The Vijnaptimatrata Buddhism of the Chinese Monk K'uei
THE VIJNAPTIMATRATA BUDDHISM OF THE CHINESE MONK
K'UEI-CHI (A.D. 632-682)
ALAN SPONBERG
B.A. , American University, 1968
M.A. , University of Wisconsin, 1972
A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF
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DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
IN
; THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES
Department of Asian Studies
We accept this dissertation as conforming
to the required standard.
THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA
August 1979
© Alan Sponberg, 1979 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for
an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that
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Department of
The University of British Columbia 2075 Wesbrook Place Vancouver, Canada V6T 1W5
DE-6 BP 75-51 1 E ABSTRACT
The dissertation seeks to determine the main features of
the Buddhist thought of K'uei-chi, First Patriarch of the Fa-hsiang
School of East Asian Buddhism, and to further establish his position
as a key figure in the transmission of Indian philosophical traditions
into China.. In addition it provides a translation of an original essay written "by K'uei-chi on Vijnaptimatrata. (Mere Conceptualization) the fundamental philosophic principle of the School of Yogacara
Buddhism to which he was heir.
There are two parts to the dissertation: Part One comprising
Chapts. I-III and Part Two comprising Chapts. IV and V. In Part One, the first chapter summarizes the biographical data available on
K'uei-chi's life, discussing in particular his role as translator and exegete, and also the relationship between these activities and his personal religious life. Chapt. II discusses K'uei-chi's written works, pointing out a number of features that indicate his special interests. It includes a detailed and annotated analysis of all his surviving works. Chapt. Ill presents a survey of the main doctrines of the Vijnaptimatrata Yogacara school of Asafiga and Vasubandhu. As one branch of Mahayana Buddhism, the. school is shown to be best understood as a systematic soteriology characterized by an emphasis on the epistemic rather than the ontologic analysis of the constituents of experience (dhamas). This chapter concludes with a discussion of
K'uei-chi's significance as a major figure in the development of iii
Buddhist thought in East Asia. He is presented as a syncretist who
sought to organize a manifold and complex tradition in a manner that would allow its transmission into a very different cultural context.
Part Two consists of a translation of one essay from
K'uei-chi's voluminous doctrinal compendium, the Forest of Doctrines
in the Garden of the Dharma of Mahayana Buddhism (Ta-sheng fa-yuan
i-lin ohang). Chapt. IV provides an introduction to the work, out•
lining the commentaries used, both contemporary and modern, and
discussing the methodological problems confronted in translating the
text. Chapter V is the translation itself: K'uei-chi's "Essay on
Vijnaptimatrata" (Wei-shih chang) in ten sections. It includes
extensive annotation indicating the sources of the ideas K'uei-chi
discusses and providing supplementary information on the many Buddhist
doctrines to which he refers. iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Abstract ii
PART ONE:
K'UEI-CHI, THE MAN AND HIS THOUGHT
Chapter
I. BIOGRAPHY 2
Family and Childhood k
Attraction to Buddhism 6 K'uei-chi and Hsuan-tsang 8 K'uei-chi, the Exegete 11 Quality of K'uei-chi's Scholarship 11 Personal Religious Life l6
II. K'UEI-CHI'S WRITTEN WORKS 21
An Analysis of the Surviving Works 2k
Discussion 32
III. K'UEI-CHI AND YOGACARA 37
YOGACARA IN INDIA AND CHINA 38
VIJNAPTIMATRATA 39
Atman and Dharmas 39 Trisvabhavata: the Three Aspects of Own-being hO
Vijnaptimatrata vs. Cittamatrata in later Yogacara k2 Vijnana and Vijnapti k3 YOGACARA PSYCHOLOGY 50
The Eight Modes of Mental Activity 51
Alaya and Atman 57 The Components of Perception 60
THE PATH TO ENLIGHTENMENT 6l
The Five Stages of Sanct if ication 6l
The Yogacara Conception of Nirvana 6k
K'UEI-CHI'S CONTRIBUTION . 6U
Doctrinal Classification 65 The Five-level Contemplation of Vijnaptimatrata 67
PART TWO
TRANSLATION OF
"THE ESSAY ON VIJNAPTIMATRAT&"
IV. INTRODUCTION TO THE TRANSLATION TO
The Commentaries 70
Methodological Considerations 72
V. K'UEI-CHI'S "ESSAY ON VIJNAPTIMATRATS" 79
[Preface] ' 79
Section
1. . Exposition of the Substance 80 2. Critical Analysis of the Term 103 3. Explanation of the Distinctions and the Unity 108 h. Which Mode of Mentation Performs the Contemplation? 118 5. Clarifying what Distinguishes the Classes 120 vi
6. The Stages of Cultivating Realization .... 127 7. Of What Nature is the Dharma '.Contemplation*? 137 •8.' The Stations and the Base of Arising .... ikk 9. Severing the Obstacles and Defilements . . . 151 10. Turning to and Embracing the Two Emptinesses 158
NOTES
CHAPTER I 162
CHAPTER II 167
CHAPTER III 171
CHAPTER IV 175
CHAPTER V 176
ABBREVIATIONS 215
BIBLIOGRAPHY 217 1
PART ONE:
K'UEI-CHI, THE MAN AND HIS THOUGHT Chapter I
BIOGRAPHY
The Chinese Buddhist monk K'uei--chi^jjf£ (A.D. 632-682), while remaining as yet relatively unknown in the West, was one of the most prominent figures among the aristocratic intelligentsia who were attracted to Buddhism during the early part of the T'ang
Dynasty (A.D. 618-907). The beginning of the 7th century had seen the founding of a new Chinese empire after 500 years of internal strife and discord; finally once again China was united. It was a time when the Chinese court was becoming increasingly more interested in the regions beyond its western frontier, and when Buddhist thought was rapidly/becoming the fashion of the day.
K'uei-chi's prominence stems from the two major activities of his life: his participation in the translation project,sponsored by- the T'ang Emperor T'ai-tsung 626-6H9), an
East Asia. Both of these activities were the consequence of his long association with the famous Chinese Buddhist pilgrim Hsuan-tsang ^
(ca. 596-661+) .2
In A.D. 61+55 when K'uei-chi was thirteen years old, Hsuan- tsang returned to the T'ang capital from sixteen years of travel and
study in the major Buddhist monastic centers and universities of 3
Central Asia and India. Buddhism had been growing steadily in China for several centuries by this time, but among Hsuan-tsang's native
Chinese contemporaries there were none who could rival his understanding of the Indian origins of Buddhism. From his long residence at the famous Buddhist monastery-university at Nalanda he had brought back a profound mastery of Indian scholastic philosophy and also an . extensive collection of Buddhist religious and philosophical literature.
The remaining nineteen years of his life were devoted to directing a team of Buddhist scholars who translated those Indian works from
Sanskrit into Literary Chinese. This translation project, the most extensive and lavishly funded in the history of Chinese Buddhism, provided the textual corpus by which the Chinese were finally to gain a mature understanding of Indian Yogacara Buddhism, a philosophical system even more alien and contrary to the indigenous thought of their time than to some of our own modern notions of philosophy and psychology.
Hsuan-tsang, if we judge from his work, considered his main role to be that of a transmitter and translator. It was to K'uei-chi, his specially chosen and personally instructed successor, that he left the equally important and arduous task of providing the commentaries that would make this vast body of newly translated technical literature
accessible to the Chinese Buddhist public. It was K'uei-chi who was largely responsible for standardizing an orthodox synthesis of the various doctrinal interpretations and positions represented in the many works brought back to China by Hsuan-tsang. So important, in fact, was K'uei-chi's role as formulator and synthesizer, that it was he who •was later given the position of First Patriarch of the Fa-hsiang Tsung
J/^v ^0 , the dominant school of Chinese Yogacara Buddhism and one which subsequently had a strong influence on Japanese intellectual history as well. Thus, in the eyes of some at least, K'uei-chi's place in the history of Chinese Yogacara Buddhism has been seen as even more crucial than that of Hsuan-tsang.
Sources for an account of K'uei-chi's life are limited and beset, moreover, with all the usual problems involved in distinguishing hagiography from.biography, a task made all the more difficult by the 3 dearth of autobiographical references in K'uei-chi's own writings.
In outline, the major events in K'uei-chi's life were his childhood in the aristocratic circles of the capital, his early attraction to
Buddhism, his training and collaboration with Hsuan-tsang, and his literary activity subsequent to Hsuan-tsang1s death. There are, in addition, two important themes running throughout his life: his commitment to careful scholarship,and to Buddhist religious practice.
In even a summary account of K'uei-chi's life it is necessary to consider each of these topics.
Family and Childhood .
The general circumstances of K'uei-chi's early years can be surmised with some probability. He was the scion of a family well- established in the T'ang imperial court.and heir to a long tradition of distinguished military leadership. The family name is recorded as Yii-ch'in, that of an originally non-Chinese clan historically associated with the court of the Northern Wei ^fc^$*Dynasty
(A.D. 386-534); By the beginning of the T'angDynasty the family had become thoroughly sinicized and controlled important positions in the
court.
K'uei chi's grandfather was given the title of Duke of
Ch'ang-ning ^^//^ and hls uncle was Yii-ch'ih Ching-te Jjf§^^Jj^y.
Duke of O^jS , a famous general who had played an instrumental
role in the founding of the T'ang Dynasty and was still a powerful
figure in the court, of T'ai-tsung, the second T'ang emperor. K'uei-
chi's father. Yu-^ch^ih"'Tsutig ^Pfjt^j* . was also rather prominent,
having secured appointment to a number of posts including Military
Governor of Sung-chou ^')4) fyfy^ and General of the Left Palace
Guard js^jSp. , . perhaps the position he was holding when K'uei-
chi was born in the T'ang capital, Ch'ang-an •> in A.D. 6 32-.^
Our subject's personal name (his ming ^ ) is not recorded in
any of the sources and, indeed, even the monastic name he took upon
entering the order has been a topic of some controversy among Japanese
scholars. Certainly the common- and probably invariable—rTpractice
among Chinese Buddhists at the time that they, at least theoretically,
relinquished all connections with their family was to take a two-
character religious name. In this they were following a custom
established by their Indian predecessors. The problem with the name
K'uei-chi*^^ is that the combination of these two characters
together is not found in any of his own writings, though he does refer 6
to himself a few times in the third-person simply.as Chi . This peculiar circumstance is compounded by the fact that in the earliest editions of his surviving works, his name as the author is usually
given preceded by various titles,.so that we find, for example:
Mahayana Chi ^ ^ , Chi of Ta-tz 'u-en. Monastery ^ i^\cL ^ -^fc > the Monk Chi^/J,\ > anc* sometimes again simply Chi.
This has led some scholars to question the reliability of the tradition which gives K'uei^ as the first character of the na^e.5
The evidence against K'uei, however, seems circumstantial and
inconclusive. Moreover, even though some question regarding the
original name does.indeed remain, we are nonetheless left with the fact
that, in the later tradition, Hsuan-tsang's famous disciple was
certainly known by the religious name K'uei-chi and referred to by the
title Tz'u-en Ta-shih ^^^^'^KJ^^-> the Great Master of Tz'u-en
Monastery.
Attraction to Buddhism
Beyond this information about K'uei-chi's family background
only a few details of his early years have survived. One of the
earliest biographical documents, the memorial inscription from his
tomb, records that, even as a child, K'uei-chi was "gifted with words
and capable of minute;study", and that he began early his training
in the Confucian classics, an aspect of his education which is borne 7
out in the frequent non-Buddhist allusions found m his prefaces.
This combination of family influence, native intelligence, and solid Confucian education would certainly suggest the prospect of a bright future in the imperial court.
It is interesting, consequently, to speculate about the circumstances.that led a youth, so well positioned for a career of power and wealth, to enter instead, a monastic life of study and meditation. We know . relatively little about this crucial period in
K'uei-chi's life, but there is one important record from his own hand, one of the very few instances in all his surviving works where he writes about himself. These terse autobiographical remarks are "found in the shorter commentary to the Ch'' eng-wei-shih-lun where K'uei-chi is.relating how he came to be qualified to comment on this important
Yogacara work:
At the age of nine. I suffered the misfortune Cof being orphaned]. From that time on I sought to entrust myself to other-worldly matters, longing ever more for the black robes Cof a Buddhist monk]. While still young I cut off all feelings for ephemeral social customs and besmirched worldly rewards, until, at the age of seventeen, I finally gave myself up to the monastic order. By special imperial decree I became an assistant Cto Hsiian-tsang]. From the time I became, one of the three thousand Cof his followers] I humbly and joyously modeled myself on the seventy 7$. y L. 8 /L* "V Cadvanced disciples], Cthinking that! I must certainly harmonize my pious vow Cwith the master's • intention] if I were later to receive his personal instruc• tion. Little did I think that with my meager talents I would indeed become, part of the translation team. It was in performing those duties that I took up my writing 9 tablet and feasted on this treatise. K'uei-chi and Hsuan-tsang
There are no.further details of K'uei-chi's earliest contact
with Hsuan-tsang in his own writings. There is however a more well-
known, though probably apocryphal, account that occurs in the later
biographies, most notably in the official Sung Biograpies of Eminent
• Monks compiled by Tsan-ning \|| and completed in 988.
After providing the customary information about K'uei-chi's family
background, Tsan-ning relates the following story:
When Hsuan-tsang first had occasion [to encounter K'uei-chi] on the street and observe his fine and luminous features as well as his rash deportment, the master remarked, "That he is the descendant of a family of generals, there is no mistaking! But suppose that [our meeting] is the converging of cause and condition
JJjk^S 63 $1 ^2- Cand not mere chance]:10 if he were to convert and become my disciple, my doctrines would certainly have an agent in whom they could be entrusted." Hsuan-tsang then recalled an event from his time in India. At the time when he was planning the itinerary for his return to China, he was staying among a group of Nirgranthikas [i.e., Jain mendicants]. An augury was done, yielding the auspicious prognostication: "Master, you have only to return to the East, and a brilliant disciple will appear.""'""'" Thereupon Hsuan-tsang went to the General of the Northern Gate- [i.e., K'uei-chi's father] to subtly suggest ^^"jj^ that his son give up the family life [and become a monk]. The father hesitated asking,. "How could a coarse and rough youth of his sort be worthy of Your Reverence's teaching?" To which Hsuan-tsang replied, "His true talents, but 9
for you General, would never have been produced but for my humble self, they would never have been recognized!" Even though his father then agreed, K'uei-chi was still vehemently opposed. They importuned him and finally, with a gesture of respect, he complied. Still agitated, he added in a strained voice, "Allow me three things and then I will take the monastic vows: that I do not have to give up my passionate desires, the prohibited foods, and afternoon meals." Hsuan-tsang pretended assent to this request, thinking that he could initially use these hooks of desire as an enticement, and then later bring K'uei-chi to the Buddha-wisdom. After that, whenever K'uei-chi traveled, he had carts loaded down with the aforementioned objects of desire. Hence the epithet' current in the vicinity of the capital: [K'uei-chi, ] the Three Cart Monk—-
Tsan-ning goes on to cite the autobiographical passage translated above, noting the obvious inconsistencies in both tone and fact between the two accounts.
While this story of the three carts filled with wine, women and fine food does add an attractive element of human feeling, and failing, to
K'uei-chi's biography, it must be noted that, by the time of Tsan-ning, sectarian polemic and even slander were not uncommon among the various monastic groups competing for imperial favor. The story reported by
Tsan-ning seems far more consistent with these later historical developments than with the earlier record of K'uei-chi's life. Even so,
TO variants of the story and also the appellation, "Three Cart Monk," did come to be widely circulated throughout East Asia, and there have been many within the tradition who have accepted this rather different
ih picture of K'uei-chi as accurate.
Whatever were the circumstances that brought the two together, there is no doubt that. Hsiian-tsang recognized K'uei-chi to be a brilliant disciple. That he very quickly became one of the master's principal assistants is suggested by K'uei-chi himself in the auto• biographical passage cited above. This is further confirmed by the record in the Klafcywzn Catalogue which shows that between 659-663
K'uei-chi served as pi-shou Jp£'-s^* ^ the amanuensis or first
assistant, to Hsiian-tsang during the translation and editing of the
Ch''eng-wei-sh-ih-lun (i.e., the Thirty Verses of Vasubandhu along with an
edited synopsis of the ten major Indian commentaries),"^ the Twenty Verses IT with auto-commentary by the same author, the Madhyanta-vibhaga verses l8 along with Vasubandhu's commentary, and also two non-Mahayana works of significance: a doctrinal analysis of the various schools of Indian 19 Buddhism, the Sarmyabhedhoparacanaedkra, and a major work in the _ 20
Sarvastivadin Abhidharma, the Dhatukayapadas'astrai both of which may or
may not be works of the same Vasumitra. It should be noted that all but
these last two are among the key works of the Vasubandhu-Dharmapala
branch of Indian Yogacara that was the basis for the Chinese school
founded by Hsuan-tsang and K'uei-chi'. • As we shall see below, it was
these works along with the Yogdcdrabhumi that received the greatest
portion of K'uei-chi's attention as a commentator. K'uei-chi, the Exegete
Beyond his association with Hsuan-tsang, K'uei-chi's fame
rests on his efforts to•provide the exegetical material necessary to make the complex Yogacara religious system understandable to the
Chinese. So prodigious were these efforts, in fact, that he came to
21 be honored as the Exegete of a Hundred Works \fj^$lLi. The
"hundred" may well have been hyperbole, but it is certain from even
a cursory examination of the various early catalogues of Buddhist works that K'uei-chi did write more than the twenty-odd works that have survived. An analysis of these surviving works undertaken below in the following chapter indicates the breadth of K'uei-chi's
interests as a Buddhist scholar.. In addition to his works on
Yogacara and Buddhist logic he wrote commentaries on the most popular early Mahayana Sutras, interpreting them from a Yogacara point of view.
Quality of K'uei-chi's Scholarship
In addition to the quantity.of K'uei-chi's literary activity
indicated above, there is also much that reflects its quality. Above
all, his scholarship is characterized by the desire to transmit and
record the Indian Yogacara tradition as accurately as possible while
still adapting its presentation to the special needs of the Chinese
audience.
This attitude is well illustrated by an account given by K'uei-chi himself of the editing and translation of the Ch'eng-wei-
shih-lim3 the single most important.treatise of the. Fa-hsiang Yogacara 22
school in East Asia. The core of this work is the Thirty Verses
(Trimsikd) composed by Vasubandhu (4th or 5th cen.) who was, along with his brother Asafiga, one of the two principal formulators of
Classical Yogacara in India. The Thirty Verses presents a concise
summary of Yogacara philosophy and soteriology focusing on the doctrine
of Vijnaptimatrata. Intended as a mnemonic aid, the bare verses them-.
selves require a supplementary commentary. None was provided by
Vasubandhu himself, but by the time Hsiian-tsang studied in India, the
commentaries of ten of Vasubandhu's successors had come to be
considered authoritative even though each differed somewhat in their 23
interpretation of Vasubandhu's thought.
Hsiian-tsang studied these commentaries in India and brought
them all back to China. His first plan was to translate all ten
commentaries separately in addition to the original Thirty Verses.
K'uei-chi objected, however, and it was his concern that prevailed.
Fearing that translations of all ten commentaries would lead to
great confusion since each differed on a number of details, he
suggested that they take one commentary as the basic text and add
to that carefully edited selections from the other nine, taking care
to illustrate the points of controversy, but also to critically
indicate the best interpretation. The commentary chosen as the
base text, was that of Dharmapala,the predecessor of Hsiian-tsang's
teacher at Nalanda. in India. The result, what we have now as the Ch'' eng-wei-shih-lun in Chinese, -is.a synthetic work showing some creativity in its presentation and discussion of the differences with• in the school, and certainly a work that succeeds better in presenting the tradition to a new audience than ten separate works, each partially contradicting the other.
The synthetic format of the Ch'eng-wei-shih-lun that K'uei-chi proposed is thus a compromise of sorts, one that mediates the dual responsibility he' felt.both to the original Indian Buddhist tradition and to the Chinese Buddhist community. This gives us a good idea of the intention of K'uei-chi's scholarship, but what of the particular skills he acquired to achieve this end?,
Tsan-ning's biography relates that K'uei-chi studied five
Indian languages under Hsuan-tsang, a point of some interest as it was very unusual for a native Chinese Buddhist in China to acquire any knowledge at all of Indian or Central Asian languages. It is also a point of much significance in the assessment of K'uei-chi's scholarship, and one which, underlies a set of key questions.
Was K'uei-chi capable of studying independently the voluminous material brought back by Hsuan-tsang? Was he able to consult the many works that were never translated? Was he capable of verifying what translations there were against the original texts? All of these questions are important in gauging the depth of K'uei-chi's scholarship, and their.answer depends largely on whether or not he did, in particular, master Sanskrit, the principal language of the Mahayana literature
Hsuan-tsang brought back from India. One might well hesitate to accept an uncorroborated report 25 in Tsan-ning's relatively late work, though his inclusion of the detail "five" suggests something more than simple hagiography. While we have no direct statement from K'uei-chi (or Hsuan-tsang) that he mastered Sanskrit, there is sufficient indirect evidence to make it very probable. K'uei-chi frequently in his writing glosses words and passages in a manner that indicates a knowledge of the original text.
Perhaps the most convincing example of this is seen in the famous passage in his Lotus Sutra commentary where he points out that
KumarajIva's Chinese text is ambiguous because it does not distinguish between cardinal and ordinal numbers. K'uei-chi notes that the Sanskrit text, at one point in the parable of the burning house and the three carts, clearly says "second" and "third" rather than "two" and "three", and that, while Kumarajiva's Chinese can be read either way, it is most likely to be understood in the latter sense.^ This is a point which had led astray even the eminent Lotus commentator Chi-tsang
^ 5 who lacked any. knowledge of Sanskrit, and subsequently led to a major controversy in East Asian Buddhism over the question of whether the bodhisattva vehicle itself was the One Vehicle of the
Lotus Sutra, or whether the One Vehicle was beyond it as well as the sravaka and the pratyekabuddha vehicle..
In addition to that type of reference to the Sanskrit text in K'uei-chi's works, there are also many passages-where he glosses a particular Sanskrit word, transcribing the sound into Chinese and then giving the meaning(s) in Chinese.. One example which occurs in the "Essay-oh •Vijnaptimatrata" translated below is worthy of special 28 note. At the opening of the second section of the essay K'uei-chi undertakes a critical analysis of the term wei-shih '^J- » "the standard Chinese equivalent for Vijnaptimatrata. He states that 'wei- renders the Sanskrit '-matrata', which he transcribes^ '•Jji (var.«Ji-
(in modern Chinese pronounced: mo-da-la-to, but in the T'ang
Chinese of K'uei-chi, something closer to ma-tat-1 at-ta); '•• and that
'shih', which is usually the equivalent for 'vijnana', in this case stands for 'vijnapti' which he transcribes ^ (modern Ch.: p'i-jo-ti; and T'ang Ch. : bj'i-nia(.k)-tej--) • He continues, moreover, in the gloss of 'wei'/matrata.' to discuss three different meanings . that the word has in Sanskrit but does not have in Chinese.
Now it is always possible that we have, in both of the instances cited above, a case of secondary or indirect, rather than direct, knowledge of the language. All of this philological informa• tion may have been part of the oral exegetical tradition passed on from Hsuan-tsang to K'uei-chi, in Chinese, during the course of their translation work, a hypothesis that is by no means implausible when one considers the amount of this sort of knowledge that the East
Asian (especially the Japanese) exegetes, without any knowledge of
Sanskrit, still maintained in the oral tradition right down to the beginning of the present century. However, though this possibility can never be conclusively excluded on the basis of the surviving documents, it does seem unlikely in K'uei-chi's case. Too many other factors argue in favor of a direct knowledge of the Indian texts. Considering the circumstances, K'uei-ch i certainly had the
opportunity to learn the language from Hsuan-tsang. And the latter,
judging from the. accounts.of his own study of Sanskrit in his travelogue,
certainly placed a high value on "being able to work directly from the
original texts. Given then the degree of K'uei-chi's intellectual
ability, the opportunity and the motivation provided by Hsuan-tsang,
and finally the indirect evidence presented in many passages like those
cited above, it does seem quite likely that K'uei-chi would have .". •
learned- Sanskrit very well indeed.
Personal Religious Life
Of great importance to the study of K'uei-chi' s understanding
of Yogacara Buddhism is an evaluation of his personal religious life.
What was the significance of religious practice in his life? Was he
a Yogacara practitioner, or was his involvement in Buddhism limited to textual study and exegesis? Answers to these questions are necessary to shed light on K'uei-chi's view of the relationship between
the philosophical and soteriological aspects of Yogacara.
From the historical record we know a great deal about K'uei -
chi's activity as a translator and commentator; it is much more
difficult to glean any information about, his personal religious
practice. Nonetheless several useful observations can be made. All the sources agree that K'uei-chi spent his adult life in residence
as a monk at the Hung-fu Monastery and later at the newly
built Ta-tz' u-en Monastery Buddhist centers in the capital. In spite of the later rumors, of K'uei-chi's indulgent tastes, it is very likely, if not certain, that the monastic rule would have "been rather strictly observed in monasteries of this prominence.
This gives us some idea of the religious atmosphere in which
K'uei-chi lived daily. There are, moreover, in at least some of the biographical sources, reports of K'uei-chi participating in three specific varieties of religious practice: meditation, pilgrimage to sacred spots, and Maitreya devotionalism.
All three of these activities were Well-established forms of
Buddhistpractice in India as well as China, and the first and the third, at least, held a special place in the Yogacara school.
K'uei-chi's participation in the first two is attested by the preface to his commentary on the Heart Sutra, an early——probably even contemporaneous-—biographical source attributed to Miao Shen-jung
There it is reported that K'uei-chi frequently
28 practiced meditation, and that, he made pilgrimages to Mount Wu-t'ai
yy. l\\ where ^e communicated with Manjusri, the patron bodhisattva of that famous religious site, and to Lou-fan ^t'^ where he made spiritual contact with the famous Chinese monk Hui-yuan ^ (A.D.
29 33^-^l6). Among other such references, the memorial inscription on K'uei-chi's tomb notes that he recited the bodhisattva vows every day, 30 and that he made statues or images of Maitreya.
This last point, raises the aspect of K'uei-chi's religious practice that most warrants special note. It seems very likely that in addition to his activities as a Buddhist philosopher and scholar, K'uei-chi was also a pious adherent of Maitreya devotionalism.
According to Buddhist tradition the bodhisattva Maitreya is the next in the long succession of Buddhas to be born in this world. He is said to dwell in the Tusita Heaven, a paradise within this world- system to which his devotees by virtue of their faith may secure rebirth, there to await his advent as the next Buddha, an event that will mark the beginning of a golden age when it will be far easier to 31 achieve the ultimate goal of nirvana.
The inspirational figure of Maitreya was already in India the focus of one branch of Buddhist devotionalism that combined both messianic and. millenarian elements. In China the Maitreya cult was especially popular during the Northern Wei period (A.D. 386-534),^ though it was later eclipsed by another branch of Buddhist devotionalism focused on the Pure Land of Amitabha Buddha. The early T'ang was a crucial period in the development of Buddhist devotionalism in China, as the transition from Maitreya to Amitabha had. already begun to take place, by the time Hsuan-tsang returned from China in 6^+5, and was soon accelerated, in part at least, by the ultimately unsuccessful attempt of the Empress Wu jf"^ (r. 655-705) to justify her usurpation of the., imperial, throne with the claim that she was the incarnation of
Maitreya.
Debate and controversy between, these two competing branches of devotionalism was thus a very current issue in the Chinese capital during K'uei-chi's. lifetime. In addition to the mention of the
Maitreya statue cited above, several other facts give evidence, both direct and circumstantial, of K'uei-chi's association with the
Maitreya cult. The Yogacara school in India already held Maitreya in special regard: several of the key works of the school are attributed to.one Maitreya-natha, whom many considered to be the bodhisattva Maitreya. Similarly, there are accounts of --Asadga receiving the inspiration for his treatises directly from Maitreya, and K'uei-chi himself reports that Maitreya devotion was practiced 35 by both Asanga and Vasubandhu. That Hsuan-tsang. was certainly a
Maitreya devotee is attested by several incidents recorded in his 36 travelogue and biographies. Finally, more direct evidence of K'uei- chi's adherence to Maitreya devotionalism is clearly seen in his one
surviving commentary on one of the principal Maitreya sutras where he asserts, in some detail, the superiority of Maitreya devotion over 37 the cult of Amitabha's Pure land.
In sum then, we have a picture of K'uei-chi as an energetic
and probably strong-willed individual, one who maintained a high
degree of prominence and independence throughout his life. As a youth
he was provided with all the prerequisites of a highly successful
career in government service, advantages which he-chose instead to
develop in a comparably fruitful career as a Buddhist monk. He was a
careful and diligent scholar, yet also a skilled interpreter who was
not afraid to advance his own ideas. Most significantly he was, in
the best Yogacara tradition, a theoretician and a practitioner, one
who saw no conflict between doctrinal study and religious practice,
between philosophical speculation and spiritual cultivation. The Yogacara Buddhism of K'uei-chi., seen in the context of his life,
clearly an. indivisible combination of both, these two elements: philosophy and soteriology. Chapter II
K'UEI-CHI'S WRITTEN WORKS
The best way of assessing the range of K'uei-chi's thought would be a careful analysis of his written works. This could tell us
a great deal about his particular interests, the manner in which he
approached the doctrinal tradition in Buddhism, and also the specific
textual sources he considered most important. The problems involved
in such an analysis are, however, considerable. In spite of the fact
that K'uei-chi was known as the "Exegete of a Hundred Works",
relatively few of these have survived, and several of those that have
are defective and incomplete.
The loss of so many of K'uei-chi's works has to do, in part,
with the decline of the Fa-hsiang School in China within three
generations after K'uei-chi, a decline due to periodic political
suppression of the monasteries, combined with an apparent loss of
interest in the intricacies of the scholastic Abhidharma asepct of
Yogacara. The problems of textual preservation were also compounded
by the fact that the first major compilation and printed edition of
the Chinese Buddhist Canon was not undertaken until 972 at the
beginning of the Sung Dynasty, almost -300 .years after K'uei-chi's
death.
Circumstances were different in Japan, however, and it was
there that many, of his works were preserved. Several of the students
of both. Hsiian-tsang and K'uei-chi had come to Ch'ang-an from Japan, and after their return, the Fa-hsiang (J': Hosso) teaching was maintained until the present as an institutionally separate school with its own monasteries and libraries.
A major impetus for the brief revival of interest in Buddhist philosophical thought and particularly in the Ch'' eng-wei-shih-lun in
China during the Republican Period in the early part of this century came as the result, of a curious incident involving some of K'uei- chi's works that had been preserved in Japan. One of the initiators of the Chinese revival movement,YANG Wen-hui >na d occasion in I878 to meet the Japanese Buddhist scholar NANJO Bun'yu (Bunyiu
Nanjio) ^^/^jjl. i-n London,, where the latter was studying with the Sanskritist Max Muller. YANG later requested NANJO to help him locate copies of Buddhist works no longer available in China but preserved in Japan. Among the hundreds that eventually made their way from Japan back to China were a number of K'uei-chi's works, including his longer commentary on the'Ch1eng-wei-shih-lun (no. 18) and his doctrinal compendium, the Fa-yuan i-lin ohang (no. 26). The subsequent publication of these works in China stimulated the interest
and of YANG's famous students OU-YANG Ching-wu jlJ&Jl MEI KuanS" hsi ^trftx^, •> tne Buddhist Abbot T'ai-hsu yivj^.^^^J' and a number of other prominent. Chinese intellectuals of the time including K'ANG
Yu-weij|^^, LIANG Ch'i-ch'ao ^ ^^and LIANG Sou-ming ||ti$>t>lv
That interest.in turn resulted in.renewed discussion of K'uei-chi. works and several modern commentaries in Chinese.1 To date, no one has attempted to reconstruct a complete list of all of K'uei-chi's writings. There has not even been a complete and annotated list of the surviving works that are attributed to him.
The task of compiling a list of K'uei-chi's lost works is a substantial research project in its own right, one beyond the bounds of the present study. Many titles of books attributed to K'uei-chi can be found in the various catalogs of Buddhist works, some of which are very nearly
2 contemporaneous:with K'uei-chi; much care, however, must be taken to determine how many of these entries indicate the same work listed under different titles. The first steps in this process have been taken by YUKI Reimon in his luishikigaku tensekishi
^iffi^^Z Hi '•'(1962>, though he restricts himself to K'uei-chi's commentaries on primary Yogacara sutras and treatises.' Much remains to be done with respect to K'uei-chi's lost works.
More can be said of the surviving material, though even here there is some confusion and a great deal of uncertainty. In 195^
FUKAURA Seibun )^ j£. ^published--an unannotated list of surviving works attributed to K'uei-chi, some 26 in number. Stanley Weinstein pointed out in 1959 that additional works attributed to K'uei-chi could be found in the Collection of Rare Books of the Sung Canon
\ suggesting the FUKAURArs list be amended to include at least
28 titles.^ Actually, both these figures are inaccurate because, as will be seen in the analysis provided below, two of the titles in
FUKAURA's. list are in fact the same work in two different forms, while one of the additions proposed by Weinstein is really just an outline of another work already listed. The more detailed analysis presented here lists 26.titles after making the corrections noted, above. But even this number has little real meaning, be• cause these are works attributed to K'uei-chi. At least one of these works has been proved to post-date K'uei-chi, and the attribution of several others has been seriously questioned. Subtracting those works from the list, we are left with 20 or 21 titles which thus far have been accepted to be the work of K'uei-
chi.^ This number too should probably be qualified by the observation that some portions of at least one of these works, the doctrinal compendium Fa-yuan i-Zin
ehang (no. 26), may have circulated separately or even been originally written
as independent essays; this will be discussed in more detail in the Introduction
to the Translation. Whichever was the case, one does encounter references to and
commentaries on individual chapters of the Fa-yuan i-Hn ehang^ which might thus
appear to be titles not included in the analysis below.
An Analysis of K'uei-chi's Surviving Works
Since the relative chronology of K'uei-chi's works is, with one or two
exceptions,^ impossible to establish, the following catalog is arranged topically.
The numbers in brackets indicate titles that have been questioned as works of
K'uei-chi's in spite of the attribution; details are noted in the respective
entries. All of the works listed here can be found in at least one of three
collections available in modern editions: the Taisho shinshu
?K (abbreviated T), the Dainihon zoku zokyo ^\$$s
see bibliography for details of publication.
I. Commentaries on Sutras
Ll.l Chin-kang-pan-jo-ohing tsan-shu
2 scrolls; (T:1700, XXXIII.124-154); (Z:l/38/4)
Commentary to the Kumarajiva translation of the Diamond Sutra (Vajraechedikd-prajndparamita). g There is a Hsiian-tsang translation of this sutra, and it is unlikely that K'uei-chi would have chosen to use the Kumarajiva version as a "base. text. The attribution of this work to K'uei-chi is 9 questioned by FUKAURA Seibun and others.
Chin-kang-pan-jo-lun hui-shih j^'J ^JJ^ ^JP*
3 scrolls; (T: 1816, XL.719-783); (Z:l/74/3).
Sub-commentary to Bodhiruci's translation10 of a commentary on the Diamond Sutra (Vajracchedika- prajftaparamita.)attributed in the Chinese text to Vasubandhu.
Pan-j' o-po-lo-mi-to-hsin-ching yu-tsan
. 2 scrolls; (T: 171©s, XXXIII. 523-542); (S:l/4l/3).
Commentary to Hsiian-tsang's' translation11 of the Heart Sutra (Prajnaparamita-hrdaya).
Ta-pan-jo-po-lo-mi-to-ching pan-Qo-li-ch'u-fen shu-tsan
3 scrolls: (T:l695, XXXIII.25-63); (Z:l/32/2).
12 Commentary to Hsuan-tsang's translation of the Perfection of Wisdom in ISO Lines (Adhyardhasatika prajHaparamita-sutra).
Miao-fa-lien-hua-ching hsuan-tsan ^ jjj^-j^ jfc^ ^ ^j*
20 scrolls; (T:1723,XXXIV.651-854); (S:l/52/4-5)
13 Commentary to Kumarajiva's translation - of the Lotus Sutra (Saddharmapundartka);: includes a postscript 14 containing some autcb/iographical material. 26
Analysis of the Surviving Works (cont. )
6. Miao-fa-lien-hua-ohing shih-wei-wei-ehr chang
1 scroll; (Z:l/52/4).
A philological essay analyzing the 6l8 occurrences
of the.two grammatical particles wei^^/^ and wei 3
in Kumarajiva's translation1'' of the Lotus Sutra; 2 for the 327 occurrences:of wei K'uei-chi distinguishes nine different meanings, and for the 327 occurrences 4
of wei , three different meanings.
7. Sheng-man-ehing• shu-ohi Jj|^ ^jfc "^(!»
2 scrolls; (Z: 1/30/4).
