Tactics 18 Preparation and Conduct of Tactical Exercises 12 Voice Procedure 4 Conduct of Range Practices 2 Unit Administration 9 Hygiene 3 Preparation of Syllabus/Organisation and Conduct of Training 10 Staff Duties 2 Methods of Instruction 4 Duties of NCOs, CUOs and Officers 2 Talks by Visiting Officers 2 Spare 4 TOTAL 108

Source: Department of Defence, School Cadet Standing Orders 1959, Government Printer, 1959, p. 19.

25 Correspondence (various), Directorate of Cadets to Cadet Brigades. CRS MT1131/1, Item A105/9/29. 26 The First Appointment Course was to be competed within two years. Department of Defence, Standing Orders 1959, p. 5. 27 This requirement could be waived from 1967 for ex-commissioned officers of the defence force. Department of Defence, Cadet Journal, No 9, 1958, pp. 15 & 24, & Department of Defence, Standing Orders 1967, p. 5.

213 There is no doubt regulatory, structural and administrative reform of the ACC in the period 1958-74 reflected the army’s efforts to exert its influence over the education sector. Importantly, however, its successes were not yet on a scale sufficient to unbalance the movement. At the same time such interest represented significant and continuing military commitment and it was this dedication, as one of the four pillars of the movement, that helped advance the organisation in this period.

A useful measure of military enthusiasm for the ACC, and a reminder of the strength of the educational/social/financial considerations underpinning the movement, was revealed in January 1959 when cadet units were first raised in PNG. The purpose of the expansion, according to the Minister for the Army, Cramer, was to grow future community leaders in the territory as well as recruits for the Pacific Islands Regiment (PIR) and Papua New Guinea Volunteer Rifles (PNGVR).28 Brigadier F.S. Evans, the Director of Army Training, added a third dimension when writing to Major General I.T. Murdoch, the Deputy Chief of the General Staff, in pointing out the potential of such units to save money if ex-cadets could be used as PIR storemen and clerks. Brigadier Evans hoped that such savings would remove financial barriers impeding the expansion of the PIR whilst pointing to the inevitability of indigenous defence for the territory.29 The first two cadet units in PNG were subsequently opened at the Sogeri Training College, east of Port Moresby, and the Malaguna Technical School, Rabaul. The initial strength of these units was set at one Caucasian officer of cadets and between 30 and 54 cadets dressed in khaki shirts, shorts, berets and sandals.30

With the arrival of an ARA warrant officer instructor from Australia training for cadets in PNG commenced at Sogeri on 6 January 1959. Activities at Malaguna commenced soon afterwards under the supervision of a second WO2 whose main instructional duties concerned the PNGVR in Rabaul.31 The first cadet NCO course in the territory was held at Goldie River training area near Port Moresby in April 1959, where ten cadets from both school detachments gained promotion qualifications,

28 Correspondence (various), Army Headquarters (1958). CRS A452, Item 1961/175. 29 Minute, Director of Training to Deputy Chief of the General Staff, dated January 1959. CRS MT1131/1, Item A48/1/1039. 30 Memo, 1 Cadet Brigade (internal) (1959). CRS A452, Item 1962/8075. 31 Department of Defence, Cadet Journal, No 10, 1959, pp. 62-64.

214 while the first combined annual camp was held in May that year in the same location.32 In 1960 inter-unit competitions were inaugurated and the Malaguna cadets conducted the first ceremonial cadet parade in PNG when they formed a guard of honour for visiting members of the South Pacific Conference.33

It was not long before the cadet movement in PNG, in line with developments in Australia (discussed later), began to expand. An increase of 20 cadets was permitted in both original units in July 1959 and from 1 January 1960 five new detachments were approved.34 Initially all PNG units were commanded by 4 Cadet Battalion in Townsville but, in October 1960, they were grouped into their own 35 (PNG) Cadet Battalion under the command of 1 Cadet Brigade.35 In its first 17 months the territorial movement grew to number seven officers and 270 cadets and in 1962, the Administrator, Sir Donald Cleland, commented that 35 Cadet Battalion ‘was of great benefit in promoting the unity of feeling and purpose among boys in the territory.’36 As the 1960s progressed the popularity of the movement continued to rise such that by June 1967 PNG boasted 14 school detachments with 887 members.37

It was the school system, rather than the army, that provided the cadet organisation in PNG with its first serious challenges. From 1970 educational developments in the territory began to push large numbers of students out of secondary schools after only two years, which meant that the cadet force grew

32 Following a subsequent camp, on 28 August 1972, a party of 29 cadets was flying home when their aircraft crashed in a remote part of the PNG highlands. Miraculously, five escaped death thanks to the efforts of Corporal Patrick Tau Gau who, despite being injured himself, repeatedly re-entered the wreckage to pull six other cadets out of the aircraft. Of those he rescued, however, only one survived. Corporal Tau Gau then gathered those who remained and led them to safety after a three-day trek through some of the most rugged country in the world. For his courage and leadership Corporal Tau Gau was awarded the George Medal by the Queen on 13 September 1973. George Medal Award Citation (Corporal Patrick Tau-Gau). CRS A2880, Item 5/4/98. 33 Department of Defence, Cadet Journal, No 11, 1960, pp. 64 & 66. 34 On 28 March 1961, inspired by the cadet movement in PNG, the Minister for Territories, P.M.C. Hasluck, requested the establishment of a pilot cadet unit at an Aboriginal settlement in the Northern Territory. The request was denied on the grounds of the difficulty of supplying ARA instructors, and as no CMF units existed in the Northern Territory to absorb cadets once they were too old to serve, such a unit would be contrary to the military aims of cadet training. Aside from these considerations, there was already a long waiting list for new units in all states. A cadet movement in Northern Territory was forced to wait. Correspondence (various), Hasluck to Cramer, dated March-April 1961. CRS A452, Item 1961/175. 35 Department of Defence, Cadet Journal, No 12, 1961, p. 17. 36 ibid., No. 11, 1960, p. 68, & Speech (transcript), Sir Donald Cleland delivered at Sogeri College, dated December 1962. CRS A452, Item 1962/8075.

215 younger and some technical schools were forced to disband their units as training became impractical. Additionally, recruiting, training and retaining native officers of cadets was always of considerable concern. There was a feeling among some Caucasian military staff that such officers were ‘of doubtful quality’ and that ‘a serious risk of failure’ was present if they were appointed to key positions. The subsequent reliance on ARA personnel led many headmasters to complain how rarely they were available (once per month on average due to the requirement to fly between unit locations). Compounding such problems, it was also apparent in the early 1970s that the relationship between the PIR and the PNG cadets was never close enough for the former to receive significant recruiting benefits from the latter.38 Despite these challenges, however, 35 Cadet Battalion remained functional and relatively healthy up to 1974.

Along with the expansion of the ACC into PNG, the army’s commitment to the cadet organisation was also demonstrated by strong material support from the late 1950s to the mid-1960s. Solid resource and financial allocations to the ACC were facilitated by an overall increase in government spending on defence which outstripped GDP growth during this period (102 per cent increase to the army vote compared to 87 per cent growth in GDP from 1957-65, see Table 8B). Cadets continued to be entitled to a free army pattern uniform which, from 1959, included a ‘formation sign’ or identification patch worn on the shoulders. The new badge consisted of a crown, below which was an outline map of Australia, surmounted by a crossed sword and torch of learning. Below the symbol were the words ‘Australian Cadet Corps.’39 The sword, crown and torch, represented an aim, function or quality of the cadet movement. Interestingly, the torch was placed on top of the sword reflecting, perhaps, the changing purpose of the organisation.40 Outdated Second World War vintage Service Dress was replaced by the Battle Dress of the contemporary army in 1961 which brought cadets ‘closer to the present army dress

37 In 1969 there were 25 schools on the waiting list to raise new units. Three years later there were 29. 35 Cadet Battalion Annual Camp Instruction, dated 22 May 1967. CRS J2810, Item R133/4/2. 38 Report, Army Headquarters (Director of Cadets), dated 5 January 1970. CRS J2810, Item R133/1/5. 39 Department of Defence, Cadet Journal, No 9, 1958, p. 15. 40 The design of the patch had been determined in 1957 through a nation-wide competition to derive a new symbol for the ACC. The successful pattern was submitted by CUO L.C. McBride of Haileybury College Cadet Unit in Brighton, Victoria. The symbol first appeared on the flag of 3 Cadet Brigade in 1958 and the basic design is still in use today. Minutes of Cadet Conference (1957). CRS MT1131/1, Item A65/1/598.

216 than to the original ANZACs.’ The cost of the initial outfitting totalled £338,300 with a further £84,182 per annum required for maintenance.41 Again indicative of material generosity, in 1964 Jungle Greens were issued as a replacement for the old style Khaki Drill uniform in tropical areas, and as a summer uniform in more temperate climates.42

Table 8B – Trends in Defence Expenditure against GDP, 1957-65

2250 GDP (at current prices ($'10M)) Defence Expenditure ($'M) 1750

1250

750

250 1957/58 1958/59 1959/60 1960/61 1961/62 1962/63 1963/64 1964/65 1965/66 Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, History of National Accounts, www.abs.gov.au & Beaumont, Sources & Statistics, pp. 31-2.

Despite continuing military commitment in principle, however, from 1965 army logistic and manpower support for cadets began to decline to considerably lower levels than those witnessed before 1958. Such rapid deterioration was a consequence of an increasingly overtaxed army caused, in the main, by military downsizing and reorganisations of the late 1950s and early 1960s, continuing commitments to the British Commonwealth Far East Strategic Reserve, the reintroduction of National Service in 1965 and the movement of ARA battalions to Vietnam and Borneo. These factors combined to ensure the ACC became a much lower military priority.43 Such pressures were also exacerbated by the fact that from 1967-74 overall defence spending did not maintain the positive trend set in the early 1960s (GDP in the period increased by 124 per cent while defence expenditure rose by a mere 33 per cent, see Table 8C).

41 The change-over was not fully completed until 1966. Reid, Looking Back With Thanks, p. 17, & Minute, Minister’s Office to Army Headquarters (1961-62). CRS MT1131/1, Item A48/1/1150. 42 AHS, Magazine, 1963, p. 17 43 The efficient operation of the National Service system became a sensitive political issue and it was given priority to ensure success.

217 Table 8C – Trends in Defence Expenditure against GDP, 1967-74

5750 GDP (at current prices ($'10M)) Defence Expenditure ($'M) 4750

3750

2750

1750

750 1966/67 1967/68 1968/69 1969/70 1970/71 1971/72 1972/73 1973/74 Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Special Article: History of National Accounts, www.abs.gov.au & Beaumont, Sources & Statistics, pp. 31-2.

The first obvious indication of a decline in military support concerned the provision of cadet weapons. In 1960 Owen Guns and 6 pounder anti-tank weapons were withdrawn from all detachments, and in the following year both the Vickers Machine Gun in specialist sections and the Bren Gun in cadet infantry sections were replaced by the M-60 General Purpose Machine Gun.44 Even more significant was the introduction of the 7.62mm L1A1 Self-Loading Rifle (SLR) as a replacement for the venerable .303 Lee Enfield as the standard cadet weapon. In March 1961, after the ARA and CMF had been outfitted, pools of SLRs were provided to each cadet brigade. These stocks, however, were completely inadequate with a token 130 weapons available across all states.45 Units were forced to wait until 1974 for SLRs to be issued en masse and even then the decision was tempered by an army refusal to continue to allow detachments to keep rifles (or indeed any weapons) at school locations as had traditionally been the case.46 Units were universally dismayed at losing their weapon holdings. They complained that without them there was no way to teach correct care and maintenance and that the SLRs should not, and could not, be safely issued at camps when prior training on them was impossible.47 What many units failed to recognise, however, was that in addition to obvious cost savings, this resolution reflected the changing military objectives previously noted. The army did

44 Reid, Looking Back With Thanks, p. 16, & Maryborough High School, The Palma, 1960, p. 37. 45 Memo, Directorate of Cadets to Cadet Brigades, dated March 1961. CRS MT1131/1, Item A17/2/205. 46 Before 1974, on the afternoons before range shoots, bivouacs, camps or courses, cadets were issued with rifles which they often took home by public transport. For security they were told to place the bolt in their school bags. The decision to no longer allow weapons to be kept in schools was justified by the army on the grounds of the perpetual problem of security and the increasingly common view that training with rifles, mortars and other heavy weapons was best done at camps. 47 Mortensen, An Australian Army Cadet Unit, p. 299.

218 not care that cadet weapon efficiency deteriorated, for by 1974 it had accepted that the organisation ought to focus on character development rather than on imparting military skills. Constant access to rifles was therefore unnecessary.

Apart from the specific issue of weapons, from the mid-1960s general financial pressure and scarcity of resources meant that ‘cadets [had] the lowest priority’ with allocations ‘dependant on demands from other sources.’48 The army was not overly apologetic for this situation, as Captain H.D. Chamberlain, Commanding Officer of 33 Cadet Battalion, explained in that it ‘[had] its hands full wielding a force with which it can hold a narrowing influence on the edge of Asia. It does not want critics – it wants support. The schools and their units can help by helping themselves.’49 It was not possible, however, for many units to achieve such self-sufficiency without assistance from a functional military framework which, in many ways, was disintegrating. Often it was not they, but rather the supporting army infrastructure which failed to cope. In 1965, for example, a memorandum from headquarters, 22 Cadet Battalion to subordinate units on the eve of the annual cadet camp remarked that

re-postings have reduced the ARA instructors to 50 per cent of establishment. Also the Q staff has been reduced to 33 per cent of establishment. This leaves only three instructors to handle most of the instructional and Q aspects associated with the eleven schools being forested.50

Similarly, with the army further stretched in 1967 following the deployment of the 1st Australian Task Force (including two infantry battalions) to South Vietnam, a letter from 3 Cadet Brigade to school units cancelled all ARA support to bivouacs, while an ACC memorandum of May 1970 decreed that ‘only some schools will take a seven day annual camp in the bush in the August-September series due to a lack of field type rations.’51

In the early 1970s Vietnam and National Service inspired manpower shortages were the root cause of most administrative difficulties. In August 1974 Lieutenant

48 ibid., p. 49. 49 Department of Defence, Cadet Journal, No 15, 1964, p. 15. 50 Mortensen, An Australian Army Cadet Unit, p. 53. 51 ibid., pp. 63 & 148.

219 Colonel K.J. Bladen, commanding 3 Cadet Brigade, was forced to concede that ‘for a considerable period now, all cadet brigades throughout Australia have suffered from an acute shortage of ARA officers.’ By this stage the constant pressure of inadequate support had convinced many headmasters that there were darker motives behind these problems than simply a thinly stretched army. The principal of the Christian Brothers Cadet Unit, St Kilda, for example, wrote to his brigade commander in 1974 suggesting that ‘where there is a reluctance to continue such an activity as cadets, one means of securing its end is by denying it necessary support.’52 The headmaster may have been wrong in this particular instance, but his instincts insofar as future governmental intentions were concerned were not too far from the mark.

The importance of ARA warrant officer instructors within the ACC throughout the period made manpower shortages from the mid-1960s doubly hard for units to bear. These instructors, under the command of the cadet battalions, were attached to a number of schools (usually three) and had a range of duties including the ‘supervision of all cadet training and activities at the school … of stores maintenance and all “Q” accounting … and of unit administration.’ 53 The instructor was ‘an advisor to officers of cadets on military matters’ and a ‘liaison officer between the school and the battalion headquarters.’54 A memo dispatched by 2 Cadet Brigade to subordinate battalions in 1969 explained that

the quality of CUOs and NCOs results from two factors – instruction on courses and in-service training. The warrant officer instructor has a key role in both … within units all aspects are discussed with him; training programs are submitted informally for criticism; problems are discussed openly and advice sought.55

In this context it was not surprising that many units lamented their increasing absence. While most were career infantrymen who had almost always seen operational service, some of these seasoned men accepted their posting to the ACC better than others. To a few it was the ‘kiss of death’ with respect to future career prospects and some saw opportunities for laxity, taking advantage of ill-defined roles and responsibilities or

52 ibid., p. 151. 53 Laffin, ‘Cadet Corps in Secondary Education’, p. 258. 54 Mortensen, K.G., ‘The Mind of a Cadet’, in Christian Brothers: Our Studies, Vol 44, No 2, October 1971, p. 87. 55 ibid.

220 looser chains of command. Certainly the job placed many beyond the scope of their previous experiences and in roles for which they had not been trained or prepared. Overall, however, the majority enjoyed and excelled at the challenge that the ACC represented and, recognising their enormous influence within the units to which they were attached, warmed to their task.56 If there were complaints, it was that there were just not enough of them in the late 1960s and early 1970s.

Along with decreasing army support, from the mid-1960s many schools faced the growing difficulty of adequately staffing their units with suitable officers of cadets.57 As a result, in 1967 permission was given for candidates to be appointed from other than school teaching staff or ex-army personnel. From this point ‘any person who in the opinion of the headmaster is suitable for the appointment’ could be chosen to fill a vacancy.58 Under increasingly difficult circumstances, however, even this initiative failed to rectify the problem. From January 1974 to August 1975 the James Ruse Agricultural College Cadet Unit, for example, could not man its four officer of cadets positions and for most of this time possessed only two. This situation led to a slackening of effort at the unit which was certainly replicated at other locations. Meeting the shortfall in army personnel support meant, according to an officer of cadets at the Cranbrook School, Sydney, that cadet responsibilities took teachers out of the classroom for 13 days per year or one day for every three weeks of the school term. This estimation did not include planning for activities or ‘un-planning half the arrangements made by the army.’ Quite simply, this Cranbrook officer, and many like him, felt that ‘the return was not worth the effort.’59 Military/educational harmony, so crucial in promoting growth for the ACC up to the mid-1960s, began to crumble.

56 ibid., p. 88. 57 Laffin, ‘Cadet Corps in Secondary Education’, p. 41. 58 Department of Defence, Standing Orders 1967, p. 4. 59 Also frustrating many officers of cadets were moves by the army which, in their opinion, were designed to suppress their military status. In 1960 Major General T.S. Taylor, the Deputy Chief of the General Staff, recommended against the Minister for the Army’s suggestion that officers of cadets be granted true military commissions applicable within the wider defence force as a means by which to increase the recognition of their efforts. Taylor blunted the Minister’s initiative on the grounds of impracticality under the extant military regulations. In truth, however, and in Taylor’s own words, the army feared that such a move would ‘belittle the significance of commissions’ in the ARA and CMF. Canberra Grammar School Cadet Discussion Paper, dated June 1990. Canberra Grammar School Archives (CGSA) Series C9 (Cadets Box 1), Item: Records of the Past, & Correspondence (various), Minister’s Office to Army Headquarters (1960). CRS MT1131/1, Item A48/1/1035.

221 Further evidence of military/educational dissonance from the mid-1960s were growing instances of friction, and at times outright resentment, between cadet staff and army officers within the ACC command structure. Many officers of cadets, increasingly frustrated at deficient ARA support believed that they, rather than permanent army staff, should be appointed as battalion and brigade commanders.60 Army officers, on the other hand, complained that officers of cadets regularly refused to accept decisions that flowed down the chain of command if it did not suit them. It was not unheard of for school headmasters to circumvent military command structures and correspond directly with highly placed army and civil figures if issues affecting their cadet units were considered to be grave enough. Such actions were never appreciated by military staff who considered the proper chain of command sacrosanct. Problems were often compounded in school units large enough to be commanded by officers of cadets of the rank of lieutenant colonel, who took instruction from ARA battalion commanders whose rank was usually that of lieutenant or captain. Occasionally the mismatch developed into a problem when, although not officially part of the military, these high ranking officers of cadets looked and acted as though they were.

Two further issues of contention served to illustrate both increasing hostility between educational and military forces and the maintenance of the state/private school divide within the movement. The first concerned private school compulsion. In 1957 in NSW, for example, 22 non-government schools made service in their cadet units mandatory. In the same year Lieutenant Colonel Ian Hutchison, commanding 3 Cadet Brigade, reported that at some schools in Victoria a boy could not be made a prefect unless already a CUO.61 Such practices had long been thought in some quarters, including the state education departments, to be contrary to the voluntary spirit of the ACC. This issue festered throughout the period and was resolved, finally, in May 1973 when the Minister for Defence, L.H. Barnard, in responding to a parliamentary question concerning the voluntary nature of the ACC, conceded that while the army exerted no pressure for involvement in the cadet organisation it was considered ‘an integral part of the curriculum’ in some private schools. He then proceeded to outlaw the practice in informing parliament that ‘schools with cadet

60 Correspondence (various), 6 Cadet Brigade Conferences. CRS MT1131/1, Item A65/1/499. 61 Memo, 3 Cadet Brigade to Directorate of Cadets (1957). CRS MT1131/1, Item A65/1/598.

222 units are being advised that official support will be withdrawn, and a unit disbanded, if compulsion or pressure is exerted on pupils to participate in cadet activities.’62 Nevertheless, the damage had been done. The Minister’s decree alienated many large private schools, the traditional bastions of the movement, while the perception of compulsory cadethood as a feature of the private school experience permeated the community and emphasised the state school/private school divide.

The second point of aggravation between the army and private schools was inspired by the Minister for the Army, Cramer, who, conscious of trying to restore a state school/private school balance, directed in July 1960 that, with approval for an upcoming expansion in cadet establishment numbers, new units were to receive enrolment priority over existing detachments. He anticipated that with the announcement of new enrolment targets ‘there is bound to be pressure from the GPS to increase their quotas of cadets’ and was determined that they be given fewer new positions than state schools who qualified for units but had previously been unable to raise them.63 By manipulating which schools were permitted to raise new detachments, Cramer was successful in stimulating an expansion in overall state school numbers. He could not, however, influence detachment size. Continuing a pre- existing tendency, the largest units in this era were almost invariably based in private schools. In 1974, for example, 19 private schools had units in excess of 300 cadets while only one state school, Maitland Boys’ High, could even approach this number. The result was that although private schools possessed only 57 per cent of all cadets the real influence wielded by these units, on account of their size, remained disproportionately high and as a consequence of Cramer’s efforts they were increasingly incensed by what they saw as blatant military/political interference. Table 8D illustrates the composition of the ACC by unit in 1974.

62 Extract (Hansard) Ministerial Statement, dated May 1973 Defence Archives File 74/4/10. 63 Memo, Defence Department to Directorate of Cadets, dated 4 July 1960 CRS MT1131/1, Item A48/1/1035.

223 Table 8D - Composition by Unit of the ACC, September 1974

State Anglican Catholic Other Denominational Non-Denominational TOTAL Schools Schools Schools Private Schools Private Schools QLD 47 (64%)* 4 (5%) 14 (19%) 4 (5%) 5 (7%) 74 NSW/ACT 89 (72%) 7 (6%) 22 (18%) 4 (3%) 2 (2%) 124 VIC 19 (45%) 8 (19%) 8 (9%) 7 (17%) - 42 SA/NT 11 (55%) 2 (10%) 4 (20%) 3 (15%) - 20 WA 20 (67%) 3 (10%) 5 (17%) 2 (7%) - 30 TAS 19 (76%) 2 (8%) 3 (12%) 1 (4%) - 25 TOTAL 205 (63%) 26 (9%) 56 (17%) 21 (9%) 7 (1%) 315

* Percentages represent the proportion of overall unit numbers not overall cadet numbers. For example, state schools held 63% of all units (see table) but only 43% of all cadets.

Public School Units Anglican School Units Catholic School Units Other Denominational Units Non-Denominational Units

Source: Department of Defence, Committee of Inquiry into the Citizen Military Forces: Report on the Army Cadet Corps, Government Printer, 1974, Annex C-1.

The strength of military, educational and social commitment to the movement up to the mid-1960s and the decline in army support and military/educational harmony that followed was clearly reflected in the rise and fall of total cadet numbers. Overall, the period saw a growth in cadet establishment numbers of 11,000 and of real numbers of around 6,500. These increases were not linear, however, but rather represented a rapid rise followed by a slow decline. The authorised cadet ceiling was raised incrementally from 35,000 in 1958 to 46,566 in 1966 before settling back to 46,000 in 1968-74.64 Cadet numbers followed a similar pattern growing from 31,179 in 1958 to a high point of 42,265 in 1966 before falling slowly to 37,662 in 1973 (Table 8E provides a detailed break down of ACC establishment and actual strengths from 1958-73).

64 A brief exception occurred in 1959 when ceiling numbers were reduced to 33,500 in connection with the suspension of National Service.

224 Table 8E - School Cadet Numbers, 1958-73 Date Establishment Strength Cadet Units Actual Strength 1958 35,000 274 31,179 1959 33,500 279 32,460 1961 35,500 299 34,953 1962 38,000 308 37,025 1963 38,500 309 37,461 1964 39,000 315 38,294 1965 45,203 323 40,201 1966 46,566 335 42,265 1967 45,000 351 41,434 1968 46,000 349 41,285 1969 46,000 346 41,213 1970 46,000 347 39,910 1971 46,000 337 38,986 1972 46,000 332 38,621 1973 46,000 327 37,622 45000

Actual Cadet Strength 40000

35000

30000

25000

20000 1958 1959 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 Source: Commonwealth Yearbooks, No 44 (1958) p 1055; No 45 (1959) p.1062; No 46 (1960) p. 1102; No 47 (1961) p. 1099; No 48 (1962) p. 1117; No 49 (1963) p. 1204; No 50 (1964) p. 1134; No 51 (1965) p. 1202; No 52 (1966) p. 1066; No 54 (1968) p. 83; No 55 (1969) p. 83; No 56 (1970) p. 92; No 57 (1971) p. 92; No 58 (1972) p. 92; No 59 (1973) p. 93; No 60 (1974) p. 103.

In addition to the range of considerations previously discussed there were a number of supplementary influences explaining this rise and fall. The first was caused by the army. With the termination of the original National Service scheme in 1959, and the reorganisation of the army prior to 1960, the military once again began to consider cadets more seriously as a source of potential recruits. As a result, establishment ceilings were raised and units whose strength was below 50, or whose schools did not teach up to 17-18 years of age, were culled. The army wanted value for money and with waiting lists and requests for extensions to establishment numbers

225 in all states such units were disbanded in favour of schools that could provide a greater continuity of training and who were likely to be able to feed more cadets into the CMF. Detachments in Western Command like those at Denmark Junior Agricultural High School and Forrest Junior High School, were dissolved in 1961 due to pressure to get the most out of the 3,100 cadet ceiling in the state.65 These and other disbandments were often accompanied by howls of protests by local interest groups, parents, teachers and concerned citizens. Such protests, like that made by the Wellington Parents and Citizens Association on behalf of disbanded country units in NSW, regularly made it to the ministerial level and there is no doubt that these vigorous appeals proclaiming the defence, scholastic, social and moral benefits of small cadet units did their part in bringing about subsequent increases in authorised cadet numbers up to the mid-1960s.66

Commitment from the education sector was a second factor encouraging cadet enrolment in late 1950s and early 1960s. The movement remained so popular that many schools became frustrated by the enrolment limitations placed upon them. The Officer Commanding the Southport School Cadet Unit in Queensland, for example, wrote a bitter letter to 1 Cadet Brigade in March 1962 complaining that he had 100 boys, half in their second year at the school, who wished to join its cadet unit but were unable due to the army restrictions.67 Eventually such grass-roots school pressure yielded results and in mid-1962 the maximum number of cadets permitted in the ACC was raised to 38,500.68 Three years later agitation for even more cadet places saw the ceiling raised to 45,203, a figure that still failed to meet demand.69

The enduring influence of the national political environment also stimulated the ACC’s growth up to 1966 while softening its decline thereafter, dominated as it was by conservative Liberal/Country Party governments. A common feature of this

65 Correspondence, 5 Cadet Brigade to Directorate of Cadets (1961). CRS MT1131/1, Item A48/1/1161. 66 Correspondence (various), 2 Cadet Brigade (1961) CRS MT1131/1, Item A48/1/1168. 67 Letter, The Southport School to 1 Cadet Brigade, dated 12 March 1962. CRS A1209, Item 1959/888. 68 This decision was supported by an increased political commitment that saw the Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant General Sir Reginald Pollard, and Minister for the Army, Cramer, attend the triennial Conference of Headmasters of Independent Schools to ensure the high profile of the ACC was maintained. Minutes, Triennial Conference of Headmasters of Independent Schools (1961). CRS MT1131/1, Item A107/1/97. 69 Department of Defence, Annual Report 1965, Government Printer, 1965, p. 30.

226 string of conservative ministries was support for the idea and practice of the cadet movement. With such political stewardship the ACC grew to the mid 1960s, just as it had under the Menzies governments of the 1950s, and although numbers then declined to 1972 (the end of the McMahon coalition government), it is important to note that such heights could never have been reached in the first place without solid and sustained political support. In this era, as in all others, conservative political governments provided an environment that encouraged the movement to thrive. Conversely, cadet numbers fell by 1,000 in the first year of the Whitlam Labor government in 1973 and this change in the political climate, combined with the power of shifting social attitudes catalysed by the growing unpopularity of the Vietnam War and the social ramifications and anti-militaristic feelings the conflict inspired, ensured the downward trend continued into 1974.

Despite losing around 4,500 cadets from 1966, the ACC remained a formidable organisation of 37,622 members in 1973. This was 6,500 more members than in 1958 and represented around seven per cent of eligible boys in Australia with 16 per cent of schools supporting units.70 Table 8F provides a breakdown of the ACC by brigade at 31 March 1974 while Table 8G lists schools waiting to form units at the time. Table 8H shows the distribution of male students in the country compared to the distribution of cadets. In general terms the rise and fall in cadet numbers in the period 1958-74 was a consequence of sturdy military, educational and social foundations which, from 1966, were progressively undermined by an unavoidable reduction in military support caused by the army’s operational tempo, educational/military friction, and souring community attitudes encouraged by the growing unpopularity of Vietnam.

70 Department of Defence, Committee of Inquiry into the Citizen Military Forces (Millar Report), Government Printer, 1974, p. 15.

227 Table 8F - Strength of Cadet Brigades, 31 March 1974 Cadet Establishment Imposed Ceiling Actual Strength Units Strength Strength Cadets Officers Total 1 Cadet Brigade (QLD) 74 9,933 8,807 7,554 259 7,813 2 Cadet Brigade (NSW/ACT) 121 17,362 16,298 12,668 352 13,020 3 Cadet Brigade (VIC) 43 8,064 7,820 6,183 193 6,376 4 Cadet Brigade (SA) 20 1,942 1,942 1,557 52 1,609 5 Cadet Brigade (WA) 30 4,193 3,613 2,499 94 2,593 6 Cadet Brigade (TAS) 24 2,368 2,100 1,364 64 1,428

Source: Department of Defence, Committee of Inquiry into the Citizen Military Forces: Report on the Army Cadet Corps, Government Printer, 1974, Annex C-2.

Table 8G - Schools with Waiting Lists for Cadet Units, August 1973 NSW/ACT VIC QLD WA SA TAS NT TOTAL Total Schools 716 616 358 226 211 103 12 2,242 Schools with 608 523 314 205 182 96 12 1,940 Male Students Schools with 121 (17%) 43 (7%) 74 (21%) 30 (13%) 20 (9%) 24 (23%) Nil 312 Cadet Units Schools Waiting 29 Nil 50 Nil Nil Nil Nil 79 for Cadet Units

Source: Department of Defence, Committee of Inquiry into the Citizen Military Forces: Report on the Army Cadet Corps, Government Printer, 1974, Annex C-1.

Table 8H - Distribution of Students Compared with Distribution of Cadets, 1974 Percentage of Total Male Percentage of Students in Australia Total Cadets State Schools 76.6 43.1 Catholic Schools 16.6 26.6 Anglican Schools 3.6 15.8 Other Denominational Schools 3.2 11.6 Non-Denominational Schools 0.9 2.9

Public School Cadets Private School Cadets (Catholic Schools) Private School Cadets (Anglican Schools) Private School Cadets (Other Denomiational Schools) Private School Cadets (Non-Denominational)

Source: Department of Defence, Committee of Inquiry into the Citizen Military Forces: Report on the Army Cadet Corps, Government Printer, 1974, Annex C-3.

228 By moving the focus from numbers to the nature of cadet activities in this period, the influence of educational and social considerations is re-affirmed. The philosophical movement of purpose towards character development, at the expense of traditional military outcomes, caused a parallel evolution in cadet training. The transition, however, was not immediately apparent. First-year cadets still covered the basic elements of infantry training ‘in a form suited to the undeveloped physical stature of young cadets’ while in the second year emphasis was placed upon junior leadership, mutual instruction and section leading. Third-year cadets with SNCO or CUO rank were given opportunities to undertake advanced training ‘designed to develop infantry platoon commanders’ while specialist training continued for those having started it in their second year.71 Table 8I demonstrates the military-style syllabus detailed for first and second year cadets in 1961 while Figure 8D provides an illustrative example of a typical cadet experience during this era.

Table 8I - Block Syllabus for Non-Specialist Training, 1961

Subject 1st Year 2nd Year Total Drill 23 10 33 Weapon training 2 - 2 Application of Fire - 8 8 Rifle (including range practice) 18 16 34 Bren Gun 16 15 31 Grenades 2 3 5 Owen Machine Gun 1 3 4 Fieldcraft and section leading 20 24 44 Map and Air photo reading 4 6 10 Hygiene & first-aid 2 2 4 Visual training (films) 3 5 8 Lectures 4 3 7 TOTAL 95 95 190 Source: Department of Defence, School Cadet Standing Orders 1959, Government Printer, 1959, p. 10.

71 Throughout this period around 46 per cent of cadets were in their first year of service, 34 per cent in their second and 20 per cent in their third or fourth. Department of Defence, Standing Orders 1967, p. 9, & Department of Defence, Millar Report – Cadets, p. C-1.

229 Figure 8D - Impressions of Cadet Service, 1961

‘My first year of training in the cadets was relatively easy. We learnt the basic skills of parade ground drill and were taught the fundamentals of fieldcraft. Life as a cadet could produce problems, especially at camp, but even the spasmodic hardships seemed to teach us something new. We were always learning. This, I feel, was the reason why we enjoyed our recruit year so much. During the following year as a sergeant I began to see a wider picture of the operation at a platoon level. The effort required of CUOs and NCOs was evident. I finished my term in cadets as the RSM of the unit. I was, then, able to see the entire operation of the unit and its relationship with the battalion and brigade commands. Cadets is not a simple organisation and demands a lot of officers. The culmination of my career as a cadet, and it was to prove a fitting end, was the passing out parade. The spirit of the night clearly reflected the heart of the unit, and the talk by Mr. McCarthy showed us what the ANZACs faced and inspired us to dedication in the duties life may impose upon us... ’ - WO1 Michael Kelly

Source: Mortensen, K.G., An Australian Army Cadet Unit, p. 281.

Continuing the outward military orientation, in a notable divergence with earlier policy, from 1958 the army encouraged school cadet detachments to affiliate themselves with CMF units and as a result a range of new training opportunities were presented. Instructors ‘borrowed’ from the CMF were particularly helpful in raising and training specialist detachments and occasionally cadets were exposed to other than infantry-type activities through such relationships. For example, although not officially a sanctioned pursuit, in 1959 the unit from the Christian Brothers College, St Kilda, was able to train a 25 pounder field gun crew thanks to the volunteer efforts of CMF soldiers from the army’s 2nd Field Regiment.72 Affiliations also provided opportunities for cadets to attend activities designed to encourage them to join the adult forces.73 In 1960 ten cadets from The King’s School, Sydney, attended a CMF camp at Puckapunyal with adult members of 1/15th Royal NSW Lancers, while in Tasmania, in 1961, 34 Cadet Battalion participated in an exercise with the local CMF where it deployed to guard a fictional atomic weapon from attack by three adult infantry companies and a commando troop.74 Less spectacular but more typical of affiliated activities of the era was Adelaide High School’s despatch of 12 cadets to observe and take limited part in local CMF bivouacs and range shoots in 1970.75

72 Mortensen, An Australian Army Cadet Unit, p. 35. 73 Memo, 2 Cadet Brigade to Battalions (1960). CRS MT1131/1, Item A48/1/1167. 74 Department of Defence, Cadet Journal, No 11, 1960, pp. 14, 25 & 35. 75 ibid., No 12, 1961, pp. 42-51, & AHS, Magazine, 1970, p. 14.

230 With the same spirit of military influence over cadet activities the majority of service and miniature Empire shooting competitions continued to be promoted by ACC and army hierarchy from 1958-74. Two brief exceptions were the King George V Trophy and the Imperial Challenge Shield small-bore contests, suspended pending a revision of rules in 1971, and recommenced in July 1972 under the new name of the Ffennell Competitions.76 In addition to international contests the full range of brigade, battalion and regional shooting matches remained popular. Non-shooting competitions also became prevalent from 1959 when the cadet brigades began to organise inter- battalion military and athletic gymkhanas which included a range of military related activities including medical, mortar, Vickers Gun and Bren Gun skill contests.77

The system of cadet promotion and specialist courses persisted under post- Second World War military-oriented arrangements. The overwhelming majority of these activities were conducted by the cadet brigades although as army support fell to seriously low levels, particularly from 1965, school-based promotion courses were once again permitted in many of the larger units. Such cases, however, were generally restricted to courses qualifying JNCOs rather than SNCOs or CUOs.78 To illustrate the scale of army-run cadet promotion courses, taking the year 1958 as an example, in NSW alone a CUO course and two SNCO courses were held for 400 and 500 cadets respectively.79

The examples noted, however, were as far as the continuance of traditional army domination of cadet training went. In line with the newfound objectives of the movement, cadet activities increasingly sought to facilitate leadership and character building outcomes at the expense of purely military objectives and, as a rule, focused

76 In addition to the two main prizes (the King George Trophy and the Imperial Challenge Shield), the new contest included the Governor General’s Trophy awarded to the Australian team making the highest score irrespective of the class of weapon used. 77 An example of one such gymkhana, held by 14 Cadet Battalion in central NSW in 1968, saw five units from schools in Forbes, Cowra and West Wyalong come together to compete in activities ranging from rifle handling to tent pitching. Victorian gymkhanas at the time, along with standard military and athletic activities, also contained events like an ‘alarm race’ where cadets rushed to dress, assemble arms, and be inspected. Mortensen, An Australian Army Cadet Unit, p. 36; West Wyong High School, Magazine, 1968, p. 20, & Mentone Grammar School, Mentonian, 1959, p. 44. 78 In 1 Cadet Brigade JNCO training was made a unit responsibility from 1963 due to the shortage of army instructors. Brigade conducted JNCO courses in this era ran for three days while SNCO and CUO courses were of around ten. Department of Defence, Cadet Journal, No 14, 1963, p. 21, & Laffin, ‘Cadet Corps in Secondary Education’, p. 54. 79 Course Schedule Returns (all states) (1958). CRS MP927/1, Item A48/1/834.

231 upon field and tactical training as a means to achieve this end. Cadets left the classroom and parade square and went into the bush. In turn, such field training, again driven by a desire to develop positive personal attributes in cadets, set in motion a slow transition to what became known as ‘adventure training.’ One overt manifestation of this transformation was the disbanding of specialist machine gun and mortar sections from 1961 with a greater priority given to advanced infantry, medical and signals specialisations to ‘permit the maximum amount of adventure type training.’80 The shift in focus was well illustrated in 1973 by the cadet training handbook, which contained a new aim of providing cadets with ‘training in fields that would make them good future citizens’ where ‘there was to be less emphasis on drill and more emphasis given to orienteering, leadership, citizenship and self-reliance.’81

Cadet bivouacs became more common and assumed a greater level of importance from the mid-1960s primarily because, in an era of declining military support, they were most commonly unit-run affairs not reliant upon external army backing.82 Along with logistic expediency, the expanding role of unit bivouacs again reflected the changing focus of cadet training now aimed to develop positive character traits by exposing cadets to the rigours of the outdoors. Consequently, most bivouacs of the era became field-based and tactically oriented. Hutted accommodation was generally not used as it had been in the past, with detachments deploying into the bush as self-contained entities under combat training scenarios.83 By 1960, the Maryborough High School Cadet Unit in Queensland, for example, ran bivouacs that placed a special emphasis on patrolling, contact drills, camouflage, stalking, target detection and indication.84 So too, in South Australia weekend bivouacs for the Adelaide High School cadets in the late 1960s and early 1970s consisted of groups of first and second year cadets deploying on tactical patrolling operations complete with

80 Maryborough High School, The Palma, 1961, p. 39. 81 Geise, R.F., St Paul’s School Cadet Unit: Thirty Great Years 1972-2002, Colin A. Cunningham, Aspley, Queensland, 2002, p. 9. 82 Most units in the period conducted two bivouacs each year with the first usually a basic training activity for new cadets and the second used as preparation for the annual camp. Bivouacs reached new levels of complexity at the time as a Geelong Grammar School activity at Point Addis, Victoria, from 1-2 November 1959 attested. This exercise involved 140 cadets, CMF artillery soldiers, and Royal Australian Air Force aircraft with cadets planning and conducting a company attack on a CMF position supported by strafing sorties by three Vampire jet fighters. Department of Defence, Cadet Journal, No 10, 1959, pp. 43-44. 83 Mortensen, An Australian Army Cadet Unit, p. 148. 84 Maryborough High School, The Palma, 1961, p. 39.

232 enemy contacts, ambushing and other combat activities, against groups of third year cadets in Kuitpo forest.85

Although combined annual camps from 1958-74 maintained their post-war scale and centralisation, their style developed along similar lines to unit bivouacs. A parallel concentration on field training, carried out under simulated combat conditions for the purposes of character development, was clearly evident. Encouraged by the increasing unavailability of army facilities and logistic support, there was a move away from traditional permanent campsites, complete with messing and accommodation facilities, towards activities conducted solely in the field. Throughout this period camps tended to follow a pattern whereby first year cadets were given basic training in order that in their second and subsequent years they could participate in more complex activities and exercises like ‘Operation Contact’, run in the 1960s in NSW, which pitted cadet sections and platoons against each other in ‘advance to contact’ scenarios.86

The tactical nature of annual camp activities at this time was well illustrated by an exercise conducted by 3 Cadet Brigade in Victoria. ‘Operation Encounter’ tasked cadet platoons from various schools to patrol for 48 hours along a roughly circular route. Two platoons began at the same time in opposite directions and pairs were released 4-5 miles apart. This meant that cadets ‘contacted’ each other a number of times along the course. All conditions were in an absolute combat setting and platoons had army ‘umpires’ attached to determine the victor of each engagement.87 This style of camp was not limited to Victoria. In 1958 a Tasmanian cadet from Scotch College reflected that ‘battle training was the order of the day at Brighton this year for the annual cadet camp’ while in 1965 South Australian cadets conducted deliberate attacks on the fortified Cultana airstrip which had all the hallmarks, if not the efficiency of planning and execution, of ARA battalion level operations.88 The point remained, however, that such tactical training was designed to set conditions to

85 AHS, Magazine, 1970, p. 14. 86 Department of Defence, Cadet Journal, No 12, 1961, pp. 30-33. 87 Mortensen, An Australian Army Cadet Unit, p. 106. 88 Department of Defence, Cadet Journal, No 16, 1965, p. 16, & Scotch College (Tasmania), The Caledonian, 1958, p. 11 & 1964, p. 36.

233 facilitate character development rather than to teach combat skills as ends in themselves.

From the mid-1960s the army’s experiences in Vietnam began to shape the style of cadet annual camps and reinforced, to an even greater degree, the emphasis on combat-focused field training. Camp exercises were almost invariably set to fictional scenarios involving ‘guerrillas’ and platoon level patrols seeking to contact and destroy them. Fortified friendly cadet positions were harassed by an enemy who taunted the defenders, in the South Australian camp of 1966 at least, in a range of Asian dialects.89 At the annual NSW camp of 1968, a brigade activity, ‘Exercise Guerrilla’, consisted of section level patrols conducting search and destroy missions, occupations of a mock Viet Cong village complete with booby traps, and deliberate platoon attacks against a fictional Southeast Asian force.90 In Victoria, an ex-cadet of Scotch College recalled that

the last few years of my time in cadets were the late 1960s and Vietnam was in full swing. The exercises changed. We were dressed in black fatigues and had to defend an Asian style village against patrols using standard Australian formations from the time.91

Only in the early 1970s, in accordance with the declining popularity of the Vietnam War, did the focus on combat training begin to fade. The 1973 annual camp at Stony Head in Tasmania, for instance, culminated in a five-mile trek and navigation activity rather than in a mock battle while the NSW camp in Singleton in 1974 saw cadets participating in canoeing expeditions and obstacle course competitions instead of combat patrols.92 Even as tactical training lost popularity, however, the emphasis of living in the field as a means to promote positive character traits remained.

As a direct outcome of shifting ideas of purpose for the ACC, the most important and far-reaching development affecting all facets of cadet training emerged through the concept of ‘adventure training’. The idea was centred on the theory that placing boys in situations of physical adversity, mental hardship and perceived danger

89 AHS, Magazine, 1966, p. 14. 90 Young High School, Burrangong, 1968, p. 42. 91 Department of Defence, Cadet Journal, No 16, 1965, p. 33.

234 would cause leadership, self reliance, self esteem and other positive characteristics to blossom. Belief in this idea was encouraged in 1958 by an army directive ordering cadet training to be as ‘imaginative’ and ‘adventurous’ as possible.93 Subsequently, and in parallel with the evolution of bivouacs and camps, adventure training initially took the form of combat field activities thought to provide the ideal arduous environment required. Later, it lost the tactical setting although the emphasis on patrols and treks remained. It would be wrong, however, to suggest that the appearance and growing dominance of adventure training was smooth, rapid, universal or linear. In 1958, for example, in response to calls for less of a combat focus for the ACC, the Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Major General I.T. Murdoch, wrote that ‘it would be a retrograde step, as far as the Cadet Corps is concerned, to depart from the basic military system of training.’94 It is also true that throughout the period tactical activities were still the mainstay of cadet training. Indeed, the stated aim of weapon training in the Cadet Training Manual of 1961 was ‘to produce soldiers who can kill the enemy in battle with any platoon weapon.’95 To this end it remained incumbent upon officers to teach their cadets how to plan, conduct and execute military operations at the section and platoon level (Figure 8E illustrates the tactical lessons applicable to cadets in 1961). Nevertheless, adventure training did grow within and in parallel to military-oriented activities to become a key aspect of cadet training by 1974.

92 Scotch College (Tasmania), The Caledonian, 1973, p. 49, & West Wyalong High School, Magazine, 1975, p. 17. 93 Department of Defence, Cadet Journal, No 9, 1958, p. 15. 94 Minute, Deputy Chief of the General Staff to Minister’s Office (1958). CRS MP927/1, Item A48/1/864. 95 Department of Defence, Cadet Training, Vol 2, Government Printer, 1961, pp. 1 & 97.

235 Figure 8E - Tactical Lessons Included in Cadet Training Syllabus, 1961 Topic 1 Topic 2 Topic 3 Topic 4 Fieldcraft Section Leading, Ambushes, Map Reading Fire Control Patrols, Platoon Tactics • Visual Training • Platoon Organisation • Conventional Sign • Range Cards • Judging Distance 1 • Section Formations • Scales • Recognition of Targets • Judging Distance 2 • Scouts • Relief & Contours • Other Aids to Indication • Judging Distance • Fire & Movement • The Grid System • Fire Control Orders • Elementary Observation • Contact Drill • Setting a Map • Elementary Observation • Personal Camouflage • Ambushes • North Points & Bearings • Tactical Movement • The Section in Attack • The Prismatic Compass • Moving with the LMG • The Section in Defence • Night Marching • Night Movement • Patrols • The Compass • Sentry Duties at Night • Platoon Formations • The Service Protractor • Lines of Advance • Battle Procedures • Finding Map Positions • Day and Night Stalking • The Platoon in Battle • Military Symbols • Fieldcraft Exercises • The Platoon in Defence • Field Signals • Tips for Tactics Teachers

Source: Department of Defence, Cadet Training, Vol 2, Government Printer, 1961, p. 150.

The use of infantry combat scenarios in early interpretations of adventure training was recorded in 1959 by the Christian Brothers’ College (St Joseph’s) (Gregory Terrace) Cadet Unit when it wrote:

we expect an opportunity be given to each boy to develop initiative, self- reliance, discipline, leadership … initiative is fostered through patrols and platoon attacks; self-reliance through the tougher living conditions; discipline through team work.96

Similarly, escape and evasion exercises became an initial medium through which to conduct adventure training.97 One of the very first activities couched purely in terms of ‘adventure’ was ‘Exercise Lawesrun’ conducted by Queensland Agricultural High School cadets in 1959. The concept was a long trek through very difficulty country over three days with cadets moving in platoon-sized groups with little supervision and under extreme conditions close to the army’s Jungle Training Centre at Canungra.98

As the 1960s dawned embryonic versions of adventure training grew more common. The cadet unit commanders of 8 Cadet Battalion in NSW, were, for

96 Christian Brothers College (St Joseph’s), Terrace, 1960, p. 39. 97 Department of Defence, Cadet Journal, No 10, 1959, p. 35. 98 ibid., No 9, 1958, p. 18.

236 example, ‘encouraged to incorporate into their training activities schemes of a more adventurous nature’, while 9 Cadet Battalion in the same year called for ‘movement, adventure and machines’ to test ‘leadership, initiative and self-discipline.’ In response, the Armidale School Cadet Unit in NSW conducted a ‘long range patrol’ from Armidale to Grafton to test its ability to ‘move over long distances and rugged terrain’ listing ‘initiative and resourcefulness’ as objectives.99 Most units had accepted the role of adventure training by this time and activities were increasingly planned with initiative, teamwork, and developing individual responsibility as their primary goals, although such outcomes were most often still worked into traditional combat training scenarios. In Victoria in 1961, for example, Camberwell Grammar School cadets conducted ‘adventurous’ bivouacs consisting of deployment into the field for commando-style raids followed by difficult navigation and trekking to pick- up points.100

By 1962 momentum was gathering with the Directorate of Cadets making specific reference to ‘adventure type activities’ in its annual training directives. Such guidance culminated in activities like 4 Cadet Brigade’s ‘Operation Rough-stuff’ and 6 Cadet Brigade’s ‘Operation Overland.’ The former was an activity at Cape Jervis where units were invited to send teams of four cadets to operate as patrols on a difficult navigational task punctuated by tests designed to assess problems solving ability and physical fitness.101 Similarly, the Tasmanian activity saw a team of 6 officers of cadets and 36 cadets participate in a ‘long range patrol’ which was, in fact, a six-day trek from the Arve Valley to Port Davey through the rough and uninhabited south-west portion of Tasmania.102

99 Eight days, three hours and forty-five minutes after leaving Armidale the party reached its destination. ibid., No 11, 1960, pp. 6-16. 100 ibid., No 12, 1961, p. 37. 101 Members of the South Australian Police Cliff Rescue Team assisted the cadets as they ascended and descended cliffs and crossed tidal waters. 102 At this stage the growing influence of adventure training also began to shape the structure of some units. Haileybury College, Victoria, for example, responded by establishing an ‘independent’ section in 1962 with members sacrificing promotion and specialist training opportunities to concentrate on adventurous activities. In order to be admitted to the section candidates went to the school’s country property to complete a selection course based on that of the adult army’s ‘Commando’ companies which included a three mile jog, a man carry, a mile run, a ten mile forced march without water, a ten foot wall climb, a seven foot ditch jump and the negotiation of an assault course. The successful cadets then spent their time on climbing, unarmed combat, physical fitness and fieldwork at two and three day bivouacs. As the 1960s and 1970s progressed many other units followed suit with Brisbane Boys College, for example, raising an ‘Adventure Training Company’ in 1974. ibid., No 13, 1962, pp. 45, 51, 62-63, & Brisbane Boys College, The Portal, 1974, p. 68.

