Second Quarter Recommendations Quarterly Series, No. 2 NATIONAL SECURITY COMMISSION ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE i Commissioners DR. ERIC SCHMIDT Chairman HON. ROBERT O. WORK Vice Chairman SAFRA CATZ DR. STEVE CHIEN HON. MIGNON CLYBURN CHRISTOPHER DARBY DR. KENNETH FORD DR. JOSÉ-MARIE GRIFFITHS DR. ERIC HORVITZ ANDREW JASSY GILMAN LOUIE DR. WILLIAM MARK DR. JASON MATHENY HON. KATHARINA MCFARLAND DR. ANDREW MOORE ii iii Letter from the Commissioners As it enters the third decade of the 21st century, the United States finds itself confronted by geopolitical, economic, ideological, technological, and military challenges—all at once. Artificial intelligence (AI) and its associated transformative technologies are central to meeting the demands of all of these challenges, and will help the United States navigate today’s turmoil towards a healthier and more secure future. Against this backdrop, Congress established the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence (NSCAI) in 2018. The United States Government must organize, resource, and train to understand, develop, and employ AI-enabled technologies. It must do so ethically, responsibly, and in close partnership with the private sector, academia, non-governmental organizations, and its international partners. In the context of recent events, excitement about the potential for AI to improve lives has increased in parallel with concerns about the danger of AI being misapplied or used for malicious purposes. A Dynamic Approach: The Urgency of Today and the Work of a Generation The Commission is pursuing a dynamic approach as it moves toward publishing its final report in March 2021. It is assessing and making recommendations about a technology in motion within a rapidly shifting global environment. Scientists, innovators, and government officials are still developing, seeking to understand, adopting, and establishing governing principles for AI-enabled technologies in all areas, including for national security purposes. We are trying to imagine a future altered by technologies that in some cases have not yet arrived. We are trying to build ethical guidelines while many of the implications remain hypothetical, not yet real. We are trying to separate hype from reality in how AI will be used and misused. Last November, the NSCAI released an interim report articulating the overarching principles guiding our work and framing a research agenda for developing concrete recommendations for the legislative and executive branches to consider. In March, the Commission released a first set of quarterly recommendations. Developing, adopting, and protecting AI advantages requires an expansive vision for promoting America’s AI leadership. Successful and responsible adoption of AI requires more than technical progress. AI developments must progress in tandem with a larger reorientation of national security departments to compete in a world shaped by strategic competition. The Commission believes the national security challenge is urgent, but it recognizes that vision for dramatic change will take time to translate into action. Many of the ideas the Commission is developing will require consensus building and hard policy engineering. Re-imagining a digital workforce, overcoming ingrained bureaucracy, developing new operating concepts, and iv synching visions with plans, strategies, organization, and action––that is the work of a generation. But it must begin now. The NSCAI’s second quarterly memo of 2020 is a compendium of recommendations that balance the urgency of the challenge with the recognition that the ambitious actions required to address it will take time. The recommendations are not a comprehensive follow-up to the interim report or first quarter memorandum. They do not cover all areas that will be included in the final report. This memo spells out recommendations that can inform ongoing deliberations tied to policy, budget, and legislative calendars. But it also introduces recommendations designed to build a new framework for pivoting national security for the AI era. Each Tab of this document can stand alone as a discrete memo on a specific dimension of the AI-national security nexus. The Commissioners believe these recommendations are solidly grounded in analysis and ready for discussion with stakeholders and the general public. While the NSCAI does not anticipate major deviations from the proposals or the underlying assessments, the Commission will adjust as any new information comes to our attention, and we will render our final recommendations in March 2021 with the most up-to-date information available at that time. Quarter 2 Recommendations In the second quarter, the Commission has focused its analysis and recommendations on six areas: ● Advancing the Department of Defense’s internal AI research and development capabilities. The Department of Defense (DoD) must make reforms to the management of its research and development (R&D) ecosystem to enable the speed and agility needed to harness the potential of AI and other emerging technologies. To equip the R&D enterprise, the NSCAI recommends creating an AI software repository; improving agency- wide authorized use and sharing of software, components, and infrastructure; creating an AI data catalog; and expanding funding authorities to support DoD laboratories. DoD must also strengthen AI Test and Evaluation, Verification and Validation capabilities by developing an AI testing framework, creating tools to stand up new AI testbeds, and using partnered laboratories to test market and market-ready AI solutions. To optimize the transition from technological breakthroughs to application in the field, Congress and DoD need to reimagine how science and technology programs are budgeted to allow for agile development, and adopt the model of multi- stakeholder and multi-disciplinary development teams. Furthermore, DoD v should encourage labs to collaborate by building open innovation models and a R&D database. ● Accelerating AI applications for national security and defense. DoD must have enduring means to identify, prioritize, and resource the AI- enabled applications necessary to fight and win. To meet this challenge, the NSCAI recommends that DoD produce a classified Technology Annex to the National Defense Strategy that outlines a clear plan for pursuing disruptive technologies that address specific operational challenges. We also recommend establishing mechanisms for tactical experimentation, including by integrating AI-enabled technologies into exercises and wargames, to ensure technical capabilities meet mission and operator needs. On the business side, DoD should develop a list of core administrative functions most amenable to AI solutions and incentivize the adoption of commercially available AI tools. ● Bridging the technology talent gap in government. The United States government must fundamentally re-imagine the way it recruits and builds a digital workforce. The Commission envisions a government-wide effort to build its digital talent base through a multi-prong approach, including: 1) the establishment of a National Reserve Digital Corps that will bring private sector talent into public service part-time; 2) the expansion of technology scholarship for service programs; and, 3) the creation of a national digital service academy for growing federal technology talent from the ground up. ● Protecting AI advantages for national security through the discriminate use of export controls and investment screening. The United States must protect the national security sensitive elements of AI and other critical emerging technologies from foreign competitors, while ensuring that such efforts do not undercut U.S. investment and innovation. The Commission proposes that the President issue an Executive Order that outlines four principles to inform U.S. technology protection policies for export controls and investment screening, enhance the capacity of U.S. regulatory agencies in analyzing emerging technologies, and expedite the implementation of recent export control and investment screening reform legislation. Additionally, the Commission recommends prioritizing the application of export controls to hardware over other areas of AI-related technology. In practice, this requires working with key allies to control the supply of specific semiconductor manufacturing equipment critical to AI while simultaneously revitalizing the U.S. semiconductor industry and building the technology protection regulatory capacity of like-minded vi partners. Finally, the Commission recommends focusing the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) on preventing the transfer of technologies that create national security risks. This includes a legislative proposal granting the Department of the Treasury the authority to propose regulations for notice and public comment to mandate CFIUS filings for investments into AI and other sensitive technologies from China, Russia and other countries of special concern. The Commission’s recommendations would also exempt trusted allies and create fast tracks for vetted investors. ● Reorienting the Department of State for great power competition in the digital age. Competitive diplomacy in AI and emerging technology arenas is a strategic imperative in an era of great power competition. Department of State personnel must have the organization, knowledge, and resources to advocate for American interests at the intersection of technology, security, economic interests, and democratic values. To strengthen the