Commentary to Gunabhadra's translation1^, of the
Sutra on the Lion's Roar of the Queen SrZmdla
(SrtmdlddevZ-simhanada).
8. Shuo-wu-kou-oh 'eng-ohing. , , shu _ „ ^, ffa
6 scrolls; (T: 1782, XXXVIII.993-1114); (Z:l/29/3-4).
17 Commentary to Hsuan-tsang's translation of the
•Vima lakTrti-nirdes'a.
Kuan-mi-le-shang-sheng-Tou-shuai-tiien-ohing tsan
2 scrolls; (T: 102, XXXVIII.272-299); (Z: 1/35/4)
Commentary to Chu-ch'u-ching-sheng's 18 _ » translation of the Sutra relating Maitreya s Analysis of the Surviving Works (cont. )
ascent to the Tusita Heaven, one of the three
principal Maitreya sutras translated into Chinese.
C10.H O-mi-t'o-ching shu p '1.scroll; (T:1T57,XXXVII.310-329); (Z:l/33/2). 19 Commentary to Kumarajiva's translation of the shorter Sukhavati-vyuha Sutvay of which there is 20 also a Hsuan-tsang translation. The attributionI 21 to K'uei-chi is questioned by FUKAURA and others. di'. 1 0-mi-t1e-ching t'ung-tsan-shu jJSj" j3«£ ^ ^ || 3 scrolls;.(T: 1758, XXXVII.329-349); (Z: 1/33/1). A longer commentary on Kumarajiva's translation of the shorter SukTiavati-vyuha; see no. C10H above. The attribution here is likewise questioned. II. Commentaries on Treatises (sastras) 12. I-pu-tsung-lun-lun shu-chi ^j^* ^/tv 1 scroll; (Z: 1/83/3). 22 Commentary to Hsuan-tsang's translation of Vasumitra's Samayabedoparacanacakra, an analysis of the doctrinal differences among the early Indian Buddhist schools composed probably in the 2nd century B.C. Etienne Lamotte refers to and translates portions of this commentary in 23 Histoire du Bouddhisme Indien. 28 Analysis of the Surviving Works (cont) 13. Yu-ch'ieh-shih-ti-lun lueh-tsuan >jj[j\z 16 scrolls; (T: 1829,XLIII.1-228); (Z: 1/75/1-3). Commentary to the first two-thirds of Hsiian-tsang's translation of the Yogacdrabhurm. 14. Yu-ch'ieh-lun chieh-chang-sung J^yi ^fcf\ ^ 1 scroll; (S: 1/75/3). Verses on the duration and succession of events in a kalpa or eon of time; based on Hsiian-tsang's translation of the Yogdcdrabhumi (see no. 13 above), 15. Tsa-chi-lun shu-chi ^ j^. 10 scrolls; (Z: 1/74/4-5). 25 Sub-commentary to Hsiian-tsang's translation of Sthiramati's commentary {Vydkhyd) to the Abhidharma- samuecaya. 16. Tien-chung-pien-lun shu-chi v^ y^*, 3 scrolls; (T: 1835, XLIV.1-46); (Z: l/75'/l). Commentary to Hsiian-tsang' s translation^ of the Madhydnta-vibhdga. 17. Wei-shih erh-shih-lun shu-chi X2^J. 2 scrolls; (T: 1834, XLIII.978-1009); (Z: 1/83/2). Commentary to Hsiian-tsang's translation of Vasubandhu's Twenty Verses ('Vims,atika) with 29 Analysis of the Surviving Works (cont. ) auto-commentary. Clarence Hamilton has done 28 a study of this work and also translates portions of it in his translation of the 29 Twenty Verses. 18. Ch'eng-wei-shih-lun shu-chi ffy V^L^ jSgj 10 scrolls; (T: 1830, XLIII.229-6o6); (Z: 1/77/1-5). 30 1 K'uei-chi's main commentary to the Ch ' eng-wei-shrh-lun3 a translation of Vasubandhu's Thirty Verses (Trirnsika) along with a selection from the commentaries of ten Indian exegetes edited by Hsiian-tsang and y 31 32 K'uei-chi. L. de La Vallee-Poussin and Wei Tat both make reference to and translate portions of this work in their respective French and English translations of the Ch'eng-wei-shih-lun. l8a. Ch'eng-wei-shi-lun shu-chi k'o-wen inc., 2 of ? scrolls; ,STIC: 5.2 (fas. 47 of reprint). An incomplete copy of what appears to be a detailed schematic outline of the contents of no. 18.. 19. Ch'eng-wei-shih-lun Lchang-chung-1 shu-yao 4 scrolls; (T: 1831, XLIII. 607-658); (Z: l/78/l). A shorter commentary on the essentials or fundamentals of the Ch'eng-wei-shih-lun. This work includes the brief but important autobiographical passage 33 translated above. Analysis of the Surviving Works (cont.) 20. Ch'eng-wei-shih-lun pieh-ch'ao jffy vfy. "2£yjjj ^ inc.: no. 1, 5, 9, &.10 of org. 10 scrolls; (Z: 1/77/5) An incomplete supplementary commentary on the Ch'eng-wei-shih-lun; only four scrolls survive. YUKX Reimon raises some questions regarding the attribution of this work to K'uei-chi, but is not ready to reject it without further textual study. C21.3 Ch'eng-wei-shih-lun liao-chien /jj^^i^^j^ ^j" fjgj 2 scrolls; (T: 1836, XLIV.46-52); (Z: 1/76/5). A selective commentary to the Ch'eng-wei-shih-lun. YUKI Reimon has done a study of this work concluding that, on the basis of the ideas it contains, it must post-date Chih-chou ^ |^ (b.679) which places it in the. mid-T'ang several generations after K'uei- chi.3^ FUKAURA Seibun agrees.3^ 22. Ta-sheng-po-fa-ming-men-lun ohieh 2 scrolls; (T: I836, XLIV.U6-52); (Z: I/76/5). 37 Commentary to Hsuan-tsang's translation of the Mahdydna-§atadharrm-prakd§amukha-sdstra of Vasubandhu, a Yogacara-Abhidharma work. The published editions of this work in the collections cited above are based on a woodblock text which was edited by the Ming 0^ monk P'u-t'ai and include his interlinear sub-commentary. 31 Analysis of the Surviving Works (cont. ) FUKAURA Seibun lists another title, the Po-fa-ming-men-lun ohui-yen § yfc f ^ *^ 3o in 1 scroll as a separate work of K'uei-chi's; this latter work, however, is in fact a sub-commentary by the Ming monk Ming-yii tf^ which includes . in the text the same K'uei-chi commentary found in the P'u-t'ai woodblock; The portion of both these works attributable to K'uei-chi is thus the same. 23. Yin-ming-ju-cheng-li-lun shu \^ <^S. jE- ^I^LJ. 3 scrolls; (T: 1840, XLIV.91-143); (Z:l/86/4). 39 Commentary to Hsiian-tsang's translation of the Nydyapravesa, an introductory work on logic which r the Chinese attribute to Sankarasvamin and the Tibetans to Dignaga. A study of this work based on K'uei-chi's commentary has been done by R.S. Y. Chi.^° 24. Yin-ming-cheng-li-men-lun shih-szu-kuo-lei shu 1 scroll; STIC: 6.1 (fas. 51 of the reprint). An exegesis of fourteen categories of logical 41 fallacy based on Hsiian-tsang's translation of Dignaga's Nyayamukha. Analysis of the Surviving Works (cont.) III. Independent Works (i.e., those that are not commentaries on some other specific work.) [25. 1 Hsi-fang-yao-ohueh-shih-i-t 'ung-kuei (2j jf^f" ^kji J$f\r ^jfl^ 1 scroll; (T: 1964, XLIV.104-110); (Z:2/l2/4). A Pure Land tract, the attribution of which has 42 been questioned by FUKAURAU Seibun and others. In his study of the authorship of this work Stanley Weinstein comments that it "is not a commentary on a particular Pure Land work, but rather an apologetic for Pure Land Buddhism in general, defending it against rival systems of belief, reconciling its seeming disagreements with certain Mahayana texts, and asserting the superiority of the Pure Land n43 concept of salvation over that of other sects. 26. Ta-sheng fa-yuan i-lin ehang ^ y^^J^, /Jy^^pL 7 scrolls; (T: l86l, XLV.245-374); (Z: 2/2/5). A doctrinal compendium comprising 29 essays or chapters on various Yogacara topics. For more on this work see the introduction to the Trans• lation below. Discussion The preceding analysis suggests a number of observations about the sources of K'uei-chi's understanding of Buddhism and about his own special interests as a Buddhist exegete. It is certainly the case that any observations based on the above data must remain somewhat tentative because we lack a complete catalog of all of K'uei-chi's works, both surviving and lost. Even so, the surviving works provide an adequate sample to allow quite useful generalizations. Some additional data on K'uei-chi's lost works will also be incorporated into, the following discussion. Looking at the group of works listed above as a whole, there are two immediately obvious, and hardly surprising, characteristics: the emphasis on Yogacara and the correlation with Hsuan-tsarig's translations, Sixteen of the works relate directly to works translated by Hsuan-tsang's translation team; and nos. 12, 14, 15, 16, IT, 18, 19, 20, [211,.22, 23, 24, and 26 are all exclusively Yogacara works. Considered topically, these exclusively Yogacara works constitute the largest single group of K'uei-chi's works, both in number and in length. In addition to the surviving works on Yogacara listed above, there is record in several of the catalogs of K'uei-chi having written a commentary to the Mahdydna- samgvahaj^the Hsien-yang-sheng-chiao-lun ( ^Prakdrandrya~§dsana/-vdad)^ and some shorter works based on the Afa/zayana^ataci/zaraapra/ca^amufe/za-^astra (cf. no. 22).^ Thus we can see that K'uei-chi wrote commentaries on virtually • . 47 all of the principal Yogacara treatises of the Maitreya*-'Asanga school, though not on the Ratnagotra-vibhaga. While he did write a commentary on most of the Yogdedrabhumi3 it is clear that his primary interests were in the later developments associated with Vasubandhu (cf. nos. 2, 15, IT, 18, 19, 20, and.-[21l)., He is, moreover, one of the only Chinese exegetes to show any sustained interest in the still later developments in logic found in the works of Dignaga and the other 48 Yogacarin logicians (nos. 23 and 24). The quite substantial sub-commentary to Sthiramati's Abhidharmasamueeaya-vydkhyd (no. 15) warrants special note. In spite of the prevailing view which associated Fa-hsiang with Dharmapala in contrast to Sthiramati, K'uei-chi clearly relied heavily on this particular Sthiramati work, a fact that is corroborated by the frequency with which it is quoted in the Fa-yuan i-tin ehang (no. 26). Finally there are, among K'uei-chi's Yogacara works, two very prominent omissions that cannot go unremarked: there is no record of K'uei-chi ever having composed commentaries to the two Yogacara sutras: 49 the Sandhinirmoeana and the Lahkdvatdra. While he might have dis• regarded the Lanka-on-doctrinal grounds, it is clear from his citations that he did consider the Sandhinirmoeana to be an important source. Most likely he simply felt that, unlike the sastras or treatises, Yogacara sutras did not require special commentary. He clearly did not feel that way about the pre-Yogacara sutras on the other hand.- After the group of exclusively Yogacara works, the next largest division of K'uei-chi's works is that comprising his commentaries on the early Mahayana sutras (nos. Ill through C11D). In this group we find commentaries on the most popular Mahayana scriptures: the Prajfldparamitd (in several versions: nos. Cl], 2, 3, and 4), the Lotus (nos. 5 & 6), the Srimdladevi (no. 7), and Vimalakirti (no. 8) and also to the devotionalistic Maitreya Sutra (no. 9) and the sutras on Amitabha's Pure Land (nos. C10H & till, cf. also no. C26H; it is the attribution of these latter Amltabha works that is most frequently questioned.) This interest in the early non-Yogacara Mahayana sutras is plainly sectarian: K'uei-chi's intention was to interpret them from the Yogacara point of view. In this sense they were sutras that required interpretation, whereas the Lanka and the Sandhinivmocana did not. Also among K'uei-chi commentaries is one based on a HTriayana work, the Samayabhedoparacanacakra (no. 12). This was an important early (2nd century B.C.) work on doctrinal history that was translated three different times into Chinese, the last time by Hsuan-tsang with K'uei-chi's assistance. K'uei-chi's apparent regard for the importance of this non-Mahayana work is consistent with the attention he devotes to doctrinal history in the Fa-yuan i-lin chang (no. 26), which begins with an essay providing a detailed analysis of the various schools of Indian Buddhism, both Hinayana and Mahayana.^0 Early doctrinal history seems to be another area, along with logic, in which K'uei-chi had a special interest. All of K'uei-chi's works considered so far have been commentaries and, with the one exception just noted, commentaries either on Yogacara treatises or on pre-Yogacara sutras. Most of these follow their respective base text very closely, usually line by line; thus they are comprehensible only when read in conjunction with it. Of the surviving works attributed to K'uei-chi only two are listed' in the analysis above as independent works, i.e., works not based directly on some particular primary text. The first of these, the Pure Land tract Hsi-fang-yao- ahueh-shih-i-t%ung-kuei (no. 25), is not a work of K'uei-chi's in the opinion of FUKAURA, Weinstein and others.^1 That leaves the Fa-yuan i-lin chang (no. 26) as the single surviving work of this class that unquestionably is a work of K'uei-chi.- It is easily one of the most significant of his works, surpassed in fame only by his two main commentaries to the Ch'eng-wei-sh-ih-lun (nos. 18 & 19). For the purpose of determining K'uei-chi's own understanding of Yogacara, it is the single most important source, as it is in this work, made up of a number of more or less independent essays, that K'uei-chi is most free to organize his material in a way that reflects his own understanding and interests: he is not bound by the text upon which he is commenting, as is the case in the other works. The special features of this last work will be considered further in the Introduction to the Translation below. Chapter III: K'UEI-CHI AND YOGACARA As one of the branches of Buddhist thought, the elaborate, and at times exceedingly intricate, theorizing of the Yogacara school was focused on a single objective: liberation, the cessation of the suffering both physical and psychological that is the inevitable consequence of normal, worldly existence characterized by the cycle of continual death and rebirth (samsara). In pursuit of this goal the various Buddhist schools sought, in different ways, to chart a practical path through the maze of our mundane experience, a course of practice that would ultimately insure the realization of this liberation. In the earliest period of the tradition, this practical, even empirical orientation, was combined with a substantial degree of anti- metaphysical skepticism. There seems to have been a good deal of initial resistance towards any preoccupation with the type of philo• sophical questions that Gautama and his followers 'felt could lead only to interminable metaphysical speculation, and hence away from enlighten• ment and liberation. As the increasingly more systematic soteriology of the later schools developed however, more and more philosophic issues were raised as legitimate and, indeed, necessary to the proper formu• lation of the path to liberation. This basically soteriologic orientation was the common ground shared by all the Buddhist schools. It was the reference of all the subsequent philosophical speculation, the one constant that established the parameters of Buddhist thought. To this common problematic the Yogacarins or Meditation-practitioners, in their turn, added a number of significant: innovations,both practical and theoretical. The most important of these must be outlined in order to assess the thought of K'uei-chi as presented in the essay translated below. YOGACARA IN INDIA AND CHINA The Fa-hsiang school of Hsiian-tsang and K'uei-chi was founded in China in the early 7th century just as Yogacara was reaching its peak in India. As one stream of the Mahayana transformation of the older Abhidharma tradition in India, the earliest strata of Yogacara thought are found in works of several disparate classes, the historical inter-relationships of which.are yet to be resolved.1 The scriptural (sutra) tradition is represented, primarily by the Sandhi-nirmocana Sutra, by portions of the Avatamsaka Sutra, and finally by the Lahkdvatdra Sutra which appears to include a good deal of relatively later Yogacara thought. The treatise (sastra) tradition is represented in the first place by the voluminous Yogdcdrabhumi (which includes the Bodhisattva- bhumi)3 an encyclopedic work attributed to Asanga but very likely com• prising much earlier material representing the transition from Hinayana - - 2 to Mahayana Abhidharma. There were also other early treatises, the Ratnagotravibhdga. Cox.Uttaratantra)and Hie AbhisamaydlanRara,for example, that represent the different streams feeding into what gradually became a recognizable school. The beginning of a second period of Yogacara development is marked by the treatises of Asanga and Vasubandhu, two brothers of the 4th century who formulated what we can think of as Classical Yogacara. This period of Yogacara thought is characterized "by a more carefully -4 integrated systematic soteriology epitomized by the Vijnaptimatrata doctrine introduced in.Asahga's Mahaydnd sutralankdra and.Mahayana- samgraha3. and later elaborated in .the Twenty Verses (Vimsatika) and Thirty Verses (Trimsika)3 attributed to Vasubandhu. These were the main Yogacara works that Hsuan-tsang studied in India. The Fa-hsiang school of Hsuan-tsang and K'uei-chi was not the first transmission of Yogacara to China, but it was the most compre• hensive introduction of this Classical Yogacara. . Hsuan-tsang's original purpose for travelling to India was to secure a better and more complete version of the Yogdedrabhumi. When he finally returned he brought not only that work, but all of the. major works of Asanga and Vasubandhu along with a thorough understanding of the several exegetical traditions that had developed since their death. The sum of this knowledge was presented in the synoptic Ch'eng-wei-shih-lun or Substantiation of VijHaptimdtratdj a work based on the Thirty Verses (Trimsika) and the ten major commentaries which he edited in China with K'uei-chi's assistance. Thus, K'uei-chi's Buddhism was derived from the Vijnapti• matrata Yogacara of the Asanga and Vasubandhu treatises, augmented by the more fundamental scholasticism of the Yogdedrabhumi and variously. interpreted by the ten principal Yogacara exegetes who included Sthiramat and Dharmapala. VIJNAPTIMATRATA Atman and Dharmas. The basic philosophical question for the later Buddhist schoolsj including Yogacara, concerned the reality status of the constituents or events of experience (dharmas) and also of the individual or the self (atman/pudgala) that experiences those events.. Many elements of the classic appearance and reality problem of Western philosophy are evident here, but always relegated to the more basic question of soteriological relevance. For Asahga and Vasubandhu especially, the objective was not so much to exhaustively analyze, or catalog what does exist, in the manner of classical ontology. They sought rather to show that what we., conventionally take as existing does not really exist, and that it is precisely this mis-perception that perpetuates our bondage and obscures the liberation to be experienced in enlightenment. All the constituents of our experience, both the 'things' experienced and also what we take to be the 'experiencer,' both the perceiver and the perceived are, in this analysis, seen to be empty of any ultimate, unconditioned reality. They must be seen as empty of any essential, . abiding substance or own-being (svabhava) that would make them, independent of all the other manifold factors of experience, real in any ultimate sense. Trisvabhayata: the Three Aspects of Own-being The Yogacarins recognized three aspects of the existence or "own-being of the phenomena, of experience: The Imaginary (parikalpita) aspect, the Dependent or Relative (paratantra) aspect, and the Absolute (parinispanna) aspect.^ The phenomena, when taken together in their mutually conditioned and.interdependent interaction, do have a provisional, practical sort of reality. In this sense we can say that they 'exist.' This Dependent own-being should however he seen in its ultimate aspect, the Absolute. It is this absolute aspect of the Dependent that, for the Yogacarins, is the only ultimate Reality. As such it remains in• expressible, though.it is referred to as the Tathata or Thusness of all things. To remain blind to this ultimate aspect of reality, to cling to the constituent elements of the Dependent aspect whether the apparent objective things or the apparent subjective self that is to remain bound to the purely Imaginary aspect of reality, the subject- object world with all the contradictions and frustration that normally constitute the unsatisfactory experience of human existence. The soteriological task for the Yogacarins is thus to cease this clinging to the Dependent in its Imaginary aspect and to realize instead the Absolute. Much of the critical epistemological awareness underlying their analysis was shared with, or even derived from, the Madhyamlka school. Both schools recognized the soteriological significance of. delusion. For both schools the basic human problem was seen to be epistemic. The Madhyamikas provided a sophisticated philo• sophical analysis of the philosophical nature of delusion and language. Accepting that analysis, the Yogacarins continued on to inquire into the psychological nature of delusion, and to combine all these insights into a comprehensive, systematic soteriology on the old Abhidharma model The. unique Yogacara contribution to the development of Buddhist thought can be seen in this emphasis on the psychological aspects of delusion and liberation. Combining the older Abhidharma attempt to present a systematic map of experience with the Madhyamika innovation of critical epistemology, the Yogacarins sought to analyze the structure of human awareness or consciousness that account for our experience of delusion or enlightenment. They presented a philosophic psychology or philosophy of mind that sought to explain the process by which we unconsciously perpetrate delusion and bondage to self and dharmas, and also the process by which that delusion can be severed. The epistemic focus of this psychology came to the forefront in Vijnaptimatrata Yogacara. Vijnaptimatrata vs. Cittamatrata in later Yogacara In contrast to the Cittamatrata (Thought-only-ness) doctrine of the earlier Yogacarins, Asanga and Vasubandhu expressed their basic position as Vijnaptimatrata. While the former doctrine focuses on the nature of the state of liberation, the latter attempts to explain the 7 nature of the state of bondage. In K'uei-chi's terms, Cittamatrata tells us about the Absolute, while Vijnaptimatrata tells us about the 8 conventional realm of experience. Cittamatrata is thus a more general proposition; it can be understood as an ontological assertion concerning the nature of existence. Vijnaptimatrata, however, is a much more specific, epistemic.proposition that is intended to tell us about the perceptual error that prevents us from realizing liberation. Again, its primary intention is patently soteriological. It involves} to some extent, ontological presuppositions regarding the nature of existence, but they are not primary and are not, for the most part, explicitly formulated. It was Vijnaptimatrata that became the central philosophical principle of Classical Yogacara as. expressed by Asanga and Vasubandhu, the Indian school of Yogacara thought from which the formulation of Hsuan-tsang and K'uei-chi was derived. It was this doctrine that provided the cornerstone of the analysis of the delusory process "by which we remain "bound- to the world of inevitable suffering and woe, and, as such, it was taken by K'uei-chi as the theme of his treatise translated below, "The Essay on Vijnaptimatrata." Vijnana and Vijnapti The Sanskrit terms vijnapti and vijnana are both primary derivatives of the verb vijfla-j both are verbal nouns expressing an activity.. The verb vijHd- is made up of the ^'jnd- (cognate to gignoskein > gn5sis; (^noscere; to know, etc.) plus the prepositional affix vi- which adds to the root the quality of being (or doing) asunder, apart, distinct or different, a qualification paralleled in many cases by that, of the Latin prefix de-/dis-. Thus the basic meaning of vijHd- is to know distinctly or discursively. In a somewhat broader sense, it can mean simply to perceive, and again by extension: to be \ 9 aware or to be conscious (of something). Examples, of all these shades of meaning, and more, can be found in the Buddhist technical literature. The nominal forms of this verb, both vijnana and vijnapti, retain the reference to an activity: they express the action specified by the verb, in somewhat the same manner as the -ing forms in English (e.g., walking, swimming, etc. as in: "Running is good for you.""^ ) They do not express a state of being: hence the inappropriateness of 'consciousness,' the most commonly encountered equivalent for-vijnana If we are to render these forms into English, the equivalents should properly be verbal nouns ending in -ings. or -tion. The -tion forms in English are more versatile, but still retain some degree of ambiguity as they can be understood in three different ways.: they can refer to the act of doing some action (e.g., "Correction is what is needed."); they can refer to the thing that is done (e.g., "There are many manifestations of this form".); and they can also express a state of "being (e.g., "He was in a state of elation".). -The latter-of-these three categories must be excluded in the case of any -tion equivalent for vijnana or vijnapti. What then is the range of vijnana as a technical term? Vijnana certainly occurs often in Buddhist literature with the more restricted meaning of perception. In Yogacara texts, however, and probably in earlier Buddhist writing as well, it is very often also used as a more generic designation for all forms of mental activity, conscious and unconscious. This is evident, for example, in the range of activity comprised by the eight modes of vijnana, a Yogacara doctrine to be discussed below. One finds, moreover, passages where vijnana is said to stand for citta (thought), manas (mind), vijnana (as specifically perception, i.e., the six modes of empirical perception), and for vijnapti as well."'""'" There is no simple English equivalent that conveys this range of meaning. The best course is probably to incorporate the term vijnana into our technical vocabulary as has already been done with a number of other Buddhist concepts: nirvana, karma, dharma, etc. If a simple English equivalent for vijnana in its broadest, generic sense 12 is necessary, then 'mentation' seems far preferable to 'consciousness.' The action-noun vijnapti, in contrast to vijnana, is derived from the causative form of the verb vijnd-} i.e., vijnapaya-. The basic meaning of vijnd- in the causative is to make someone (else) know or distinguish (something). In Classical Sanskrit it came to mean: to declare (x to be y); to announce, to address (a superior); to inform (someone about something), etc. Thus the nominal derivative vijnapti can refer to the act of representation or designation, and it is also used to refer to the object of that act, i.e., the •information that is made known, the address that one makes (to a superior), etc. As a technical term in the Classical. Yogacara of Asanga and Vasubandhu, the meaning of vijnapti seems to be derived most directly from the verbal meaning of declaring or designating x to be y, as when the Dependent (paratantra) is mis-taken and then clung to in its Imaginary (parikalpita) aspect. Vijnapti thus refers generally to the act by which this is done and,.perhaps, in some cases to a given, particular instance of the act. The term:has been translated by using a number of different equivalents: representation (Suzuki and Hamilton), ideation or ideification (Levi), notation or notification (Demieville and Levi), idee(s) (Lamotte), Erkenntnis (Frauwallner), designation (Hurvitz), etc. None of these, however, fully conveys the particular epist'.anic activity the Yogacarins seem to have in mind. 'Denotation' of 'designation' probably comes the closest to rendering the literal meaning, as both reflect the causative element in the grammatical form of the term. There is more however that' should be conveyed by any . equivalent, if the special Yogacara application of the term is to be understood. Asanga and Vasubandhu seem to be focusing on the activity of taking one thing as another, or in a narrower, epistemological context, on the process by which we come to know the world, the process of concept formation. A better English equivalent for reflecting this aspect of vijnapti's meaning is 'conceptualization.' It is through this act of conceptualization, according to the Yogacarins, that we construct or. constitute the world as we take it to be given in our experience; we do this in a manner that allows understanding and conventional discrimination, in a manner necessary to function in the mundane world. This activity is thus not in itself negative it does however become so. To the extent that we cling to the world so constructed as ultimately real, we are deluded. Thus blinded to the true Reality Thusness or tathata we remain inextricably bound to the world of death and rebirth (samsara). It is in this sense that the Yogacarins assert that the world as we know it is vijnapti-matra or conceptualization-only. There are two questions that remain unresolved in this inter• pretation. The first concerns the causative form of vijnapti: Why did the Yogacarins choose a causative derivative of vignd- if they were referring to conceptualization, a process which is internal and does not necessarily involve some other party? The second question arises when we look to the Chinese transmission of the doctrine: Why did the Chinese translators generally not distinguish between vijnapti and vijnana, rendering them both with the same character? It is quite possible that these questions are not unrelated and, while it is not yet possible to provide fully satisfactory answers to them, the following discussion may at least suggest some possibilities for further ex• ploration. Vijnapti became a key Yogacara.concept for.the first time in the works of Asanga and Vasubandhu, the two figures responsible for the first careful and systematic formulation of what.had been a rather loose tradition comprising several different streams of thought. It is not difficult to imagine why they might seek for their principal doctrine a new, more precise term, especially given the new more epistemic orientation of their analysis. Vijnana was a key concept to be sure, 47 but one which already had a broad range of different meanings, both general and more technical. The new idea they sought to emphasize was clearly related to this broad notion of vijnana, and it is not surprising that they would choose a form of the same verb, vijnd-. But why a causative form? Why a form that, in the' strictest sense, indicates the act of causing, not oneself, but.someone else to know something? This seems inconsistent with the basic intention of the Yogacara analysis. They were not concerned with how we cause others to have knowledge, but rather with how we ourselves come to have knowledge and, coincidentally, come to be deluded with respect to Reality. This is a purely internal, reflexive process, not one involving a second party as one might expect the causative to imply. And there were certainly other, non-causative forms of vijna- available. Why not vijnati, for example, rather than the vijnapti? One possibility is that the causative aspect of vijnapti by that time had been diluted in conventional usage to the point of having lost its force in the strictest sense of "one party causes another party to do x." This is certainly possible; but even if it allows a looser use of vijnapti, it still does not explain the attractiveness of that particular form. There is one possibility that may account for the attractiveness of the particular term vijnapti, one that.warrants further, more diachronic study: the possible relationship between vijnapti and prajnapti, a term already by Asanga's time in the technical vocabulary 13 of the Sautrantika's and the Madhyamikas. It is perhaps no coincidence that Asanga choose a. term that was both.formally and semantically parallel to the Madhyamika term for the world-constructing process. Prajnapti has been defined as referring to the designations or the language constructs by which we relate.to the world, as "the superimposition of 'concepts' onto bare experience."1^ Douglas Daye, who has a special interest in relating Madhyamika to contemporary developments in. Western philosophy, says about prajnapti: CThe Madhyamika! concept of language constructs (prajnapti) is an accommodation to the Abhidharma Sautrantika answer that all dharmas are prajnaptis, i.e., fruitful fictions, appropriate but unconfirmable. outside the systemic context of dharma analysis language. As we shall see, there is also a Madhyamika acknowledgement of this problematic, so, just as prajnaptis are fruitful fictions within the religious language frameworks, we find in a similar manner that the word emptiness (sunyata)is said also to be merely a prajnapti; it is a fruitful fiction which, if reified, leads to confusions which obviate the desirable religious ends for which both the concepts of emptiness and dharma analysis have been generated. Another way to say the same thing is that prajnapti(s), upayas, and the "emptiness of emptiness" are reflexive metagrids which refer to relation• ships of epistemic evaluation but not to the ontological entities presupposed by the world's way of taling.-^ The vijnapti of Asanga and Vasubandhu certainly seems to have played in their system a parallel role to prajnapti. in.the Madhyamika system. With the second question raised above we turn to the Chinese transmission of Vijnaptimatrata to ask why the Chinese translators choose to render this key doctrine with the am iguous equivalent wei- shih 3^ using for vijnapti the character shih If^? , (to recognize, to know) the same equivalent used standardly for vijnana. This too is a problem that yields to no simple solution. One thing is clearj however it was not a case of simply confusing the two Sanskrit words, certainly not in the case of Hsuan-tsang and K'uei-chi,at least. The fact is easily established that the two terms could and often were distinguished in the writings of Hsuan-tsang and K'uei-chi. Their standard equivalent for vijnapti when it is to be distinguished from vijnana is liao (to understand) or liao-fen ~f ^ft which K'uei-chi in turn glosses as liao-ta (to understand, comprehend) and fen-pieh^^ (to dis• criminate or discern). This is clearly not vijnana (mentation) in the generic sense as synononymous with citta (thought). K'uei-chi in• dicates this in his discussion of why the sutras emphasize citta while the sastras emphasize vijnapti."'"^ The Chinese gloss of vijnapti is in fact very close, in both form and meaning, to the Tibetan equivalent vnam par rig, and that provides some interesting information with respect to the first question raised above. Neither the Chinese or the Tibetans rendered vijnapti with a causative form, indicating that the causative, second-person- directed aspect was not a prominent feature in the gloss of the term IT that they received from their Indian teachers. While it is thus not difficult to establish that Hsuan-tsang and K'uei-chi understood vijnapti as a term distinct from the generic vijnana (mentation), the question still remains of why they rendered vijnapti with shih "^jjj^ as well as with liao . Two considerations may have played at least some role in their decision. First, shih was already well-established in the Chinese Buddhist. tradition as an equivalent for both vijnana and vijnapti, especially in the earlier Yogacara translations done by Paramartha (Mahayana-samgraha, Trimsika.) and Prabhakaramitra.