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Christoph Gelbhaar [email protected] Sonderburger Straße 105, 68307 Mannheim, Germany 0049 176 528 29 180 Working Paper for the 23rd Annual Conference of the European Society for the History of Economic Thought (University of Lille, 23-25th May 2019) A tradition of conceptual confusion in the history of international trade theory 1 << If there were an Economist‘s creed, it would surely contain the affirmations “I understand the principle of comparative advantage” and “I advocate Free Trade.” >> << From the early nineteenth century until the late 1970s, international trade theory was dominated almost entirely by the concept of comparative advantage(…). >>1 To explain and contextualize the achievements of their ‘New Trade Theory,’ economists like Paul Krugman use statements like these. The history of scientific theory concerning international trade is divided in two parts, with their own theoretical contributions being the dividing event: From David Ricardo to the later 20th century, the whole theory of international trade was dominated by and built around the concept of comparative advantage. But this undue dominance has ended, they tell us. It ended when the ‘New Trade Theory’ gave us formal models of non-comparative advantage trade due to increasing returns to scale.2 The premise of this account is hardly controversial; nor should it be. Economists have long been exaggerating the degree to which a mere understanding of the concept of comparative advantage, when combined with factual knowledge on the actual pattern of comparative advantages, had been enabling them to explain and predict the contents and directions of the flows of international trade. And they have certainly been exaggerating the degree to which the mere initiation into the concept of comparative advantage had to be equated with an introduction into an established truth concerning economic policy, that is, an insight into the superiority of free trade. But what, precisely, has been the nature of this exaggeration? Krugman sees it as a matter of omission and emphasis. In his account, economists had always understood that the impact of increasing returns to scale on trade was something that their models of comparative advantage had not fully captured. But since, originally, they weren’t able to model this other factor of influence on trade gains and trade patterns, they simply omitted it in their textbooks. They only incorporated what they could model: comparative advantage trade. 1 Krugman, Paul R.: Is Free Trade passé?, in: The Journal of Economic Perspectives 1 (1987), Nr. 2, p. 131-144, here: p. 131 and 132. 2 This is ‘work in progress,’ a conference working paper for the sole purpose of facilitating discussion of the author’s presentation at the ESHET gathering in Lille in May 2019. However, please feel invited to share your thoughts. Please feel free to contact the author using this address: [email protected]. The author would be especially interested in learning about ESHET members who are publishing on the same subject or related subjects in other languages. 2 So his account contains two hypotheses, one factual and one causal. Firstly, the exaggeration appears to be mainly a thing of the past that has been overcome, that has already been eliminated in modern textbooks. And secondly, it has supposedly been overcome by the same progress of scientific knowledge that created it: International trade theory has followed “the path of least mathematical resistance,” progressing naturally from the simpler models of comparative advantage to the New Trade Theory after the latter had been made possible by new models of ‘imperfect competition.’3 But the end result of this supposedly continual scientific evolution has been a change in political implications, though a rather limited one. Together with the accumulating knowledge on the political economy of trade policy, the New Trade Theory is still providing a lot of weighty arguments against protectionism. But the status of free trade, according to Krugman, has “shifted from optimum to reasonable rule of thumb. There is still a case for free trade as a good policy, and as a useful target in the practical world of politics, but it can never again be asserted as the policy that economic theory tells us is always right.”4 By implication, the concept of comparative advantage should have lost most of its special status as well. For an ‘Economist’s creed’ that equates initiation into this concept with an insight into the optimality of a certain policy is not in line with the state of professional knowledge anymore. As a matter of course, the insight that survival in international competition does not necessarily depend on absolute cost advantages remains of the utmost importance. It still is, or rather could be and should be, a powerful pedagogical weapon against the most vulgar versions of protectionist demagoguery. 3 Krugman, Paul R.: Rethinking International Trade, Cambridge (Ma.) 1990, p. 3-4: „(…) [O]ne may wonder why it took so long for the new theory to emerge. The main answer is that while trade based on increasing returns is easy to talk about in a general sense, it is difficult to model formally. Since economics as practiced in the English-speaking world is strongly oriented toward mathematical models, any economic argument that has not been expressed in that form tends to remain invisible. While many economists no doubt understood that increasing returns could explain international trade even in the absence of comparative advantage, before 1980 there were no clean and simple models making the point. As a result this idea was often simply left out of textbooks and trade courses, and even good trade theorists often seemed unaware of the possibility. (…) The long dominance of Ricardo over Smith - of comparative advantage over increasing returns – was largely due to the belief that the alternative was necessarily a mess. In effect, the theory of international trade followed the perceived line of least mathematical resistance. Once it was clear that papers on noncomparative-advantage trade could be just as tight and clean as papers in the traditional mold, the field was ripe for rapid transformation.” 4 Krugman, Is Free Trade passé?, p. 132. 3 But the concept’s perceived status relative to less crude versions of protectionism should now basically equal the status of the concept of increasing returns. While generally considered to be a major reason for the mutual profitability of trade, increasing returns are also and have always been the key ingredient in sophisticated arguments for the potential desirability of protectionism under specific conditions. Comparative advantages can now be assigned to the same role. Take, for example, the model of ‘External Economies and Specialization’ in Krugman’s and Obstfeld’s bestselling textbook. This model aims to explain a theoretically valid argument for infant industry protection: A fully established industry residing in a comparatively disadvantaged country can nevertheless survive, due simply to the early start that it enjoyed relative to its potential competitors, for the externality of localized economies of scale in this industry will discourage any new individual investment in other countries that would otherwise be advantaged, be it absolutely or comparatively. But this means that, technically, unused comparative advantages can provide an additional argument for infant industry protection: According to the model, if the aim is to maximize both global productivity and national welfare by redirecting international trade so that it will eventually conform to the pattern of comparative advantage, this aim might then call for a protectionist policy. But as a matter of fact, economists still represent the introduction into the concept of comparative advantage as a provision of an insight into the wisdom of free trade, while assigning other textbook contents to the role of the qualifications. The concept’s special status remains intact. And this shows why Krugman’s account of the history of the discipline should indeed be controversial, both with respect to the supposedly achieved elimination of international trade theory’s undue domination by the concept of comparative advantage and with respect to the factors that have ostensibly sustained and ended this domination. And though criticism of the account is usually not explicit, neither is it rare. It usually takes the form of papers or statements criticizing the “theory of comparative advantage,” a theory that is supposedly the core of a textbook orthodoxy on the subject of international trade – a currently dominating orthodoxy, not one of the past. Although the theory is usually criticized without being precisely defined beforehand, it is clear enough what its content is thought to be: It is vaguely understood as the postulate that the contents and directions of the flows of 4 international trade are generally determined by the patterns of comparative advantage, and that this clearly points to free trade as an optimal economic policy. In this alternative view, the traditional exaggeration has not yet been overcome. Its elimination is still to be achieved, which is precisely what the critics of the “theory” understand to be the purpose of their critical efforts. And this “theory” is not just a straw man, put up by the critics of textbook orthodoxy to inflate the importance of their contribution. A “theory of comparative advantage” is actually mentioned in many of the criticized textbooks, as a theory that is generally valid and that has been proven by David Ricardo in 1817. Some even call it the “law of comparative advantage.” The description of that supposed law usually contains not more than an explanation of the concept of comparative advantage, plus sometimes a description of one of the mechanisms that can turn comparative cost advantages into absolute price advantages. But the law is nevertheless presented as “one of the most important laws in economics” (as, for example, in Dominick Salvatore’s “International Economics.