237 By 1966 a split between traditional cadet activities and adventure training had become clearly evident. It was formally codified on 31 July 1967 when Army Headquarters released an instruction to all units inaugurating the cadet Adventure Training Award designed to encourage cadets to display high levels of initiative, endurance and self-reliance. A badge was struck to be worn by those who qualified for the Award with cadets eligible to compete if they were in the second or subsequent years of training, were classified as efficient, and were nominated by their headmasters to undergo the prescribed tests.103 From its inception the popularity of the Adventure Training Award soared and its qualification badge rapidly developed into the most coveted insignia a cadet could earn.104

By the 1970s the army recognised the growing dominance of adventure training and formally accepted it into cadet standing orders. It was not, however, willing to completely abandon traditional military activities and found a compromise by maintaining that ‘the characteristics of an infantry fighting patrol provide an ideal basis for the development of this type of training.’105 Military authorities could not, however, hold back the tide of change and a useful indicator of the altered balance by 1972 was the fact that school units in Queensland were invited to send cadet detachments to Adventure Training Award courses at Shoalwater Bay, rather than attending their annual camps, which had previously been the high point of the cadet training year.106 In addition, in many units the primacy of adventure training was attributed as being the key factor responsible for cadet enthusiasm and retention. The principal of the Isis State High School, Queensland, reported in 1973 that adventure training had caused a ‘renewed interest’ in cadets within his school.107 In the context of growing post-Vietnam anti-military sentiment in the community there is evidence

103 To be eligible a candidate was required to participate in a ‘test exercise.’ The activity was to be at least two days long and conducted in challenging terrain in teams of no less than three cadets. The exercise was to ensure a cadet could plan and carry out a task, work alone and in a team, maintain personal and equipment health, navigate, and keep a journal of activity. With the test exercise complete, an aspirant was then required to achieve a 75 per cent score in a specialised gallery, sneaker range or snap shooting practice. Finally the candidate was required to complete a confidence course consisting of a series of natural and artificial obstacles under a specified time. Army Cadet Adventure Training Award Instruction (1967). CRS J2810, R133/4/1. 104 The original Adventure Training Award badge was a 2½ centimetre gilded metal brooch depicting the torch of learning centrally placed behind a boomerang upon which ‘Adventure’ was written. It was worn above the left breast pocket. Geise, St Paul’s School Cadet Unit, p. 16. 105 Department of Defence, Standing Orders 1967, pp. 9-10. 106 1 Cadet Brigade Annual Camp Report (1972). CRS J2810, Item R133/4/1A, & Maryborough High School, The Palma, 1972, p. 15.

238 to suggest that at this time many detachments were focusing all of their energies in this direction. In 1973 Ballarat College described its unit as ‘run more along Outward Bound lines’, while at the same time the unit at Christian Brothers’ College, Kalgoorlie, recorded that ‘the program will be very different from the parades experienced in past years; drill will be reduced to a minimum and will be replaced by adventure training, first aid, radio and signals, bush safety.’108 By 1974 the transformation was complete and adventure training ‘in its many aspects and with its many skills’ had become the most important aspect of cadet training.109 Along with bivouac and camp developments its rise to ascendancy was a clear manifestation of social and educational prerogatives over traditional military objectives.

Between 1958-74 sustained military, political and community support encouraged the ACC to reach its pinnacle of achievement in 1966, with over 42,000 members, before changing public attitudes, school/military friction, and an overstretched army caused some falling away up to 1974. Throughout the period educational considerations and social expectations shaped the purpose of the movement more towards that of a youth development program and away from that of an essentially military institution. Consequently, to achieve these changing objectives cadet training transitioned first to a field focus using combat scenarios and then towards adventure training without the need for tactical settings. Thus, the relative influence of the four foundation forces of the cadet movement shifted appreciably in this period. Financial and social support rose and fell while the military/educational balance moved towards the latter. Under such conditions, although not immediately obvious at the time, the future of the movement hung in the balance as 1975 approached.

107 Bundaberg News-Mail, 25 September 1973. 108 Ballarat College, The Minervan, 1973, p. 36, & Department of Defence, Annual Report 1973. CBA HSP0000136/01, Item: Senior School Speech Annual Report 1976; Junior School Annual Report 1975; Modifications to 1975 Report Possibly for 1976; Annual Report 1973 and 1972; Junior School Report 1971. 109 Department of Defence, Millar Report – Cadets, p. 14.

239 Correct as at: 17 Feb 06

Word Count: 9,034 / 9,986 CHAPTER NINE

Death & Rebirth 1975 – 1982

This chapter is presented in two halves. The first is focused on the Whitlam Labor government’s pivotal decision, announced to the House of Representatives on 26 August 1975, to dismantle the ACC and bring an end to the cadet movement in Australia. The issues behind this decision, including the impact of a key Committee of Inquiry into the CMF and the army’s response to its recommendations concerning cadets, are analysed prior to a study of political, community, school and unit reactions to it. The second half of the chapter deals with the reprieve granted the movement by a change of government in December 1975 and its rebirth as a substantially transfigured organisation. An examination of the essential elements of the new cadet system characterised by an ever-changing purpose, fundamentally altered organisational and administrative structure, and drastically reduced military support follows. The chapter concludes with an assessment of the net effect of such turbulence in terms of fluctuating numbers and training-related developments.

To all outward appearances in early 1975 the ACC was a stable and relatively healthy organisation. It certainly faced a number of challenges, not least of which were declining numbers, but it had endured more difficult circumstances in years past and had managed to survive. The movement still boasted around 30,000 members (6½ per cent of all eligible boys) in 312 units.1 In this context it came as somewhat of a surprise to many observers, including those within the cadet organisation, when the Labor Minister for Defence, W.L. Morrison, announced the ACC was to be disbanded from 1 January 1976.2 After 110 years of continuous tradition the government resolved that the demise of the cadet movement was at hand. Clearly, as unexpected as it may have been in many quarters, this decision was not taken on a whim, and in order to understand it properly a number of factors require investigation. The first concerned a Committee of Inquiry into the CMF.

1 Laffin, ‘Cadet Corps in Secondary Education’, p. 22. 2 W.L. Morrison replaced L.H. Barnard as Minister for Defence on 6 June 1975. Morrison, W.L., CPD, Vol 96, 26 August 1975, pp. 483-4.

240 The Committee of Inquiry into the CMF was appointed by Morrison’s predecessor, L.H. Barnard, in April 1973. Its purpose was to report and recommend on the role, structure, strength, geographic organisation, conditions of service and training of the part-time army. Soon afterwards, in a letter dated 28 May 1973, Barnard requested the Chairman of the Committee, T.B Millar, undertake in conjunction with the CMF inquiry ‘a full examination of the usefulness and cost of the Australian (Army) Cadet Corps, and form an opinion as to whether the continued maintenance of the school cadet system is justified.’3 Accordingly, Millar sought submissions from the public on the issue and received several hundred replies. Committee members visited schools and units, talked to headmasters, officers of cadets, parents, and members of the army involved with the ACC. A public opinion survey was also conducted regarding army cadets and comparisons were made with their naval and air force counterparts. Millar’s final report was submitted to Morrison on 27 June 1974.

From the outset the Committee recognised that, despite its army framework, the cadet movement rested equally on educational and social foundations. It was duly aware of the danger of examining the scheme without proper acknowledgement of this fact in that its ‘role is much more diffuse [than the CMF], the standards and value of training vary widely, and the value of the system is very much a matter of subjective judgement.’4 Nonetheless, it was confounded by narrow terms of reference that demanded an isolated assessment of the military value of the organisation.5 Consequently, in purely military terms, the Committee ran on the assumption that any youth trained in weapon handling, navigation and fieldcraft added to the nation’s stock of martial expertise and focused its attention, henceforth, on questioning whether close to $10 million spent on the ACC annually was justified in a wider defence context. With this in mind the Committee was forced to conclude that after several years of training ‘the level of achievement reached at the end of their cadet experience is about the standard reached in 2-3 weeks of full-time training in the

3 Dr T.B. Millar was the Director of the Australian Institute for International Affairs at the ANU. The other members of the Committee were Major General D.B. Dunstan, the General Officer Commanding Field Force Command, Major General K.D. Green, the Secretary of the Victorian Department of the Premier, W.A. Jarvis, a Senior Lecturer in Behavioural Science at UNSW, J.G. O’Loghlin, a consultant, and Colonel L.A. Simpson, who was a town planner in Hobart. Department of Defence, Millar Report – Cadets, p. 1. 4 ibid., p. 1.

241 regular army recruit training system’, concluding that ‘the military value of cadets is small and does not itself justify the present annual allocation of funds and regular army manpower.’6 Reinforcing this deduction were criticisms of the way the scheme was operating, including a ‘number of cadet units in poor shape, with very low standards of training and little school interest.’7 Although there were ‘good units, well run, with enthusiastic officers and cadets proud of their standards’ they were balanced by others whose unit administration left ‘much to be desired’ and whose training was ‘patchy and limited.’ Insufficient army support was identified as a systemic problem and, importantly, the Committee found that cadets ‘have never had a high priority in the allocation of regular army manpower or equipment’ and that there was ‘a widespread feeling that the army has tended to send to cadets some of its least effective personnel.’8 Cornered by narrow ministerial direction and devoid of wider context, such conclusions were damaging.

On a more positive note, Millar’s committee upheld the enduring belief that cadet service made boys more interested in full-time or part-time military careers. The 1973 CMF census had found that a third of the force were ex-cadets and of these 56 per cent claimed that their cadet experiences had influenced them to join while 71 per cent maintained that cadet training had helped them within the adult force. Similarly, at the Royal Military College, Duntroon, more than 50 per cent of regular army officer candidates in 1974 were former cadets and 36 per cent of these indicated that ACC service had influenced their career choice.9 The Committee accepted and emphasised the military importance of the ACC in terms of recruitment.

Despite the preponderance of pessimistic observations with regard to the military usefulness of the ACC, the Committee, again recognising the complex nature of the organisation where the Minister had not, was wary of providing an overly simplistic conclusion and warned Barnard that

5 ibid. 6 ibid., p. 9. 7 ibid., p. 22. 8 ibid., pp. 7 & 21. 9 At the Officer Cadet School, Portsea, over 50 per cent of trainees were ex-cadets and 41 per cent of these felt that their school service had influenced them to join. ibid., p. 9-10.

242 there is no simple answer to the Minister’s question as to whether maintenance of the present system is justified … school cadets must be considered not only in their own right but in the context of … national thinking about defence, education and recreation.10

It was subsequently in the area of social education that the Committee felt able to support the ACC as possessing ‘a value beyond the military aspects’ and, as many boys joined because of the military character of the organisation, such advantages could ‘not be obtained or obtainable in any other way.’11 Youth development outcomes were dependent on there being an army cadet system in the first place. The Committee mapped the character building features of the scheme to include discipline, leadership, initiative, teamwork, cross-class comradeship, loyalty, self- reliance, self-discipline and physical fitness. In addition, it saw the organisation as providing non-academically or sporting oriented youths an ‘opportunity to shine’ and valued its emphasis on outdoor activities in exposing metropolitan boys to the country. Finally, it considered the movement to have a wider social function in providing clothing and ‘wholesome meals’, giving the taste of independence to boys from sheltered homes, and, through exposure to the army, helping to ‘counter uninformed criticism of military service.’12 In making these points the Committee pointed to strong community support for the extant system as evidenced by hundreds of submissions from parents, teachers and boys involved with the ACC. 13

In a dangerously contradictory manner, the Committee’s final recommendations, like its general observations, both supported and undermined the movement. On the one hand, given the weaknesses identified, it advocated sweeping changes and that units with ‘very low standards of training and little school interest … should be either rapidly improved or disbanded.’ It warned that without such reforms the ACC would become ‘increasingly anachronistic, unacceptable and irrelevant.’14 At the same time, however, it praised the direction in which the organisation seemed to be headed and encouraged continuing marginalisation of ‘old-style military

10 ibid., p. 4. 11 ibid., p. 11. 12 ibid., p. 16. 13 The Committee found that 76 per cent of its survey respondents supported cadet training for boys at schools. ibid., pp. 19-20. 14 Recommended reforms included the grouping of cadets in nearby schools for training, the revision of administrative procedures, a greater level of training for officers of cadets, a bridging of the gap

243 practices’ as ‘cadets [were] not a military activity for young people but a youth activity with a military flavour.’15 In the end it was the Committee’s belief in the youth training opportunities the ACC provided that prompted a unanimous conclusion that ‘there is justification for retaining the school cadets’ and a recommendation that ‘the present army cadet system be retained, with modifications, on a totally voluntary basis in peace time.’16 In this way the preponderance of criticism in the body of Millar’s report was countered by recommendations in support of the ACC’s continuance. Unfortunately, such contradictions left the Committee’s findings open for interpretation and exploitation by stakeholders able to quote the report to support extreme positions either for or against the organisation. Indeed, according to some observers it was ‘inevitable that the indecisive report of the Committee, with its many damaging generalisations, would prove the basis of an adverse decision by the Labor government.’17

The army’s formal response to Millar’s report was tabled in September 1974. It revealed a grave deterioration in military commitment to the movement and indicated a preparedness, if not an eagerness, to see the ACC dismantled. The army seized upon Millar’s conclusions concerning the negligible military value of the organisation as its rationale. It remarked that that the ‘total burden imposed on the army’s resources is becoming more sharply felt in the present climate of financial and manpower restraint.’18 Money was, indeed, the crux of the matter. The army supported the concept of youth development but with limited funds it did not see that it should have to pay for it. This did not mean that the military placed no value in the ACC at the time, rather that senior officers concluded that the resources consumed by cadets would be better spent elsewhere. Inadequacy of general military finance determined the army’s attitude and in this context it is difficult to question the Military Board’s conclusion that ‘the cost and effectiveness of cadet training cannot be justified from the viewpoint of its contribution to the defence of Australia.’19 The ACC was a heavy burden at a time when the army could ill afford it (Table 9A shows

between the ACC and the community, and the greater use of CMF officers, NCOs and qualified civilians. ibid., pp. 12-14 & 23-25. 15 ibid., p. 24. 16 ibid., pp. 21 & 25, & Letter, Sir Donald Dunstan to Author, dated 30 April 2005. 17 Mortensen, An Australian Army Cadet Unit, p. 342. 18 Report, Army Response to the Millar Report (Cadets) (1975). Defence Archives File 74/4/10. 19 ibid.

244 the regular staff permanently allocated to the ACC in 1974 representing an expenditure of 15,000 man-days per annum).20

Table 9A - ARA Manpower Allocation to the ACC, 1974 Brigade 1 2 3 4 5 6 Directorate TOTAL Rank of Cadets colonel 1 1 lieutenant colonel 1 1 1 3 major 6 10 5 1 1 1 1 25 captain 2 4 1 2 3 2 14 lieutenant 5 9 4 18 WO1 5 10 5 2 1 3 26 WO2 27 56 31 10 14 10 148 staff sergeant 1 1 1 3 3 1 10 sergeant 9 18 9 3 2 2 43 corporal 5 2 1 5 3 16 private 5 10 4 1 3 2 25 civilians 6 11 5 9 2 2 1 36 TOTAL 72 132 67 31 34 26 3 365

Source: Department of Defence, Millar Report – Cadets, Annex D.

The army’s ‘treachery’ did not end with its formal response to Millar’s report. Rather, under continuing financial pressure, senior military figures hardened their stance. In early 1975 the army’s budget was $500,000 overdrawn in terms of its travel and subsistence vote alone and, as a result, a series of general restrictions were put in place with respect to leave, postings, exercises, schools, training, and overseas activities. At the same time the ACC was costing $9.2 million per annum excluding capital costs for weapons, buildings or military facilities used at annual camps.21 In this context Lieutenant General F.G. Hassett, the CGS, wrote to the Chiefs of Staff Committee on 12 June 1975, before Morrison had made his announcement, informing it that he ‘strongly recommend[ed] that the Australian Cadet Corps be abolished at the earliest available opportunity.’22 Perhaps in preparation for what was becoming an increasingly obvious outcome Hassett also briefed Major General B.A. McDonald, the

20 Department of Defence, Millar Report – Cadets, p. 10. 21 ibid., Annex E. 22 Hassett had certainly changed his tune since 1968 when, as the General Officer Commanding Northern Command, he told a cadet parade at Rockhampton that investment in cadets was ‘money well spent’ and that their training ‘would be of great value should a situation develop in which they might be required to defend their country.’ Minute, Chief of the General Staff to Chiefs of Staff Committee, dated 12 June 1975. Defence Archives File 74/4/10, & Rockhampton Morning Bulletin, 30 September, 1968.

245 Chief of the Army Reserve, that cadet activities did not necessarily have to be done ‘within a military framework.’23 The army’s position was clear.

A final indicator of the army’s desire to be rid of its cadets was its single and rather token effort to address Millar’s criticisms in a study commissioned in July 1974. The only solution the army could find to rectify the identified shortcomings was to radically redefine the whole organisation. The study proposed an ‘Australian Army Cadet Training Scheme’ involving the abolition of all cadet units to be replaced by army-run cadet courses, conducted at regional training centres, to which any school could send its students.24 Needless to say this idea was never going to be supported by the military hierarchy but nor was that the intention. With the subsequent and inevitable dismissal of the only proposed solution to Millar’s criticisms, senior army staff were free to encourage the government to execute their preferred path of action in disbanding the cadet system. After years of struggling to support the ACC, and in an environment of tightening defence expenditure, the army’s actions should not have been the surprise and shocking betrayal felt by the majority of cadet advocates at the time. One pillar of the movement undermined another as limited finance encouraged military abandonment.

The Labor government had toyed with the idea of disposing of the ACC well before Millar’s report was submitted. As early as 5 July 1973, W.H. Hartley, of the Victorian branch of the Labor Party moved a successful motion, later approved by the Federal Executive, opposing all forms of military training in schools.25 While this motion had no immediate effect it revealed an important aspect of Labor thinking with respect to the cadet system well before Millar’s Committee was formed. Socialist elements of the Party were cognisant of the perceived elitism of the movement, and the middle-class and private school bias it was accused of fostering given that all the money invested in it was spent on only 6 per cent of boys in only 16 per cent of

23 Minute, Chief of the General Staff to Chief of Army Reserve, dated June 1975. Defence Archives File 74/4/10. 24 Under this scheme there would be no standing cadet detachments at all. Instead, the military would run cadet-like activities open to all comers. Rather than regular army cadres going to schools to train cadets, the cadets would come to them. No uniform or weapons would be needed at schools as home training would never occur. Brief, Army Headquarters (internal) (1975). Defence Archives File 74/4/10. 25 Sun, 6 July, 1973.

246 schools.26 In addition, Labor was conscious of growing criticisms concerning the propagation of militarism in schools. Australian society was deeply affected by the social ramifications of the anti-war movement surrounding Vietnam, and growing numbers began to question the place of a military organisation situated within the education system.27 Notable among these was R.B. Healy, a Christian Brothers’ teacher, who was concerned that the movement was sowing the idea that force was the ultimate sanction in human affairs and guilty of creating hate for potential ‘enemies.’ He believed supporting the ACC was contrary to the pronouncements of the Pope concerning world peace and went as far as querying the motivation of officers of cadets who desired to ‘prove themselves in mimic warfare, being precluded by their lack of calling from joining the real thing.’28 Nor could the government have been deaf to religious organisations like the Catholic National Commission for Justice and Peace which wrote in early 1974 that ‘since military training is the business of the army and not that of the church, schools … should reject the concept that training students in the military arts is laudable ... cadet corps in such schools should be abolished.’29 Finally, at the same time that Millar’s report was submitted the federal Minister for Tourism and Recreation, F.E. Stewart, made clear that he did not support cadets as a youth training scheme and the Minister for Education, K.E. Beazley, advised the government that if the ACC did not exist he would not favour its introduction on educational grounds.30 In the context of such multi-faceted pressure it was convenient for the government, as it had been for the army, to ignore the holistic recommendations of Millar’s report and make use of selections that dealt with the direct military value of the ACC to justify its decision to dismantle the organisation.31

26 Report, Army Response to the Millar Report (Cadets) (1975). Defence Archives File 74/4/10. 27 Public Questions Committee, Report on Cadet Units in Church Schools, Presbyterian Church of Queensland, November 1972, p. 3. 28 Healy, R.B., ‘Peace Movements and Cadet Training’, in Christian Brothers: Our Studies, Vol 42, No 2, September 1969, pp 54-58. 29 Knight, P., ‘The Cadet Controversy’, in Catholic Weekly, 29 May 1975, p. 16. The attitude of many religious groups was that the appearance of encouraging militarism, and the wearing of a military uniform, meant supporting an attitude towards life which ‘large sections of the Church was no longer enthusiastic about.’ Mortensen, An Australian Army Cadet Unit, p. 347. 30 Correspondence (various), Minister’s Office to Army Headquarters (1975). Defence Archives File 74/4/10. 31 An inter-departmental committee, established in June 1975, to suggest what action the government should take with respect to the ACC criticised Millar’s conclusion that the scheme be retained in view of comments concerning its cost-ineffectiveness. It concluded that, in the face of keen competition for available resources, the government could no longer justify expenditure on cadets. The money was said to be needed ‘for much higher priorities by the Defence Force Development Committee.’ Correspondence (various), Inter-departmental Committee on the ACC (1975). Defence Archives File 74/4/10.

247 As the fate of the ACC grew increasingly obvious Millar became frustrated at the deliberate misinterpretation of his report. He was ‘very concerned that the government should take out random, half-sentences to justify its decisions’, a viewpoint remembered by the senior military member of the Committee, Major General D.B. Dunstan, as being shared by all Committee members at the time.32 Nonetheless, that was exactly what Morrison did when he announced that

I fully appreciate that the abolition of school cadets … will come as a disappointment … However ... we need to protect our national interests by ensuring that Defence resources are not used for activities that do not contribute to our defence capabilities.33

Nor was the government above using the army to lend credibility to its decision. The Minister was keen to point out in Parliament that ‘the Military Board has advised me that the cost and effectiveness of cadet training cannot be justified from the viewpoint of its contribution to the defence of Australia.’34 In any case the decision was made and the deed was done. Growing weakness in the four pillars of the cadet movement had facilitated the Labor government’s move. Fractures in social commitment and minor educational angst encouraged an anti-cadet agenda, while the desertion of the army, motivated by serious financial pressure, helped legitimise the decision. With the announcement made senior military and political figures braced themselves for political, public, school and unit reactions.

First, in a key political response, on 1 October 1975 the Liberal/Country Party opposition, through the Shadow Minister for Defence, D.J. Killen, announced that if elected the coalition would restore the ACC. Killen was supported by the leader of the Country Party, J.D. Anthony (a former King’s School student), who told the House of Representatives that the disbandment of the cadet system was a grave mistake that would have significant consequences.35 Such moves were to be expected, for in addition to a heritage of conservative political commitment to the movement, it had been coalition policy to support the ACC since the first indications of Labor’s intentions had surfaced. As early as May 1975 Killen wrote that ‘in general terms, the

32 Australian, 31 October 1975, & Letter, Sir Donald Dunstan to Author, dated 30 April 2005. 33 Ministerial Press Release (1975). Defence Archives File 74/4/10. 34 Morrison, W.L., CPD, Vol 96, 26 August 1975, pp. 483-4. 35 Killen, D.J., CPD, Vol 96, 1 October 1975, pp. 1499-1506.

248 Liberal Party seeks to encourage the Cadet Corps activity as we believe that the enthusiasm of young boys should be respected and used.’36

As was anticipated by the army and the government, in the context of a Roy Morgan Research Centre poll of 1974 indicating that 76 per cent of people supported cadet training, public reactions to Morrison’s announcement were heated.37 The Labor Party, it seemed, had over-estimated the true level of social and educational discord with respect to the ACC. Even before the announcement Major General W.G. Henderson, the General Officer Commanding Training Command, complained to Army Headquarters on 6 August 1975 that press coverage concerning the possible disbandment of cadets was causing ‘constant telephone calls.’38 In reply Major General B.A. McDonald, Chief of the Army Reserve, acknowledged that there was ‘a growing disquiet among those people in the community who are concerned with cadets.’39 Even the Military Board warned that ‘many schools have great pride in their cadet units and can be expected to oppose any suggestion that the units be disbanded.’ The Board’s assumption was correct and on the day of Morrison’s announcement Beazley, the Minister for Education, accepted a petition signed by 41,000 people calling for the retention of the ACC.40 Regional Australia was particularly vocal with the Maryborough Chronicle blaming ‘the left wing of the ALP organisation’ for the decision. The paper asked ‘where else is there 33,000 young Australians prepared to give of their free time to learn not only military skills but also to absorb discipline in a society sadly lacking it?’41 Similarly, the pages of Reveille, the journal of the RSL, were full of support for the cadet organisation and highly critical of the government’s action.

So too government miscalculation of the real level of educational antipathy for cadet training, perhaps inspired by a vocal minority represented by Healy, was revealed by school reactions upon learning the fate of their cadet units. Most became vocal critics of the government’s policy and, predictably, it was the private sector that

36 Laffin, ‘Cadet Corps in Secondary Education’, p. 2. 37 ibid., p. 7. 38 Minute, General Officer Commanding Training Command to Army Headquarters, dated 6 August 1975. Defence Archives File 74/4/10. 39 Minute, OCARES to General Officer Commanding Training Command, dated 10 August 1975. Defence Archives, File 74/4/10. 40 Beazley, K.E., CPD, Vol 96, 26 August 1975, p. 481.

249 rallied most enthusiastically behind the cadet cause. Immediately, more than 90 private school headmasters attending the 18th Headmasters’ Conference of Independent Schools in Perth sent telegrams to government and opposition members in protest.42 Similarly, a resolution was adopted by the Presbyterian and Methodist Schools’ Association in September 1975 that read

this council, in noting the decision to terminate the system of cadets in schools, urges the Australian government to … continue the benefits of cadets, such as teamwork, growth towards maturity, mastery of physical skills, character building and leadership.43

Comparable feelings were replicated in schools across the country. The Christian Brothers College (St Joseph’s), Gregory Terrace, Brisbane, for example, lamented the demise of the ACC calling it a ‘retrograde step’ while Sydney Grammar was ‘bewildered at the Labor Party’s decision to abolish cadets.’44

Individual cadet units reacted to the government’s announcement in a variety of ways. Many were immediately disbanded while others hung in a state of limbo. A number continued independently without army or government support and often in innovative directions. Of the latter, notable examples were Belmont Senior High School’s St John’s Ambulance Unit in NSW, Mudgee High School’s Civil Defence Training Unit and Southport College’s State Emergency Services (SES) Unit in Queensland. Unfortunately, among those detachments which chose to fold were some of the longest serving units, including that at Ballarat College, one of the oldest in Victoria. In this case the headmaster registered his regret at the ‘lack of enthusiasm displayed by the Australian government for such activities’ and opted to place more school emphasis on outdoor education schemes to ‘partly fill the gap left by cadets.’45 Similarly, the Prince Alfred College detachment, an original South Australian unit, disbanded with ‘regret at the way the government has removed support for the cadet

41 Maryborough Chronicle, 27 August 1975. 42 Laffin, ‘Cadet Corps in Secondary Education’, p. 2. 43 Quirke, Gentlemen of Honour, p. 278. 44 The cadet question was one of a number of points of friction between the Labour movement and ‘elite’ private schools at the time. A second concerned declining levels of government financial assistance. Christian Brothers College (St Joseph’s), Terrace, 1975, pp. 74-75, & Sydney Grammar School, The Sydneian, 1975, p. 133. 45 Ballarat College, The Minervan, 1973, p. 7.

250 corps.’46 In NSW units that were unwilling to disband formed a ‘Brigade of Cadets’, with the moral backing of the Liberal/Country Party state government, which assumed control of 6,000 cadets from 35 units across the state.47 The Brigade strongly criticised the advice proffered by the army to the government to abolish the ACC, deplored the fact that the decision was taken without consultation with any school body, and encouraged protest by all and sundry to newspapers, parliamentarians and any other relevant party.48 Although the Brigade of Cadets was not replicated in the other states, many units from around the country chose to soldier on despite the government’s announcement.49

Unexpectedly, the government’s commitment to terminate the ACC from 1 January 1976 did not spell the end of the cadet movement. Such a fate was avoided by stroke of the Vice Regal pen on 11 November 1975 when the Governor General, Sir John Kerr, dismissed Prime Minister Gough Whitlam in the first and only action of its kind in Australian political history. Although in all likelihood unaware of it at the time, in doing so the Queen’s representative saved the cadet movement, for after the subsequent federal elections the Liberal/Country coalition assumed power with 91 of the 127 seats in the House of Representatives. All that remained was for the new Prime Minister, Malcolm Fraser, and his Minister for Defence, Killen, to honour their pre-election commitment to restore the ACC. Whitlam’s famous demise had given the cadet movement an unanticipated reprieve.

No era of cadet history better illustrated the ideological gulf between Liberal/Country Party conservatives and Labor Party policy makers, with regard to the cadet movement, than the period 1975-82. After twenty-three years in opposition Labor’s comprehensive agenda of social reform included the dismantling of a cadet

46 Prince Alfred College, Chronicle, 1976, p. 9. 47 The NSW Minister for Sport and Recreation, L.J.F. Barraclough, addressing a meeting of officers of cadets at Scots College on 23 September 1975, announced that ‘the NSW government deplores the abolition of the school cadet corps.’ The resolutions of the inaugural meeting of the NSW Brigade of Cadets included the formation of an executive including a commander, three deputy commanders (one each representing state schools, independent private schools and Catholic schools), one full-time Adjutant/Quartermaster, and a number of sub-committees. The meeting also undertook to organise and conduct an annual cadet camp and promotion courses in November and December 1975 should the army decide not to run them. Laffin, ‘Cadet Corps in Secondary Education’, p. 3. 48 Resolutions of the Inaugural Meeting of the Brigade of Cadets. Laffin, ‘Cadet Corps in Secondary Education’, Appendix 1, p. 3. 49 Christ Church Grammar School, The Mitre, 1975, p. 42.

251 system that had, in general terms, flourished under consecutive conservative ministries from 1950. Without underestimating the influence of military, financial, educational and social factors that were used to justify Labor’s position, these had not changed dramatically from conditions in place in 1974. Nor were they substantially improved by 1976 when the new Fraser government committed itself to reviving the scheme. Labor’s actions must, therefore, be understood in terms of ideological differences. This period, better than most, accentuated the longstanding link between the federal political environment and the fortunes of the cadet movement.

After the election instructions were sent immediately to all cadet units to cease disbandment pending a clarification of policy regarding the restoration of the cadet system. In mid-January 1976 the Minister for Defence, Killen, instructed his department to draw up proposals for a new scheme with consideration of the multitude of letters and submissions previously received concerning the ACC, and with Millar’s 1974 recommendations in mind. With little enthusiasm for the task it took more than five months for the Department of Defence to overcome its bureaucratic inertia and execute the Minister’s directive. A new system of defence force cadets, providing for individual army, navy and air force components, was finally announced by the Minister in Parliament on 27 May 1976. The new organisation was christened the Australian Services Cadet Scheme (ASCS). Killen went on, however, to forestall any hopes of rapid action in declaring that the ASCS and its army component, still known as the ACC, would be operational from 1 October 1976; almost ten months after the government came to power.

It was in this interim period, from December 1975 to October 1976, that the seeds of future difficulties were planted for the army component of the re-styled ASCS. First, the Minister described three factors as instrumental in shaping the new scheme: an obligation to use cadet training to inculcate ‘leadership, discipline, self- reliance and loyalty’; a desire ‘to see a greater involvement by schools and the community generally in cadet training’; and lastly ‘one of cost.’50 As the remainder of this chapter illustrates, these three issues representing the purpose, military commitment, and financial restrictions affecting the new scheme, proved its three

50 Killen, D.J., CPD, Vol 99, 27 May 1976, pp. 2540-2545.

252 greatest impediments. Second, the ten month wait before the implementation of the ASCS did not assist cadet retention. On 28 May 1976, the Chief of the Army Reserve, Major General R.L. Hughes, wrote to all schools that had previously supported ACC units asking whether they wished to re-raise them under the new scheme.51 He did not get the joyous response that was anticipated, for the slow pace of political and departmental action had caused significant attrition with less than a third of all previously existing army cadet units still in operation in June 1976. Last, although Killen described the new ACC as retaining ‘the school as the basis on which cadet units will be formed’, at the same time he laid the foundations for a potential weakening of the educational basis of the movement in his support for the concept of ‘open units’. For the ACC such detachments were, in a disturbing echo of previous Regimental Cadet experiments, to be situated outside schools in Army Reserve depots and were to draw membership from the general community.52 In any case, with no practical army support forthcoming until the first school term of 1977, surviving units were forced to function independently as the wheels of military bureaucracy slowly began to turn.

As far as cadet activities during this interim period were concerned, many units, like that at the Shore School, Sydney, operated with ‘a belief in the educational value of cadet training’ and continued with traditional programs of drill, camps and bushcraft activities without army weapons or equipment.53 Rockhampton Grammar School described 1976 as a ‘holding operation as far as cadets were concerned.’54 At other schools training continued to branch out in new and novel directions, such as Bundaberg State High School’s maintenance of a motorcycle club within its unit.55 Similarly, in the absence of military guidance, cadets at Maryborough High School reoriented their training to ‘develop more self-reliance in the individual’ and as such initiated flotation exercises, survival in the bush courses, camping, pioneering and other non-military oriented outdoor training.56

51 Letter, Hughes to Schools (43/1976), dated 28 May 1976. CBA HSP0000136/02, Item: Service Cadets. Correspondence on Re-introduction of Service Cadets in 1976 and CBC Kalgoorlie’s Reply on Unable to Make Commitment to Continue the Cadet Movement. 52 Memo, Minister for the Army to Chief of the General Staff (1976). Defence Archives File 98/6065. 53 Shore, The Torchbearer, 1989, p. 131. 54 Rockhampton Grammar School, Capricornus, 1976, p. 66. 55 Bundaberg News-Mail, 9 July 1975.

253 Once the new ACC was eventually running in early 1977 it was with a significantly altered sense of purpose. The disbandment and subsequent re-raising of the organisation provided the opportunity to cement a trend that had become widespread before 1975. The re-styled organisation lost all but the most tenuous links with its traditional military objectives and became a scheme whose aims revolved fundamentally around youth development. In June 1976, six months before the new system was fully underway, Killen, in commenting on the objectives of the cadet movement, made no mention of a military role in that ‘cadet training engenders many valuable qualities in young people. It fosters initiative, leadership, self-discipline, comradeship and loyalty; all qualities that we should try to develop in young people.’57 Indeed, the minutes of a cadet conference, held in June 1976 revealed a similar change in military attitudes in that ‘units belong to the school not the army.’58 The only manner in which the military officially expressed any aspirations for the post-1976 ACC was through tenuously implied recruiting benefits in attempting to

provide a foundation of military knowledge and discipline; to develop the qualities of leadership, self reliance and initiative; to develop an interest in the army and its traditions; and, to encourage cadets to continue some form of military service.59

The non-military emphasis of the contemporary cadet scheme was strongly propagated by schools. The principal of James Ruse Agricultural High School in NSW provided insight into school expectations of cadets at this time when he described his unit as providing the opportunity for ‘leadership, the development of self-discipline and for bringing the adolescent into the world of the full-grown man.’60 Across the board teamwork, leadership, and self-reliance themes were regularly stressed. The Armidale School unit, in New England, described its aims in 1979 as ‘to offer the opportunity for the growth of both independence and interdependence … to provide opportunities of real leadership.’61 Perhaps the St Patrick’s Christian Brothers’ College, Mackay, best captured educational attitudes to the movement by

56 Maryborough High School, The Palma, 1976, p. 21. 57 Defence Press Release Number 9 of 1976, dated 15 January 1976. CGSA C9 (Cadets Box 1), Item: Records of the Past. 58 Minutes (fragmented), HQTC-A Cadet Conference, dated 10-11 June 1976. CGSA C9 (Cadets Box 1), Item: General. 59 Department of Defence, Australian Cadet Corps Standing Orders 1980 (Standing Orders 1980), Government Printer, 1980, p. 2-1. 60 Hoskin, J.C., ‘School Cadets’, in Despatch, Vol 12, No 8, February 1977, p. 155.

254 the early 1980s when it wrote that it ‘must be seen as a part of the students’ development towards becoming a balanced and useful member of the community.’62 By 1982 references to army training objectives had all but disappeared from collective military and school memories. The transition was not, however, without a price. The more non-military oriented the movement became the more difficult it was to legitimise necessary army investment and associated material support.

Before questions of military commitment can be addressed, however, it is necessary to build a picture of the regulatory and structural characteristics of the new cadet system. Some significant changes in the way the ACC had previously functioned were imposed by ASCS regulations gazetted the on 2 November 1977.63 In order to be considered cost-effective, for example, schools that wished to form units were required to have an increased minimum of 70 willing students.64 Schools also became responsible for cadet administration including the issue and care of uniforms and other items of equipment provided by the military.65 Importantly, these units, given the independence that 1976 had necessitated, were generally less inclined to wait for top down regulatory changes to be imposed upon them. On 1 November 1977, the Headmaster of Canberra Grammar School, P.J. McKeown, representing the Headmasters’ Conference of the Independent Schools, met with Killen to suggest a number of unit driven reforms. He recommended a ‘Cadet Advisory Committee’ to advise the Minister annually on cadet matters in accordance with the Conferences’ belief that the old system had been betrayed by the army without due hearing from schools. Although this initiative was rejected, McKeown managed to achieve a range of minor concessions, and, moreover, his actions confirmed a newfound independence of spirit for school units, with considerable future implications. 66

61 The Armidale School, The Armidilian, 1979, p. 61. 62 St Patrick’s Christian Brothers College (Mackay), Annual Magazine, 1982, p. 38. 63 These regulations replaced interim arrangements where the three service organisations operated on pre-1976 single service instructions. Department of Defence, Annual Report 1978, Government Printer, 1978, p. 17. 64 Permission could be given for smaller units if a school could shown evidence of possessing an efficient detachment in the past. Minutes (fragmented), HQTC-A Cadet Conference, dated 10-11 June 1976. CGSA C9 (Cadets Box 1), Item: General. 65 Memo, HQTC-A (internal) (1976). Defence Archives File 98/6065, & Department of Defence, Standing Orders 1980, pp. 3-1 - 3-3. 66 One example was permission for CUOs to man adult officer positions in units with excess of 300 cadets. In addition to minor regulatory amendments, an unsuccessful submission was made to Army Office in March 1981 requesting the prefix ‘Royal’ for the title Australian Cadet Corps. 3 Cadet Group

255 The ACC was subject to further administrative reform in 1980 as a consequence of re-written standing orders which were, in many ways, indicative of further movement away from the army. These orders introduced the concept of detachment ‘sponsors’ to assume many previous military responsibilities. Sponsors were tasked to provide training material not supplied by the army, liaison with the community and local authorities, the provision of club, welfare and sporting facilities, maintenance of financial records on behalf of the unit, organising and conducting non- army approved cadet activities, and generally maintaining morale, discipline and well- being.67 Up to 1982 unit sponsors were invariably the schools in which units were situated for, although authorised, Killen’s open cadet units were not yet widespread.68

In line with changing social attitudes to gender, a key development for the ACC from 1982 was the informal integration of female cadets. The idea had been around for some time and had been advocated strongly by the commander of 2 Cadet Brigade, Lieutenant Colonel P.L. Tilley, early in 1974. In September of that year the Queensland Minister for Education, Sir Alan Fletcher, wrote to his federal counterpart, Beazley, commenting that ‘the suggestion that there be provision for girls to take part in cadet activities is an interesting one … there would be no valid reason why girls should not be given the opportunity.’69 As a result of such attitudes units like that at Pittwater House Grammar School, Sydney, raised volunteer mixed sex cadet units without official sanction.70 Pressured by precedence, the army, following

Newsletter 2/1981. Teague Papers, Army History Unit, Canberra, & Letter, Killen to McKeown, dated 12 April 1977. CGSA C9 (Cadets Box 1), Item: General. 67 Department of Defence, Standing Orders 1980, p. 3-1. 68 Only three such units existed in 1983 and they were all in South Australia. Open units were required to find ‘sponsors’ from within the community with local RSL branches popular choices. They were also required to find willing ‘foster’ units from within the army and to nominate suitable accommodation before being raised. From 1980 all potential detachments ran initially on a trial basis. During the trial the potential unit needed to parade for three months with four prospective officers of cadets and 70 budding cadets giving an average attendance of 60 per cent. If this was accomplished the unit was formally established. Once raised a detachment could be disbanded for a number of reasons. At any time the sponsor could ask that the unit be closed. A unit could also be disbanded on the basis of inactivity, inefficiency, or a failure to maintain the minimum four officers of cadets and 70 cadets. Finally, ‘conduct detrimental to the corps’ was a sufficient justification for closure. Department of Defence, Standing Orders 1980, pp. 4-1 - 4-3. 69 Laffin, ‘Cadet Corps in Secondary Education’, p. 133. 70 At Pittwater House 16 of the 82 cadets were girls and, although generally organised in female sections, female NCOs were placed in charge of male cadets and a female officer of cadets was appointed. Girls participated in all activities and wore the same jungle green uniform as the boys. Similarly, in 1974 three Tasmanian school cadet units raised ‘Girl Auxiliaries’ on the insistence of a number of interested female students containing about 30 individuals across the state. The term ‘Auxiliaries’ did not mean that the girls were in any way subservient as they participated in all cadet

256 the Millar Committee’s view that there was ‘no intrinsic reason why girls should be excluded from most forms of cadet activities’ formally allowed them into the ASCS from July 1982. The enrolment of female officers of cadets commenced immediately, and soon afterwards small numbers of female cadets were admitted into units to be trained as NCOs in order to assist in the subsequent enrolment and training of greater numbers of girls.71 This policy worked well and many units soon discovered that their female cadets were ‘doing well and were experiencing no unusual problems’, and were ‘indistinguishable from their male counterparts in standards of dress, bearing and training.’72

From July 1976 fundamental changes, again highlighting shrinking military involvement, were made to the organisational structure of the new ACC. The old cadet brigade and battalion framework was dismantled and replaced by a system of seven Cadet Groups numbered according to Military District. The exception was 7 Military District (Northern Territory) which raised no Cadet Group and whose District headquarters commanded its cadet units directly. One (Queensland), Two (NSW) and Three (Victoria) Cadet Groups answered to the Directorate of Cadets at HQTC-A while the remainder did so through their Military District headquarters. Due to geographic dispersal in Queensland and NSW a number of Group Detachments were also raised in regional areas to act as conduits between cadet units and their Group headquarters. The General Officer Commanding Training Command was made responsible to the CGS for the administration of the organisation and a colonel at HQTC-A was appointed as the Director of Cadets. The Commander of the Army Reserve was responsible for coordinating ACC matters within Army Office and between Army Office and HQTC-A. Within this chain of command HQTC-A coordinated army support to the Cadet Groups and developed ACC policy. Each Cadet Group provided general supervision of their units, helped administer and advise them on military matters, arranged training courses for officers of cadets, and assisted

activities with the exception of firing weapons. Females were also amalgamated into the Chevalier College unit (NSW) as early as 1979. Laffin, ‘Cadet Corps in Secondary Education’, pp. 134-140, & Reid, Looking Back With Thanks, p. 25. 71 Department of Defence, Millar Report – Cadets, pp. 13 & 21. 72 3 Cadet Group Newsletter 1/1982. Teague Papers, Army History Unit, Canberra, & McAdams, R.H., ‘The Lesson Plan That Worked’, in Australian Defence Force Journal, March – April 1988, p. 61.

257 in the planning and conduct of army-approved activities.73 Units themselves conducted the detailed planning and execution of all cadet training as well as maintaining their units in a general sense (see Figure 9A for a schematic representation). 74

Figure 9A - Structure and Organisation of the ACC, 1980

Army Office (Reserve Branch)

Directorate of Cadets (HQTC-A)

1 Cadet 2 Cadet 3 Cadet HQ 4 Mil HQ 5 Mil HQ 6 Mil HQ 7 Mil Group* Group Group District District District District

4 Cadet 5 Cadet 6 Cadet Townsville Brisbane Bathurst Casino Group Group Group Det Det Det Det

Cadet Cadet Cadet Cadet Cadet Units Units Units Units Units

Cadet Units Cadet Units

* 1 Cadet Group also had a Liaison Section in Rockhampton.

Source: Department of Defence, Standing Orders 1980, p. 2-3.

At the lowest level cadet detachments remained structured, in a basic sense, as infantry companies of the adult army. All units possessed a Commanding Officer nominated by the unit sponsor and appointed by the Director of Cadets. Although rank varied with a unit’s size the Commanding Officer retained overall responsibility for all aspects of the unit. Training Officers, who were also the seconds-in-command, were charged with the preparation of a yearly syllabus and weekly training programs while the position of Adjutant was filled by an officer responsible for personnel and financial administration. The unit Quartermaster administered stores, transport, accommodation and repairs and was usually assisted by a cadet appointed as a Quartermaster Sergeant. Unit CUOs and NCOs exercised the appointments and

73 Each ARA Cadet Group commander had authority to raise an advisory body, known as a Cadet Group Support Unit, of no fixed strength, consisting of officers of cadets who were not members of any unit. Group commanders also had the power to call a Cadet Group Consultative Committee, whose composition varied, to provide advice on a range of issues facing units. Department of Defence, Standing Orders 1980, pp. 3-1 - 3-3 & 4-4.

258 responsibilities allocated to them under the pre-1975 system (see Figure 9B). Alpha- numeric designations continued to define unit structures although they were not enforced nearly as closely as they had been previously and many variations appeared.75 From the late 1970s, for example, a ‘Cavalry Contingent’ was instituted at Chevalier College, NSW, consisting of six horses used for ceremonial occasions.76 So too, The Southport School, with the largest unit in Queensland in 1982, raised a first year company of six platoons structured along traditional lines and an unconventional second year company made up of two Adventure Training platoons, two SES platoons, an Administration platoon, a Signals platoon and a ‘Scuba Diving’ section.77

Figure 9B - Cadet Unit Organisations, 1982

Unit Classified as D1 or larger Unit Classified as C1 to C4

UNIT Commanding Officer (lieutenant UNIT Commanding Officer (major/captain) HQ colonel/major) HQ Adjutant (captain/lieutenant) Training Officer/2IC (major/captain) Quartermaster (lieutenant) Adjutant & Quartermaster (capt/lieutenant) CSM (WO2) & CQMS (SSGT) cadets RSM (WO1) & RQMS (WO2) cadets

Officer Commanding (major / captain) COY HQ PL HQ Platoon Commander (CUO) cadet CSM (WO2) & CQMS (SSGT) cadets (up to 4) (3) Platoon Sergeant (sergeant) cadet

PL HQ Platoon Commander (CUO) cadet (3) Platoon Sergeant (sergeant) cadet SECT Section Commander (corporal) cadet (3 or 4) Section 2IC (lance corporal) cadet 8 x cadets SECT Section Commander (corporal) cadet (3 or 4) Section 2IC (lance corporal) cadet 8 x cadets

Source: Department of Defence, Australian Cadet Corps Training Manual 1982, Headquarters Training Command – Army, 1982, p. 2-2.

It is within this regulatory and structural framework that the true effect of Killen’s ‘increased community involvement’ and ‘cost savings’ may be assessed. The truth was that such platitudes were euphemisms for drastic and officially sanctioned reductions in military support now restricted solely to the provision of uniforms, rations and equipment for annual camps, travel subsidies, compensation cover and

74 Memo, HQTC-A (internal) (1977). Defence Archives File 87/49959. 75 Standing Orders 1980, pp. 2-1 - 2-11 & 4-2. 76 Reid, Looking Back With Thanks, p. 20. 77 The Southport School, The Southportonian, 1992, p. 71.

259 occasional visits to units by regular army warrant officer liaison staff.78 That such a decline took place in the context of increased overall defence spending as a proportion of GDP (see Table 9B) underscores the emphasis on cost-savings for the remodelled cadet movement. The future of the movement was correctly assessed by 3 Cadet Group in Victoria in its lament that ‘finance (or the lack of it) will be a big influence on all.’79

Table 9B – Trends in Defence Expenditure against GDP, 1975-82 19000 17000 GDP (at current prices ($'10M)) 15000 Defence Expenditure ($'M) 13000 11000 9000 7000 5000 3000 1000 1974/75 1975/76 1976/77 1977/78 1978/79 1979/80 1980/81 1981/82 1982/83 Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, History of National Accounts, ABS Homepage, www.abs.gov.au & Beaumont, Sources & Statistics, p. 32.

The wider implications of the withdrawal of material military commitment from the ACC from 1976 were reflected, to a large extent, in the provision of uniforms. First, in 1977 the order of dress for cadets was changed to Jungle Greens in both summer and winter and the issue of Battle Dress was discontinued.80 Second, under newfound conditions of frugality even the supply of this single uniform was not without its problems. In December 1977, for example, the Shore Cadet Unit, Sydney, reported

it has not yet been possible to kit out with uniform the whole unit and present advice is that this will not be possible until some time in 1978. The

78 ibid. 79 3 Cadet Group Newsletter 2/1981, Teague Papers, Army History Unit, Canberra, & Department of Defence, Annual Report 1981, Government Printer, p. 25. 80 Battle Dress was privately purchased by some units after this date. The unit insignia on hat badges and shoulder flashes was not issued for free and to cover the cost of these accoutrements most units charged a joining fee of around $5. With the approval of the Director of Cadets a number of detachments continued to wear unique school or traditional pattern uniforms at their own expense. Department of Defence, Standing Orders 1980, pp. 7-5 - 7-6.

260 result is that senior members of the unit have little feeling of belonging to an organisation that is service oriented.81

Such disappointment was echoed by units across the country, although in fairness the problem of providing uniforms after 1976 was compounded by the previous government’s decision to recall and dispose of them when it had disbanded the scheme.82 Nonetheless, the time taken to remedy the situation represented altered army priorities and diminished material support to the movement as a whole.

A second cause of resentment within many units, again driven by decreasing military involvement and an unavailability of army instructors, was a directive that all detachments be staffed with officers of cadets to the ratio of one to every twenty cadets.83 This ratio represented a significantly increased staff requirement for most units. In a number of cases, following the 1967 decision that officers of cadets need not necessarily come from the school to which the unit was attached, it meant for the first time units found themselves led by individuals who were not on the school staff and the resultant weakening of direct teacher influence was an unwelcome change. In the context of scarce resources most units faced considerable difficulties recruiting sufficient adult volunteers to meet the army’s ratio. Complaints were immediate and vocal. Barker College, for example, in writing to 2 Cadet Group, NSW, pointed to an annual camp that it successfully conducted where one officer had been responsible for 300 cadets.84 Eventually unit agitation saw the ratio increased to 1:50 in November 1977 for detachments with more than 150 cadets. A second and considerable annoyance for many officers of cadets was the cessation of the award of the British

81 Shore, The Torch Bearer, 1977, p. 147. 82 Concordia College, The Concordian, 1977, p. 21. 83 The conditions of service for officers of cadets in the new ACC closely resembled those in place before 1975. Candidates were required to be between 19 and 56 years of age, be medically fit, and have ‘sufficient knowledge’ to enable supervision of cadet activities. Unit sponsors recommended appointments, reductions, promotions or rotations of officers of cadets for decision by Cadet Group commanders, or the Director of Cadets, depending on circumstance. They could still be promoted from lieutenant up to lieutenant colonel so long as vacancies existed, they were of a stipulated minimum age, and had completed the relevant training course. Appointments could be terminated at any time if a member was medically unfit, showed unsatisfactory attendance or interest, or was deemed ‘unsuitable to be an officer of cadets.’ Detachment Commanding Officers retained the power to promote and reduce qualified cadets up to the rank of WO1 while promotions to CUO required the recommendation of the unit Commanding Officer, in conjunction with the sponsor, and were subject to approval by Cadet Group commanders. Department of Defence, Standing Orders 1980, pp. 5-1 – 5-6 & 6-4 – 6-5. 84 Letter, Hughes to Schools (43/1976), dated 28 May 1976. CBA HSP0000136/02, Item: Service Cadets. Correspondence on Re-introduction of Service Cadets in 1976 and CBC Kalgoorlie’s Reply on Unable to Make Commitment to Continue the Cadet Movement.