(Mahayana-sutralankara). Hsuan-tsang and K'uei-chi may have felt the expression wei-shih '•^'l^was already so well- established that it should be left, relying on the context and frequent glosses to make the necessary distinctions.clear. Also, using shih "3^ for both does reflect the integral relationship between vijnana and vijnapti, a fact apparent in Sanskrit.from the common root, but obscured in Chinese when two unrelated characters are used. With this second question we are, in the end, reduced to speculation. The above may well have been factors in the decision, but they are difficult to accept as an adequate explanation. There were many other established equivalents that•Hsuan-tsang did change: transcriptions like alaya ^ ^or the older ^^^^ and trans• lations as well: pien-chi-so-chih hsing *|£for parikalpita- svabhava in the place of the older fen-pieh hsing ^ ^j'} ''j^.et c. Besides, he re-translated all the important Vijnaptimatrata Yogacara works (except for the Mahayana-sutralankaTa); so consistency was not a serious1 problem. Finally there were certainly other suitable ways of rendering vijnapti into Chinese: in the later translation of the Lahkdvatdra done by Siksananda and edited by Fa-tsang and others at the beginning of the 8th century, for example, we find vijnapti rendered chia-ming ^Ij^J^, (lit.: suppositional or conventional names) and chia-shih-shei|^^^"^^ (suppositionally or conventionally provided or established).1^ Why Hsiian-tsang and K'uei-chi retained shih for vijnapti thus remains a conundrum. YOGACARA PSYCHOLOGY The Yogacarins had from the beginning a special interest in the structures of mental activity. They sought to understand not only why human suffering is the result of delusion, but also how the delusion is perpetrated what the psychological mechanics of this process are. Affirming the fundamental Mahayana equation of samsara and nirvana, they went on to ask why, even in the light of reason, people still obstinately cling to the delusions by which they are bound. They felt that an understanding of the nature of mental activity, conscious and unconscious, was necessary if we are to free ourselves of the obstacles to enlightenment. In the course of their analysis they developed a sophisticated philosophy of mind and a psychology .' which 19 included an explicit theory of unconscious motivation. The Eight Modes of Mental Activity The centraldoctine in the Yogacara psychology is their analysis of the eight modes of mental activity or mentation (vijnana), a paradigm that represents the culmination of a long tradition of psychological interest and speculation in Buddhist thought. The Agama literature includes several models for understanding the noetic aspect of human experience. What was perhaps the earliest analysis of man, the psycho• physical organism posited an inseparable, dual nature termed name-and- form (nama-rupa). Rupa, or form, was glossed as the four primary elements (mahabhuta.) : earth, water, fire and air; while naman was under stood to comprise all the noetic, non-formal factors of what we con• ventionally know as. the individual. The Five Skandha formula, which has its origins in the same period, reflects even more the subjective orientation that was character istic already in early Buddhist thought. In this analysis the first aggregate (skandha) of the human-personality is still rupa (form), but the noetic component is divided into four different aggregates: feeling or sensation (yedana), conception (samjna), predispositions (samskarah) and discrimination or perception (vijnana). The distinctions between, and the relationships among, these four factors were, however, never adequately distinguished. With the Abhidharma literature another, more systematic paradigm came to the fore: the six modes of perception (vijnana). Here there is clearly an attempt to understand the process and the structures of sensory perception and conceptual organization. The first five modes correspond to the five sense faculties and are involved in rudimentary, empirical perception. The sixth mode, mano-vijnana, is the activity of unifying or organizing the raw sense data into the conceptual framework by which we relate to our experience. For the early Abhidharmikas, the sixth was the highest order of noetic activity corresponding to what has been called mind or intellect in the Western tradition. In the six-vijnana analysis this coordinative function plus the five modes of empirical perception were thus thought to cover the full range of mental activity. With the flowering of philosphic discussion and argument in the scholastic period, however, a number.of problems were raised that indi• cated serious deficiencies, in the six-fold analysis. The Yogacarins were, with respect to religious practice, specialists in. the cultivation of meditative trance. It was they, in particular, who felt.that the six modes did not exhaust the full range of mental activity: it could not account for some of the kinds of cognition they had experienced directly or intuitively in meditation. They pointed out, moreover, that there must be some additional mode of mental activity to account for the continuity of the individual personality through, periods when the first six modes are inoperative in deep sleep, in unconsciousness, in some kinds of meditative trance, and in the c transition from one life to the next rebirth. To solve these problems they proposed the addition of two further modes: manas (mind) and alaya vijnana (store-mentation). In the Yogacara scheme - of eight vijnanas, manas' then became the seventh mode of mental activity. Strictly speaking manas means mind, a thing or entity, and so it may appear to us. The Yogacarins gloss it however as manana (reflective cogitation, thinking), and it, like the 20 other modes, should be understood as an activity. Manas is responsible for our awareness of the subject-object dichotomy; in the unpurified state, as klista-manas, (defiled mind), it is the ego-postulating function and, thus, the source and the locus of the delusion that obscures en• lightenment. Hence the crucial role that manas plays in Yogacara soteriology. This delusion persists because manas takes as the object (alambana) of its reflective activity.the eighth mode of mental activity, the alaya-vijnana, reifying it into a 'self (atman) or ego. In the Yogacara analysis this is the primary act constituting nescience (avidya), the source of all afflictions. Thus manas itself-is not self-conscious• ness, or the ego; but the interaction between manas and the alaya-vijnana is. The alaya-vijnana. too, as we shall see, is not a thing, but rather a continuum of discrete events. When manas is directed towards the alaya, however, it projects onto the continuum a unifying identity: it is then that self-consciousness is born and one thinks of "oneself" as an indi• vidual. Short of enlightenment this portion of the manas activity remains unconsciousness, though, unlike mano-vijnana (the sixth vijnana) it never 21 ceases, throughout the course of normal human existence. The eighth vijnana according to the Yogacarins is the latent substructure of all mental activity. As such, it is distinguished from the other seven vijnanas. which are said to be the manifest or proceeding modes of mental activity (pravrtti-vijnana ^jjfc) • If the activity of manas is partially conscious and partially unconscious as indicated : above, the activity of the eighth vijnana is totally unconscious. In this broadest sense it bears the designation fundamental mentation (mula-vijnana):, but it is encountered more frequently under several other names referring to specific aspects of its function. Before discussing the three functions of the eighth vijnana as laid out in the Ch'eng- wei-shih-lim it is necessary to introduce two further terms, vasana (impression, impregnation, permeation, perfuming) and bija (seed, trace, potentiality), the key. concepts in the Yogacara theory of the unconscious conditioning of all human action. Vasam.a is the process by which traces of former action, the bijas or seed-potentialities, are laid down and retained, in the continuum of the substratum mental activity (i.e., in the Unconscious). Vasana is generally said to be derived from the denominative verb vasaya-: to make fragrant, to perfume, to scent (cf. vasa: perfume), as reflected in the Chinese equivalent hsun-hsi^ ^ (perfuming repetition or habituation). It seems also to have been associated with (if not historically derived from) the causative of ^vas (to dwell) which, in the nominal form vasana, refers to an impression left dwelling in the mind,and by extension to a notion, an idea, a false notion, etc. This latter association with ^vas is probably reflected in the Tibetan equivalent: bag ehags inclinations or propensity; cf., anusaya: bag la rial). By this process of vasana, unconscious energy patterns or inclinations are impressed upon the stream of mentation by every action we perform. These seed-potentialities then develop as part of the 55 stream until, eventually, they come to fruition, affecting our behavior at some later point in time. This "ripening of the seeds" persists not only throughout one's entire life, but into future lives as well, this being necessary of course to account for the fundamental law of causation in the form of karmic retribution. For the Yogacarins, the six modes of mental activity could not adequately account for the persistence of this vasana process, especially given its unconscious nature. Hence the necessity of the eighth vijnana. The discussion of the eighth vijnana in the Ch'eng-wei-shih-lun focuses on three different characteristics, each having its own par• ticular designation: the eighth as alaya-vijnana, as sarvabTjaka- 22 vijnana, and as vipaka-vijnana. Thus we find the eighth vijnana considered in terms of its essential characteristic (sva-laksana ), in terms of its function as a cause (hetu 1^3 ), and in terms of its function as an effect (phala ). With regard to its essential characteristic, the eighth vijnana is called the alaya-vijnana; considered in its role as cause, it has the special name sarvabTjaka or bearer of all the seeds; and considered in its role as the result of previous acts, i.e., as effect, it is given the special name vipaka-vijnana or fruition mentation. The most familiar, of these is, of course alaya- vi jnana. The second two designations, also occur very frequently however, and are important because they indicate a cause and effect aspect of the eighth vijnana to which K'uei-chi frequently refers. Alaya-vijnana has been rendered with a number of different equivalents: store-consciousness,.foundation consciousness, Grund- erkennen (Frauwallner), connaissance-receptacle (Lamotte), or connaissance- trefonds (Levi), etc. The word alaya is from the Sanskrit verb ~tl~ - meaning to cling to, adhere to, alight on, or he hidden in. The nominal form alaya can mean a firm or fundamental base, and by extension is used to refer to a dwelling or home. Following an established tradition, Hsiian-tsang and K'uei-chi rendered alaya-vijnana as tsang-shihJust as often, however, they, use the transcription j^jwhich was introduced by Hsiian-tsang to replace an older form. The character ^gyy has two main readings in 2 Chinese: as a verb (now read ts'ang ) it means to hide away, to embrace or bear, to store up and save; as a noun (now read tsang J, it is used to refer to a granary or storehouse, i.e., the place where something is stored up or hidden away. The eighth vijnana is. said in the Ch''eng-wei-shih-tun to be alaya in three different senses: it is actively alaya (neng-ts'ang jrt^ in that it "stores" the seeds (bijas); it is passively alaya (so-ts'ang ft\ ^ ^U ^at it is what is "perfumed" or permeated by all actions per formed through the process of unconscious conditioning or impression (vasana); finally it is alaya in the sense of being clung to (chih- ts'a.ng jjj^)) by the seventh vijnana (manas) which mistakes it for an enduring self (atman) or ego. K'uei-chi takes the last of these three senses of alaya to be the most important or basic. The latter two correspond to the other two designations for the eighth Vijnana: sarvabTj:aka and vipaka. The designation sarvabijaka-vijnana, i.e., mentation holding all the seeds, refers to the eighth vijnana in its capacity of being the cause of all events. It retains all the seeds, both innate and acquired, without loss until they are ready to come to fruition in the form of some future action. K'uei-chi correlates the sarvabijaka aspect of. the eighth vijnana with the active (neng-ts'ang) sense of alaya. The third designation, vipaka-vijnana, i.e., fruition or retribution mentation', refers to the eighth vijnana in its capacity of being the effect of all previous actions. As the underlying stream of mentationj it is what has been impregnated or "perfumed" by the seeds of all previous acts....As such, it is their "fruit" or effect. K'uei-chi correlates the vipaka aspect of the eighth vijfiana with the passive (so-ts'ang) sense of alaya. Alaya and Atman We have seen that the eighth vijnana doctrine of the Yogacarins was an attempt to deal with the problem of continuity: the persistence of the individual personality and the causal efficacy of karmic retri• bution. Both of these aspects of continuity must be preserved if there is to be any meaning in religious cultivation, in the quest for liberation. The most ingenious innovation of the Yogacara colution to this problem has also been the most misunderstood. Beginning with their contemporary critics within the Buddhist tradition, the charge that has been raised against the Yogacarins is that the alaya-vijnana is simply the Upanisadic atman, the immutable Self or Soul, in disguise. While it is fruitful to consider the influence.of early Indian classical philosophy-—especially Sahkhya for example on this Buddhist school, the suggestion that.theYogacarins abandoned or betrayed the basic Buddhist doctrine of anatman (no-soul) involves a misunderstanding of the Yogacara conception of alaya, and of vijnana as well. Moreover, it misdirects one's attention away from the real innovation introduced by the Yogacarins in their theory of the eight modes of mental activity. First of all, with respect to the nature of personal continuity throughout one's own life and from one life to the next, the Yogacarins employed essentially'the same argument used by all Buddhists to avoid positing a permanent, immutable substance or soul. The eighth vijnana is indeed said to persist, but in a quite particular manner: "it proceeds on like the current of a river" (tac ca vartate srotasaughavat) or, in the Chinese, equivalent, "perpetually turning like a raging torrent" The river flows along., always different, and yet we consider-it the same river from one moment to the next. Even the peculiar currents and eddies remain the same or shift only slowly over a long period of time as the obstructions to the flow are gradually shifted about or worn away. So also does personality "persist", but this is not to say that there is some underlying "immutable persistent". The Yogacarins go to some pains to establish that what "persists" is the. stream of momentary events, each arising and then perishing to give way to the next. Thus they posit continuity, but not permanence. If the eighth vijnana were permanent in the sense of immutable there could be no "perfuming" (vasana), no unconscious, habituation, because the eighth vijnana could not be altered in any way by the influence of performed acts. It it were notcontinuous, on the other hand, causal connection would be broken, there would be no link between cause and effect, between religious practice and attaining liberation. Does.this flow ever cease? Is this substratum activity of the eighth., vijnana ever entirely broken off? According to the Ch'eng-wei- shih-Zun} the eighth vijnana, in some form, continues forever. Certain of its functions, however, cease at certain stages on the path to en• lightenment. The alaya function -i.e., the eighth vijnana as mistaken by manas to be an enduring self ceases in those who have become arhats. The Dharmapala. tradition followed by Hsuan-tsang and K'uei-chi interprets this to mean those who have eliminated the obstruction constituted by the 24 afflictions (klesavarana). The seeds or traces of the afflictions are still present in the eighth vijnana of these saints, in the vipaka or fruition function, but these seeds no longer come to fruition in any manifest activity. These saints are thus called bodhisattvas who do not fall back (avaivartika bodhisattvah). Those-, who have thus eliminated the obstacle of the afflictions can include the sravaka arhats, the pratyeka-buddhas and, according to the Dharmapala tradition, bodhisattvas from the Eighth to Tenth.Lands. Because the affliction-seeds (klesabTja) persist even in these saints, the vipaka function of the eighth vijnana continues.. This is brought to an end only in the Tathagata of fully- realized' Buddhas, at which point the eighth vijnana is said to become 25 amala- or vimala-vijnana, pure or immaculate mentation. The point on which the Yogacarin explanation of individual continuity most significantly differs from that of the earlier Buddhists is that with their conception of the seventh and eighth vijnanas we find an explicit theory of active, yet quite unconscious, mentation. This seems to be the real innovation of Yogacara psychology: a well-developed theory accounting for the persistence in the unconscious of energy patterns which have the potential to affect future action. This is the Yogacara theory of dynamic unconscious motivation. 6o The Components of Perception Another important theory of the Yogacara philosophy of mind that is taken up in K'uei-chi's essay is the bhaga doctrine, the analysis of the components (bhaga) of perception. The later Yogacara scholiasts recognized four variants of this doctrine, each analyzing perception 26 into one, two, three, or four components respectively. The Dharmapala tradition followed by K'uei-chi was the school that posited four components in all: the subjective or noetic component (darsana-bhaga), the objective or noematic component (nimitta-bhaga), the self-verifying component (svasamvitti-bhaga) and the verifier of the self-verifying component (samvitti-svasamvitti-bhaga). . According:to this theory there are, in the act of perception, two reciprocal'aspects: the constituting "subject" or noesis and the constituted "object" or noema. Both of these are components of the internal act of perception: there is no question at this level of analysis.of any "external object." The important point is the corre• lative relationship between the two: each presupposes the inevitable, as it is, a function of the manas activity. It is impossible to have a "self" without having an "other," though the "other" in this case is purely internal or noematic. Implicit here also is a notion of the intentionality'of consciousness: for the Yogacarins the object perceived is an intentional object. The latter two components are meant to explain our ability to become intuitively aware of our mental-activity at this intentional level. It is the more essential self-verifying or self-witnessing component that allows us to step back from, the level of dichotomized cognition, and it is the verifier of this self-verifying function that confirms this. K'uei-chi discusses the soteriological significance of this theory in his section on the five-level contemplation of Vijnapti- - 27 matrata. It should be noted that the infinite regress suggested by Dharmapala's svasamvittibhaga and samvittirsvasamvitti-bhaga would not have been acceptable to any Buddhist philosopher. It seems best to understand his samvitti-svasamvitt-bhaga simply as an attempt to intro- . duce, not a regression, but a reflexive loop into the system by which pre-dichotomized mentation.can become aware of itself intuitively. THE PATH TO ENLIGHTENMENT Another important division of Yogacara, doctrine comprised the various formulations of the stages on the path to enlightenment or sanctification. "While more in the realm of dogmatics than the epistemo• logical and psychological doctrines discussed above, it was this aspect of Yogacara that provided the framework for all religious practice. Given the.basic soteriological orientation of Yogacara and having noted the role of personal^-religious practice in K'uei-chi's life, it is not surprising to find that a large portion of his "Essay on Vijnapti• matrata" is devoted to the discussion of various scholastic issues regarding the stages on the path. The. Five. Stages of Sanctification The Yogacara formulation of the stages on the path to enlighten• ment is a complex system comprising a number of different paradigms, many of which can be found independently of the others in earlier Abhidharma works. Indeed, it is here that the Yogacara debt to the older Abhidharma tradition is most obvious. K'uei-chi follows a basic system of five stages (avastha)- on the path, one that is presented in some detail in 28 the Ch'eng-wei-shih-lun. This formula is based primarily on the Mahay ana-samgraha of Asanga who systematized a great, deal of earlier material found in the Yogacarabhwni , the Dasabhumika sutra^the Buddha- 29 bhumi Sutra, and other works. The five stages presented in the Ch'eng-wei-shih-lun. are: / 1. The Stage of Provisioning (sambhar avast ha $^.f^- ) 2. The Stage of Preliminary Training (prayogavastha 3. The Stage of Penetration(prativdhehavastha "0 . |^ /f^. ) h. The Stage of Cultivation (bhavanavastha 'j'^ ^ //^- ^ 5. The Ultimate Stage (nisthavastha ^j\X-) In the Stage of Provisioning the aspirant is primarily concerned witmoksabhagTyah developins g thjf^jf^Le qualitie^ » asn favorablolder Abhidharme to liberatioa categorn knowy referrinn as thge to 30 one's.own liberation, . but said in the Yogacara context to refer to the bodhisattva's efforts to secure the liberation' of other beings. This stage is said to last from the first thought of enlightenment (bodhicitta) until one is equipped with all the moskabhagiyas. It is in this stage that the practitioner first confronts the task of cutting off the seed- potentialities of the two obstacles, that of the afflictions and that barring wisdom. The Stage of. Preliminary Training is dominated by the development of the qualities favorable to.the penetration.of understanding, the nirvedhabhagiyas )'||| jf^ • These nirvedhabhagTyas comprise the Four Examinations.(paryesana) and the Four Exact Comprehensions, two important doctrines that K'uei-chi mentions several times in his 31 "Essay on Vijnaptimatrata." They will "be discussed further below. In other Yogacara works these first two stages, since they are both preparatory, are grouped together as the Land Where One Practices Firm Resolve (adhimukticaryabhumi). The next stage, called the Stage of Penetration in the Ch'eng- we%-sh%h-Vim3 is also commonly known.as the Path of Vision or Insight (darsanamarga M y$. ) • Having succeeded in the Four Examinations and the Four Exact Comprehensions, the practitioner now produces the non• discriminating cognition • (nirvikalpakajnana ^t? ^ %'\ ) which is free of the subject-object dichotomy.and gives direct, intuitive knowledge of reality. One experiences Thusness at this stage, and actually all that remains to be done is practice and. further refinement. This stage is completed with the thought of the first of the Ten Bodhisattva Lands. Next is the Stage, of Practice or Cultivation in which one * 32 proceeds through, the Ten Bodhisattva Lands (dasabhumi). The newly acquired nondiscriminating cognition is employed to destroy the "crude dross" (dausthulya) of the two obstacles in preparation for the basic reorientation (asraya-paravrtti) of personality that constitutes liberation. This stage culminates in the Diamond-like Concentration (vajropamasamadhi) which marks the ultimate realization. The. Ultimate Stage is attained with, the final elimination of all the seeds of the two obstacles. This is the pure realm of the Buddhas in.which, one experiences the various Buddha-bodies. 6k The Yogacara Conception of Nirvana Yogacara shares much of the formal structure outlined above with the rest of Mahayana Buddhism. There are. however, several innovations that were developed especially in the Vijnaptimatrata Yogacara of Asanga and Vasubandhu. The most important of these is the notion of dynamic or unfixed nirvana (apratisthita-nirvana). The roots of this explicitly positive formulation of nirvana can be traced back to the Prajflapdram-itd Sutras, but its first systematic presentation seems to be found in the 33 Mahdydna-samgraha. Building on the basic Mahayana doctrine advocating the salvation of all being through the combination of the bodhisattvas wisdom (prajna) and compassion (karuna), the doctrine of dynamic or unfixed nirvana presents a cognitive model of enlightenment that attempts to resolve the dilemma of supra-mundane transcendence versus mundane salvific efficacy inherent in.the older notion of nirvana. Unlike the Abhidharma conception of nirupadhLsesa-nirvana (extinction without remainder) in which the arhat became totally removed from the world of discrimination and suffering, the Yogacara idea of unfixed nirvana allows the fully-realized bodhisattva to remain active.in the realm of death and rebirth (samsara). By means of his subsequently acquired cognition (prs^tha-labdha jnana) he is able to perceive both.the Absolute and the Dependent, allowing him to work for. the weal of the beings still trapped in delusion. K'UEI-CHI'S CONTRIBUTION . Before turning to the translation of -K'uei-chi's "Essay on Vijnaptimatrata" something must be said of K'uei-chi's special contri• bution to Yogacara thought. What role did he play in the overall history of Yogacara Buddhism? What role did he play in Chinese Buddhism? In what way, if any, did he continue developing the school of thought he. sought to preserve in its new home? A final answer to these questions can hardly be made on the basis of a study of one short work; there are, however,'several indications of K'uei-chi's contribution evident in this essay. We have seen already the role K'uei-chi played in introducing a more comprehensive.transmission of the Vijnaptimatrata Yogacara of Asanga and Vasubandhu into China, as both translator and exegete. Looking now in particular at his work as an essayist, it becomes obvious that he saw his role as that of a syncretist. There are, moreover, two distinct facets to K'uei-chi's. syncretism, one that can be seen as systematic or taxonomic, and one that is clearly more synthetic or creative. Doctrinal Classification The taxonomic facet of K'uei-chi's efforts is the most apparent of the two in the' "Essay on Vijnaptimatrata." . Doctrinal classification., what the Chinese called p'an-chiao jjhj ^f{, is a special form of exegesis that had its origins in India, but became an even more salient feature of Chinese Buddhism. It was an attempt to rationalize in some systematic manner all the various, and at time seemingly contradictory, teachings that were put forward as "the word of the Buddha.". It is possible to distinguish two types of doctrinal analysis, one more characteristic of the Indian Abhidharma tradition, and one more characteristically, though, not exclusively, Chinese. The former was the necessary result of the doctrinal inflation or proliferation that marked the' development of Abhidharma Buddhism in India. As the problematic addressed by the later schools became increasingly complex, new solutions were formulated and new models generated. The old formulas and paradigms, venerable even if outmoded, were never discarded, however: they were simply accumulated. A great deal of the later Buddhist scholiasts' energies was devoted to providing a rationale for the inter• relationship of an ever-expanding number of doctrines, even though these doctrines, for the most part, never originally had any particular integral or genetic relationship., having simply been different but parallel responses to the same questions. Another form of doctrinal analysis, one which in fact is simply an extension of the first, sought to construct a hierarchy of the various Buddhist schools, usually based on some periodization of the Buddha's teaching career. Again the attempt is to reconcile apparently diver• gent positions, but now on a broader scale, usually with the intention of proving the superiority of one particular school over the others while still incorporating all. the schools into a developmental schema: i.e., "Our school represents the ultimate doctrine.of the Buddha ex• pressed in terms of the absolute truth, while the other schools are provisional teaching leading eventually up to ours." This is the form of doctrinal analysis that is usually meant by p'an-chiao in China. The multi-level systems of the T'ien-t'ai ^ and Hua-yen 34 schools are the most prominent examples. Of these two types of doctrinal classification K'uei-chi was clearly more occupied with the former. This very likely reflects the fact that his training in Buddhism and his style of scholarship were influenced more by traditional Indian models than by those of the current Chinese schools. His doctrinal analysis certainly shows a sharp contrast to that of his slightly earlier counterparts Chih-i ^ ]jj (538-597) of the T'ien-t*ai school, and Fa-shun j/fcj/fy (557-640) and Chih-yen^ (602-668) of the Hua-yen school. There are a number of examples of this first type of doctrinal analysis in K'uei-chi's "Essay on Vijnaptimatrata," virtually all of them rationalizing, various Yogacara doctrines. Intjl.3.2 for example, he lays out a five-fold classification of the different ways in which Vijnaptimatrata is taught in the scriptures (sutra) and treatises (sastra). £ln 2.2 he explains why the sutras teach Cittamatrata whereas the sastras teach Vijnaptimatrata. In ^6.1 he discusses the difference between the four-stage path of the Mahdydna-samgraha and the five- stage path.that is found in both the Mahdydna-samgraha and the Ch'eng- wei-shih-Xiai. These, are all characteristic examples of K'uei-chi's style of doctrinal analysis, the first or taxonomic, facet of his syncretism. The Five-level Contemplation of Vijnaptimatrata The second, or more creative, facet of K'uei-chi's syncretism is seen most clearly in his formulation of the Five-level Contemplation of Vijnaptimatrata presented in tjl. 1.1-5 of the'essay translated here. This type of syncretism differs from the doctrinal classification discussed above in that here we find an original attempt to summarize the soteriological process that lies at the core of Vijnaptimatrata Yogacara. K'uei-chi. is doing something more that simply reconciling doctrines that were already current: with the new doctrine of the Five-level Contemplation he is attempting to syntheeize the whole system into one.comprehensive and easily understandable paradigm. This doctrine represents K'uei-chi's most original contribution both to Yogacara Buddhism" in general and'to Chinese Buddhism as well. It provides a model for'the progressive realization of the fundamental principle of Mere Conceptualization (Vijnaptimatrata), a model outlining the successive levels by which one gains an understanding of delusion and experiences the enlightenment that constitutes nirvana. It incorporates the critical epistemology and psychology of a number of basic Yogacara doctrines, the eight modes of mental activity, the three aspects of existence.'or own-being, the emptiness, of the self and the dharmas, the analysis of the perceptual components., combining all of these in a manner that clarifies how their, application leads, step by step, to the ultimate experience of Thusness and liberation. It is in this original doctrine that we see most clearly K'uei-chi's own personal combination of Buddhist philosophy and soteriology. PART TWO: TRANSLATION OF "THE ESSAY ON VIJNAPTIMATRATA" Chapter IV INTRODUCTION TO THE TRANSLATION K'uei-chi's "Essay on Vijnaptimatrata" is the third of 29 chapters in his rather long doctrinal compendium, the Ta-sheng fa- yuan i-Zin chang (no. 26).. The rest of this work includes, among others, essays on the doctrinal history of the early Indian schools, • on the various classifications of vehicles (yana), on the sixty-two false views (drsti), the eight deliverances, the three jewels (Buddha- Dharma-Sahgha), and on the Buddha lands. No precise date is given, for the compilation of the work, though it is likely to be relatively late as K'uei-chi cites several of his earlier works in the text. It is possible that at least some, of the chapters were written as independent essays, or at least circulated as such. This is suggested by the fact that in addition to the commentaries to the work as a whole, one also finds commentaries written on several of the individual essays or chapters. The "Essay on Vijnaptimatrata" seems to have been one of the most popular of the essays judging from the commentaries. The Commentaries The catalog section of the Taisho lists a total of 59 commen• taries that treat all or parts. of K'uei-chi's compendium."'" Of these, 11 are available in printed editions, 34 survive in manuscript, and the remaining 14 have been lost.. Of the surviving commentaries that treat the compendium as a whole, the most important are: 1. Ta-eheng fa-yuan i-lin ehang pu-eh'ueh 3 surviving scrolls, Z:2/3/1. Composed by Hui-chao j||Jj (?-714), second patriarch of the Fa-hsiang school after K'uei-chi. 2. Ta-sheng fa-yuan i-lin ehang ehueh-tse-chi 4 scrolls, Z: 2/3/1. Composed by Chih-chou \% (678-733), third patriarch of the Fa-hsiang school after K'uei-chi. 3. Da-igohoongivinjd shishikusho 22 scrolls, T: 2323, LXXI.473-887. Composed by the Tokugawa Japanese monk Kiben ^ (1718-1791) in 1787. Among these three, nos. 2 and 3 have sections commenting on the "Essay on Vijnaptimatrata," while the corresponding section of no. 2 has been lost. Kiben's commentary is important because he cites, critically, a number of. other commentaries that are available only in manuscript or that have been lost. 1 There.are also several commentaries on the "Essay on Vijnapti• matrata" alone: 4. -Yuishikisho sh-Lki 12 scrolls, T: 2319, LXXI.298-4l8. Composed by the Fujiwara monk Shin go jjjf js]|jf (931-1004). . 72 5. Ta-sheng fa-yuan i-lin wei-shih-chang chiang-lu Written by the Chinese Buddhist Abbot T'ai-hsu. y£\ wh_ (1890-1947); pp. 938-1089 of his collected works, the T'ai-hsu Ta-shih chuan-shu (see bibliography). 6. Fa-yuan i-lin chang wei-shih-chang chu Written by Mei Kuang-hsi /jsJ^^Li^' » originally published in 1923 and reprinted by the Hsin-wen-feng ch'u-pan|(j^^J ^!| Jjjj, Taiwan, 1973. Shingo's , commentary is excellent, providing much information on the sources of the doctrines K'uei-chi mentions in his text. The latter two works are interesting in their own right as examples of the thought inspired by the revival of Buddhist philosophy in the - early part of the 20th century. T'ai-hsu's commentary shows a good deal of originality whereas that of Mei follows the Japanese works very closely. In preparing the present translation, I made use of these six commentaries relying especially on nos. 3 and k. No. 2 is the most authoritative but, unfortunately, it is very short and often more obscure than K'uei-chi's original text. I also consulted the Japanese trans• lations of the text in the Kokuyaku issaikyo —* JQ\ (KI: XLV.Ul-53) and the Kokuyaku daizokyo ^ ^^^\ j^fcfy&S™' XLI1'56-80), Methodological Considerations There are several different problems that must be overcome in the translation of any of K'uei-chi's works, problems that can be especially difficult in the case of his essays where, in,contrast to the commentaries, one does not.have a base text providing the theme and structure. All of K'uei-chi's works were, moreover, written for an audience having a more thorough knowledge of the Indian Buddhist tradition and the Yogacara literature in particular than, is current today. Many doctrines of which he assumes a knowledge can, however, be tracked down in one of several basic works: in the Abhidharmakosa, a HTnayana Abhidharma work, the Mahdydna-samgraha, the most systematic introduction to Asanga's thought, or the Ch'eng-wei-shih-lun, the synthetic edition of the Indian commentaries to Vasubandhu's Thirty Verses (Trimsika) discussed above. The Kos"a survives in Sanskrit as well as Chinese and Tibetan, the Mahdydna-samgraha, in Chinese and Tibetan only, and the Ch'eng- wei-shih-tun -is only in .Chinese.Fortunately we have from Louis de La Vallee-Poussin and Etienne Lamotte excellent annotated translations 2 in French of all three of these works. For the present study reference has also been made, to the Mahdydna-samgraha commentaries of Asvabhava. and Vasubandhu, which survive in Chinese and Tibetan and are excerpted' in Lamotte's: Samgraha translation. The translation of Buddhist philosophical treatises from Literary Chinese poses, a number of philological problems as well. The Chinese Buddhist exegetes had, by K'uei-chi's time, developed a number of stylistic conventions peculiar to "Buddhist Chinese." Many of these reflect the special demands of translating from Sanskrit, a highly inflected language given to hypotactic construction., to Chinese which is uninflected and, relatively, .free of hypotaxis. An example can be seen in. the construction very frequently encountered in the Chinese of Hsuan-tsang and K'uei-chi where a declarative proposition is followed by one or more clauses providing the reason or justification for the assertion. Each.of these "because. . ." clauses is marked by the function word ku i^H^ (therefore, thus) coming at the end of the clause. In an unpunctuated text, and even more in a poorly punctuated text, this can very easily lead to confusion, since one normally expects jjj^ to stand at the beginning of a "therefore. . ." clause. There are many examples of this particular construction in the text translated here, and several instances where the punctuation indicated in the Taisho edition of-the .text is very questionable. Another set of problems, often far more perplexing, arises when one encounters the Chinese equivalents of Buddhist technical terms. This is of special concern when working with the writings of Hsuan- tsang and K'uei-chi. Their translations are generally considered to be the most technically accurate of all of those done in China. Hsuan- tsang did not hesitate, in most cases, to revise older equivalents. Constantly striving for consistency and philological precision, the often chose painfully literal equivalents for technical terms, a feature of his style that makes it seem peculiar to the Chinese reader who is well-educated, but. unfamiliar with Buddhist doctrine and terminology. Consider, for example, his rendering of the Sanskrit vipaka (fruition) as in the fruition or retribution aspect (vipaka-vijnana) of the eighth mode of mental activity.discussed in Chapter III above: i-shu (lit..:- 'different-ripening'; contrast Paramartha's kuo-pao )^ '• 'fruit-retribution'). Hsuan-tsang's-equivalent, in this case, is etymologically precise to the point of being quite misleading. From the Chinese alone, one has no way of knowing that the i.('different') of i-shu simply renders the vi- of vipaka, the same prefix mentioned above in the discussion of vijnana. In This case, the Chinese i is probably not meant to significantly qualify or restrict the meaning of shu though, when.working only from a Chinese text, one might well expect that it did. A certain amount of this peculiarity is a feature of all Buddhist writing in Chinese.- One does, however, find it much more often in the Chinese of Hsuan-tsang and K'uei-chi than in that of KumarajTva whose translations are freer and consequently seem more "Chinese." This, excessive literalness, in both syntax and diction, can work in two different directions. When one is unfamiliar with a given expression, it may seem quite opaque in the Chinese or, what is worse, it may seem to mean something quite different from the Sanskrit technical term it renders. On the other hand., once one acquires the necessary familiarity with.the terminology, this peculiarity begins to work as an advantage, especially given the meticulous conistence in the writing.: of these two monks. To acquire that familiarity,.-,especially when dealing with relatively obscure. Abhidharma doctrines, can however still be a formidable task. This is just.as true when working with K'uei-chi's essays, as when reading a work that has been translated from Sanskrit into Chinese. Even: though.the. essays were originally composed in Chinese, they still, because of their technical nature, employ all the stylistic conventions and terminology of the translations. While it is unlikely that K'uei- chi: went so far as to.compose his essays in Sanskrit and then translate them into Chinese, it is nevertheless often helpful to reconstruct the hypothetical Sanskrit patterns and terms that lie behind his thought. 76 Fortunately, this task has been made somewhat easier by several research aids that have become available only relatively recently, aids that were indispensable to the present study and translation. While the translations of La-Vallee-Poussin and Lamotte done in the first half of this century provide a great deal of assistance in recognizing the Chinese equivalents of Sanskrit technical terms, many of the equivalents they give are hypothetical reconstructions from texts that survive only in Chinese and Tibetan. The possibility of being mislead is always present: a prime example is La Vallee-Poussin's initial reconstruction of *bhuta-tathata for the key term chen-ju ^ ^gin the Ch'eng-wei-shih- Vun, a reconstruction that he himself subsequently realized was not borne out by. the surviving Sanskrit of the Madhydnta-vibhdga where chen-ju is shown to be Hsiian-tsang's standard equivalent for the more basic Yogacara term tathata (Thusness). The publication of modern critical editions of the works like the• Madhydnta-vibhdga that do survive in Sanskrit as well as Chinese and Tibetan has made our task easier than that faced by La Vallee-Poussin. We now have Sanskrit editions of most of the basic Yogacara works: the Mahdyana-sutrdlahkara, the Vimsatikd3and Tvimsika with commentaries, the Lahkdvatava3 the Abhidharma-samucoaya3 and also portions of the earlier Yogdcdrabhurni.. We also now have the Sanskrit version of the Abhidharmakosa from a manuscript that was not available to La Vallee- Poussin when he undertook his translation of that work from the Chinese. Even more helpful, than these, critical editions are a number of recent bi- and tri-lingual glossaries and indices to the most important Yogacara works surviving in Sanskrit. Most helpful for the present translation were NAGAO Gadjin's indices to. the .Mad.hy~mta-V-ibha.ga and the Mahayana-sutralahkara, HIRAKAWA . Akira1 s index to the Abhidharma-kosa, k and SUZUKI Daisetsu's index to the Lofika.vata.Ta. These books provide a separate, index for each of the languages, Sanskrit, Chinese and Tibetan, with cross-references to the other languages and page references to various editions of the text. This makes it much easier to determine if a given Chinese expression was used as an equivalent for some Sanskrit term, and in many cases allows comparison of the equivalent used by different Chinese translators and by.the Tibetans as well. The first and third of the above list are especially useful in working on K'uei-chi's writings because they are both works translated by Hsuan-tsang, one a Yogacara treatise and the other an Abhidharma compendium. By using these indices along with the earlier reconstructions of La • Vallee-Poussin andLamotte, I have been able to provide a signi• ficant number of Sanskrit equivalents for the technical terms in •K'uei-chi's. essay. This might seem less necessary in the case of a text that was not originally translated from Sanskrit; however, it is warranted in light of the special characteristics of K'uei-chi's essay style that were outlined above. There were also other considerations. English, equivalents'for Yogacara terms especially, have only just begun to be worked out and there is some controversy over the best rendering for many important...concepts. I have provided the Sanskrit were possible to avoid ambiguity, especially for those who may be familiar with Yogacara from Sanskrit and Tibetan sources rather, than from Chinese. The Sanskrit equivalents.also serve to.alert the reader of the Chinese text .that there may be special, considerations when rendering a given Chinese expression into English. As a general methodological principle, my English translation is based' on the meaning of the original Sanskrit technical term (where it is known) rather than on the Chinese equivalent In most instances there is no noticeable discrepancy, but in some the case, of i-shu discussed above, for example the English does not always come directly or literally from the Chinese. In these cases the Sanskrit is always provided on the first occurrence and again later if the term is taken up in a different context. Chapter V K'UEI-CHI'S "ESSAY ON VIJNAPTI-MATRATA"1 [Preface! In outline, this essay on the Vijnapti-matrata doctrine is a critical explanation in ten sections: 1. Exposition of the Substance; 2. Critical Analysis of the Term; 3. Explanation of the Distinctions and the Unity; k. Which Mode of Mentation Performs the Contemplation?; 5. Clarifying what Distinguishes the Classes; 6. The Stages of Cultivating Realization; 7- Of What Nature is the Dharma 'Contemplation'?; 8. The Stations and the Base of Arising; 9. Severing the Obstacles and Defilements; 10. Turning to and Embracing the Two Emptinesses. (258bl8) Section One: Exposition of the Substance There are two varieties of this substance: the substance of that which is contemplated^^ [i.e., the objective aspect of Vijnaptimatrata] and the substance of the contemplator [i.e., the subjective aspect of Vijnaptimatrata]. 