261 Cadet Forces Medal in Australia in 1975 when the Australian Honours and Awards system was established. No replacement Australian decoration was struck which, no doubt, added to feelings of abandonment. The military attempted to mask its sharply declining support to the movement with talk of increased opportunities for greater responsibility for individual units. Indeed, an army review of the ACC, conducted ten months after the introduction of the ACSC, reported that ‘the benefits of the greater involvement and independence of schools … has been recognised and used to advantage by most schools … The growing self-reliance and sense of purpose within most cadet units is readily apparent.’85 The true picture was not at all so positive, with most units all but left to fend for themselves. Lieutenant Colonel I.C. Teague, Commander of 3 Cadet Group in 1981, considered the new system to be ‘disadvantaged by a lack of proper commitment and support for the scheme from our political masters.’86 Cost-cutting had particularly grave consequences in the area of manpower support. In 1976, around 100 regular army officers and NCOs (down from 365 in 1974) were left to provide guidance and administrative support and to ensure ‘uniformly high standards’ across the country. 87

From 1976 diminishing army commitment was a wedge driven between the military, educational and social foundations of the movement. Many units, and elements of the wider community, were disappointed by the reality of reduced army involvement and harkened to memories of bygone days. Frustrated at what it saw as insufficient support to the ACC the 64th National RSL Congress in 1980 resolved that ‘the Commonwealth Government be asked to honour its election promise to (fully) restore the School Cadet Scheme.’88 Similarly, a deputation of eleven prominent Victorian private schools expressed their concern over the level of army commitment to cadets in 1981, professing ‘a general disappointment … about the level of support the army is now able to give school cadets.’ They felt that the government’s decision to revive the movement ‘should be backed up with an equally clear decision that the

85 Minute, HQTC-A (internal) (1979). Defence Archives File 98/6065. 86 3 Cadet Group Newsletter 2/1981, Teague Papers, Army History Unit, Canberra. 87 ibid. 88 RSL 64th National Congress Resolution Number 24 (p. 36.). CGSA C9 (Cadets Box 1), Item: General.

262 regular army should be fully involved in supporting cadet activities’ for without it ‘the cadet movement in schools will flounder.’89

A further direct and important consequence of restricted army support was the widening of the perpetual state school/private school divide. Those units that managed to survive 1976 were typically wealthy private schools with sufficient resources to operate in a vacuum of army involvement. At the affluent Trinity Grammar School unit in Sydney, for example, the ‘overwhelming majority of parents’ supported a continuance of the unit and immediately permissive occupancy of a large block of land north of the Hawkesbury river was obtained as a training area.90 State schools could never match this level of expenditure. Once the new scheme was underway from 1977, while small and poorer units struggled under conditions of reduced military support, a small proportion from schools rich enough to pick up the army’s slack enjoyed the freedom that it entailed. The Marcellin Cadet unit in NSW, for example, recorded with some satisfaction in 1980 that ‘the training and administration of the unit now relies heavily on its own personnel and resources within the school.’91 Canberra Grammar School felt liberated by the withdrawal of army influence as it could now consider ‘the best aspects of cadet training, no longer handicapped by army rules.’92 Such freedom was not, however, without its price. Reduced army support was a critical disadvantage to state schools not in the same financial position as their large private counterparts. Smaller government schools could not afford, and often the parents of cadets within them could not subsidise, camps and other cadet activities. Consequently, the proportion of state school cadets in the ACC dropped to 41 per cent by 1978 (see Table 9C). The state school/private school rift was in danger of developing into a gulf.

89 Letter, Camberwell Grammar School to Minister of Defence, dated 30 March 1981. CGSA C9 (Cadets Box 1), Item: General. 90 Trinity Grammar School, The Triangle, 1976, p. 49. 91 Marcellin College, Marcellin College Annual Magazine, 1980, p. 57. 92 Memo (Canberra Grammar School internal), dated 13 September 1975. CGSA C9 (Cadets Box 1), Item: General.

263 Table 9C - Cadet Enrolments, 1975 & 1978

1975 1978 Type of School Average Per Average per Units Cadets Units Cadets School School State 206 16,687 81 82 7,446 91 Private (Catholic) 50 8,542 171 27 4,101 152 Private (Non-Catholic) 53 9,285 175 37 6,486 175

1975 1978

Public School Cadets

Catholic School Cadets

Non-Catholic Private School Cadets

Source: Mortensen, An Australian Amy Cadet Unit, p. 386.

The collective impact of political antipathy and financially inspired military abandonment in 1975, an interim period of considerable uncertainty, and a reborn scheme characterised by meagre material support, had predictable consequences with respect to overall cadet numbers. In 1976 a ceiling of 32,000 was imposed, which was roughly that of the old system, but far removed from reality. In 1977 many schools simply refused the invitation to maintain units under the ASCS. Some were disgruntled with the treatment they had received, others considered that the era of military involvement in schools had passed, while many more had found outdoor education programs to replace their cadet detachments. Of the 25 units in Tasmania prior to 1975, for example, only six chose to continue into 1977.93 Those that did endure also found their strength severely diminished. Even the Shore School in Sydney, a traditional bastion of the cadet movement, found its numbers halved under the ASCS.94 Many units that had resisted emerging concepts like ‘adventure training’ encountered serious problems as decreasing army involvement removed their military orientation without offering anything to fill the void. The Gilles Plains High School unit in South Australia, for example, although initially well manned for a state school

93 Essay, History of the Cadet Corps in Tasmania. HQ AAC File 123/1/32.

264 (180 cadets), found that numbers declining from mid-1978 due to a self-confessed lack of direction and purpose.95 The net result was that by 1982 the ACC held 20,652 cadets, 55 per cent of its 1973 total, with the number of units falling by 63 per cent from 327 to 152.96 The shock and aftermath of 1975 caused irrecoverable damage to the scale of cadet enrolments across the country. (see Table 9D).

Table 9D - Falling ACC Numbers, 1973-82

Year 1972 1973 1979 1981 1982 Cadets 38,621 37,622 26,474 20,650 20,652

40,000 35,000 30,000 25,000 20,000 15,000 10,000 5,000 0 1972 1973 1979 1981 1982

Sources: Commonwealth Yearbook, No 59 (1973) p. 93 & No 60 (1974) p. 103 & Department of Defence, Annual Reports 1979 (p. 14.) & 1981 (p. 25.).

Aside from numbers, another key consequence of reduced army support combined with the de-emphasis of military purpose for the movement was the almost complete demilitarisation of cadet training and activities. Killen explained that a more ‘general type of adventure training would prevail’ and that traditional military and weapon training ‘is therefore not predominant in developing the qualities of leadership, self-reliance and loyalty in Australia’s youth.’97 In the main, conventional programs of home training parades, bivouacs, camps and courses remained. What was done within them, however, represented the end state of earlier trends towards the primacy of character development. At a unit level this orientation was well described by Brighton Grammar Cadet Unit, Victoria, in 1976

94 Sherington, Shore, A History, p. 294. 95 McAdams, The Lesson Plan That Worked, p. 60. 96 Department of Defence, Annual Report 1981, Government Printer, 1981, p. 25. 97 Letter, Minister of Defence to RSL National Headquarters, dated 10 March 1980, & RSL 64th National Congress Resolution Number 24 (p. 36.). CGSA C9 (Cadets Box 1), Item: General.

265 Gone are the days of rigid discipline and military-based activities as the Cadet Corps moves to respond to new demands placed upon it by today’s youth in a changing world … Training to meet the demands of the Second World War will simply not stand up to what is required for the youth of the 70s.98

To this end a newly defined set of training principles guided the organisation. Instruction was progressive and designed to be ‘interesting, imaginative and purposeful.’ Competitions, exercises and games were utilised while lessons and tests were ‘out of doors’ where possible. War-like training, including the teaching of infantry minor tactics, was henceforth prohibited.99 Under these directions a number of important innovations began to appear and foremost among them was a growing informal cadet involvement in the Duke of Edinburgh Award scheme. The St Paul’s School Cadet unit, Queensland, explained in 1976 that the Award ‘not only provided a challenge for those involved, but it also sat comfortably with the [new] aims and objectives of cadets.’100 In a second innovation, from 1982 Cadet Group Commanders were authorised to raise specialist ‘field engineering’ sections within existing units. Despite their martial title, these specialists were not militarily oriented but rather they were taught a range of practical pioneering skills including the use of hand tools, ropes, knot tying, anchorages, blocks and tackles, aerial ropeways, tool care and safety.101

Congruent with the theme of reduced army influence over cadet activities, from 1976 unit home training parades, previously characterised by weapon training and tactically oriented instruction, faced significant reform. The only subjects left to teach with any semblance of a military flavour were drill, lessons on army rank, organisation, dress, ceremony, leadership, navigation and history lessons. Combat focused topics were no longer considered ‘mandatory for the achievement of the military aims of cadet training.’102 The curtailing of such activities during home training parades was by no means a universal disappointment. A survey conducted by 3 Cadet Group in 1982 placed weapon training and tactical activities well down the

98 Brighton Grammar School, Grammarian, 1976, p. 21. 99 Department of Defence, Standing Orders 1980, p. 14-1. 100 There were many other examples of unofficial training creativity such as the introduction of horse riding into the syllabus at Caulfield Grammar School Cadet Unit, Victoria, in 1979. Caulfield Grammar School, The Caulfield Grammarian, 1979, p. 61, & Geise, St Paul’s School Cadet Unit, p. 25. 101 Department of Defence, Australian Cadet Corps Training Manual 1982, Headquarters Training Command – Army, 1982, p. 4-1.

266 list of cadet preferences.103 In addition, their loss was often compensated by the opening of a range of non-military options. In NSW the James Ruse Agricultural High School Cadet Unit training program of 1977 was a good example of the deviation and increased scope of home training within the new scheme. The unit taught traditional forms of fieldcraft, first-aid, radio communication, leadership, navigation, and confidence course activities. After a cadet had completed these topics, however, training was available in ‘teaching and instruction’, Q-store, canoe building and canoeing, adventure training, physical training and band work.104

In a similar manner, post-1976 unit bivouacs and annual camps also reflected the new ACC’s commitment to character development at the expense of military skills. Bivouacs remained a unit responsibility and, if not used early in the year to train recruits, often took the form of adventure training hikes like that conducted by cadets from Normanhurst Boys’ High School, Sydney, whose ‘Exercise High Condor’ in 1980 consisted of a trek through mountainous areas from the Upper Colo River to Bilpin.105 A second feature of unit bivouacs during this period was the increased involvement of affiliated army units with cadets, seventeen years or older, permitted to attend appropriate Army Reserve week-end training events. In 1979, for example, select members of the Grantham High School detachment in NSW attended weekend bivouacs with a company from 1/15th Battalion, Royal NSW Regiment.106 Although against formal direction, and very much in the minority, it is worth noting that a few units occasionally misused unit bivouacs to conduct old-style tactical exercises. In 1978, in Western Australia, a combined Guildford Grammar and Swanleigh Cadet Unit bivouac was held at Rottnest Island. The activity pitted the two units against each other in a combat scenario whereby the Guilford cadets defended a portion of the island from Swanleigh landings at the height of which explosives were used to simulate artillery.107 Such activities were, however, rare and had all but disappeared by the 1980s. That they occurred at all, and generally without rebuke, was indicative of the army’s reduced propensity and ability to supervise cadet training to the extent it had done in the past.

102 Department of Defence, Standing Orders 1980, p. 14-4. 103 3 Cadet Group Newsletter 2/1981, Teague Papers, Army History Unit, Canberra. 104 Hoskin, School Cadets, p. 155. 105 Normanhurst Boys’ High School, Phoenix, 1980, p. 52. 106 Grantham High School, Ballyhoo, 1979, p. 48.

267 Under the auspices of the ASCS all army cadets were expected to spend between three and seven days at one of two types of annual camps. The first continued to be combined army-run activities coordinated by the Cadet Groups in each state. The second were re-emergent individual unit-run camps, previously marginalised by the army, but given new life under parsimonious post-1976 circumstances. In a similar manner to years past, at army-run camps the Cadet Groups arranged all administrative aspects including accommodation, rations and transport as well as planning and executing Duke of Edinburgh and Adventure Training Award activities. In between these group activities cadet units were required to plan, resource and coordinate their own training.108 In a divergence from pre-1975 practices, however, a non-military focus was maintained even at these army-run camps. That held in NSW near Nelson’s Bay in 1977, for example, concentrated upon a range of water activities including sailing and canoeing, with cadets visiting the air force base at Williamstown and enjoying helicopter rides.109 Similarly, the 1981 cadet camp at Northam, Western Australia, was based on adventure and survival training and included cross-country running, orienteering, a confidence course, the use of a flying fox, and a crossing of the icy Avon river.110 The only purely military activity that remained a feature of army-run camps was the conduct of range shoots; now the only occasion where cadets were exposed to operational weapons.111 Inevitably, these camps suffered the same difficulties associated with limited army support that plagued the cadet system as a whole in this era. A coalition of Victorian private schools maintained in 1981, for example, that the effectiveness of annual camps was significantly reduced due to a shortage of army instructors, transport, medical support,

107 Guildford Grammar School, The Swan, 1978, p. 48. 108 Where ‘practicable’ Cadet Group commanders arranged medical inspections of all cadets attending army-run annual camps. Where this was not possible medical questionnaires were filled in by a cadet’s next-of-kin. Department of Defence, Standing Orders 1980, pp. 8-2 &14-5 - 14-6. 109 The Armidale School, The Armidilian, 1977, p. 68. 110 Scotch College (Claremont), Reporter, 1981, p. 31, & Caulfield Grammar School, The Caulfield Grammarian, 1973, p. 59. 111 Cadets were only permitted to fire a 25 metre introductory shoot or a 100 metre grouping serial practices on a static mechanical range. In all cases they were to expend no more than 20 rounds. The rifle generally used during these camps was the SLR although from 1977, concurrent with its introduction into Army Reserve units, limited numbers had the opportunity to fire the M-16 (Armalite) 5.56mm rifle. Department of Defence, Standing Orders 1980, p. 14K1-1, & Normanhurst Boys’ High School, Phoenix, 1978, p. 40.

268 and equipment (particularly radios). They went on to attest that ‘this picture of frustration and shortages is counterproductive so far as recruitment is concerned.’112

Activities at resurgent individual school-run annual camps mirrored those of their army-run counterparts with the notable exception of range practices. These camps, however, made up for the lack of shooting with a greater level of flexibility and an even wider range of adventure training opportunities. In 1976, for example, the James Ruse High School unit conducted a camp at Singleton, NSW, and trekked from Payne’s Crossing to Wollombi. The unit chose similar treks for its annual camps in 1978 and 1979 hiking from Warragamba Dam to Cox River and from Katoomba to Jenolean Caves.113 The Southport School, Queensland, provided a useful example of the scale and complexity of a large independent school-run unit camp in 1982 when it deployed more than 320 cadets to the foothills of Mt Tamborine. There they participated in orienteering, an Adventure Training Award course for two platoons, an SES exercise involving a search for lost bushwalkers in rugged country, and an overnight trekking activity. 114

Decreased levels of army support also led to marked changes with respect to the conduct of cadet courses. In the period 1976-82 promotion courses at the JNCO level became the sole responsibility of individual units training their cadets according the army approved syllabi (see Tables 9E and 9F).115 This burden was more than many detachments could bear alone and as a result they often combined resources to conduct them. In 1977, for example, St Patrick’s College (Goulburn), and Waverley College, Sydney, ran a joint promotions camp to train their NCOs.116 In some cases, however, such collective activities were impractical and for many schools unit-run courses became an unbearable strain. Consequently, a conference of eleven of Victoria’s leading private schools drafted a letter in 1981 to the Minister for Defence, Killen, stating their dissatisfaction and maintaining that ‘the most important service the army could provide would be cadet courses as they were organised prior to

112 Letter, Camberwell Grammar School to Minister of Defence, dated 30 March 1981. CGSA C9 (Cadets Box 1), Item: General. 113 Mills, C., ‘History of James Ruse Agricultural High School Cadet Unit’, in Despatch, Vol 15, No 8, February, 1980, p. 153. 114 The Southport School, The Southportonian, 1982, p. 72. 115 Letter, Killen to McKeown, dated 12 April 1977. CGSA C9 (Cadets Box 1), Item: General. 116 St Patrick’s College (Goulburn), Annual Review, 1977, p. 135.

269 1976.’117 This, and similar protests across the country, convinced the army to once again commit to administering a suite of centralised multi-unit promotions courses from 1983. Apart from promotion courses, officer of cadet training continued and, importantly, in 1981 the army reinstituted Adventure Training Award courses suspended since 1975.118

Table 9E – Cadet JNCO Course Training Objectives, 1980

Topic Detail Must have a general knowledge of purpose of the corps; outline of the cadet organisation from Army Office to unit level; status of members; scope & purpose of cadet training; Fundamentals orders & reports; responsibilities of officers, WOs & NCOs; dress & deportment, badges of rank, medals & decorations of the army; compliments, who, what & when to pay. Organisation & Must be given some background knowledge of unit administration & the basic organisation Administration of the military arms & services. Man-management Must have a general & working knowledge of the principles of good leadership. Drill Must be proficient in the basic drill movements taught within the unit to first year cadets. Must know visual training, elementary observation, judging distance, elementary obstacle Bushcraft crossing, movement by day & night. Physical & Games & recreational training must be conducted for the cadet with a view to improving Recreational Training his physical condition. Source: Department of Defence, Standing Orders 1980, p. 14-D1.

Table 9F – Cadet Warrant Officer & SNCO Course Training Objectives, 1980

Topic Detail Fundamentals Must know & be able to give short lectures on dress & deportment. Administration Must know & be able to give short lectures on unit administration & duties of WOs & NCOs. Organisation Must know & be able to give short lectures on the outline organisation of the cadet group & the unit in detail. Man-management Must know & be able to give short lectures on leadership, morale & welfare. Drill Must be proficient & able to instruct in all drill movements required within the unit. Navigation Must be proficient & able to instruct on information to be found on a map; co-ordinates, contours, map setting & position finding, north points & bearings. Bushcraft Must be proficient & able to instruct in all bushcraft lessons required by the unit. Instructional Must know the principles of instruction, validation, question technique, training aids & the preparation of lessons. Basic Field Must know the principles for construction of improvised field accommodation facilities, Engineering field machines & bridges, & use of cordage. Source: Department of Defence, Standing Orders 1980, p. 14-D1.

117 Letter, Camberwell Grammar School to Minister of Defence, dated 30 March 1981. CGSA C9 (Cadets Box 1), Item: General. 118 As opportunities presented themselves many cadets participated in ‘one off’ voluntary courses conducted outside of normal training programs. Six Queensland cadets, for example, were involved in an air force survival exercise in 1978. 3 Cadet Group Newsletter 1/1981, Teague Papers, Army History Unit, Canberra, & Geise, St Paul’s School Cadet Unit, p. 31.

270 Given the de-emphasis on cadet weapon handling within unit training programs, traditional participation in international service rifle shooting competitions declined significantly. The new ACC did, however, facilitate limited involvement, as individuals and teams, in miniature shooting contests like the Ffennell Competition.119 Provided at least five Australian teams entered this contest the highest ranked was still awarded the celebrated Governor General’s Trophy and silver medals. In place of the traditional concentration on international rifle matches a number of standard shooting contests were conducted at army-run annual cadet camps. In most states a series of unique awards were made to units with the best average scores from their camp range practices. In Victoria, for example, these included the Clowes Cup and Melbourne Cricket Club Trophy.120 In a similar manner non-shooting camp ‘efficiency’ trophies were awarded on the basis of points allocated by Cadet Group staff for organisation, attendance, control of training, discipline, dress, hygiene, and personnel administration.121 Orienteering competitions were also a feature of army-run camps of this era.122

The process of death and rebirth for the ACC in the period 1975-82 was a classic illustration of the interaction of the military, educational, social and financial foundations of the cadet movement. These four forces were unbalanced in the early 1970s and required correction. It was concern over the cost of the system, within the wider context of a transition in purpose and training away from a military orientation, which prompted the army to support a decision to abandon the scheme. By 1974 educational considerations had gained precedence without shouldering a commensurate part of the financial and administrative weight of the scheme. Both the army and the government were not content to allow this situation to continue. Such an imbalance was also set to the backdrop of changing political and social attitudes less inclined to provide unquestioning support for a military institution within the

119 During this period the winners of the Ffennell Competition were awarded the King George’s Trophy and the second place getters were awarded the Earl of Jellicoe Sword. Due to the fragility of these historic awards only photographs were actually presented to the units. The army provided endorsement, forwarded lists of teams to the UK, managed entry forms, adjudicated official results of shoots conducted in Australia, sent them overseas, and issued prizes to the winning teams. Standing Orders 1980, pp. 16-1 - 16-3. 120 ibid., p. 16A-1. 121 Again, a number of state awards were made. These included the AMP Efficiency Shield (NSW), the Herald and Weekly Times Trophy (Victoria), and the V.R. Long Trophy (Tasmania). 122 Department of Defence, Standing Orders 1980, p. 16A-3.

271 education system. The net result of this asymmetry and disharmony was Morrison’s announcement of 26 August 1975. The cadet organisation that emerged from 1976 represented, therefore, an effort to correct earlier imbalances. While youth development and educational outcomes were still dominant, the ACC received commensurately less support from the military, with schools forced to shoulder much more of the burden. The cost of the scheme was drastically reduced and its activities aligned themselves more with the social expectations of the 1980s than the 1950s. What remained was for time to tell if the reorganisation had gone too far and whether the new equilibrium could endure.

272 Correct as at: 17 Feb 06

Word Count: 9,190 / 9,695 CHAPTER TEN

The Great Divide 1983 – 1995

In laying the foundations of the ASCS in 1976, the Minister for Defence, D.J. Killen, made provision for regional cadet units situated in the community rather than in schools. Although few of these units were raised up to 1982 they became widespread in the period 1983-95. The resultant partition of the ACC between these units and their traditional school-based counterparts fundamentally transformed the nature of the movement in a period of sustained hardship. This chapter traces the course of these events by first examining a series of key organisational and structural reforms up to 1989, before exploring the influential ‘Thorne Report’ of 1990 and its implications for the ACC up to 1995. Within this context the recurring issues of an ever-evolving purpose and inadequate levels of army support are scrutinized. Finally, an investigation of cadet training and activities of the period, as a case study of the range, depth and impact of these factors, concludes the chapter.

In retrospect, that the period 1983-95 marked a particularly difficult phase for the cadet movement ought to have been predictable. A new Labor government entered office on 11 March 1983 and the Party, under the Hawke and Keating ministries, remained in power for the next thirteen years. Following a pattern in place since the colonial era, adversity for the ACC once again coincided with the absence of conservative political influence at a federal government level. Indeed, these troubled times were considered in some quarters, even by contemporary observers, to be a direct consequence of a tradition of anti-cadet policy by Labor. Be this as it may, as an organisation still reeling from the implications of the events of 1975, eight years later the ACC was set to face some of the most serious challenges it had yet encountered.

The first of these trials was initiated in July 1982 when the CGS, Lieutenant General P.H. Bennett, directed a study be undertaken into the army cadet system. He wanted to know ‘what we do now, and why, including the costs of specific activities’ as well as ‘what we should seek to do’ in the future.1 The results of this investigation

1 Minute, Chief of the General Staff to Director of Cadets, dated July 1982. Defence Archives File 87/31749.

273 informed an announcement on 12 October 1983 by the new Minister for Defence, G.G.D. Scholes, that from 1 January 1984 ‘the Australian Cadet Corps will be restructured along the lines of the existing Navy and Air force schemes.’2 In effect this meant that Killen’s largely dormant idea of widespread community-based units would become a reality at the expense of traditional school based detachments. Scholes left open the possibility of school units remaining part of the ACC but with the key proviso that they would do so without army support. He hoped the changes would open the scheme to a broader cross section of the community and, more importantly, that neglecting school detachments would release significant army manpower and resources. The Minister admitted his fiscal motivations by explaining that ‘clearly the army has been unhappy about the cost of cadets’ and that there was a need to restrict ‘low return items.’3 The abandonment of school-based units was Scholes’ answer. In an eerie echo of the events of 1975, the acting CGS, Major General P.C. Gration, explained that the decision had emerged ‘from a detailed examination of defence priorities’ to ‘reduce or delete areas of either low priority or limited direct benefit to primary defence objectives.’4 The ramifications of the decision to remove support for school detachments shook the foundations of the ACC. Once again the destructive potential of limited finance was realised in that it set the army against the educational keystone of the cadet movement.

On 21 October 1983 a meeting of senior army officers was held in Canberra to discuss the implications of Scholes’ direction. Conscious of an inevitable backlash against any policy designed to remove army commitment to school-based cadets, in his opening address the Director of Army Plans, Colonel J.M. Sanderson, remarked that ‘the restructuring of cadets is a very sensitive issue’ and ‘we must be very circumspect in our dealings.’ Congruent with this theme on 9 November 1983 HQTC- A released a signal to all Cadet Groups stating that ‘particular care and tact must be shown by all army personnel’ as the ‘army must not be seen as abandoning the corps and hastening units towards a “backdoor disbandment.”’5 Many schools, however, drew their own conclusions. Sanderson’s prediction of the sensitivity of the issue was correct. Protest against Scholes’ announcements was immediate and again led by T.B.

2 Canberra Times, 13 October, 1983. 3 ibid., & Letter, Scholes to Author, dated 2 May 2005. 4 Minute, Chief of the General Staff to Functional Commands (1983). Defence Archives File 87/31749.

274 Millar, who still resented the use of his report in 1975 to justify the previous Labor government’s decision to dismantle the ACC. Millar reiterated his view that the best way of maintaining an effective cadet organisation was through the education system and as such he was staunchly opposed to the impending community-based reorganisation.6 In short order many schools joined the chorus of complaint, begrudging another announcement ‘without any consultation with any of the schools, government and non-government.’ The headmaster of St Patrick’s College, Goulburn, F.D. Marzorinin, voiced the majority opinion in that ‘the movement is educationally based and structured … leave it where it is.’7 Canberra Grammar School called the announcement ‘unfortunate and short-sighted’, while a number of schools expressed views akin to B.H. Travers, the headmaster of Sydney Church of England Grammar School, who wrote ‘one may wonder, therefore … whether the Minister and his military advisors hope that cadets will disappear.’8

On 27 October 1983 Gration sent letters to all school-based cadet unit sponsors explaining that ‘army support provided to existing school cadet units through the Cadet Groups is to be withdrawn from the beginning of 1984.’ This letter confirmed the division of the ACC into two fundamentally different types of units. The first were the new style community-based Regional Cadet Units (RCUs) operating from Army Reserve depots and given a similar level of military support previously received by all.9 The second were Limited Support Units (LSUs), based on existing school detachments receiving no ‘free’ army support whatsoever. A small number of school units escaped categorisation as LSUs and remained fully supported on the grounds of disadvantage by distance from a RCU or by low socio-economic circumstances of the

5 Signal, HQTC-A to Cadet Groups, dated 9 November 1983. Defence Archives File 87/31749. 6 Canberra Times, 13 October 1983. 7 SMH, 17 October 1983. 8 Canberra Grammar School Cadet Report (1983). CGSA C9 (Cadets Box 1), Item: Records of the Past, & SMH, 21 October 1983. 9 There were only eight RCUs in existence in 1984 with six of these raised as pilot programs by Field Force Command on 7 February that year. One each existed in Camden and Grafton, NSW, with the remainder in Noarlunga, Northern Districts, Murray Bridge, Warradale, Silver City and Whyalla in South Australia. From July 1984, RCU officers of cadets received both training and payment while cadets were provided uniforms, stores and annual camps at public expense. Home training and bivouacs, however, were not supported with either personnel or equipment. Ironically, the difficulty faced by many embryonic RCUs was that many students found it less attractive to join a cadet detachment that did not reflect a school focus. Signal, Field Force Command to Cadet Groups (4037/MLC) (1984). CGSA C9 (Cadets Box 1), Item: General, & Thorne, P.T.H., Study into the Australian Cadet Corps (ACC Study), Department of Defence, 1989, p. 2.

275 area in which they were located.10 In November 1983 school detachments were sent letters asking them if they wished to remain a part of the cadet organisation, and, if so, what type of unit they wished to become.11 Many schools, with a sense of what an acceptance of LSU status might mean for their units, were slow to respond. As a result on 30 March 1984, the General Officer Commanding Field Force Command, Major General J.D. Kelly, was again forced to write to the headmasters of schools with cadet units providing further clarification on the impending changes and insisting that they indicate if they wished to continue as part of the ACC or disband their units.12 The army’s attitude at this time was unforgiving. As school detachments considered their futures Kelly warned all army units with formal or informal affiliations with cadets that some schools, when faced with LSU status, might opt to continue and then try to use their connections to obtain support on an informal, unpaid basis. He was clear in his direction that such a ‘provision of support to cadet units under local arrangements will not be permitted under the new scheme.’13 Another predictably sluggish response to these letters, however, meant that implementation of the LSU/RCU re-structure was postponed until 1 July 1984.

School units that elected to continue were initially unsure about exactly what their newfound LSU status meant. They soon discovered, however, that despite remaining under the control of the ACC for policy matters they were, in effect, on their own.14 The removal of military support had a devastating impact with only five operational school-based units remaining in the Brisbane metropolitan area by October 1984. Those that were not inclined to disband were often forced to transform into RCUs in order to survive. The Gilles High School Cadet Unit in South Australia was drawn down such a path and found a sponsor in the local RSL branch. The unit was subsequently renamed the Northern Districts (RSL) RCU.15 Nevertheless a proportion of schools remained determined to continue with attitudes commonly reflecting that of

10 A total of ten disadvantaged school detachments were initially authorised to continue as fully supported units. These units were in Woodridge (QLD); Canterbury, Fairfield, Plumpton, Punchbowl and Shalvey (NSW); Girrawheen, Kwinana and North Lake (Western Australia); and Rokeby (Tasmania). 11 Letter, Director of Cadets to School Units, dated November 1983. Defence Archives File 87/31749. 12 Letter, Commander Field Force to Cadet Units, dated 30 March 1984. CGSA C9 (Cadets Box 1), Item: General. 13 Signal, Field Force Command to Cadet Groups (4037/MLC) (1984). CGSA C9 (Cadets Box 1), Item: General. 14 Geise, St Paul’s School Cadet Unit, p. 47. 15 McAdams, The Lesson Plan That Worked, p. 61.

276 St Patrick’s College, Goulburn, in that ‘there is no doubt as to the value of training and discipline encountered by our young men in cadets, and so long as St Patrick's College lives, so too will the unit, founded long ago in 1908.’16

An important feature of the school units that managed to endure in a vacuum of support beyond 1984 was a strong and growing sense of independence combined with a healthy measure of distrust of the army. Many units, having weathered the storm of uncertainty and neglect in 1975-76 only to face the implications of LSU status in 1984, began to question their connections with the military altogether. Indeed, the prospect of increased autonomy and decreased army control was often considered the only redeeming feature of the new LSU reality. Such feelings were particularly evident in large private schools wealthy enough to find strength in self-determination. Sydney Grammar School, for example, recorded in 1984 that the removal of army support had ‘the additional advantage of independence from the interference of 2 Cadet Group.’17

Growing LSU freedom, and subsequent disregard for many ACC regulations, was initially manifested in the ‘special positions’ that many of the larger school units established to allow a greater number of senior cadets to be promoted. In other cases schools began appointing cadets to warrant officer and CUO rank without any reference to the Cadet Groups. The divergence between LSUs and RCUs, who due to their reliance on army support remained beholden to ACC rules, became increasingly pronounced as time progressed and in many ways replaced the traditional state school/private school divide that had characterised the movement for more than a century. The removal of support for school units was, of course, the doom of the movement in the state schools. Almost without exception, lacking the resources of their private counterparts, they either disbanded or were transformed into RCUs. From this point, thanks to the LSU/RCU divide, the school-based branch of the movement became virtually synonymous with the private school sector.

At the same time that cadet units were being categorised as RCUs and LSUs the higher command organisation of the ACC also faced serious reform. From 1

16 St Patrick’s College (Goulburn), Annual Review, 1983, pp. 65-66. 17 Sydney Grammar School, The Sydneian, 1984, p. 37.

277 January 1984 ACC policy matters became the responsibility of Army Office (Operations Branch) while command of the organisation was transferred from the General Officer Commanding Training Command to the General Officer Commanding Field Force Command. This change was predicated on the assumption that Army Reserve units would be used as affiliated ‘fosters’ for the new RCUs, and such units belonged to the Field Force. A Director of Cadets of the rank of lieutenant colonel was appointed at Field Force Command headquarters and the Cadet Groups were disbanded as soon as they could transfer their duties to divisional and brigade headquarters staff.18 Field Force Command, however, did not remain in charge for long and on 11 May 1987 the CGS, Lieutenant General L.G. O’Donnell, again transferred command of the ACC. This time the Assistant Chief of the General Staff – Army Reserve (ACRES-A) was chosen, with the cadet organisation administered through his Office (OACRES-A).19 ACRES-A’s deputy, a colonel, was appointed as the Director of Cadets and was, in turn, supported by an ARA major as the Staff Officer Grade Two Cadets (SO2 Cadets). This reorganisation was made to allow for direct control of cadet units within each state and to provide for a Directorate at Army Headquarters level.20 With Field Force Command out of the equation regional responsibilities were shifted back from the divisions and brigades to the Military Districts headquarters. Within each District headquarters Cadet Support Units (CSUs), were formed to supervise the training and administration of cadet units. These CSUs consisted of a mix of ARA and Army Reserve staff supplemented, for the first time at this level, by senior officers of cadets. Below the CSUs the last links in the cadet chain of command remained individual army foster units charged with providing facilities, training and administrative services of all types.21

18 Minute, Director of Cadets to Cadet Groups, dated December 1983. Defence Archives File 87/31749. 19 The transfer was complete by 30 June 1987. The changes were not welcomed by the Military Commands with 2nd Military District, for example, forced to assume responsibility for 50 cadet units. Brigadier F.J. Cross, Commander 2nd Military District, wrote to Major General Adrian Clunies-Ross, the Chief of Operations at Army Office, warning that his headquarters could not cope with this level of additional cadet responsibility without a significant increase in staff. Letter, Commander 2nd Military District to Army Office (1987). Defence Archives File 87/25794. 20 ACRES-A’s capacity to administer the ACC was always limited by an inability to direct resources in support of it. In addition, the appointment of ACRES-A as commander provided for a confused delineation of authority from Army Headquarters to ACC units. Brief, OACRES-A (internal) (1994). Defence Archives File 94/4387, & Directive, Chief of the General Staff to ACRES-A, dated 2 May 1987. Defence Archives File 96/7813. 21 In 1988 OACRES-A recognised the need to create a link between ACC units and their army fosters. As a result, Army Reserve NCOs were appointed as Cadet Unit Liaison Officers (CULOs) with foster unit establishments amended accordingly. These positions were not, however, universally or even regularly filled. In August 1990, for example, there were 17 CULOs in the 1st Military District, 9 in the

278 Predictably, the RCU/LSU divide had a significant and damaging impact on cadet enrolment figures. The strength of the ACC as at 30 June 1982 stood at 20,018 cadets and 992 officers of cadets in 165 units.22 As a direct result of the withdrawal of support from school units numbers fell by 17 per cent to 16,671 by 1989. This was despite a considerable but unsuccessful effort by the army to raise RCUs to replace the LSUs that chose to disband (see Table 10A for details). Interestingly, although there were 83 RCUs and only 55 LSUs in 1989 the school based units still accounted for 60 per cent of all cadets.23 The majority of the ACC at this time therefore stood without army support and in spite of the military’s attitude towards their continuing existence.

Table 10A - Breakdown of the ACC, 30 June 1989 Military District RCUs LSUs Units Officers Cadets Units Officers Cadets 1 15 85 1,318 9 46 1,295 2 23 137 2,188 24 181 5,631 3 14 70 1,004 13 126 2,825 4 13 79 897 - - - 5 12 68 798 4 19 341 6 5 22 298 - - - 7 1 5 76 - - - Total 83 466 6,579 50 372 10,092

RCU Cadets LSU Cadets

Source: ACC Strength State as at 30 June 1989. Defence Archives File 87/49959.

The first seeds of a long-term recovery from many of the difficulties facing the ACC in the late 1980s were sown by what came to be known as the ‘Thorne Study’. A review committee established in 1988, as part of a general examination of the command arrangements of the army, reported that the ACC appeared ‘to be at the crossroads of a major decision with regards to training’ and that it had ‘received

4th Military District, 13 in the 5th Military District and none anywhere else. Minute, ACRES-A to Cadet Support Units (1988). Defence Archives File 87/49959. 22 Of this total, in 1983 1,754 cadets were female and 120 of the 1,010 adult staff were women. ACC Strength State as at 30 June 1982. Defence Archives File 87/31749. 23 Thorne, ACC Study, p. 2.

279 sufficient comment to cause us to believe a study into the cadet corps is overdue.’ The CGS, O’Donnell, accepted these recommendations and as a result the Thorne Study was commissioned. Its mandate was to review and report on all aspects of the cadet organisation to ascertain if it was meeting its aim, to recommend any necessary changes, and to identify the resource implications of any suggested improvements.24 It used quantitative information gained through a questionnaire given to cadets and officers of cadets and qualitative information gathered by interviewing senior army officers, headmasters, and a ‘large number of cadets.’25

The Thorne Study did not specifically reject the aim of the contemporary ASCS or the published objectives of the ACC. Rather, it concluded that youth development outcomes were being met and that ‘there is strong support for the view that the ACC is a sound vehicle for developing qualities of leadership, self-reliance and initiative.’26 At the same time, however, it considered that such youth development should not be the primary role of the scheme and identified a need to emphasise its military nature if it was to thrive and be thought of as more than just another youth organisation.27 Importantly, the Study recommended a reorganisation of the objectives of ACC training to place military outcomes ahead of character development aspirations.28

Less flattering was the Study’s conviction that the ACC was failing to develop in cadets an active interest in the army. It contended that military ‘information is virtually non-existent in LSUs and limited in RCUs.’ Cadets had little contact with the military and their identification with their parent service was weak. Indeed, in situations where units were struggling to survive, and where they perceived the military as indifferent to them, there was obvious ‘antipathy towards the army.’ Only 43 per cent of cadets in LSUs reported that their experiences had given them an interest in the military compared to 69 per cent of RCU cadets. Such responses lent

24 Minute, OACRES-A (internal) (1988). Defence Archives File 87/49959. 25 Thorne, ACC Study, p. 1. 26 ibid., p. 10. 27 ibid., p. 4. 28 The suggested order was as follows: to develop an interest in the army and its traditions; to encourage cadets to continue some form of military service; to give cadets a foundation of military knowledge and discipline; and to develop the qualities of leadership, self-reliance and initiative. Memo, OACRES-A (internal) (1989). Defence Archives File 87/49959.

280 weight to the idea that the removal of support from LSUs had discredited the army in the eyes of school-based cadets.29

The Thorne Study considered that the ACC’s enduring aim of encouraging cadets to continue some form of military service as adults was being partially met with recruiting statistics of the era confirming the considerable contribution the organisation made to the army in this regard. At the same time, however, it concluded that the decrease in the proportion of ex-cadets joining the defence forces compared to years past was evidence of the destructive effect of reduced army support over a sustained period. The Study endorsed the view that ‘cadets have been buggerised around so much they no longer follow the natural progression from CUO to RMC.’30 Its argument concluded with the key contention that the removal of discrimination against LSUs would eliminate the negative influence against choosing an army career in former school-based cadets, with recruiting into both the ARA and Army Reserve benefiting as a result.31

Another of the ACC’s stated aims, of providing a foundation of army knowledge and discipline, was harshly criticised by the Thorne Study as being neither widely understood nor observed. It contended that military training should be the core syllabus and that cadets themselves desired a greater army orientation.32 The Study argued that the common feeling that the ACC should avoid focussing on military matters for fear of being condemned as promoting militarism was unfounded, and to this end recommended that cadet training programs be aligned with the Army Reserve recruit course with exemptions from initial training offered to suitably qualified ex- cadets entering the Reserve. In support of this recommendation it pointed to 2,000 current ACC members who indicated an interest in joining the Army Reserve if it were made a goal of cadet training.33

The dominant recurring theme and most important overall conclusion made by the Thorne Study was that the newly implemented RCU/LSU structure was counter-

29 Thorne, ACC Study, p. 5. 30 Memo, OACRES-A (internal) (1989). Defence Archives File 87/49959. 31 Thorne, ACC Study, pp. 6-7. 32 ibid., p. 7. 33 Memo, OACRES-A (internal) (1989). Defence Archives File 87/49959.

281 productive. The Study concluded that the categorisations created division within the ACC and between it and the wider army noting that it was a ‘very divisive factor’ and the ‘root cause of many of the problems confronting the ACC.’34 The split system caused a loss of credibility, goodwill, control, and identification between the army and school detachments, while fostering negative perceptions of the military within them.35 To remedy the situation the Study recommended that the categorisation of LSU be completely removed and that ‘all cadet units be supported equally and adequately, initially to the level of support currently prescribed for RCUs.’36 Although this key recommendation was not acted upon immediately, the idea resonated and remained in the forefront of debate between many key ACC stakeholders in the years that followed.

The Thorne Study was submitted to the Chief of the General Staff Advisory Committee (CGSAC) on 21 July 1989. Unfortunately, the Committee directed few of its recommendations be implemented and the ACC continued, in the main, to develop in previously established directions. Importantly, the army did accept that the reason cadet contributions to adult recruiting had slowed was due the lack of funding and as a result, in November 1990, a proposal to remove the RCU/LSU division was formally examined. The cost of such a decision was estimated at $51.3 million over five years and, regrettably but not surprisingly, a lack of available funding prevented any serious attempt at implementation.37 Worthy of note, on 22 June 1992 one less significant recommendation, the renaming of the Australian Cadet Corps as the Australian Army Cadet Corps, was successfully executed.38

34 Thorne, ACC Study, p. 2. 35 Memo, OACRES-A (internal) (1989). Defence Archives File 87/49959. 36 Other less significant recommendations included the allocation of an additional $462,000 in the financial year 1989/90 to increase support arrangements for the ACC. The money was to be spent on training stores, allowances for officers of cadets, uniforms and equipment for LSUs. The Thorne Study also recommended that officers of cadets be paid allowances for up to 30 days per annum (up from a previous limit of 20) and that a pilot reintroduction of yet another Regimental Cadet scheme be conducted. It went on to advocate the establishment of an Australian Cadet Service Medal to recognise twelve or more years of service by ACC staff and, finally, suggested that cadets be issued with camouflage-style uniforms to replace their Jungle Greens and that the title ‘Australian Cadet Corps’ be replaced with ‘Australian Army Cadet Corps.’ Thorne, ACC Study, pp. 4, 10, & 16-17. 37 Minute, ACRES to Deputy Chief of the General Staff, dated November 1990. Defence Archives File 94/4387. 38 The idea was to engender the same degree of service affiliation as the ‘Naval’ Reserve Cadets and ‘Air’ Training Corps. The old acronym (ACC) was retained for some time afterwards for legal usage. Directive, OACRES-A to Cadet Cells, dated 22 June 1992. Defence Archives File 87/25794.

282 Without explicit awareness or acknowledgement, the Thorne Study was clearly an attempt to address growing imbalances and inequities between the four foundation forces of the cadet movement. Conscious of relaxing community attitudes to the role of the military in society it recommended a greater army orientation while at the same time advocating the removal of the LSU impediment to increased educational involvement. Such equity of support would, by necessity, equate to increased financial investment in the movement. Had the Study’s recommendations been adopted without delay these four forces would have found a degree of alignment. Instead, friction and disharmony continued to plague the ACC for the next six years.

In the wake of the Thorne Study the command structure of the ACC continued to experience turbulence and transformation. In 1990 discrete Cadet Cells replaced the CSUs in each Military District headquarters. The new Cells were responsible to the SO2 Cadets at OACRES-A and, with the assistance of the Military District personnel branches, managed selection, promotion, appointment and termination of cadet staff. Similarly, coordination of training activities was conducted by the Cells with the aid of Military District operations branches, while the logistic branches assisted them in the provision of equipment and stores. The manning of the new Cadet Cells varied considerably between states. The 3rd Military District, for example, contained an Army Reserve lieutenant colonel, a major, a WO1, a WO2 and a sergeant with an ARA lieutenant and two ARA WO2s. At the same time the 2nd Military District had an Army Reserve major and captain with four ARA WO2s for almost twice as many cadets.39 (Figure 10A shows the command organisation of the ACC in 1990).40

39 Minute, Army Personnel Agency - Sydney to OACRES-A, dated July 1993. Defence Archives File 87/49959. 40 Brief, OACRES-A (internal) (1994). Defence Archives File 94/4387.

283 Figure 10A - Organisation of the ACC, 1990

COMD ACC (ACRES-A)

Director of Cadets (DACRES-A)

SO2 Cadets

HQ 1 MD HQ 2 MD HQ 3 MD HQ 4 MD HQ 5 MD HQ 6 MD HQ 7 MD* MAJ MAJ LTCOL CAPT WO1 WO2 CAPT CAPT MAJ WO1 WO2 WO1 WO2 x 4 CAPT WO2 SGT WO2 LT WO1 WO2 x 3 SGT

RCU – 17 RCU – 24 RCU – 15 RCU – 13 RCU – 15 RCU – 5 RCU – 1 LSU - 9 LSU - 23 LSU - 2 LSU - 0 LSU - 4 LSU - 0 LSU - 0

* There was no dedicated Cadet Cell or ACC Staff in 7 Military District.

Source: OACRES-A Brief on the ACC (1994). Defence Archives File 94/4387.

Further command instability surfaced in 1992 when the Military District system was dismantled entirely in favour of military ‘Regions’ established without headquarters personnel.41 These Regions were state and territory based except for Queensland which was divided into the North and South Queensland Regions. Direct control of cadet units remained with the Cadet Cells which were, for want of a better alternative, embedded within each Region’s Army Personnel Agencies (APA) except for Western Australia where the cell was located within the Western Region Defence Centre. Unfortunately, the placement of the Cadet Cells in APAs, whose primary responsibilities concerned personnel matters, and even in Defence Centres, whose role was administrative, removed them from the agencies that were required to provide support to their activities. This would not have been that case had they been relocated to Land Command or even Training Command.

As the turmoil of the LSU/RCU reorganisation settled cadet numbers rose steadily from a low point of 14,132 (137 units) in 1990 to 17,431 (173 units) in 1995 primarily as a result of increasing RCU enrolment rather than any revival of the

284 movement in schools. In 1990, however, the majority of cadets were still situated within LSUs which held 9,110 (64 per cent) of all ACC members (see Table 10B).42 Interestingly, this proportion stood despite the fact that Tasmania and South Australia maintained no school units at all and it was indicative of an overall sluggish response to the community-based concept. The average RCU at the time contained 72 cadets, as compared to 160 for LSUs, while schools whose cadet membership was compulsory had an average number of 245 per detachment, twice that of their voluntary counterparts and more than three times the size of the average community unit.43 By 1992, however, this balance had begun to shift and in 1993 it tipped in favour of the RCUs with 74 per cent of units containing 8,191 members (51 per cent of cadets). This trend persisted in the following year, with 16 new community units established, and continued up to 1996 (see Table 10C). 44

Table 10B - Breakdown of the ACC, 30 October 1990 RCUs LSUs State Units Officers Cadets Units Officers Cadets Qld 18 61 648 9 45 1,090 NSW/ACT 25 144 2,038 22 163 5,119 Victoria 14 59 898 12 128 2,516 SA 13 72 799 - - - WA 15 88 791 4 19 385 Tasmania 5 28 301 - - - NT 1 3 40 - - - Total 91 455 5,515 47 355 9,110

LSU Cadets RCU Cadets

Source: ACC Strength State as at 30 October 1990. Defence Archives File 87/49959.

41 The Regions were North and South Queensland Region, Eastern Region (NSW), Southern Region (Victoria), Central Region (South Australia), Western Region (Western Australia), Tasmanian Region and Northern Region (NT). 42 At this time 12 per cent of ACC members were female. 43 McAllister, J., ‘Schools, Enlistment, and Military Values: The Australian Services Cadet Scheme’, in Armed Forces and Society, Vol 22, Fall, 1995, p. 85. 44 OACRES-A Study of Support to ACC Annual Camps (pp. 1-2.). HQ AAC File 123/1/22(1).

285 Table 10C - Strength of the ACC, 1989-95

Region 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 North Qld - - - - 858 (10) 910 (10) 920 (10) South Qld 2,498 (24) * 1,245 (26) 2,826 (28) 3,209 (30) 2,449 (22) 2,410 (25) 2,728 (27) Eastern 7,534 (48) 7,157 (47) 6,715 (46) 7,062 (50) 7,032 (55) 7,192 (60) 7,547 (60) Southern 3,773 (27) 3,414 (26) 3,581 (30) 3,245 (30) 2,938 (28) 2,968 (30) 3,208 (29) Central 910 (13) 799 (13) 776 (13) 793 (12) 681 (13) 535 (13) 642 (14) Western 1,165 (16) 1,176 (19) 1,109 (20) 1,370 (20) 1,668 (23) 1,569 (23) 1,759 (24) Tasmania 315 (4) 301 (5) 313 (5) 349 (4) 361 (5) 523 (6) 509 (6) Northern 76 (1) 40 (1) 120 (3) 85 (2) 99 (2) 149 (3) 118 (3) Total 16,271 (133) 14,132 (137) 15,440 (145) 16,113 (148) 16,082 (158) 16,256 (170) 17,431 (173) * Parenthesis indicate the number of cadet units.

18,000 17,000 16,000 15,000 14,000 13,000 12,000 11,000 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995

Source: ACC Strength Returns (various) 1989-95. Defence Archives File 93/18148.

The LSU/RCU divide affected much more than cadet enrolment. In the context of deep structural division, the period 1983-95 represented an important but unofficial evolution of purpose for the cadet movement which, like the Thorne Study recommendations, sought to correct an imbalance between military and socio- educational objectives. On the surface, however, the official aim of the ASCS remained ‘to better equip young people for community life, by fostering initiative, leadership, discipline and loyalty through programs which are also designed to stimulate an interest in the services.’45 There is no question that this philosophy continued to emphasise the priority of youth development and accepted any defence benefits as purely secondary outcomes. Similarly, the aims of the ACC were unchanged from 1976 with the order of its objectives further indication of an official acceptance of the primacy of character development goals.46 The Minister for Defence

45 Thorne, ACC Study, p. 2. 46 It was ‘to give cadets a foundation of army knowledge and discipline; to develop the qualities of leadership, self-reliance and initiative; to develop an interest in the army and its traditions; and to

286 Science and Personnel, J.P. Faulkner, confirmed this viewpoint in 1993 in responding to the NSW Branch of the RSL who complained that Australia ‘cannot afford to adopt a weak-kneed and wimpy approach to defence’, and that ‘we need a starting point from which to build our defences and there is no better way than from regional cadets.’ The Minister replied that ‘cadets are not considered young soldiers, but members of a youth organisation that looks to develop initiative, leadership and loyalty. Interest in the services is an important but not a crucial by-product.’47 In the same vein in 1994 OACRES-A briefed Faulkner that ‘we should not be training our children in the concepts of war and, to that end, warlike training has not been in the program for the Australian Cadet Corps since the reintroduction of the cadet scheme.’48

These official sentiments and statements were not, however, entirely representative of wider army opinion in that they failed to acknowledge a small but growing resurgence of interest by elements within the army in the military benefits of the ACC. The primary stimulant for this line of thought remained recruitment. After a decade of under-emphasis and thanks to seeds planted by the Thorne Study, many army officers became increasingly aware of the importance of the ACC as a conduit to adult military service. Plain statistics spoke loudly in this respect, with, in 1989 two per cent of the eligible male population involved in the ACC accounting for 10 per cent of ARA recruits and 19 per cent of army apprentices. Although this proportion had decreased over the previous twenty years it remained significant. In Tasmania in 1987-88, from an ACC population of 295, 50 joined the ARA and 117 the Army Reserve (53 per cent).49 In 1991, at the Royal Military College, Duntroon, 28 per cent of officer candidates were ex-ACC members while at the Australian Defence Force Academy (ADFA) 30 per cent were former cadets (Table 10D shows ex-cadet enlistees into the ARA from 1989-92).50 Although this re-emerging military awareness did not shape the organisation significantly in this period it became an important consideration after 1995.

encourage cadets to continue in some form of military service.’ Brief, OACRES-A (internal) (1994). Defence Archives File 94/4387. 47 Letter, Minister to RSL (NSW Branch), dated 3 March 1993. Defence Archives File 94/7376. 48 Brief, OACRES-A to the Office of the Minster for Defence Science and Personnel (1994). Defence Archives File 94/7376. 49 Thorne, ACC Study, p. 6.

287 Table 10D – Ex-Cadet Enlistees into the ARA, 1989-92 Quarter General Entry ADFA RMC Apprentices % Ex-cadets 30 Nov 89 35 - - - 5.82 28 Feb 90 17 - - - 3.75 31 May 90 37 - - - 5.93 31 Aug 90 34 - - - 4.09 30 Nov 90 19 - - - 3.91 28 Feb 91 36 9 15 18 6.91 31 May 91 45 2 6 - 5.77 31 Aug 91 7 - - - 1.14 30 Nov 91 8 - - 1 5.29 29 Feb 92 17 15 - 16 13.17 Source: Minute (Annex), OACRES (internal) (1992). Defence Archives File 94/4387.

Compounding the influence of ex-cadet military recruitment statistics, in 1995 an investigation was conducted by Professor Ian McAllister, head of the Politics Department at ADFA, which concluded that with a little more military commitment the ACC could become an even greater recruiting and retention tool. McAllister found a ‘strong link between cadet membership and institutional (military) values’ and by virtue of that fact ex-cadets ‘had a greater intention of serving longer in the military.’51 His study pointed to the importance of cadethood in shaping military attitudes and promoting the notion of military service among adolescents. The inculcation of values emphasising commitment meant, ipso facto, ‘longer periods of service for those that enlisted.’52 McAllister concluded his study by pointing to the cost-effectiveness of the ACC in both recruiting and retention for the army. He believed that it ‘far outweighs other informal means of recruitment, such as media advertisements, in cost effectiveness’; especially poignant as the defence budget for recruiting advertisements was four times the total cost of the ASCS in 1995.53 Such conclusions were taken on board by many senior officers who, by the end of the period, had begun to critically analyse the official philosophy of the ACC.54

50 Huston, J., ‘The Australian Cadet Corps – Lost Opportunities’, in Australian Defence Force Journal, No 89, July-August, 1991, p. 18. 51 McAllister, Schools, Enlistment, and Military Values, pp. 86 & 96. 52 ibid. 53 ibid., pp. 90, 95 & 98. 54 The Army Personnel Agency – Brisbane, for example, conducted its own survey in March 1996 to attempt to quantify long-standing anecdotal evidence that ACC members subsequently went on to join the Services. It found that from 1990-95 a total of 459 (7.4%) of ex-cadets joined as officers or other ranks from the South Queensland region. Brief, APA-B to OACRES-A, dated June 1996. Defence Archives File 93/18148.

288 The first sparks of a similar evolution of attitude were also present in the education sector during this period. Overtly at least, the school system remained enthusiastic about the non-military character of the ACC. The commander of the Canberra Grammar Cadet Unit in the 1990s, J.B. Windeyer, for example, was pleased that the army had ‘increased in understanding of the educational aspects of the corps … training has moved a long distance from the “platoon in attack” to less specifically military adventure-style training.’55 From the early 1990s, however, it was possible to trace a burgeoning counter-movement in opposition to the entrenched anti-military feelings of the 1970s. Some teachers, like N.J. Clark, headmaster of Mentone Grammar School in Melbourne, believed that ‘to persist in regarding any military interest or activity as unwholesome or even anti-educational is to condemn the nation to a purely passive role in shaping, or protecting its own destiny.’ He considered that the ‘parental and educational generation’ was ‘haunted by the ghosts of Vietnam’ and therefore reluctant to allow the cadet movement to function as it should, blaming ‘the doctrinaire views of a narrow and obsolete pedagogy, incapable of envisioning the “complete and generous education” to which a healthy cadet organisation could contribute so much.’56 Clark also noted that ‘there were no votes to be had in espousing anything of a military nature, particularly in schools’ as ‘the obstructionist dogma of the Teacher's Union will see to that.’57 He need not have been so pessimistic as the kernel of reform he represented, like gradual and parallel developments in military thinking, was destined to produce results in the longer term.

That military attitudes towards the purpose of the ACC were starting to soften by 1995 does not alter the fact that the period was characterised by a continuing lack of support to it from the army. Not surprisingly such a decline corresponded with a steady reduction in overall defence spending between 1983-95 (see Table 10E). Just as surely as fiscal restraint pitted military and educational forces against each other in the creation of the LSU/RSU divide, so too a lack of money inspired levels of army material support barely sufficient for the organisation to function. Clearly the net military commitment to the organisation was slashed with the decision to withdraw

55 The Armidale School, The Armidilian, 1985, p. 102, & Canberra Grammar School Cadet Discussion Paper, dated June 1990. CGSA C9 (Cadets Box 1), Item: General. 56 Clark, N., ‘Of Peace and War – The Value of and Need for Military Service and Discipline’, in Independence, Vol 16, No 2, October 1991, p. 41. 57 ibid., p. 42.

289 military backing from school-based units. Even within this context, however, army support remained consistently below that required; especially as RCUs became more numerous in the 1990s. In 1983 the army manned 100 military positions within the ACC and shouldered $9.5 million in total costs per annum. By 1989 this had slumped to 12 ARA positions with at an overall cost of $2.26 million.58 In addition to drastically reduced financial and personnel allocations was an overall reduction in the military ranks of what few support staff remained. The senior ARA officer solely charged with cadet matters in 1995, for example, was a captain at the APA Brisbane.59 Under such circumstances units like that at Scots College, Sydney, were able to legitimately claim that ‘no member of the army has been sighted for years.’60

Table 10E – Defence Expenditure as a Percentage of GDP, 1983-95 2.8

2.6

2.4

2.2

2

1.8

/84 /86 88 /89 91 /92 /94 83 85 86/87 88 89/90 91 93 94/95 9 9 9 9 9 9 1 1984/85 19 1 1987/ 1 1 1990/ 1 1992/93 19 1 1995/96 Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2001 Special Article - Defence Expenditure Over the Century, ABS Homepage, www.abs.gov.au.

Obviously, the units that suffered most from a lack of army support from 1983- 95 were LSUs. The Guildford Grammar School detachment in Western Australia reported that ‘1984 could be described as a year of disaster … due to the final blow from the government … no support except in name only, no camps, no stores, no uniforms and generally no assistance.’61 If school units wanted these items they were forced to purchase them from the army.62 For surviving school detachments all planning, training, re-supply and even casualty evacuation during cadet activities was organised and carried out as a unit responsibility. To defray associated costs many

58 Thorne, ACC Study, p. 10, & Minute, OACRES-A to Chief of the General Staff (1990). Defence Archives File 98/6065. 59 OACRES-A Study of Support to ACC Annual Camps (p. 1-3.). HQ AAC File 123/1/22(1). 60 Thorne, ACC Study, p. 8. 61 Guildford Grammar School, The Swan, 1984, p. 30.

290 schools adopted a bond system where the cost of a uniform was paid by a cadet’s parents and refunded at the completion of service. Often parental committees were formed and tasked with provisioning rations, supplying transport, searching out stores and equipment and providing cooks at camps and bivouacs.63 Civilian CB sets were purchased in lieu of military radios while training stores were made by volunteers or begged and borrowed from parents who ‘knew the right people.’64 Across the country schools had no choice but to impose annual levies on their cadets. Trinity College in NSW charged them $100 each while St Virgil’s College, Tasmania, asked for $40 per member. Other units covered direct costs but required parents to pay for uniforms: $80 per cadet at The King’s School (NSW), $135 each at Knox Grammar (NSW) and $40 at Guildford Grammar (Western Australia). Alternatively, some were forced to allocate finance each year to their cadets from general school fees. Mentone Grammar in Victoria committed $40,000 per annum from school funds to support its unit.65 Such remedies were only successful, however, where schools and parents were wealthy enough to fund them.

By 1989, five years without army support saw many school units struggling to maintain themselves with detachments often reduced to conducting fund-raising activities in order to survive. The James Ruse Agricultural High School unit in NSW described such endeavour as ‘a waste of time and energy, but the situation is critical as equipment runs down.’66 This state of affairs was inexplicable to school unit representatives like Robert Outterside, headmaster of Sydney Boys High School, who commented that ‘the army, which stands to gain most from cadet training does nothing to help. I cannot understand this.’67 As the Thorne Study discovered, the military lost credibility and control of school units who legitimately asked ‘what right had the army to tell us what to do – they do nothing for us.’68 Relations between the army and LSUs moved, in many cases, to breaking point with schools contending that ‘the image of the army is increasingly less healthy (The Kings School)’; that ‘army support is poor and even when promised cannot be relied upon … cadets are treated as a pain in the

62 Thorne, ACC Study, p. 2. 63 McAdams, The Lesson Plan That Worked, p. 61. 64 ibid. 65 Memo, Canberra Grammar School (internal) (1985), CGSA C9 (Cadets Box 1), Item: General. 66 Thorne, ACC Study, p. 11. 67 ibid., p. 12. 68 ibid., p. 11.

291 neck (Barker College)’; and that army staff were not ‘helpful at all, they consider that cadets are a nuisance … their attitude is that cadets are the lowest of the low (Pittwater Group of Schools).’ Such growing antipathy towards the military led Brigadier F.J. Cross, Commander of the 2nd Military District, to conclude that ‘cadets have become almost impossible to manage as a disciplined force.’69 In response to this alarming trend in 1989 and again in 1990 Major General R.G. Fay, ACRES-A, made submissions to Army Office for increased support to LSUs by trying to exploit the nexus between ACC funding and improved recruiting and retention in the army as identified by the Thorne Report.70 More money, however, could not be found.

While generally faring better than their school based counterparts, RCUs were not immune to the impact of inadequate army support. Despite the CGS, Lieutenant General Gration’s, direction in 1984 that ‘these elements [RCUs] will continue to be fully supported’, delays and shortages in supplying clothing and equipment were frequent.71 Concern over the level of support provided to community-based units prompted Major General D.R. Luttrell, ACRES-A, to write to a number of key army commanders in September 1992 complaining that conditions of financial restraint had led many foster units ‘to reduce what has been promised’ to ‘the detriment of the ACC’. He ordered Army Reserve fosters to ‘include in your training directives scope for commanders to allocate time and resources to the administration and support of cadet units.’72 The situation did not improve. In a further largely unsuccessful effort to address the issue of inadequate support, Luttrell called an inaugural Commander of Cadets Conference in August 1993 during which he revealed his growing concern over the army’s ability to provide the manpower, equipment and funding necessary to meet its RCU commitments. Many grievances were aired by ACC representatives but no solutions were tabled.73

69 ibid., p. 12. 70 Brief, OACRES-A to Army Office (1990). Defence Archives File 87/49959. 71 Minute, Chief of the General Staff to OACRES-A (1984). Defence Archives File 87/49959. 72 Minute, OACRES-A to Cadet Foster Units, dated 11 September 1992. Defence Archives File 98/6065. 73 At the Conference regional ACC representatives pointed specifically to the damaging effect of a 70 day per annum limit placed on Army Reserve personnel supporting the cadet organisation (a 50 per cent cut from the previous year). This reduction meant that Reservists had difficulty in effectively planning and conducting cadet activities. The Cadet Cell in North Queensland reported its allocation as insufficient ‘for cadet staff to carry out their duties.’ Minute, Army Personnel Agency -Townsville to OACRES-A, dated November 1996. Defence Archives File 93/18148.

292 From 1987 the burden of supporting the ACC had been transferred to the Army Reserve. Previously cadet detachments were supported by the nearest appropriate army unit depending on the nature of the assistance required but from this point unit fosters assumed full responsibility for resourcing their cadets. Given the magnitude of the task inevitable difficulties were soon forthcoming. The constant pressure of limited Army Reserve expenditure meant, for example, that while the seven day annual camp for RCUs continued to be supported there was no longer any capacity for army funded bivouacs. Complicating this issue was a reticence by many Army Reserve units to properly engage their affiliated cadets. This issue was of such concern that from 1993 fosters were required to sign Memoranda of Understanding with respect to their cadet duties.74 Again, however, this initiative failed to solve the problem. In November 1995, for example, the Wauchope sub-branch of the RSL wrote to R.F. Ray, Minister for Defence, complaining bitterly about the level of support provided to RCUs. It was disgusted that its local unit was forced ‘to resort to car-washing and street stalls for funding.’75 In the following year the overall allocation of Army Reserve training days in support of the ACC was reduced by nine per cent with units in North Queensland Region, although requiring $37,254 worth of Army Reserve time to function, allocated only $27,375. In general terms there were not enough support days to cover scheduled cadet activities leaving annual camps and range practices dangerously understaffed.76

Ironically, at the same time that the removal of army assistance from school cadet units was devastating many LSUs and inadequate support was seriously impacting upon RCUs, the ACC continued to maintain a commitment to provide what assistance it could back to the army. Cadet detachments contributed to their foster units during range days by providing sentries and regularly allocated personnel for demonstration purposes in support of Army Reserve promotion courses.77 By performing such duties in 1989 the ACC saved the army 9,379 man-days.78 In

74 Directive, OACRES-A to Army Reserve Foster Units (1993). Defence Archives File 93/18148. 75 Tables, ACC Forecast and Expenditure (1996). Defence Archives File 92/15354. 76 Similarly, the Eastern Region camp of that year was allocated $73,000 rather than the $90,000 it requested and in Tasmania a number of Army Reserve personnel assisted ACC activities without being paid at all. Against this backdrop the Defence Reform Program, under which the army rationalised many of its property assets, began to seriously effect many RCUs making use of military facilities. ibid. 77 McAdams, The Lesson Plan That Worked, p. 62. 78 Minute, ACRES-A to Deputy Chief of the General Staff, dated November 1990. Defence Archives File 94/4387.

293 Victoria alone in this year the cadet organisation provided the army with the equivalent of $152,000 worth of ceremonial and Army Reserve training support.79

One aspect of the cadet organisation particularly vulnerable to the implications of the LSU/RCU divide and barely adequate levels of army support were its adult staff. From 1984 a clear distinction arose between officers of cadets working in RCUs and those in LSUs with the latter receiving neither the uniforms nor allowances provided to their community-based counterparts.80 Commensurate difficulties in retaining officers in school units, combined with a perpetual problem of recruiting adult staff in RCUs not supported by a school teaching faculties, inspired an important innovation in 1988 when adult ‘instructor of cadets’ positions were established. This initiative allowed the appointment of former ARA and Army Reserve NCOs to cadet units in ranks similar to those they held in the adult services. Although there had been provision for adult NCOs within cadet units in the past, for the first time in its history significant numbers became part of the organisation.81 Although most other conditions of service for adult ACC staff remained unchanged from the late 1970s, meagre levels of military commitment ensured festering issues, like the provision of an ACC long service medal, remained unresolved despite a multitude of public submissions to the Minister for Defence and a number of representations to high level army and defence committees.82

A second contentious issue for the ACC in the period 1983-95, reflecting both the universal impact of limited army material support along with the effect of continuing official concentration on non-military outcomes for the movement, concerned cadet weapons. Even though operational weapons had been previously removed from cadet unit armouries, the cost of providing and maintaining ‘innocuous’ and ‘drill’ rifles, combined with concern over their security, became important issues

79 Minute, Army Personnel Agency - Melbourne to OACRES-A (1989). Defence Archives File 87/49959. 80 Minute, OARES-A to Cadet Cells (1988). Defence Archives File 87/25794. 81 Like officers of cadets in RCUs these individuals were appointed by Military District commanders and were required to attend qualification courses. Instructors of cadets in LSUs were generally appointed upon the recommendation of headmasters and did not regularly attend courses. Minute, OACRES-A to Cadet Cells (1988). Defence Archives File 87/49959. 82 In 1994 Major General D.R. Lutterall wrote to G.F. Punch, the Minister for Defence Science and Personnel, in strong support of such a medal. His efforts, however, were not successful. Brief, OACRES-A for COSC (1992). HQ AAC File 123/1/13, & Letter, ACRES-A to Minister for Defence Science and Personnel, dated 4 November 1994. HQ AAC File 123/1/13.

294 for the army. In the decade up to 1996 189 innocuous or drill SLRs along with 14 SLR magazines, 4 breech blocks, and even a ‘safe’ 66mm anti-armour weapon went missing from cadet units. As a result, from 1991 only weapons without internal moving parts were allowed to remain at detachment locations which left the ratio of SLRs to cadets in most units at about one to four.83 Additional security requirements from 1994 meant that many units were forced to store their weapons at local Army Reserve depots and in 1995 all remaining SLRs were gradually withdrawn pending the issue of the new F88 Austeyr rifle.84 This string of restrictive weapon policies was resented by most cadet units and served to deepen feelings of antipathy towards the army.

An investigation of cadet training in the period 1983-95 is a useful case study of the impact of the range of difficulties facing the movement in the era. The effect of inadequate military support, the growing divide between LSUs and RCUs, and nascent agitation against the ACC’s strict non-military orientation permeated the range of cadet activities. Officially, home training programs maintained a non-combat focus with instruction in navigation, map reading, radio communication, first-aid, instructional techniques and survival training detailed within a revised syllabus, known as ACC Training Management Package (TMP), from December 1992. According to the TMP such activities were to occupy around 80 per cent of the year’s home training time with the remaining 20 per cent allocated for adventure training like roping, rappelling, and canoeing.85 With an eye to its character-building function, in most cases CUOs and SNCOs actually planned home training programs under the supervision of adult staff and the vast majority of instruction was given by cadets.86 The commander of the Canberra Grammar School unit captured the spirit of such practices when he wrote in 1987 that ‘we do not train boys to lead and exercise

83 Concern over these losses was compounded by the realisation, in 1991, that it was possible to restore most weapons previously classified as ‘drill purpose’ to ‘operational’ states. Minute (Annex), OACRES-A to Cadet Units (1992). Defence Archives File 98/6065. 84 Minute, OACRES-A to Cadet Units (1995). Defence Archives File 94/7376. 85 From 1994 the army set about aligning some aspects of ACC training with the Army Reserve recruit training syllabus – less that which was combat related. The idea was that upon enlistment in the Army Reserve, cadets who had completed the ACC syllabus, including terminal tests of training would attend a five-day conversion course to qualify them as private soldiers. A trial of one such ‘conversion course’ was run on 1 January 1995. Minute, OACRES-A to Cadet Units, dated December 1992. Defence Archives File 93/18148, & Brief, OACRES-A (internal) (1994). Defence Archives File 94/4387. 86 Canberra Grammar School Cadet Discussion Paper, dated June 1990. CGSA C9 (Cadets Box 1), Item: General.

295 responsibility in order that they should watch while officers of cadets train their troops and solve their problems.’87

Although officially sanctioned these home training guidelines were not universally followed. With independence born of army neglect LSU training programs widened the division between themselves and their RCU counterparts. A large proportion paid increasingly less attention to official ACC training principles and in many cases, by 1989, the subjects outlined in the TMP were neither followed nor monitored in school units. Indeed, in a number of schools the lack of army contact meant that little ACC approved training was conducted at all.88 As Rockhampton Grammar School suggested ‘the unit is of necessity moving away from the military and its traditions.’89 School detachments placed their own priorities ahead of ACC policy. In NSW in 1985, for example, cadets at The Armidale School introduced a ‘bush furniture making’ course as well as ‘many activities that had been part of the school’s old ranger program’, while Trinity Grammar School cadets in NSW were taught self-defence techniques during their home training periods. Echoing the sentiments of many LSUs, Canberra Grammar School considered its unit’s home training schedule as ‘more a part of the school than part of the Australian Cadet Corps within the school.’90

By far the most significant manifestation of LSU home training autonomy, perhaps inspired by sparks of a counter-movement in concepts of purpose for the movement, was a re-emergence of warlike activities. Officially, any training that included a real or imaginary enemy or activities instigated by incoming or outgoing fire such as ambushes, contact drills, attacks, or fire and movement remained forbidden.91 During this period, however, increasing numbers of school units ignored such direction with instances of combat training becoming common enough by 1989 for the 2nd Military District headquarters to write to all detachments in NSW noting that it ‘was evident that some units are conducting training not authorised nor

87 Memo, Canberra Grammar School (internal), dated 24 February 1987. CGSA C9 (Cadets Box 1), Item: General. 88 Thorne, ACC Study, p. 7. 89All Souls’ and St. Gabriel’s School (Charters Towers), The Phoenix, 1984, p. 13. 90 The Armidale School, The Armidilian, 1985, p. 97, & Canberra Grammar School Cadet Discussion Paper, dated June 1990. CGSA C9 (Cadets Box 1), Item: General. 91 Brief, OACRES-A (internal) (1994). Defence Archives File 94/4387.

296 condoned by either the army or the ACC. This type of training is generally tactical in nature and involves the use of weapons.’92 Sensitive to ‘community attitudes to violence and perceived “Rambo” activities’, the letter clearly attested that ‘the army will not tolerate training which contravenes the letter or spirit of this instruction.’93 With the gap between it and school units widening, however, there was a limit to what the army could do to stop it.

Many LSUs drifted towards combat training because they found it difficult, in an atmosphere of almost non-existent military involvement, to maintain the interest of their cadets in any other way. Most large private schools had developed a range of alternate outdoor activities or education programs which no longer left the cadet unit as the sole or even dominant form of this experience. Consequently, fewer encouraged or compelled students to become cadets and these types of schools, the traditional home of large and influential detachments, began to see their cadet numbers decline. In contemplating its impending disbandment, the Cranbrook School Cadet Unit in Sydney wrote that ‘with the development of the link with Outward Bound the experiences and skills being offered to Cranbrookians will be immeasurably wider than those offered through the cadet unit.’94 Similarly, in 1990 the Canberra Grammar School unit was disbanded primarily as a result of ‘steadily declining numbers of boys seeking to join the cadets when faced with a choice between cadets, scouts and the outdoor training group.’95 Just as surely as the withdrawal of support in 1984 had spelt the immediate end of most state school detachments, so too, as the period progressed, sustained army neglect was gradually wearing down the movement in private schools.

Despite unremitting financial and resource pressure on the ACC, from 1983 the army once again began to support a limited number of cadet promotion courses. Of course, with the advent of RCUs never in a position to run their own, it had little alternative. The conduct of such courses emphasised the divisions within and between LSUs and RCUs. First, unlike community-based detachments, school units were

92 Letter, 2nd Military District to Cadet Units, dated 18 September 1989. CGSA C9 (Cadets Box 1), Item: General. 93 ibid. 94 Canberra Grammar School Cadet Discussion Paper, dated June 1990. CGSA C9 (Cadets Box 1), Item: General. 95 Letter, Canberra Grammar School Cadet Unit to Parents, dated 1 November 1990. CGSA C9 (Cadets Box 1), Item: General.

297 commonly excluded from all but CUOs courses and were therefore forced to conduct the majority of promotion training from within their own resources.96 As was the case previously, smaller schools were forced to band together for this purpose. In 1984, for example, Victorian units from Northwood High School, Seymour and Shepparton Technical Schools combined at Camberwell Grammar to hold their NCO courses.97 At the other end of the spectrum large wealthy private schools generally managed the extra burden with ease. NCO training was conducted by Newington College in Sydney that was internally resourced well enough to culminate in a continuous five-day camp at the school property.98 Second, in a further illustration of LSU independence, the Cadet Cells unsuccessfully directed that only potential CUOs attending army-run courses were eligible for promotion. This order was largely ignored by school-based units across the country.99

The scarcity of material resources severely affected the conduct of weekend bivouacs with all units forced to plan, pay for and conduct them without any army support. As a result most ran no more than two per year unless Cadet Cells or foster units could, in rare instances, supply the necessary resources for more. As was the case for cadet courses, associated costs encouraged LSUs to conduct combined activities, and in accordance with a wider trend, many designed bivouac activities as team- building or problem-solving exercises that had little to do with the cadet TMP. The Canberra Grammar unit noted of its bivouacs that ‘there is not very much military [in nature] about trying to release fake fish into real rivers or to distribute real self- government medals in polling booths to win fake self-government referenda.’100 Significantly, for both RCUs and LSUs, affiliations with army foster units occasionally yielded unique bivouac opportunities. The St Paul’s School Cadet Unit in Queensland, for example, had a very close association with the army’s 140 Signals

96 In 1996 the curriculum for the NCO promotion course included instructional techniques, drill, public speaking, administration and roll-book maintenance, planning training, leadership, fieldcraft, navigation, radio operation, and first-aid. 97 Camberwell Grammar School, The Camberwell Grammarian, 1984, p. 11. 98 Newington College, The Newingtonian, 1994, p. 61. 99 Apart from promotional activities, the range and style of other ACC courses continued without significant change. One minor exception, in 1993, occurred when officers and instructors of cadets became eligible to attend a newly developed Restricted Drivers Course run by the army to lessen the cadet unit driver support liability for Army Reserve foster units. Minute, OACRES-A to Cadet Units (1993). Defence Archives File 93/28537. 100 Canberra Grammar School Cadet Discussion Paper, dated June 1990. CGSA C9 (Cadets Box 1), Item: General.

298 Squadron which regularly invited cadets to participate in the weekend training run for its adult Army Reserve soldiers.101

Although annual cadet camps from 1983-95 possessed many features common to those of the late 1970s, a growing split was evident between army-run grouped activities, which became almost the sole purview of RCUs, and continuing school- based camps.102 Like weekend bivouacs (and understandably given that schools shouldered most costs) LSU camps became individualistic and again tended not to reflect TMP training objectives. The Camberwell Grammar School unit in Victoria recorded in 1984 that ‘the changed relationship with the army has allowed a greater flexibility in the program’ with its cadets becoming increasingly involved in abseiling and canoeing.103 This example was followed by Guilford Grammar School in Western Australia whose cadets rafted down the Avon river for ‘a very exciting three days of upturned canoes and dodging rocks in and out of bushes.’104 Cases of LSUs abandoning traditional camp formats grew even more prevalent in the 1990s with The Southport School camp, in Queensland in 1992, embracing fitness tests, a muscle toughening course, quick decision exercises, orienteering competitions, and SES rescue activities.105 That LSUs were free to plan camp activities as they saw fit does not belie the fact that they often faced considerable difficulties in running them and, in truth, a large measure of innovation reflected resourcing difficulties as much as a rejection of traditionally styled camp programs. Such problems were well illustrated by the St Patrick’s College (Goulburn) cadet camp of 1988. For want of more appropriate facilities the event was run out of the local RSL Youth Club building with parents used to instruct cadets in various subjects. Fresh water was provided by a volunteer bushfire unit and electricity came from generators loaned from a local farmer.106

In line with developments in LSU home training, one important direction in which many school-run camps drifted was towards a re-implementation of combat related training. In 1984 the Aquinas College Cadet Unit in Western Australia

101 Geise, St Paul’s School Cadet Unit, p. 47. 102 If LSUs attended army run camps they were forced to pay all associated costs. 103 Camberwell Grammar School, The Camberwell Grammarian, 1984, p. 11. 104 Guildford Grammar School, The Swan, 1983, p. 35. 105 The Southport School, The Southportonian, 1992, pp. 82-83

299 conducted a five-day camp that included patrolling and ambushing while the Sydney Grammar Cadet camps of the period regularly included military-styled escape and evasion exercises.107 So too, in 1986 the St Patrick’s College (Goulburn) detachment raised a Weapons and Tactics Platoon whose cadets took part in a ‘tactical village search’ and fired SLRs, Lee Enfields and .22 calibre rifles. The highlight of this camp entailed an ‘Eye Spy’ exercise that pitted cadet companies against each other in close tactical reconnaissance activities.108 Similarly, Sydney-based cadets from Knox Grammar School, encamped at Lithgow NSW, conducted their entire camp in a tactical context such that fictional ‘Kamerian Forces’ regularly harassed and attacked them throughout. The Knox cadets were forced to behave in an operational military manner at all times; including the use of sentries, cover and concealment.109

Contrasting with these individualistic school-run activities, grouped army- administered camps, attended predominantly by RCUs, were still styled as a series of centrally conducted events following the cadet TMP. A useful example of such a camp was that run in Eastern Region between 20 September and 3 October 1995. The activity was held at Singleton and all RCUs in NSW were invited to attend. The aim of the camp was to provide cadets with the ‘opportunity to conduct collective training and to have validated their previous year’s training’ with the Army Reserve providing the bulk of the support personnel. Instruction ran from 6.00 a.m. to 6.00 p.m. daily with individual cadet detachments inserted into specific unit areas and not permitted out of them unless it was to conduct a centralised activity such as an explosive ordnance display, range practices, a confidence course, roping, rappelling, an obstacle course, field engineer training or two short field exercises designed to train and assess cadet platoons in navigation and bushcraft skills. When not participating in these activities units organised their own intra-unit training.110

Although run by the army, these annual camps, like most aspects of the movement in this period, suffered from chronically inadequate support. An official report of 21 April 1983 explained this problem in terms of conflicting priorities within

106 Trinity Grammar School, The Triangle, 1986, p. 135. 107 Aquinas College, Aquinas, 1984, p. 42, & Sydney Grammar School, The Sydneian, 1984, p. 85 & 1990, p. 35. 108 Trinity Grammar School, The Triangle, 1986, p. 135. 109 Knox Grammar School, The Knox Grammarian, 1990, p. 56.

300 Commands and Military Districts but recognition of this fact did not equate to a remedy.111 As a result of limited available resources a quota system was imposed on the number of cadets admitted to army-run camps in 1987. In NSW, for example, the 2nd Military District was permitted 1,500 participants that year despite the fact that there were 2,600 RCU members in the state at the time. Indeed, in 1988 and 1989, all army-run camps in Queensland were cancelled due to the unavailability of stores and other resources.112 This unsatisfactory state of affairs was not lost on RCUs who were well aware of their entitlement to full support. In 1990, for example, a ministerial complaint was made on behalf of 208 RCU about support to the 2nd Military District annual camp contending that ‘the Australian army is falling well short in its share of the support required to produce an effective youth organisation in the Australian Cadet Corps.’ At this camp a range of stores entitled under ACC regulations were simply not present while ‘transport and tentage were lacking.’113

Nor did the situation improve as the 1990s progressed. The Minister for Defence Science and Personnel, Faulkner, received several complaints regarding the provision of transport, personnel, the quality of food, and unsafe range practices at the 1993 annual army-run cadet camp in South Queensland. Although the army rejected many of these claims they served to illustrate a concrete perception of a lack of military commitment by growing numbers of parents and officers of cadets in community-based units.114 In 1995, a number of parents of cadets from 214 RCU wrote letters of complaint to Faulkner’s replacement, G.F. Punch, concerning the 1995 Eastern Region Cadet Camp. They pointed to unsuitable food, unhygienic toilet facilities, wet sleeping conditions and inadequate showers. In this case the army conceded that there had been problems due to wider obligations (Exercise Kangaroo ’95) but maintained that while the complaints were substantively true, the severity of the problems was exaggerated.115

110 Report of the Eastern Region Cadet Camp (1995). Defence Archives File 93/15827. 111 Report, OACRES-A to Chief of the General Staff, dated 21 April 1983. Defence Archives File 87/31749. 112 Minute, 1st Military District to Field Force Command (1989). Defence Archives File 87/49959. 113 Ministerial Representation, (1990). Defence Archives File 90/33830. 114 Ministerial Representations (various) (1993). Defence Archives File 98/6065. 115 Ministerial Representation (1996). Defence Archives File 96/874.

301 By November 1995 difficulties surrounding the ACC camp system had become serious enough for Major General Stephen Golding, the new ACRES-A, to direct a study be undertaken into them. The investigation was led by Lieutenant Colonel H.P.M. Hoebee and its results were tabled in January 1996. In spite of a string of government and military statements to the contrary Hoebee concluded that army’s basic capacity to support the ACC had progressively eroded since 1976. He pointed to continual reorganisations, unit amalgamations, army rationalisations, outmoded support requesting procedures, the raising of the Ready Reserve, and a limitation on Army Reserve training days as all contributing to the problem. In general terms Hoebee found that army support for cadet camps was ‘sometimes inadequate’, that it ‘reflects poorly on the army’ and could have ‘undesirable safety and welfare consequences.’116 To address these problems Hoebee made a number of key recommendations. Among them he advocated that the army’s commitment to the ACC be made ‘non-discretionary’ and that policy be drafted to formalise and standardise army support. He also suggested that a thorough investigation of the ACC command and management structure be undertaken with specific emphasis on the cadet unit/foster unit relationship.117 Of vital importance for the cadet movement, the army executed Hoebee’s recommendation for a general review of the ACC in what became known as the Brewer Report; a document that was to have deep and far reaching consequences from 1996.

The period 1983-95 was a difficult time for the ACC. It was marked by institutionalised division and a paucity of army support as the same fiscal, military, educational and social factors that had shaped the post-1976 organisation continued to exert their influence. The critical LSU/RCU schism, effectively halving the army’s commitment to the ACC, was a product of ongoing financial pressure in the context of official denial of the military importance of the organisation. There was a price to be paid for this neglect as LSUs either disbanded or distanced themselves from the ACC establishment. Nobody, apart perhaps from those preparing the defence budget or drafting official army statements, was entirely pleased with the situation. Despite such difficulties the organisation endured and the first stirrings of a counter-movement

116 OACRES-A Study of Support to ACC Annual Camps (pp. 1-2.). HQ AAC File 123/1/22(1). 117 The army’s immediate response to Lieutenant Colonel Hoebee’s report was to rewrite the ACC Policy Manual and draft a new Defence Instruction on support to the ACC. ibid., pp. 17-18.

302 began to surface. Elements within the military, equipped with evidence like that provided in the Thorne Study, began to re-focus on the recruiting and other benefits the ACC provided to the army and, accordingly, started to question the direction in which the organisation was moving. Educators articulated their dissatisfaction more directly by expressing their autonomy with little heed for army policy. The ACC in 1995 was not a healthy organisation. It was under-funded, disunited and discontented. A point had been reached where such issues and imbalances required correction or the movement risked a perilous future.

303 Correct as at: 17 Feb 06

Word Count: 10,838 / 11,991 CHAPTER ELEVEN

Healing, Harmony & Hope 1996 – 2004

A considerable change of fortune befell the cadet movement in the period 1996-2004. In contrast to the preceding era, rifts were healed, disparities corrected, and a successful balance finally struck between the financial, social, military and educational foundations of the organisation. Stability and vitality replaced the division, neglect and decay of the late 1980s and early 1990s. The path to this point of strength is traced by first examining the practical and philosophical implications of two key investigations into the ASCS in the Brewer Report (1996) and the Topley Report (2000). Second, as a measure of the progress made by the movement in this period, the level of official support provided and developments concerning the purpose of the movement are analysed. Finally, a case study of cadet training and activities is used to emphasise the symmetry and success of the cadet organisation of 2004.

True to historical precedent, improvements in circumstances for the cadet movement coincided with the Liberal/National coalition’s decisive federal election victory of 2 March 1996. Once again a series of conservative governments heralded a period of sustained organisational achievement which contrasted sharply with the difficulties of the Labor years. Staunch political support for cadets from consecutive Howard ministries buttressed the ASCS and facilitated rapid and extensive reform of the tri-service organisation and its contingent service elements. What emerged by 2004 was an army cadet movement characterised by a greater sense of professionalism replete with sufficient funding, growing social acceptance, a stronger military commitment, and renewed engagement from the education sector.1

The turning point for the ACC was a military investigation of the ASCS established in May 1996. The inquiry, chaired by Colonel C.J. Brewer, was prompted

1 Funding was sufficient in a holistic sense from 1996-2004. That is not to suggest, however, that there were no specific issues of financial concern in the period. In 2003/04, for example, $3.1 million was allocated for adult staff salaries which represented a cut of 16 per cent, in real terms, on the previous year. Cadet headquarter staff complained that the reduction would have ‘serious consequences on the conduct of cadet activities’ from which ‘adverse community and political reaction is likely to result’. Brief, HQ AAC to AHQ, dated April 2004. HQ AAC File, 2004/1029230/1.

304 by concerns ‘about whether or not [the ASCS] was maintaining its relevance and was functioning efficiently within an environment characterised by change.’2 The tri- service cadet organisation of 1996 had evolved from government guidance issued twenty years earlier and it was increasingly apparent that its policy and management practices were no longer appropriate. This awareness, along with the specific pressure of public criticism of the lack of military commitment to cadets helped commission and shape Brewer’s terms of reference. The specific timing of the inquiry was driven by Western Australian and Victorian state government plans, encouraged by resurgent support for educational involvement in the movement from the new federal government, to introduce their own school-based cadet schemes. Brewer’s review team sought input from the federal and state governments, various defence headquarters, the three services, a cross representation of personnel involved with the army, navy and air force cadet schemes, and a considerable number of unsolicited written submissions.3

The Brewer Report was submitted on 30 September 1996. It contained 44 significant recommendations concerning a revised aim, objectives, principles and a new charter for the ASCS. It also advocated the establishment of an independent cadet cell within Australian Defence Force (ADF) Headquarters to provide a central focus of command for the tri-service organisation.4 The Report concluded that ‘existing command, control and management structures and procedures of the ASCS are a weakness.’ With respect to the ACC it proposed that the Deputy Chief of the General Staff be given command of the organisation as ACRES-A lacked the authority over Land, Logistic and Training Commands to ensure appropriate support.5 Importantly, in discussing the provision of army support to cadets the Report noted that equality should apply to all ACC units. Like the Thorne Study that preceded it, Brewer’s investigation pointed to equity issues between RCUs and LSUs as a point of grave and ongoing concern. Concluding that ‘the present arrangement is not satisfactory’ it

2 Brewer, C. J., Review of the Australian Services Cadet Scheme – Executive Summary (Executive Summary), Department of Defence, 1996, p. 1. 3 Other members included Wing Commander G.J. McCloy, Lieutenant Commander G.L. Legge, RANR (Staff Officer Naval Reserve Cadets), Major N.J. White (SO2 Cadets - Army) and Major P.J. Morris (Staff Officer to ACRES-A). Minute, OACRES-A to Army Headquarters (1996). Defence Archives File 96/6737, & Brewer, Executive Summary, p. 1. 4 Brewer, Executive Summary, p. 2. 5 Brief, Army Headquarters (internal) (for Chief of the General Staff) (1996). Defence Archives File 98/6065.

305 recommended that resourcing distinctions between school and community units be abolished and contended that with little or no current control over LSUs a continuing division based on the provision of army support would drive school units even further from the official ACC establishment.6 In a secondary but nonetheless important effort to maintain centralised control, the Report counselled the ACC to embrace and integrate emerging state government cadet initiatives.

Along with recommendations concerning command and support arrangements the Brewer Report focused on the need to improve interaction between the services and their cadet schemes which, in their contemporary state, were described as ‘most damaging’, with ‘many throughout the ADF who have neither understanding nor tolerance of the ASCS’ and ‘some within the ASCS who have limited regard for the ADF.’ For the ACC this meant that existing associations between cadet detachments and their army foster units needed to be closer and formalised. In terms of training Brewer supported the Thorne Report’s earlier call for increased military orientation in that activities allowing participation ‘in low level tactical activities, where appropriate, must be maintained.’ Equally, training standards for adult staff were described as a ‘considerable weakness that requires urgent attention’ with 14 days of continuous annual training suggested to solve the problem. If the ADF was prepared to execute such changes with a ‘systematic program of enhancement and invigoration’ then Brewer contended that not only would the ASCS be rejuvenated but the services would receive considerable recruiting benefits.7

Overall, according to the Report, although the ASCS was ‘achieving its aims to varying degrees from a modest investment’, it had ‘reached a significant stage where there is a perception that its future is in balance between its record of achievement and its potential on one hand; and its cost and perceptions of relevance and usefulness, on the other.’8 By recognising the requirement for increased and equitable resourcing, the potential of state government school-based cadet initiatives and the need for increased military orientation, Brewer’s recommendations were another attempt to bring financial, educational, military and social forces into

6 Brewer, Executive Summary, p. 3, & Brewer, C. J., Review of the Australian Services Cadet Scheme, Department of Defence, 1996, para 216. 7 Brewer, Executive Summary, pp. 4-5.

306 alignment. As such three options were given as to the way ahead; maintenance of the status quo, abandonment or reinvigoration.9

When the Brewer Report was tabled it was described by the CGS, Lieutenant General J.M. Sanderson, as ‘the most significant consideration of the scheme since the 1976 Government policy statement that provided us with the basis for the current cadet corps structure.’10 As far as Brewer’s three options for the future were concerned, the CGSAC feared that maintenance of the status quo would result in continued investment in a system that ‘lacks clear direction’ and whose value to the army could not be measured. The abandonment of the ASCS was not seriously considered which, therefore, left the CGSAC with little choice but to support the invigoration of the scheme in accordance with the broad recommendations of the Report.11 Influencing CGSAC’s decision was strongly worded advice proffered by Major General Stephen Golding, ACRES-A, that the Brewer Report become the basis for developing both the ASCS and ACC. He advised CGSAC to note the $4 million dollar annual cost it would take to resource all LSUs to RCU standards, the growing potential of state government involvement in cadets to offset such costs, and that the General Officer Commanding Training Command was actually better placed than he, or the Deputy Chief of the General Staff for that matter, to command the army cadet organisation.12

The first Brewer inspired reform to impact on the ACC was executed on 30 November 1997 when HQTC-A was once again given responsibility for the organisation.13 The Assistant Commander Training Command (an Army Reserve brigadier) was appointed as its head with a major, the Staff Officer Grade 2 Operations (Cadets), tasked with a range of associated coordination and administrative responsibilities.14 Assuming provincial control of units ‘Cadet Wings’ were raised within the army’s state-based Training Groups (and later the Regional

8 ibid., p. 1. 9 Brief, OACRES (internal) (1996). Defence Archives File 96/7813. 10 The appointment ‘Chief of the General Staff’ was redesignated ‘Chief of Army’ in July 1997. 11 Minutes of CGSAC Meeting (extract), dated October 1996. Defence Archives File 96/6737. 12 Brief, OACRES to CGSAC (1996). Defence Archives File 96/7813. 13 Minute, HQTC-A to Regional Training Centres/Training Groups, dated October 1997. Defence Archives File 2000/12332/1. 14 Commandant, RMC Duntroon was made responsible for all ACC adult staff training while Commandant, Army Recruit Training Centre was given carriage of all other aspects of cadet training.

307 Training Centres that succeeded them), to replace the Cadet Cells previously resident within the APAs and Defence Centres.15 The Cadet Wings continued to employ senior officers of cadets to assist them in the administration and the conduct of cadet activities although overall numbers of these ‘non-army’ ACC headquarters personnel were kept to a minimum.16 The proportion of ARA, Army Reserve and ACC personnel within the Wings varied considerably between Regions. (see Table 11A).17

Table 11A - Full-time and Part-time Staff in Cadet Wings, September 1998 Region Units Cadets Unit Staff Wing Staff Cadets per Staff Full-time Part-time* Civilian North Queensland 10 851 69 1 5 0 142 South Queensland 27 2,555 173 2 7 0 283 Eastern 63 7,600 400 4 3 1 950 Southern 29 3,021 187 3 5 1 336 Central 14 574 68 2 18 0 29 Western 24 1,637 122 2 2 0 409 Tasmania 6 468 41 1 0 0 468 Northern 3 109 9 0 1 0 109 * including officers of cadets.

Source: Minute, HQTC-A to Army Headquarters, dated 9 September 1998. HQ AAC File 123/1/27.

Of critical importance, in March 1998 the Minister for Defence Industry, Science and Personnel, Senator B.K. Bishop, following Brewer’s advice, directed that army achieve equity in funding across the ACC by converting all LSUs to fully supported status during the financial year 1998-99. The decision to provide army support to the remaining 39 LSUs (and their 9,000 cadets) was budgeted to cost $6.15 million in the first year alone.18 Nonetheless, Bishop was determined to correct an ‘iniquitous distribution of Commonwealth funding that has existed since 1976.’19 Empowered by the Minister’s direction on 6 August 1998 the Commander of the ACC, Brigadier N.R. Turner, wrote to all school-based units advising them of the upcoming offer of full support. All but one eagerly accepted with Scotch College, Western Australia, declining on the basis that it wished to leave the ACC and

15 Letter, Turner to Topley, dated 6 March 2000. HQ AAC File 123/1/55. 16 Officers of cadets working at the Cadet Wings typically held the rank of major or lieutenant colonel. Minutes of the ACC Conference, dated 25 February 1999. HQ ACC File 123/1/1(5). 17 Letter, Turner to Topley, dated 6 March 2000. HQ AAC File 123/1/55. 18 Brief, Army Headquarters (internal) for Chief of Army, dated 4 June 2001. HQ ACC File 123/1/1(6). 19 Brief, HQTC-A (internal), dated 22 March 1998. HQ AAC File 2001/33042/1.

308 transform its unit into an SES cadet detachment.20 From this point all references to LSUs were excised from the ACC policy documentation with such detachments henceforth known as School Based Units (SBUs).

The execution of the policy of supporting SBUs to RCU standards resulted in an immediate doubling of the cadet liability for the army.21 School-based units gained access to a full suite of courses and the provision of allowances for adult staff, testing of potential officers and instructors of cadets, compensation cover, a regionally based annual camp of up to seven days, and transport to and from it. From this point army foster units were expected to supply school-based detachments with accounting and logistic support, uniforms and equipment, storage facilities, assistance with the compilation of annual training programs, access to army loan stores, training areas (when available), as well as training, safety and administrative advice.22 Such benefits, however, did not come without a price, with the army directing that

the provision of fully supported unit status to the LSUs should be conditional on the compliance by the LSUs with the ACC Training Management Package, the ACC command, control and coordination structure, the selection, testing and training of the officers of cadets, instructors of cadets and cadets, and attendance by cadets at annual camps.23

While most school units were happy to accept the army’s conditions some, while eager for the support, were less enthused by the idea of surrendering any measure of hard-won independence. Delegates of a meeting of Victorian school units held in April 1998, for example, were concerned that if they accepted the offer it would mean an end to school-run promotion courses, particularly at the SNCO and CUO level. A number of schools also wished to continue to conduct individual annual camps and enforced compliance with ACC rules endangered this prerogative. The minutes of the meeting resounded with the theme that ‘the running of the unit seems to be in question ... we hope that the ACC can leave this up to the school.’24 Concern over the loss of school autonomy was not restricted to Victoria. Sydney Grammar

20 Letters, HQTC-A (6980/98 & 21850/98) to School Based Units (1998). HQ ACC File 123/1/1(4). 21 From this point all SBUs were required to identify army ‘foster’ units from which to source their newly entitled support. Minute, HQTC-A (internal) (1998). Defence Archives File 2000/12332/1. 22 Annex A to Minute, HQTC-A to Cadet Wings, dated 6 August 1998. HQ AAC File 123-1-1(3). 23 Minute, HQTC-A to Army Headquarters, dated 21 September 1998. HQ AAC File 123/1/1(3).

309 School worried that with full support it might lose its freedom of action, especially with respect to ‘the level of authority currently granted out to CUOs.’25 Similarly, Barker College, Sydney, hoped that ACC administrators would ‘recognise and accept the unique features of the Barker College Cadet unit that have been developed over many years.’26 The reluctance of many large private school units to accept what seemed to be a generous army offer was not unreasonable. Apart from issues of independence, Scotch College in Victoria, for example, had spent $330,000 on equipping and outfitting its unit and thousands on chroming its SLR weapons for ceremonial parades. It had a unique unit structure that included a large and famous pipe band and, since 1984, had developed an effective annual camp system which contrasted dramatically with previously disappointing school unit experiences at grouped ACC activities.27 Such units had little to gain and much to lose from coming back into the ACC fold. To assuage such concerns the army gave assurances that cadet policy would be modified to accommodate their needs, especially in keeping school detachments ‘closed’ to the wider community. Although with considerable reluctance in some cases, school units accepted the army’s terms.

In January 1999 an ‘ASCS Management Plan’ was set up to oversee the implementation of a number of lesser Brewer initiatives. Although the Management Plan represented the establishment of a form of the centralised authority recommended by the Report, primarily as a result of army’s intensive lobbying in a number of high level defence committees, it was rapidly degraded into a ‘joint policy and coordination forum’ rather than a true tri-service cadet command.28 It was not to interfere with single service control of each cadet scheme but rather to concentrate on

24 Of particular concern to many officers of cadets in LSUs was the requirement for adult staff to attend training courses that did not recognise their skills as teachers. Minutes of LSU Conference, dated 7 April 1998. HQ AAC File 123/1/1(3). 25 Letter, Sydney Grammar School to HQTC-A, dated 22 March 1999. HQ ACC File 123/1/1(5). 26 Letter, Barker College Headmaster to 2 Cadet Wing, dated 7 June 1999. HQ AAC File 123-1-1(5). 27 Letter, Officer Commanding Scotch College Cadet Unit to Assistant Commander ACC, dated 20 August 1998. HQ AAC File 123/1/1(3). 28 The ‘ASCS Management Plan’ was administered by a Staff Officer Cadets (a regular army lieutenant colonel) responsible directly to ADF headquarters with connections into the various single service cadet headquarters. Its role was to provide advice to the Chief of the Defence Force on all matters affecting the ASCS and, in conjunction with the three services, to develop tri-service policies for the scheme. The Staff Officer Cadets sought to provide a supervisory role by issuing national directives and guidance on cadet matters.

310 tri-service policy, training, equipment procurement, funding and general administration.29

Against expectations the Brewer reforms did not produce the immediate increase in cadet numbers that had been anticipated. At the beginning of 1997 the ACC had 173 units and 16,773 cadets.30 Of these units 50 were SBUs with 21 coming from NSW, 11 from Victoria, 13 from Western Australia and 5 from South Queensland. All other states possessed only RCUs.31 In September 1998 the total number of cadets rose to a height of 18,248 (see Table 11B) but from this point numbers fell to 17,183 in 1999 and to 16,455 in 2000 (see Table 11C). School-based units, in particular, failed to expand despite newfound levels of army support and well into 1999 the proportion of SBU cadets in the ACC remained around 47 per cent.32 Interestingly, and again in spite of expectations to the contrary, the percentage of female cadets during this period followed a similarly disappointing trend. Their numbers rose from 21 per cent in 1997 to a height of 23 per cent in 1997 and 1998 before falling back to 22 per cent in 1999 (see Table 11D). In NSW, the largest cadet region, the figures were even more unsatisfactory beginning with a below average 15 per cent of females in 1997 which fell to 13 per cent in 2001 (see Table 11E). In truth, such disappointing enrolment statistics were the result of a number of long-term structural, administrative and training problems that were not immediately overcome by the Brewer reorganisations. In an effort to identify and address such issues on 8 December 1999 the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Defence, Senator Eric Abetz, commissioned another strategic review of the ACSC. The product of this review was the Topley Report.