1.1 The Objective Aspect of Vijnaptimatrata The objective aspect of Vijnaptimatrata takes all dharmas as it. essentia! stance % .3 _se notn exists ana non- k existing dharmas are contemplated as being nothing but conceptualiza• tion (vijnapti-matra). There are in outline five levels [of contem• plating all dharmas as vijnapti-matraD. (258b20) 1.1.1 First Level: Banishing the False Preserving the Real The first level is the [contemplation of 1 Vijnapti[-matratal]^ in which one banishes the false^ and preserves the real^ st4*f- One contemplates the fact that the Imaginary (parikalpita) arises from what is exclusively unreal (abhuta-matra) and is completely without substance function |zl . One should properly banish what is thus empty (sunya), because it exists only in one's [deluded! feelings $ and not as a matter of absolute reality j£ .8 One then contemplates the fact that the Dependent (paratantra) and the Absolute (parinispanna) are the substance and the reality of all dharmas and are the realm of the Two Wisdoms. One should properly preserve what thus exists, because they do exist as absolute reality, even though they CseemU not to exist from the perspective of one's [deluded!! feelings. A pair of verses1^ by Asanga says: The [relationship] between name and thing is adventitious Their nature should be CthusH examined. With regard to their dual aspectj11 one must also deduce that There is nothing but conceptualization, nothing but conventional designation. With the Exact Comprehensions one sees there is no 'object' (artha), That there is nothing but discrimination into three. The object does not exist, and so the three do not exist either; To realize this is to enter into the 13 Three Natures. [Glossing the term 'Vijnaptimatrata'Ii, the Ch'eng-wei-shih-lun says: The word vijrlccpti expresses collectively [the various categories of mental activity common, to all sentie,nt beings: namely, the eight modes of mentation (vijnana), the six classes of mental coefficients (caitta), the development1^ of mentation into an objective component (nimitta-bhaga) and a subjective component (darsana-bhaga), the modality distinctions1^, and the Thusness (tathata)1^ that is made evident by the principle of their emptiness. Cit expresses the eight vijnanas,! because they are the essential characteristics (svalaksana) of all mentation (vijnana); [the mental coefficients,! because they are associated with mentation; [the objective and subjective components,! because they are the developments of the above two; [the distinctions,! because they are modalities of the above three; [and Thusness,! because it is the Reality ^| (bhutata?) of the above four. Thus all dharmas: are inseparable from mentation and are collectively defined by the term 'vijnapti'. The word mdtvatd is meant simply to deny the notion clung to by fools that there are some truly existing external forms or matter, etc., separate from our mentation.1^ There are many passages like these that verify [the doctrine of ' • "banishing the false and preserving the real"!. (258c4) People have always, without any beginning, clung to the notion of self (atman) and dharmas as existing, while dismissing relative facts jfe- and the abstract universal as empty. Therefore, in this [first level! of contemplation, the "banishing" is the contemplation of the emptiness Cof the Imaginary], as it counteracts and destroys our clinging to what [seems to] exist; whereas, the "preserving" is the contemplation of the existence [of the Dependent and the Absolute], as it counteracts and expels our clinging to what [seems to] be empty. 83 Thus we now contemplate the emptiness Cof what seemed to exist] and the existence Cof what seemed empty] '^"^j » while banishing the alleged existence Cof what only seems to exist] and the alleged emptiness Cof what only seems to be empty] ^*' However, if there is no existence Cof what we formerly thought to exist] and no emptiness Cof what we formerly thought to be empty] • "jf^ ^ ^St, then, so also, is there no emptiness Cof what we formerly thought to exist] and no existence Cof what we formerly thought to be empty] By taking all these assertions of 'emptiness' and 'existence' as mutually dependent, the contemplation is brought to completion. Of what emptiness, after all, can there be any 'pure existence'; and,.of what existence, any 'pure emptiness'? Therefore, all .those who wish to enter the true dharma-hood (dharmata) that is cut off from words, must enter by relying on this 20 device Cof contemplating what seems to exist as empty and what seems to be empty as existing]. This does, not mean, however, that in every case 'existence' and 'emptiness' are fixed as such Ci.e., reified]. _ 21 At the stage where one realizes (saksatkaroti) the contemplation of Reality, there is neither 'existence' nor 'emptiness'. There is no discrimination of dharmas because their ultimate nature is cut off from words. When it is stated Cas for example in the PrajhTiparamita Su.tra.sl that it is. necessary to contemplate everything as empty, for only then can one experience (saksatkaroti) Reality, this means that it is necessary to.take as one's initial entrance the view that the Imaginary is empty. 84 One. is thereby able to enter into Reality. [Thus, while one does indeed take the view of emptiness], the substance of Reality itself 22 • is not emptiness. .We have seen that the expression • 'Vijnaptimatrata' denies what is falsely clung to. That being the case, if one clings to the notion that there truly exists some 'only-ness' of all vijnapti, then since this too is something clung to it must be rejected as well. This is the level of [the contemplation] of the objective aspect of Vijnaptimatrata that constitutes the initial entrance [to the doctrine]. At every stage along the path, one should deliberate on it and cultivate its realization. (258cl4) 1.1.2 Second Level: Relinquishing the Superfluous Retaining the Pure 23 The second level is [the contemplation of] Vi jnaptil-matrata] in which one relinquishes the superfluous and retains the pure $0-^1 n*$L' Although we have taken the view that relative particulars [i.e., the paratantra] and the absolute universal [i.e., the parinispanna] do not exist apart from mentation (vijnana), it is nevertheless the case that this internal vijnana has both an objective field [i.e., the nimitta-bhaga] and subjective thought (citta) [i.e., the darsana-bhaga]. This is so, because as soon as thought arises, it 24 25 is deposited in the internal objective field [as a seed] and is then born..[Even so,] it is only representation (vijnapti) that is said to be '-only' (-matra); we do not say 'objective-field-only' (visaya-matra *^^), [i.e., that all dharmas are only of the objective _, 26 field]. The Oieng-wei-shih-lun says: Vijnana exists only internally, whereas the objective field also pervades the external. Fearing this•overflowinto the external, we only say 'vijnapti-only' [and never say 'visaya-only *] The foolish deludedly cling to the objective field.-Performing defiled deeds (klistakarniani) they-are submerged in the cycle of death.and rebirth (samsara). They do not know to contemplate the mind and diligently to seek escape [from this cycle]. Out of compassion for them,[the Buddha] declared this expression, 'vijnapti-only', thereby causing them to contemplate their.thought and find liberation from the cycle of death and rebirth. This does not mean that the internal objective field [i.e., the nimitta-bhaga] is, 27 like the external, totally mexistent. Because the objective field [i.e. , the nimitta-bhaga] has this super• fluous overflow 3^^_Cinto seeming externality], it is relinquished and not designated '-only' (-matra). Because the substance of thought [i.e., the darsaha-bhaga] is pure, it is retained and declared to be 'vijnapti-only'. The Ghanavyuha Sutra says: The objects of citta, manas and vijKana [i.e., of all men1 ,al activity] " Are not separate from their own-being (svabhava); Therefore I declare that, in every way 29 There is only vijnana and nothing else. The Avatamsaka, Sutra and other works say, "The three realms are nothing "but thought (citta-matra). The I-ohiao Ching jjj^ says, "Therefore all of you must carefully regulate and focus your thought; if it is regulated and focused on one point, there will "be no 31 matter which is not distinguished." These passages are all included in this entrance (pravesa), [the second level of the contemplation of the Vijnaptimatrata of all dharmasH. (258c26) 1.1.3 Third Level: Gathering in the Branches Returning to the Root - • - 32 The third level is [the contemplation of3 Vijnapti[-matrataH in which one gathers in the branches33 and returns to the root .. Jp^jj . The objective field, which is what is apprehensor (grahya) within thought, is manifestly evident; and, so also, are the operations (kriya J^J )of thought, which is the internal apprehender (grahaka). This subjective portion (darsana-bhaga) and objective portion (nimitta- bhaga) both exist in dependence on mentation (vijnana). This is so, because, if separated from the substantial root3^ ^ ^of mentation, the branch-dharmas »^ absolutely cannot exist. The Trimsikd says: The notions of a self (atman) and truly existing dharmas, which arise in provisional discourse 87 Have a variety of different permutations; All of which, depend on developments of mentation; What develops into them are only three: 35 The Ch'eng-wei-shih-lun states, "'Development' (parinama^^) means that the substance of mentation turns into what appears to be the two components. This is so, because, both the objective component (nimitta-bhaga) and the subjective component (darsana-bhaga) arise in 36 dependence on the self-verifying component (svasamvitti-bhaga)." The Sandhi-nirmoeana Sutra states, "All the objects (alambana ^jff jjHJO 37 of mentation (vijnana) are merely manifestations of mentation.' One gathers in the objective and subjective components, which have branched out, and returns to their root, viz., mentation. Therefore, this entrance (pravesa) [i.e., the third level of the contemplation of the Vijnaptimatrata of all dharmasH encompasses- the contemplation of what is declared to be the absolute universal and relative particulars, or the absolute (paramartha ^ ) and the conventional (samvrti^^), etc. (259a4) 1.1.4 Fourth Level: Suppressing the Inferior Manifesting the Superior 38 The fourth level is [the contemplation of1 Vijnapti[-matrataH in which one suppresses the inferior -and manifests the superior '-•fli? • Both thought (citta)- and the mental coefficients (caitta). are capable of developing and becoming manifest. Even so, we only say 'thought-only' (citta-matraA^*) and not 'mental- coefficients-only' (caitta-matra^fe'VC,' jf{[ ). The substantial characteristic of thought, the king, is its supremacy (pradhanya j|p ; whereas, the mental coefficients are subordinate and depend on their superior to be born. At this level we suppress what is subordinate and do not display it, thus manifesting only the superior dharma, [thought !. Therefore, the Commpassionate and Honored One [i.e., Maitreya! declared: It is granted that thought manifests itself in what appears as a duality; Just so, it may appear as greed (.ragaj/ - \, etc.; 39 Or, alternatively, it may appear as faith (sraddha) , etc.;^° Nevertheless, there are no distinctly defiled or whole• some dharmas [separate from thought (citta)!.^" While the essential substance $''fj^ of "thought (citta)^2 is able to develop, manifesting itself in what appears as the duality of the subjective and objective components, it is still the case that the substance of the mental coefficients greed, faith, etc. also are each able to develop, manifesting themselves in what appears as their own subjective and objective components. Because thought is superior however, the verse says [only! that thought appears as the two. Because the mental coefficients are subordinate, they are suppressed, and the verse says nothing about them. This does not mean, however, that they are incapable of appearing as the two. The Vimaldk'rti says, "Through the defilement of thought, beings are defiled. Through purity of thought, beings are purified."^3 This and other such passages are included in this entrance (pravesa), [the fourth level of contemplating the Vijnaptimatrata of all dharmasD.(259al2) 1.1.5 Fifth Level: Banishing the Marks and Realizing the True Nature _ hh The fifth level is Cthe contemplation ofH VijnaptiC-matrataD in which one banishes the characterizing marks (laksana) and realizes the true nature (dharmata' ?)4^"ff^Si *|^. • ^n wnat is expressed by the word 'vijnapti', there are both an abstract universal and relative particulars . The relative particulars are the marks jjfQ or functions |£j which one should banish and not grasp. The abstract universal is the true nature *J^-or substance which one should seek to realize. The SrZmala Sutra declares, "the thought (citta) that is clear and pure by nature Q >^'V^' . "^ A verse from the Mahayana- samgvaha says: From a rope arises the notion of a snake, But on seeing the rope, one discerns that in the 1+6 light of reason there is no snake, And, when one verifies the constituent parts of the rope itself, 90 One knows that it, like the perception of the hi snake, is a delusion. What is stated here is that when we give rise to the notion of the rope (rajjubuddhi), we have banished the notion of a snake (sarpabuddhi): This is a metaphorical representation of how one banishes Imaginary (parikalpita) notions by contemplating the Dependent (paratantra). When we see the constituent parts making up the rope, we banish the notion of the rope itself: this is a meta• phorical representation of how one banishes the notion of the Dependent (paratantra) by seeing the Absolute (parinispanna). The meaning here is clear: both of these banished notions arise dependent on something else $>C^i2» ytfi • When one has severed 48 the defiled [portion of the Dependent], the notions of an eternal self (atman) and truly existing dharmas, which, like the snake and the rope, were clung to as real, no longer correspond to any factuality. With regard to the Dependent (paratantra): this does not mean that., because, it should be banished, therefore both [the defiled portion and the pure portion] are eliminated together. The snake appears as a result of delusion, and so is completely without either substance or function. The rope, however, comes into being by virtue of its constituent hemp fibers, and so is not without some provisional function. The: hemp fibers illustrate the real universal, while the rope illustrates the dependent aspect of things. Once one knows the respective substance and function of the rope and the hemp fibers, the factuality of the snake is spontaneously destroyed. Because the factuality of the snake is destroyed, the 'snake' corresponds to no factuality [i.e., it lacks even provisional existence]. This is what is termed "banishing what is clung to." It is not as if [clinging to] the Dependent (paratantra) can be severed only after "one is on'the Holy Path (aryamarga). This is so, because one gradually enters Reality, penetrating the emptiness of the 'snake' and understanding the constituent nature of the rope. At the stage, where one realizes the contemplation of Reality, the real universal is illuminated and the conventional particulars are evident. Once the universal and the particulars have become evident, the notions of self (atman) and. truly existing dharmas cease. It is precisely this that is the essence of what was viewed in the first contemplation. (259a27) 1.2 The Subjective Aspect of Vijnaptimatrata 1.2.1 The subjective aspect of Vijnaptimatrata takes as . _ . kQ its essential substance wisdom (prajna), the mental coefficient of the special or determinate (viniyata) class of dharmas. The sixth scroll of the Mahayana-samgraha says: "For what reasons does the bodhisattva enter into Vijnaptimatrata? By means of a knowledge of calming (samatha) and insight (vipasyana) that.is supermundane and that takes the synthetic dharmas as its -object'. . ."^ Asvabhava explains the passage saying, "It is by a. concentrated knowledge^1 not subject to confusion (samahitaviparitajnana). . .." Some interpret this saying that Vijnaptimatrata as applied to the contemplating subject has both the calming (samatha) and insight (vipasyana) [components of meditation!] as its nature (svabhava). This•- is' simply not. so... If we include 'its' associates , then the four mental aggregates (skandhas) are the substance. But if we add its subsidiariesjjj^ , then all five aggregates would be involved. The current opinion holds that, based on the name, the substance of the subjective aspect of Vijnaptimatrata is wisdom only [i.e., insight (vipasyana)^ and not calming (samatha)3. Asvabhava says both that Vijnaptimatrata [is realized!! by means of the knowledge that is intuitive comprehension (abhisamaya), and also, that it is by means of the concentrated knowledge not subject 54 to confusion. He cites only the knowledge that arises in concen• tration (samadhi) as the substance of the subjective aspect of Vijnaptimatrata because, when one produces the special view of Vijnaptimatrata accompanying the Four Examinations (paryesana), one necessarily is in concentration (samadhi). He does not say that the subjective aspect of Vijnaptimatrata has calming (samatha) as its substance. The Mahayana-samgraha, moreover, says: ... by means of the Four Examinations (pariyesana). . ., and the Four Exact Comprehensions (yathabhuta-parijnana), . . . and because everything is thus nonexistent, one takes this Thusness and this Suchness [known tol all bodhisattvas as the cultivation and training by which one enters Vijnapti• matrata. With respect to the mental expressions (manojalpa), which appear as words (aksara) and •meanings (artha),, /when.one deductively examines these..word-names , Cone sees; that] they are only mental • expressions . . . In the Yogdadra-bhwni}the Abhidharma-samuccay Four Examinations and the Four Exact Comprehensions all have wisdom 56 (prajna) as their substance. The Four Examinations are exclusively defiled (sasrava), while the Four Exact Comprehensions are both defiled and pure (sasravanasrava). When the. Mahayana-samgraha says that entering into the characteristics of what is to be known (jfieyalaksana) is based on the beneficial perfuming influence of frequently hearing [the scriptures 1 (bahusruta- bhavita) and that this, is not included (asamgrhita) in the alaya- -57 vijnana, the text refers only to the pure seeds which develop in that stage of the Holy Path. They are what is called 'perfuming influence' (bhavana) [in the text], and they are designated as distinct; from the alaya-vijnana. It is not the case that all subjects performing the contemplations are exclusively pure Canasrava). • Were that not so, the Four Examinations would not [fall under the category ofII preliminary cognition (prayogika-jnana). (259bl6) 1.2.2 While the above pertains in a general discussion [of the subjective aspect of Vijnaptimatrata, it can be further analyzed]. In a more specific presentation, it is summarized under two divisions: first, the contemplating subject as cause \^ ; and second, the v*) 59 contemplating subject as effect 3£ . 94 As cause, it applies to all.three varieties of •wisdom, and is exclusively defiled: therefore,. we take the wisdom produced through erudition (srutamaya), the wisdom produced through reflection (cintamaya), and the wisdom produced through spiritual cultivation (bhavanamaya as the substance of the contemplating subject. But, this has only the nature of [what is acquired through! acute discernment; it is not something that is wholesome (kusala) by virtue of one's birth \%va. . 61 Therefore, the Mahayana-samgraha says, "By means of these mental expressions (manojalpa.) which appear as the texts and theses (dharmartha) and are produced of the characteristics of the Dharma of the Great Vehicle, [the bodhisattva enters! the land where one produces resolute belief (adhimukticaryabhumi), or the Path of Vision (darsanamarga) or _ 62 1 the Path of Cultivation- (bhavanamarga). . ." And the Cheng-wei-shih-lun says of Vijnaptimatrata in this context: at the Stage of Provisioning 63 (sambharavastha) one gains profound resolute belief (adhimukti) through erudition and reflection; while, at the Stage of Training (prayogavastha.), one produces the Four Examinations, etc. and projects the vision of reality*^ [of the Path of Vision (darsanamarga)!.^ [The contemplating subject, taken! as effect, is exclusively pure. In this sense, we take the wisdom produced through spiritual cultivation, as the substance of the contemplator because it takes both. the. correct cognition (samyag-jnana) and the subsequently acquired cognition (prsta-labdha-jnana) as its essential substance. The Mahayana-samgraha and other works say that it is by thoroughly 95 comprehending the principle of Thusness,, and then, by controlling all the obstructions, and finally! "by separating oneself completely from all the obstructions that one enters, respectively, the Path of Vision, the. Path:.,of Cultivation, and the'Path: of the Saints (asaiksa-marga); thus.is the sequence. Realizing the VijnaptiC-matrataJ of the absolute, universal is. done only by the correct cognition (samyag- jnana],.and realizing the VijnaptiC-matrataH of the conventional particulars is done only by the subsequently acquired cognition (prstha-lahdha-jnana).^ Such passages in the scripture are numerous and their meaning is clear. It is not necessary to cite any more as proof for these doctrines. (259b27) 1.3 Further Analysis 1.3.1 Contemplation, Concentration and Realization While the preceding [i.e.., §1.1 and §1.21 analyzed CVijnapti- matratal, again into.a subjective and an objective aspect, that was still a discussion of its.most, general meaning. If we speak of Vijnaptimatrata. in the broadest sense, it applies to both the subjective and objective aspects. If, Chowever,! we speak of the 'contemplation of Vijnapti• matrata', this involves only the subjective and not the objective aspect... It. applies to both-impure and pure (sasravanasrava) mental dharmas. .It.applies to both: dispersed (asamahita) and concentrated Csamahita) mental dharmas.^8 It takes as its essential substance all of the three varieties, of wisdom that produced through erudition, through reflection, and through, spiritual cultivation and also the three types of cognition the preliminary (prayogika), the fundamental (mula), and the subsequently acquired '(prstha-labdha).^ If we speak of 'concentration (samadhi) on Vijnaptimatrata', it applies to both the impure and pure mental dharmas, but only the concentrated and not the dispersed. It involves only the wisdom produced through spiritual cultivation1 and not that of erudition and reflection. It applies to all three types of cognition. If we. speak of 'truly realizing Vijnaptimatrata', it involves only pure dharmas and not the impure, only the concentrated and not the dispersed. It involves only the correct cognition (samyag-jnana) and the subsequently acquired cognition, but not the preliminary cognition. In these last two cases, what is said, about the three varieties of wisdom is Estill at the level Seventh Land and below where they are each considered to have a distinct substance %'\l^f^_ , andU not at the level of the. [ultimate] doctrine. Were it not so, then the concentration of Vijnaptimatrata and the true realization of Vijnapti• matrata spoken of above would also be.said to involve the wisdom produced through erudition and.through reflection as is stated in the TO Dasabhimi-vydkhyana.^ . This, should be understood as explained below [in the "Essay on the Three Varieties of Wisdom" X-lkt% H.71 (259c6) 1.3.2 The Five Categories of Vijnaptimatrata Now., in general, if we carefully examine all the various notions of Vijnaptimatrata expounded in the various teachings, we see 72 that there are really no more than five categories. First, there is Vijnaptimatrata in terms of the objective sense-field ^LJ^^efi, . The Abhidharma Sutra says: Hungry ghosts (preta), beasts (tiryak), men and gods Each, according to their respective capacities, Have, different notions of the same thing';';' therefore 73 We accept that objects (artha) have no true existence. Texts such as this, which teach only the objective realm contemplated by Vijnaptimatrata, all fall under the category of Vijnaptimatrata in terms of the objective sense-field. The second-category is Vijnaptimatrata in terms of doctrine T^Jt *ll J exemplified by such verses as, Because thought clings to itself. 75 The Vijnaptimatrata doctrines declared in the Avatamsaka Sutra, the Sandhinirmocana Sutra, and other works all fall under the category of Vijnaptimatrata in terms of doctrine. Third, is Vijnaptimatrata in terms of abstract universals s as exemplified by the Trimsikd verse that says:. . All the developments.of vijnana are either That which, discriminates or that which, is discriminated; By virtue of this, they do not exist, and Therefore everything is nothing but con- 75 ceptualization;,(vi jnapti-matra). The principles that thus establish Vijnaptimatrata all fall under the category of Vijnaptimatrata in terms of abstract universals. Fourth, is: Vijnaptimatrata in terms of practice^^fjE fijr; it is exemplified by verses such as: The bodhisattva, in the state of concentration - 16 It is also exemplified by the Four Types of Examination (paryesana) and by the Four Exact Comprehensions (yathabhuta-parijnana), etc. These all fall under the category of Vijnaptimatrata in terms of practice. Fifth, is Vijnaptimatrata in terms of its resulting fruit/: /f^ HHK . The Buddhabhumi Sutra says, "It is in the Great Mirror Cognition (mahadarsajnana) that all spheres (dhatu), sense-realms 77 (visaya) and perceptions (vijnana) appear." The Tathagatagundlamkara Sutra says The untainted mentation (vijnana) of the Tathagatas Is limpid (visuddha); it is the pure (anasrava) realm, Liberated from all obstacles (avarana),and 78 Associated with the Great Mirror Cognition. The' Ch'eng-wei-shih-lim says Cof the fruit3: It is the pure realm (dhatu), Inconceivable, good, immutable, and Blessed; it is that Body of Liberation, 79 Named the Dharmatbody] of the Great Sage. The acquired fruits of Vijnaptimatrata, which are thus taught, all fall under the category of Vijnaptimatrata in terms of its fruit. (259c2l) 80 1.3.3 The Six Divisions The doctrine of Vijnaptimatrata. in five categories expounded here, includes, without exception., all varieties of Vijnaptimatrata. Among the doctrines [found in the scriptures], however, various and different things are taught, with regard to the level of meaning and according to what is most opportune, under the first category of Vijnaptimatrata in terms of the objective sense-field. 1. Some scriptures discuss [the first category of] Vijnapti• matrata on the basis of what is.clung to. The Lahkdvatdra states: Because thought clings to itself, Thought appears" as • the manifestation ' of external objects. Because these sense-objects (drsya) do not exist 8l They are nothing but thought. [This passage illustrates the first alternative!] because it shows that the objective sense-field is an unreal manifestation based only on [thought ] clinging to thought. 2. Some scriptures elucidate [the first category] of Vijnapti• matrata on the basis of the impurity [of the sense-field]. The Avatamsaka Sutra states: "The three world-realms are nothing but 82 thought (cittamatra)." [This passage illustrates the second alter• native] because it teaches Vijnaptimatrata with reference to the worldliness [of the sense-field]. 3. Some scriptures discuss [the first category of] Vijnaptimatrata on the basis of what is clung to and according to what exists conditionally. A verse from the Trimsikd says: The notions of self (atman) and truly existing dharmas, which arise in provisional discourse Have a variety of different permutations; All of which depend on developments of mentation / • .— x 83 (vijnanaJ. [This passage illustrates the third alternative,] because it [teaches the Vijnaptimatrata of the sense-field] on the basis.of the production of clinging both to the two, [i.e., self and dharmas] and to the subjective and objective components (darsananimittabhaga), which arise 101 84 from. the verifying component (sam.vittihha.ga) of mentation (vijnana), and also on the basis of the notions of self and dharmas declared by mundane teachers and by the Holy Scripture.^ 4. Some scriptures discuss [the first category] of Vijnapti• matrata on the basis of sentient beings. The Vimdlaktrti-nirdesa says, "Through purity of thought, sentient beings are pure: through o Y the defilement (samklesa) of thought, sentient beings are defiled." 5. Some scriptures discuss Cthe first category] of Vijnapti• matrata on the basis of all dharmas, both conditioned and unconditioned (samskrtasamskrta). TheSandhinirmocana declares that, "All objects (alambana) of mentation (vijnana) are nothing but manifestations of + .. ,,88 mentation. 6. Some scriptures discuss [the first category] of Vijnapti• matrata. according to how a thing [i.e., the supposed object] is referred to. An Abhidharma Sutra verse says: Hungry ghosts (preta), beasts (tiryak), man, and gods Each, according to their respective capacities, 89 [Have different notions of the same thing]. . . [This verse illustrates the sixth alternative] because it discusses Vijnaptimatrata in terms of the fact that one thing is referred to [differently by different beings]. Thus there are innumerable doctrinal categories and divisions. The six [alternative] divisions cited above categorize and encompass all doctrines... It is only the fifth of the above Cl.3-3-53 however, that completely exhausts the full meaning of the principle. This is so, because it states in a general way that everything is vijnapti-mat In some cases we restrict the categories of Vijnaptimatrata 90 to three: sense-field, practice, and fruit. These are analyzed more thoroughly in [my) Commentary on the Heart Sutra. ^1 (260a9) 103 Section Two: Critical Analysis of the Term 2.1 The Meaning of Vijnaptimatrata 2.1.1 Vigyiapti The Sanskrit vijnapti fft is translated "by shih ; in this context shih means 'knowing discursively' or 'discriminating' 11192 That which has mentation (vijnana) as its characteristic [the eight vijnanasH, that which is associated with mentation [the six classes of mental coefficients], the developments of mentation [the subjective and objective portions], the modalities of mentation [the twenty-four citta-viprayukta-dharmas], and the real, nature•of mentation [ThusnessD, all these five dharmas the absolute universal 9k and the relative particulars are inseparable from vijnana and, ., . 95 therefore, are said to be nothing but conceptualizatLcn(.vijnapti-matra). Were it not so, Thusness would not be Vijnaptimatrata (Conceptualization only-ness). This is not to say, on the other hand, that there is only one single Thought and. nothing else whatsoever. Since it encompasses everything else and goes back to Vijnana, everything is collectively defined by this term 'vijnapti'. If it did not encompass and go back to Reality ,then it would not be called Thus^^j..^^ (260alU) 104 2.1.2 -matrata The Sanskrit -mdtratd j3p; «.Jl3. (var.00. ) ^ is translated "by V>ei\zJ^. Maira has three meanings. 1. The first is matra in the sense of 'selecting out and holding to' ,^as when we reject jSj^j^the Imaginary (parikalpita) self-hood of both beings and dharmas, while seizing on ^f^jj^the Dependent (paratantra) characteristics and the Absolute (parinispanna) aspect of vijnana. The Ch'eng-wei-shih-lun says that the expression '-matrata' is meant to deny the notion of a self or dharmas existing apart from vijnana, but not to deny thought and mental coefficient's Ccaitta), that do exist inseparable from vijnana."'"00 (260al8) 2. The second meaning is matra in the sense of 'definitely' % L 101 102 or 'certainly' Therefore [part of a verse in! an old translation of the Madhyanta-vibhdga says: Within this there definitely is emptiness, 103 In that there is also this. This-means that within conventional particulars there definitely is the absolute universal ^^J^^ and within that absolute universal, there definitely are conventional particulars. These two particulars and universal are defined^^"^Cby'matra(ta)' 1 as falling within what is expressed by 'vijnapti'; and this demonstrates that the [duality! of apprehenso'r and apprehended does not exist.10^ (260a2l) 105 3. The third meaning is matra in the sense of 'making clear what is superior' -^is meaning is illustrated by the Sastra- master Gopa in his Vimsatika commentary where he says, "When the text says Vijnaptimatrata, it mentions only the sovereign i-J^^' According to reason (yukti)• however, this includes [not just thought (citta), but! the mental constituents (caitta) as well, just as when we say, 'The king is coming!.' we know that it is never without his retinue of ministers and attendants."10'' These are the three different meanings. Currently, in the context of Vijnaptimatrata,'matra' is usually glossed with the first meaning, 'selecting out and holding to'. (260a24) 2.2 Discussion 2.2.1 Vijnapti-matra vs. Citta-matra [Why do the sastras say conceptuali-zation-only (vijnapti-matra), while the sutras say thought-only (citta-matra)?!''Conceptualization (vijnapti) is the same as thought (citta). Because thought 'accumulates'10^ and gives rise to variegated pictures [i.e., the vijnapti!, the sutras take it as the principal factor JL. and, on that 107 basis,state 'thought-only' (citta-matra). The sastras, however, take the discriminating '/J JJ'J and understanding ~^ jj^ [activity of 108 the mind! as their basis, and say that everything is conceptualization only (vijnapti-matra). Some say that the doctrine of the sutras applies to both cause and resultant fruit; and so the sutras, speaking comprehensively, 106 say citta-matra. Whereas, what is taught by the sastras lies only in the realm of cause, and so the sastras say only vijnapti-matra. Vijnapti's meaning of 'discerning and analyzing' pertains at the causal level, and the practical utility of 'vijnapti' is powerful; therefore [the sastrasD teach that it is 'vijnapti' that is 'matra'.. These two doctrines citta-matra and vijnapti-matra do not differ in meaning. The Vimsatikd says, "Thought (citta), mind (manas), mentation (vijnana), and conceptualization (vijnapti ) are but differences of name."10^ Vijnaptimatrata, understood as "the only-ness that is of vijnapti", is' a karmadharaya compound"!"10 Others, including the Lokayatas and Bhavaviveka, have established doctrines of 'objective- field-only-ness' (visaya-matrata). In order to distinguish our doctrine from;theirs, we say 'the only-ness of vijnapti'. [The object-field is a development of vijnana, so] relying thus on the principal[i.e. , what is primary and not derivative], we cannot go astray (260b2) 2.2.2 Vijnaptimatrata vs. Prajna In order to cause beings to relinquish conceptualization (vijnapti) and to.rely on wi,sdom. (prajna), the sastras teach the expression 'Vijnaptimatrata.' If we speak of the subjective aspect, then wisdom is dominant and conceptualization is secondary. If we take as our focus the objective-field (visaya), then it is in ever case inseparable from thought.(citta). Now.the sastras take the objective aspect [as their focus] and therefore call their doctrine conceptualization-only-ness 107 (Vijnaptimatrata). Again: because [vijnapti] is not separate from, and relies on, the principal [i.e., vijnana or citta], the sastras call their doctrine Vijnaptimatrata. Certainty (nis'citatva), [however] comes from the subjective aspect [rather than the objective]; therefore one should rely on wisdom (prajna). Again, taking [what brings] bliss as their topic, the sutras in every case only call their doctrine the [Perfection of] Wisdom; whereas, the sastras take [what is to be] ..abhorred as significant and expound both When we take as our principal doctrine the fact that all dharmas ultimately go back to the., unconditioned [Absolute (parinispanna)], we say all dharmas are Thusness. When [from a different viewpoint] we take as our principal doct;rine the fact that all dharmas go back to the conditioned [Dependent (paratantra)]., then we say all dharmas are con- ceptuaiization-only (vijnapti-matra). Finally, when we take as our principal doctrine the fact that all dharmas go back to intuitive discernment (pravicaya)^"^then we say that everything is wisdom (prajna). This [concludes] what is titled "Section Two: A Critical Study of the term." (260bl0) Section Three: Explanation of the Distinction and the Unity In the above title 'distinct' ^means ''separate'^ , and 'united with'^* means 'the same as' . The title means that, since all the sutras and sastras have each stated various doctrines under different names, we shall now explain them in terms of their basic unity. These various doctrines are only distinctions in the basic meaning of Vijnaptimatrata; there is no substantial difference •"'among' .-. them. (260bl3) [The various doctrines discussed here are divided into five main groups: those that have one term, those that have two terms, and 112 so on up to those that have five terms.! 