29 Brief, HQTC-A (internal) (2000). Defence Archives File 2000/12332/1. 30 It ran at a cost of $5.63 million per annum which was a large slice of the 367 units, 25,771 cadets and $12.73 million claimed by the whole of the ASCS. In 1999/2000 ACC expenditure was $8.5 million out of ASCS budget of $20-22 million. 31 Brief, Army Headquarters (internal) (for Chief of the General Staff) (1996). Defence Archives File 98/6065. 32 ADF Cadet Enrolment Figures (Tables) (1996-99). HQ AAC File 2003/52751/1.

311 Table 11B - Strength of the ACC, 16 September 1998 State Cadets Officers of Instructors of Total Units Cadets Cadets Male Female Male Female Male Female QLD 2,789 746 95 35 32 6 3,703 35 NSW 5,985 1,087 370 73 18 4 7,537 62 VIC 2,952 624 134 28 22 9 3,769 32 SA 512 173 43 15 12 1 756 17 WA 1,200 358 68 26 23 9 1,684 25 TAS 296 131 20 9 11 5 472 8 ACT 98 31 4 1 1 - 135 1 NT 127 52 3 4 3 3 192 3 Totals 13,959 3,202 737 191 122 37 18,248 183

Source: ACC Strength Return, dated 16 September 1998. Defence Archives File 2000/12332.

Table 11C - Cadet Numbers by Region, 1997 – 2000 Nth QLD Sth QLD NSW/ACT VIC TAS SA WA NT TOTAL 1996 16,773 1997 927 2,662 7,335 3,257 431 730 1,551 135 17,374 1998 1,040 2,605 7,895 3,572 494 685 1,558 155 18,248 1999 1,000 2,446 7,155 3,576 412 663 1,811 120 17,183 2000 1,121 2,201 6,976 3,734 344 513 1,504 61 16,455

8000

North QLD 7000 South QLD 6000 NSW / ACT VIC 5000 TAS 4000 SA WA 3000 NT 2000

1000

0 1997 1998 1999 2000

Source: ADFC Unit Strength Tables (1997-2000). HQ AAC File 2004/1017910/1.

Table 11D - ACC Gender Distribution, 1995-99

312 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Male 12,162 13,716 14,138 14,602 14,067 Female 2,583 3,057 3,236 3,301 3,116 % Female 21 22 23 23 22

16,000 Male 14,000 Female 12,000 10,000 8,000 6,000 4,000 2,000 0 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Source: ACC Strength Returns (1995-99). HQ AAC File 123-1-53.

Table 11E - ACC Gender Distribution in NSW, 1997 – 2001 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Male 6,301 5,973 5,263 6,016 5,487 Female 1,134 1,105 903 995 794 % Female 15.4 15.4 14.6 14.2 12.6

7,000 Male 6,000 Female 5,000 4,000 3,000 2,000 1,000 0 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

Source: ACC Strength Returns (1995-99). HQ AAC File 123-1-53.

The Topley investigation was conducted by a steering group consisting of a chairman, John Topley, and two additional members, Major General D.C. Low Choy, Head Reserve Policy, and Air Vice Marshal R.V. Richardson (retired). The purpose of the review was to build upon Brewer’s recently implemented recommendations, and to ‘formulate a vision for the scheme, establish mission goals, objectives and performance measures, and obtain budgetary and resource allocations to ensure that it

313 remained a contemporary youth development organisation.’33 The subsequent report, entitled ‘Cadets: The Future’, was publicly released on 8 December 2000. It was the culmination of a nine-month program of consultations that included 56 public submissions and over 1,000 interviews. The Topley Report contained ten ‘core recommendations’ and a further 38 ‘enabling recommendations’ to be implemented over a three year period. These proposals, in turn, informed the Defence White Paper of 2000 in which the Howard government signalled strong and continuing support to the cadet movement by undertaking to increase funding for the ACSC to $30 million per annum by 2002.34

Topley’s ten core recommendations began by urging the government to formally endorse the ASCS and to place it among the strategic goals and objectives of the ADF. The Report then asked the Department of Defence to confirm the ‘service’ character of the organisation, noting that ‘the two greatest, unfulfilled needs of cadets … are … doing things of a service-related nature and to win the general respect and support of the men and women of the ADF.’35 As such, it contended that the three service cadet organisations should offer programs that included a realistic experience of service life. Subsequent recommendations gave six goals aimed at balancing military, social and youth development expectations with the remaining core proposals concerning the potential functioning of a reformed ASCS.36 It was again suggested that the organisation should stand as a distinct and unified entity ‘closely linked with the ADF’ but able to organise and manage itself and its resources. It was to be financed by a combination of Commonwealth funding under the defence vote, together with ‘in-kind’ support from the services supplemented by individual, community and state government contributions.37 These recommendations confirmed and extended the visions and philosophies of the earlier Thorne and Brewer reviews. Topley’s attempts to strengthen military connections, thereby offsetting the emphasis

33 Cabinet Memorandum, Enhancement of ADFC, dated April 2001. HQ AAC File 123-1-65. 34 Brief, HQTC-A to Cadet Wings (2000). Defence Archives File 99/25501. 35 Department of Defence, Australian Army Cadets Policy Manual 2004 (Draft) (Policy Manual 2004), Headquarters AAC, Canberra, 2004, Vol 1, Chapter 6, Appendix 1 to Annex E. 36 Specifically, these aims were the provision of opportunities for personal development in a disciplined, service and community setting; to sustain interest in the services to stimulate recruiting; to maintain community support for the ADF and represent it publicly; to ‘contribute to young people’s equitable participation in Australian society’; to offer training opportunities that would contribute to the ‘national stock of competencies’; and to foster participation in, and voluntary service to, the wider community. Topley Report Extracts (various) (2000). Defence Archives File 99/6954. 37 ibid.

314 on youth training and character development outcomes, while suggesting mechanisms to ensure unity of command and continuity of funding, represented a further effort to bring balance to the four foundation forces of the movement. Each iteration; Thorne, Brewer, and now Topley, brought the process closer to completion.

In releasing the Topley Report Senator Abetz announced the government’s support for its core recommendations and directed the Department of Defence to develop an implementation plan for them. This plan was to take the form of an ADF Memorandum to be prepared for Cabinet endorsement by 23 March 2001.38 The Chiefs of Services Committee (COSC) examined the Report at a special sitting on 9 March 2001 and the Memorandum was subsequently framed to ‘reaffirm Defence’s commitment to military cadets and endorse the need for enhanced ADF involvement.’ The COSC acknowledged that a ‘greater commitment is required at all levels of management’ and put forth some practical solutions to Topley’s generic suggestions.39 First, in line with the Parliamentary Secretary’s intent, the Committee supported all ten core recommendations with one notable exception. Rather than accepting the management structure of Topley’s proposed tri-service cadet headquarters, which placed a civilian in charge and marginalised the role of the adult services, it suggested Major General Low Choy be appointed as Director General of Cadets at the head of a new Directorate of Defence Force Cadets (DDFC). The Directorate would provide strategic management and direction for the enhanced organisation and bring together the three service cadet programs into a single organisation within rather than closely linked to the ADF.40 In order to maintain a proper alignment to parent services, but in contrast to Topley’s vision, the Committee suggested that the service chiefs remain responsible for their respective cadet elements. This was considered ‘critical to the delivery of support to cadets within the military environment’ and was to ensure that the services actively fostered cadet activities whilst subordinating strategic issues to the DDFC.41 Of less significance, the COSC suggested the name ‘Australian Defence Force Cadets (ADFC)’ replace the old

38 Cabinet Memorandum, Enhancement of ADFC, dated April 2001. HQ AAC File 123/1/65. 39 Minutes of COSC Meeting (extracts), dated 9 March 2001. Defence Archives File 99/6954. 40 An ADFC Council was to be formed to represent cadet staff, the ADF, and other youth development bodies. It was to advise on the strategic direction of the organisation. 41 Minutes of COSC Meeting (extracts), dated 9 March 2001. Defence Archives File 99/6954.

315 ‘Australian Services Cadet Scheme’, and that the title ‘Australian Army Cadets’ (AAC) be used in place of ‘Australian Army Cadet Corps’ (ACC).42

The army did not agree with the range of Topley’s findings, and nor did it unreservedly endorse COSC’s subsequent recommendations or the ADF Memorandum they informed. Lieutenant General P.J. Cosgrove, the Chief of Army (CA) was ‘not convinced that the national command and control structure proposed by the Review will achieve the outcomes sought.’ He supported the concept of better ‘grass-roots’ support for the ACC rather than increased centralised control represented by the proposed DDFC, and wrote that ‘the management structure identified by the Review fails to address the practical problems identified at a local level.’ It was an ‘expensive and unnecessary overhead’ and a ‘Canberra-focused solution to a regional- Australia problem.’ Cosgrove’s disapproval was echoed by his deputy, Major General P.F. Leahy, who believed a separate and autonomous DDFC risked separating the services from their cadets. As far as the recommendation for a greater level of support to the ACC was concerned, Cosgrove maintained that ‘I cannot recommend any course of action that reduces army’s flexibility while increasing the demands placed upon it.’43 Despite the army’s concerns the ADF Memorandum was endorsed by Cabinet and its recommendations were executed forthwith with an external overview team, consisting of the authors of the Topley Report, convened to oversee their implementation.44 Topley’s initiatives fundamentally re-shaped the post-Brewer army cadet movement into its contemporary form; the details of which are the subject of the remainder of this chapter.

The DDFC was raised, with Major General Low Choy at its head, in April 2001 and assumed stewardship of 427 tri-service units containing around 25,000

42 The name changes were affected on 26 March 2001. The Australian (Army) Cadet Corps (ACC) was changed to the Australian Army Cadets (AAC) while the Naval Reserve Cadets (NRC) changed to the Australian Navy Cadets (ANC), the Air Training Corps (ATC) to Australian Air Force Cadets (AAFC) and the Australian Services Cadet Scheme (ASCS) to Australian Defence Force Cadets (ADFC). The loss of the word ‘corps’ from the title of the army cadet scheme was bitterly resented by many of its members who often continued to toast ‘the corps’ at their formal engagements. Department of Defence, DEFGRAM Number 95/2001, dated 26 March 2001. 43 Minute, Chief of Army to Secretary of Defense, dated October 2000. HQ AAC File 123-1-65. 44 Minute, DDFC to HQ AAC, dated 14 January 2004. HQ AAC File 2003/52738/1.

316 cadets and 2,000 adult staff.45 Under the new arrangements the Chief of the Defence Force (CDF) gained overall responsibility for all service cadets with the Director General Cadets, supported by a civilian Deputy Director General and a small military and civilian staff, accountable to him, through the Vice Chief of the Defence Force, for their strategic management.46 An ADFC Committee was established to guide the organisation, chaired by the Director General and made up of the Deputy Director General and the national commanders of the navy, army and air force cadet schemes. This committee was charged with ‘setting the strategic agenda’ for the ADFC, for establishing and fostering a collective approach to the development of policy and to ‘ensure effective communication with the broader cadet community.’47 Day to day control of each single service cadet organisation, however, remained the responsibility of their respective national commanders, each of whom was responsible to their service chief.48 By 2004 the original ADFC Committee membership was extended to include senior cadet representatives and a second committee, the ADFC Defence Steering Group, was also raised to aid in its governance.49 According to Major General Low Choy’s successor, Air Vice-Marshal D.J. Dunlop, by this time the DDFC had evolved from a headquarters primarily responsible for implementing the recommendations of the Topley Report and acting as an interface between

45 Nelson, B., Media Release: Historic Reforms Prepare Cadets for the Future, (PARLSEC 174/01), Defence Minister’s Homepage, www.minister.defence.gov.au, & Cadetnet Homepage, www.cadetnet.icemedia.com.au. 46 CDF responsibility for cadets was indirect and exercised through his relationship with the service chiefs (through COSC) and via the line of communication through the Vice Chief of the Defence Force to the Director General Cadets. In 2004 the DDFC contained 13 military and civilian staff with 11 based in Canberra and one each in Townsville and Darwin. Brief, Army Headquarters (internal) for Chief of Army, dated 24 July 2001. HQ AAC File 123/1/1(6), & Brodtmann, G., ‘Nurturing Defence’s Future’, in Defence, October 2004, pp. 22-23. 47 Cadetnet Homepage, www.cadetnet.icemedia.com.au. 48 ibid. 49 Membership of the steering group mirrored the original ADFC Committee with the exception that the national commanders were replaced by single service ‘one-star’ brigadier equivalent officers responsible for cadet matters within each service. The Steering Group was raised to provide for single service input at a Directorate level and to overcome a governance mismatch created by the rejection of Topley’s original ADFC management structure (previously described). Unlike the other two cadet organisations, for the AAC this arrangement posed complications as the one-star representative and the national commander were the same officer. The situation was resolved with the Deputy Commander of the AAC, the organisation’s senior officer of cadets, replacing the national commander in the ADFC Committee. The Steering Group was given responsibility for considering the recommendations of the ADFC Committee in the context of wider political and defence priorities and managing joint cadet matters. Brodtmann, Nurturing Defence’s Future, pp. 22-23.

317 government, defence groups and cadets to become more of a ‘tri-service cadet policy and program lead organisation.’50

As the DDFC was being established the higher command structure of the AAC was completely reorganised, with Lieutenant General Cosgrove ordering the establishment of an independent national headquarters co-located with the new Directorate in Canberra. Although this headquarters was raised on 1 July 2002 it did not assume responsibility for the AAC from HQTC-A until 1 October 2002. Earlier that year Cosgrove had provided directives to both Major General Low Choy and the new Commander AAC, Brigadier Michael Fairweather, with respect to the strategic oversight and management of the new look army cadet system. Under these arrangements, although the Commander AAC reported to the Director General Cadets, he retained the right of direct access to the CA as the DDFC exercised no specific command responsibility over the army cadet scheme. Within the new-look national Headquarters AAC in Canberra an officer of cadets, Colonel P.J. Christie, was appointed as the Deputy Commander to supervise the operations of three Cadet National Liaison Officers, officers of cadets of the rank of lieutenant colonel attached to the headquarters to represent the often disparate interests of the AAC.51 In addition an ARA officer, Lieutenant Colonel Greg Flynn, was appointed as the Director AAC and tasked with the daily administration and management of the organisation.52

The AAC’s new national headquarters assumed responsibility for eight subordinate headquarters based in each of the military Regions (formerly the Cadet Wings of respective Regional Training Centres). Each of these was commanded by a lieutenant colonel or major and staffed by regular and reserve army personnel, officers of cadets, and in some cases civilians. Like the Cadet Wings before them these headquarters were tasked to carry out command and control of AAC units within their Regions including the conduct of annual cadet camps, Adventure Training Award activities and cadet promotion courses.53 Assisting the Commanding Officer of each

50 Following Major General Low Choy’s tenure the positions of Director General Cadets and Deputy Director General Cadets were renamed Head Cadet Policy and Assistant Secretary Cadet Policy respectively. ibid. 51 Department of Defence, Australian Army Cadets Policy Manual 2001 (Policy Manual 2001), Government Printer, 2001, p. 3-1. 52 ibid. 53 ibid., p. 2-2.

318 regional AAC headquarters was an officer of cadets appointed as the Senior Cadet Officer (SCO) to act as the principal adviser on matters of policy and personnel.54 Figure 11A illustrates the channels of communication within the AAC in 2001. By 2002 the relationship between the DDFC and the AAC was codified confirming CA control of army cadets with policy development, liaison and consultation relationships maintained between the DDFC and Headquarters AAC (see Figure 11B).55 The following two years saw a number of additional structural refinements applied to Headquarters AAC to streamline administrative processes.56

Figure 11A – AAC Outline Organisation and Channels of Communication, 2001

Commander AAC Assistant Commander AAC

Director AAC Cadet National Liaison Officers

CO AAC CO AAC CO AAC CO AAC CO AAC CO AAC CO AAC CO AAC (Sth QLD) (NSW) (VIC) (SA) (WA) (TAS) (NT) (Nth QLD)

Sth QLD NSW VIC SA WA TAS NT Nth QLD Units Units Units Units Units Units Units Units

Source: Department of Defence, Australian Army Cadets Policy Manual Policy 2001, Government Printer, 2001, p. 2-3.

54 The SCO was originally designated as the Senior Officer of Cadets but the acronym ‘SOOC’ was not considered entirely appropriate ibid., p. 3A-1. 55 This situation continued to 2004 with the exception that by this date the Commander reported to the Chief of Army through the Deputy Chief of Army. Department of Defence, Defence Instruction (Army) Administration 53-1 Australian Army Cadets (DIG(A)53-1) (Draft), Headquarters AAC, July 2004, p. 2; Minute, Chief of Army to Director General Cadets, dated October 2002. HQ AAC File 2003/52638/1; Department of Defence, Policy Manual 2001, p. 2-1, & Department of Defence, Policy Manual 2004, para 4.02. 56 By 2004 a Command Cell within the headquarters had assumed control of all eight regional headquarters as well as overseeing five subordinate cells (Personnel, Logistics, Information Management, Training and Projects). Within this organisation the Commander AAC remained an Army Reserve brigadier and the Assistant Commander an officer of cadets of colonel rank. One notable change from 2001, however, was a Chief of Staff position established for an Army Reserve lieutenant colonel appointed to assume the responsibilities previously held by the Director AAC. The Director’s position (which had always been on the DDFC establishment) remained but was transformed from a command-style appointment into one of strategic policy development and liaison with the DDFC and Army Headquarters. The Cadet National Liaison Officer appointments were dissolved in favour of four Staff Officer Grade One positions in personnel, policy, equity and diversity, and safety. These positions remained staffed by senior officers of cadets. The only ARA staff at the national AAC headquarters in 2004 were an Operations Officer (major), an Adjutant (captain) and a Chief Clerk (W02). AAC Homepage, www.aac.adfc.gov.au, & Department of Defence, Policy Manual 2004, paras 4.11 & 5.08.

319 Figure 11B - Command and Control Model of the AAC, 1 July 2002

Army Headquarters

HQ AAC DDFC Liaison

Regional

Training Centres Located at Regional AAC Headquarters Liaison

Cadet Units Army Foster 46 SBUs & 156 RCUs Units Support

Source: 2nd Division Plan 2003/04 (2004). HQ AAC File 123/1/1(3).

Two additional structural innovations were implemented in 2002 to help overcome the barriers that had grown between the army and individual cadet units, and to allow greater cadet input into AAC policymaking than in years past.57 New Cadet Adjutant and Cadet Regimental Sergeant Major (RSM) positions were raised in each of the eight AAC Regions. The former was responsible for representing the interests of cadets and advising the SCO on cadet matters while the latter fulfilled traditional RSM roles and assisted the Cadet Adjutant. Both positions were manned for a maximum of one year by CUOs and Cadet WO1s respectively. In addition to this regional arrangement a National Cadet Adjutant and National Cadet RSM were appointed to provide a cadet voice and presence at Headquarters AAC and to ensure that a ‘cadet perspective was relayed effectively to the Commander AAC.’58 A second initiative, designed to facilitate the incorporation of cadet ideas into decision-making processes at both national and state levels, was the establishment of Cadet Advisory

57 From 17 February 2004 the term ‘Regional Cadet Unit’ (RCU) was replaced by ‘Army Cadet Unit’ (ACU) while School Based Units retained the names of their schools followed by ‘CU’. At the same time the term ‘Community Support Group’ replaced that of unit ‘sponsor’ although roles and duties remained the same. Minute, HQ AAC to Regional Headquarters, dated 17 February 2004. HQ AAC File 2004/1008775/1, & Department of Defence, Policy Manual 2004, para 6.04. 58 The national positions were selected from amongst the regional Cadet Adjutants and RSMs.

320 Councils. Each Council contained at least one cadet per unit and met annually under the stewardship of the Cadet Adjutants and Cadet RSMs.59

The AAC had no plans to slow the pace of structural reform as 2004 drew to a close. In September 2003 ‘in principle’ approval was granted by the CA, Lieutenant General Leahy, to transform the eight regional headquarters into ‘brigade headquarters’ and to re-raise subordinate cadet battalions as a layer of command between individual units and brigade staff. These proposed changes closely resembled pre-1975 arrangements. Although the requirement for amended manning tables prevented this plan from being fully executed in 2004, a number of Regions began to reorganise themselves along such lines as personnel and resources became available.60 When completed the restructure will see an AAC battalion headquarters in the two smallest Regions (NT and Tasmania) with units allocated geographically to cadet companies. In the other Regions cadet brigade headquarters will be raised to command subordinate battalions (see Figure 11C).61

59 In addition to these regional Councils, a National Cadet Advisory Council was formed from the regional Cadet Adjutants and Cadet RSMs with meetings held in conjunction with annual AAC National Conferences. Minute, HQ AAC to Regional Headquarters (2002). HQ AAC File 2002/21228/1. 60 Brief, HQ AAC (internal), dated May 2004. HQ AAC File 2003/52745/2. 61 According to the HQ AAC plan the North Queensland brigade was to be divided into a ‘Northern’ and a ‘Southern’ battalion while the South Queensland brigade would comprise ‘Northern’, ‘Southern’ and ‘Western’ battalions. The NSW brigade was to consist of seven battalions as follows: ‘Northern NSW’, ‘Hunter’, Sydney North’, ‘Sydney South’, ‘ACT/Southern NSW’, ‘Western NSW’ and a ‘Sydney Schools’ battalion., the last of which may well turn out to become the ‘GPS Battalion’ envisaged by certain Sydney schools at various times since 1906. The Victorian brigade was to be divided into an ‘Eastern’ and ‘Western’ battalion while its South Australian counterpart would command ‘Northern’, ‘Southern’, and ‘Central’ battalions. Finally, Western Australia was to be divided into four geographically based battalions yet to be named. The re-introduction of a brigade and battalion headquarters was to entail no change in the command relationships between Headquarters AAC its subordinate headquarters. Department of Defence, Policy Manual 2004, para 5.26.

321 Figure 11C - AAC Organisational Structure (Proposed), July 2004

Army Headquarters

Headquarters AAC

DDFC

AAC Br igades / Battalions Community Support Groups (Sponsors) Cadet Units Army Foster Units

Note: 1 AAC Brigade is in North Queensland, 2 AAC Brigade (NSW), 3 AAC Brigade (Victoria), 4 AAC Brigade (South Australia), 5 AAC Brigade (Western Australia excluding the Kimberley), 11 AAC Brigade (North Queensland); 6 AAC Battalion (Tasmania); and 7 AAC Battalion (NT including the Kimberley).

Source: Department of Defence, Policy Manual 2004, para 4.21.

Along with these comprehensive developments in AAC command and control arrangements another key structural initiative of the period 1996-2004 was the emergence of state government cadet schemes in Western Australia, Victoria, South Australia and Queensland. The importance of such developments lay in their potential to re-engage state education department (and thereby wider school) interest in the movement and, indirectly, to strengthen the financial position of the organisation. The emergence of state-based cadet programs, absent since the colonial era, was encouraged by the Commonwealth government policy statement ‘Australia’s Defence – February 1996’, in which the federal government sought to ‘re-establish cadet units in schools’ with a pledge to ‘match the states dollar for dollar to a maximum of $3 million.’62 The realisation of this promise was the Cadets in High Schools Program (CHSP). Under the CHSP state schemes were established to encourage a wide range of cadet service providers, of which the ACC was but one of many potential choices, to involve themselves with schools. Alternatives included cadet-like branches of the

62 Minute, Army Headquarters to OACRES-A, dated March 1996. Defence Archives File 96/6737.

322 Green Corps, SES, Police, Fire Brigade, Surf Life Saving Australia and the Scouts. Individual schools were left to select the cadet program they desired.63

Initial enthusiasm for army cadet units raised under the CHSP was restrained primarily as a result of the decision to categorise them as LSUs.64 Consequently, by September 1997 the ACC had only two CHSP detachments at Carnarvon Senior High School and Eastern Hills Senior High School in Western Australia and one unit in Victoria (with a second raised in January 1998).65 Once all army cadet units were granted full support status in March 1998, however, ASCS and ACC involvement in the CHSP gained momentum with 29 detachments (from all three services) raised from July 1998 to March 2001.66 During this period the ADF contributed to the program through resource support to units, rather than by cash transfer, while state governments were responsible for providing start-up and per capita cash subsidies based on the number of cadets present. Schools were tasked with providing student volunteers, suitable adult staff, facilities and office equipment.67 Of the 20 CHSP units in existence in 2001, ten were AAC detachments with four each in Western Australia and Queensland and one each in Victoria and South Australia.68

State government interest in cadets, however, predated the federal government’s 1996 announcement. In 1995 the Western Australian Premier, R.F. Court, reviewed the activities of the ASCS (primarily the ACC) to assess the suitability of cadet-style training for Western Australian secondary schools.69 The Premier was impressed by the perceived positive effect on crime statistics of a Karratha-based ACC unit already in operation and, consequently, a cadet program was approved by the Western Australian Cabinet on 18 September 1995 with a pilot scheme (initially called the Youth Training Program and then renamed Cadets WA)

63 Brief, DDFC to HQ AAC, dated 12 April 2001. HQ AAC File 2001/33042/1. 64 Letter, Army Personnel Agency - Melbourne to Victorian Youth Development Program Task Force, dated June 1996. HQ AAC File 123/1/50. 65 Fax, Cadet Cell (Perth) to SO2 Cadets (OACRES-A), dated 27 October 1997. HQ AAC File 123/1/52. 66 Brief, DDFC (internal), dated 12 April 2001. HQ AAC File 2001/33042/1. 67 Brief, HQTC-A (internal), dated March 2001. Defence Archives File 2000/12332/1. 68 Brief, DDFC to HQ AAC, dated 12 April 2001. HQ AAC File 2001/33042/1. 69 Original interest in the idea was sparked by Lieutenant Colonel Campbell, an officer of cadets, who successfully brought the issue to the attention of the State Governor and Premier’s Department. Minute, Army Headquarters to OACRES-A, dated March 1996. Defence Archives File 96/6737.

323 beginning in the first school term of 1996.70 A series of positive evaluations in 1996 and 1999 ensured the Western Australian system enjoyed continuing support and in 2001 all existing RCUs in the state were permitted to affiliate with Cadets WA; thereby gaining access to significant financial assistance.71 In 2004 the Western Australian state government remained responsible for policy development, promotion, evaluation and sponsorship of the Cadets WA scheme.72 It also provided AAC units raised under the program with a $5,000 start-up grant and $75 per cadet per annum to be used in connection with cadet related activities.73

Following a visit to Perth by S.N. Elder, the Victorian Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Education, the CHSP was initiated on a trial basis in Victoria in February 1997 under the auspices of the Victorian Youth Development Program (VYDP). Two ACC units were raised as part of the trial, with the state government formally approving the scheme on 18 November 1999.74 Up to 2004 the conditions of the Victorian CHSP mirrored those in Western Australia with the exception that funding was available to state schools only and, rather than a start up grant, AAC units under the program received $450 per cadet in their first year and $400 per member in subsequent years.75 In 2004 the VYDP transitioned into a similar program known as ‘Advance’ with participating schools funded to continue to deliver their existing programs to students enrolled for 2004.76 See Appendix 11 for a summary of

70 The idea behind Cadets WA was to develop cadets ‘physically, intellectually and socially through structured leadership, initiative and teamwork training activities.’ Under the original Western Australian scheme both state and private schools had the opportunity to choose between the ACC, Naval Reserve Cadets, the Air Training Corps, Police Ranger Cadets, SES Cadets and St John’s Ambulance Cadets (expanded to later include BushRanger, Red Cross and Lifesaving cadets). Brief, HQ AAC (internal), dated April 1996. HQ AAC File 123/1/50, & Brief, HQ AAC (WA) to HQ AAC, dated September 1995. Defence Archives, File 99/6954. 71 By April 2001 a total of 36 RCUs had taken up the offer. 72 Cadets WA Homepage, www.cadetswa.wa.gov.au. 73 Brief, DDFC to HQ AAC, dated 12 April 2001. HQ AAC File 2001/33042/1, & Cadets WA Homepage, www.cadetswa.wa.gov.au. 74 Brief, HQTC-A to Army Headquarters, dated February 1997. Defence Archives File 96/6737; Office of Youth – Advance Homepage, www.youth.vic.gov.au, & Victorian Youth Development Program Guidelines (2000). HQ AAC File 123/1/52. 75 A school/cadet service provider structure similar to that in Western Australia was established with, in addition to the AAC, eleven other youth development organisations available for schools to choose from including the Air Training Corps, Country Fire Authority, Coast Guard Cadets, Red Cross, Environment Corps, Scouts Australia, Guides Victoria, Life Saving Victoria, Naval Reserve Cadets, SES Cadets, St John Ambulance Cadets and the Victoria Police Youth Corps. Brief, DDFC to HQ AAC, dated 12 April 2001. HQ AAC File 2001/33042/1. 76 Office of Youth – Advance Homepage, www.youth.vic.gov.au.

324 all AAC units in Victoria in 2004 detailing locations, sponsors, fosters and establishments of units (including those raised under the CHSP).

In the absence of direct consultation with the federal government or the military, the announcement of a South Australian CHSP program, known as the ‘Premier’s Youth Challenge’, on 16 July 1999, came as somewhat of a surprise; although being conceptually based on the Western Australian and Victorian examples it was not long before the ADFC was invited to participate. More than two years passed, however, before the announcement was finally actioned when, on 19 July 2001, the Premier, J.W. Olsen, officially launched a retitled ‘Active8 – Premiers Youth Challenge’ scheme. In describing the program Olsen commented on the manner in which similar interstate initiatives had succeeded in increasing the ‘leadership capacities and self-reliance of the young people involved.’77 Nineteen cadet service providers were originally involved in the South Australian scheme, one of which was the AAC, with a $4,000 start up grant provided by the state government to units raised under the program. In addition to this grant each AAC cadet attracted a further $200 per annum paid directly to their detachment by the South Australian government.78

Apart from Western Australia, Victoria and South Australia, no other sustainable state government cadet initiatives had emerged by 2004. In Queensland an attempt was made through the ‘Queensland Youth Action Program’ (YAP) in 1998 where state government sponsored cadet units were trialled in ten state secondary schools using the Western Australian template. Interestingly, an evaluation of this experiment concluded that ‘a relatively high proportion (21 per cent) of students involved in the YAP in schools where the defence forces [were] service providers expressed an interest in joining the defence force after leaving school.’79 The tenure of ACC involvement in the Queensland scheme was, however, short-lived with four detachments surviving as YAP sponsored units until the program was abandoned in

77 Memorandum of Understanding between the army and South Australian Minister for Youth and Training, dated 13 December 2000. HQ AAC File 123/1/52, & Active8 Handbook (2000). HQ AAC File 123/1/52. 78 ibid. 79 Youth Action Program Trial Evaluation Report (1999). HQ ACC File 123/1/1(5).

325 May 2001.80 Elsewhere in Australia, in November 2000 the NSW government informally sought information concerning the CHSP but did not proceed, preferring to direct its funding to target broad-based youth development schemes rather than cadet- related programs, while budgetary concerns prevented Tasmania or the territories from instituting CHSP programs by 2004.81

Beyond the overarching influence of a Liberal/National federal government on the cadet movement as a whole, the establishment of the CHSP also provided clear evidence of a correlation between conservative politics and support for cadets at a state level. It was no coincidence that Liberal Premiers held power in Western Australia, Victoria and South Australia when CHSP units were first raised in those states. Conversely, Labor ministries in Queensland, NSW and Tasmania (from 1998) decided against implementing the scheme. State Labor marched in tune with its federal counterpart as far as its philosophy and policies with respect to the cadet movement were concerned.

Modifications to AAC regulations and general conditions of service from 1996-2004 proceeded at a far slower pace than the considerable command, structural and state-based developments described. Post-Topley administrative changes focused on stimulating enrolment with, for example, minimum age requirements lowered to 12½ years in mid-1999 with cadets permitted to remain in the organisation up to and including the year in which they turned eighteen, or in special circumstances, until reaching twenty.82 In a second attempt to stimulate numbers, by 2004 detachments of more than 15 members were authorised where full units could not be manned, thereby revoking the 30 cadet minimum of 2001. These half-detachments required two adult staff and were placed under administrative command of an existing cadet unit. They

80 Brief, DDFC to HQ AAC, dated 12 April 2001. HQ AAC File 2001/33042/1. 81 ibid. 82 An unforseen variation in enrolment policy was forced on the organisation with the application of the Disability Discrimination Act (1992) when, in 1997, a potential cadet was refused entry on the grounds that he had epilepsy. Previously, cadets were not allowed to enrol if suffering from epilepsy, diabetes or a range of other ‘permanent disabilities.’ Unlike the ADF, however, the AAC was not exempted from the requirements of the Act and was forced to reconsider its enrolment restrictions. Subsequently, by 2004 it had become AAC policy that ‘wherever possible all eligible children are to be accepted into the scheme.’ From this point, a prospective cadet was required to provide a statement from a medical practitioner showing a capacity to participate in cadet activities with onus for the provision of specialised supervision resting solely with the cadet’s parent or guardian. Department of Defence,

326 did not require a separate sponsor but did need to identify an army foster unit to be considered viable.83 The net effect of these, and the range of other Topley inspired initiatives, proved moderately more successful than the Brewer reforms in increasing cadet numbers within the ADFC and the AAC.

Of the 2 million youths in the country of cadet age in June 2001 over 25,000 (1.25 per cent) were members of the ADFC with the strength of the AAC standing at 16,826 in 187 units.84 Of these, 124 were RCUs, 37 SBUs and 26 CHSP detachments. In total, 81 army foster units supported these detachments with 59 coming from Land Command and 22 from Training Command (see Table 11F).85 Although total AAC numbers fell to 16,570 in December 2002, they rose to 16,820 by the same time in 2003 and, in the first half of 2004, the cadet ceiling of 17,000 was finally reached.86 As a result, on 19 July 2004, following deliberations at the AAC National Conference, the decision was taken to increase authorised AAC numbers to 19,000.87 Table 11G shows the steady increase in AAC enrolment statistics from 2000-04 (see Appendix 12 for a list of all AAC units in 2004 and Appendix 13 for authorised cadet establishment tables 2001-04). After the dark days of the late 1970s and 1980s a string of reviews and reforms had progressively corrected the imbalances that had plagued the movement. Structural reorganisations and pushes for an increased service orientation were indicative of hardening military commitment and social acceptance while the CHSP signalled a measure of re-engagement by the educational sector. Rising cadet numbers were a product of growing strength in these three foundation forces. It was the fourth, however, that provided proof of just how far the cadet movement had progressed.

Policy Manual 2001, p. 1-2, & Minute, Headquarters Australian Defence Force (ACPERS 210/96) to OACRES-A, dated 11 March 1996. HQ AAC File 123/1/1(5). 83 Department of Defence, Policy Manual 2004, para 6.11. 84 Department of Defence, Policy Manual 2001, p. 1-1. 85 Brief, Army Headquarters (internal) for Chief of Army, dated 4 June 2001. HQ AAC File 123/1/1(6). 86 Brief, HQ AAC to CASAC, dated 7 May 2003. HQ AAC File 2004/1008775/1, & Brief, HQ AAC to COSC, dated 18 May 2004. HQ AAC File 2004/1030583/1. 87 Broken down as follows: North Queensland (1,000), South Queensland (2,200), NSW (7,650), Victoria (4,100) South Australia (850), Western Australia (1,700), Tasmania (550) and the Northern Territory (350) Minute, HQ AAC to Regional AAC HQs, dated 19 July 2004. HQ AAC File 2001/33042/2.

327 Table 11F - AAC Strength and Manning, 31 March 2002 Strength Waiting List Officers of Cadets Instructors of CUOs Cadets Cadets Male F'male Total Male F'male Total Male F'male Male F'male Total Male F'male HQ AAC 6 - 6 Sth QLD 107 42 147 23 1 24 55 19 2,244 452 2,770 135 28 NSW 233 81 314 11 3 14 209 35 5,474 867 6,585 276 112 VIC 163 48 211 8 2 10 95 15 2,713 543 3,366 68 35 SA 59 21 80 2 1 3 7 4 474 120 605 2 1 WA 66 60 126 17 - 17 23 16 1,043 280 1,362 11 6 TAS 22 18 40 7 1 8 - 3 181 80 264 - - NT 7 7 14 3 - 3 - 1 72 28 101 - - Nth QLD 45 31 76 5 - 5 31 19 627 246 923 4 - TOTAL 708 308 1,014 76 8 84 420 112 12,828 2,616 15,976 496 678

HQ AAC NTH QLD STH QLD NSW VIC SA WA TAS NT

Source: ACC Strength Returns (1995-99). HQ AAC File 123-1-53.

Table 11G – ACC/AAC Numbers, 2000-04 Year Total June 2000 16,455 June 2001 16,826 December 2002 16,570 December 2003 16,820 June 2004 17,000 17000

16800

16600

16400

16200

16000 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Source: ADF Cadet Numbers (Tables) (2000-04). HQ AAC File 2003/52751/1, & ADF Cadet Unit Strength Tables (2000-04). HQ AAC File 2004/1017910/1.

328 In line with gradual increases in total defence spending from 2001 (see Table 11H), by 2004 the level of fiscal and material support provided by the army to the cadet movement had grown to surpass even that afforded in halcyon days of the mid- 1960s. Such an end state, however, took time to manifest. Clearly, after July 1998 full support to school units ensured the sum total of army commitment to the ACC increased. In real terms, however, the decision meant that the average level of support per unit became less than that provided to most RCUs before this date. With an immediate requirement to almost double their cadet resource and training liabilities army foster units could seldom meet all of the demands placed upon them. This trend prompted the Topley Report to note that, in the years up to December 2001, thinly stretched resources had led to ‘decreasing material support to cadets.’88

Table 11H – Defence Expenditure as a Percentage of GDP, 1996-2004

2.02 1.97 1.92 1.87 1.82 1.77 1996/97 1997/98 1998/99 1999/2000 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Defence Expenditure Over the Century, www.abs.gov.au, & Australian Bureau of Statistics, Year Book Australia Defence Resources, ABS Homepage, www.abs.gov.au.

Decisions made in light of the Topley Report not only corrected this situation but ushered in a new era of outstanding and continuing support; the flagship of which was the Cadet Enhancement Program (CEP). On 3 June 2001 B.J. Nelson, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Defence, announced the ‘historic reforms’ of the CEP whose initiatives ‘built on the government’s commitment to enhance the cadet movement’ in order to rectify ‘the disastrous decision of the Whitlam Labor Government.’ Nelson claimed that since 1975 ‘units have suffered from a lack of consistent political, financial and military support’ but the Howard Government, he promised, ‘sought to turn this around.’89 Detailed for implementation over three years and including a $6 million increase to the cadet budget from 1 July 2001, the CEP

88 Brief, HQTC-A (internal), dated 19 December 2000. HQ AAC File 123/1/65.

329 represented ‘a range of initiatives designed to improve the quality of the cadet experience.’90

Significant CEP activities commenced or completed in 2001-02 included additional funding for uniforms and equipment, an audit and review of unit accommodation, the drafting of a tri-service occupational health and safety policy, the development of an indigenous participation strategy and an inaugural ADFC national conference held in April 2002. In a key undertaking a review of military-like activities and firearms training for cadets was also initiated.91 A singularly important product of the CEP was the provision of information technology support to the AAC. This program, known as CadetNet, consisted of a range of projects including the delivery of internet connected computers, ancillaries and phone lines to all units, the development of a CadetNet web page and a ‘Cadet Online Administration System.’92 The CEP began to yield results in the following year with functionality and maintenance works carried out in 150 cadet facilities around the country. So too, participation pilot projects in north Queensland and the Northern Territory saw 130 indigenous cadets engaged in these two Regions.93 By the end of 2004 the commitment represented by the CEP remained considerable in both its magnitude and net effect on the AAC and its air force and naval counterparts. In 2001-02, $3.02 million was spent on the program increasing to $7.68 million in 2002-03 and $6.90 million in 2003-04. This represented a total of $17.61 million to July 2004. 94 Such levels of military support would have seemed out of the question a decade earlier.

As extensive as they were, CEP enterprises were not the only manifestation of newfound levels of military commitment with significant progress also made in

89 Nelson, B., Media Release, www.minister.defence.gov.au. 90 Department of Defence, DEFGRAM No. 332/2002, Government Printer, dated 6 September 2001, & Department of Defence, Defence Report 2002-03, Government Printer, 2003, pp. 313-14. 91 Department of Defence, Defence Report 2001-02, Government Printer, 2002, p. 227. 92 While options for this system were being investigated, from mid-2004 the AAC began to trial a potential solution known as ‘Sarah’ in a number of Queensland units. The Sarah program, developed by an officer of cadets, was a software package used by units to administer cadets and report to their regional headquarters. Its purpose was to reduce the administrative burden on AAC units and ‘improve the compliance with policy and duty of care responsibilities through the provision of an administrative information system.’ By April 2004, the Sarah system had been evaluated in several units in Victoria, NSW, ACT and Queensland with the hope that it might form the basis of an ADFC solution to be implemented through CadetNet. Brief, HQ AAC (internal), dated 24 June 2004. HQ AAC File 2004/1048602/1, & Email, DDFC to HQ AAC, dated 21 July 2004. HQ AAC File 2003/52736/1. 93 Department of Defence, Defence Report 2002-03, Government Printer, 2003, pp. 313-14.

330 developing AAC cadet/foster unit relationships. There were, of course, many instances of successful partnerships between cadets and their foster units before 2001 with the Camberwell Grammar School unit in Victoria, for example, writing of its foster, the 4th/19th Prince of Wales Light Horse Regiment, that ‘apart from supplying most of our uniforms and equipment, they also provided a significant support for this year’s annual camp.’95 However, the point, well recognised by the Topley Report, was that there was no consistency of quality in the support provided by fosters. Training Command summarised the problem in June 2001 in that ‘the standard and quality of support provided by foster units in both Land and Training Commands varies considerably’ and in many cases was ‘dependant on the relationship that exists between personalities in both foster and cadet unit.’96 In response, the CA, Lieutenant General Cosgrove, instituted the ‘Foster Unit Partnership Program’ which aimed at ensuring the army maximised opportunities to enhance the cadet experience. The program was focused at the individual foster unit level where Commanding Officers were expected to develop in their attached cadet units a ‘positive approach to army through direct access to army support, advice and liaison.’97 Fosters were ordered to afford uniformly high standards of planning, stores, equipment, and transport support where available as well as providing training advice, instruction and administrative assistance.98

Cosgrove’s support for the Foster Unit Partnership Program continued into 2002. On 16 May he wrote to Major General Low Choy, Director General Cadets, informing him of his intention to contact all army functional commanders directing that they ‘give AAC units every assistance possible to enable the organisation to flourish and move forward.’99 The new CA, Lieutenant General Leahy, fulfilled this promise in October 2002 when he wrote that

it is in our best interests, and the interests of cadets and the community, to ensure that a service orientation is strengthened at every possible

94 ibid., p. 35. 95 Camberwell Grammar School, The Camberwell Grammarian, 2001, p. 9. 96 Brief, Army Headquarters (internal) for Chief of Army, dated 4 June 2001. HQ AAC File 123/1/1(6). 97 Pamphlet, AAC ‘Guide to the Foster Unit Partnership Program’ (2001). HQ AAC File 123/1/50. 98 ibid. 99 Minute, Chief of Army to Director General Cadets, dated 16 May 2002. HQ AAC File 2003/52638/1.

331 opportunity through the provision of appropriate and proper support to the cadet organisation.100

Importantly, Leahy’s intent persuaded Major General R.P. Irving, Commander of the Army Reserve’s 2nd Division, to be equally unequivocal. In the 2003-04 ‘2nd Division Plan’ Irving aimed to ‘provide cadets an enhanced military experience … through direct access to army support, advice and liaison.’101 He directed that ‘all 2 Div units … are authorised and expected, whenever practicable, to extend support to AAC units and activities.’102 Such sentiments were a far cry from those that had heralded the removal of army support from school units in 1983.

Apart from the specific application of the CEP, and the general issue of improved cadet/foster units relations, the implications of increased military commitment touched all aspects of the movement. A particular example concerned the conditions of service for AAC adult staff. From 2001, in an effort to ensure quality and suitability, procedures for appointment, training and promotion became more stringent and coordinated than ever before. From this date in order to be selected as an AAC staff member a candidate was required to possess the ability to supervise and control cadet activities, a ‘genuine interest in youth training’, a ‘level of maturity commensurate with the role undertaken’, to be of high moral standards, educated to a Year 10 level, physically fit and able to attend an appointment course not more than three months after acceptance into the organisation. Potential volunteers were also subject to medical and psychological examinations, police checks and an interview by a selection board.103 So too, the decision on 1 July 1999 to grant adult staff a new Cadet Forces Allowance when attending approved cadet activities was evidence of an availability of military finance and the commitment to spend it on cadets.104 Similarly indicative of newfound army recognition of AAC staff was the resolution of the

100 Minute, Chief of Army to Land Commander, dated October 2002. HQ AAC File, 2003/52638/1. 101 2nd Division Plan 2003/04. HQ AAC File 123/1/1(3). 102 ibid. 103 The Selection Board consisted of an administrative task to assess written, problem solving and planning skills, a group task to assess negotiation, problem solving and organisational skills, and an interview. Department of Defence, Policy Manual 2001, pp. 6-1 & 6-3. 104 This allowance was payable at a daily rate if on duty for at least 6 hours (to a maximum of 28 days per year) or at a half-daily rate for parades greater than three hours (to a maximum of 40 times per year). The size of this allowance ranged from $67.21 per day for a corporal up to $193.35 per day for a colonel. While there is no doubt that the provision of such a comprehensive allowance system acknowledged and recompensed the time and effort invested by adult cadet staff, some observers, both

332 enduring issue of a long-service medal with the announcement, on 24 March 2000, of the Australian Cadet Forces Medal by B.C. Scott, Minister for Veteran’s Affairs.105 The level of military engagement and material support provided to the cadet movement by 2004 was extensive and pervasive.

To return to the theme of ‘harmony’ between military, social and educational pillars of the movement, the period 1996-2004 marked the fulfilment of a process begun a decade earlier in the achievement of balance between previously conflicting purposes within the cadet organisation. By 2004 reconciliation between the undeniable social and educational role of the scheme and its inherent military characteristics was achieved. Reaching this equilibrium, however, was a gradual process. In 1997 the official aim of the ASCS, unchanged from the previous era, continued to marginalise military outcomes. From this point, however, alternative ideas, where they had been unsanctioned and sporadic in the previous era, began to assert themselves in an official cadet doctrine.106 A draft re-write of ACC Standing Orders in 1998 gave a much firmer purpose to military training, in that it was to

develop an interest in the army and its traditions; to encourage cadets to continue military or community service; to give cadets a foundation of military knowledge; to develop the qualities of leadership, self-discipline, self-reliance and initiative; and to provide training that may contribute to army common induction training.107

So too the wider ASCS mission in 1999 alluded to a growing military consciousness in its commitment to ‘operate as a community based youth training organisation,

within and outside the AAC, questioned its effect on the traditional volunteer ethic embodied by the cadet staff of years past. 105 In February 1998, the army’s Training Commander, Major General Michael Keating, recommended that cadet service be recognised by an ACC ‘badge’ as the government’s Interdepartmental Committee on Defence Awards had previously decided against a re-instituted medal. This concept, however, was not supported by the cadet organisation whose members continued to lobby for a ‘real’ medal. When finally instituted, the Australian Cadet Forces Medal was awarded after 15 years of service to officers or instructors of cadets if at least one day of service was given after 13 February 1975, with a clasp added for every additional five years. The medal itself was silver with the ASCS insignia surrounded by the words ‘The Australian Cadet Forces Service Medal’ on one side with a Federation Star on the other. The ribbon consisted of seven alternating stripes of blue and gold edged by the tri-service navy blue, red and light blue. AAC Form AC 972 (2000). HQ ACC File 123/1/13, & Minute, HQTC-A to ACRES-A, dated March 1998. HQ ACC File 123/1/13. 106 Brewer, Executive Summary, p. 6. 107 Draft AAC Standing Orders (1998). HQ AAC File 123/1/48.

333 which stimulates interest in the ADF.’108 The Commander of the ACC, Brigadier N.R. Turner, encouraged this transition in suggesting a vision statement for the ASCS in 2000 that would ‘benefit the individual, the defence force and the wider community.’109 In the following year the AAC charter considered its purpose was to ‘encourage the development of positive personal and team characteristics ... and to provide an understanding of the army, specifically its place within the community, and its career options.’110 By 2003 the organisation’s self-proclaimed mission was to ‘develop Australian youth within an army context … and build on the relationships between the community and defence now and in the future.’111 In a final testament to the acceptance of a multifaceted social, educational and military purpose, by July 2004 a new official objective was drafted for the AAC: ‘to develop army cadets into more effective citizens within a safe, enjoyable and challenging military-like environment … that will lead to support for Defence.’112

It was the recurring theme of recruiting potential that facilitated the re- acceptance of such military outcomes alongside of established social and educational outcomes. Again, Brigadier Turner did his best to promote this concept suggesting that ‘cadets are young people who are generally declaring an interest in the ADF as a likely preferred career choice … they are clearly a fertile recruiting field.’113 Statistics underwrote his argument. In 2001 more than 50 per cent of ex-cadet career enquiries resulted in applications to enlist and the number of former cadets in the Army Reserve ranged from 18 per cent in their entry year to 48 per cent after 25 years service.114 In February 2002, the CA, Lieutenant General Cosgrove, was informed that ‘the potential recruiting value to army of the AAC … is considerable’ while in 2003 a Department of Defence submission to the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, estimated that around 30 per cent of tri-service cadets, with over 24 months tenure in the program, moved into the ADF with 20 per cent of

108 Newsletter of the ASCS Association, The Torch, dated 1 December 1999. HQ AAC File 123/1/48(2), & ACRES-A ASCS Management Plan 1999/2001. HQ AAC File 2003/52664/1. 109 Letter, Turner to Topley, dated 6 March 2000. HQ AAC File 123-1-55. 110 Charter of the ACC (extract) (2001). HQ AAC File 2001/33042/1. 111 The Australian Army Cadets Strategic Plan (2003). HQ AAC File 2003/52657/1. 112 Department of Defence, DI(A) 53-1, p. 1. 113 ibid. 114 Brief, HQ AAC to COSC, dated 18 May 2004. HQ AAC File 2004/1030583/1.

334 permanent and reserve members having had cadet experience.115 Not surprisingly, 122 of 313 (39 per cent) of new ADFA trainees in that year were ex-cadets.116 In October 2004 the Assistant Secretary Cadet Policy at DDFC, Kim Isaacs, suggested that anecdotally ‘former cadets generally stay much longer in the ADF … are also much more likely to reach a senior other rank and are significantly more likely to become a senior officer.’117 Her contention was supported by the fact that in that year 54 per cent of army brigadiers were former cadets, as were 56 per cent of lieutenant colonels while, as far as the other ranks were concerned, over 30 per cent of staff sergeants and above had once been cadets.118 The recruiting potential of the AAC remained a powerful tool in justifying its links to the army and the inclusion of a military purpose for the movement. The path to a true balance between social, educational and military objectives for the AAC was neither rapid nor smooth and in many ways it had taken over 130 years to attain. Nonetheless, by the end of 2004, it had been substantially achieved.

In addition to issues of purpose, cadet training and activities were a useful representation and confirmation of the balance of social, educational and military considerations that underwrote the strength of the movement in this period. In 1997 a recruiting poster for 37 RCU in north-eastern Victoria described most of the general training activities of a typical cadet unit of the time: map reading, navigation, first-aid, radio communication, field engineering, military history, bush craft and limited training in the use of the F88 Austeyr rifle.119 Additional core ACC activities not portrayed by the poster included drill, visits to military establishments, safety, physical, and survival instruction, while elective training included parachuting, abseiling, canoeing and advanced first-aid.120 Of course not all units attempted to pursue the full range of such activities although a number structured themselves to come close. The Camberwell Grammar School unit in Victoria, for example, initiated a two-tiered training program where cadets pursued either the ‘Management Stream’

115 Brief, HQ AAC to Army Headquarters (internal) for Chief of Army, dated February 2002. HQ AAC File 2001/33042/1, & Submission Number 1, Review of Defence Annual Report 2002-3, Defence Sub- Committee of Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Parliament House Webpage, www.aph.gov.au. 116 Department of Defence, Annual Report 2002/03, Government Printer, 2003, p. 313. 117 Brodtmann, Nurturing Defence’s Future, pp. 22-23. 118 Brief, HQ AAC to COSC, dated 18 May 2004. HQ AAC File 2004/1030583/1. 119 37 RCU Recruiting Poster (1997). HQ AAC File 2001/33042/1. 120 Brief, HQ AAC to COMCARE (2000). HQ ACC File 123/1/22.

335 or the ‘Senior Cadet Training Program.’ The former focused on a traditional syllabus for cadets aspiring for promotion while the latter was designed for those destined not to wear rank and who participated, in addition to standard training, in a range of alternate and adventurous activities.121

A noticeable feature of cadet training in this period was an emphasis on correct procedure and a commensurate increase in associated paperwork. Such formalisation was encouraged by a re-written TMP, issued on 24 August 1999, which gave a complete set of rules and guidelines prescribing the range of activities that were to be undertaken during a cadet’s progression through the organisation (see Table 11I).122 On top of this rigid syllabus, from 2001, units were obliged to provide annual training programs and were required to submit requests to conduct cadet activities to their Cadet Wings six weeks prior to commencement. Requests for events involving large units, adventure training, range practices or non-standard training were to be submitted a minimum of eight weeks in advance.123 Furthermore, in the same year a number of activities were banned completely including bungee jumping, para gliding/sailing, hang gliding, ice climbing, rock fishing, free fall parachuting, open ocean kayaking, certain climbing activities, and white water rafting.124 With such administrative overheads and restrictions in place it took motivated adult staff to keep training programs from becoming boring and predictable.125

121 Camberwell Grammar School, The Camberwell Grammarian, 2001, p. 8. 122 Minute, Commander AAC to Chief of Army, dated 25 November 2003. HQ AAC File 2004/100872/1. 123 In addition, from this point Training Command required an army ‘Cadet Liaison Officer’ to be in attendance at any cadet field activity and a written instruction was required in any case where a unit wished to conduct training away from its home depot. NSW Cadet Wing Newsletter Number 8 of 2001. HQ AAC File 2001/33042/1, & Brief, Army Headquarters (internal) for Chief of Army, dated 4 June 2001. HQ ACC File 2001/33042/1. 124 Where rapids were Grade 2 or higher. Department of Defence, Policy Manual 2001, pp. 9-8 – 9-9. 125 It was also during the period 1996-2004 that cadet training activities came firmly under the influence of federal government safety legislation. In November 1999 cadets were confirmed as employees of the Commonwealth for the purposes of occupational health and safety (OH&S). Responding to this duty of care obligation a draft cadet OH&S policy document was immediately released and applied to all units (a formal policy document was re-released in 2003). The policy stipulated a detailed and bewilderingly comprehensive set of roles and responsibilities for all levels of command. While such a document was no doubt necessary, there remained a risk within such a legalistic and detailed framework of promoting risk avoidance rather than risk management. In April 1999, 4 Cadet Wing in South Australia, for example, complained that the new policy used ‘OH&S and safety in training as a catalyst to restrict many aspects of training’ and that it sought to ‘provide the ADF with a no blame proposition.’ South Australian AAC Magazine, The Disseminator, dated September 2001. HQ AAC File 123/1/48(2).

336 Table 11I - Typical Five Year Cadet Progression, 2001-04

Year Age Rank Attainable Appointment Courses Offered • Recruit (on joining) 1 12 ½ • Cadet • Recruit Platoon JNCO (at end of year) • Cadet • Senior Training Platoon 2 14 • Lance Corporal • Section 2IC • SNCO (at end of year) • Corporal • Section Commander • CUO • Sergeant • Platoon Sergeant 3 15 • Adventure Training • Staff Sergeant • Company Quartermaster Award • WO2 • Company/Regimental Sergeant Major • CUO 4 16 • WO1 Platoon Commander/Company • Adventure Training • CUO 2IC/Assistant Quartermaster/Instructor Award • Regimental Sergeant Major • WO1 5 17/18 Platoon Commander/Company • CUO 2IC/Assistant Quartermaster/Instructor

Source: Department of Defence, Policy Manual Policy 2001, p. 7-3.

Within this increasingly restrictive training environment the rise of the Duke of Edinburgh Award scheme and enduring importance of the Adventure Training Award were strong indications of the continuance of character development and adventure training as central training philosophies. From 2001 units were actively encouraged to participate in the Duke of Edinburgh Award whose moral objectives were closely aligned with those of the cadet movement.126 Award qualifications were made at the gold, silver and bronze level with qualified cadets permitted to wear associated insignia on their uniforms.127 As participants were free to choose the activities they included in each section of their award it was possible for cadets to gain Award qualifications entirely through their involvement in the AAC. By 2004 the Duke of Edinburgh Award was considered a top achievement within the AAC and it, along with the Adventure Training Award, was one of the two most prestigious qualifications that a cadet could earn.128

126 The aim of the Duke of Edinburgh Award is to develop youth in the qualities of initiative, self- discipline, leadership, loyalty, community service, and physical well-being. 127 To be eligible for the bronze award candidates must have had completed one year in the AAC and attained the age of 14½ years. To participate in the silver awards cadets needed to have held a bronze for twelve months, served for two years in the AAC, and have reached 15 years of age. A gold award required the holding of a silver for another twelve months, three years in the AAC, and to have reached 17 years. Department of Defence, Policy Manual 2001, pp. 13-3 & 13-4. 128 Duke of Edinburgh Award Program, Australian Army Cadets Links with the Duke of Edinburgh’s Award, Victorian State Award Office, November 2002.

337 By 2003 the Adventure Training Award had evolved to represent the pinnacle of cadet accomplishment and the embodiment of the adventure training ethos. All preparations were still conducted at unit locations with cadets converging for an assessment course. The difficulty of the assessment, however, rose in proportion with the esteem in which the award had come to be held. Participants were told that they ‘must be comprehensively skilled in all aspects of cadet training’ in order to succeed and were required to undergo an ‘Adventure Training Award Pre-selection Barrier Test’ and the ‘Adventure Training Award Fitness Test’ before even attempting the course.129 A pass/fail regime was applied, allowing no retests, with candidates permitted only two attempts in their cadet careers. Such harsh regulations were designed to ‘re-establish a core group of elite cadets, and re-instate the Adventure Training Award as the most difficult, but highly prized, award to be earned by a cadet during his/her career.’130 The style of activities undertaken during the Award assessment remained similar to those in place up to 1996 with the course held in South Australia at Roonka Scout Camp in 2001, for example, rotating twenty cadets through arduous navigation exercises, a cliff training area to take part in abseiling, obstacle course training, sporting activities, and a canoeing exercise.

Balancing the focus on character development and adventure training, represented by the Duke of Edinburgh and Adventure Training Awards, was the re- emergence of military influence through weapon and warlike training. Throughout the period access to firearms became a very sensitive issue with the army focusing its attention on if, when, where and how cadets should make use of them.131 In 1997 weapon training was limited with heightened security requirements for armouries ensuring that most units did not hold rifles at home locations.132 In 1998, however, the situation began to improve with the ‘ACSC Cadet Training Improvement Initiative’ enhancing opportunities for access to weapons for ceremonial, handling, safety and

129 The barrier test was a written theory exam of 59 questions on navigation, first aid and communications with a pass mark of 90 per cent. The fitness test consisted of sit-ups (minimum 80), push-ups (minimum 50 male & 25 female) and a 2.4 kilometre run. A pass was determined by an overall a points system. Candidates were also required to be in their third year of training and to have attended at least two annual camps. ATA Participants Handbook (2003). HQ AAC File 2004/1017907/1. 130 ibid. 131 Report of HQ AAC Weapon and Ammunition Audit (1997). HQ ACC File 123/1/22. 132 Minute, Army Equipment Maintenance Authority to HQ AAC, dated 27 July 1999. HQ ACC File 123/1/7.

338 firing instruction. The policy entailed the introduction of innocuous F88 Steyrs to replace outdated SLRs and represented ‘a heightened commitment by defence to provide safe and responsible weapons training access.’133 The initiative included a voluntary continuum of rifle training progressing from the innocuous Steyr, to a single shot bolt action .22 calibre weapon, to the .22 calibre F88T Steyr, and finally to the service 5.56mm Steyr. 134

Following the recommendations of the Topley Report, which advocated a substantially increased opportunity for weapon training for all cadets, on 11 May 2001 Brigadier M.W. Meecham was commissioned to undertake a full review of military- like and firearms training for the ADFC. This investigation, known as the Meecham Review, advocated voluntary participation in weapons training, an increased allocation of innocuous Steyrs, and participation by cadet units in civilian rifle club activities. In September 2001 the federal government gave broad agreement to Meecham’s recommendations and directed the development of a formal firearms training implementation plan.135 In February 2003 an AAC Firearms Training Policy was finally drafted embodying many of the Meecham Review’s original proposals (see Table 11J). The aim of such training was to ‘inculcate pride, confidence and respect’ through ceremonial activities and to ‘train cadets in safe and competent handling of firearms to a stage where they can confidently participate in a live range.’136 All rifle training was voluntary and dependant on written consent from parents or guardians with cadets required to pass relevant army skills tests prior to any live practice. By March 2004 the Firearms Training Policy was certified in accordance with a range of legal requirements although it continued to be developed and refined.137

133 Brief, HQ AAC to Parliamentary Secretary’s Office (2003). HQ AAC File 2003/52658/1. 134 By mid-2002 most of the planned 1,500 innocuous Steyrs had been issued. ibid. 135 While this plan was under development there was significant confusion about what cadets could do with respect to firing weapons. In short, no cadet was able to shoot with the Steyr, apart from a familiarisation practice, unless they were formally qualified on the weapon. It was difficult for cadets to achieve such qualifications, however, as they were prohibited from using the army’s simulated shooting system due to the human likeness of its targets. This meant that most cadet shooting activities were restricted to basic familiarisation practices at annual camps. Senate Legislation Committee Brief, dated 10 May 2004. HQ AAC File 2003/52658/1; AAC Cadet Shooting Policy Statement, dated 1 December 2001. HQ AAC File 2002/3179/1, & Brief, HQ AAC (internal), dated 7 October 2002. HQ AAC File 2003/52635/1. 136 Draft AAC Firearms Training Policy, dated 10 February 2003. HQ AAC File 2002/3179/1.

339 Table 11J – Progression of Cadet Weapon Training, 2003 Year Age Training 1 12.5 • Nil 2 14 • Introduction to bolt action rifles • Drill with arms • WTSS familiarisation 3 15 • WTSS Grouping practices • F88T qualification 4 16 • F88 qualification • WTSS elementary application of fire 5 17/18 • F88 continuation • WTSS advanced application of fire • Selected cadets trained as Safety Supervisors

Source: Draft AAC Firearms Training Policy, dated 10 February 2003. HQ AAC File 2002/3179/1.

Paralleling the re-emergence of weapon training was formal endorsement of the military-like activities unofficially embraced by a number of LSUs prior to 1998. Such training was initially facilitated through the Cadet Foster Unit Partnership Program which advocated an enhancement of ‘the cadet experience by providing quality and safe military-like activities.’138 Under this program cadets, 16 years and older, were able to voluntarily participate in army exercises and adventure training.139 In 2000, however, official guidance remained that ‘warlike’ training, such as ambushing, attacking, or training involving an enemy, either real or imaginary, was forbidden. Despite the clarity of this policy Brigadier Turner, Commander AAC, believed that it ‘was time to test the community attitude and redraw the line.’140 He pointed to a demand for a shift in this position by cadets and their staff, and that ‘some easing of limitations would allow access to high quality training materials … and would lead to efficiencies and improvement in the quality and appeal of cadet training.’141

Turner found support in the recommendations of the Topley Report which contended that ‘cadets wanted to re-define the boundaries of acceptable warlike activities’ and that ‘cadet involvement in military-like activities be thoroughly

137 Senate Legislation Committee Brief, dated 10 May 2004. HQ AAC File 2003/52658/1. 138 Department of Defence, DIG(A) 53-1, p. A4. 139 ibid. 140 Letter, Turner to Topley, dated 6 March 2000. HQ AAC File 123/1/55. 141 ibid.

340 reviewed in a liberal direction.’142 Topley wished to ‘enable cadet participation in simulated service activities such as infantry minor tactics in the field.’143 Subsequently, the Meecham Review, in addition to its analysis of cadet weapon training, concluded that ‘some of the current restrictions on military-like activities, particularly elementary infantry minor tactics, should be lifted’ and cadets be once again permitted to conduct fire and movement, patrolling, contact drills, observation and listening posts, escape and evasion, tracking and associated fieldcraft activities.144 Although the aim of such training would be to introduce cadets to military skills, rather than developing combat proficiency, Meecham recognised the potential to ‘draw adverse public comment, possibly about “child soldiers”.’145 Nonetheless, its value was clear and ‘with careful management’ he believed a positive outcome was ‘achievable within the short to medium term.’146 From 2001-04 there was steady movement in this direction.

The wider balance of educational, social and military training considerations found specific application in the conduct of annual cadet camps in this era. In 1996-97 regionally administered army-run activities continued to be large and fairly standardised affairs catering predominantly for RCUs. The 1996 Southern Region camp in Victoria, for example, ran under a time-honoured program of centralised and unit-run phases with cadets practicing drill, weapon training, range practices, an obstacle course, field engineering, orienteering, signals and first-aid training. Individual units conducted an overnight field exercise and, when not participating in centrally organised activities, ran their own training to ‘confirm lessons taught in home training periods.’147 The transition to equity of support between SBUs and RCUs in 1998, however, had a serious impact upon the conduct of these camps. The Cadet Wings were faced with a range of difficulties associated with an immediate requirement for much larger activities.148 With the influx of school units the South

142 Brief, HQTC-A (internal), dated 19 December 2000. HQ AAC File 123-1-65. 143 Brief, HQ AAC to Parliamentary Secretary’s Office (2003). HQ AAC File 2003/52658/1. 144 This recommendation was restricted to ‘quasi-enemy’ engagements. Bayonet training, assaulting a physical enemy, defending against a physical enemy and ambushing were still regarded by the Report as too warlike. Report of the Review of Military-Like Activities and Firearms Training for ADFC (p. 23.), dated July 2001. HQ AAC File 123/1/58. 145 ibid. 146 ibid. 147 South Australian Annual Cadet Camp Instruction, dated June 1996. Defence Archives File 97/6802. 148 Annex A to Minute, HQTC-A to Cadet Wings, dated 6 August 1998. HQ AAC File 123-1-1(3).

341 Queensland annual camp of 1998, for example, suffered from a lack of instructional personnel and vehicle support.149 Across Australia, of the 10,000 cadets who attended regional camps in 1999, approximately 3,000 were from SBUs and 7,000 from RCUs, which represented a 43 per cent increase in cadet numbers than would have been catered for had LSUs continued to be denied access.150 Until the ACC adjusted to the implications of universal support there was no way of avoiding these types of problems.

Consequently, by 2000 Training Command was forced to admit that ‘it would be impractical for every cadet and cadet unit to attend an army conducted regional annual cadet camp.’151 The NSW activity, for example, typically run for around 2,000 RCU cadets, could not hope to cope with an additional 4,493 school-based participants had they all sought attendance. As a result, from this point SBUs were encouraged to return to the old practice of conducting individual school camps, although they would now be reimbursed their costs on a per capita basis for rations, transport and sanitation.152 This notion certainly appealed to many of the larger and wealthier school units who traditionally favoured running their own activities and were now going to be paid for it. Up to this date units like that at Knox Grammar, Sydney, had conducted substantial and complex camps including, for example, a deployment of 500 cadets to Wollemi National Park in 1998 to carry out roping, confidence course, watermanship, orienteering and search exercise activities interspersed with bush walking and trekking.153 With army financial and material backing such sizeable and intricate individual unit annual camps remained a feature for large school units up to 2004.

Meanwhile, freed somewhat from numerical pressures of catering for all school units, army administered annual camps began to develop a range of variations from what had become an overly predictable format. In 2002, for example, the South Australian camp consisted of a series of four day-long programs conducted in a round-robin with activities including a field exercise, a range practice, a community

149 Minute, South Queensland Cadet Wing to HQTC-A, dated August 1999. HQ AAC File 123-1-1(5). 150 Brief, HQTC-A (internal) (1999). Defence Archives File 99/29438. 151 Minute, HQTC-A to Cadet Wings (2000). Defence Archives File 2000/12332/1. 152 ibid. 153 Knox Grammar School, The Knox Grammarian, 1998, p. 55.

342 support activity (clearing a railway cutting) and watermanship training.154 Continuing innovation saw the 2004 annual camp in NSW include, for the first time, SES and Rural Fire Services activities.155 Similarly inventive was the Victorian camp of the same year. Christened ‘Exercise Emu’, the activity catered for more than 1,200 cadets and was focused on a week of adventure training with a static display of armoured vehicles provided by the Army Reserve as a highlight. The commander of the AAC, Brigadier N.G. Miller, commented that such creativity and army involvement in annual camps ‘further enhances the military-like experiences and opportunities available’ to members of the AAC.156 It is therefore likely to continue.

The period 1996-2004 witnessed disparate and unequally resourced SBU/RCU annual camps first merge, and then settle into a functional duality of individual school and grouped army-run activities. The difference this time was that adequate financial and material support was available for the proper conduct of both. The larger schools remained engaged and enthused with the army confident in its ability to cater for RCUs and SBUs not inclined to attempt individual camps. Indeed, the system worked well enough from 2000 for grouped camps to begin to match the innovation and flexibility previously the reserve of larger school-run activities. Again, with respect to annual camps and in reflection of the wider movement in this period, balance was the key.

The conduct of cadet courses in this era lent cohesion to the movement and returned a measure of consistency lacking prior to 1996. In 1998 the suite of appointment and promotion courses for officers and instructors of cadets was completely remodelled. Upon joining the ACC, all staff were required to attend an Induction Course and a First Aid Course, with officers of cadets participating in a mandatory Officers’ Course.157 In addition to these first appointment courses, from 1

154 South Australian AAC Magazine, The Disseminator, dated August 2002. HQ AAC File 123/1/48(2). 155 HQ AAC (NSW) Media Release, dated 2 July 2004. HQ AAC File 2004/1030632/1. 156 Hope, J., ‘Emu Parade for AAC Victoria’, in Army Newspaper, 21 October 2004, p. 5. 157 The Induction Course was a pre-requisite for appointment as an officer or instructor of cadets. It was two days long and covered topics such as legal responsibilities and adolescent behaviour, and had to be completed within three months of acceptance into the ACC. The First Aid Course was again run over two days while the Officers’ Course consisted of nine days training for candidates wishing to be appointed as officers of cadets. This latter course provided basic military skills, was to be completed within two years of appointment, and was a pre-requisite for all further promotions training. Annex A to Minute, Royal Military College to Cadet Wings, dated 16 December 1998. HQ AAC File 123/1/1(5).

343 January 2000, AAC unit commanders were obliged to qualify on a Command Course with those failing to do so by 30 June 2001 relieved of command. From this point officers of cadets needed to pass an Administration Course to be promoted to lieutenant while either a Training or Logistics Course was required for promotion to captain. To become a major a candidate required all three.158 This continuum of three appointment and four promotions courses remained essentially unchanged to 2004. Understandably, the development of such a regime was not necessarily welcomed by some school unit staff, although such feelings had more to do with the compulsory attendance requirements than with the nature of the courses themselves. Prior to the end of LSU independence many units had simply refused to comply with selection and training requirements for its adult staff.159 After the provision of full support, however, the army was at last in a position to impose its will and a total of 1,138 trainees participated in this program in the financial year 1999-2000 alone.160

With full support status accorded to all units instances of school-run cadet promotions training dwindled in favour of regionally administered activities under three general categories. First, a Junior Leader’s Course qualified cadets for promotion up to the rank of corporal and taught the basic fundamentals of their role as section commanders in charge of around ten cadets. Second, a Senior Leaders Course equipped candidates for promotion to sergeant and staff sergeant rank focusing on leadership, field and ceremonial skills. Finally, a CUO/Warrant Officers’ Course qualified cadets for promotion to these ranks with a focus on instructional and administration/management skills. By 2004 these combined promotions camps had become reasonably large events with that in Victoria in December 2003, for example, qualifying 250 cadets from 24 of the 28 units in the state. Separate Junior Leaders, Senior Leaders and CUO/Warrant Officers’ courses were held with trainees working at ‘field and navigation skills, leadership, initiative, self-discipline and the ability to work as part of a team.’161 Like the range of remodelled adult staff courses, the

158 Department of Defence, Policy Manual 2001, p. 6-7. 159 Minute, HQTC-A to South Queensland Cadet Wing, dated 13 February 1998. HQ ACC File 123/1/1(5). 160 Minute, Royal Military College, Duntroon, dated 13 July 2000. Defence Archives File 2000/12332/1. 161 While the Junior Leaders Courses by 2004 could be run either in a central location in each Region or by individual units, it was rare for Senior Leaders Courses or CUO/Warrant Officers’ Courses to be run anywhere other than at army administered courses camps. Brief, HQ AAC to Parliamentary Secretary, dated November 2003. HQ AAC File 123/1/48(2), & AAC Homepage, www.aac.adfc.gov.au.

344 conduct of cadet promotions camps ensured irregularity and disparity were replaced by consistency of standards across the army cadet organisation.

The final aspect of cadet training reflecting the newfound sense of balance within the movement concerned competition. From 2002 a number of revealing innovations evolved of which one notable example was the CDF Cadet Leadership Challenge announced in April 2002 by the CDF, Admiral C.A. Barry. One senior and one junior cadet representative were selected from all eight Regions from the army, navy and air force cadet schemes (giving a total of 48 cadets in six teams of eight with a junior and a senior team representing each service). From 28 September 2002 participants were subjected to a four-day competition conducted in and around ADFA.162 The winners of the inaugural contest were the AAC team in the senior division and the air force team in the junior division. Despite its success, the Leadership Challenge was discontinued after a single contest, but in its place for the AAC the CA, Lieutenant General Leahy, initiated the Cadet Team Challenge with the inaugural contest held in Sydney from 16-18 January 2004. This competition saw one team from each of the eight Regions selected to compete in a comparable set of activities with the aim of identifying a champion Region for the award of a perpetual trophy.163 In both instances the focus of competition was on assessing skills such as fitness, teamwork, leadership and general military knowledge; clearly representing the combination and integration of the social, educational and military objectives of the movement.164

The fact that the AAC was flourishing by 2004 was the inevitable result of an alignment of its four foundation forces. In an atmosphere of sustained conservative political backing, military, educational, social and fiscal factors had at last found an

162 Joining Instruction for Chief of the Defence Force Cadet Leadership Challenge, dated September 2002. HQ AAC File 2003/52737/1, & Letter, DDFC to Chief of the Defence Force, dated 5 April 2002. HQ AAC File 2002/ 21228/1. 163 Each competing team consisted of the regional Cadet Adjutant and RSM, two cadets below the age of 15, two cadets below the age of 16, and two older than 16. There was one female in each of these last three categories. Brief, HQ AAC to Chief of Army/RSM Army, dated January 2004. HQ AAC File 2004/1005809/1. 164 Although decreased in precedence from the pre-1975 period, organised cadet competitions remained a focus for the AAC from 1996-2004. Intra and inter unit contests at annual camps, national challenges such as those described, or even international events like the cadet rifle shooting teams sent to England to compete in the British Inter-Service Cadet Rifle Matches and the Schools Meeting held at Bisley,

345 appropriate balance. Following both the Brewer and Topley reviews the army committed itself to properly sustaining the cadet organisation. At the same time renewed support for school-based units, represented by the rise of the CHSP, and a successful harmony between its youth development and military objectives, ensured commitment from the education sector. Financial support, evidenced by initiatives like the CEP, was deep, consistent and effectual while at the same time the movement became increasingly aware and responsive to the mood of public opinion and expectation. The appropriate timing and nature of reintroduced miliary-style training initiatives was a clear example of such perceptiveness. There is no doubt that should these four factors remain synchronised then future success for the AAC is assured. Should they once again fall out of equilibrium, however, then a return to the troubled times of years past is inevitable. Perhaps 140 years of history has taught the movement enough to ensure it is the first alternative which unfolds in the years to come.

remained important facets of cadet life in 2004 and will continue to be so in the future. General Instruction – ADF Rifle Team Tour to Bisley, dated 29 June 2004. HQ AAC File 2004/1030632/1.

346 Correct as at: 17 Feb 05

Word Count: 912

CHAPTER TWELVE

Conclusion

This thesis set out to present a general history of the army cadet movement in Australia from 1866 to 2004. It has done so through an examination of a number of key features of the cadet system including its purpose, organisational structure, administrative system, enrolment statistics, adult staff, the provision of material support, and the range of cadet training activities. There is no doubt that there were (and are) additional aspects of the cadet experience worthy of investigation but it is these issues, through time, that provide a rounded and holistic understanding of the organisation.

The cadet story is one of a series of highs and lows. Throughout its history the movement has ridden waves of success where numbers, prestige and support were all forthcoming, only to be followed by periods of difficulty where the organisation struggled to keep itself from fading to inconsequence (see Figure 12A). From humble nineteenth century beginnings, cadet schemes in most of the colonies rose to positions of relative strength in the years following Federation. Against early expectations, however, the new Commonwealth system established in 1906 set disappointing standards before being overtaken by the era of compulsory military training which marked all eligible boys for uniformed cadet service from 1911. When universal service drew to a close the volunteer movement was split into Regimental and School branches and endured difficult circumstances until the Second World War set the conditions for its revival from 1939-45. After the war the cadet organisation grew to considerable proportions to reach a peak in the mid-1960s before the disastrous events of 1975. Down but not out, from 1976 the movement gradually recovered. Unfortunately, in 1983 another ill-fated decision, this time to withdraw support from school-based units, confounded further progress. Undaunted, from 1996 to 2004, through a series of influential reviews, the cadet organisation managed once more to claw its way back to a position of strength with solid numbers backed by growing educational engagement and firm military and political commitments.

347 Figure 12A - The Rise and Fall of the Cadet Movement, 1904-2004

100000

90000

80000

70000

60000

50000

40000

30000

20000

10000

0 1904 1910 1915 1920 1925 1931 1935 1939 1945 1950 1954 1957 1961 1965 1970 1973 1979 1982 1989 1993 1998 2000 2004

NSW Colonial Cadets Vic Colonial Cadets Qld Colonial Cadets SA Colonial Cadets WA Colonial Cadets Tas Colonial Cadets Senior Cadets School Cadets Mounted Cadets Senior Cadets Regimental Cadets LSU Cadets FSU Cadets ACC Cadets AAC Cadets

These fluctuations of fortune were never random. This thesis has demonstrated that the cadet movement has always been subject to the influence of four foundation forces: the wider military organisation, the educational establishment, community and social attitudes, and the availability of resources. Cadet history, therefore, is fundamentally a product of the balance and interaction of these four factors. Their relative strengths and orientations have quite literally determined all aspects of its outward appearance and internal functioning. When one or more of them has undermined the movement then it has struggled. Alternatively, when all four have been aligned it has thrived. Any worthwhile investigation of the army cadet movement will always require a study of the relationships between these four pillars.

The thesis has also demonstrated that throughout the history of the cadet movement superimposed upon and complementing these four fundamental forces has been the recurring influence of party politics and the ramifications of a lasting private school/state school divide. Almost invariably periods of sustained growth and development for the cadet organisation have coincided with conservative political

348 leadership while difficult times have been marked by its absence. Similarly, for most of its existence the movement has been characterised by a private school/state school divide which, depending on the severity of the split, has also contributed to its fluctuating fortunes.

What of the future of the army cadet movement? In 2004 the organisation was backed by a committed military, an increasingly involved education sector, social attitudes willing to accept, to a far greater extent than in the past thirty years, the role of a uniformed and army-oriented youth development organisation and, importantly, sufficient finance and resources to achieve the outcomes expected of it. In July 2004, the Commander of the AAC, Brigadier N.G. Miller, outlined what he perceived were the strengths of the organisation to the CA’s Senior Advisory Committee as being esprit de corps, foster unit support, the dedication of adult staff and the capability of cadets. He noted the future brigade and battalion re-structure as being important to improve command and control and observed that levels of support were on the increase now that individual Army Reserve foster units understood the recruiting benefits of supporting the cadet organisation. Miller pointed to greater military training opportunities and a recent decision to purchase 5,000 .22 calibre rifles for cadet units as evidence of an improving cadet experience and an increasing differentiation from organisations like the scouts. The organisation had found balance and was rightly confident in its outlook.

This does not mean, however, that the cadet system cannot continue to improve itself. Brigadier Miller also conceded that the shallowness of military skill in some adult staff and a negative perception of cadets by wider elements of the ADF remained weaknesses.1 Nor does it mean that the future of the organisation is assured. Should any one of the four foundation forces weaken or change its orientation then danger, once more, will stalk the cadet organisation. Perhaps this thesis might go some way to helping the contemporary cadet movement understand its heritage and thus equip itself more effectively to combat any future challenges that may arise.

At its heart the army cadet movement retains, in 2004, the same spirit that inspired its creation in the 1860s. Time and circumstance have not dulled it as a positive

1 Brief, Commander AAC to CASAC, dated 18 June 2004. HQ AAC File 2004/1030587/1.

349 and challenging experience for young Australians. The torch is bright and the sword is sharp - may they remain so.

350 Appendix 1

Commonwealth Military Cadet Corps Battalion, Company and Squadron Establishments

Senior Cadet Battalion (1907)

Battalion Headquarters Officers Warrant SNCOs Drummers Rank TOTAL Officers or Buglers & File Commanding Officer 1 1 (major or lieutenant colonel) Adjutant 1 1 Quartermaster 1 1 Signals Officer 1 1 Medical Officer 1 1 Regimental Sergent Major 1 1 Regimental Quartermaster Sergeant 1 1 Orderly Room Sergeant 1 1 Band Sergeant 1 1 Band 21 21

Total 3 21 30

Cadet Company

Officer Commanding 1 1 (captain or lieutenant) Lieutenants 2 2 Colour Sergeants 1 1 Sergeants 3 3 Drummers or Buglers 2 2 Corporals 4 4 Cadets (privates) 45 45 Cadets (private stretcher bearers) 2 2

Total for 1 Company 3 4 2 51 60 Total for 8 Companies 24 32 16 408 480

Total with Battalion Headquarters 29 1 35 16 429 510

Source: Department of Defence, Commonwealth Military Cadet Corps Regulations and Standing Orders 1907 (Provisional), Government Printer, 1907, p. 8.

351 School Cadet Battalion (1907)

Battalion Headquarters Officers Warrant SNCOs Drummers Rank TOTAL Officers or Buglers & File Commanding Officer 1 1 (major or lieutenant colonel) Adjutant 1 1 Quartermaster 1 1 Signals Officer 1 1 Medical Officer 1 1 Regimental Sergent Major 1 1 Regimental Quartermaster Sergeant 1 1 Band Sergeant 1 1 Band 21 21

Total 2 21 29

Cadet Company

Officer Commanding 1 1 (captain or lieutenant) Lieutenants 2 2 Colour Sergeant 1 1 Sergeants 3 3 Drummers or Buglers 2 2 Corporals 4 4 Cadets 47 47

Total for 1 Company 3 4 2 51 60 Total for 8 Companies 24 32 16 408 480

Total with Battalion Headquarters 29 1 34 16 429 509

Source: Department of Defence, Commonwealth Military Cadet Corps Regulations and Standing Orders 1907 (Provisional), Government Printer, 1907, p. 11.

352

Mounted Cadet Company (1909)

Officers Others Total Officer Commanding (Captain) 1 1 Lieutenants 4 4 Squadron Sergent-Major 1 1 Squadron Quartermaster Sergeant 1 1 Sergeants 4 4 Trumpeters 2 2 Corporals 4 4 Privates 55 55

TOTAL 5 67 72

Source: Department of Defence, Commonwealth Military Cadet Corps Regulations and Standing Orders 1909, Government Printer, Melbourne, p. 11.

353 Appendix 2

The Evolution of Cadet Uniforms 1866-2004

In the earliest days of the cadet movement in NSW the original St Mark’s School unit wore navy blue tunics with grey trousers, a style that, after 1874, was adopted as the official NSW colonial cadet uniform.2 It included a plain leather belt, a brass buckle, a bayonet strap and a peaked cap similar in style to the contemporary mounted police.3 Exceptions to the standard uniform, however, became more common than adherence and in many cases units deliberately chose individualistic apparel. A number of detachments, following the adult volunteer example, chose red tunics and dark trousers with a red or other coloured stripe, and a kepi cap with shades attached to the neck in summer.4 Cadets at Sydney Grammar School, for example, wore scarlet coats and blue cuffs with white braid, blue trousers with red stripes and peaked caps. This design became the basis for NSW Public School Cadet uniforms from 1883 which consisted of a scarlet tunic trimmed and faced in white with blue trousers with a scarlet stripe down the seam, and a blue cap with white edging.5 Perhaps the most ornate of the NSW cadet units in this era was that at Newington College, Sydney. The Newington uniform resembled the British Rifle Brigade design of dark blue serge. The tunic was faced with bright green on the front and cuffs and had shoulder straps of green twisted braid. The trousers had a green stripe down the side and the cap was of blue serge with piping. In front was a silver bugle coiled around the letter ‘NC.’ Not surprisingly the school maintained its own tailor, hatter and fletcher.6 Despite such early variation, by the 1890s many of the unique and colourful NSW cadet uniforms had been dropped for khaki.

As uniforms were originally provided at school or parental expense in colonial Victoria a wide range of designs emerged. The Wesley College unit, for example, initially wore a Garibaldi Jacket, trousers and caps of maroon serge with red trimming with belts and webbing of yellow leather.7 When the Victorian cadet system was well established a standardised uniform was approved although there is some disagreement about its exact style. Given that boys were required to furnish it themselves some variations would not have been surprising. What is agreed is that the uniform was navy blue in colour with long, baggy trousers with either a single breasted coat with six buttons or a ‘blue jumper faced with red.’8 All accounts agree to a stiff blue hat with a shiny peak. This uniform was generally disliked by cadets and many parents refused to clothe their sons in it. The Melbourne Argus commented that ‘a more hideous looking costume could not be designed, even for burlesque’ and many boys complained that they were often mistaken for telegraph workers in the ‘abominable costume.’9 Subsequently, the wealthier independent schools in the colony were able to convince the government to allow them to discard the standard uniform and to adopt their own designs. In 1885, for example, the Melbourne Grammar School unit fitted itself out with

2 In 1875, as a result of this early attempt at standardisation, the St Mark’s uniform was changed to a grey coat and dark blue trousers to ensure the unit remained unique. Bromham, Cadet Corps in NSW, p. 15. 3 Horan, Fort St, p. 70. 4 Bean, Here, My Son, p. 177. 5 Memo, Chief Inspector (NSW) to District Inspector, dated May 1884. SRNSW CGS3830, Item 20/12655. 6 Kitney, Australian School Cadet Movement, p. 57. 7 Candy, Victorian Cadet Movement, p. 24-3. 8 ibid., p. 24-9 9 Argus, 21 May 1885.

354 a rifle green Norfolk jacket, trimmed with black braid, with trousers of the same colour and an imperial pattern cap worn with a white cover in summer.10 In 1886 permission was given for each battalion to choose its own uniform, although many Victorian state schools retained the original and even encouraged its use as a general school uniform.11 In 1888-89, the Victorian government began to subsidise the cost of cadet uniforms with the provision of £2,000 for this purpose in its defence estimates. As a consequence in 1889, when Major General A.B. Tulloch was appointed as the Commandant of the Victorian Military Forces, he had the power to standardise Victorian cadet uniforms. Alarmed at the existing diversity he directed that the whole force be dressed in khaki with a felt hat, a battalion numeral on the shoulder straps, and a school badge on the collar in the case of colleges and grammar schools.12 The Victorian Senior Cadets were allowed to continue in blue until 1890 when they too were dressed in khaki, with helmets, capes and black leather accoutrements.13

Across the remaining colonies uniforms were equally as varied. In Queensland, the state school cadet organisation wore the uniform of the Queensland Volunteer Teachers Corps, which in the late 1890s consisted of a grey tunic and pants with black leather accoutrements. Private schools, however, were permitted to be more inventive. The Brisbane Grammar School cadet unit uniform in 1880 consisted of a blue tunic, grey trousers and a French kepi hat although by 1890 a khaki uniform had replaced the blue and grey.14 The short-lived Prince Alfred and St Peter’s cadet battalion in South Australia wore a uniform consisting of a jacket with yellow facings and shoulder straps of the school colours with the letters ‘I/C/CC’ upon them. A felt hat with a ‘fine cock’s feather’ (similar to the NSW Lancers) was also worn.15 In Western Australia the Junior Cadets of 1897 wore a ‘Glengarry’ cap, a red coat, trousers and a brown leather belt while members of the later Western Australian Public School Cadet Force were clad the same khaki uniforms as their NSW and Victorian counterparts.16 Finally, Tasmanian cadet units connected to adult volunteer regiments wore the uniforms of the units to which they were attached while school-based detachments copied them in style. At its inception the Hutchins School unit, for example, wore a navy blue uniform with red facings and a cap. From 1897 the Southern Tasmanian Cadet Corps was clad in a khaki uniform with scarlet facings and ‘field service caps’ with this uniform remaining in vogue until 1905.17

Although subsidised under the Commonwealth cadet system from 1906-10 cadet uniforms were not standardised and continued to vary between states. The only common element was a numeral on the shoulder strap to denote the wearer’s battalion, while a special school badge was worn on the collar for School Cadet and school-based Senior

10 Kitney, Australian School Cadet Movement, p. 56. 11 Victorian Volunteer Cadet Corps Revised Standing Orders (p. 5.). CRS A1194, Item 20.42/6623. 12 Henry, Victorian Cadet System, p. 10. 13 Daley, Victorian Junior Cadet Corps, p. 22. 14 Kitney, Australian School Cadet Movement, p. 57. 15 Earlier, when school drill teams came together for displays or other purposes, a suitable and standard uniform was adopted for the occasion. An 1890 example consisted of a coat and trousers of navy blue serge, trimmed in red braid, with brass buttons, a ‘cheese-cutter’ cap, and a narrow red stripe running down the trouser seam. School initials were worn on the front of cap. Department of Education (South Australian), Education Gazette, Government Printer, September 1885, p. 37, & Horner, PAC Cadet Unit (Extracts), p. 3. 16 WA M.V&P, 1904, Vol 1, Report of the Secretary for Education for the Year 1903, p. 76, & WA M.V&P, 1896, Report of the Commandant of the Local Forces of Western Australia for 1896, p. 5. 17 Notes on the history of the cadet corps in Tasmania. HQ AAC File 123/1/32.

355 Cadet units. NSW uniforms were quite colourful with both School and Senior Cadets wearing khaki trousers, puttees and peak caps with scarlet edging and detachable neck flaps. The jacket for School Cadets was of navy blue serge with scarlet shoulder straps while Senior Cadet jackets were dark green with shoulder straps edged with scarlet braid.18 Victorian School and Senior Cadets wore khaki jackets with scarlet braid around the collar, shoulder straps and cuffs. Their khaki trousers had a scarlet seam stripe and they wore a Glengarry cap embroidered with a gold cadet badge on its front- left side or a slouch hat with a looped-up side.19 South Australian cadets of the era wore a less colourful uniform of plain khaki jackets and trousers with peaked Bisley caps as the state’s Commandant, Colonel E.T. Wallack, did not ‘consider it desirable to have colour facings.’20 Queensland cadets adopted a khaki uniform that differed from that in South Australia only in that it chose a slouch hat with the left side turned up with a maroon puggaree for the Senior Cadets.21 The Western Australian uniform on the other hand consisted of khaki hat, puggaree, jacket, trousers and leggings with dark navy blue facing added to the edge of the collar, shoulder straps and the cuff. School Cadet trousers had a blue braid seam while Senior Cadet trousers were plain khaki.22 To the south Tasmanian uniforms were made up of a blue serge jacket and trousers with a forage cap of the same colour replete with scarlet braided edging. Both Junior and Senior Cadet uniforms were the same in Tasmania except for the colour of the facings was red for School Cadets and green for Senior Cadets.23

During the era of compulsory training from 1911-29 a free cadet uniform was issued. It took the form of a woollen khaki shirt, cord breeches, a brown leather belt, puttees and ankle boots. Senior Cadets also wore a slouch hat with a rounded crown and a hatband of a single brown leather strip with battalion numbers worn at the front.24 In 1917 the military shirts issued to cadets were replaced with a cadet jacket and at the same time the brown hat band was substituted by a green puggaree similar to adult infantrymen of the era. Badges and chevrons of rank were as per the CMF. 25 In theory these uniforms were universally provided but the military always found it difficult to fully outfit the sizeable numbers of cadets rotating through the organisation. Nor were uniforms easily replaced if damaged or worn out.26 In the end the financial burden of cadet uniforms, combined with reduced quotas and a changing training emphasis, convinced the army authorities to replace the military-style uniform in 1922 with a more practical garb consisting of a brown jersey, brown shoes and socks, khaki shorts and hats.

After the compulsory era the Regimental Cadets of the dual system were provided uniforms in the style of adult CMF soldiers. Their school-based counterparts, however, were entitled to no such free issue.27 In 1930, bereft of much assistance of any sort from the army, they wore whatever they could find. The military justified this

18 Minute, NSW Commandant to Cadet Units, dated May 1906. CRS MP84/1, Item 1832/9/19. 19 Memo, Officer Commanding Cadets (Victoria) to Army Headquarters (1906). CRS MP84/1, Item 1832/9/45. 20 Minute, Commandant (SA) to Army Headquarters (1906). CRS MP84/1, Item 1832/9/40. 21 Note, Description of SA Cadet Uniform. CRS MP84/1, Item 1832/9/41. 22 Minute, WA Commandant to Army Headquarters, dated June 1906. CRS MP84/1, Item 1832/9/14. 23 Memo, Commandant (Tasmania) to Army Headquarters (1906). CRS MP84/1, Item 1832/9/17. 24 Defence Act (1903-1912) – Regulations and Instructions (pp. 66-7). CRS A1194, Item 12.11/4338. 25 Department of Defence, Regulations 1915, p. 328. 26 ibid., p. 335. 27 Minute, Army Headquarters to Military Districts (1931). CRS A6006, Item 1930/02/11.

356 position on the grounds that membership of a school unit offered advantages that Regimental Cadets did not possess including the non-sacrifice of personal time for parades and the non-requirement to commit to join the CMF at the end of cadet training.28 From these austere beginnings, however, School Cadet uniforms grew in colour, style and variation. As uniforms were not issued at public expense, it was the responsibility of individual headmasters to submit unique designs to the Military Board for approval and such an arrangement led to a range of colourful, if impractical designs.29 The Cranbrook School’s cadet uniform of khaki and scarlet, for example, was criticised by the military on the grounds that the ‘colours must inevitably run’ while the Scots College, Sydney, went as far as partitioning the Minister for Defence for permission to import military Balmorals and Sporrans without paying customs tariff.30

For reasons of economy, a number of smaller school units in the 1930s adopted their standard school apparel as a cadet uniform with, in many cases, the simple addition of a distinctive hat or school badge. This was certainly the case for the Camden Church of England Grammar School in NSW when it raised a small unit of 29 cadets in 1936. The unit was commended by Brigadier J.L. Hardie, General Officer Commanding the 1st Division, for avoiding the trouble associated with cadets outgrowing distinctive and expensive uniforms.31 Nevertheless, even small schools could seldom avoid the attraction of a distinctive dress for their cadets. The diminutive Devonport High School unit in Tasmania, for example, wore khaki trousers and a khaki jacket with a red collar, brown epaulettes and green piping fringing the shoulders and cuffs. The uniform was finished with brown boots, puttees, and a cap with red trim on the sides surrounded by brown piping.32 Cadet officers of the era generally wore the same uniform as the rank and file with the addition of a Sam Browne belt and appropriate rank insignia.33

The early years of the Second World War saw a continuation of the variation in colour and style of cadet uniforms of the 1930s. Even uniform accoutrements diverged between one unit and the next with some wearing school badges and others the ‘Rising Sun’ of the adult forces. Parramatta High School cadets, for example, wore khaki shorts and shirts with tan boots and school badges while those at the Christian Brothers College, Lewisham, wore blue slacks and tunics with light and dark blue piping and CMF badges.34 The most common variants, however, were basic khaki styles with the school colours embossed on the shoulder straps. By 1941, while military authorities still refused to dictate the colour and style of uniform chosen by cadet units, repeated instructions ‘recommending’ khaki patterns and slouch hats over other colours and forage caps were distributed to schools on the grounds that this combination was best suited to field work and offered protection from the sun.35 By 1944 after repeated

28 Memo, Army Headquarters (internal), dated December 1930. AWM 61, Item 426/1/208. 29 Army authorities recommended between 35s and 50s be spent on uniforms. Some units, however, opted for styles that cost considerably more. Memo, Department of Education (Victoria) to Schools (1930). AWM 61, Item 426/1/206. 30 Correspondence, Various Schools to Army Headquarters (1930). AWM 61, Item 426/1/176. 31 Letter, 1st Division to Camden Church of England Grammar School (1936). AWM 61, Item 507/2/234. 32 Correspondence, Devonport High School to Army Headquarters (1939). CRS B1535, Item 734/11/110. 33 AMF and Senior Cadets – Standing Orders for Dress. CRS A1194, Item 20.60/18054. 34 Catholic School Applications to form Cadet Units in Eastern Command (various) (1940). AWM 61, Item 426/2/90. 35 Letters, (various) Army Headquarters to Potential Cadet Detachments (1941). AWM 61, Item 426/2/113.

357 suggestions from Army Headquarters most units had complied and wore some type of khaki uniform.

On 7 December 1944 the War Cabinet at last decided that free military pattern uniforms would be issued to all cadets and as a result, from 1 January 1945, those south of Rockhampton received Battle Dress while those north of Rockhampton received the lighter Khaki Drill Battle Dress.36 The main cadet complaint in 1945 was that the uniforms, although free, were often ‘unnecessarily large’ or came only after ‘unsatisfactory delays’; which was hardly surprising given that the free issue consisted primarily of uniforms worn by the CMF from 1931-39.37 Being generally of poor condition by the end of 1945 these uniforms were replaced almost universally by the standard Service Dress of soldiers of the 2nd AIF with the exception that cadets wore either a beret or a slouch hat with a puggaree of dark blue, often with their school colours sown into the upper portion.38 The provision of free uniforms reduced the annual efficiency allowance from 15s to 5s per cadet and cost the government an initial £105,404 pounds in 1945 and £10,401 pounds per annum thereafter.39

After the Second World War free standard Service Dress pattern uniforms continued to be issued to units and on 10 October 1946 all cadets except those in Queensland (who already had them) and Tasmania (who did not need them) were issued with additional summer uniforms of khaki drill shorts, shirts, hose-tops and puttees (with military or school badges depending on unit preference).40 Skill-at-arms badges for cadet rifle shooting were re-introduced in October 1946, and on 12 June 1947, the army approved the introduction of a number of additional proficiency badges for Bren Gun, Vickers Gun, mortar, signals and band training.41 At this stage many cadet detachments began agitating for a number of other uniform improvements including berets for winter, unit discretion to choose trousers or drill shorts, two pairs of boots, an army jersey and a kit-bag. By June 1948 these requests had expanded to include a new lighter type of boot. 42 In addition, appeals by a number of private schools to don unique uniforms were finally acceded to in September 1948 with the proviso that these schools pay for them from their efficiency allowances.43

36 Battle Dress consisted of a pair of boots, slouch hat, service jacket, service trousers and gaiters. Khaki Drill Battle Dress included a cape, drill trousers and khaki shirt. 37 These uniforms buttoned up to the neck and both neckband and sleeves had piping of red or green. St Joseph’s, Terrace, 1946, p. 48. 38 Mortensen, An Australian Army Cadet Unit, p. 3. 39 War Cabinet Agendum Number 20 of 1943. CRS A5954, Item 276/13. 40 Memo, Army Headquarters to Cadet Brigades, dated 10 October 1946. CRS SP1008/1, Item 436/4/203. 41 To qualify for the rifle badge a cadet needed to achieve an 80 per cent score at a special shoot on an open range. If successful he was considered to be a ‘marksman’ and entitled to wear the badge for 12 months after which time, unless he re-qualified, it was handed back. The badges were copper ‘oxidised’ colour and consisted of Crossed Rifles, Crossed Rifles with Star, ‘L.G.’ in Wreath (Bren Gun), ‘M.G.’ in Wreath (Vickers Gun), Mortar in Wreath, Crossed Flags, Crossed Flags with Star and ‘Band.’ Memo, 1 Cadet Brigade to Subordinate Battalions, dated 2 June 1947. CRS SP1008/1, Item 415/1/949. 42 Berets were issued in October 1947 and jerseys on 1 August 1949. Correspondence (various), 3 Cadet Brigade (1948). CRS SP459/1, Item 436/1/6576, & Memo, 2 Cadet Brigade to Subordinate Battalions (1948). CRS SP1008/1, Item 436/4/353. 43 This allowance was set at 30s if the free uniform was declined by units wishing to purchase their own approved patterns. In August 1948 schools with unique uniforms were Melbourne Grammar, Geelong Grammar, Scotch College (Victoria), Aquinas College, Christian Brothers College (Perth) and Scotch College (WA). All other units wore army apparel. Memo, Army Headquarters to Cadet Brigades, dated September 1948. CRS SP1008/1, Item 436/4/320.

358 The next significant uniform development for cadets came on 5 January 1949 when the Minister for the Army, Cyril Chambers, approved the distribution of cadet ‘efficiency badges.’ The efficiency badge saga was a long one with original approval of the concept coming in early 1945. As a temporary measure efficient cadets were given the army’s marksmanship badge to wear as the issue of all adult skill-at-arms badges was suspended during the war. At the cessation of hostilities these awards were reintroduced into the army which rendered the marksmanship badge as no longer useful to denote cadet efficiency. In March 1947 a design was submitted to Army Headquarters of a blue rectangular cloth badge containing a red circle with a gold ‘E’ in the centre and a number of gold bars below it to represent years of consecutive efficiency. This design was, however, shelved until 1949 until finally approved to be worn on the shoulders of all cadet jackets and shirts. It was thought that due to its visibility the badge would increase morale and induce cadets to want to strive for annual efficiency in the same manner as the CMF ‘chevrons of efficiency’ worn on the right forearm by adult soldiers.44 No other significant alterations to cadet uniforms were made up to 1957 with the exception that from the mid-1950s ‘unofficial’ epaulettes bearing school colours started appearing in a number of units.45

Between 1958-74 cadets continued to wear either a free army pattern uniform or an approved and school purchased variation (usually of Scottish design). In both cases from 1959 all cadets were required to wear a new ‘Formation Sign’ or identification patch on their shoulders that replaced traditional ACC shoulder tiles. The new badge consisted of a crown, below which was an outline map of Australia, surmounted by a crossed sword and torch of learning. Below the symbol were the words ‘Australian Cadet Corps.’46 The design of the patch had been determined in 1957 through a nation- wide competition to derive a new symbol for the ACC.47 The successful pattern was submitted by CUO L.C. McBride of Haileybury College Cadet Unit in Brighton, Victoria, who wrote that each symbol: the sword, the crown and the torch, represented an aim, function or quality of the cadet movement. Interestingly the torch was placed on top of the sword reflecting, perhaps, the change of focus of the organisation in this period. The symbol first appeared on the flag of 3 Cadet Brigade in 1958 and the basic design is still in use today. 48

The type of army issued uniform for the ACC was changed in 1961 from Second World War vintage Service Dress to the Battle Dress of the contemporary army.49 The idea was not only to replace an outdated uniform with a superior design, but also to increase feelings of association between cadets and adult army as the new uniform brought boys ‘closer to the present army dress than to the original ANZACs.’50 The new Battle Dress uniform included or slouch hat, jacket and trousers, khaki shirt and drill trousers, a jersey, a greatcoat, belts, anklets and accoutrements with the cost to the army of the initial outfitting totalling £338,300 with a further £84,182 per annum required for maintenance.51 In 1964 in tropical areas, and as a summer uniform in more temperate climates, Jungle Greens were worn with a blackened webbing belt, boots and gaiters, as

44 Memo, Army Headquarters to 5 Cadet Brigade (1949). CRS MP742/1, Item 48/1/677A. 45 St Joseph’s, Terrace, 1953, p. 38. 46 Department of Defence, Cadet Journal, No 9, 1958, p. 15. 47 Minutes, Cadet Conference (1957). CRS MT1131/1, Item A65/1/598. 48 Department of Defence, Cadet Journal, No 11, 1960, p. 69. 49 The change-over was not fully completed until 1966. 50 Reid, Looking Back With Thanks, p. 17. 51 Minute, Minister’s Office to Army Headquarters (1961). CRS MT1131/1, Item A48/1/1150.