3.1 Doctrines Having One Term Of those doctrines having one term, there are thirty-one. 3.1.1 In the Avatamsaka 'Sutra and other works, that which denies that there are sense-fields (visaya) separate from vijnana 113 - —• is called Thought-only-ness (citta-matrata). In the Eadhayanta Vibti'agay, that which denies the ways of clinging to the extremes Cof nihilism and eternalism! is called the Middle Way (madhyama pratipad). In the Prdgnqpdramita Sutras , that which elucidates the discerning (pravicaya) nature Cof wisdom! is called the Perfection 109 of Wisdom (prajna-paramita). In the Lotus Sutra that which elucidates ultimate conveyance11^ is called the One Vehicle (ekayana).11^ These four doctrinal terms Thought-only-ness, the Middle Way, the Perfection of Wisdom, and the One Vehicle apply to both the subjective and the objective aspect; they also apply to the con• templation of both the absolute (paramartha) and the conventional (samvrti) fields Cof knowledge]. However, Cof the three kinds of cognition within the subjective aspect,] the correct cognition (samyag-jnana) involves only the absolute, whereas the preliminary cognition (prayogika-jnana) and the subsequently acquired cognition (prstha-labdha-jnana) involve both the absolute and the conventional.11^ 117 But if we speak of realization, then the subsequently acquired cognition involves only the conventional realm. (260bl9) ll8 There are, however, some that say of the COne Vehicle doctrine] in the Lotus Sutra that it has as its basis (asraya) only the fruition wisdom Cand is thus beyond the causal level]. The sutra, Cthey claim], says merely that three carts wait outside the door, Cnot that they are means of escaping the burning house]. Therefore, what are called the means-, of exit from the house Ci.e., the effective causes of liberation] are being carried out in the folds of Cthe father's] robe,climbing on the table Cto get out the window], or leaving through the door; the One Vehicle is not named among these Cas a cause]. This view is, indeed, contrary to reason (yukti). The sravakas, the pratyeka-buddhas and the non-relapsing (avaivartika) bodhisattvas mount this jewelled cart Ci.e., the One Vehicle] and 119 go directly to the Platform of the Path Ci.e., enlightenments. Therefore, the One Vehicle CfunctionsH at the level of cause Cand resultant fruit 1. Moreover,since the Six Dharmas taught in the Srimdla-sutra'^" ' already have the Great Vehicle as their purport, it must apply to the preliminary CcausalU stage as well Cas the fruition . stageH. A full exposition of this is provided below in the "Essay on the Vehicles". (260b24),• 3.2.2 CContinuing the list of the thirty-one doctrines having one term,] in the Srimald-Sutra, that which denies all forms of -vain delusion (abhuta-parikalpa) is called the One Truth. Also, that which clarifies the root or foundation of all dharmas, is called the One Base. Both the emptiness Cof the parikalpitaH by which one realizes the Absolute and also the emptiness of that realization itself are called Emptiness. That which displays the different entanglements, which manifests all the Buddha virtues, and whence all Buddhas issue forth is called the Tathagata-garbha. That which elucidates the essentially undefiled true dharma-nature is called the Mind that is Pure by Nature; and that which is the substance of the Buddha-virtues is called the Dharma-kaya. In the Vimaldkirti-nirdesa, that which denies that there are distinctions within the ultimate universal is called the Dharma-theme 122 of Ion-duality (advayadharma-mukhapravesa). In the Ta-hui-ching . that which demonstrates that dharmas neither arise nor i\V •MA' cease is also called the doctrine of Non-production and Non- 123 destruction. In the Mahdparinirvdna-sutra, that which shows the Ill cause of the Dharma-kaya is frequently called the Buddha-nature. In the Lahkdvatdra-sutra3 that which manifests what is beyond verbal 124 - - expression is called the Inconceivable (acintya). In the Yogdedra• bhumi- and other treatises, that which cannot be established or fixed conceptually,12'' is called the Indeterminate (avyavasthita) .12^ In the Mahdydna-samgraha and other works, that which "manifests its 127 universality, continuity. . .," is called the Absolute (parinispanna). In Sthiramati's Commentary to the Abhidharma-samuccaya and other treatises, that which elucidates what is not delusional and not - 128 inverted- - • is called Thusness '(tat-hata.). - These thirteen doctrinal terms [i.e., those of §3.1.23 are only universale• applying to the objective aspect and only to the field of absolute knowledge. (260c6) 3.1.3 For fear that the text will become too prolix, only a few of the one-term doctrines have been summarily cited here. Indeed, there are many more. There is the Dharma-realm (dharma-dhatu); Dharma-ness (dharmata), the quality of not. being false and delusional (abhuta- 129 130 parikalpatva), the quality of being unaffected (avikaratva), the quality of universal same-ness (samata), the quality of being free of re-birth, the fixed-ness of all dharmas, the dwelling Cof tathata3 in all dharmas (dharmasthitita) the Dharma-station, the Pinnacle of ^ 131 Reality (bhutakoti), Space (akasa) , the Inexistence (nairatmya) Cof self and dharmas3, the Absolute (paramartha), and the Realm of the Inconceivable (acintyadhatu); these fourteen doctrines are explained 132 more fully in the Greater C100:,000; Vermel Pra jrld-paramitd Sutra. 112 All the thirty-one listed above are single-term doctrines . (260c]Q ) 3.2 Doctrines Have Two Terms There are four doctrines with two terms. 3.2.1 In the Yogdedrabhunri, we find that what is conceptually 133 fixed and what is not conceptually fixed differ in that the former is shallow and obvious- whereas the latter is deep •' and abstruse; therefore they are called the Determinate and the Indeterminate Truths (vyavasthitavyavasthitasatya) which are the same as the doctrines of the Four Holy Truths that are Fashioned (krta) and the Four Holy Truths that are Unfashioned (akrta) found in the Srimdla . Sutra. And in the Mahaparinirvdna Sutra there is what is called the Two 136 Truths, absolute (paramartha) and conventional (samvrti). In the Hsien-yang-lun that which specifies and that which is 137 specified are called the Two Dharmas, Name and Thing. These three binary doctrines [Determinate and Indeterminate, Two Truths, Name and ThingH apply to both the subjective and the objective aspect; they involve both the absolute and the conventional, and also all three kinds of cognition: the initial Ci.e., prayogika- jnanaH, the middle Ci.e., mula- or samyag-jnanaH, and the subsequent 138 Ci.e., prstha-labdha-jnanall. (260cl5) 3.2.2 In the Mahdydna-samgraha and.other works, that which makes clear the inexistence of what is clung to is called the 139 Nonsubstantiality of Person and Dharmas (pudgaladharmanairatmya). This doctrine also applies to both the subjective and the objective 113 aspect. It involves only the absolute, however, and not the conventional. It still applies to all three kinds of cognition: the initial, the middle and the subsequent.(260cl7) 3.3 Doctrines Having Three Terms There are four doctrines that have three terms. 3.3.1 In the Sandhinirmocana Sutra and other works, the doctrine that makes clear the categories and distinctions that apply to all the dharmas, determining what exists [paratantra and parinispanna] and what does not exist [parikalpita], what are relative particulars [paratantra] and what is the absolute universal [pari• nispanna], is called the doctrine of the Three Aspects of Own-being (trisvabhava). Also, the doctrine that makes clear how these three aspects are [to be understood as] free from any imaginary (parikalpita) reality is called the Three-fold Absences Of Own-being (trividha • nihsvabhavata. )^° These two doctrines involve only the objective aspect, though they still apply to all three kinds of cognition and to both the absolute and the conventional fields. If, however, one speaks of the contemplation of these two doctrines [trisvabhava and trividha. : nihsvabhavata "],then it is only the subjective aspect that is in• volved and not the objective aspect. It still applies to all three kinds of cognition and to both the absolute and the conventional.(260c21) 3-3.2 In the Yogacara-bhumi and other works the doctrine that elucidates the skillful means for parting one's bonds is called the 114 doctrine of the Three Entrances to Liberation (vimoksamukha).1^1 Also, the doctrine that expounds the verification of the abstruse universal is called the doctrine of the Three Kinds of Non-arising 142 Dharma Patience (anutpattikadharmaksanti). These two doctrines involve only the subjective aspect and not the objective aspect. They involve only the fundamental cognition [i.e., the correct cognition or samyag-jnanaH and the subsequently acquired cognition. They apply to both the absolute and the conventional.(260c23) 3.k Doctrines Having Four Terms Of doctrines with four terms, there are four. 3.4.1 In the Bodhisattva-bhumi3that which clarifies the summation of doctrine is called the FourUdanas, viz., 1.) All con• structions (samskara) are non-enduring; 2.) All impurity is suffering (duhkha)^ 3.) All dharmas are without self-hood [i.e., ultimately nonexistent]; k.) Nirvana is quiescent (santa).1^3 In the Treatise on the Perfection of Wisdom (Ta-chih-tu-lun)3 /v. jjt §V8) .> that which makes clear the distinction [between different points of view] is called the doctrine of the Four Siddhantas*, viz., 1.) the mundane point of view (laukika siddhanta); 2.) the absolute point of view (paramarthika siddhanta); 3.) the therapeutic point of view (prati- paksika siddhanta); and 4.) the individual point of view (prati- paurusika siddhanta) The preceding two doctrines apply to both the subjective aspect and the objective aspect, to both the absolute and the conventional, and to all three kinds of cognition.(260c29) 3.k.2 In all the sastras, the means by which one initially contemplates what is coarse are called the Four Examinations (paryesana) .1^They involve only the subjective aspect and not .'the objective aspect, only the preliminary cognition and not the middle or subsequent cognitions. They apply to both the absolute and the" conventional. (26la2) 3.4.3 Also in all the sastras, the means by which one sub• sequently contemplates what is subtle are called the Four Exact Comprehensions (yathabhutha-parijnana)They also involve only the subjective aspect and not the objective aspect. They apply to all three kinds of cognition Chowever 1, Tand/fall.,within' -both the absolute and the conventional. (26la4) 3.5 Doctrines Having Five Terms Of doctrines with five terms, there is one. In the Sutra of the Benevolent Ring, the doctrine by which the stages Cof the bodhisattva pathH can be distinguished and certified is called the doctrine of the Five Degrees of Patience. First is the Subduing Patience, because it is the certification that the passions have been initially subdued Cin the preliminary practice!) before the Ten Lands (bhumi). Second is the Patience of Faith, which is established in the First, Second and Third Lands as one attains an unshakeable faith because all mundane categories are taken together as the same. Third is the Patience.of Following, which is attained in the Fourth, Fifth 116 and Sixth Lands,because one follows the supr.amundane practices. Fourth is the Non-arising Dharma Patience, which is attained in the Seventh, Eighth and Ninth Lands, because one constantly and spontaneously views the principle that all dharmas are sign-less (animitta). Fifth is the Patience of Quiescence, which is attained in the Tenth Land,, the Buddha-land, and the Cause and Fruition Stage, because one becomes 147 completely and fully quiescent. These five involve only the subjective aspect and not the objective aspect. The First Degree of Patience involves only the preliminary cognition, while the latter four degrees should apply 148 to the remaining two kinds of cognition. All Five Degrees of Patience apply to both.the absolute and the conventional. (26lall) 3.6 Doctrines Having Six and More Terms There are other doctrines called the Six Clear Comprehensions (abhisamayantika)j1^^ the Seven Components of Enlightment (bodhyanga)1^0 the Eight-fold Holy Path (astangamarga^^the Nine Varieties of 152 Calming (samatha), the Ten Dharmas of Those who have Nothing More 153 to Learn (asaiksadharma). the Four States of Mindfulness (smrtyupasthana),^^^the Four Right Efforts (samyak-prahana) 156 the Four Elements of Supernatural Power (rddhipada), the Five Faculties (indriya) the Five Powers (bala) j^^etc. These doctrines Care common to all the three vehicles andU are not within the proper Ci.e., exclusive!! contemplation of the bodhisattvas. Therefore, they are not discussed separately here.1^ (26lal4) 3.1 Conclusion Thus, although all of these doctrines are taught under different names, they are all [merely! specific names for the knowledge of the realm of "Vijnaptimatrata [expounded! here. (26lal5 Section Four: Which Mode of Mentation Performs the Contemplation? 4.1 According to Other Buddhist Schools The Mahasamgikas and others^^declare that the six sensory- perceptions (vijnana^^are defiled (rakta) and that all of them can become purified (virakta). The Vatsiputrias and others^^declare that the first five sensory vijnanas are neither defiled nor purified, 163 whereas the sixth can be both. The Sarvastivadins and others say that all six vijnanas are defiled, but only the sixth can be purified, Within the Mahayana, some of the former teachers said that it is the seventh vijnana Ci.e., manasH that is purified on the Path of Cultivation (bhavana-marga), while others said that it is the eighth 164 Ci.e., alayaH that is purified on the Path of Cultivation. All of these are incorrect doctrines and cannot be relied upon. (26la20) 4.2 The Correct View 4.2.1 The Subjective Aspect. If we speak of mentation '.(vijnana) in its subjective aspect, , 45- then, at the causal level, it can only be the sixth vijnana._ This is so because the first scroll of the logdcdrdbhwni says that the only thing capable of effecting separation from greed (raga)1^ is 164 the unique action of the sixth vijnana, mano-vijnana. It applies to both the absolute and the conventional, as well as to all three kinds of cognition. CAgain, this can be true only of the sixth vijiianall because the other seven vijffanas are incapable of ' activating;..generalized objects (.samastalambana), of contemplating universal truth.;."and, thus-, of entering - into a Reality. The Yogdadrabhumi, moreover, says that this is so because only the sixth vijnana discerns and reflects on objects (alambana)To the extent 169 that the seventh vijnana is drawn out by the sixth vijnana, it too may be taken to function in the subjective aspect, applying, Cin that case] to the middle and the subsequent of the three kinds of cognition Ci.e., samyag-jnana and prsta-labdha-jnana3. The fruition level, i.e., Buddhahood, applies to all vijnanas and is capable of the contemplation of Vijnaptimatrata. Three bf the Four Cognitions Cviz>. , the Great Mirror Cognition (mahadarsa-jnana) - the cognition of Universal Sameness (samata-jnana), and the Cognition of Profound Contemplation (pratyaveksana-jnana)1 apply to both parts of the two divisions: absolute and conventional, universal and particulars. The Cognition of Action Ci.e., the Cognition that Performs What is to be Done (krtyanusthana-jnana)1 does not involve the absolute; it contemplates only the conventional vijnana. This explanation is based on the sastras. On the bases of reason (yukti), however, some CsayD the Cognition of Action also involves the absolute. That which is only the perception (vijnana) of Thusness is definitely not the subjective aspect. (26la27) 4.2.2 The Objective Aspect If we speak of the objective aspect, then all eight vijnanas apply at both the causal and the fruition level. The perception of Thusness is also thus, Ci.e., under the objective aspect]. (_26la28) 120 ' Section Five: Clarifying what Distinguishes the Classes mm 5.1 The Absolute Aspect of Mentation The first of these classes is mentation (vijnana) in its absolute (paramartha) aspect. 5.1.1 As Contemplated by the First and Third Cognition If it is a contemplation of the preliminary cognition (prayogika- jnana) or the subsequently acquired cognition (prstha-jnana), then it is the common or complex characteristic (samanya-laksana) of things [that are contemplated], rather than the distinct characteristic (prabheda- 170 laksana). This is so, because all the dharmas are taken together as 171 a general object (samastalambana). (26lbl) 5.1.2 As Contemplated by the Second Gognition If it is contemplated with the fundamental cognition (mula- jnana-samyag-jnana.), then it is the distinct characteristic [that is contemplated], rather than the common characteristics. This is so, because, in this case, all the dharmas are known distinctly. 1. However, even though the substance [i.e., the own-being (sva-bhava)] of a thing is not a common characteristic, all myriad dharmas are,.nonetheless, inseparable from these [i.e., from the characteristics they have in.common with other dharmas]. According to reason, then, the above are the same, and not two [different 121 cases!. Therefore one should still, [even with reference to funda• mental cognition!, say it is the common characteristics [that are contemplated]. The sutras and sastras say that the act of mind focused on the common characteristics (samanyalaksana-mamasikara?) is able to 172 sever doubts: we can explain this assertion on the basis of the above doctrinal principle [that all dharmas are inseparable form their common characteristics] and also on the basis of preliminary cognition 2. However, in the case of all dharmas, each has individually its own universal and this is realized separately within each. One should not say that this is a common characteristic. (26lb6) 5.2 The Dependent Aspect of Mentation [The next of these classes is] mentation (vijnana) in its 173 Dependent (paratantra) aspect [when seen] as illusory. 5.2.1 The Eight Modes of Mentation. 1. Some say that the substance [of all experience], whether at the causal or the fruition level, is the same single vijnana, one substance whose functions are numerous. This is the doctrine of 17 k the bodhisattvas of one category. 2. Others state that the substance, whether at the causal or the fruition level, is dual. The section on the "Land Endowed with Thought" (sacittika bhumi) in the "Viniscaya-samgrahani" of the Yogdad^abhumi states that this refers to the fundamental mode of — 175 mentation (mula-vijnana) and the developed modes (pravrtti-vijnana). 3. In some cases, the causal level alone is declared to have three parts. The Madhyanta-vighdga says, "Vijnana transforms itself into what appear as external objects (artha) and beings (sattva), 176 as a self (atman) and as representations (vijnapti ~f ). . . ." The Trirns'ikd says, "[The three] vijnanas are fruition, cogitation, 177 and the discrimination of. the sense, fields." The most frequently experienced aspect of the eighth vijnana. is the fruition nature [i.e. 178 karmic retribution, especially continual rebirth]; that is why the treatises (sastra) emphasize it rather than the other aspects. When the eighth vijnana is considered under the name adana-vijfiana (that which retains the seed potentialities and the manifestations), then according to reason (yukti), it applies at the fruition level as well h. In some cases, the causal stage and the fruition stage together are declared to have three parts, vis., thought [citta as the eighth vijnana], mind [manas as the seventh vijfiana], and 179 perception [vijnana as specifically the six sensory vijnanas]. 5. In some cases, the fruit alone is declared to be four, as in the Buddhabhumi Sutra and other works, which teach the topic l80 of the Four Cognitions. 6. In some cases, cause :and fruit together are declared to be six, as in the Srimald Sutra where six vijnanas are taught. 7- In some cases, cause and fruit together are declared to be seven, as in the doctrines that teach the Seven Thought Realms x 182 (dhatuj. 8. In some cases, cause and fruit are declared to be eight, 183 vis., the Eight Modes of Mentation (vijnana).' 9. In some cases, cause and fruit taken together are declared to he nine. The ninth Ci.e., "Sagatham"] chapter of the Lahkdvatara Sutra says: All the modes of mentation, eight or nine, Are like the waves formed + 184 m water. If, according to the Wu-hsiang-lun ^B'ft^"'"^ and the T'ung-hsing-ahing }g| *|^)l.^vjjj t>^^ one takes Thusness (tathata) as the ninth Cvijnanal,-. it is because the absolute and the conventional l87 Caspect of the eighth] are being discussed side by side. Now we, Con the other hand], take the purified state of the eighth or base vijnana to be Cwhat others call] the ninth, because the defiled and the pure states of the base vijnana, Cthe eighth,] are discussed separately Cwithout being considered two different modes, an eighth and a ninth]. The Tathdgata-gimdlamkara Sutra says: The unstained, vijnana of .the Tathagata Is the pure, undefiled (anasrava) realm; Resolving all obstruction, l88 It is connected with the Great Mirror Cognition. In this text, it says that the unstained (vimala or amala) vijnana goes together with the Great Mirror Cognition, and because the ninth vijnana is further called the amala-vijnana; therefore, one should know that the defiled and pure aspect of the eighth vijnana are being 124 discussed separately, and that it is this latter that is taken to he a ninth vijnana. 10. In some cases, the cause is [considered] eight and the fruit, three Cof the eight] vijnanas, as in the Buddhxbhumi and other works, which say it is so because the first fifteen realms 189 (dhatu) are exclusively impure (sasrava). 11. In some cases, the cause is [considered] eight and the fruit, seven [of the eight] vijnanas. The sastra-master Sthiramati says this is so because mind (i.e., manas, the seventh vijnana] is 1Q0 exclusively defiled. 12. [Finally,] it is said in some cases that all eight vijnanas are present in both the cause and the fruit. Such was taught to be the correct doctrine by. Dharmapala and others ?~^{26lb6) 5.2.2 The Components of Perception [Next are the distinctions regarding the number of components (bhaga)] within mentation in its Dependent (paratantra) aspect. Some declare that there is only one, the self-verifying component (samvitti- bhaga). This is. the view of the master Sthiramati. Some declare that there are only two, the subjective component (darsana-bhaga) and the objective component (nimitta-bhaga). This is the view of the master 192 Nanda. Some say there are only three, the self-verifying component, the subjective component, and the objective component. This is the view of the master Dignaga. [Finally,] some say that there are four components., adding to the above three, the. verifier of the self- verifying component (samvitti-svasamvitti-bhaga). This is the view of the master Dharmapala. (26lb29) 5.2.3 The Eight Modes are Neither the Same nor Different. All such distinctions among the vijnanas pertain only when they are discussed from one particular viewpoint. CA more comprehensive understanding is] based on the passage in the Ch'eng-wei-shih-lun where it states that the eight vijnanas, with respect to their own- being, cannot be said to be definitely different from each other. This is so,.because they have the nature of being both cause and fruit, because their nature is not. fixed, and because they are like the waves in water. Nor, on the other hand, are they definitely the same. This is so, because their aspects (akara), their bases (asraya), their objects (alambana) and their associated Cmental coefficients] 193 (viprayukta) are different, because their arising and extinction are different, and because their roles in the perfuming process (vasana)^"^are different1^ The Lankavatara Sutra says: There are eight modes: citta, manas, and Cthe six] vijnanas. Conventionally, their characteristics (laksana) are distinguished, But absolutely, their characteristics are not distinguished, For, Cat that level] there is neither that which characterizes nor that which is characterized. , (26lc5) 5.3 Conclusion All such distinctions among classes of vijnana are called con• ceptualization-only (vijnapti-matra). With respect to this illusory mentation ,when contemplated with the preliminary cognition, only the common characteristics (samanya-laksana) Cof things] are cognized, not the in dividual: characteristic (sva-laksana); when contemplated with the subsequently acquired cognition however, the contemplation of their in .dividual ; characteristic is included as well. This is so, because, [by means of the subsequently acquired cognition] each relative entity of the Dependent (paratantra) aspect is individually verified.1^ (26lc8) Section Six: The Stages in Cultivating Realization 198 Clarification of the Stages 6.1.1 Different Accounts in'the'Scriptures 1. The Mahayana-Samgraha declares: At what points is the bodtiisattva able to enter Cinto the characteristics of what is to be known (Jfieyalaksana)]? It is said that, with regard to these mental expressions (manojalpa) endowed with vision the expressions that take the appearance of the Dharma and its meanings and that are born of the characteristics of the Mahayana Dharma the bo.dhisattva is either in the Land where One Practices Firm Resolve (adhimukticaryabhumi), or on the Path of Vision (darsana-marga), or on the Path of Cultivation (bhavana-marga), or on the Ultimate Path (nistha-marga).Clf he is in the Land where One Practices Firm Resolve,] it is because, with regard to the fact that all dharmas are merely conceptualization (Vijnaptima• trata), he becomes firmly resolved based on what he has heard. Clf he is on the Path of Vision,] it is because he succeeds in exactly (yathabhutam) penetrating Cthe Doctrine]. Clf he is on the Path of Cultivation,] it is because he brings all the obstacles under control. CAnd, if he is on the Ultimate Path,] it is because he becomes completely 194 separated from all the obstacles. Asavabhava says in his commentary Con this passage]: Some reside in the Land where One Practices Firm Resolve because, in the midst of the fact that all dharmas are conceptualization only', they produce a firm resolve basing themselves only on Ethe teachings] they have heard. Others are • on the Path of Vision because they succeed in exactly penetrating these mental expressions . . . .Others are on the Path of Cultivation because this cultivation counteracts and controls the obstacle to what is to be known (Jneya- varana). And some are on the Ultimate Path, because they are extremely pure and completely separated from the obstacles.200 (26lcl7). The Ch'eng-wei-shih-lun says: How does one gradually enter (praskandati) Vijnaptimatrata? All bodhisattvas, with regard to the characteristics and nature of Vijnapti- _ 201 C-matrataH become capable of a profound - 20 (gambhira) belief and understanding (adhimukti) at the Stage of Provisioning (sambharavastha)1. At the Stage of Preliminary Training (prayoga- vastha), they are able gradually to subdue and eliminate both what is apprehended (grahaka) and what apprehends (grahya), and to produce (abhinirharanti) the View of Reality (tattvadar- sana). At the Stage of Penetration (prativedha- vastha) they exactly penetrate or comprehend. At the Stage of Cultivation (bhavanavastha), they repeatedly cultivate [their realization] in accord with the vision [of the previous stage], subduing and severing ...the remaining obstacles. Arriving at the Ultimate Stage (nisthavastha), they escape all obstacles, becoming complete and lucid, able for the rest of the time to convert the various classes of beings, causing them also to enter the characteristics and nature of 203 Vijnaptimatrata. (26lc23) 3. The fifty-ninth scroll Cof the logdodvabhumil says: How is one able to sever the afflictions (klesa)? What is necessary (kiyata) for it to be suitable to say that the afflictions have been severed? . . . Because the bodhisattva has accumulated the provision of wholesome dharmas Cat the Stage of Provisioning!], because he has attained a realization of the Land of Skillful Means Cat the Stage of Preliminary Training]j because he has a full realization of the Land of Vision Cat the Stage of Penetration], and because he has assembled the Land of Cultivation Cat the Stage of Cultivation], he is able to sever the afflictions and attain the Ultimate Land. It is then that one should say that the bodhisattva has 204 severed all of the afflictions. This is just the same as in the Ch' eng-wei-shih-tun. (26lc27) 6.1.2 ' "Explanation of the Differences. 'The doctrine of four stages in the Mahayana-samgraha holds that the Provisioning Stage (sambharavasta) of hearing (sruta) and thinking (cinta) Cabout the Dharma] is quite long: only after completing a great eon(mahakalpa) of cultivation does one undertake Cthe activities] of the Stage of Initial Training (prayogavastha) and 205 then, in the stage of, concentration, produce the contemplation of Vijnaptimatrata. Emphasizing in its discussion what predominates Lin this period leading up to the Stage of Vision, viz:. , the hearing and thinking about the Dharma], the Mahccydna-samgraha teaches only- four stages. Because [262a] the actual time spent in contemplation Cat the Stage of Training] is relatively short, that stage is sub• sumed [under the first] and. is not taught separately. The doctrine of five stages taught in the Ch'eng-wei-shih-lun and other works is a discussion based on Reality (tattva); it fully distinguishes all the aspects (akara) of spiritual cultivation (bhavana). In the stage preceding the Path of Vision (darsana-marga) there is, indeed,some .subduing and elimination of the afflictions.20^* The Mahayana-samgraha,the Ch'eng-wei-shih-lun and other works each say that, because of the contemplation involved in the examinations performed in [the Four Steps Conducive to Intellectual Penetration — 207 (nirvedha-bhagiyas), vis.,] heat (usmagata), etc., there is some subd.uing and elimination of the afflictions. Those who hasten directly [to Buddhahood following the bodhisattva path] and those who go the long way round [converting only later to the bodhisattva path after progressing on the sravaka or pratyeka buddha path] are the same in the stages prior to the Ten 208 Lands. Those who go the long way round, even though they are becoming pure (anasrava) and are in the kind of discursive con- 209 templation, are,nonetheless, unable to subdue and eliminate the afflictions. This is so, because, not ever having realized real mentation, they are never able to discern the mentation that is like an illusion. (262a6) 131 6.2 Types of Cultivation The preceding paragraphs clarified the stages; the following will distinguish the types of spiritual cultivation (bhavana). Three types of cultivation are distinguished: the cultivation of realization, the cultivation of the characteristics (laksana?), and the cultivation of the stations of existence (bhumi). 6.2.1 Cultivation of Realization. At the stages prior to the Path .'of Vision (darsana-marga), although one produces the contemplation of the Vijnaptimatrata of both the absolute and the conventional, it is only apparent and not real. On entering the Path of Vision, [the bodhisattvasH of both the Path of Vision into Reality and the Path of Vision into the 210 Characteristics [of Vijnaptimatratan discern real mentation; and it is just then that the subsequently acquired cognition of the conventional discerns conventional mentation. The the Fourth Land 211 and before, the absolute and the conventional are only just united. However, as it is done only with much effort (abhoga), the unification can be effected only slightly in the beginning. Arriving at the Sixth 212 Stage, the state of being free of notions (nirnimitta) about things occurs frequently, but one is not yet able to sustain it for a long time. Only then in the Seventh. Land does one succeed in sustaining it for a long time.' It is, however,still similar to preliminary training [in that it still requires effort], and so it too is not yet spontaneous. In the Eighth Land and above, one's cultivation becomes effortless, while spontaneously, and in the midst of emptiness, one gives rise to the supreme practice. Both the absolute and the 132 conventional'mentation permanently take a unified object (alambana). 213 Having arrived at the Land of the Buddhas, three of the Four Cognitions Cviz., the Great Mirror Cognition (mahadarsa-.jna.na), the Cognition of Universal Sameness (samatajnana), and the Cognition of Profound Contemplation (pratyaveksana-jnana)1 are able to take 214 absolute and conventional mentation as their object. The sixth is unspecified, because it follows the mind's inclination (adhyasaya). The Cognition that Completes Things Ci.e., the Cognition that Completes what is to be Done (krtyanusthaha-jnana)D takes only the conventional as its object, because its aspects 215 (akara) and objects (alambana) are shallow, though there are others who say that it also includes the absolute, because its sovereignty (vasitva) is complete. (262al6) 6.2.2 Cultivation of the Characteristics What is termed 'cultivation of the contemplation of Vijnapti• matrata'? This refers to the process by which the seeds (bija) and the Manifestations (samudacara) of the impure (sasrava) and the pure (anasrava) contemplating mind are brought to develop, flourish, grow and mature. In the first stage of cultivation, following the Dharma that has been heard, the cogitation that engenders the sense-fields causes this contemplating mind to ripen in its refinement and become sovereign.21^ Later, when one subdues the.clinging to what is apprehended (grahya) and what apprehends (grahaka), the contemplating mind develops to become clear and superior, while the images making 217 up the sense-fields gradually become more subtle. When the mind 2l8 and the sense-fields suddenly become profound, the contemplation develops to become pure (anasrava)Continuing to development in 2: the same way, it proceeds from the lower degree to the middle degree. Developing further from the middle degree to the highest degree, it 221 reaches the ultimate completion and fulfillment. This is what is 222 termed cultivation. 223 The first two stages involve the three varieties of wisdom in their impure (sasrava) form and the cultivation of both the manifestations (sumudacara) and the seeds (bija); this is so, because the efficacy of the purity acquired from cultivating the seeds accrues only gradually. At the Stage of Penetration (prativedhavastha) Ci.e., the Path of Vision], there is only the wisdom produced through •. . cultivation. It becomes refined and pure. There is cultivation of~ both the manifestations and the seeds, but the cultivation of seeds remains impure. At the Stage of Cultivation: if in the Seventh Land or before, one is equipped with all three varieties of wisdom, both impure and pure, and one undertakes the cultivation of both the manifestations and the seeds. From the Eighth Land onwards, one has the three varieties of wisdom in their pure form and undertakes the cultivation of both the manifestations and the seeds, with the latter again remaining impure. At the Ultimate Stage, the impure dharmas are completely abandoned. Since the pure dharmas have come to completion, there is no further cultivation. One is, however, still equipped with manifestations and seeds and with the pure contemplation of the dual theme of the absolute and the conventional. (262a29) 6.2.3 Cultivation of the Stations of Existence There is the cultivation of acquisition (pratilambha- bhavana) and the cultivation of practice (nisevana-bhavana.) .The ninth, scroll of Sthiramati's Commentary on the Abhidharma-samuecaya says: 225 Moreover, when born to one of these paths, one is able to determine one's habit energy Ci.e., the perfuming effect one's current actions have on the production of wholesome dharmas in the future]. This is called 'cultivation of the acquisition Cof future wholesome dharmas]', because, on the basis of this, all the classes of se.ed-potentialities develop,increase and link together, eventually to be produced. Moreover, the cultivation or practice that actualizes these paths is what is called "the cultivation of practice", because it is by virtue of this that the 226 actualization of these paths is effected. "Practice" refers to the manifest state (samudacara) and acquisition" to the seed-potential state. There are those who are based in one of the lower stations of existence and put forth the thought of one of the same lower stations. Their 'cultivation of. practice' Ci.e., what is manifest (samudacara)] is only of the lower stations,' while their 'cultivation of acquisition' Ci.e., what becomes seed-potentiality] is of the upper stations as well, since, what it 'acquires' is the taking of higher realms as its object which causes its power to flourish and grow. This is so, because Cin this case] both the substance and the function of the lower stations are enhanced; whereas, only the function of the higher 227 stations is enhanced. [This is attested by] a passage in the Ch''eng-wei-shih Lun that says: That the first three of the formless (arupya) stations are said to have this faculty [vis., anajnatam] is because it is the partial, cultivation-acquisition of the superior Path of Vision, Ci.e., it is present as a seed- . , . , .. • 228 potentiality]. There are those who are based in a lower station of existence . and who put forth the thought of a higher station. Their 'cultivation of practice' is of the higher station only, while their 'cultivation 229 of acquisition' is of the lower station as well. There are those who are based in a higher station of existence and who put forth the thought of a higher station. Their 'cultivation of practice' is of the higher station only, while their 'cultivation of acquisition' is also of the lower stations as well 230 Has the higher stations]. There are those who are based in a higher station of existence and who put.forth the thought of a lower station. Their 'cultivation of practice' is of the lower station only, while their 'cultivation of acquisition' is of the higher stations as well. In every case one can, when based'in a higher station of existence, cultivate either the same station or any of the lower stations. If, however, we speak of cultivating a higher station when based in a lower station of existence, this must refer to the cultivation of one who has already attained that higher station [in a 136 previous existence]'or one who has sovereignty over that station [acquired through concentration (samadhi)]. It does not refer to the other, classes, of beings. The passage in [Sthiramati1s] Commentary to the- Abhidharma-samueeaya saying that those of lower 231 station of existence are incapable of cultivating higher stations is a statement pertaining only to the cultivation of either the 2 32 neophyte (adikarmika) or the one who is gradually approaching [the concentration of a higher station]. They have not yet acquired sovereignty (vasitva) and, if they have not attained the higher levels of concentration (samadhi), they are incapable of the higher cultivations because they have either only just produced the fruit [in the case of 233 the latter] or not yet produced fruit [in the case of the former]. It is not the case that those who are superior are thus limited. (262bl5) 137 Section Seven: 23U Of What Nature is The Dharma 1 Contemplation1? There are two varieties' of this constituent of experience (dharma): the 'contemplator' JfJ^^^Ci.e. , the subjective factor]; and the 'contemplated' iSlel Ci. e. , the objective factor]. 7-1 The Subjective Factor The subjective factor is definitely not Imaginary (parikalpita), because the Imaginary is without substance. This is according to the correct doctrine Ci.e., that of Dharmapala]. The impure (sasrava) subjective factor definitely belongs to the Dependent (paratantra), while the pure (anasrava) subjective factor is included under two Cof the three] natures. With respect to whether it is continuous or non-continuous, it belongs to the Dependent (paratantra); whereas, with respect to whether it is impure or pure, it belongs to the Absolute (parinispanna). It is certainly not the case that pure subjective factor belongs exclusively to the Absolute Caspect of existence], because it is not the absolute universal^ . This makes it clear that: In the period before entering the ten lands, there is only an impure and.Dependent subjective factor. In the Seventh Land and before, the ''subjective factor is". Cpartially] impure and Cpartially] pure, and is both Dependent and Absolute. In the Eight Land and above, the subjective factor is only pure, but is still both Dependent and Absolute. (262b22) 138 7.2 The Objective Factor 7.2.1 Three Different Scriptural Sources la. On the nature of objective factor, the Mahayana-samgraha says: 235 Thus, by awakening."to and entering the characteristics of the apparent objects • which are mental expressions, the.Bodhisattva awakens to and enters the Imaginary Nature. By awakening to and entering Vijnaptimatrata, he awakens to and'=enters-• the • Dependent. Nature . . . . If he has 236 destroyed the notion of the Vijnaptimatrata of the classes of seed-potentialities that were perfumed by the preached Dharma which consists of mental expressions... . then, at that time, the intuitive nondiscriminating cognition (nirvikalpaka- ^jnana). . . that.