359 a replacement for the old style Khaki Drill uniform.52 By 1969 a number of units had received official permission from Army Headquarters to wear lanyards with their uniforms while many others continued to wear them without formal approval. So too, berets became popular from 1971 as a replacement for slouch hats in many detachments. 53

In 1977 the order of dress for cadets was changed to Jungle Greens in both summer and winter and the issue of Battle Dress was discontinued.54 The Jungle Greens uniform consisted of a beret, green shirt and trousers, and polished black boots, web belt and gaiters. Brassards of NCO rank were worn on the right upper arm and unique unit lanyards, school badges and coloured unit titles (worn on the shoulder or on the epaulette) were authorised with the permission of the Director of Cadets. At the same time the ACC colour patch and range of proficiency badges endured.55 When in the field a bush hat replaced the beret and webbing equipment replaced a web belt.

In July 1990 Major General P.M. Jeffery, the Deputy Chief of the General Staff, ordered an investigation into a replacement uniform for the Jungle Greens worn by cadets. Consequently, on 20 November OACRES-A recommended that the ACC be provided with a composite uniform resembling the Disruptive Pattern Camouflage Uniform (DPCU) of the adult army. This included a DPCU bush hat, a Howard Green jumper and GP boots. A non-standard cadet specific DPCU-style shirt and Jungle Green style trousers were suggested.56 This hybrid solution was not accepted and cadets remained in Jungle Greens until the end of 1992 when a general issue of a complete DPCU uniform (including cadet specific DPCU-style versions) was commenced. From this point cadets and their adult staff wore a uniform almost indistinguishable from the field dress of the adult army with the exception of blue ACC insignia worn on the left and right upper arms of all garments except raincoats.57 Apart from this standard dress detachments were free to approach the Director of Cadets for permission to purchase army ‘polyester’ uniforms with approval only given on the proviso the uniform was bought by the unit from within its own resources and that it only be worn when parading as a unit and not in the presence of other ACC detachments.58 Such conditions generally restricted polyester uniforms to wealthy LSUs.

Cadet dress in 2004 included DPCU (or DPCU-style) and polyester uniforms. The first existed in three orders with the most common being ‘Barracks Dress’, worn in unit

52 AHS, Magazine, 1963, p. 17 53 Signal, Army Headquarters (WLA002), dated 3 July 1969. CRS J2812, Item R133/6/1. 54 Battle Dress was privately purchased by some units after this date. The unit insignia on hat badges and shoulder flashes was not issued free and to cover costs most units charged a joining fee of around $5. With the approval of the Director of Cadets a number of units continued to wear unique school or traditional pattern uniforms at their own expense. Department of Defence, Standing Orders 1980, pp. 7-5 - 7-6. 55 On ceremonial occasions cadet SNCOs were authorised to wear scarlet sashes across their shoulders while CUOs and WO1s wore Sam Browns belts. ibid., pp. 7-4 - 7-5. 56 Brief, OACRES-A to Chief of the General Staff, dated November 1990. Defence Archives, File 87/49959. 57 Cadet units retained their ‘DPCU-style’ shirts and commonly wore them as a barracks dress with ‘real’ DPCU shirts reserved for field activities. Memo, OARES-A (internal) (1993). Defence Archives, File 93/28537. 58 The polyester uniform consisted of formal style khaki slacks with a short or long sleeve light khaki shirt and polished black leather shoes or boots. Minutes, OACRES-A to Cadet Units (various) (1993-93). Defence Archives, File 93/18148.

360 locations by cadets and adult staff during normal training hours. It consisted of a DPCU shirt and trousers with black boots, a webbing belt and either a slouch hat (brim turned down), an approved unit beret, or a bush hat. The second order of DPCU dress was a ‘Field Dress’ uniform worn by all personnel involved in field exercises or training activities. In this case DPCU shirts and trousers were worn with a bush hat with no awards or other accoutrements allowed. A third ‘Ceremonial’ version of this uniform was also used in that a black belt and the slouch hat with the brim turned up were worn along with a royal blue (or other approved) lanyard. Officers of cadets, CUOs and Cadet WO1s wore a Sam Browne belt, swords and accessories with this uniform. Polyester uniform shirts, trousers and accoutrements were the same as those issued to adult army personnel and were worn in two orders. The first was a ‘General Duties’ uniform consisting of a slouch hat or beret with a short sleeved shirt with embroidered rank on the sleeves (or shoulder slides), polyester trousers, a lanyard, black boots or shoes, a khaki belt or Sam Browne belt (for officers of cadets, CUOs and Cadet WO1s), cadet awards and nameplates. The ceremonial version of this polyester uniform was the same except that a slouch hat was mandatory and a black belt was worn along with swords and accessories. Scottish dress was permitted to be worn as ceremonial attire for approved units.59

A range of approved cadet awards, badges and embellishments were authorised to be worn with these uniforms. The first was an adventure training insignia earned by cadets completing the Adventure Training Award course. The badge was a guilt metal brooch with the torch of learning centrally placed behind a boomerang bearing the word ‘Adventure’. It was worn above the centre of the right pocket. The second was the Duke of Edinburgh Award (bronze, silver or gold badge) which consisted of the Duke's insignia superimposed upon a map of Australia. Eligible cadets were authorised to wear this badge in the same position as the Adventure Training Award award. If a cadet possessed both awards then they were placed side by side. In addition to these badges, on 2 July 1999, approval was given for cadets to wear Parachute Wings and Flying Wings on their uniforms. The first was worn by individuals having completed a ‘First Jump Course’ on the right sleeve of DPCU uniforms only. Similarly, a cadet ‘Flying Wings’ badge was worn by those successfully completing a civilian pilot’s licence course over the left pocket.60

59 Department of Defence, Army Standing Orders for Dress (ASOD), Vol 2, Part 7, Chapter One: Australian Army Cadet Corps - Uniforms and Appearance, Government Printer, p. 1-Annex E. 60 ibid.

361 Appendix 3

The Junior Cadet System in Australia, 1911-31

The overriding purpose of the Junior Cadet scheme was to prepare boys for Senior Cadet and adult military service primarily through physical education. The official Junior Cadet training textbooks spoke of ‘the production and maintenance of health in body and mind … to give him a stronger and more healthy body, and to aid him to approach more nearly to the ideal of perfect physical development.’1 The system required all eligible candidates to present themselves for medical inspections at times and places notified local by Area Officers in order to begin training on 1 July of the year in which a boy turned 12.2 To give some sense of the scale of the scheme, at its inauguration on 31 December 1911, a total of 33,767 Junior Cadets underwent medical examinations and of these 97.8 per cent were cleared to begin their training (see the table below for Junior Cadet numbers 1914-21).3 Junior Cadet activities were, for the most part, carried out in schools as part of the normal school curriculum under the supervision of school headmasters, acting with approval of Military District Commandants, with training responsibilities usually divulged to a teacher or teachers from within the school.4 There were very few boys of Junior Cadet age not attending schools in this era and these few, where not exempted, received their training from the military authorities at night and on holidays.5

Junior Cadets Registered Medically Fit and Under Training, 1914-21

1914 1915 1916 1917 1918 1919 1920 1921

Deemed Medically Fit 47,236 48,561 49,112 53,817 55,625 54,910 56,003 51,471 Eligible Boys Tested 97.8% 97.6% 97.7% 97.9% 98% 98% 98% 98%

Source: Commonwealth Yearbooks No 7 (1914) p. 936; No 8 (1915) p. 944; No 9 (1916) p. 984; No 10 (1917) p. 988; No 11 (1918) p. 1021; No 12 (1919) p. 1010; No 13 (1920) p. 1003; No 14 (1921) p. 921; No 15 (1922) p. 620.

At the inception of the scheme an appeal was made by the Department of Defence for teachers to cooperate by accepting honorary commissions as Junior Cadet officers.6 Many responded and were granted such commissions provided they qualified by examination at military-run schools of instruction.7 It was not, however, necessary

1 Department of Defence, Physical Training Part 1: Junior Cadet Training Textbook, Government Printer, 1925, p. 7. 2 Area Officers placed notices in post offices and other approved places and wrote to headmasters of schools in which Junior Cade Training was authorised. Defence Act 1903-1912, Sections 125-126, quoted in Regulations and Instructions for Universal Training (p. 3). CRS A1194, Item 12.11/4339. 3 Commonwealth Yearbook, No 9 (1916), p. 982. 4 Report of the Minister for Defence on the Progress of Universal Training (1912). CRS A5954, Item 1208/7. 5 Department of Defence, Australian Junior Cadet Regulations 1917, Government Printer, 1917, p. 12. 6 Adelaide High School, 50th Anniversary Book, 1958, p. 15. 7 The number of commissions granted within a school depended on the number of Junior Cadets under training. Junior Cadet commissions bestowed no right of command in the Australian Military Forces

362 for teachers to be officers in order to train Junior Cadets for so long as the District Commandant was satisfied with the standard of instruction at a school then that was all that was required.8 The incentive to attain Junior Cadet commissions rested more, therefore, with the fact that the qualification entitled teachers under 26 years old to substitute their Junior Cadet responsibilities for their own universal training requirements.9

Prescribed Junior Cadet training was initially set at 120 hours each year with physical training and drill given as two compulsory subjects. It was recommended that boys receive lessons of between 20-30 minutes at least three or four times per week (see the tables below for an example proforma and script for a physical training lesson). Generally this requirement was broken down into physical training lessons of 15 minutes in each school day along with elementary drill practice once a week.10 In addition, Junior Cadets were required to reach a prescribed level of proficiency in at least one of the following optional subjects: miniature rifle shooting, swimming, running exercises in organised games, or first aid. In June 1912 the mariner’s compass and elementary signalling were added to the list of elective subjects and the total training time each year for Junior Cadets was reduced to 90 hours.11

Standard Lesson Proforma for a Physical Training Lesson to Junior Cadets, 1916

Serial Action 1. Introductory running and breathing exercises 2. Head pressing backward, truck pressing forward 10 mins 3. Arm exercises (boning and stretching and shoulder blades) 4. Balance and leg exercises 5. Trunk turning and bending sideways 6. Marching, running, jumping 10 mins 7. Game 8. Breathing exercises

Source: Department of Defence, Junior Cadet Training, Text Book 1916: Part 1 - Physical Training, Government Printer, 1916, p. 82.

beyond the Junior Cadet organisation. Teachers held rank only so long as their school trained Junior Cadets or for so long they were appointed as instructors. Department of Defence, Australian Junior Cadet Regulations 1917, Government Printer, 1917, p. 17. 8 Department of Defence, Australian Junior Cadet Regulations, Government Printer, 1925, p. 17. 9 White, K., ‘Compulsory Military Training in Australia in 1914’, in Sabretache, Vol 18, 18 January 1977, p. 16. 10 Department of Defence, Physical Training Part 1: Junior Cadet Training Textbook, Government Printer, 1925, p. 24. 11 The mariner’s compass was only taught in certain specified state schools. Minutes of Conference on Junior Cadet Training (1912). CRS MP84/1, Item 1832/13/573.

363 Script of a Physical Training Lesson Given to a Detachment of Junior Cadets, 1916

Serial Action Command 1. Form class into one rank. Backs to the wall - move! 2. Select two leaders and place them in position two paces apart (on marks). 3. Form two ranks on leaders. (Cadets go alternatively to front and rear ranks). 4. Practice whole class running to wall and back To the wall - move! To places - move! in ranks. 5. Attention. Stand at Ease. Atten - tion! Stand at - ease! 6. Covering in files. Class - cover! 7. “As small as possible, as tall as possible”. As small as possible, as tall as possible - down! Class - up! etc. 8. Knees full bending. Knees full - bend! Knees - stretch! (The heels are raised as the knees are bent). 9. Marking time. Mark - time! Class - halt! (begin on left foot; instant halt on command). 10. Rapid march in large circle, instant halt on Quick - march! Class - halt! (step off with the left signal or command. foot, keep time). 11. Racing in 4s or “all against all”. 12. Reform in open ranks (place leaders). To your places - move! 13. “Bouncing Balls”. (Small rapid jumps with nearly straight knees). Breathing. Breathing - commence! Class - steady!

Source: Department of Defence, Junior Cadet Training, Text Book, 1916, Part 1 - Physical Training, Government Printer, p. 86.

Of the time allotted for Junior Cadet activities by far the greatest portion was devoted to physical training and over time this focus tended to twist the system into a glorified physical education program in many schools.12 At the same time the military considered miniature rifle shooting to be the most important of the optional training subjects as the first stage in a progression that was to continue through the Senior Cadets to culminate in the trained soldier musketry courses of the adult forces.13 Once a year all Junior Cadets were inspected by a representative of the Military District Commandant to assess their proficiency in compulsory and elective subjects and lists were sent to the Military Board of schools that did not train their Junior Cadets to a sufficient standard.14 Such schools could then be removed as approved locations for training (forcing their pupils to parade elsewhere) while those deemed to be maintaining appropriate training standards were given an allowance by the government of 2s 6d per efficient Junior Cadet. 15

12 Collins, J.R., ‘Training of Junior Cadets’, in Lone Hand, 1 March 1913, p. 414. 13 ibid., p. 416. 14 Department of Defence, Australian Junior Cadet Regulations 1917, Government Printer, 1917, p. 13. 15 The eight cadet minimum was dropped after 1914. Regulations and Instructions for Universal Training (p. 12). CRS A1194, Item, 12.11/4339.

364 Despite the popularity of the Junior Cadet scheme and its perceived success (as measured by ever decreasing numbers of medical exemptions for Senior Cadets), the fate of the system was sealed on 1 June 1922, when the Prime Minister, Alfred Deakin, wrote to the state Premiers to inform them that ‘in view of the need for economy in expenditure on matters relating to defence, the Commonwealth government has reluctantly decided to cease its activities in connection with the Junior Cadet training scheme as from the 30 June 1922.’16 Junior Cadets had expended between 1-2 per cent of the defence budget in the financial year 1921-22 and in a time of enforced fiscal restraint it was a burden that became too heavy to endure.17 The Prime Minister’s Office reiterated the cause of the decision in its desire to emphasise to the states that ‘only the present state of the country’s finances renders necessary the course of action outlined.’18

Despite the cessation of Commonwealth support the various state education authorities were not eager to forgo many of the perceived benefits of the Junior Cadet system and eventually their concerted and sustained agitation in support of re-raising the scheme yielded results when federal approval for a resumption of military support for the scheme was granted from 1 July 1924.19 From this point direction and coordination of Junior Cadet training was again undertaken by the army but the system was no longer compulsory and was administered by the state education departments at minimum Commonwealth expense.20 Under such arrangements the modified Junior Cadet system limped along for another seven years until army finally discontinued any further association with it on 30 June 1931.21 Many schools continued with similar programs under their own volition and the physical training previously conducted under the auspices of the Junior Cadets was gradually absorbed into school curriculums as physical education or similarly titled subjects. Military connections and connotations were lost and quickly forgotten.22

16 Letter, Prime Minister to State Premiers, dated 1 June 1922. QSA RSI15191, Item (1-431). 17 From 1919-21 the scheme cost the Department of Defence over £2,000 per annum in allowances alone. By 1922 the cost of the system as a whole had grown to £15,000 per annum. Memo, Queensland Education Department (internal), dated 11 May 1923. QSA RSI15191, Item 1-431. 18 Memo, Prime Minister’s Office to State Departments of Education, dated 2 July 1922. CRS A457, Item C404/5. 19 Military Board Order Number 162 of 1924. CRS A5954, Item 895/9. 20 Letter, Commandant 1st Military District to Undersecretary of Public Instruction (Qld), dated 17 June 1924, & Memo, Queensland Education Department (internal), dated 11 May 1923. QSA RSI15191, Item 1-431. 21 Memo, Army Department of Physical Training to Military Commandants, dated 21 June 1931. AWM 61, Item 412/3/72. 22 Australian Junior Cadet Regulations (1927). CRS MP742/1, Item 4/1/291.

365 Appendix 4

Senior Cadets in Training by State, 1913-20

1913 1914 1915 1916 1917 1918 1919 1920 QLD 12,111 11,813 11,865 11,141 11,495 11,941 13,038 13,221 NSW 32,496 31,157 32,729 31,971 33,009 32,190 37,385 37,230 VIC 28,028 27,817 27,671 26,655 27,560 28,110 29,977 28,811 SA 8,849 8,639 8,810 8,905 8,942 9,251 9,864 9,933 WA 4,286 4,353 4,811 5,169 5,535 5,852 6,090 6,186 TAS 2,938 2,919 3,069 3,118 3,201 3,450 3,753 3,569 TOTAL 88,708 86,698 88,955 86,959 89,742 90,794 100,107 98,950

Source: Commonwealth Yearbooks, No 7 (1914) p. 936; No 8 (1915) p. 944; No 9 (1916) p. 984; No 10 (1917) p. 987; No 11 (1918) p. 1020; No 12 (1919) p. 1009; No 13 (1920) p. 1002; No 14 (1921) p. 921.

366 Appendix 5

Numbers of Senior Cadets Undergoing Compulsory Training and Absent From Training, 1921-29

Military 1921 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 Formation Training Absent Training Absent Training Absent Training Absent Training Absent Training Absent Training Absent Training Absent

1 Division 14,616 1,622 5,806 107 5,475 88 2,514 36 2,361 49 2,187 55 2,331 49 2,334 45 (2 MD)* 2 Division 24,227 327 9,330 248 9,247 214 4,144 103 3,835 198 3,506 197 4,133 312 4,982 179 (2 MD) 3 Division 16,881 399 7,324 292 7,337 261 3,616 135 3,379 236 3,097 203 3,076 279 3,479 357 (3 MD) 4 Division 11,656 248 3,659 162 3,536 136 1,637 74 1,553 93 1,312 64 1,372 73 1,563 53 (3 MD) 4 Division 9755 45 3,762 52 3,842 67 1,668 22 1,552 43 1,268 47 1,517 123 1,523 17 (4 MD) 11 Brigade 11,963 70 4,008 33 4,120 97 1,838 37 1,490 83 1,493 47 1,329 29 1,509 103 367 (1 MD) 12 Brigade 3,701 27 876 36 879 37 424 14 375 14 290 29 830 23 328 13 (6 MD) 13 Brigade 6,198 41 2,290 13 2,272 10 1,045 5 972 3 681 12 367 13 880 10 (5 MD) 5 District ------23 - 25 - 22 - Base (5 MD) TOTAL 98,997 2,779 37,005 943 36,709 910 16,886 426 15,517 719 13,852 654 14,988 901 16,620 777

* (MD) is Military District

Source: Commonwealth Yearbooks, No 15 (1922) p. 919-20; No 16 (1923) p. 620; No 17 (1924) p. 590; No 18 (1925) p. 606; No 19 (1926) p. 551; No 20 (1927) p. 561; No 21 (1928) p. 587; No 22 (1929) p. 579; No 23 (1930) p. 616. Appendix 6 Regimental & School Cadets Numbers, 1931-1938

Military 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 Formation Regt School Regt School Regt School Regt School Regt School Regt School Regt School Regt School Regt School Field Troops 526 477 373 421 375 374 327 485 327 479 334 452 516 533 422 657 361 927 (1 MD)* 1 District 2 - 11 - 17 - 14 - 13 - 18 - 21 - 23 - 33 - Base (1 MD) 1 Cavalry 99 75 79 68 42 82 58 71 56 68 28 - 49 - 55 57 40 57 Division 1 Division 398 335 416 325 403 348 318 363 257 350 280 416 449 731 434 549 499 632 2 Division 826 545 645 551 451 542 445 559 384 504 434 624 755 485 739 899 605 1,011 2 District 195 - 149 - 98 - 119 - 102 - 59 - 129 - 125 - 174 - Base (2 MD) 2 Cavalry 107 - 82 - 94 - 100 - 101 - 97 - 110 - 73 - 103 - Division 3 Division 1148 632 840 450 548 567 627 659 551 673 543 700 863 898 680 927 709 877 4 Division 543 245 363 225 266 251 389 361 424 388 399 379 557 426 516 428 568 469 3 District 162 - 123 225 91 - 110 - 77 - 44 - 73 - 68 - 83 - Base (3 MD) Field Troops 354 200 240 - 160 271 231 239 239 227 226 233 320 293 270 403 375 387

(4 MD) 368 4 District 3 - 2 286 2 - 10 - 13 - 6 - 13 - 9 - 15 - Base (4 MD) Field Troops 267 49 185 111 164 114 122 148 103 160 111 206 303 214 276 252 285 305 (5 MD) 5 District 16 - 15 - 8 - 19 - 13 - 10 - 33 - 36 - 63 - Base (5 MD) Field Troops 113 24 90 15 125 - 144 - 140 69 150 109 222 100 212 132 192 115 (6 MD) 6 District 15 - 15 - 21 - 13 - 5 - 8 - 18 - 19 - 14 - Base (6 MD) TOTALS 3,628 4,774 2,582 2,452 2,865 2,549 3,046 2,885 2,805 2,918 2,747 3,119 4,431 3,700 3,957 4,304 4,119 4,780 6,080 7,356 5,414 5,931 5,723 5,866 8,131 8,261 8,899 * (MD) is Military District

Source: Commonwealth Yearbooks, No 24 (1931) p. 413; No 25 (1932) p. 427; No 26 (1933) p. 325; No 27 (1934) p. 334; No 28 (1935) p. 341; No 29 (1936) p. 344; No 30 (1937) p. 260; No 31 (1938) p. 263. Appendix 7

School Cadets at Educational Establishments, February 1938 Formation Educational Establishment Structure Strength 11th Mixed Brigade (Queensland) Maryborough Grammar 1 Coy* (4 Pls**) 94 Toowoomba Grammar 1 Coy (5 Pls) 200 Southport School 1 Coy (3 Pls) 65 Church of England Grammar Brisbane 2 Coy (8 Pls) 192 Scots College, Warwick 1 Coy (2 Pls) 67 Warwick State Technical College 1 Platoon 43 Slade School 1 Platoon 36 Townsville Grammar 1 Coy (3 Pls) 80 All Souls School, Charters Towers 1 Coy (3 Pls) 80 1st Cavalry Division (NSW) The Armidale School 1 Coy (2 Pls) 71 1st Division (NSW) Sydney Church of England Grammar 2 Coy (8 Pls) 182 Barker College 1 Coy (2 Pls) 50 Knox College 1 Coy (3 Pls) 100 Sydney Grammar 1 Coy (3 Pls) 80 Camden Church of England School, Manly 1 Platoon 30 2nd Division (NSW) Scots College, Bellevue Hill 1 Coy (6 Pls) 200 The Kings School 1 Coy (5 Pls) 179 Newington College 1 Coy (4 Pls) 106 Cranbrook School 1 Coy (4 Pls) 105 Sydney Boys High School 1 Coy (3 Pls) 81 Canterbury High School 1 Coy (4 Pls) 104 Hurlstone Agricultural High School 1 Platoon 40 3rd Division (Victoria) Melbourne Church of England Grammar 2 Coy (6 Pls) 230 Scotch College, Melbourne 2 Coy (8 Pls) 420 Xavier College 1 Coy (5 Pls) 208 Brighton Grammar 1 Coy (4 Pls) 132 Camberwell Grammar 1 Coy (2 Pls) 73 Haileybury College 1 Platoon 25 Caulfield Technical School 1 Coy (6 Pls) 106 4th Division (Victoria) Geelong Church of England Grammar 2 Coy (8 Pls) 337 Geelong College 1 Coy (4 Pls) 126 Field Troops (4th Mil Dist (SA) St Peter’s College 2 Coy (8 Pls) 212 Prince Alfred College 1 Coy (2 Pls) 63 Scotch College, Adelaide 1 Coy (4 Pls) 101 Field Troops (5th Mil Dist) (WA) Guildford Grammar 1 Coy (4 Pls) 100 Hale School 1 Coy (4 Pls) 100 Scotch College, Perth 1 Coy (2 Pls) 60 Christian Brother College, Perth 1 Platoon 40 Field Troops (6th Mil Dist) (Tas) Launceston Church of England Grammar 1 Coy (2 Pls) 67 Scotch College, Launceston 1 Coy (2 Pls) 45 Hutchins School, Hobart 1 Platoon 40 TOTAL 4,670

*Coy = Company ** Pl = Platoon Source: Report: Army Headquarters (internal), dated February 1938. AWM 62, Item 63/1/534.

369 Appendix 8 Manning Establishment Table for Cadet Units, 1944

1 Company 2 Companies 3 Companies 4 Companies 5 Companies 6 Companies 3 platoons of 9,10 or 11 sections or 11 9,10 of 3 platoons sections or 14 12,13 of 4 platoons sections or 17 15,16 of 5 platoons sections or 20 18,19 of 6 platoons sections or 23 21,22 of 7 platoons sections or 26 24,25 of 8 platoons 29 sections or 27,28 of 9 platoons sections or 32 30,31 of 1 platoon sections 35 or 33,34 of 11 platoons sections 38 or 36,37 of 12 platoons sections 41 or 39,40 of 13 platoons sections 44 or 42,43 of 14 platoons sections 47 or 45,46 of 15 platoons sections 50 or 48,49 of 16 platoons sections 53 or 51,52 of 17 platoons sections 56 or 54,55 of 18 platoons sections 59 or 57,58 of 19 platoons sections 62 or 60,61 of 20 platoons 1 platoon of 3,4 or 5 sections or 5 3,4 of 1 platoon or 8 sections 6,7 of 2 platoons Majors ------1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 Captains - - 1 1 1 2 2 2 4 4 4 5 5 5 6 6 6 8 8 8 Lieutenants 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 6 6 7 7 8 8 9 9 10 10 11 11 370 Cadet Lieutenants 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 6 6 7 7 8 8 9 9 10 10 11 WO2s - 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 3 3 3 4 4 4 5 5 5 6 6 6 Staff Sergeants 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 Sergeants 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 Corporals 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27 30 33 36 39 42 45 48 51 54 57 60 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40 43 46 49 52 55 58 61 5 8 11 14 17 20 23 26 29 32 35 38 41 44 47 50 53 56 59 62 Lance Corporals 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27 30 33 36 39 42 45 48 51 54 57 60 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40 43 46 49 52 55 58 61 5 8 11 14 17 20 23 26 29 32 35 38 41 44 47 50 53 56 59 62 Senior Cadets 24 48 72 96 120 144 168 192 216 240 264 288 312 336 360 384 408 432 456 480 32 56 80 104 128 152 176 200 224 248 272 296 320 344 368 392 416 440 464 488 40 64 88 112 136 160 184 208 232 256 280 304 328 352 376 400 424 448 472 496 Strength: Minimum 22 67 100 132 164 198 230 262 301 333 365 399 431 463 498 530 562 597 629 661 Maximum 54 87 120 152 184 218 250 282 321 353 385 419 451 483 518 550 582 617 649 681

Source: Department of Defence, Standing Orders for Cadet Services, Government Printer, Melbourne, 1944, pp. 15-16. Appendix 9Appendix Australian Cadet Corps (School Units), 1 November 1952

Command Brigade Battalion School Establishment 1st Military District 1 Cadet Brigade 1 Cadet Battalion (Brisbane Area) Brisbane Boys’ College 254 Brisbane Boys Grammar 325 Brisbane Church of England Grammar 490 St Joseph’s Christian Brothers College 325 Nambour State High School 54 The Southport School 185 2 Cadet Battalion (Toowoomba Area) Toowoomba Christian Brothers College 54 Downlands College 254 Toowoomba Grammar 254 Queensland Agricultural High School 222 St Mary’s Christian Brothers College 121 Scotch College 153 Slade School 121 Toowoomba State High 121 Warwick State High 88 3 Cadet Battalion (Rockhampton Area) Rockhampton Boys’ Grammar 121 371 Rockhampton Christian Brothers College 121 St Brendan’s College 153 St Patrick’s College (Mackay) 121 Maryborough State High 185 Bundaberg State High 153 4 Cadet Battalion (Townsville Area) All Souls’ School 222 Townsville Boys’ Grammar 88 Cairns Technical College 153 Townsville Christian Brothers College 121 Mt Carmel College 121 St Augustine’s College 153 Charters Towers State High 54 Thornburgh College 121 5 Cadet Battalion (Enoggera Area) Ipswich Boys’ Grammar 153 Brisbane State High 527 Brisbane Industrial High 254 Marist Brothers College (Brisbane) 153 St Columban’s College 121 St Mary’s Marist Brothers College 222 Nudgee College 325 Villanova College 88 2 Cadet Brigade 7 Cadet Battalion (East Sydney Area) Rose Bay Christian Brothers College 88 Paddington Christian Brothers Technical High School 121 Marist Brothers High School (Darlinghurst) 88 Marist Brothers High School (Randwick) 185 Sydney High School 185 The Cranbrook School 153 The Scots’ College 357 Waverley College 357 8 Cadet Battalion (Leichhardt Area) Canterbury High School 121 St Mary’s Christian Brothers College 153 Dulwich Hill Central School 121 Fort St High School 121 Glebe Central Technical School 88 Leichhardt Central Technical School 88 Newington College 286 Sydney Grammar 325 Trinity Grammar 222 9 Cadet Battalion (North Sydney Area) Chatswood Christian Brothers College 153 372 372 Manly Christian Brothers College 121 Crows Nest Secondary Technical School 121 Knox Grammar 222 Manly Boys’ Junior High School 121 Mosman Intermediate High School 88 North Sydney Boys’ High School 325 North Sydney Technical High School 121 St Aloysius College 121 St Ignatius College 153 Sydney Church of England Grammar 357 10 Cadet Battalion (West Sydney Area) Barker College 185 Blue Mountains Grammar 54 Holy Cross College 88 Homebush High School 88 Hornsby Central Technical school 88 Katoomba High School 121 Marist Brothers High (Parramatta) 121 Parramatta High School 88 St Bernard’s College 88 St Joseph’s College (Hunters Hill) 222 The Kings School 325 Westmead Central Technical School 121 11 Cadet Battalion (Newcastle Area) Cooks Hill Intermediate High School 121 Gosford High School 88 Muswellbrook Intermediate High School 121 Maitland High School 222 Newcastle Boys’ High School 222 Newcastle Technical & Junior High Schools 121 (each) Singleton Intermediate High School 88 Taree High School 185 Wyong Central Rural School 54 12 Cadet Battalion (Casino Area) Ballina Intermediate High School 54 Casino High School 121 Coffs Harbour High School 121 Grafton High School 121 Kempsey High School 121 Kyogle Central School 54 Lismore High School 222 Mullumbimby Central School 54 Murwillumbah High School 54

St John’s College, Woodlawn 185 373 13 Battalion (Tamworth Area) Armidale High School 121 Tamworth Christian Brothers College 88 De La Salle College 153 Farrer Memorial Agricultural High School 88 Glenn Innes High School 88 Gunnedah High School 88 Inverell High School 121 Moree Intermediate High School 54 Narrabri Intermediate High School 54 Quirindi Intermediate High School 88 Tamworth High School 121 The Armidale School 222 14 Cadet Battalion (Bathurst Area) All Saints College 153 Coonabarabran Intermediate High School 54 Dubbo High School 88 Forbes Inter High School 88 Gilgandra Inter High School 54 Lithgow High School 121 Marist Brothers College (Forbes) 121 Mudgee High School 88 The Scots School (Bathurst) 54 Wellington Intermediate High School 54 Wolaroi College 54 15 Cadet Battalion (Young Area) Young Christian Brothers College 54 Cowra High School 54 Grenfell Intermediate High School 54 Griffith High School 88 Hay War Memorial High School 88 Leeton High School 121 St Anne’s Convent School 54 Temora High School 54 Wagga Wagga High School 121 Yanco Agricultural High School 121 Young High School 88 16 Cadet Battalion (Goulburn Area) Canberra High School 54 Chevalier College 88 Da La Salle College (Cootamundra) 54 Goulburn High School 153 Gundagai Central School 54 Queanbeyan High School 54 St Patrick’s College (Goulburn) 222 St Patrick’s Intermediate Technical School 88 374 Telopea Park Central School 88 Tumut Intermediate High School 54 Yass Intermediate High School 54 17 Cadet Battalion (South Sydney Area) Wollongong Christian Brothers College 121 De La Salle College (Marrickville) 222 Hurlestone Agricultural High 121 Marist Brothers High School (Kogarah) 153 Nowra Intermediate High School 88 Sutherland Intermediate High School 88 Wollongong High & Secondary Technical Schools 121 & 153 3 Cadet Brigade 20 Cadet Battalion (Sandringham Area) Brighton Grammar 222 Brighton Technical School 88 Caulfield Grammar 185 Frankston High School 121 Geelong Church of England Grammar 426 Geelong College 222 Geelong Junior Technical School 88 Haileybury College 121 Hampton High School 121 Mentone Grammar 88 Mordialloc-Chelsea High School 88 St Joseph’s College (Geelong) 121 Sandringham Technical School 54 21 Cadet Battalion (Camberwell Area) Ballarat College 121 Ballarat High & Junior Technical Schools 121 & 81 Camberwell Grammar 121 De La Salle College (Malvern) 185 Horsham High School 121 Oakleigh Technical School 121 Richmond Technical School 121 St Patrick’s College (Ballarat) 222 Scotch College 591 Warragul High School 121 Xavier College 185 22 Cadet Battalion (St Kilda Area) Caulfield Technical School 121 East Melbourne Christian Brothers College 185 St Kilda Christian Brothers College 222 Echuca Technical College 88 Kyabram High School 54

Melbourne Boys’ High School 485 375 St Patrick’s College (East Melbourne) 121 St Joseph’s Technical College 185 Seymour High School 88 Shepparton High School 121 Swan Hill High School 54 University High School 183 Wesley College 426 23 Cadet Battalion (Westgarth Area) Albury Grammar 121 North Melbourne Christian Brothers College 153 Collingwood Technical School 121 Essendon High School 88 Melbourne Church of England Grammar 527 Northcote High School 121 Preston Technical School 88 St Bernard’s College (Moonee Ponds) 121 St Joseph’s Technical College (South Melbourne) 121 St Kevin’s College 121 St Thomas’s College 88 South Melbourne Technical School 121 Williamstown High School 121 4 Cadet Brigade 26 Cadet Battalion (Warradale Area) Adelaide High School 222 Nailsworth Boys’ Technical School 88 Port Pirie High School 54 Pulteney Grammar 54 Scotch College 185 Unley High School 121 28 Cadet Battalion (Warradale Area) Glossop High School 88 Nuriootpa High School 54 Oakbank Area School 54 Prince Alfred College 286 Rostrevor College 222 Sacred Heart College 185 29 Cadet Battalion (Warradale Area) Bordertown Higher Primary School 54 Adelaide Christian Bothers College 185 Kadrina High School 88 St Peter’s College 185 Woodville High School 121 5 Cadet Brigade 30 Cadet Battalion (East Perth Area) Kalgoorlie Christian Bothers College 88 Leederville Christian Bothers College 88 Perth Christian Bothers College 121 Eastern Goldfields High School 88

Eastern Goldfields Technical School 54 376 Forrest High School 153 Hale School 121 Leederville Technical School 54 Perth Boys’ High & Junior Technical Schools 121 & 88 Perth Modern School 88 31 Cadet Battalion (Bayswater Area) Albany High School 185 Aquinas College 222 Bunbury High School 121 Clontarf Primary and Secondary Agricultural College 88 Collie High School 88 Denmark School of Agriculture 54 Guildford Grammar 185 Kent St High School 121 Midland Junction High School 121 Wesley College 121 32 Cadet Battalion (Claremont Area) Fremantle Christian Brothers College 88 Geraldton Christian Brothers College 121 Christ Church Grammar 121 Claremont High School 88 Fremantle Boys’ High School 121 Geraldton High School 121 Narrogin School of Agriculture 88 Northam High School 153 Scotch College (Swanbourne) 254 St Louis Jesuit School 121 6 Cadet Brigade 33 Cadet Battalion (Hobart Area) AG Ogilvie High School 54 Albuera St Practising School 54 Hobart High School 121 Hobart Technical High School 185 Hutchins School 88 New Norfolk Modern School 54 Robert Cosgrove Modern School 54 Snug Area School 54 St Virgil’s College 222 34 Cadet Battalion (Launceston Area) Cressy Area School 54 G.V. Brooks Community School 88 Launceston Church Grammar 153 Launceston High School 54 Launceston Technical High School 121 St Patrick’s College (Launceston) 88 Scotch College (Launceston) 54 377 West Tamar Area School 54 35 Cadet Battalion (Burnie Area) Burnie Modern School 54 Burnie High School 88 Devonport High School 88 Devonport State School 54 Junior Technical High School (Queenstown) 121 Latrobe Modern School 54 Smithton High School 54 Ulverstone State School 54 Wynyard State School 54 Yolla Area School 54

Source: ACC School Unit Location Statement, dated 1 November 1952. AWM 54, Item 147/2/3.

Appendix 10 The Structure of 2 Cadet Brigade, 1974

6 Cadet 7 Cadet 8 Cadet 9 Cadet 10 Cadet 11 Cadet 12 Cadet 13 Cadet 14 Cadet Battalion Battalion Battalion Battalion Battalion Battalion Battalion Battalion Battalion

New England & Northern NSW Sydney Sydney Sydney Sydney Sydney Southern NSW Central NSW Hunter

HQ Casino HQ Vaucluse HQ Leichardt HQ Crow’s Nest HQ Hornsby HQ Hurstville HQ Adamstown HQ Goulburn HQ Bathurst

Casino High Cranbrook Bass Hill Boys’ Chatswood High Barker College, Belmore Boys Armidale High Canberra Bourke High School School, High School School Hornsby High School School Grammar School School Bellevue Hill Coffs Harbour J.J. Cahill Birrong Boys’ Crow’s Nest Blacktown Bonnyrigg High Christian Chevalier Cowra High High School Memorial High High School Boys’ High Boys’ High School Brothers College School School, Mascot School School College, Tamworth Glenn Innes High Marcellin Canterbury Killara High Cumberland Campbelltown O’Connor Christian Dubbo High School College, Boys’ High School High School, High School Catholic High Brothers College, School 378 Randwick School Carlingford School, Young Armidale Grafton High Maroubra Bay Enmore Boys’ Manly Boys’ Epping Boys’ East Hills Boys’ Farrer Memorial Goulburn High Forbes High School High School High School High School High School High School Agricultural School School High School, Tamworth Inverell High Randwick Fort St High Narrabeen Boys James Ruse Edmund Rice Gunnedah High Leeton High Henry Lawson School Boys’ High School, High School Agricultural College, School School High School, School Petersham High School, Wollongong Grenfell Carlingford McLean High South Sydney Granville Boys’ St Aloysius Knox Grammar Heathcote High Maitland High Lyneham High Katoomba High School Boys’ High High School College, Milson’s School, School School School School School, Point Waroonga Maroubra Moree High Sydney Granville South St Ignatius Normanhurst Hurstville High Marist Brothers Monaro High Kinross/Wolaroi School Grammar Boys’ High College, Boys’ High School High School, School, Cooma School, Orange School School Riverview School Maitland Murwillumbah Sydney Boys’ Holroyd High St Pius X Parramatta Hurlstone Mussellbrook St Patrick’s Marist Brothers High School High School, School, College, Marist Brothers Agricultural High School College, College, Forbes Surrey Hills Wentworthville Chatswood High School College, Goulburn Glenfield Mullumbimby The Scots Homebush Boys’ Shore Grammar Northmead High Ingleburn High Newcastle High Wagga Wagga Mudgee High High School College, High School School, North School School School High School School Bellevue Hill Sydney Kempsey High Waverley Ibrox Park Boys’ Pittwater House Castle Hill High Keira Boys’ Singleton High Yanco St Stanislaus School College, High School, Grammar School, School High School School Agricultural College, Bathurst Waverley Leichhardt Dee Why High School

Matraville High Merrylands High Grantham High Liverpool Boys’ Taree High Young High The Canobolas School, Chifley School School, Seven High School School School High School, Hills Orange Meadowbank Evans High Marist Brothers The Armidale Wellington High Boys High School, High School, School School School, West Blacktown Kogarah Ryde Newington Seven Hills Narwee Boys’ Raymond West Wyong College, High School High School, Terrace High High School Stanmore Beverley Hills School Patrician The Kings Port Kembla Blayney High Brothers School, High School School College, Parramatta Fairfield St Joseph’s St Mary’s High Punchbowl

College, School Boys’ High 379 Hunter’s Hill School Trinity Grammar School, Summerhill

Source: Laffin, C.A., ‘The Australian Cadet Corps in Secondary Education’, Thesis (M.Ed. Hons.), University of Sydney, 1976, Annex 11, p. 349. Appendix 11

Australian Army Cadet Units in Victoria, 2004

Unit Location Foster Sponsor Raised Estab. Beaconhills Christian College ACU Packenham HQ AAC Victoria College 1994 40 Braemar College ACU Woodend HQ AAC Victoria College 1994 30 Brighton Grammar School ACU Brighton HQ AAC Victoria School 1918 260 Camberwell Grammar ACU Canterbury 4th/19th PWLH1 School 1908 160 Ivanhoe Grammar School ACU Ivanhoe University Melb Regt School 1923 320 School Based Melbourne Grammar School ACU Sth Yarra University Melb Regt School 1977 100 Cadet Units Melbourne High School ACU Sth Yarra University Melb Regt School 1907 160 Mentone Grammar School ACU Mentone Monash University Regt School 1943 360 Monivae College ACU Hamilton HQ AAC Victoria College 1963 320 The Peninsula School ACU Mt Eliza 2nd/10th Field Regiment School 1965 120 Scotch College ACU Hawthorn HQ AAC Victoria College 1884 420 Sebastopol College ACU Sebastopol 8th/7th RVR2 College 1997 120 Total 2,410 30 ACU Sunshine 5th/6th RVR Try Youth 1985 80 32 ACU Geelong 2nd/10th Field Regiment Try Youth 1985 80 33 ACU A Coy Wangaratta ATLC3 Try Youth 1999 40 33 ACU B Coy Benalla ATLC Try Youth 1999 40 37 ACU Wodonga ALTC Try Youth 1987 80 Try Youth 38 ACU Shepparton 8th/7th RVR Try Youth 1991 60 CHSP Units 39 ACU Watsonia DFSS4 Try Youth 1988 120

300 ACU Ballarat 8th/7th RVR Try Youth 1993 100 301 ACU Echuca 8th/7th RVR Try Youth 1988 60 302 ACU Oakleigh 4th CSSB5 Try Youth 1988 60 310 ACU Dandenong 2nd/10th Field Regiment Try Youth 1994 80 Total 860 31 ACU Norwood 4th CER6 Ringwood RSL 1986 140 34 ACU Colac 2nd/10th Field Regiment Colac Shire 1986 60 35 ACU Broadmeadow 4th CSSB Pascoe Vale RSL 1985 140 36 ACU Frankston 2nd/10th Field Regt Frankston RSL 1987 100 39 ACU Broadford DFSS Broadford High 2002 50 303 ACU Stawell 26th Transport Company Stawell RSL 1989 40 Other 304 ACU Yallourn 39th Engineer Squadron Morwell RSL 2001 60 Regional 305 ACU Surrey Hills 5th/6th RVR Surrey Hills RSL 1991 60 Cadet Units 306 ACU Monash Monash Uni Regt Clayton RSL 1991 60 307 ACU Deniliquin 8th/7th RVR Deniliquin RSL 1991 60 308 ACU Sale 4th/19th PWLH Sale RSL 1995 60 309 ACU Bendigo 8th/7th RVR Bendigo RSL 2002 40 311 ACU Mildura 8th/7th RVR Mildura Assoc. 1997 60 Total 930 TOTAL 4,170 Source: Try Youth Homepage: www.tryyouth.org.au

1 PWLH = Prince of Wales Light Horse Regiment 2 RVR = Royal Victorian Regiment 3 ALTC = Army Logistics Training Centre 4 DFSS = Defence Force School of Signals 5 CSSB = Combat Services Support Battalion 6 CER = Combat Engineer Regiment

380 Australian Army Cadet Units, 2004 Appendix 12

Queensland New South Wales Victoria South Australia Tasmania 11 ACU (Logan) 218 ACU - B Company (Moss Vale) 300 ACU (Ballarat) 41 ACU (Whyalla) 61 ACU (Devonport) 12 ACU (Camp Hill) 222 ACU (Ulladulla) 303 ACU (Stawell) 410 ACU (Berri) 64 ACU (Burnie) 12 ACU (Nyanda) Det 21 ACU (Penrith) 311 ACU (Mildura) 411 ACU (Clare) 65 ACU (Pontville) 12 ACU (Salisbury) Det 23 ACU (Camden) 34 ACU (Colac) 416 ACU (Port Lincoln) 67 ACU (Pipes & Drums) Det 120 ACU (Chinchilla) 213 ACU (Cronulla) 38 ACU (Shepparton) 416 ACU - B Coy (Ceduna) 67 ACU (Youngtown) 120 ACU (Dalby) Det 215 ACU (Fort St) 302 ACU (Oakleigh) 42 ACU (Broken Hill) 68 ACU (Deloraine) 120 ACU (Maranoa) 218 ACU (Macarthur) 305 ACU (Surrey Hills) 46 ACU (Port Augusta) 62 ACU (Launceston) 121 ACU (Wynnum/Manly) 26 ACU (Wollongong) 306 ACU (Monash) 49 ACU (Smithfield) 66 ACU (Scottsdale) 122 ACU (Clermont) Det 208 ACU (Hastings Valley) 31 ACU (Ringwood) 43 ACU (Warradale) 60 ACU (Warrane) 122 ACU (Dysart) Det 211 ACU (Newcastle) 33 ACU (Benalla) Det 44 ACU (Greenacres) 63 ACU (Dowsing Point) 122 ACU (Mackay) 216 ACU (Lismore) 35 ACU (Essendon) 40 ACU (Noarlunga) 123 ACU (Caboolture) Chevalier College ACU 36 ACU (Frankston) 410 ACU - B Coy (Waikerie) Northern Territory 124 ACU (Biloela) Det 217 ACU (Lake Macquarie) 39 ACU (Broadford) Det 412 ACU (Woodside) 70 ACU (Larrakeyah) 124 ACU (Gladstone) 225 ACU (Murwillumbah) 39 ACU (Watsonia) 413 ACU (Keswick) 71 ACU (Robertson Barracks) 125 ACU (Rockhampton) 229 ACU (South Lakes) Beaconhills Christian College ACU 414 ACU (Port Pirie) 70 ACU (Daly River) Platoon 126 ACU (Bray Park) Trinity Catholic College ACU Braemar College ACU 414 ACU - B Company (Kadina) 70 ACU (Port Keats) Platoon 127 ACU (Ipswich) Trinity Grammar School ACU Brighton Grammar School ACU 43 ACU - B Coy (Victor Harbour) 70 ACU (Wadeye) Platoon 128 ACU (Yandina) 22 ACU (Ingleburn) Camberwell Grammar School ACU 45 ACU (Murray Bridge) 73 ACU (Tennant Creek) 129 ACU (Enoggera) 200 ACU (South West Slopes) Ivanhoe Grammar School ACU 48 ACU (Mt Gambier) 73 ACU (Alice Springs) Det 13 ACU (Harristown) 220 ACU (Lithgow) Ivanhoe Grammar ACU (Mernda) Det 48 ACU - B Company (Kingston) 381 130 ACU (Townsville) 230 ACU (Norfolk Island) Melbourne Grammar School ACU 44 ACU - B Coy (St Paul’s College) ACT 131 ACU (Sarina) 234 ACU (Maitland) Melbourne High School ACU 413 ACU - B Coy (Underdale High) 224 ACU (Canberra) 132 ACU (Capricornia) 236 ACU (Toukley) Mentone Grammar School ACU 132 ACU (Yepoon) Det 24 ACU (Grafton) Monivae College ACU Western Australia 133 ACU (Palm Beach) 200 ACU - 1 Platoon (Grenfell) Scotch College ACU 506 ACU (Geraldton) 133 ACU (Southport) 22-29 ACU (Holsworthy) Sebastopol Secondary College ACU 506 ACU (Port Hedland) B Company 134 ACU (Atherton) Det 25 ACU (Erina) The Peninsula School ACU 508 ACU (Karratha) 134 ACU (Cairns) 27 ACU (Coffs Harbour) 30 ACU (Sunshine) 510 ACU (Merredin) 135 ACU (Kilcoy) Det 226 ACU (Normanhurst) 301 ACU (Echuca) 512 ACU (Narrogin) 135 ACU (Wondai) 233 ACU (St George) 304 ACU (Newborough) 518 ACU (Katanning) 135 ACU (Yarraman) Det 29 ACU (Padstow) 308 ACU (Sale) 55 ACU (Eastern Goldfields) 136 ACU (Mt Isa) AAC Band - Sydney 310 ACU Dandenong 50 ACU (South Guildford) 136 ACU (Redlands) 200 ACU - 2 Platoon (Cowra) 32 ACU (Geelong) 501 ACU (Aquinas) 137 ACU (Monto) Barker College ACU 33 ACU (Wangaratta) 502 ACU (Karrakatta) 138 ACU (Rosedale) Baulkham Hills High School ACU 507 ACU (Joondalup) 139 ACU (Lockyer) Knox Grammar School ACU 509 ACU (Lynwood) 14 ACU (Blackwater) Det 28 ACU (Taree) 51 ACU (Girraween) 14 ACU (Rockhampton) Newcastle Grammar School ACU 513 ACU (Eastern Hills) 140 ACU (Townsville) 201 ACU (Dee Why) 52 ACU (Armadale) 142 ACU (Balonne) Newington College ACU 53 ACU (Wanneroo) 145 ACU (Winton) 202 ACU (Blacktown) 56 ACU (East Fremantle) 146 ACU (Bamaga) 203 ACU (Cumberland) 57 ACU (Noaranda) 15 ACU (Bowen) Det 204 ACU (Parramatta) 58 ACU (Carine) 15 ACU (Townsville) 206 ACU (North Sydney) 59 ACU (Rockingham) 16 ACU (Redcliffe) 200 ACU - 3 Platoon (Young) 504 ACU (Mandurah) 17 ACU (Clifton) Shore (SCEGS) ACU 505 ACU (Albany) 17 ACU (Stanthorpe) Det St Aloysius College ACU 511 ACU (Busselton) 17 ACU (Warwick) Sydney Boys’ High School ACU 511 ACU - B Company (Bunbury) 18 ACU (Bundaberg) Sydney Grammar School ACU Carnarvon ACU 18 ACU (Hervey Bay) Det The Kings School ACU St Joseph’s College ACU 19 ACU (Pittsworth) The Pittwater House School ACU Christ Church Grammar School ACU Anglican Church Grammar ACU 200 ACU - 4 Platoon (Boorowa) Guildford Grammar School ACU Downlands College ACU The Scots College ACU Scots PGC College ACU Waverley College ACU St Paul’s School ACU 205 ACU (Mudgee) The Southport School ACU 205 ACU - A Company (Mendooran) Toowoomba Grammar School ACU 218 ACU - A Company (Picton) 207 ACU (Glen Innes) 382 209 ACU (Tamworth) 221 ACU (Cobar) 235 ACU (Dubbo) 256 ACU (Cootamundra) Hurlstone Agricultural High ACU James Ruse Agricultural High ACU Kinross Wolaroi School ACU The Armidale School ACU The Scots School ACU 219 ACU (Wagga Wagga) 219 ACU - A Company (Leeton)

Source: CadetNet Webpage: www.cadetnet.icemedia.gov.au Authorised Cadet Unit Establishments (2001-04)

Appendix 13

Unit Size <31 31- 41- 61- 81- 101- 121- 140- 161- 181- 201- 221- 241- 261- 281- 301- 321- 361- 381- 421- 461- 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 220 240 260 280 300 320 360 380 420 460 480 Rank Number of Personnel Lieutenant Colonel ------1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Major 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 Captain 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 5 5 6 7 7 Lieutenant/2nd Lts 1 1 2 3 4 4 4 5 6 6 7 7 7 8 6 7 8 8 8 11 10 Instructor of Cadets 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 CUO 1 2 3 4 4 5 5 7 9 10 11 11 12 12 13 15 16 17 20 20 21 WO 1 ------1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 383 WO 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 Staff Sergeant 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 Sergent 1 2 2 3 3 4 5 5 6 7 8 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 15 17 Corporal 3 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 16 18 20 22 23 25 27 29 33 35 38 42 43 Lance Corporal 3 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 16 18 20 22 23 25 27 29 33 35 38 42 43 Cadet 20 28 43 57 73 87 102 115 129 140 154 169 185 200 214 227 259 273 301 333 346

Source: Department of Defence, Australian Army Cadets Policy Manual Policy 2001, Government Printer, 2001, pp. 4D-1 & 4D-2. BIBLIOGRAPHY

UNPUBLISHED OFFICIAL RECORDS

NATIONAL ARCHIVES OF AUSTRALIA. A range of items under the following series, in reading rooms across Australia, were examined:

Canberra Reading Room

CRS A1 Correspondence Files, Annual Single Number Series, 1903-38. CRS A2 Correspondence Files, Annual Single Number Series, 1904-20. CRS A6 Correspondence Files, Annual Single Number Series, 1901-02. CRS A361 Correspondence Files, Annual Single Number Series with ‘DSG’ [District Surveyor General] Prefix, 1916-25. CRS A432 Correspondence Files, Annual Single Number Series, 1929-. CRS A452 Correspondence Files, Annual Single Number Series, 1951-75. CRS A457 Correspondence Files, Annual Single Number Series, First System, 1915-23. CRS A663 Correspondence Files, Multiple Number Series with 'O' Prefix (Primary Numbers 1- 224), 1940-57. CRS A664 Correspondence Files, Multiple Number Series (Class 401), 1924-40. CRS A1194 Library Material, Single Accession Number Series with Decimal Classification, 1923-. CRS A1200 Photographic Negatives and Prints, Single Number Series with ‘L’ [Library] Prefix, 1911-71. CRS A1209 Correspondence Files, Annual Single Number Series (Classified), 1944-. CRS A1336 Applications for Literary and Dramatic Copyright (with Exhibits), 1907-69. CRS A2880 Correspondence Files, Multiple Number Series, 1912-97. CRS A5799 Defence Committee Agenda, Annual Single Number Series, 1932-. CRS A5954 ‘The Shedden Collection’ [Records collected by Sir Frederick Shedden during his career with the Department of Defence and in researching the history of Australian Defence Policy]: Two Number Series, 1901-71. CRS A6006 Folders of Copies of Cabinet Papers, 1901-. CRS A6662 Miscellaneous Correspondence Relating Mainly to Local (Non-Imperial) Matters, 1887-1912. CRS A6680 Correspondence and Administrative Files, Multiple Number Series with ‘DY’ [Duke of York] Prefix, 1860-1928. CRS A8681 Public Relations Bulletins from the Department of Air, Directorate of Public Relations, 1940-49. CRS A11804 General Correspondence of Governor-General (Excluding War Files), 1887-1937. CRS CP697/41 Inwards letters (‘Put by’ or ‘Dead’ papers) of the Deputy Administrator, Government of Norfolk Island (Sydney) (1897-1913) and later of the Administrator and Chief Magistrate on the Island (1913-1917), 1896-17.