[takes.subject and object! as the same (sama-sama) will have arisen, and he will awaken 237 to and enter the Absolute Nature. lb. Arid, it says further: The [relationship between! name and thing is adventitious; Their", nature should\ be. [thus! examined. With.regard to their dual.aspect one must also deduce that There is nothing but.conceptualization, nothing but representation With, the Exact Comprehensions one sees that there, is no object (artha), 139 That there is.nothing hut discrimination into three. The object does not exist, and so the three do not exist either; To realize this is to enter into the 2 38 Three Natures. The first half of the first verse refers to awakening to and entering the Imaginary (parikalpita), and the second half of the first verse refers awakening to• and entering the Dependent (paratantra) Nature. The second verse refers to awakening to and- entering- the Absolute' (parinispanna) Nature. lc. The Ch'eng-wei-shih-lun-. says: Without having seen Thusness (tathata), One is not able to discern that 239 all constructions Are like magical illusions, etc.: Even though they may be there., they are not real.2^10 2. Thus, the three passages above are not the same. According to the first passage from the Mahayana-samgraha3 it is with the Warmth degree (usmagata) and the Head Degree (murdhan) Cof the Stage of Preliminary Training. (prayogavastha)ll that one enters the Imaginary (parikalpita); then, with.the Acquiescence Degree (ksanti), the Pinnacle of Worldly Truth Degree (laukikagryadharma) also of the Stage of Preliminary Training], one enters the Dependent (paratantra); • 241 and then, with.the first thought of the First Land, one enters the Absolute (parinispanna). According to the second passage from the Mahayana-samgraha, one enters two of the Natures [vis., Imaginary and Dependent] with the Four Examinations, which are part of the Warmth and the Head Degree Cof the Stage of Preliminary Training], and then, with the Four Exact Comprehensions. [also of the Stage of Preliminary Training], one enters the Absolute. According to the Ch'eng-wei-sh-ih-tun passage, one must enter the First Land, and only then does one awaken to the Three Natures. (262c8) 7.2.2 Two Different Doctrinal Views Although there are three passages, there are really only two [different] doctrines: the first is genuine realization and 1. The verse in the Ch'eng-wei-shih-lun is based on what 242 is genuine personal realization. This is because it is only with the two Pure Cognitions---vis.,the fundamental cognitions (mula- jnana) which \-"first'.- realizes the absolute, and the subsequently- acquired wisdom (prstha-labdha-jnana) which later realizes the conventional that the latter two Natures [Dependent and Absolute] can be realized. When one has realized these two Natures, one does not perceive the duality of that which.apprehends (grahaka) and that which is apprehended (grahya), and it is this that is called realizing the non-existence of the Imaginary (parikalpita). [Such] non-existent dharmas entail the absence of substance; . 243 what then is there [of the Imaginary Nature] for wisdom to realize? The non-existence [of the Imaginary] that is indicated by the fact 141 that things are permutations of vijnana is included in Cthe realization of] the Dependent Nature, -while the non-existence Cof the Imaginary] indicated by the universal of Thusness is included in Cthe realization of] the Absolute. Therefore,Cin the Ch'eng-wei-shih- lun passage],the Imaginary, is not discussed separately as having a separate realization. Having only entered into the two Natures Cvis., Dependent and Absolute], one no longer perceives: the duality of that which apprehends and that which is apprehended, and this Cin.itself] is called becoming aware of and entering the Imaginary. However, since it is the cognition of true substance Ci.e., the fundamental cognition (mula-jnana)] that realizes the', universal by fully penetrating the non-existence Cof that which apprehends and that which is apprehended], it is most-often said to be this cognition that realizes the Imaginary. Even though this duality Cof apprehender and apprehended] is already no longer seen even before the Path of Vision (darsana-marga), one still has not personally acquired the two cognitions Cvis., fundamental and subsequently acquired] and it is not called.the realization of the non-existence Cof apprehender and apprehended]. Therefore, it is only then at the First Land that one is said to have realized Cthe Three Natures] (262cl7) lb. In the first passage from the Mahayana-samgraha,what is said about awakening, to the Absolute is based on Cthe first of the above categories,] genuine realization; and accords with the Ch'eng- wei-shih-lun passage. CWhat is said.about] awakening to the first two Natures is based on Cthe second of the above caregories,] 'apparent awakening'. This is so, because, for most of the time, during the greatest.portion Cof one's practice], one thinks, with some intellectual 142 understanding, about the first two Natures. Even.though, for a very- short time, during a small portion Cof one's practice], one does indeed appear to awaken and enter the Absolute, nevertheless, this is not for most of the time during the greatest portion Cof' one's practice] and is still not.personal realization. Therefore, this passage is based on the first category of'genuine realization'. (262c2l) lc. In the second passage from the Mahaydna-samgvaha, what is said about awakening to and entering the Three Natures is a discussion based entirely on Cthe second category of] 'apparent' intellectual understanding. One first contemplates the fact that name and thing are 245 not [intrinsically] inter-related; therefore that is called awakening to and entering into the Imaginary. Next one contemplates the fact that there is nothing but dharmas conceptualized by mentation and named by 246 convention, etc.; and, even though one has not yet realized what is the Ultimate Reality, this is called awakening to the Dependent. At the stage of the Four.Exact Comprehensions, even though what is.real still has characteristics and one has not yet realized Thusness, the two that 247 which apprehends and. that which is apprehended both cease. One enters in a manner bearing an apparent resemblance to the contemplation of real wisdom Con the Path of Vision] and, with that intellectual understanding, goes so far as to say, "Why, this is Thusness (thathata)!" Thus, while the stage of the Exact Comprehensions may indeed be called entry into the Absolute (parinispanna), still it is not an intuitive entry (262c28) 2. CSummary:3 The Mahay'ana-samgraha bases itself on the apparent: in. light of the intellectual understanding of the Three 24 Natures, it explains, separately how one awakens to and enters each. The Ch'eng-wei-shih^-Lun bases itself on the real : it says that one separately realizes the latter two Natures and, in doing that, succeeds in realizing the Imaginary. Even though the texts differ, they do not contradict each other. Other text can all be explained by analogy to these. (263al) Section Eight: The Stations and the Base of Arising This section has two parts: the first discusses the base (asraya)2^ [from which one gives rise to the contemplation of Vijnaptimatrata],and the second clarifies the stations Cof existence 250 or meditation] in which it arises. (263a3) 8.1 The Base2^1 252 8.1.1 First Arising 253 If it is a case of sudden and- direct awakening, then the first arising Cof the contemplation] is attained by one based in the Realm of Sense-desire (kama-dhatu). This is so, because one can first produce the superior mind only in the Realm of Sense-desire. 254 The Hs%en-yang-sheng-ch%ao-luri•- "and other .works say: Because of the extreme distress, it does not arise in 255 the wretched destinies (durgati); Because of the extreme pleasure, it does not arise in the two higher realms.2"^ .It'is-only among-the men and. the gods of the Realm of Sense-desire That Buddhas appear and that one is able to give rise 257 to comprehension (abhisamaya). During the period up to and including the First Land Ci.e., at the Stage of Provisioning and the Stage of Preliminary Training], everything can be accomplished.while based in any of the three realms. We allow that the bodhisattva of insight (vipasyana- bodhisattva) can be born in the Realm of Formlessness (arupya- dhatu), because he can, with a formless mind, discern everything. Were it not so, what person would succeed in this matter. During the period up to and including the Seventh Land, the bodhisattva gives rise to the contemplation while based either in the Realm of Sense-desire or the Realm of Form (rupa-dhatu). This is so, because the bodhisattva Cof this degree1 is not born in the Realm of Formlessness. From the Eighth Land on, the bodhisattva gives rise to the contemplation based only, it is certain, in a body of the Realm of Sense-desire.. This is so, because it is by entrusting himself to this superior base that he attains enlightenment (bodhi). (263alo) 258 2. If it is a case of gradual awakening: Cthere are three distinct classes: (2a) those who have already attained the first two fruits; (2b) those who attained the third fruit and are of successive birth; (2c) those who.. have. either attained the third fruit and are not of successive birth, or who have attained the fourth fruit.: 2a. If they are. saints who had already attained the first two. fruits, (i.e.., those who were stream-winners "or once-returners before taking the bodhisattva pathH, the base upon which they succeeded in first giving rise to the contemplation must be of the Realm of Sense-desire. COf these, there are again two classes: those of successive birth and those not of successive birth.1 If he is not of successive birth (aparivrttajanman) the base upon which he gave rise to the contemplation at the Seventh Land and before can also be of the Realm of Form [as well as the Realm of Sense-desire!. Although he has not yet entered the Lands, he is still, not born.in the Realm of Formlessness. This is so, because he received birth according to the sovereignty of his vow of compassion towards all beings, and that prevents him from being born in the Realm of Formlessness[where compassion cannot be practiced!]. It is also the case, because such an alteration of the realm in which the. bodhisattva is born, is not allowed on the basis of [any new karmie action due toll his practice of cultivation. Such a bodhisattva. differs from the bodhisattva of sudden awakening: the latter has already become pure (anasrava) before • entering the Path of Vision because the strengths he has acquired through his karmic action are more numerous. There are some who allow that this type of bodhisattva [i.e., one of gradual awakening who is of successive birthD is also born into the Realm of Formlessness. This [they say 3 is so, because, the connections of karmic action they have within the three •realms' " still exist'; ;• and also because it is not the case that being born in the higher realm, they loathe the defilements, of the lower realms. If it is the case of a bodhisattva of gradual awakening who is of successive birth (parivrttajanman), then he definitely cannot be born in the upper, realm. This is so, because, on producing the thought and afterwards, he can be only in the Realm of Sense-desire. (2"63al7) 2b. If it is a case of a bodhisattva Cof gradual awakening] who had attained the third fruit Ci.e.., who was a non-returner (anagamin)] and is not of successive birth, then it was in the Realm of Sense-desire that he first put forth the thought, and he subsequently takes both this realm and also the Realm of Form as the base for giving rise to the contemplation of Vijnaptimatrata. He is not born into the Realm of Formlessness because it is without advantage. (263al9) 2c. If it is a case of a bodhisattva Cof gradual awakening] who had attained the third fruit and is of successive birth, or who had attained the fourth fruit, Cthere are two possibilities]. If it was in the Realm of Sense-desire that he first produced the thought Cof enlightenment], then, in.the beginning and later, he gives rise to the contemplation based only in the Realm of Sense- desire. If, on the other hand, it was in the Realm of Form, that he first produced, the thought Cof enlightenment], then It is based only in the Realm of Form that he gives rise to the contemplation of Vijnaptimatrata. (263a2l). 8.1.2 The First Realization 1. Bodhisattvas of sudden awakening, at the time of their first realization Cof Vijnaptimatrata], must be based in the Realm of Sense-desire. This is. so, because by virtue of having severed the tendency to cling to the notion, of Self (pudgalabhinivesa?), their wisdom and their, loathing Cof the cycle of death and re-birth] are deep. 2. Bodhisattvas of gradual awakening, at the time of their first realization Cof VijnaptimatrataH can be based in the Realm of Form as well as the Realm of Sense-desire. When the Esien-yang-sheng-c'kiao-'lun and other works declare that it is only within the Realm of Sense-desire that one can enter comprehension (abhisamaya), it is with reference to the initial entry of each of the three types of saints on'' his respective path Cviz., sravaka, pratyeka-buddha, or bodhisattvail. This is so, because the statement does not pertain to those who have gradually awakened to the: bodhisattva path Cafter severing the clinging to the notion of Self on either the sravaka or patyeka-buddha path!, since Cthe remaining task of1 severing the clinging to a notion of truly existing dharmas (dharmabhinivesa.) does not require the deep loathing of the cycle of death and re-birth Cpossible only in the Realm of Sense-desire:. (263a24) 8.2 The Stations 8.2.1 The Correct Doctrine The preceding clarified the base Cupon which one gives rise to the contemplation of Vijnaptimatratal, what follows clarifies the stations, of existence or meditation in which it arises. In one's own station of existence^^within the Realm of Sense-desire, the contemplation.involves both the wisdom, produced through erudition (srutamayi prajna) and the wisdom produced through reflection (cintamayi-prajna). Being only dispersed (asamahita), it is not concentration (samadhi); it is also not free of the impurities (anasrava). This is based on the correct doctrine and does not take up any lateral assertions. During, contemplation based, in the Realm of Form, two of the wisdoms are involved, that due to erudition and that due to cultivation (bhavanamayi-prajna). In contemplation based in the Realm of Formlessness there is only the wisdom produced through cultivation, and not the others. We say the Realm of Form lacks the wisdom produced through reflection, and that the Realm of Form• lessness lacks the wisdom due to erudition as well as that due to reflection, because this is in accord, with all of the teachings. These three varieties of wisdom are acquired through training 262 (prayogika) only; they are not included within the class of what is acquired through birth (upapatti-pratilambhika). 8.2.2 Explanation'', of some Lateral Assertions According to what is asserted in the sixty-fifth scroll of 263 the •Yogdedrabhumi.,. however, they may be C263bH Cthe result ofH concentration (samadhi), and they may be acquired through birth, as with ihs;i:ght,-bodhisattvas who have not.-yet-> attained sovereignty and sravakas who have attained broad:wisdom. Whether they be sravakas who still have something to learn (saiksa)- or arhats, they discern dharmas of the three realms and pure dharmas by means of thought Cwhile basedH in the Realm of Formlessness. Therefore, we know that this contemplation is also present in the Realm of Form• lessness. The bodhisattva [in that easeH is at the stage of the Forty Stations of Thought practiced on the Path of Vision and before;.this, is so, because it is declared in many places that at the stage of the Lands and above [i.e., from the end of the Path 150 of Vision], the bodhisattva is not horn Cin the Realm of Formlessness]. The sravaka of broad wisdom is properly (yathayogyam) declared to be of this class, because he is not deluded about the dharmas. Aside from these two exceptions it is not stated that other humans also succeed in taking everything as an object with "formless, thought. From the stage of the bodhisattva's Path of Vision up to the Diamond-like Concentration (vajropan.a-samadhi), one's station is the fourth level of meditation Cin the Realm of Form], Later all the stations are included: one can properly be based, in any of the ten stations the six in the Realm of "Form,and the four in the Realm of Formlessness and give rise to this contemplation. Cof Vijnaptimatrata!]. What, severs doubts are the first nine of these stations, while 264 discursive contemplation is involved in all ten. They should properly be taught separately. The pure (anasrava) modes of wisdom due to erudition and reflection accord with their base Cviz., wisdom due to cultivation: and are without error. Of the Ceight3 not-yet-arrived (anagamya) levels2^, the highest seven have only pleasure Cin the higher realmsH and loathing _ \ '266 Cm the lowest realm]; their aspects (akara) appear as if checked, and so they are unable to produce.it Ci.e., the base of cultivation], (263bll) 151 Section Nine: . Severing the Obstacles and Defilements There are two types of obstacles: those'that are. innate (sahaja), and those Cthat arise as the result] of discrimination (vikalpita). Each of these is again divided into two types: the obstacle [constituted by] the various afflictions (klesavarana or affliction-obstacle), and the obstacle Charring] what is to be known (Jneyavarana or wisdom-obstacle).^''' 9.1 The Stage of Severance The Tenth Scroll of Ch'eng-wei-shih-lvn says Cthat the two 268 types of the two obstacles are severed as follows]. 9.1.1 The manifestations (samudacara) of the discrimination- produced portion of the affliction-obstacle (vikalpaklesavarana) are subdued, bit by bit, on the Path of Provisioning (sambhara-marga), and then, on the Path of Training (prayoga-marga), one can, at once, subdue them completely. The seeds and impregnations Cof this portion of the affliction-obstacle 1. are severed in the First Cor Joyous] Land. 9-1.2 The manifestations of the innate portion of the affliction-obstacle (sahajaklesavaranasamudacara) are subdued, bit by bit, before the CBodhisattva] Lands, and then, from the First Land onward, one can, at once, subdue them completely. They will, however, on occasion seem to arise by the strength of Cthe bodhisattva's3 will Ce.g., as skillful means (upaya) for the conversion of other beings], but there is nothing wrong with that. From the Eighth Cor Immovable] Land onward there are no further manifestations. The impregnations Cof this portion of the affliction-obstacle] are 152 removed Stage by Stage, while its seeds are severed in the Diamond• like Concentration. The erroneous view of individuality•(satkayadrs^i),etc., of Cthe affliction-obstacle], along with its innate portion, are both perma• nently subdued in the Fourth Cor Brilliant] Stage because there is no longer any clinging to dharmas Cas real] (dharmagraha). The Cafflictions] Produced by Cthis erroneous view of individuality] are not operative in the Fifth CVery Difficult to Conquer] Land because they, as its companions,, are also destroyed. 9.1.3 The manifestations, of the. discrimination-produced portion of the wisdom-obstacle (vikalpajneyavaranasamudacara) are also subdued, bit by bit, on the Path of Provisioning; and then, on the Path of Training one can, at once, subdue them, completely. The seeds and impregnations Cof this portion of the wisdom-obstacle] are severed in the First Cor Joyous] Land. 9.1.4 The manifestations of the innate portion Cof the wisdom-obstacle](sahajajneyavaranasamudacara) are Cgenerally speaking], subdued bit by bit prior to the CBodhisattva] Lands, and this continues until, finally, in the Tenth Cor Dharma-cloud] Land they are subdued completely. If, however, we speak Cof each type of manifestation] specifically, then Cthose manifestations associated with] the first six vijnanas are subdued completely in the Eighth Cor Immovable] Land, while the seeds and impregnations Cassociated with the six vijnanas] are severed Stage by Stage. CThose manifest• ations associated with] the seventh vijnana are subdued on the Path of Training stage of the Diamond-like Concentration; and, when this Diamond-like Concentration arises, the seeds and impregnations [associated with the seventh vijnana! are all severed. (263b25) 9.2 Various Other Classification 9.2.1 The Three Stages of Severance. The Bodhi-sattvabhumi-'teaches that the affliction-obstacle 269 and the wisdom-obstacle are both severed in three stages. 1. First, is the Stage of Supreme Joy where the afflictions [associated with! the unfavorable destinies and also the most super- 270 . • ficial crude dross (dausthulya) of the wisdom-obstacle are all severed forever. [At this Stage! one is able to prevent any further manifestation of the upper-middle grade of afflictions, and has the very first realization of the cognition of the reality of the two emptinesses. 2. Second is the Inefficacious and Formless Stage. [In this Stage! the afflictions which can obstruct the non-arising dharma patience and also the less-superficial crude dross of the wisdom- obstacle are all severed forever. -Before the various afflictions cease to be manifested, one has, spontaneously, the very first realization of the non-arising dharma patience. 3. Third is the Stage of the Supremely Fulfilled Bodhisattva. [In this stage! the impregnations and the proclivities (anusaya) of the afflictions and also the most deep-rooted crude dross of the wisdom-obstacle are severed forever. [Thereupon! one enters the Tathagata Stage. (263c5) 9.2.2 The Three Proclivities The Sandhinirmocana Sutra states that there are three 271 Ctypes of] proclivities (anusaya). 1. First are the proclivities known as 'companions that have been destroyed.' "These are the non-innate afflictions of the first five Lands that are the attendants or companions of the manifestations of innate afflictions. The former are permanently non-recurrent at 272 that time Ci.e., the Fifth Land]." The meaning of this teaching is that Cthe group of afflictions] associated with the sixth vijnana and comprising the erroneous view of individuality (satkayadrsti), etc., are termed 'innate', while all the other afflictions are termed•'non-innate.' The.substance of these non-innate afflictions is relatively coarse however: they arise with the innate afflictions as their cause, and, when these innate afflictions are severed, they too, in turn, cease to exist. Therefore they are called 'destroyed ,273 companions.' 2. Second, are the feeble proclivities. "These are the subtle manifestations occurring in the Sixth and Seventh Lands. This is so because, if subdued by spiritual.cultivation (bhavana), they are no 274 longer manifested." It is not the case Cas with the first type of. proclivity]. that, as the innate erroneous view of individuality is severed, so also in turn are they. This ..is because they are relatively difficult to sever. What is said here does not contradict the Lahkavatara Sutra which says that, because the innate erroneous view of individuality is severed, greed Ci.e., raga, first of the 275 - afflictions] is no longer produced. The sutra focuses on the doctrine of the affliction severed by the first two vehicles Ci.e., 155 the sravakas and the pratyeka-buddhas1. It is not based on the doctrine that, when the bodhisattva's wisdom-obstacle has ceased to exist, his afflictions [greed, etc.] are therefore not produced. If, alternatively, we base, ourselves'on the stage where both types of proclivities are definitively severed, then the sutra and this treatise are not in mutual contradiction. 3. Third are the subtle proclivities. "This means that from the Eighth Cor Immovable] Land and above, all the afflictions that, have been removed from this Land are never again manifested. This is so because what remains are only those proclivities that have 276 the wisdom-obstacle as their base." 277 However, it is also said that, by virtue of having severed the most superficial crude dross in. the initial Lands, one can then and only then manifest and attain the first two Cof the above] degrees of proclivity Csuppression]. And again, that by virtue of having severed the less superficial crude dross in the Eighth Cor Immovable] Land, one manifests the Cthird] degree in which the subtle proclivities' Care suppressed].. Finally, if Cthe aspirant] has severed the deep-rooted crude dross, then we say he is permanently separated from all proclivities and resides in the Land of the Buddhas. (263c2l) 9.2.3 The Four Obstacles In the Ratnagotra-vibhdga there are passages saying that there are. four obstacles (avarana): first, the obstacle of the icchantikas' lack of faith Cin the Buddha's teachings]; second, the obstacle.of the non-Buddhists' (tirthika) clinging to an eternal 279 self: (atman); third, the obstacle:of the sravakas' fear of suffering; 1 156 and fourth, the obstacle of the pratyeka-buddhas.' abandonment of 280 the thought Cof great compassion]. 281 With the state of mind gained in the Sixth of the Ten Faiths, Cthe bodhisattva! subdues the first of the above obstacles because his 282 faith does not relapse. In the Fourth Abode of the Ten Abodes, Cthe bodhisattva] subdues the second of the above obstacles because the coarse aspect of the false view of an eternal self (atmadrsti) due to false discrimination is not produced. The seeds of these two obstacles are severed on. entering the First Cor Joyous] Land. The third of the above obstacles, which is an obstacle barring what is to be known Ci.e., jneyavarana, or wisdom-obstacle], is severed in the Fifth Cor Very Difficult to Conquer] Land. This is so because the obstacle constituted by the desire for the lesser 283 nirvana of the lower vehicles Ci.e., that of the sravakas and Pratyeka-buddhas] is severed in the Fifth Land. CThe fourth of the above obstacles], that obstacle constituted by the pratyeka-buddhas giving up the thought Cof Great Compasison for other beings], is severed by the bodhisattva only in the Seventh Cor Far-reaching] Land. This is so, because up until the Sixth Land the bodhisattva -.• is "still contemplating the twelve-fold chain of causation Cas if he were a pratyeka-buddha] In some cases it is said that the seeds of the passions (klesabija) of the former two of these obstacles are severed on the Path of Vision (darsana-marga), while the seeds of the passions of the latter two obstacles are severed in the Diamond-like Concen• tration (vajropamasamadhi). 263c28) 9.2.4 The" Five" Persistent Afflictions The Srimala Sutra declares•that there are five varieties 285 of persistent affliction: The persistent affliction based on some particular false view, the persistent affliction of craving for the objects of desire, the persistent affliction of craving for form, the persistent affliction of craving for worldly existence (bhava), 286 and the persistent affliction of nescience. The first of these, the persistent affliction based on some particular false viewpoint, is severed [by the bodhisattva! in the First Cor Joyous] Land. The next three are severed in the Diamond-like Concentration. The fifth variety, the persistent affliction of nescience, is severed according to its degree either bit by bit or all at once on the Path of Vision and on the Path of Spiritual Cultivation. If the impregnations and the proclivities of the first four Cof these varieties of affliction] are the same as the wisdom- obstacle Ci.e., as the fifth], then they are severed either bit by bit or all at once on the Path of Vision and on the Path of Spiritual Cultivation. (264a4) 288 • 9-2.5 In other cases the doctrine of the Six Afflictions, 289 and also the.doctrines of the Seven Proclivities, the Eight 290 291 292 Envelopments, the Nine Fetters, the Ten Afflictions, the Ten 293 294 Distractions, the Ten Discriminations, and others are taught. These are discussed more thoroughly in the "Essay on the Severing of 295 the Obstacles." The afflictions and obstacles, etc. discussed in this.section are only those which are severed in the contemplation of Vijnaptimatrata; the others that are to be destroyed are not discussed. (264a7) Section Ten: Turning to and Embracing the Two Emptinesses 10.1 General Statement The treatises (sastras) declare the two emptinesses: emptiness of the individual (pudgala-sunyata) and emptiness of the dharmas dharma-sunyata).^^6 rp^is contemplation of Vijnaptimatrata involves the contemplation of both the. two emptinesses. The Four Examinations and the Four Exact Comprehensions involve the emptiness of both the 297' individual and dharmas. As CdharmasH constitute the base (asraya) upon--Which, the individual is posited, the treatises teach only the 298 contemplation of dharmas. They do.this, because the mind, seeking knowledge of all modes (sarvakarajnata), contemplates the emptiness of dharmas; and because it is done in order to produce the proper understanding of the two emptinesses. Moreover, the contemplation of Cthe emptiness] of dharmas. necessarily entails the emptiness of the individual; this is so, because it is attested in the treatises. (264al2) 10.2 Discussion 10.2.1 Objection Clf you say the emptiness of dharmas necessarily entails the emptiness of the individual,3 why is it that when you discuss delusion in.contrast to awakening, you say that clinging to the notion of the individual is necessarily,combined with clinging to the notion of dharmas; yet when you speak of awakening in contrast to delusion you say that [realization of] the emptiness of the individual does not involve the emptiness of dharmas? If you'say that, depending on the degree of one's understanding, one can he awakened to Cthe emptiness] of the individual, hut not necessarily to Cthe emptiness] of dharmas, then it must also he the case that, according to the degree of one's delusion, one could he deluded about the function Ci.e., about the individual], and not be deluded about the substance , Ci.e., about the dharmas].2^ (26Ual5) 10.2.2 Reply There has never been a case of someone understanding the substance while being deluded about the function; therefore, clinging to the Cnotion. of an] individual necessarily entails clinging to the Cnotion of] dharmas. But, just as the degree of one's awakening may be shallow and not penetrate the depths, so Cunderstanding] the emptiness of the individual does not necessarily entail that of dharmas. The. Vimsatikd-vijnaptimdtratd says: The nonsubstantiality^^of the dharmas to which beings cling, Moreover, is entered by means of .the , . . ' 301 remaining doctrine. It is this doctrine, of Vijnaptimatrata that Cis the "remaining doctrine" by which one] enters the emptiness of dharmas. This says that the emptiness of dharmas necessarily depends on- Vijnaptimatrata, not that the contemplation of Vijnaptimatrata is nothing hut the emptiness of dharmas; this is so because establishing only the emptiness of the individual is still Cone part of] Vijnaptimatrata. If it is only the contemplation of the emptiness of dharmas, then it is definitely Vijnaptrimatrata. With the emptiness of the 302 individual, it-is not certain, because the emptiness of the individual Ccultivated by those] of the lesser two vehicles is not the contemplation of Vijnaptimatrata. (26Ua2l) 10.2.3 Analysis 1. The contemplation of Vijnaptimatrata is broad in extension in that it involves the contemplation of both the individual 303 and dharmas. The contemplation of dharmas is more limited in extension in that it occurs only in,Cthe contemplation of] Vijnapti• matrata. The contemplation of the individual is broad in that it occurs in what is the contemplation of.Vijnaptimatrata. The contemplation.of Vijnaptimatrata. is more limited in extension in that there are cases when the contemplation of the individual is not _ 304 Cthe contemplation of .Vijnaptimatrata]. 305 2. Therefore, when we direct our attention to the contem• plation of. the emptiness of the individual in the contemplation of Vijnaptimatrata, it must be analyzed according to the above statements. There is no case where the contemplation of Vijnaptimatrata is not the emptiness.of the individual, because the contemplation of only the emptiness of dharmas necessarily.involves that of the individual. There are Chowever] cases where the contemplation of the emptiness of the individual is not that of Vijnaptimatrata; namely, the contemplation of the emptiness of the individual Ccultivated by those] of the lesser two vehicles. 161 3. In the case.of the emptiness of dharmas vis-a-vis Vijnaptimatrata,.it is again a similar situation.. There are cases vhere Cthe contemplation of] Vijnaptimatrata is not Cthe contemplation] of the emptiness of dharmas, namely the contemplation of Vijnapti• matrata in which Cone views] the emptiness of the individual. There are [however] no cases where the contemplation of Cthe emptiness of] the dharmas is not that of Vijnaptimatrata. The meaning of the statements established by these two are [thus] understandable.(264a28) 10.3 Conclusion If we speak in terms of a^general rule (utsarga Vijnaptimatrata involves the contemplation of both the two emptinesses. When the treatises state only that the contemplation of dharmas is the contemplation of Vijnaptimatrata, it is because their statement is based on what is the necessary condition [i.e., on the sine qua non, the emptiness of dharmas]. Furthermore, when it is said that all [varieties of].emptiness are together embraced Cby the contemplation of Vijnaptimatrata], it is then as is taught in the "Essay on 308 Emptiness. (26Ubl) Notes to Chapter I Pages 2 x- 20 Noel Peri,•who considered K'uei-chi to be' "probablement le plus grand des ecrivains chinois bouddhistes," (A propos de la Date de Vasubandhu," p. 34), was perhaps the first Western writer to draw attention to his importance. After that, though several scholars including most notably La Vallee-Poussin made use of K'uei-chi's commentaries, nothing was written that dealt specifically with K'uei-chi until Stanley Weinstein's two articles in 1959 (see Bibliography below for complete references). Even in the modern Japanese secondary literature one finds very little on K'uei-chi. Besides brief treatment in the standard Yogacara/Fa-hsiang histories (e.g., FUKAURA and YUKl) and the occasional article (e.g.,WATANABE), there is, to my knowledge, only one monograph devoted to K'uei-chi: SAEKI's biographical study, Jion daishi den. A more comprehensive assessment of K'uei-chi's place in the development of East Asian Buddhism and Yogacara in particular is yet to be done. 2 For information on Hsuan-tsang see especially: Arthur Waley, The Real Tripitaka, 1952; Hui-li, The Life of Hsuan-tsang,and Kenneth Ch'en, Buddhism in China X1964), pp. 235-38, 368-9, and p. 523 for further bibliography. 3 In his "Biographical Study of Tz'u-en" (1959), Stanley Weinstein has provided a critical analysis of the early sources for K'uei-chi's biography, pointing out the inadequacies of the "official Sung biography" (see below) which is the basis for many of the modern biographical references. The relevant early documents have been published under the title "Jion Daishi denki.monj ii," in Shoso, 9 (June 1940), 40-48. Cf. also SAEKI Ryoken, Jion daishi den. Ii The various records of K'uei-chi's birth and death have been analyzed by. S. Weinstein, and he concludes that the most commonly cited dates, A.D. 632-682 are preferable to any of the variants ("Bio. Study," pp. 148-149). ^ See, for example FUKAURA S., Yuishikigaku kenkyu, Vol. I, p. 256, n. 2. Stanley Weinstein ("Bio. Study," pp. 129-133) goes further to suggest that K'uei-and Chi were two different monks, one famous and one obscure, each having one-syllable names which were later assimilated into one. While it may well be thought peculiar that the full name is not recorded in the works of K'uei-chi that have survived, it is not necessary to assume that the name was in fact, simply Chi, a situation that would be even more peculiar. Abbreviation of two-character monastic names to only the second character was common, especially when some additional title was affixed or when reference was made to oneself in writing. Notes to Chapt. I (pp. 2 -20) The full name, K'uei-chi, is attested quite early, the most reliable source being the famous K'ai-yuan Buddhist Catalogue (cf. Chapt. II, note 2) compiled in A.D. 730-by Chih-sheng, a time less than 50 years after K'uei-chi's death when the prominence of the Fa-hsiang School.was at its apogee. It is difficult to believe that Chih-sheng, a bibliographer noted for his critical scholarship, would have accepted an unverified version of the name of so prominent a Fa-hsiang master. 7 Cited in S. Weinstein, "Bio. Study," p. 137. 8 Gyonen.'s $\ (1240-1321) history, the Sangoku buppo denzu engi %. \% % >f| jj| ^$t> (BZ: CI.10TM.2-13) records the tradition that Hsiian-tsang had 3000 disciples f*}/^, 70 of whom were advanced jj^j , M replete JL./^ , and one fully initiated ^ST^.. The parallel here with the 70 disciples of Confucius is probably no coincidence; in fact, it is possible that those seventy represented, the ideal of the disciple that K'uei-chi actually had in mind at the time that he wrote this passage. o T: XLIII.698b24-29. For a somewhat different rendering of most of this passage compare S. Weinstein, "Bio. Study," p. 137. 10 This seems preferable to the punctuation indicated at T: L.725b24. For the Buddhists the converging of cause and condition (hetupratyaya) was of course determined by previous actions (karma). 11 Hui-li's biography (The Life of Hsuan-tsang3 pp. l6l-l62) reports Hsiian-tsang's encounter with the Nirgrantha Vajra who was re- -nowned' for his skills in divination. A divination was performed to '.. learn about the return journey and several different things were revealed. Hui-li's account mentions nothing, however, about the prophesy of a brilliant disciple. 12 T: L725b23-c7. In some cases I follow S. Weinstein's renderin of this passage; in others we differ significantly: cf. his "Bio. Study," p. 140. 13 One variant is found in another Sung work the Ts'ung-Un sheng-shih J^qfc compiled by the Zen master Ku-yiieh Tao-jung & Q j|k , who says (Z:2b/2l/l.47.1.b) that K'uei-chi was followed by three carts filled with sutras and sastras with wine and food *fySp_, and with women • Ku-yiieh Tao-jung also includes the intriguing report that on one occasion when K'uei-chi had an audience with the emperor he did not carry out the prescribed etiquett This source is not included among those considered in Weinstein's "Bio. Study." Notes to Chapt. I (pp. 2 - 20) A striking example may be seen in the case of Ikkyu Sojun — •f^'^?^, , the famous Zen eccentric of 15th cen. Japan, who sought to identify his own unconventional behavior with that of the Abbot K'uei-chi whom he took to be a kindred spirit :- Sonja Arntzen in "The Crazy Cloud Anthology (Kyounshu) of Ikkyu Sojun," (poem no. 166) translates the following poem of Ikkyu's: "Praising the Dharma Master Tz'u-en K'uei-chi" K'uei-chi's samadhi was by its very nature real. Wine, meat, the sutras and beauties, The eye of the Abbot was just like this. In our school, there is only this ClkkyuH Sojun. 15 Literally "the transciber," i.e., the one whose duty was to transform the oral translation of the senior translator from the colioquial into literary Chinese, the written form of the language that differs significantly from the spoken language in both vocabulary and grammar. It should be noted that, in light of the value placed on elegant expression, this was a position of more responsibility and prestige than that of a mere scribe. 16 T: 1585, XXXI.1-60 1T T: 1590, XXXI.74-77 18 T: 1600, XXXI.464-477 19 T: 2031, XLIX.15-17 ^U T: 1540, XXVI.614-627 21 See for example Tsan-ning's biography, T: L.726bl4. 22 K'uei-chi's account is found at the opening of his shorter commentary to the Ch'eng-wei-shih-lun, T: XLIII.6o8b29cl4. ,.The ten were BandhusrT, Citrabhanu, Gunamati, Sthiramati, Nanda, Suddhacandra, Dharmapala, Visesamitra, Jinaputra and Jfiana- candra; for more on these prominent Indian sastra masters see P. Demieville, "Historique du Systeme Vijnaptimatrata," pp. 18-22 and also E. Frauwallner, "Landmarks in the History of Indian Logic." T: L.725cl2 Notes to Chapt. I . (pp. 2-20) 25 There is another reference to K'uei-chi's knowledge of Sanskrit in a biographical passage in Hsi-fu's -rSJ^jL sub-commentary to K'uei-chi's Lotus Sutra Commentary (Z:l/53/3.179r); Hsi-fu's work was not written until 877 however, so we still lack corroboration from any of the contemporary accounts. A careful study of K'uei-chi's Miao-fa-lien-kua-ching shih-wei-wei-erh-chang (no. 6) in conjunction with the Sanskrit text of the Lotus Sutra may yield more conclusive evidence of his knowledge of Sanskrit. 2^ S. Weinstein ("Bio. Study," pp. 143-144) discusses this passage (T: XXXIV.715b) in more detail. 27 MARUYAMA Takao ("Kichizo no Hokkegiso no kenkyu," pp. 312-315) discusses thevarious passages where this ambiguity is present in the Chinese translation showing, through comparison with the original Sanskrit, that Chi-tsang sometimes understood the text correctly, sometimes not. 28 This passage occurs at T: XLV.260al0-24 which corresponds to section 2.1 of the translation below. on S. Weinstein ("Bio. Study," p. 128) suggests that Miao Shen- jung is probably an old error for Miao Shen-k'o ^ !^ , a historian in the service of Empress Wu jj^ (r. 655—) • 30 This is not necessarily to be assumed of a Buddhist monk, especially one whose primary vocation was doctrinal exegesis. KumarajTva, for example, is reported to have had little patience with two HTnayana meditation specialists and.to have agreed to translate Mahayana meditation works only.after repeated requests from his Chinese followers,.events which suggest that, for some Dharma Masters at least, there may have been more of a division between theory and practice than for K'uei-chi. 31 Cited in S. Weinstein, "Bio. Study," pp. 147 and 148. 32 Cited in ibid., p. 148 33 Paul Demieville has provided an excellent study of Maitreya devotionalism in his two articles "Maitreya l'inspirateur" and "Le paradis de Maitreya." See also E. Lamotte, Eistoire, pp.' 775-788 and esp. the notes on pp. 778, 783-785 for additional bibliography on Maitreya in Western sources. Notes to Chapt. I (pp. 2 - 20) 3k The fact that K'uei-chi's family first rose to prominence in this same non-Chinese dynasty suggests the possibility of exposure to Maitreya devotionalism even prior to his Yogacara affiliation. 35 In his commentary on one of the Maitreya sutras at T: XXXVIII.277c25. 36 Cf. for example the famous incident of Hsuan-tsang's encounter with the bandits which is summarized from his biography in P. Demieville's "Le paradis de Maitreya" p. 388. When Hsuan-tsang thought he was about to be sacrificed to Durga by the bandits, he requested that they first allow him a moment to enter by means of concentration the Tusita Heaven; on doing this, his countenance became so transformed that the bandits were dissuaded from the sacrifice. S. Weinstein's article "On the Authorship of the Esi-fang Yao-chueh" discusses the prominence of Maitreya devotionalism in K'uei-chi's thought while showing why it is unlikely that K'uei-chi wrote the Pure Land tract that is attributed to him. The attribu• tion of all of the Pure Land works K'uei-chi is said to have written was previously questioned by FUKAURA and others; cf. the discussion of these works in Chapt. 2 below. 167 Notes to Chapter II Pages 21 - 36 This reintroduction of K'uei-chi's works into China might be seen as a purely East Asian instance of what some sociologists refer to as the "pizza effect." For a more extensive account of the 20th century .. revival of Yogacara thought in China see Wing-tsit CHAN, Religious Trends in Modern China (1953), chapters II & III; and Holmes Welch, The Buddhist Revival in China, (1968), esp. chapters I, III, & VI. 2 K'uei-chi's works are listed in a number of catalogs; the most important are: Kai-yuan shih-ohiao lu ^fj ^C-> 20 scrolls; by Chih-sheng 5 compilation completed in A.D. 730; T: 2154, LV.372-722. Hosso-shu. shosho Jj^ *^ 4^. J^^JL* 1 scroll; compiled by the Japanese monk KelsoJ~-j^^? in A.D. 914; T: 2180, LV.1138-1140. Sinp 'yon ohogong kyonggang oh 'ongnok jffi jfcjjjff jgfa ^Jjfe ^H^L 3 scrolls; compiled by the Korean monk Uichon in 1090; T: 2184, LV.1165-H78. Chushin Hosso-shu. shosho jfij^ ^ J^Q "f^ ^ 1 scroll; compiled by the Japanese monk Zoshun J^jj •^jf* in 1176; T: 2l8l, LV.1140-1144. Yuishikigaku kenkyu, Vol. 1, pp. 249-250. S. Weinstein, "Bio. Study," p. 122, n. 10. In addition to those works questioned by more than one ;.• researcher, YDKI Reimon(Yuishikigakutensekishi, pp. 310-311) suspects one of the lesser Ch'eng-wei-shih-lun commentaries, no. 20 (q.v.), but suggests further study before any judgment is made. Notes to Chapt. II (pp. 21 - 36) The longer commentary on the Ch'eng-wei-shih-lun (no. 18) was written before the shorter (no. 19); the Heart Sutra commentary (no. 3) is quoted in the Fa-yuan i-lin ehang (no. 26); and the Maitreya Sutra commentary (no. 9) is quoted in the commentary on the VimalahTrti-nirdesa (no. 8) and appears to be referred to in the longer Ch'eng-wei-shih-lun commentary (no. 18). 7 T: 235, VIII.748-752. T: 220.9, VII.979-986. q FUKAURA S., luishikigaku kenkyu, Vol. I, p. 250. 10 T: 1511, XXV.781-798. This Vajraeahedika commentary was apparently never translated by Hsiian-tsang. 11 T: 251, VIII.848-849. 12 T: 220.10, VII.986-991. -10 T: 262, IX.1-63. -The\ Saddharmti-TpundarZka was never translated by Hsiian-tsang. lhr See S. Weinstein, "Bio. Study," P. 122. See note 13 above. 1^ T: 353, XII.217-223. The SrvmdlddevZ was never translated by Hsiian-tsang. 17 T: 476, XIV.557-588. -1 o T: 452, XIV.418-421. None of the Maitreya sutras were translated by Hsiian-tsang. 19 T: 366, XII.346-348. Of) T: 367, XII.348-351. 21 FUKAURA S., luishikigaku kenkyu, Vol.1, p. 250, MOCHIZUKI S., Jodokyo no kenkyu, p. 480; SAKAINO K., Shina Bukkyo-shi kowa, Vol. II, p. 380. 169 Notes to Chapt. II (pp. 21 - 36) 22 T: 2031, XLIX.15-17- 23 pp. 300-310. ?4 T: 1579, XXX.279-883. 25 T: 1606, XXXI. 694-774. 26 T: 1600, XXXI. 464-477- 27 T: 1590, XXXI.74-77. 28 "K'uei Chi's Commentary on Wei-shih-er-shih-lun," JAOS, 53 (1933), 142-151. 29 Wei-shih-er-shih-lun, (1938). Cf. also the other articles by Hamilton on the Twenty Verses listed in the Bibliography below. 3°'T: 1585, XXXI.1-60. 31 VijHaptimdtratdsiddhi:La Siddhi de Eiuan-Tsang, (1929-1948). 32 Ch'eng Wei-shih Lun. (1973). 33 The passage occurs at the opening of the work, in a discussion of the transmission of the Ch'eng-wei-shih-lun, T:XLIII.6o8b24-29. See above p. 7- 34 - YUKI R., luishikigaku tensekishi,^. 310-311. 35 - YUKI R.,. Joyuishikiron-ryoken no kenkyu; cf. also his luishikigaku tensekishi, p. 310. FUKAURA S., luishikigaku kenkyu, Vol. I, p. 250. 37 T: l6l4, XXXI.11-13. FUKAURA S., luishikigaku kenkyu Vol. I, p. 250. 39 T: 1630, XXXII.11-13. 170 Notes to Chapt. II (pp. 21 -36) ^° R. S. Y. Chi, Buddhist Formal Logic, (1969). 111 T: 1628, XXXII. 1-6. 42 FUKAURA S., Yuishikigaku kenkyu, Vol. I, p. 250; and S. Weinstein, "On the Authorship of the Hsi-fang yao-chueh," pp. 12-13. 43 Weinstein, ibid. 44 YUKI R., Yuishikigaku tensekishi, p. 227. 45 This is a work attributed to Asanga; it is related to the Yogacarabhumi and survives only in the Chinese translation of. Hsuan- tsang (T: 1602-1603, XXXI.480-589) and the partial translation of Paramartha (T: 1618, XXXI.878-882).Cf. YUKI R., Yuishikigaku tensekishi, pp. 86-87, and 300. 46 - YUKI R., Yuishikigaku tensekishi, pp. 382-383. 47 ' The one exception is the Mahayana-sutralankara, perhaps because this was not translated by Hsuan-tsang while the Hsien-yang- sheng-ohiao-lun was. 48 Several catalogs also record a K'uei-chi commentary to •'- Hsuan-tsangls-'-translation (T: 1624, XXXI.888-889) of Dignaga's Alambanapar~ksa; cf. YUKI, ibid., p. 365. 49 The Sandhinirmooana was translated by Hsiian-tsang (T: 676, XVI.688-711), but the Lahkaoatara was not, although it was well-known in the translations of Bodhiruci and Gunabhadra. 50 The Tsung-liao-ohien-ehang ^.^fa]3^ , T: XLV.245-255- ^ See note 42 above. Notes to Chapter III (Pages 37 -68) Jacques May ("La Philosophie.bouddhique idealiste") provides a review of recent scholarship on these historical questions. 2 For recent.arguments supporting Frauwallner's contention that the Yogacarabhumi represents a composite Schulwerk, see L. Schmithausen, "Zur Literaturgeschichte der Alteren Yogacara-schule." Schmithausen points out the absence.in this work of the later Yogacara doctrines that are associated.with Asanga: Vijnaptimatrata, apratisthita- nirvana, tri-kaya, etc. See J. May, "La Philosophie bouddhique idealiste," p. 265 for a different periodization of what he prefers to call -Vijnanavada. h - - The meaning of vijnapti as a technical term in Yogacara is discussed in detail below. The reader should note that here and in the translation below there are two forms of the term, vijnapti-Matra and Vijnaptimatrata. The -taending in the second form corresponds to our suffix -ness. Thus, the first form is the adjectival form as in the statement: "Everything is nothing but vijnapti" or "vijnapti-only." The addition of the suffix in the second form turns the qualification into an abstract houn, as in the phrase, "the doctrine of mere vijnapti" or "vijnapti-only-ness." The large case 'V will be used in the latter case to help distinguish the two forms. ^ K'uei-chi takes up the topic of the Two Emptinesses in §10 of his essay translated below. ^ K'uei-chi discusses the Trisvabhavata doctrine in $1.1.1-5 and %"{. 7 Cf. Suzuki, Studies in the LanW.vata.ra Sutra, pp. 179-182. 8 2.2 in the translation. 9 Cf. E. Conze, Materials for a Dictionary of The Prajnaparamita Literature, p. 352: vijanati and pp. 182-183: janati. See also Stcherbatsky's short article, "Uber den Begriff vijnana in Buddhismus." Notes to.Chapt. Ill (pp. 37 - 68) The -ana derivatives, hut not the -ti derivatives (except for a few exceptions in the masculine rather than the feminine) can also he agent nouns, i.e., nouns indicating the person or thing in which the action appears; the reference in that case .is concrete rather than abstract as with the action nouns. This grammatical alternative is, however, quite:unlikely in the case of vijnana. Cf. W.D. Whitney, Sanscrit Grammar, pp. 420-428, 432-438. 11 Cf. Lahkdvatara: "Sagathakam" 459 (Suzuki ed.); but see also CWSL: v. 8a where citta,. manas and vijnana are correlated to the eight modes, of mental activity (vijnana). K'uei-chi discusses this at 5-2.3 in the translation below. 12 Besides being a state rather than an act, consciousness is also inappropriate because, when applied to the eighth vijnana, one has the anomaly of "unconscious consciousness." 13 Prajnapti has a long history as a technical term. It is found in early abhidharma works (e.g., the PrajHaptis'dstra, one of the sub• sidiary Pddas- to the ."Jftdnaprasthdna) . It is .found-in the Prajnaparamita Sutras where Conze translates it as concept, conception, conceptual entity, nominal concept, intimation (see Materials for a Dictionary of the Prajftdparamita. Literature, p. 269). It is also found in the Lahkdvatara where,:in.the opinion of Suzuki (Studies, p. 420, 440-44l) it is a synonym for vijnapti. Charles Prebish (ed.), Buddhism, A Modern Perspective, p. 290. "Madhyamika," in ibid., pp. 91. See §2.2.1' of the translation below. 17 There is one instance.in the Madhydnta-vibhdga (iV.lOcd v) where para-vijnapti is rendered with a causative form in Tibetan: ' mam par rig bhyed, but in that case Hsuan-tsang's translation also reflects the / causative: ling-t 'o-shen-hsin-shou ^ l*$ i%^L • Thus in a different context vijnapti could be and.was. translated with the causative in both languages. 18 Cf. Suzuki, Studies, pp. 440-441 on vijnapti in the Lanka. 19 In the West it is usually Freud that is given credit for first formulating a theory of dynamic, unconscious motivation; see for example, J.O. Wisdom, "Psychoanalytic Theories of the Unconscious," in the Encyclopedia of Philosophy (New York: Macmillan, 1967). Notes to Chapt. Ill (pp. 37 -'68) 20 Cf. Trims'ikd. II: there is some debate over whether manana in the text of this verse: means manana (cogitation, reflection) or Manyana (conceit in the sense of vain imagining and pride). Both would fall within the activity of manas in any case. See Levi, Materiaux} p. 70, note 2 and La Vallee-Poussin, Siddhi} p. 90. 21 The occasions when.the manas. activity ceases are discussed in CWSL: v.2a-8a. 22 CWSL: ii.l2a-13a. 23 Trirnsikd IV 24 On the two obstructions see 9 of the translation below and also CWSL: ix.5b-7a. 25 See K'uei-chi1s discussion of the difference between 8th and 9th vijnana at 5.2.1.(9) in the translation below. 2^ These are treated at some length in the CWSL (see esp. ii.26b- 29a); cf. also La Vallee-Poussin's very helpful note, Siddhi3\sg. 8-9. K'uei-chi outlines the' four different opinions at §5-2.2. 27. On the Five-level Contemplation see §1.1.1-5 of the translation below. 28 CWSL: ix.3b-8b: Siddhi: pp. 562-667. 29: See 6.1. where. K'ueir-chi discusses the difference between the four-stage theory and the five-stage theory. 30 Kosa: VI. 22-25. (xxiii.7b-9b) 31 On the Four.Examinations and the Four exact Comprehensions see 1.2.1 of the translation and. especially Chapt. V, note 56. 32 On the ten.lands and their position in the five stages see Obermiller, "Doctrine of Ppm," pp. 51-57, and also pp. 14-47 where he contrasts, the. Banayana and the Mahayana versions of the five stages, 33 - - For a study of this doctrine In the Mahayana-samgraha and its relation to the three varieties of nondiscriminating cognition (the preliminary, the fundamental and the subsequently acquired) see my article "Dynamic Liberation in Yogacara Buddhism." 174 Notes to Chapt. Ill (pp. 37 -68) On the topic of doctrinal, classification.in general and on the T'ien-t'ai system of Chih-i in particular, see Leon Hurvitz, Chih-i} pp. 214-331. 175 Notes to Chapter IV Pages 70 - 78 This section of the Taisho has the separate title Showa hobo somokuruku flj fa >£f $9, g gfc see Vol. I: pp. 480-481. 2 See bibliography for full references. La Vallee-Poussin amended his early reconstruction before the publication of the second volume of the Siddhi; he discusses the issue in the appendix, pp. 7^5-750. See bibliography for full references. Notes to Chapter V Pages 79 - l6l : i There are several variants of the title of this portion of the Ta-sheng fa-yuan i-lin ehang (no. 26): the Taisho edition (based on a l8th cen. blockprint) has the "The Doctrinal Forest of Vijnapti• matrata" j whereas, the 8th cen. commentaries of both of K'uei-chi's immediate successors, Hui-chao and Chih-chou have simply "Essay on Vijnaptimatrata" as translated here. The ten section headings listed in the.Preface also occur in the subsequent text as the main divisions. The sub-sectional headings are provided by the translator. 2 Reference to the Taisho text of the essay will be given in this manner at the end of each sub-section. 3 When K'uei-chi uses the expression t'i.'j^j^ here and above, he has in mind both the Chinese philosophical distinction between substance and function (see below:§ 1.1.l) and also the Buddhist technical term svabhava ('own-being' ) which in Hsiian-tsang's Chinese is rendered sometimes as tzu-hsing ^ »|^_ , sometimes as tzu-t'i Q In this translation t'i ', and tzu-t'i & <<&£ are consistently rendered as 'substance' and 'essential substance'; respectively, although K'uei-chi does not seem to distinguish between the two. ^ Shingo (298b) comments that this could mean either 'existing and non-existing' or 'conditioned (samskrta) and unconditioned (asamskrta) dharmas'. He opts for the former interpretation saying that the contemplation of the objective realm includes purely imaginary (parikalpita) objects which would not be included within the class of conditioned and un conditioned dharmas. Fa >^ is, of course, the standard equivalent, for the Sanskrit 'dharma' whether it means the 'Doctrine of the Buddha' (Dharma) or 'the elements of experience' (dharmah). ^ The commentators agree that jjLjjE- ^f^Jt should be understood as "the [contemplation] of Vijnapti[matrata] that banishes the false and preserves the Real; cf. T'ai-hsii (p. 954): 6 In a Buddhist context hsii used with a negative connotation is mos3tt likely to be understood asTisu-wang J^_^. > 'unreal' or 'false' (abhuta). 7 Shih ,standing alone, is not a standard equivalent for any Sanskrit technical term in the Chinese of Hsiian-tsang and K'uei-chi. It is probably best understood here as elliptic for chen-shih , which is the standard equivalent for tattva. There are a number of Notes to Chapt. V (pp. 79 - l6l) related. Yogacara terms that can he translated as 'Real,' 'the Reality,' 'the Absolute,' etc.; cf. notes 9 and l6 below. 8 Cf. CWSL (viii.29a); La Vallee-Poussin reconstructs ruci and yukti. The commentators say that ch'ing ('feelings') means wang- ch'ing ^ .jjk ('deluded feelings' ). 9 & The chen JH. here, as is often the case given the constraints of the four-four rhythmK'uei-chi sought to maintain, is probably elliptic for chen-ju ^-^^.(tathata) or Thusness, which for the Yogacarins was Reality") See also note l6 below. 10 These two verses occur as quoted here in the second scroll of Hsuan-tsang's tranlation of the Mahayana-samgraha (T:XXXI.l43ci-4) and in Asvabhava's Upanibandhana in the sixth scroll of Hsiian-tsang's translation (T:XXXI. 417c21-4l8al5). For the Sanskrit of the first verse, which survives in the Mahayaha-sutralamkara, see XIX:hj, p. 168 in the edition of S. Levi, and p. 276 in his translation. ^ The first line (pada) of this verse is somewhat problematic since the Chinese translation can very easily be misunderstood. Hsiian-tsang's translation has: The Sanskrit, as preserved in the Mahay ana-sutralankara (see note 10 above), says: agantukatvaparyesa anyonyam namavastunoh \ prajnapter dvividhasyatra tanmatratvasya caisana || The Chinese k'e*^ (guest, lodger, traveler, stranger, etc.) often occurs with chu (master, ruler) expressing the relationship between host and guest, lord and retainer, proprietor and customer, etc. Now the Chinese for the first line above says that "name and thing are reciprocally guest to each other," with the implication that one is the host for the other and visa-versa. This should not however be understood to mean that they are"mutually related" in any intrinsic way. Quite to the contrary the verse means to say they have no essen• tial or inherent relationship whatsoever, their association is purely accidental. This is expressed more clearly by the Sanskrit agantuka-, which can also mean both 'stranger' and 'guest ,':', but as an adjective in technical usage means 'adventitious' or 'accidental'. Thus the best literal translation of the Chinese would be that they are "strangers to each other," but "adventitious" (following the Sanskrit) is less likely to mislead. K'uei-chi discusses these same two verses again in Section Seven below, and at § 7.2.2(lc ) he glosses the relationship between name and thing as pu-hsiang-shu ^ M\ > "not inter-related". The "dual aspect," according to Asvabhava^s commentary (T:XXXI. 417c-4l8a2), refers to their apparent uniqueness or own-being and their apparent distinctions or specifications. 178 Botes to Chapt. V (pp. 79 -l6l) 12 Asvabhava (Ul8a5-7) says these are the discrimination or conceptualization of the name, the discrimination or conceptualization designating the name, and the discrimination or conceptualization designating the specifications (see above, n. 10). For more on these see n. 55 below on the Four Examinations and the Four Exact Comprehensions, 13 The Three Natures are the Three Aspects of Own-being (trisvabhava) j£l ^ *\%. discussed in Chapt. III. K'uei-chi cites these verses again below in his discussion of this how the three natures are realized in Section 7-2. ~^ Cf. La Vallee-Poussin Vs" note" (Siddki3'p. 67) on the term parinama and the differences in its interpretation by Sthiramati and Dharmapala. La Vallee-Poussin., following SAEKI, takes these to be the viprayuktas, which the Yogacarins-—unlike the Sarvastivadins do not consider to be a separate category of dharmas completely distinct from rupa-citta-caitta. ~^ Chen-ju ^-^t^. renders tat hat'a '(Thusness) or tattva (Reality) in Hsiian-tsang's Chinese, not bhuta-tathata; this is attested by a number of occurrences in his translation of the Madhyanta-vibhdga3 for which the original Sanskrit survives. On the difference between these terms and their Chinese equivalents see also La Vallee-Poussin's Appendix: "Notes sur la Tathata ou Dharmata" (Siddhi3 pp. 743-761. 1T CWSL: vii.25a l8 The relative facts correspond to the Dependent (paratantra) aspect of own-being or existence, and the abstract universal to the Absolute (parinispanna). 19 The extensive interpolation necessary to make this passage comprehensible in English is based on the parallel structure of the Chinese and on the explanations of the commentators. 20 This is a skillful means (upaya) to be employed only provisionally and later abandoned when the goal is reached. 21 The Sanskrit saksatkr- (lit.: to do or put before one's own eyes') has the meaning of 'experiencing directly,' or 'verifying through one's own experience.' The Chinese render this with cheng HjE^ (lit.: 'to testify to') conferring upon it a somewhat extended meaning. The best English equivalent is 'to realize' understood to mean both 'to effect' and 'to make part of one's own personal experience.' Notes to Chapt. V (pp. 79 - l6l) 22 - - This is the crucial point regarding which the Yogacarins felt they differed most significantly from the Madhyamikas. 23 Cf. note 5 above. 24 T'o"j£ means literally 'entrusted to': In Buddhist Chinese the expression t'o-sheng is used to describe the manner of procreation of higher life forms whereby the male deposits, his. _ seed (usually thought of as a homunculus) into the womb of the female who subsequently bears the child. 2^ In Hsuan-tsang's Chinese ching £^usually renders visaya, 'the objective realm or field,' but can also stand for artha, 'object La Vallee-Poussin prefers the latter, reconstructing 'artha-matra.' 2f^ This answers an unstated objection, namely: If the inner noetic or subjective component and the inner noematic or objective component are inextricably joined, it seems arbitrary to speak only of vijnapti-matra; why not say visaya-matra. 27 CWSL: x.31a 28 The Yogacarins often gloss citta ('thought') and manas ('mind') as synonyms for vijnana ('mentation'); sometimes, however, they distinguish between the three terms saying that citta refers specifically to the eighth mode of mentation, manas to the seventh, and vijnana, in the strictest sense ('discrimination' or 'perception' to the first six modes. Cf. also 2.2.1 and note 109 below. 29 The Ghanavyuha Sutra was never translated by Hsuan-tsang; however this verse is cited in the Cheng-wei-shih-lun (vii.21a), T: XXXI.39a, although the source is not mentioned there. 30 This well-known assertion occurs several times m the Avatatnsaka, see . for example T: X.194a and 195b. 31 The I-ckiao eking is an alternative name for KumarajTva's Fo-dh 'ui pan-nieh-p 'an lu^h-shuo-chiao-ch-ieh eking translation of the T: $^#L>f ^4tL^1#££( no- 389)- K'uei-chi cites with ellipses the passage occurring at T: XII.lllla!5-20. 32 Cf. note 5 above. 33 -t Mo '5^is more literally the tips or ends of the branches, The image is of the root as the cource and the. branches as the extensions. 180 Notes to Chapt.. V (79 - l6l) 3^ This refers to the self-verifying component (svasamvitti-hhaga), which occurs as tsu-t' i-fen & >j§w as well as tzu-cheng-fen fa Cf. note 36 below. * 35 This is Hsiian-tsang's rendering of the first verse of Vasubandhu's Thirty Verses (T: XXXI,60a23-24). This is the commentary on the above verse in the CWSL (i.2b), T: XXXIlbl. Note that K'uei-chi in citing this passage uses the variant tzu-t'i ^ (lit.: own-substance or essential substance) rather than the more standard equivalent tzu-cheng ^ (lit.: self-attester) which is what is found at the corresponding spot in the TaishS edition of the CWSL. 37 T: XVI.698b2. 38 Cf. note 5 above. 39 Greed (raga) is first in the Yogacara list of the six afflictions (klesa ) or defilements (samklesa^ft^ ), i.e., those mental coefficients (caittas) that obstruct enlightenment. Faith (sraddha) is first in the list of the eleven wholesome or good (kusala )mental coefficients, i.e., those mental states conducive to enlightenment. 41 This is from the Mahayana-sutralarnkdra; K'uei-chi cites the verse as translated by Hsiian-tsang in the CWSL (vii.8a) where it occurs as a quote; cf. T: XXXI.36c27-28. The translation of La Vallee- Poussin (Siddhi, p. 3l6) incorporates some helpful interpolations based on K'uei-chi's CWSL commentary: Nous affirmons que la pensee, unique, apparait double, comme objet et sujet (grahya, grahaka) oucomme image et vision (nimitta et darsanabhaga, . . .); de meme elle apparait comme Raga, etc., comme Sraddha, etc.: il n'y a pas de Dharma souille ou bon en dehors du Citta. For the surviving Sanskrit version of the verse, see S. Levi's edition of the Mahayana-sutralamkara (p. 36). This is the self-verifying component (samvitti-bhaga); cf. note 37 above. Notes to Chapt. V (79 - l6l) This passage occurs in a slightly different form in Hsuan- tsang's translation (T: XIV.5631)27-28). K'uei-chi cites it again, with yet another variation, in % 1.3.3 (k); cf. note 87. kk Cf. note 5 above. 1+5 T: XII.222b4-c7. ^ The a^" here is problematic. K'uei-chi's commentators take it as an equivalent for yuktas or yuktitas(as translated here) which it often is. Lamotte seems to ignore it in his translation of the line, "puis on examine la corde et on comprend qu'elle n'est pas un serpent," {La Somme3 p. 164). There is nothing to which it corresponds in the two Chinese and one Tibetan versions of the parallel text cited in note 47 below. ^ Actually the verse itself is not in the Mahay ana-samgraha, but rather in Asvabhava's commentary (T: XXXI.Ul5b6-cl6). Asvabhava cites no source but it seems to be the same as the first verse found in the Hastabhavaprakarana, a work the',Tibetans ascribe to Aryadeva and the Chinese to Dignaga; cf. F. W. Thomas and H. UI: "The Hand Treatise', A Work by Aryadeva." This latter work seems to be the earliest reference in Indian literature to the famous rope-snake analogy, better known perhaps from the later Vedanta works of S*ankara. HU The interpolation follows Benkl (605cl4-6o6a27)• According to both the Mahay ana-samgraha and the Ch'eng-wei-shih-lun there are two portions or aspects of the Dependent: one defiled (i.e., the paratantra as parikalpita) and one pure (i.e., the paratantra as parinispanna). 1)9 Hsuan-tsang and K'uei-chi render prajna ('intuitive wisdom') with both chih ^ and YmlJ^ . Hui is used for prajna as one of the five special or determinate (viniyata) mental coefficients (cf. n. Ill below), while chih occurs in more general contexts. Both forms, and also the transcription pan-jo J$S£ 7?^ occur in the present dis• cussion. The standard English equivalent is 'wisdom' in all three cases. Here huijl* is rendered with "wisdom" and later in this passage chih^ is rendered with "knowledge" to reflect K'uei- chi's choice of the two different characters. The context makes it clear, however, that K'uei-chi considers^? "knowledge" (as used here) to be equivalent to wisdom^; . The argument that K'uei-chi develops here also assumes the association of insight (vipasyana) with wisdom (prajna). 182 Notes to Chapt. V (79 - l6l) The citation is ungrammatical hecause of the ellipsis; see Lamotte's translation of the complete passage, La Somme, pp. 167-168. 51 Cf. note 49 above. 52 Hsuan-tsang's translation of Asvabhava's Uphanibandana commentary to the Mahay ana-samgraha (T:XXXI.4l6c6). 53 Cf. note 49 above. 54 K'uei-chi seems here to be paraphrasing the passage cited above (n. 52). ^ This is quoted from the translation of Hsuan-tsang, T: XXXI.142cl7-21. For a rendering of the complete passage, see Lamotte's translation, La Somme, pp. l6l-l62. ^ The Four Examinations are: 1. nama-paryesana : examination of the fact that the name (naman) is simply a mental expression (manojalpa). 2. art ha-parye sana ^jff-J^. :examination of the fact. that the thing or object (artha) is simply a mental expression. 3. namarthasvabhava-prajnapti-paryesana %j. fa ^ ^fj(^ ^ examination of the fact that the uniqueness or own-being (svabhava) attributed to the name or thing is nothing hut conceptualization (Prajnapti). 4. namarthavisesa-prajnapti-paryesana, ^ 7^ ^-^fj^ 5oL examination of the: fact that the distinctions or specifications (visesa) attributed to the name are nothing but conceptualization. The Four Exact Comprehensions are the corresponding states of comprehension arising when one knows each of the above four, propositions to be true. For a discussion of these two Yogacara doctrines in the Ch'eng-wei-shih-lun and the Mahay ana-samgraha, see Siddhi, pp. 576-577 and La Somme, pp. l6l-l62. For references to the doctrines in the Bodhisattva-bhumi,the Mahayana-sutralamkara and the Abhidharma-samueeaya-vyakhya, see La Somme, p. 30. On the role of the Examinations and the Comprehensions in realizing the emptiness of the self and of dharmas see 10.1 and esp. note 297 below. Notes to Chapt. V (79 - l6l) 57 Rather than a direct quote, this appears to he a paraphrase of T:. XXXI.l42h6-7 in the translation of Hsiian-tsang. 58 The commentators say it is at the Stage of Provisioning and the Preliminary.Stage; cf. Tai-hsii, p. 993- 59 Chih-chou (53b) says, "The impure (sasrava) is termed 'cause,' and the pure (anasrava) within the cause >^ is given the general designation 'effect.'" ^° For a discussion of these three varieties of wisdom see Ko§a VI.5 (xxii.lla-12a).. For a more specifically Yogacara presen• tation of the three, see•:MaTidydna-sutrdlamkdra3yj.. 6-7 (Levi ed., PP. 55-56; trans., p.103) and also St.S'chayer's study of that chapter, "Die Erlosungslehren der Yogacaras," esp. pp. 100-102. ^ The various ways by which things are considered wholesome or conducive to enlightment are defined in the "Prakaraprabheda" section of the Abhidhavma-sgmueeaya.- Walpola Rahula {Le Compendium, p. 35) translates: Qu'est-ce qui est favorable par l'obtention de naissance? C'est la production des resultats (vipakabhinirvrtti)qui leur conviennent (tadrupa) par suite de la pratique habituelle anterieure (purvabhyasam agamya) de ces memes qualites favorables, de telle maniere que le penchant (ruci) vers elles demeure naturellement (prakrtya) et inconscie.mment (apratisamkhyaya). ^2 T: XXXI.I42bl4-l6. In this passage the causal aspect is represented by the verbal concepts, while the stages attained are the effect. ^ Hsin-chieh /f|. fa is one of several Chinese equivalents for the technical term adhimukti which La Vallee-Poussin renders quite literally as 'adhesion-sympathie.' It is variously glossed as involving elements of zealous inclination, strong resolution, faith, certainty, etc., with regard to the Dharma. 6h On the two varieties of the Darsanamarga, viz., the tattvadarsanamarga and the laksanadarsanamarga, see ix.l3a-15a, and also La Vallee-Poussin's note {Siddhi pp. 588-560). Notes to Chapt. V (79- l6l) This passage.is not a direct - quote, hut rather a summary of the material in the ninth scroll which treats the five stages (avastha) on the Holy Path. ^ The correct cognition, also known as the fundamental Enon-discriminatingH cognition (mula-Cnirvikalpaka3-jnana), is:the state of awareness by which one realizes enlightenment. The sub• sequently acquired cognition, which follows the correct cognition, is the state of awareness by which the enlightened bodhisattvas and Buddhas are able to retain their salvific efficacy in the world of beings still bound by discrimination (vikalpa). Both of these are necessary in the Yogacara conception of liberation, i.e., the Unfixed Nirvana (apratisthita-nirvana). These two together with the preliminary cognition (prayogika-jnana),. make up the doctrine of the three kinds of cognition For a study of this important Yogacara soteriological doctrine based on chapters 8 and 9 of the Mahaydna- samgraha see Sponberg, "Dynamic Liberation in Yogacara Buddhism." On the doctrine of pure and impure dharmas, see Kosa 1:4 (i.3a-3b). 68 On the distinction between dispersed and concentrated mental dharmas see Kosa 1:33 (ii.5b-6a) and IV:123 (xvii.l7a-b). 69 Cf. notes 60 and -6~ above. 70 This is Vasubandhu's commentary to the Dasabhumika Sutra; the reference is to the 10th chapter (12th scroll) of Bodhiruci's translation, T: XXVI.193-203. 71 This is another essay or chapter in K'uei-chi's Ta-sheng fa-yuan .i-Zin chang (no. 26), T: XLV.350-356. The five categories of Vijnapti-matrata are different from the five levels of Vijnapti-matrata t^'i^'^L which were treated above.in 1.1.1-1.1.5. 73 K'uei-chi cites the verse as it is quoted in the Mahdydna- samgraha at T-.XXXI .148bl-2 in the translation of Hsuan-tsang. This same argument is one of the four used to establish Vijnaptimatrata in the Vimsatika (II-III). The •Mahdydna-abdhidharma-sutra does not survive. Notes to Chapt. V (79 - 1.6l) 1_r This is one line of a verse from the Lahkdvatara Sutra as it occurs in the translation Budhiruci and as it is quoted in the Ch'eng-wei-shih-lun (ii.29a). K'uei-chi cites the complete verse below at 1.3-3.1; see note 8l. 75 y This is Hsuan-tsang's rendering of Trimsika XVII (T: XXXI.6la2-3)- It reflects the Dharmapala tradition of inter• preting the Sanskrit original which in the edition of Levi (Deux TraitSs,p. 14) reads: vijnanaparinamo 'yam-vikalpo yad .vikalpyate XJ •' • tena tan nasti tenedam sarvamvijnaptimatrakam }|l7l| The tradition that followed Sthiranati parsed the Sanskrit somewhat differently, yielding an alternative understanding, which is followed by Jacobi (Trimsika, p. 47) who translates: Diese Modification des Bewusstseins ist eingebildete Vorstellung; was durch diese vorgestellt wird, das ist ''nichts'" Selendes . This verse is one of the most significant of the thirty for comparing the two divergent traditions; cf. La Vallee-Poussin's note (Siddhi, p. 416). if\ This is the first line of two verses quoted in the Mahdydna- samgraha from the Yoga-vibhahga (?)^S'J 3$t4foi$ • Tne complete text of the two from the Chinese of Hsuan-tsang reads: The bodhisattva in the state of concentration Sees that images (pratibimba) are nothing but thought.. Once the concept of objects (arthasamjna) has been destroyed, He sees that there is nothing but his own concepts (svasamjfia). Residing thus in internal thought (antascitta) He knows that what is apprehended (grahya) is inexistent, And then, that the apprehensor (grahaka) does not exist either; Finally he touches the state where there is nothing to be had (anupalambha). K'uei-chi, no doubt, has in mind the passage from the Ch'eng-wei- shih-lun (ix.lla) that cites these two verses to illustrate the nirvedhabhagTyas or phases of the Station of Preliminary Training (prayogavastha). 186 Notes -to Chapt. V (79 - l6l) 77 This is quoted from Hsuan-tsang's translation of Bandhuprabha's commentary to the Buddhabhumi Sutra, T:. XXVI. 302c. 7ft K'uei-chi cites the verse as it is quoted in the Ch'eng-wei-shi-lun, (iii.15a), T: XXXI.13c23-24. 79 17 TrimsikaXXX (T: XXXI.6lb22-23). Hsuan-tsang's translation in this case is a very literal rendering of the Sanskrit (Levi, Deux Traites, p. 14): sa evanasravo dhatur acintya^. kusalo dhruvah | . sukho vimuktikayo 'sau dharmakhyo 'yam mahamuneh 113011 80 Having discussed the five categories of Vijnaptimatrata, K'uei-chi now gives examples of six alternate ways of explaining the first of the five categories, i.e. , Vijflaptimdtrata.'ln terms of the objective sense-field. 8l Cf. note 74 above. The corresponding Sanskrit is found in the Lankavatara Sutra X:101 (NANJO, ed., p. 227): svacittabhinivesena cittam vai sampravartate | bahirdha nasti vai drsyam ato vai cittamatrakam || 82 See note 30 above. This is Trimsika I (T: XXXI.60a23-24) which K'uei-chi has already cited above at §1.1.3; cf. note 35 above. 84 The commentators explain that referring to the subjective and objective components is to discuss Vijnaptimatrata in terms of what exists conditionally (samskrta-dha'rma), and that referring.to the clinging to self and dharmas is to discuss it in terms of what is clung to. 85 The'following line is not in the Taisho edition of K'uei-chi's text, though it does occur in all the other editions. The Taisho ommission is probably a simple printing error since no variant is noted in the apparatus. The omitted line reads: 86 The commentators explain that mundane people conventionally state that self and dharmas exist basing themselves on what has no substance and following their deluded feelings this is to discuss Vijnaptimatrata in terms of what is clung to. The Holy Scriptures provisionally state that self and dharmas exist basing themselves on what is substantially established this is to discuss Vijnaptimatrata according to what exists conditionally. Notes to Chapt. V (79 - l6l) ^ Cf. T: XIV.563h27-29. This passage was already cited above in a slightly different form at §1.1.4; cf. note 43. 88 In Hsiian-tsang's translation of the Sandhinivmooana Sutra this passage occurs at T: XVI.698b2. 89 The full verse is cited above at §1.3.2: cf. note 73. 90 In that analysis the first three sense-field, doctrine and principles of the five categories fall together under the heading of sense-field understood more generally. 91 T: XXXIII.526a26-cl6; cf. no. 3 in the Analysis of K'uei- chi's Surviving Works (Chapt. II, p. 25 ) above. 92 In Buddhist Chinese shih"ti8fecan render the two different Sanskrit verbal nouns: vijnana (mentation or perception) and vijnapti (representation or conceptualization). In the Buddhist Chinese of Hsiian-tsang, liao-pieh ^^ij which is given here as the gloss for vijfiapti usually renders a finite form of the verb vijna-. . ' Vijna-' means to know in a discursive or discriminating manner; whence vijnana: discriminate know-ing, mentation, perception, etc. Contrast the verb prajna-: ' to know.intuitively; whence the noun prajna: intuitive wisdom, gnosis, etc. Cf.$ 2.2.1 below where, rather than liao-pieh f Jji] , K'uei-chi speaks of the liao-ta XjJix (understanding) and fen-pieh /^^(discriminating) activity of the mind. 93 Here (and below) K'uei-chi has simply shih "\$£fc , which could correspond to either vijnana or vijnapti, and may indicate that he felt it was unnecessary to distinguish between the two; cf. Chapt. Ill above. Here mentation :(vijnana") •• seems more likely because of the context, even though he clearly specifies vijnapti ^.^"y^ Just above 94 The commentators explain that the first four are the relative particulars and the last is the universal principle: cf. Tai-hsii, p. 1007. 95 This is a paraphrase of a passage in the Ch'eng-wei-shi-h-lun (vii.25a) cited by K'ei-chi in^l.l.l above. 96 This is a play on the Chinese equivalent for Thusness which is the combination of the two characters: chen-ju j|| The commen• tators explain that this statement is to answer the objection that it seems just as valid to say Thusness-only as to say representation-only While both are indeed accepted as true, their context and applications 188 Notes to Chapt. V (79 -l6l) vary. The latter-—-though, not as ultimate——is nonetheless preferred because.it focuses the aspirant's.attention on the delusory, grasping nature of the mind and is thus more appropriate., to the first efforts towards liberation. Cf. the last paragraph of § 2.2.2 below. 97 Each, of the editions of the text consulted reproduce the second anda xmrthirad charactercnaracters ofi tinthis transcription differentlydifferently.. The Taisho (XLV.260al5) has -*IL for -ZjL , and fc>)for ^.J with no varianiant-s cited, Ch'u-tz 'u (T'ang pronounciation: tsia?-tsviah)«di-jji'J is an impossiblii e transcription for the Sanskrit '-tra-.' and probably is simply the result, of a misprint, or perhaps the error of an earlier scribe. There is some evidence for the latter possibility, since T'ai-hsu. (p. 1008) gets, the third character^ correct, but like the. Taisho has <*)£. for tfjt- . Shingo (LXXI. 342b26), and Mei (.35b) whose commentary is based on his, both: have the correct form Kiben (LXXXI.6l5a23) abbreviates to RJ- .„8 The single character wei renders both the base form 'matra' (only) and the derivative 'matrata', (only-ness, exelusiveness). The transcription above is clearly 'matrata', however the three meanings given in the text seem to apply to the" base form; hence 'matra' here and 'matrata' above in the translation. 99 The English 'only' renders this first meaning of '-matra'. 100 This appears to be a paraphrase of CWSL (vii.19b) \ T: XXXI.38c24-25, which, reads slightly differently:. "The expression '-matrata' Is meant to deny that there are real things existing apart from vijnana w&iSt "^f ijfy , tut not to deny that mental dharmas, etc. do exist inseparable from vijnana jj^ ^ %&W('*jfti \& ^ SAEKI, following K'uei-chi, glosses "mental dharmas, etc." as the two perceptual .components (bhaga)., form (rupa), Thusness, etc. 101 K'uei-chi probably, has. in mind both the Sanskrit 'eva' (just, precicely, quite, that very . . ., etc.) and also the explative particle . 