Melbourne Reading Room

CRS A2023 Correspondence Files, Multiple Number Series with ‘A’, ‘B’, ‘D’ or ‘E’ Prefix, 1907-17. CRS B1535 Correspondence Files, Multiple Number Series, 1919-42.

384 CRS B3756 Correspondence Files, Annual Single Number Series, 1872-01. CRS MP84/1 Correspondence Files, Multiple Number Series, 1894-1953. CRS MP5/42 Papers of the Director of Rationing Dr H.C. Coombs, 1942-43. CRS MP151/1 Correspondence Files, Multiple Number Series (‘201’ Series), 1911-53. CRS MP367/1 General Correspondence Files,1917-29. CRS MP508/1 General Correspondence Files, Multiple Number Series, 1898-1972. CRS MP742/1 General and Civil Staff Correspondence Files and Army Personnel Files, Multiple Number Series, 1920-56. CRS MP897/1 General Correspondence 1937-55. CRS MP 927/1 General and Civil Staff Correspondence Files and Army Personnel Files, Multiple Number Series, 1898-1968. CRS MT1131/1 General and Civil Staff Correspondence Files and Army Personnel Files, Multiple Number Series, 1962-69.

Sydney Reading Room

CRS D844 Correspondence Files, Multiple Number Series, Second System, 1912-64. CRS SP1008/1 General Correspondence Files, Multiple Number Series, 1871-1965. CRS SP459/1 Correspondence, 1912-64.

Brisbane Reading Room

CRS J2810 Correspondence Files, Multiple Number Series with ‘R’ Prefix [PNG], 1958-73. CRS J2111 Staff and Regimental Lists, Australian Military Forces and Military Cadet Forces, 1908-47. CRS J2812 Correspondence Files, Multiple Number Series with ‘R’ Prefix [PNG cadets], 1966- 73. CRS J505 Unit Scrapbook, Chronological Series, 1968-75.

Adelaide Reading Room

CRS D844 Correspondence Files, Multiple Number Series, Second System, 1912-64. CRS D845 Security Classified Files, Annual Single Number Series, 1905-42.

Perth Reading Room

CRS PP944/1 Correspondence Records, Establishment Files, Multiple Number Series, 1963-83. CRS K238 Correspondence Files (5 Cadet Unit), Multiple Number with ‘R’ Prefix Series, 1963-84.

Hobart Reading Room

CRS P2471 Registration Forms and Military Service Histories of Cadet Trainees Under the Compulsory Universal Training Scheme of 1909, Launceston Units, Alphabetical Series by Quota Year, 1919-29.

385 AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL, CANBERRA. A range of items under the following series were examined:

AWM 54 Written Records, 1939-45 War, 1926-92. AWM 61 Eastern Command Secret and Other Security Classified Records, 1898-1948. AWM 62 Southern Command Registry Files, 1920-43. AWM 113 Records of the Military History Section (Army), 1905-76.

Files from the following series, located at state archive or public record offices around Australia, were examined:

STATE RECORDS, NSW.

CGS 3864 Department of Education, 1890-93. CGS 3830 Department of Education Subject Files, 1875-1948. CGS 906 Colonial Secretary Special Bundle.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, VICTORIA.

VPRS 11479 Register of Male Teachers Attending Physical Training and Teachers who obtained the Junior Cadet Training Certificate, 1912-40. VPRS 892 Education Department, Special Cases, 1862-1977. VPRS 4824 Correspondence Register Training, Singing, Drill and Gymnastics, Elocution, and Science 1888-1902. VPRS 640 Departmental Correspondence with Schools, 1878-1962. VPRS 794 Central Registered Correspondence Files, 1873-1986.

QUEENSLAND STATE ARCHIVES.

RSI 2612 Subject Batch Files, 1872-1985. RSI 15191 General Correspondence, 1869-1967. SRS 426 Corporate Subject Files, 1910-98.

STATE RECORDS OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA.

GRG 2/59 Despatches and Reports Concerning Defence, Including Files on the Military Staff Office, 1890-1901. GRG 24/51 Correspondence, Returns and Other Papers Relating to the Volunteer Military Forces and Imperial Troops, 1842-70. GRG 18/3 Correspondence Files (‘IGS’ files), 1879-96. GRG 18/93 Annual Reports of the Minister of Education, 1876-1971.

386 ARCHIVES OFFICE OF TASMANIA.

CSD 13 General Correspondence (Lefroy),1880-86. CSD 19 General Correspondence (Gormanston), 1893-96. CSD 22 General Correspondence, 1824-1924. ED 9 General Correspondence [Indexed in ED 28], 1905-16. ED 148/1 General Correspondence, 1935-65. ED 10 Correspondence (‘O’ Series), 1917-41.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE ARCHIVES, QUEANBEYAN. The following individual files, identified by file number and name, were examined:

2000/12332 Australian Army Cadet Corps - Financial Aspects. 74/4/10 Cadets - Army Comments on the Report on the Australian Cadet Corps (June 1974). 85/21368 Naval Reserves Cadets/Army Cadets and Air Training Corps - Facilities Aspects. 86/54144 Australian Bicentenary 1988 - Overseas Exchange Project - Air/Sea and Army Cadets - DGSPP Aspects. 87/25794 Amendment to Establishments - Army Cadet Corps - DORG-A Aspects. 87/31749 Acts Regulations and Ordinances Army - Restructuring of the Australian Army Cadet Corps - Policy - OCRES-A Aspects. 87/49959 Army Cadet Corps - Policy - ASRP-A (Activities) Aspects. 90/33830 Ministerial Representations By B. Quil - Support to the Australian Cadet Corps by the Army. 91/13752 Army Program - Australian Cadet Corps (ACC) Estimates Financial Year 1991/92 and Financial Year 1992/93 - 1995/96. 91/14669 Ministerial Representation by Officer Cadet Wendy Brewer-Jones - Redress of Grievance and Employment in the Army. 91/2211 Naval Reserve Cadets - John Penfold (Captain) Salvation Army - Honorary Chaplain. 91/28564 Service Checks for Former Army Reserve (ARes) Officers of Cadets - 1991-93. 91/34245 Fatal Shooting Incident Involving Army Reserves (ARes) and Australian Cadet Corps (ACC) at Onkaparinga Gorge, Adelaide - 2 November 1991. 91/5313 Complaint to the Defence Force Ombudsman by Mr L.W. Carter - Refusal by Army to Appoint Him as Officer of Cadets. 92/15354 Australian Army Cadet Corps (ACC) - Army Reserve Training Day - Estimates/Allocation/Expenditure - OACRES-A Aspects. 92/35074 Future Training and Employment of Army Officer Cadets with Chronic Medical Conditions. 93/15827 Australian Army Cadet Corps - Camp Instructions - 1992-95 - OACRES-A Aspects. 93/18148 Cadet Units - Army Personnel Agencies (APA) Sponsored - Personnel Management. 93/19101 Freedom of Information Request 8/93/94 - Lieutenant S. Brown - Army Cadet Unit Service Records. 93/28537 Australian Army Cadet Corps (ACC) Routine Orders - (Excluding Headquarters) - ACRES-A Aspects. 93/33554 Australian Army Cadet Corps - Ministerials - 1992/93. 93/34462 Raising and Disbanding of Australian Army Cadet Corps Units - 1992/93. 93/34466 Raising and Disbanding of Australian Army Cadet Corps Units - 1994/95. 93/7936 Australian Army Cadet Corps (AAC) - Policy Manual Review 1993. 94/25756 Australian Army Cadet Corps Weapons - DEP-A Aspects. 94/31394 Australian Army Cadet Corps (AAC) Activities Program/Annual Calendar. 94/4387 Briefs and Presentation Reports - Australian Army Cadet Corps - OACRES Aspects. 94/5402 Australian Army Cadet Corps (AAC) - Courses 1994/95.

387 94/7376 Australian Army Cadet Corps - Ministerials - 1994/95. 94/7870 Australian Army Cadet Corps (ACC) - Braemer College Cadet Unit - Control/Authorisation. 94/791 Australian Army Cadet Corps - Liquid Fuels - Estimates/Allocation and Expenditure – Financial Years 1993-97. 94/792 Australian Army Cadet Corps - Combat Rations - Estimates/Allocation and Expenditure – Financial Years 1993-97. 95/22865 Australian Cadet Corps - 1995-97 - Army Health Aspects. 96/19151 Australian Army Cadet Corps (ACC) - Provision Of Weapons and Ammunition - OACRES-A Aspects. 96/21745 Cadets (Army/Navy/Air Force) - Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Aspects - 1996/97. 96/29669 Ministerial Representation Submitted By Pauline Hanson MP on Behalf of Mr Rad Piljic - Discrepancy Between Army and Airforce Cadet Fees for Uniforms. 96/31463 Australian Army Cadet Corps (ACC) - Occupational Health and Safety (OH&S) Matters - OACRES-A Aspects - 1996/97. 96/36538 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Cadetship Program - Army Program. 96/6737 Support to Australian Army Cadet Corps (ACC). 96/7813 Study into the Australia Services Cadet Scheme - Army Cadets - OACRES-A Aspects. 96/874 Australian Army Cadet Corps (ACC) - Ministerials - 1996. 97/13096 Australian Army Cadet Corps - Personnel Support Issues - 1997 - DGPSC-A Aspects. 97/16846 Safety Rehabilitation and Compensation (SRC) Act 1988 - Motor Vehicle Accident. 97/32839 Australian Defence Force Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Recruitment and Career Development Strategy - Army Cadets. 97/40325 Chief of the Army - Army Cadets Scheme - 1997/98. 97/6802 Australian Army Cadet Corps - Camp Instructions - 1996/97 - OACRES-A Aspects. 98/6065 Chief Of General Staff - Cadets - Army - February 1990 to May 1997 - For Information Only. 99/20311 Australian Service Cadet Scheme - Death of Corporal (ACC) Army Cadet Corps. 99/25501 Chief Of The Army - Army Cadets Scheme - 1999/2000. 99/29438 School Cadets - Army - Training Command - Australia - Forecasts Financial Years 1999-2001. 99/6954 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander (ATSI) Recruitment and Career Development Strategy - Cadets (Army/Navy/Air Force) - Cadetships - 1997-2000. 99/9247 Freedom Of Information Request Number 133-98-99.

ARMY HISTORY UNIT, CANBERRA. The following collection of private papers was examined:

Teague Papers 3 Cadet Group Newsletters 1981-82.

UNPUBLISHED SCHOOL RECORDS

Files from the following series, held at school or central educational archive locations, were examined:

CHRISTIAN BROTHERS ARCHIVES.

HSP0000137/13 Army Cadets (Francis Cocks Box 1). HSP0000031/01 Trinity School Administration 1947-83 (Trinity School Admin Box 1). HSP0000136/01 Annual Reports 1971-76 (Christian Brothers College Kalgoorlie Box 1).

388 HSP0000136/02 Policy, Co-instruction, Scholarships, Service Cadets 1971-76 (Christian Brothers College Kalgoorlie Box 1). HSP0000176/03 School Administration, Inspection Reports, Annual Reports 1953-74 (Christian Brothers College Kalgoorlie Box 1). HSP0000176/07 Manion Correspondence - School Administration, Property Management 1953-55 (Christian Brothers College Kalgoorlie Box 2). HSP0000135/06 Fish 1962 - 1988 (Periodicals Box 1). HSP0000135/07 Fish 1967 - 1970 (Periodicals Box 1).

PRINCE ALFRED COLLEGE ARCHIVES

656/5 Personal Papers of Old Scholars - Johnson, Maxwell. 138 Cadet Unit. 148/1 Prince Alfred College Cadet Unit. Flag Ceremony Order of Ceremony and Historical Notes. 269 Prince Alfred College Cadet Unit. Newspaper Clippings Relating to the Award of the Earl Roberts Imperial Cadet Trophy. 684 Boer War Mauser Rifle (1899-1902). 987 Prince Alfred College Cadet Unit Records Relating to New Guinea Tour 6-22 May 1971. 183 Students Invited to Join Eastern Districts Cadet Units. 295 Drill Instructions Circa 1932. 700/3/8 Subject Files of the Headmaster (Headmastership of G.B. Bean).

CANBERRA GRAMMAR SCHOOL ARCHIVES

Series C9 Cadets Box 1 - General. Series C10 CGS Remembers Box 1.

ACTIVE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE FILES

The following active Department of Defence files, identified by file number and name and located at HQ AAC, Canberra, were examined with the kind permission of that headquarters:

122/7/1 Cadets: Army - Resources General. 123//1/27 Establishments in Cadet Cells. 123/1/1 (3) Cadets: Units - Army Policy Review - AAC. 123/1/1 (4) Cadets: Units - Army Policy Review - AAC. 123/1/1 (5) Cadets: Units - Army Policy Review - AAC. 123/1/1 (6) Cadets: Units - Army Policy Review - AAC. 123/1/13 Cadets: Units - Army Cadets Forces Medals. 123/1/22 (1) Cadets: Units - Army OH&S Matters. 123/1/22 (2) Cadets: Units - Army OH&S Matters. 123/1/24 Courses (OOCs). 123/1/26 Cadets: Units - Army Request for Use of the Duke of Edinborough Banner. 123/1/32 History of the AAC. 123/1/33 Cadets: Units - Army Honours and Awards.

389 123/1/43 Cadets: Units - Army Clothing and General Stores (includes Block Scales). 123/1/48 (1) Cadets: Units - Army Public Relations. 123/1/48 (2) Cadets: Units - Army Public Relations. 123/1/49 (2) Raising and Disbanding of AAC Units. 123/1/50 Sponsorship of Cadet Units. 123/1/52 State Government Funded Cadet Scheme. 123/1/53 Strength Returns. 123/1/55 Study into the Australian Services Cadet Scheme. 123/1/58 AAC Cadet Training. 123/1/62 (1) Cadets: Units - Australian Army Cadet Corps Visits Overseas by Cadets, OOCs and Honorary Colonels. 123/1/62 (2) Cadets: Units - Australian Army Cadet Corps Visits Overseas by Cadets, OOCs and Honorary Colonels. 123/1/63 AAC visits within Australia Cadets/OOC/HONCOL. 123/1/65 Cadets the Future/Topley Review. 123/1/7 (1) Cadets: Units - Army Provision of Weapons and Ammunition. 123/1/7 (2) Cadets: Units - Army Provision of Weapons and Ammunition. 2001/33042/1 Establishment - Policy HQ AAC - Establishments General. 2001/33042/2 Establishment - Policy HQ AAC - Establishments General. 2001/35202/1 Recruiting. 2001/37337/1 Information Management: Reporting HQ AAC - Indigenous Cadets. 2001/37342/1 International Relations: Liaison HQ AAC - International Activities. 2002/21223/1 Bisley UK - Shooting Competition. 2002/21228/1 HQ AAC - National Conference 2002. 2002/25027/1 HQ AAC - Investigations - Tasmania. 2002/278/1 HQ AAC - Training. 2002/278/2 Training (General). 2002/3179/1 HQ AAC - Shooting and Weapon Training. 2002/3183/1 HQ AAC - SA. 2002/3183/2 HQ AAC - SA. 2002/3186/2 AAC Uniforms Enhancements. 2002/3775/2 Western Australia. 2002/3779/1 HQ AAC - Tasmania. 2002/3779/2 HQ AAC - Tasmania. 2002/40799/1 Chiefs of Service Committee Briefing - CA. 2002/4093/1 Firearms Training and Shooting. 2002/4095/1 Information Technology. 2002/4096/2 Northern Territory. 2002/4098/2 Victoria. 2002/4103/3 South Queensland. 2002/4106/2 North Queensland. 2002/4120/2 New South Wales. 2002/7787/1 Visits. 2003/52635/1 Capability Development: Planning HQ AAC - Hot Issues Briefs 2002. 2003/52638/1 Directives - Command and Control Directives. 2003/52640/1 Military Personnel: Reporting Studies and Surveys. 2003/52657/1 Capability Development - Meetings AAC National Conference February-March 2003. 2003/52658/1 Military Like Activities (MLA). 2003/52664/1 Strategic Plan. 2003/52667/1 Logistic Support to AAC - External Review.

390 2003/52670/1 Capability Development - Meetings National Conference 2003. 2003/52730/1 Memorandums of Understanding (MOU). 2003/52736/1 CadetNet. 2003/52737/1 Challenge - CDF Cadet Leadership Challenge. 2003/52738/1 Military Personnel: Training HQ AAC - Cadet Enhancement Projects 2001-2004. 2003/52738/1 Cadet Enhancement Projects. 2003/52739/1 Australian Army Aviation Policy and Projects (Including Parachuting). 2003/52745/1 HQ AAC - SED Review - 2002-04. 2003/52745/2 HQ AAC - SED Review - 2002-04. 2003/52748/1 Briefings - Ministerials (Not Representations). 2003/52749/1 Government Relations - Representations Ministerial representations 2000-2002. 2003/52751/1 Questions - Senate Questions on Notice. 2004/1005809/1 Chief of Army Cadet Team Challenge. 2004/1007436/1 Conference - National (March 2004). 2004/1007439/1 Planning - Operations Planning Conference 2004. 2004/1008325/1 Activities - Cadet Initiated Activities (CIAs). 2004/1008331/1 Adjutant and Regimental Sergeant Major (Cadet). 2004/1008334/1 Advisory - Cadet Advisory Council (CAC). 2004/100872/1 Courses and Training (OOC). 2004/1008775/1 Commander AAC Directives. 2004/1016849/1 Cadet Online Administration System (COAS). 2004/1017907/1 HQ AAC - Cadet Training. 2004/1017910/1 Strength Returns/Calendars of Events. 2004/1017912/1 History of the AAC. 2004/1029230/1 Briefings - Army Capabilities Management Committee (ACMC). 2004/1029397/1 Commander AAC Briefings. 2004/1029451/1 Cards - Cadet Identification Cards. 2004/1029564/1 Briefings - Hot Issues. 2004/1029588/1 Briefings - DDFC. 2004/1030583/1 Briefings - Chiefs of Service Committee (COSC). 2004/1030587/1 Briefings - Chief of Army Senior Advisory Committee (CASAC). 2004/1030632/1 HQ AAC - Public Relations. 2004/1030633/1 Community Support Group and Foster Unit Support to AAC. 2004/1030978/1 Administration. 2004/1048602/1 Sarah Project.

OFFICIAL PUBLISHED SOURCES

The following government publications were examined:

Brewer, C.J., Review of the Australian Services Cadet Scheme, Department of Defence, 1996.

______, Review of the Australian Services Cadet Scheme (Executive Summary), Department of Defence, 1996.

Department of Defence, Junior Cadet Training: Textbook, Parts 1-7, 1916, (revised 1919), Government Printer, 1919.

391 ______, Commonwealth Military Cadet Corps Regulations and Standing Orders 1907 (Provisional), Government Printer, 1907.

______, Commonwealth Military Cadet Corps Regulations and Standing Orders 1909, Government Printer, 1909.

______, Amendments and Additions to the Regulations for the Australian Military Forces and Senior Cadets 1916, Government Printer, 1919.

______, Annual Reports 1963-2004, Government Printer, 1963-2004.

______, Army Standing Orders for Dress (ASOD), Vol 2, Part 7, Chapter One: Australian Army Cadet Corps - Uniforms and Appearance, Government Printer, 2000.

______, Australian Army Cadets Manual 2004 (Draft), Headquarters Australian Army Cadets, 2004.

______, Australian Army Cadets Policy Manual Policy 2001, Government Printer, 2001.

______, Australian Cadet Corps Manual 1976 (Provisional), Government Printer, 1976.

______, Australian Cadet Corps Standing Orders 1967, Government Printer, 1967.

______, Australian Cadet Corps Standing Orders 1980, Government Printer, 1980.

______, Australian Cadet Corps Training Manual 1982, Headquarters Training Command - Army, 1982.

______, Australian Defence Force Cadets Occupational Health and Safety Policy, Government Printer, 2003.

______, Australian Junior Cadet Regulations 1917, Government Printer, 1917.

______, Australian Junior Cadet Regulations, Government Printer, 1925.

______, Australian Military Forces and Senior Cadets Instructions for Training, Government Printer, 1933.

______, Cadet Standing Orders 1975, Government Printer, 1975.

______, Cadet Training, Vol 2, Government Printer, 1961.

392 ______, Defence Instruction (Army) Administration 53-1 Australian Army Cadets (Draft), Headquarters Australian Army Cadets, July 2004.

______, DEFGRAM No 95/2001, dated 26 March 2001.

______, DEFGRAM No 332/2002, dated 6 September 2001.

______, Ebonesra: Cadets Handbook, Government Printer, 1972.

______, Extracts from Regulations for Military Forces and Senior Cadets of Australia 1916: Rifle Club Reserves: Rifle Associations, Government Printer, 1916.

______, Financial and Allowances Regulations for the Australian Military Forces and Senior Cadets, Government Printer, 1921.

______, Journal of the Australian Cadet Corps, Nos 1 - 16, Army Headquarters Printing Press, Melbourne, 1949-66.

______, Military Orders: Australian Military Forces, Government Printer, Melbourne, 1915-1924.

______, Physical Training. Part 1. Junior Cadet Training Textbook, Government Printer, 1925.

______, School Cadet Standing Orders, Army Headquarters, 1959.

______, Standing Orders (Provisional) for the Equipment of the Australian Military Forces and Senior Cadets. Part 1. General, Government Printer, 1940.

______, Standing Orders for Cadet Services, Government Printer, 1944.

______, Standing Orders for Cadet Units Raised at Educational Establishments, Government Printer, 1949.

______, Standing Orders for Clothing, Part II, Militia Forces and Senior Cadets, Government Printer, 1935.

______, Standing Orders for the Equipment of the Australian Military Forces and Australian Cadet Corps, Pamphlet No 10, 1949, Amendments No 1, Government Printer, 1951.

______, Standing Orders for the Equipment of the Australian Military Forces and Senior Cadets, Part 1 (1923) General, Government Printer, 1923.

______, Standing Orders for the Equipment of the Australian Military Forces and Australian Cadet Corps, Government Printer, 1948.

393 ______, Standing Orders for the Equipment of the Australian Military Forces and Australian Cadet Corps, Government Printer, 1960.

______, Syllabus of Training: Australian Cadet Corps (School Units): Intelligence Training (Third Years), Government Printer, 1950.

______, Syllabus of Training: Australian Cadet Corps (School Units) Intelligence Training (Second Years), Government Printer, 1962.

______, Syllabus of Training: Australian Cadet Corps Anti-Tank Training (Second & Third Years), Government Printer, 1947.

______, Syllabus of Training: Senior Cadet Detachment: Non-Specialist and Specialist Training, (Period: Three Years), Government Printer, 1945.

______, Syllabus of Training: Senior Cadet Detachments, Government Printer, 1944.

______, The Defence Act 1903-1915 and Regulations for the Military Forces and Senior Cadets of Australia, Government Printer, 1916.

______, The Defence Act 1903-1927 and Regulations and Orders for the Australian Military Forces and Senior Cadets, Government Printer, 1927.

______, The Defence Act 1903-1939 and Regulations and Orders for the Australian Military Forces and Senior Cadets, Government Printer, 1940.

______, The Defence Act, 1903-1941 and Regulations and Orders for the Australian Military Forces and Senior Cadets, Government Printer, 1942.

______, Minutes of the Cadet Conference: 17 November 1905, Government Printer, 1905.

______, Report of the Conference of Militia Officers, 22-25 October 1912, Government Printer, 1912.

______, Report of the Minister of Defence on the Progress of Universal Training (to 30 June 1912), Government Printer, 1912.

______, Military Forces of the Commonwealth: Minute Upon the Defence of Australia, Government Printer, 1902.

______, Commonwealth Military Cadet Corps - Report of the Director General for Year Ending 30 June 1908, Government Printer, 1908.

394 ______, Commonwealth Military Cadet Corps - Report of the Director General for Year Ending 30 June 1909, Government Printer, 1909.

______, Reorganisation of the Australian Cadet Corps, Government Printer, 1974.

Department of Defence (SA), Military Forces of South Australia 1892, Government Printer, 1892.

______, List of Officers and Warrant Officers in the South Australian Military Forces 1897 - 1901, Government Printer, 1901.

______, Volunteer Force Regulations, Standing Orders, Musketry Regulations, etc, Government Printer, 1887.

Department of Defence (Victoria), Standing Orders for Instructions Together with Regulations for Victorian Volunteer Cadet Corps, Government Printer, 1887.

Kitchener, H., Memorandum on the Defence of Australia, Government Printer, 1910.

Millar T.B., Committee of Inquiry into the Citizen Military Forces, Government Printer, 1974.

______, Committee of Inquiry into the Citizen Military Forces: Report on the Army Cadet Corps, Government Printer, 1974.

Murphy, R., Address to Senior Cadets, Government Printer, 1912.

Thorne, P.T.H., Study into the Australian Cadet Corps, Department of Defence, 1989.

Tulloch, A.B., Federal Military Conference, Government Printer, 1894.

The following parliamentary speeches and presentations, published in Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, were examined:

Beazley, K.E., Vol 96, 26 August 1975.

Cook. J., Vol 54, 25 November 1909.

Deakin, A., Vol 35, 28 September 1906.

Fisher, A., Vol 15, 7 August 1903.

Killen, D.J., Vol 96, 1 October 1975.

Morrison, W.L., Vol 96, 26 August 1975.

Pearce, G., Vol 49, 1 July 1909.

395 The following parliamentary articles and reports, published in Commonwealth Parliamentary Papers, were examined:

Commonwealth Parliamentary Papers, 1904, Vol 2, Cadet Forces of Australia - Scheme of Organisation.

______, 1907-10, Vol 2, Memoranda of the Minister of State for Defence on the Estimates for the Financial Years 1907-10.

______, 1909, Vol 2, Military Forces - Cadet Corps, Military Cadet Corps, Report of the Director- General for the Year Ending 30 June 1909.

NSW Journal of the Legislative Assembly, 1881-95, Report of the Minister of Public Instruction for the Years 1880-95.

NSW Legislative Assembly Votes & Proceedings, 1892-1906, Report of the Minister of Public Instruction for the Years 1892-1905.

Queensland Legislative Assembly Votes & Proceedings, 1889-1910, Reports of the Secretary of Public Instruction for the Years Ending 31 December 1888-1909.

______, 1875-89, Reports of the Board of General Education for the Years ending 31 December 1874-1888.

______, 1885-89, Reports of the Commandant of the Queensland Defence Force.

SA Parliamentary Papers, 1877, Vol 2, Report of the Council of Education, 1876.

______, 1882, Vol 2, Progress Report on the Commission on the Working of the Education Acts.

______, 1886, Report of the Select Committee of the House of Assembly on the Defence Forces Bill.

______, 1900, Vol 2, Report of the Acting Military Commandant for the Year 1899-1900.

Tasmania, Journals & Papers of Parliament, 1884, Vol 3, Report by the Commandant on the Reorganisation of the Defence Force.

______, 1886, Vol 12, Report by the Commandant of the Tasmanian Defence Force.

396 ______, 1888-89, Vol 14, Report by the Commandant of the Tasmanian Defence Force.

______, 1888-1902, Education Department Reports for 1887-1901.

Victorian Parliamentary Papers, 1877-1902, Reports of the Minister for Public Instruction 1876-1901.

WA Minutes, Votes & Proceedings of the Parliament, 1895, Vol 2, Report of the Central Board of Education for the Year 1894.

______, 1895-1906, Reports of the Secretary for Education for the Years 1894-1905.

______, 1890-97, Reports of the Commandant of the Local Forces of Western Australia for the Years 1889-97.

A range of statistical and official information was sourced from the following Official Yearbooks of the Commonwealth of Australia.

Numbers 1-61, (1908-76).

PUBLISHED BOOKS

The following publications were examined:

Alpin, G., et al (eds.), Australians: Events and Places, Fairfax, Syme & Weldon Associates, Broadway, N.S.W., 1987.

Andrews, E., The Department of Defence, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 2001.

Barrett, J., Falling In: Australians and Boy Conscription 1911-1915, Hale and Iremonger, Sydney, 1979.

Bean, C.E.W., Here, My Son, Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1950.

Beaumont, J., Australian Defence: Sources & Statistics, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 2001.

Bernays, C.A., Queensland Politics During Sixty Years (1859-1919), Queensland Government Printer, Brisbane, 1919.

Boehms, E.A., Prosperity and Depression in Australia 1887-1897, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1971.

397 Braga, S., Barker College: A History, John Ferguson, Sydney, 1978.

Burgess, H.T. (ed.), The Cyclopaedia of South Australia Vol 1 , Alfred and Selway, Adelaide, 1907.

Candy, P. C., The Victorian Cadet Movement: An Outline History from 1867 to 1969, P.C. Candy, Melbourne, 1969.

Cooper, D., Barker College Cadet Unit: 100 Year History 1900 – 2000, Barker College, Hornsby, N.S.W., 2003.

Coulthard-Clark, C.D., No Australian Need Apply: The Troubled Career of Lieutenant-General Gordon Legge, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1987.

Dawes, J. & Robson, L., Citizen to Soldier: Australia Before the Great War Recollections of Members of the First AIF, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1977.

Dening, G., Xavier Portraits, Old Xaverians Association, Kew, Victoria, 1993.

Dodds, T.H., Cadet Rifle Exercises and Musketry Instructions: Adapted for the Westley- Richards and Francotte Rifles, J.H. Thompson, Brisbane, 1908.

Edgar, W.J., Veldt to Vietnam: Haleians at War, Old Haleins Association, WA, 1994.

Fitzpatrick, B., The Australian People 1788 – 1945, Melbourne University Press, Carlton, 1946.

Fletcher, J.P. & Hills, J.F., Conscription Under Camouflage, Privately Published, South Australia, 1919.

Geise, R.F., St Paul’s School Cadet Unit: Thirty Great Years 1972-2002, Colin A. Cunningham, Aspley, Queensland, 2002.

Gibbs, R.M., A History of Prince Alfred College, Peacock Publications, Kent Town, 1984.

Grey, J., A Military History of Australia, Cambridge University Press, Melbourne, 1990.

______, The Australian Army, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 2001.

Grey, J. & Dennis, P. (eds.), A Century of Service: 100 Years of the Australian Army: Proceedings of the 2001 Chief of the Army’s Military History Conference, Army History Unit, Canberra, 2001.

______, The Second Fifty Years: The Australian Army 1947-97: Proceedings of the 1996 Chief of the Army’s Military History Conference, Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra, 1996.

Hodge, B., The Magic Years: the Coffs Harbour High School Cadet Story 1939-45, Cambaroora Star Publications, Hill End, N.S.W., 1993.

398 Horan, R.S., Fort Street, Honeysett Publications, Leichardt, N.S.W., 1989.

Horner, D. & Branford, A., Prince Alfred College Cadet Unit: The Unit History 1965-1975, Prince Alfred College, Adelaide, 1975.

Horner, D.M., Making the Australian Defence Force, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 2001.

______, Prince Alfred College Cadet Unit: Extracts from Unit History, Prince Alfred College, Adelaide, 1964.

Jauncey, L.C., The Story of Conscription in Australia, Macmillan, Melbourne, 1968.

Johnson, D.H., Volunteers at Heart: The Queensland Defence Forces, 1861-1901, University of Queensland Press, St Lucia, Queensland, 1975.

Kiddle, J. & Jukes, R., Liber Melburniensis, 1848-1936, Griffin Press, Adelaide, 1965.

Kuring, I., Redcoats to Cams: A History of the Australian Infantry 1788-2001, Australian Military History Publications, Loftus, NSW, 2004.

La Nauze, J.A., Alfred Deakin A Biography, Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1979.

Lea-Scarlett, E., Riverview: Aspects of the Story of Saint Ignatius' College & its Peninsula 1836-1988, Hale & Iremonger, Sydney, 1989.

Lemon, A., A Great Australian School: Wesley College Examined, Helicon Press, Wahroonga, N.S.W., 2004.

Lowenstein, W., Weevils in the Flour: An Oral Record of the 1930s Depression in Australia, 20th Anniversary Edition, Scribe, Melbourne, 1988.

Macintyre, C., Political Australia: A Handbook of Facts, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1991.

Main, J.M., Conscription: The Australian Debate, 1901-1970, Cassell Australia, Melbourne, 1970.

Mortensen, K.G., An Australian Army Cadet Unit, 1945-1977: Dismissal and Reveille, Gerald Griffin Press, Parkville, Victoria, 1978.

Nicholls, R., The Colonial Volunteers: The Defence Forces of the Australian Colonies 1836-1901, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1988.

Palazzo, A., The Australian Army: A History of Its Organisation 1901-2001, Oxford University Press, South Melbourne, 2001.

Penrose, H., Red, Black and Khaki: Cadets at Xavier College, Eldon Hogan Trust, Melbourne, 1999.

399 Quirke, N., Gentlemen of Honour, A History of Brisbane Boys’ College 1902 -2001, Brisbane Boys College, Brisbane, 2001.

Reid, H., Look Back With Thanks: A History of Chevalier College Cadet Unit 1949- 2000, Chevalier College, NSW, 2000.

Sherington, G., Shore: A History of Sydney Church of England Grammar School, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1983.

Steele, W.A., The History of All Saints’ College, Bathurst, 1873 - 1934, Angus & Robinson, Sydney, 1936.

Stupart, R. (ed.), Rifle Exercises and Musketry Instruction for Cadets: for Officers and Non- Statement Commissioned Officers in the Commonwealth Cadet Corps, Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1914.

______, The Cadet Handbook and Section Roll, Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1912.

Tanner, T.W., Compulsory Citizen Soldiers, Maxwell Printing, Waterloo, 1980.

Thiele, C., Grains of Mustard Seed, Department of Education, South Australia, 1975.

Vazenry, G.R., Military Forces of Victoria 1854-1967, Privately Published, Melbourne, 1970.

Ward, J.F., Prince Alfred College: The Story of the First Eighty Years 1869 - 1949, Gillingman & Co, Adelaide, 1951.

Ward, R., A Nation for a Continent: The History of Australia 1901-1975, Heinemann Educational Australia, Victoria, 1977.

______, Australia: A Short History, URE Smith, N.S.W., 1979.

Waterhouse, C., Xaverians on Active Service: From South Africa to Vietnam, The Eldon Hogan Trust, Melbourne, 2001.

Wilcox, C., Australia’s Boer War: The War in South Africa 1899–1902, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 2002.

______, For Hearths and Homes: Citizen Soldiering in Australia, 1854-1945, Allen & Unwin, St Leonards, 1998.

Withers, G.A., Conscription: Necessity and Justice, Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1972.

Wyatt, D.M., A Lion in the Country, 6th Military District Museum, Hobart, 1990.

Yarwood, A.T., Walers: Australian Horses Abroad, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1989.

400 ARTICLES

The following articles were examined:

Audley, R., ‘New South Wales Cadet Encampment, August 1890’, in Despatch, Vol 15, Nos 2 & 3, August 1979.

Bishop, K., ‘A Hundred Years of Tradition on Parade’, Sydney Morning Herald, 18 June 1990.

Brazier, N.M., The Australian Military Journal, Vol 5, No 3, 1914.

Brodtmann, G., ‘Nurturing Defence's Future’, in Defence, October 2004.

Bruer, M., ‘School Cadet Corps Could Get People Involved’, Age, 2 August 1990.

Clark, N., ‘Of Peace and War - The Value of and Need For Military Service and Discipline’, in Independence, Vol 16, No 2, October 1991.

Cohen, H., ‘The Victorian Volunteer Cadet: An Alternative to Conscription’, in The Empire Review, 1903.

Collins, J.R., ‘Training of Junior Cadets’, in Lone Hand, 1 March 1913.

Cummins, B., ‘TKS Lads Beat Feared Hall Gang In Running Gunfight’, Parramatta Advertiser, 19 March 1975.

Daley, C., ‘The Story of the Victorian Junior Cadet Corps (1855 - 1912)’, in The Victorian Historical Magazine, Vol 20, No 1, June 1943.

Downey, M., ‘The Commonwealth Senior Cadets Competition Medal’, in Despatch, Vol 6, Nos 6 & 7, December - January, 1970-71.

Fischer, I., ‘The Involvement of the Commonwealth Government in Physical Education: From Defence to National Fitness’, in Sport, Federation, Nation, 2001.

Goldsmith, J.A., ‘Suggestions for Improvement in Cadet Training’, in Australian Military Journal, Vol 5, 5 July 1914.

Hall, W.H., ‘The League’s 1965 Defence Submission’, in The Listening Post, Vol 44, No 2, June 1965.

Hanley T., The Catholic Weekly, 17 July 1975.

Hayes, L., ‘Employers for Defence - Early Training Days Recalled’, West Australian, 28 February 1990.

Healy, R.B., ‘Peace Movements and Cadet Training’, in Christian Brothers: Our Studies, Vol 42, No 2, September 1969.

401 Henry, D.L., ‘The Victorian Cadet System’, in Journal of the Royal United Services Institute, Vol 3, No 7, December 1894.

Hope, J., ‘Emu Parade for AAC Victoria’, Army Newspaper, 21 October 2004.

Hoskin, J.C., ‘School Cadets’, in Despatch, Vol 12, No 8, February 1977.

Huston, J., ‘The Australian Cadet Corps - Lost Opportunities’, in Australian Defence Force Journal, No 89, July - August 1991.

Johnson, E.J., ‘School Military Training Considered’, in School and Society, Vol 51, March 1940.

Jones, W.H., ‘Measuring the Value of the Australian Services Cadet Scheme’, in Australian Defence Force Journal, January - February 2000.

Kerridge, B., ‘Army Cadet Brent Gets a Taste of the Action’, Courier Mail, 20 September 1990.

Kitney, P., ‘The History of the Australian School Cadet Movement to 1893’, in Defence Force Journal, No 12, September-October 1978.

Knight, P., ‘The Cadet Controversy’, in The Catholic Weekly, 29 May 1975.

Loch, H.B., ‘Our Colonial Forces: Australia - IV’, in Army and Navy Illustrated, Vol 7, No 103, January 1899.

McAdams, R.H., ‘The Lesson Plan That Worked’, in Australian Defence Force Journal, March - April 1988.

McAllister, J., ‘Schools, Enlistment, and Military Values: The Australian Services Cadet Scheme’, in Armed Forces and Society, Vol 22, Fall 1995.

Merrett, D.T., ‘The School at War: Scotch College and the Great War’, in Melbourne Studies in Education, Melbourne University Press, Carlton, 1982.

Mills, C., ‘History of James Ruse Agricultural High School Cadet Unit’, in Despatch, Vol 15, No 8, February 1980.

Mortensen, K.G., ‘The Mind of a Cadet’, in Christian Brothers: Our Studies, Vol 44, No 2, October 1971.

______, ‘The Future of Army Cadets’, in Mufti, Vol 24, No 1, March 1984.

Perry, W., ‘Military Reforms of General Sir Edward Hutton in NSW 1893-96’, in The Australian Quarterly, Vol 28, No 4, December 1956.

Pilgrim, S., ‘Armed for Life’, Newcastle Herald, 29 September 1990.

402 Pixley, N.S., ‘Queensland: One Hundred Years of Defence’, in Royal Historical Society of Queensland Journal, September 1959.

Public Questions Committee, Report on Cadet Units in Church Schools, Presbyterian Church of Queensland, November 1972.

SA Dept. of Education, Education Gazette, Government Printer, 1885 - 1971.

SA Government, Gazette, Government Printer, 4 December 1862.

Speed, F.W., ‘Australian Defence Under Labor’, in The Army Quarterly and Defence Journal, Vol 103, No 3, April 1973.

Stanley, R.J., ‘Opportunities in Cadet Training’, in Australian Army Journal, No 241, June 1969.

Stevenson, I.R., ‘The Voluntary Nature of the School Cadet Unit’, in Australian Army Journal, No 312, June 1975.

Tanner, T.W., ‘The Introduction of Compulsory Military Training in Australia 1901 - 1914’, in Armidale and District Historical Society Journal & Proceedings, No 10, 1967.

Unknown, ‘Australia’s Citizen Army’, in Army Quarterly, Vol 62, No 1, April 1951.

______, ‘The Volunteer Defence Corps’, in The Listening Post, Vol 21, No 3, March 1942.

______, The Bulletin, 4 September 1971.

White, K., ‘Compulsory Military Training in Australia in 1914’, in Sabretache, Vol 18, 18 January 1977.

Wingate, G.W., A Report on the Feasibility and Advisability of Some Policy to Inaugurate a System of Rifle Practice Throughout the Public Schools of the Country, Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1907.

Zwillenberg, H.J., ‘South Australia’s Army: Parts 1 & 2’, in Sabretache, Vol 22, Nos 1 & 2, January - March & April - June 1981.

SCHOOL PUBLICATIONS

The following school publications were examined:

Adelaide High School, 50th Anniversary Commemorative Book, 1958.

______, Adelaide High School Magazine, 1909-71.

403 Albury High School, Southern Cross, 1979.

All Souls’ & St. Gabriel’s School (Charters Towers), The Phoenix, 1982-86.

Aquinas College, Aquinas, 1981-84.

Armidale High School, The Acorn, 1948-72.

Ballarat College, The Minervan, 1946-73.

Barker College, The College Barker, 1980.

Bendigo High School, Old Gold, 1980-82.

Boonah State High School, Focus, 1982.

Brighton Grammar School, The Grammarian, 1912-84.

Brisbane Boys’ College, The Portal, 1931-76.

Burnie High School, The Darwinian, 1981 & 1983.

Camberwell Grammar School, The Camberwell Grammarian, 1970-2001.

Canberra Grammar School, The Canberran, 1976-91.

Caulfield Grammar School, The Caulfield Grammarian, 1973-82.

Christ Church Grammar School, The Mitre, 1972-80.

Christian Brothers College (Gregory Terrace), Terrace - Quarterly Review, Vol 2, No 3, 1939.

______, Terrace, 1940-75.

Church of England Grammar School (Brisbane), The Viking, 1980-81.

Clayfield College (Brisbane Boys’ College), The Clayfield Collegian, 1916-30.

Concordia College, The Concordian, 1977-80.

Geelong High School, Flotsam, 1980.

Gladstone State High School, Tonka, 1983.

Grantham High School, Ballyhoo, 1977-80.

Guildford Grammar School, The Swan, 1978-86.

Hurlstone Agricultural High School, Harvester, 1980-86.

404 Ignatius Park College, Ignatius Park College Magazine, 1970-82.

Kedron State High, Nordek, 1982.

Kempsey High School, Macleay, 1980.

Kepnock High School, Kalori, 1980-82.

Knox Grammar School, The Knox Grammarian, 1980-98.

Mansfield State High School, Scene, 1979.

Marcellin College, Marcellin College Annual Magazine, 1980.

Maryborough High School, The Palma, 1934-76.

Mentone Grammar School, Mentonian, 1944-74.

Mudgee High School, Mirri, 1980.

Newington College, The Newingtonian, 1994-2000.

Normanhurst Boys’ High School, Phoenix, 1978-81.

Prince Alfred College, Chronicle, 1989-75.

Punchbowl Boys’ High School, The Voyager, 1980.

Rockhampton Grammar School, Capricornus, 1974-80.

Sacred Heart College, Downlands Magazine, 1940-80.

Scotch College (Claremont), Reporter, 1981-87.

Scotch College (Tasmania), The Caledonian, 1922-75.

Scots College (Warwick), The Tartan, 1976-80.

St Mary’s High School (Queensland), South Creek, 1981.

St Michael’s College, Annual Magazine, 1981-84.

St Patrick’s Christian Brothers College (Mackay), Annual Magazine, 1979-82.

St. Patrick’s College (Ballarat), Yearbook, 1980-88.

St Patrick’s College (Geraldton), Annual Report, 1981.

St Patrick’s College (Goulburn), Annual Review, 1977-88.

405 St Paul’s School, Magazine, 1973-76.

St. Joseph’s College (Rockhampton), Annual Magazine, 1977-80.

Sydney Church of England Grammar School, The Torch Bearer, 1891-2002.

Sydney Grammar School, The Sydneian, 1919-99.

Te Kuiti High School, Koru, 1982.

The Armidale School, The Armidilian, 1977-81.

The Southport School, The Southportonian, 1992-95.

Toowoomba Grammar School, Annual Magazine, 1889-93.

Trinity College, Annual Magazine, 1981-85.

Trinity Grammar School, The Triangle, 1976-86.

Wesley College, The Western Wyvern, 1974-78.

West Wyalong High School, Magazine, 1968-76.

Young High School, Burrangong, 1962-71.

NEWSPAPERS

A range of non-author accredited articles from the following newspapers were examined:

Courier Mail, 9 June 1916.

Sydney Morning Herald, 29 March 1856 15 August 1863 5 August 1873. 22 August 1890. 27 October 1909. 9 August 1910. 26 August 1975. 17 October 1983. 21 October 1983.

Argus, 20 August 1863. 1 September 1863. 21 May 1885. 4 September 1908. 11 March 1910.

406 Australian, 31 October 1975. 28 May 1976.

Bundaberg News-Mail, 29 September 1971. 25 September 1973. 9 July 1975.

Canberra Times, 13 April 1983.

Maryborough Chronicle, 3 August 1971. 27 August 1975.

Melbourne Truth, 2 August 1975.

Rockhampton Morning Bulletin, 30 September 1968.

Sun, 6 July 1973.

West Australian, 26 August 1975.

UNPUBLISHED THESES & MANUSCRIPTS

The following theses and manuscripts were examined:

Bromham, K.W., ‘A Brief History of the School Cadet Corps in New South Wales: The First Forty Years’, Thesis (M.Ed.), University of Sydney, 1968.

Jones, D.J., ‘The Military Use of State Schools 1872 – 1914’, Thesis (PhD), La Trobe University, 1991.

Laffin, C.A., ‘The Australian Cadet Corps in Secondary Education’, Thesis (M.Ed. Hons.), University of Sydney, 1976.

Lee, M. & Williams, S., A History of St Peter’s College Cadet Unit, unpublished, 1963.

Millar, T.B., ‘The History of the Defence Forces of the Port Phillip District and Colony of Victoria 1836-1900’, Thesis (M.A.), University of Melbourne, 1957.

Zwillenberg, H.J., ‘Citizens and Soldiers: the Defence of South Australia’, 1836-1901, Thesis (M.A.), University of Adelaide, 1970.

407 WEBSITES

The following websites were examined:

AAC Homepage, www.aac.adfc.gov.au

Active 8 Homepage, www.active8.on.net

Australian Bureau of Statistics Homepage, www.abs.gov.au.

Cadetnet Homepage, www.cadetnet.icemedia.com.au

Cadets WA Homepage, www.cadetswa.wa.gov.au

Digger History Homepage, www.diggerhistory.info

Minister of Defence Homepage, www.minister.defence.gov.au

Office of Youth - Advance Homepage, www.youth.vic.gov.au

Parliament House Webpage, www.aph.gov.au

Try Youth Homepage, www.tryyouth.org.au

PERSONAL CORRESPONDANCE

The following personal correspondence, addressed to and in the possession of the author, was examined:

Letter: Hon. Gordon Scholes, dated 2 May 2005.

Letter: Sir Donald Dunstan, dated 30 April 2005.

408