'tu.' which, does occur in the verse he cites below. .10 2 Although, the' Taisho apparatus gives no varients, the ku (therefore) at 260al8 does not occur in the T'as-hsu, Mei, or Shing5 editions of the text;. (.it is in that of Kiben). The meaning is not significantly affected either way. 189 Notes to Chapt. V (79 - l6l) This is the second half of the famous Madhydnta-vibhdga verse (l:l), which survives in the original Sanskrit (NAGAO ed., pp. 17): ahhuta-parikalpo 'sti dvayan tatra na vidyate | sunyata vidyate tv atra tasyam api sa vidyate |Jl.l|| This verse is important because it expresses an atttempt to resolve the dilemma of accepting plurality in the world at the conventional level, while maintaining that at the ultimate level Reality is an Absolute, here expressed as amptiness (sunyata). It is thus a key passage for determining the relationship between the Dependent and the Absolute and it is also important to any study of early Madhyamika- Yogacara hybrid thought. See the following note for a full translation. Two Chinese translations of the Madhyanta-vibhaga survive, that of Paramartha done between 559-570 and that of Hsuan-tsang done in 66l; (YUKI, Tensekishi, mentions no lost translations). The line quoted is the same as Hsuan-tsang's version except for the character ting for which Hsiian-tsang gives 'wei ' . Shingo (6l5a29-bl) says that the version K'uei-chi cites here is that of Paramartha, however the Taisho edition of Paramartha's text, (T: XXXI. U6UblU), like Hsiian- tsang's (T: XXXI.l+51alM has rather than , with no variant given. K'uei-chi could perhaps be referring to an early draft of Hsiian-tsang's translation. 'Ting' is a more accurate translation of the Sanskrit 'tu' than 'wei'. 10H This alludes to the first half of the above verse, which K'uei-chi does not give in his citation. Hsiian-tsang translates the complete verse: Vain delusion exists. In this the two do not exist. Within this there is only emptiness. In that there is also this. Vasubandhu's commentary (T: XXXL.U6Ubl6-22) explains that "vain delusion" refers to the discrimination of the apprehender and the apprehended. These "two" however do not exist. Gopa's commentary was never translated into Chinese; K'uei-chi quotes this passage from a citation in his own Vimsatikd commentary (no. .1.7) at T: XLIII.982a. This gloss, which is very frequently encountered in Yogacara works, goes back to a historically questionable etymological derivation of citta (thought) from the root Vci-: to gather, collect. The doctrine of citta-matra is perhaps best known from the Lahkdvatara Sutra, but is also found in the Avatamsaka•Sutra, cf': note 113 below. Notes to Chapt. V (79 - l6l) -i AO Cf. note 92 above. 109 This comes from the opening of Vasubandhu's auto-commentary on the Twenty Verses. Note, that here the Chinese for vijnana is clearly distinguished from vijnapti ~J . Cf. CWSL (v.8a) T: XXXI. 42c9-15)5 which explains how the terms citta, manas and vijnana are used differently, though they are of the substance. 110 In Sanskrit grammar karmadiaraya compounds are descriptive compounds usually illustrated by examples like hilbtpala.. (blue lotus), or, in English, by a compound like blackbird. Vijnaptimatrata can be understood as one of a special sub-class of karmadharya compounds made up of two substantives, rather than the more common adjective/adverb-substantive pattern. ~L1~'" As part of a discussion of the five special or determinate (viniyata) mental coefficients (caitta), the Ch'eng-wei-shth-lim (v.31ab) defines wisdom (prajna) as discernment (pravicaya Ef] if ). In Buddhist. terminology, pravicaya ([intuitive or enlightened' dis• cernment) has a positive connotation, whereas vikalpa ([false, vain, or deluded] discrimination) has a decidedly negative connotation; cf. also note 92 above. 11? Cf. Shingo (345b6-9). 113 The citta-matra(ta) doctine occurs several places in the Avatamsaka (e.g., T: X.194a, 195b and 288c) and very often of course, in the Lankavatara. Thmi e commentator' ' s glos"—s yu" n *'* , '(t ';o< transport, transportation) ; (vehicle); hence 'conveyance.' as sheng 115 The most important passage in the Lotus dealing with the One Vehicle doctrine is the Parable of the Burning House (T: IX.9b ff. in KumarajTva's Chinese version). For an English translation of the KumarajTva version, the most popular in East Asia, see L. Hurvitz, Scripture of the Lotus Blossom, pp. 58ff. On the three kinds of cognition see note 66 above. 117 Shingo (347al9-20) and Mei (29a-b) say that this means: "When we speak of realizing the principle- that the Dependent is like an illusion , then it is only the conventional and not the ab• solute1 [that is involved!." Notes to Chapt. V (79 - l6l) ll8 Shingo (3^71>2l) cites Zenju who says that the following polemic is directed primarily against.the Chinese. Madhyamika exegete Chi-tsang jjjw . The issue is whether the One Vehicle should, be considered cause or fruit, or both. Chi-tsang discusses the three alternatives in his Commentary on the Lotus Sutra.(T: no. 1722, XXXIV) deciding in favor of the second alternative, that the One Vehicle is the Fruition • Knowledge of the Buddhas. K'uei-chi attacked that position, maintaining that it must be both cause and fruit. His arguments are intricate and scholastic. The present text is only a brief summary; they are presented more fully in K'uei-chi's Commentary on the Lotus Sutra (T: XXXIV.762a). The key point for K'uei-chi is that the One Vehicle is a conveyance, a means of reaching the goal of enlightenment. It must, therefore, be considered as cause. He accepts that, as the reward which is waiting outside the burning house, it can also be considered the fruit; hence his position that it is both cause and fruit. 119 Tao-ch,'' ang is the standard equivalent for bodhimanda, the platform, terrace or seat of enlightenment the spot under the hodhi tree where the Buddha became enlightened. 120 According to the Srimdld-devT Sutra (T: XII.219b), the Six Dharmas or basic topics taught by the Buddha are the preservation of the True Doctrine, the decline of the True Doctrine, the monastic rules (pratimoksa), the monastic code (vinaya), going forth from the home to take up the monastic life, and the ordination of monks. For an English translation of this passage, see A. and H. Wayman, Lion's Roar, pp. 78-79. 121 This is the fourth essay or chapter of K'uei-chi's Ta-sheng fa-yuan i-'-lin ehang (no. 26), T: XLV.261+-268. 122 The chapter on the Dharma-theme of Non-duality, famous for the passage relating VimalakTrti's "thunderous silence," is in the fifth scroll of Hsiian-tsang*s translation (T: XIV.577al2-23); cf. E. Lamotte's excellent French translation of the Tibetan version of the chapter, L*Enseignement3 pp. 301-318. 123 Ta-hui ehing (Mahamati Sutra) is an alternate name for Gunabhadra's translation of the Lahkdvatara Sutra: the doctrine referred to here is found at T: XVI.506a. 124 s The doctrine of the Inconceivable is discussed at T: XVI.526a in Bodhiruci's translation of the Lahkdvatara. Notes to Chapt. V (pp. 79 - l6l) 125 » i,v In the Chinese of Hsuan-tsang and K'uei-chi, shih-she is a standard equivalent for prajnapti and the. finite forms of the verb prajna- in the causative, which means 'to form concepts of, or 'to designate'. This is discussed at T: XXX.654a in Hsuan-tsang's translation of the Yogdedrabhumi. 127 This is taught several places in the Mahayana-samgraha, see esp. T: XXXI.139b6 ff. The phrase: "manifestests its universality, continuity. . . ," is also found in the CWSL (viii.30a) T: XXXI46bll. 128 This is the Abhidharma-sumueeaya-vydkhyd which was translated by Hsuan-tsang and was the subject of a .sub-commentary by K'uei-chi (no. 15). The passage referred to here (T: XXXI.702b3-c2) occurs in a discussion of the eight unconditioned dharmas which include several of the other doctrines mentioned by K'uei-chi in this section. 129 Cf. Madhydnta-vibhdga verse 1:4 (NAGAO ed., p. 19). 130 This is a seemingly un-Buddhist. doctrine, especially if avikaratva is rendered 'immutability'. Shingo (353a29-bl) cites Sthiramati's Abhidharma-samuccaya-vydkhya l(T: XXX.702b-c), which explains that what is forever unaffected is the lack of any true self (anatman). 131 Shingo again cites the same passage (see n. 130 above) from Sthiramati's commentary which explains that akasa should be understood as the absence of matter or form. 132 The reference is to a passage (T: V.71a) in Hsuan-tsang's translation of the 'Satasdhasrikd Prajftdparamitd. 133 See notes 125 and 126 above. The text of the Yogdedrabhumi (T: XXX.653c) goes on to explain that the Four Holy Truths are what can.be conceptually fixed and the Thusness (tathata), is what cannot be conceptually fixed. See also La Vallee-Poussin's note, Siddhi, p. 582-583. 135 The passage occurs at T: XII.221b-c. For a discussion of the difference, see the English translation and notes in A. and H. Wayman, Lion's Roar, pp. 96-98. The Waymans refer to the two types as the "Create and Uncreate Holy Truths." Notes to Chapt. V (79 - l6l) 136 T: XII.443a 137 T: XXXI.536c; this is from an important hut as yet rather neglected-early Yogacara treatise, the Hsien-yang-sheng-chiao-lun ... (ff: 1602), a work surviving only in Chinese that is attributed to Asanga and was translated by Hsuan-tsang; the Sanskrit title has been reconstructed as Prakaranarya-sasana-sastra or -vaca- It is an abridgement of the Yogdedrabhumi according to the preface, but Alex Wayman {Analysis, p. 32 and 39) feels that it is an earlier work of which the Yogdedrabhumi is an expansion; this is a problem that warrants more attention. 138 K'uei-chi often uses initial, middle and subsequent to refer to the three kinds of nondiscriminating cognition, the preliminary, the fundamental or correct, and the subsequently acquired; cf. note 66 above. 139 The Sanskrit nairatmya means literally 'selfless-ness'. Nairatmya-dharmata (the nonsubstantiality of all dharmas [including the person or self1) is mentioned in the Mahayana-samgraha at T: XXXI.147c9, and Asvabhava analyses it into the dual non-sub• stantiality of both person and dharmas in his commentary, T: XXXI.430al7 26... This doctrine is a more frequently encountered topic in the CWSL. li|0 See T: XVT.688b694a for the Sandhinirmocana chapter. There is also a long discussion of these two doctrines in the Mahayana-samgraha and the CWSL. The Yogdedrabhumi (T: XXX.436b) lists the three as emptiness (sunyata), the absence of signs (animitta), and the absense of desires (apranihita). They are also mentioned but not listed in the commentary t Mahayana-sutrdlankdra XI:3 (S. Levi ed., p. 54). 142 I have not yet located this doctrine in the Yogdedrabhumi. 143 • In Hsuan-tsang's translation of the Yogacarabhumi these are discussed at T: XXX.544a. 144 The doctrine of the Four Siddhantas or points of view is found only in the Ta-chih-tu-lun (Mahaprajnaparamita-sastra?), T: XXV.59b-6lb; although there is a parallel doctrine of four realities (tattva) in the Bodhisattvabhumi (WOGIHARA ed., p. 37). For a translation of the Ta-chih-t*u-lun passage, see E. Lamotte, Le traite, pp. 27-46. Notes to Chapt. V (79 - l6l) See note 56 above and 297 below. See note 56 above and 297 below. - i,^7 This is the Jen-wang pan-jo-po-lo-mi-to ching .J. >j£ ^7 (T: no. 245). The discussion of/the Five Patiences is found at (T: VIII .,826b)-. On the Ten.Lands see. section nine of the translation below. 148 The commentators, however, say that all three cognitions are involved, and not simply the remaining two: cf. Shingo (358al6-17). On the Six Abhisamayas see CWSL (ix.l6b-17a). Also very helpful.is La Vallee-Poussin1s long note, "Les six Abhisamayas et les deux Darsanamargas, (SiddhiyW. 601-602 ) which discusses the Sanskrit and Pali sources for the Abhisamaya doctrine and also the various lists that occur. The Seven Components of Enlightenment make up the sixth division of the Thirty-seven Aids to Enlightenment (bodhipaksya, dharmah); for a convenient list of the thirty-seven aids with one set of the Chinese equivalents, see L. Hurvitz, Chih-I3 pp. 344-346. For a detailed study of the thirty-seven, see Har Dayal, Bod. Doctrine, pp. 80-164. 151 The Eight-fold Noble Path is, of course, the Fourth Holy Truth and also the seventh division of the Thirty-seven Aids to Enlighten• ment; cf. note 150 above. 152 A This doctrine is discussed in the' Sravakabhwii section of the logacarabhwtij T: XXX.450cl5-20. 15 3 These are discussed in the Hsien-yang-lun (cf. note 137) at T: XXXI.496b5-12. 154 The four States of Mindfulness make up the first division of the Thirty-seven Aids to Enlightenment; cf. note 150 above. The Four Right Efforts make up the second division of the Thirty-seven Aids to Enlightenment; cf. note 150 above. The Four Elements of Supernatural Power make up the third division of the Thirty-seven Aids to Enlightenment; cf. note 150 above. Notes to Chapt. V (pp. 79 - l6l) 157 These are moral faculties rather than the first five sense- faculties. Together they make up the fourth division of the Thirty- seven Aids to Enlightenment; cf. note 150 above. 158 These are the fifth division of the Thirty-seven Aids (cf. note 150 above); they are the powers corresponding to the five (potential) faculties mentioned above. Shingo (359al7-19) comments that the above doctrines (from the Six Comprehensions to the Five Powers) are common to all three vehicles, to that of the sravakas, the pratyeka-buddhas, and the bodhisattvas; therefore, they are not discussed in detail. In another chapter of K'uei-chi's Ta-sheng - fa-yuan i-lin ehang;. (no. 26), the "Essay on Severing the Obstacles" Jg^" jSjjt^f^. , he says that this refers to the four divisions of the Mahasamgikas plus the MahTsasakas (T: XLV.282cl7-l8). K'uei-chi's primary source for information regarding the doctrines of the early Indian schools of Buddhism that never gained any following in China is vasumitra's Samayabhedoparacanacakra, a doctrinal history translated by both Paramartha and Hsiian-tsang and also the subject of a commentary by K'uei-chi (no. 12). These are the first six modes of mentation (vijnana), the list common to all Buddhist schools. l62 Following K'uei-chi's other works Shing5 (359"b22-24) says that this group includes the VatsTputrTyas and also the DharmottarTyas, the BhadrayanTyas, the. SammEtTyas and the Saimagarikas. Shingo notes (359c4-10) that K'uei-chi does not specify in his other works which schools are to be included, in this group, but he and the other commentators feel that K'uei-chi meant to include the rest of the traditional list of eighteen Hinayana schools, according to Vasumitra (see note 160 above). 164 The first view is ascribed to Bodhiruci, the second to Paramartha. The references cited by Shingo (359c-360a) illustrating these two views warrant discussion in any future work on Yogacara in pre-T'ang China. T'ai^hsii (p. 1029) comments: "While still within the causal stage Ci.e., before the fruit of nirvana is attained], only the [mental coefficient] wisdom (prajna),associated with the sixth vijnana can be considered vijnana in its subjective aspect." Notes to Chapt. V (pp. 79 - 161) In a more specific context the Chinese yii renders the special or determinate- (viniyata) mental coefficient (caitta) chanda (interest or desire). Here it seems more likely to he-elliptic for t'an-yu ^ , and thus to he understood as the more serious affliction: greed of covetousness (raga). The compound li.-yii occurs in Hsiian-tsang's translation of the Kosa for vita-raga, vairagya-, etc. This statement occurs in a significant passage discussing the distinctions of the sixth vijnana: T: XXX.280h in Hsiian-tsang's translation. l68 This is. in the same passage cited above in note 167. T'ai-hsii (pp. 1029-1030) and the other commentators explain that, from the time that the bodhisattva begins on the Path - of Vision (darsana-marga) and the sixth vijnana begins to develop into wisdom, the seventh also follows, gradually developing into wisdom as well. Shingo" (360b-c) cites at some length the texts on which this view is based. 170 _ _ On the samanya-laksana and the prabheda-laksana see CWSL (ix.7a) and Kosa -III:32c-d* (x.8a), VI:15c-d (xxiii.2b). La Vallee- Poussin reconstructs *samasta-laksana and vyasta-laksana respectively, but the forms given above are attested in Hsiian-tsang's translation of both the Kosa and thQ^Mad^ydnta-vibhaga. T'ung-hsiang ilsl is an alternative for kung-hsiang ^Z.^ • ' 171 Lit.: ". . .because of all the darmas, which are a general object ^samaatalambanasarvadharmebhyah)"; on the samastalambana, see the Kosa references cited in note 170 above. 172 For examples see the Yogacarabhumi (T: XXX.628c), Sthiramati's Vyakhya to the Abhidharma-samuceaya (l: XXXI-.726,ST-727a), and also the commentary to the Buddhabhumi 'Sutra (T: XXVI.3l8a-b). 17 3 The Dependent (paratantra) has a defiled, illusory nature and a pure nature, i.e., it can be seen as the Imaginary (parikalpita) or as the Absolute (parinispanna); cf. §1.1.5 and note 48 above. 174 The "bodhisattvas of one category" maintained that there is only one category or mode of mentation, viz. manas, and that everything can be reduced to it. For a discussion of this position see the Mahay ana-samgraha (T: XXXI.138 c23-13916) and the corresponding commentaries: Vasubandhu (339c23-342bl3) and Asvabhava (401c27- 402bl0). Cf. also Lamotte's trans. (La Somme, pp. 101-103); Lamotte Notes to Chapt. V (pp. 79 - l6l) understands i-lei p'u-sa.-- to mean "one category of bodhisattvas" rather than "the bodhisattvas of one category." No names of any Indian masters who held this view are given,'but Kiben (630al-2) says that K'uei-chi's famous rival, the Korean monk Wonch'uk $ 7$'^ 1S assoc^-a"ted with one variety of the doctrine. 175 The fundamental mode of mentation is another name for the eighth or store (alaya) mode, and the developed (.pravrtti)- '.'•' modes are the first seven. The passage cited occurs at T: XXX.651b in the translation of Hsuan-tsang. This is Hsuan-tsang's translation (T: XXXI.U64c9) of the first half of Verse 1:3; in Sanskrit (NAGAO ed. p. 18): artha-satvatma-vijnapti-pratibhasam prajayate | vijnanam nasti casyarthas tad-abhavat tad apy asat j| There are actually four terms mentioned here, but K'uei-chi's commentators explain that the first two, what appear as objects and beings, are included in the alaya-vijnana; the third, what appears as a self, is the seventh vijnana (manas); and the fourth, what appears as representations, comprises the six sensory vijnanas. 177 This is verse 2a-b of the Tvimsikd T: XXXI.60a26 in Hsuan- tsang' s translation. Fruition is the eighth or alaya-vijnana, cogitation is the seventh (manas) and discrimination of the sense- fields comprises the remaining six sensory vijnanas. The CWSL, in its commentary on the above verse (ii.12b-13a), explains that the eighth vijnana can be considered both cause and effect: as cause it is termed sarvabTjaka, that which has all the seed potentialities; as effect, it is the vipakaphala, the ripened fruit of the particular existence (i.e., birth) a given individual experiences as the result of his.previous actions that is as a result, of the seeds laid down previously. This is not the same cause-fruit distinction that distinguishes the spiritual path (cause) from Buddha-hood (fruit). 179 T'ai-hsu (1034) says that this view is represented by the Vimsatikd. Shingo • (366cl6-367a7) analyzes., it -more carefully,: citing"* passages out of .'several'works including the Yogdcavdbhurni. 180 T: XVI.721b; see also the commentary attributed to Bandhuprabha: T:•XXVI.302b. On the four cognitions see Chapt. Ill above. 198 Notes to Ch.. V (pp. 79 _ I'6l:) T: XII.222h. l82 Of the eighteen realms or factors in the process of perception, (vis., six sense faculties, six sense objects and six sensory perceptions) seven are considered to be mental in the HTnayana Abhidharma. 18 3 • , On the ..eight modes pf mentation, see Chapt. Ill above. -1 oJ. • ' - T: XVI. 565b The Wu-hsiang-lun (aZaksana-sdstra?) was a long work, probably a compilation of several Yogacara texts, said to have been translated by Paramartha. It is no longer existent as such", however, Paramartha's translation of the Trimsikdjthe Chuan-shih-lun ^tsSfcl^w (T: 1587, vol. XXXI) is said to have been one part of it. K'uei-chi's reference is to a passage in this latter work (T: XXXI.62C). 186 T: XVI.642c-643a. -1 Qrj Shingo.(369a22-29) explains that these two texts consider the amala-vijnana to be Thusness (t-athata) rather than simply the purified form of the eighth vijnana. This is of course contrary to the Dharmapala tradition. 1 Aft This verse is quoted in the CWSL (iii.15a) T: XXXI.13c. 189 This view maintains that all eight vijnanas function at the causal level, but only the sixth,.seventh, and eighth remain when the fruit is realized. The first five are excluded from the fruition' stage because it is held that they and their respective objects and faculties, i.e., the first fifteen realms or factors of perception (cf. note 182 above) are inherently impure and antithetical to the fruit of Buddha-hood. K'uei-chi refers to the passage in the Budanabhumi at T: XXVI.293c, and probably also has in mind CWSL (x.l9a-22b) T: XXXI.57a. 190 Sthiramati thus maintains that, while the causal stage comprises all eight vijnanas, the fruition"•stage lacks the seventh because it is essentially defiled and must be totally cut off. 191 Dharmapala differs from Sthiramati in that he accepts a purified state of the seventh vijnana (manas) which is functional in..the fruition ? . stage of Buddhahood. 192 ^ • This view is also ascribed to Bandhusri Notes to Chapt. V (pp. 79 - l6l) 193 That is to say: the eight vijnanas have different activities, they have the different sense faculties as their base, they have the different sense-fields as their objects, and they are associated with, different mental states. 194 The eighth vijnana is what is perfumed (so-hsun H]^* )» whereas the remaining seven vijnanas are the perfuming agents (neng- 195 This appears, to be a paraphrase of a passage occurring at CWSL (vii.18a) T: XXXI.38c; cf. La Vallee-Poussin's translation and very helpful interpolations (Siddhi3 p. 414). 196 In the Lankdvatdra this verse is found at T: XVI.574b-c. It is also quoted in the CWSL passage cited above in note 195 and La Vallee-Poussin (Siddhi, pp. 414-415) adds a very interesting note. This verse,, in its different versions warrants further study. 197 This last paragraph seems out of place, coming after the stated conclusion. It might, be an addendum of K'uei-chi's or the interpolation of some later commentator. It might also be a displaced portion of the original text: logically it should come at the beginning of§5.2 before the discussion of the eight modes of mentation. 198 The. stages of sanctification are the Four Paths (marga) and the Five Stages (avastha) discussed above in Chapt. III. Here K'uei-chi first (§6.1.1) cites three different passages from Yogacara.treatises that seem to outline the progression of sancti- fication differently, and then (§6.1.2) he explains how these passages are to be understood so that there is no contradiction. 199 K'uei-chi cites Hsuan-tsang's. translation of the Mahaydna- samgrdha.: (T: XXXI.142bl4-17); cf. Lamotte's French translation (La Somme3 pp. 155-156). 200 This citation from Asvabhava's Upanibandana is slightly abbreviated; see Hsuan-tsang's Chinese translation (T: XXXI.414a3-5) and also the French, translation of Lamotte (La Samme, pp. 155-156). This phrase, "yu'shih hsiang hsin was apparently dropped in La Vallee-Poussin's.translation of the CWSL (Siddhi3 p. 563) Rather than Wei Tat's.(p. 667) reading of vijnana for shih in this line it seems.preferable to take it as an ellipsis for wei-shih , necessary to maintain the strict four-four rhythm. Understood thus (as translated here) it is parallel with, the closing phrase of the 200 Notes to Chapt. V (pp. 79 - l6l) 202 "^ The ""belief and understanding"/^ nT nere ^s "the same as the "firm resolve"^ jJJj; in the Mahayana-samgraha in the first paragraph above. Both are standard Chinese equivalents for the Sanskrit adhimukti, which is perhaps best understood as 'resolute belief.' • 203 CWSL (ix.4a-b) T: XXXI.48bl5-20 204 The passage is cited from Hsuan-tsang's translation, T: XXX.628bl5-24. 205 The "stage of concentration" refers to the cultivation of the Four Examinations (paryesana) and the Four Exact Comprehensions (yatha-bhuta-par'ijnana )undertaken at the Stage of Preliminary Training (prayogavastha); cf. note 56 above. 2°^ Though there is no subduing and elimination- of the afflictions in the period of hearing and thinking about the Dharma, there is some subduing and elimination when one begins training in the Four Examinations and the Four Exact Comprehensions; therefore, these two periods which comprise the First Land (bhumi) in the Mahayana-samgraha are counted separately as two distinct stages in the CWSL formula. 207 The Four Steps Conducive to Intellectual Penetration are the preparation for entering the Path of Vision (darsana-marga), in the five-stage formula of the CWSL they make up the Stage of Preliminary Training; whereas, in the four-stage formula of the Mahayana-samgraha they are mastered at the very end of one's residence in the Land where One Practices Firm Resolve (adhimukticarya-bhumi). The Four Examinations and the Four Exact Comprehensions are acquired during the course of mastering these nirvedha-bhagiyas. The Path of Vision is also known as the Stage of Penetration (nirvedhavastha). 208 Tai-hsu (p. 1042) says this refers to those who first follow the HTnayana and later the Mahayana, or in some cases, to those who fall back to the Hinayana from the Mahayana, only later to take up the Mahayana once again. In the latter case especially yu-hui. can be understood in its common meaning of 'winding about like a river.' Those who convert to the bodhisattva path are those of unspecified or indeterminate clan (aniyata-gotra); cf. La Vallee-Poussin's "Carriere du Bodhisattva" in the appendix to the Siddhi3 p. 723, and also Ober- miller's "Doctrine of Prajna-paramita.," p. 33. 209 Pure, discursive^ contemplation is the highest of the anupurva-samapattis and is the preparation for nirodha-samapatti, the concentration of extinction accessible to the saints of all three vehicles. 201 Notes to Chapt. V (pp. 79 - l6l) 210 According to...the CWSL (ix.l3a-l6b) there are two divisions of the Path of Vision (darsana-marga), the chen-chien-tao $ v jvf' and the hsiang-chien-tao J^Q , which La Vallee-Poussin "reconstructs as tattva-darsana-marga and laksana-darsana-marga respectively.There are problems with both reconstructions however: the first could be *bhuta- darsana-marga or *tathata- ; and the second, even more problematic, could be laksana- , nimitta-00 or even akara-00, where hsiang^ would stand for hsing-hsiang ^ Jjf)^ • The commentators to K'uei-chi's text seem to have the latter, i.e., akara-darsana-marga, in mind, but the issue remains a problem requiring further•study and additional sources. See also La.Vallee-Poussin's note (Siddhi, pp. 588-589). 211 The commentators point out that this refers only to the Second, Third and Fourth Land, since the First Land is attained already on the Path of Vision (darsana-marga). The following statements thus pertain to the Path of Cultivation (bhavana-marga). The nirnimitta-vihara fully attained only in the Seventh Land; cf. Siddhi, p. .616, for a discussion of "being without notions." 213 The Stage of Cultivation (bhavana-marga) comes to an end with the Tenth Land bringing K'uei-chi now to the Final. Stage (nisthavastha*) which is the Land of the Buddhas (buddha-bhumi). 214 The first two of the Cognitions are specified or determinate in that they always take the absolute and the conventional together as their object. The sixth of the contemplations that make up the third Cognition, however, takes them sometimes together, sometimes separately as its object. 215 The commentators say that the preceeding view is that of •Dharmapala and what follows is that of Prabhamitra, the disciple of Dharmapala's who wrote the commentary on the Buddhabhumi Sutra. This occurs at the Stage of Provisioning(sambharavasta) ; according to the commentators. 217 This occurs at the Stage of Preliminary Training (prayoga- vastha). 01 A Shingo5. (383a26-27) says that this line means that "the realization of the mind and the sense-field come together with Reality." Notes to Chapt. V (pp. 79 - l6l) PI Q This is said to. occur on the Path, of Vision (.darsana-marga). 220 This, corresponds to the cultivation of the Ten Lands on the Path of Cultivation (bhavana-marga). 221 This is said to occur at the Final Stage (nis.thavastha). 222 This paragraph analyses cultivation with reference to the condition or states of the contemplating mind as it progresses through the Five Stages. The next paragraph gives another analysis of culti• vation, this time specifying which of the three varieties of wisdom is operative at each stage, whether one is cultivating the mani• festations or the seed-potentialities,and whether the reference is to impure or pure dharmas. 223 These are the three varieties of wisdom: that produced through erudition (srutamayT prajna), that produced through reflection (.cintamayi"); and that produced through cultivation (bhavanamayT). 224 This refers not to the Ten Lands of the Bodhisattva Path discussed above, but to the nine stations of the three realms. There nine lands or stations are the levels of existence, one land at the level of the Desire Realm (kama-dhatu), four lands in the Realm of Form (rupa-dhatu) and four more in the Formless Realm (arupya-dhatu). They are both levels of rebirth and of meditative concentration. Another name for the nine stations of existence (chiu-ti is the nine paths (chiu-tao -j]^ jjjf. ). 226 This quote is from a passage (T: XXXI.738al2-68) discussing four types of cultivation., the two which K'uei-chi treats here plus two more, viz.: the cultivation of disposing (vinirdhavana-bhavana) and the cultivation of opposing (pratipaksa-bhavana). In the first of the four, the cultivation of acquisition, one cultivates the whole• some dharmas that have not yet been produced in order to acquire them. In the second, the cultivation of practice, one cultivates the whole• some dharmas that have already been produced in order to enhance and expand them. In the third, the cultivation of disposing, one culti• vates the expulsion of .unwholesome dharmas that have been produced in order to permanently dispose of them. And finally in the fourth, the cultivation- of. oppostion, one opposes those unwholesome dharmas that have not yet been produced so that they will never be produced. 227 The manifestation can produce new seeds; this is what is meant by an increase in the substance. However, the newly produced seeds can be only of the same level as the manifestation itself, hence only of the lower state in this case. An increase in Notes to Chapt. V (pp. 79 - l6l) function, on the other hand, refers to.the reinforcement of seed-, potentialities already present,. and these, can he of any state, higher states as well as the current lower state.. Therefore,. although there can he no new production of seed-potentialities of higher states, the already existing seed-potentialities of higher states, can he reinforced and thus enhanced;cf. T'ai-hsu's comment to this passage (p. 1050). PPR CWSL (vii.33a) T: XXXI.41a24-25. 229 What is manifest is only the thought of the higher state; however, all wholesome seed-potentialities, even those already acquired.in lower states, are enhanced and so the 'cultivation of acquisition' is said to be of both the higher and the lower levels. 230 This case differs from the above only in that it is initiated in one of the higher states. The results are the same as the case above. The commentators discuss a number of theories on the dividing line between these two cases within the nine states. 231 T: XXXI.74255-12• 232 Lit.: Cat the stage] of the initial actions. This term occurs as the first of a series of progressive degrees in several Abhidharma classifications; cf. Kosa VI:9d (xxii.l4b), VI:70 (xxv.l4a- 15a), and VIII:31c'(xxix2b-3a). 233. The translation follows the commentators rather than the punctuation indicated in the Taisho ed.; cf. Shingo (370a8-12) and Jiben (639c20-23). 23^ Hsing "Id (nature) as is often the case, stands for tzu-hsing Q 7flL : svabhava (own-being). The question treated by K'uei-chi in this section is: to which of the three aspects of existence or own- being (svabhava) does contemplation belong. Jiben (639c26-28) glosses kuan-fa Jg^y^ (contemplation-dharma) in the title of this section as meaning 'contemplation and dharma(s)' rather than 'the dharma of contemplation.' He goes on to say that contemplation means 'what contemplates'. (i.e. , the subjective factor) and dharma(s) means what is contemplated (I.e..., the objective factor). This interpretation is not found in the other commentaries and is not reflected in the present translation. 23^ Wu-ju "J^fyX^ renders the Sanskrit verb praskand- which means 'to enter,' but with the additional connotation of 'coming to under• stand completely.' Thus 'to enter' the Three Natures is to fully understand and experience all their implications, not simply to Notes to Chapt. V (pp. 79 - l6l) know them as, doctrinal statements. Both.Chinese and English lack a single verb, that conveys this, meaning adequately. The Chinese translators employed: the compound wu-gu. (to awaken to. and. enter, or awakened-ly to enter). The literal English equivalent seems somewhat clumsy, hut it makes it possible to reflect K'uei-chi's. play on the Chinese wu-ju which he later splits into two separate verbs. 2 36 There is a discrepancy here between K'uei-chi's citation and the text of Hsuan-tsang's Mahdydna-samgraha translation. Hsiian- tsang' s translation in all surviving versions has lisiang jN^7 (samjna: conception, notion), whereas all editions of K'uei-chi's text have hsiang which can be either laksana or nimitta (characteristics or signs). The present translation follows the Hsiian-tsang text. 237 This is a citation of T: XXXI.I43a9-l6 that has become rather distorted by the ellipses indicated. Working primarily from the Tibetan, Lamotte (La Somme, pp. l64-l65) renders the complete passage as follows: Air:.si done,en entrant dans la parole mentale (mano- jalpa) qui est •--l;''objeti apparent (nirbhasarthalaksana), le Bodhisattva est entre dans la nature imaginaire ( ;parikalpitasvabhava); en entrant dans le Rien qu'idee (vijnaptimatra), il est entre dans la-rtature dependante (paratantrasvabhava); comment entre-t-il dans la nature absolue (parinispannasvabhava)? II y entre en rejetant (nirakarana) encore la notion de Rien qu'idee (vijnapti- matrasamjfia). Alors,pour- le Bodhisattva qui a .de.truit (vidhvams-) la notion d'objet' '• (arthasamjna), les paroles mentales (manojalpa), resultant de 1'impregnation des Dharma ou'is (srutadharmavasananvaya), n'ont pas la possi- bilite (avaksasa) de naitre sous l'apparence d'un objet et, par consequent, ne naissent pas non plus comme idee, sans plus. Quand le Bodhisattva reside .'"dans le nom- sans-concept a l'endroit de tous les objets (sarvarthesu nirvikalpakanama), quand il reside par perception directe (pratyaksayogena) dans 1'element fondamental (dharmadhatu), alors il atteint le savoir intuitif (nirvikalpakajnana) pour qui l'objet (alambana) et le sujet de connaissance (alambaka) sont parfaitement identiques (samasama).C'est ainsi que le Bodhisattva est entre dans la nature absolue. 238 These two verses were already quoted above in 1.1.1.; cf. notes 10 and 11 for details on their origin and the surviving Sanskrit original for the first. This is samskara (hsing ^ ) in the more general sense of 'all conditioned states," which is very close to-.rsamskrt'adharma rather than the more specific use of samskara (predisposition) for the fourth skandha and the second nidana; cf. Edg. p. 542. Notes to Chapt. V (pp. 79 - l6l) CWSL (viii.' 3lb), T: XXXI.46c-6; SAEKZ notes! that this verse is from.the Avatamsaka Sutra, but gives no specific reference. See also La Vallee-Poussin1 s note. (Siddhi, p. 533c) comparing this verse t a line from Nagarjuna. 241 This is the first of the Sixteen Thoughts of the analytic view of the second division-, of the Path of Vision (viz., laksana- darsanamarga, see note 210 above). Cf. Obermiller, "Doctrine of the Prajna-paramita," pp. 21-24 and 37-41. 2 42 Contrary to the Taisho punctuation, theku.^^at 262cll should go with what preceeds rather than what follows it. 243 This paragraph explains why the CWSL passage unlike those from the Mahayana-samgraha gives no specific point at which the Imaginary, is realized separately•from the other two. There is no content to the: realization of the Imaginary because it has no substanc Its realization is constituted by the realization of the Dependent and the Absolute; it follows necessarily: when they are realized, it is realized. 2^ T'ai-hsu (p. IO58) explains this rather elliptic passage as follows:. "Prior to the Path of Vision the Exact Comprehensions contemplated.the Pinnacle of Worldly Truth. Degree Cof the Stage of Preliminary Training]. Even though one has. therein also contemplated the emptiness of that which, apprehends and that which, is apprehended, this characteristic of emptiness is still a permutation of conscious• ness and not the realization of wisdom. Because one has not yet acquired the Two Wisdoms, one is still, unable to realize the latter two Natures.. Because to realize the latter two Natures is to realize the First, the CWSL says that.it is on entering the First Land, and only then, that one realizes the Three Natures." 245 This refers to the first part of the first of the two Mahayana-samgraha verses cited above in§7-2.1 (lb); cf. also 1.1.1, note 11. 246 This refers to the second part of the first of the two Mahayana-samgraha verses cited above in§7.2.1 (lb). 247 This refers, to the second of the two Mahayana-samgraha verses cited, above in§7-2.1. (lb). 248 This seems preferable to the punctuation indicated by the Taisho.bunt en at T: XLV.262c27-28: it makes the.first statement more parallel to the next. 206 Notes to Chapt. V (pp. 79 - l6l) Hsiian-tsang and K'uei-chi render asraya (base) a numher of different ways: iffi., so—i f^^L , so-i-chih^f 250 The lands (hhumi) here again refer not to the Ten Lands of the bodhisattva path, but to the nine stations of existence in the three world-realms. 251 The base may, depending on circumstances, be any one of the three realms of existence. K'uei-chi's discussion of the base (§8.l) . is divided into a consideration of the base from which one first gives rise to.the contemplation of Vijnaptimatrata (§8.1.l) and the base from which one first realizes Vijnaptimatrata (§8.1.2). Each, of these is further sub-divided depending on the type of individual involved. 252 The discussion of the base from which one first gives rise to the contemplation of Vijnaptimatrata', (§8.1.1) is again divided into several parts on the basis of what type of practitioner is involved: (l) those whose awakening was sudden and direct, (2) those whose awakening was gradual. Each of these is then further sub-divided. 253 The commentators say this.refers to those who enter the bodhisattva path and proceed directly to the goal, as opposed to those who begin in one of the other paths and take up the bodhisattva practices only later. 254 On this work see note 137 above. 255 The wretched destinies are birth as a ghost (preta), as a denizen, of hell (nairayika) or as an animal (tir.yagyoni). These, along with, the favorable births: as a god (deva) or as a human (manusya), make up the five destinies to which one may be reborn. Because existence in the Realm of'Fbrm(rupa-dhatu) and the Realm of Formlessness (arupya-dhatu) is so pleasant, their inhabitants have no incentive to seek, release of death and rebirth.. This is often said of existence as a god (deva) generally. T: 258 This refers, to.those, who. first follow the sravaka or pratyeka-buddha path, and later convert to. the. bodhisattva path. 259 It is not clear from the text or the commentaries exactly how K'uei-chi understood this designation, which is rendered into Chinese as pu-ching-sheng-che ^ 3—>& '.' The term is mentioned in the Kosa commentary to.VI:40c-d (xxiv.66); La Vallee-Poussin (VI, p. 219) translates: "II arrive qu'un.Arya, devenu Arya dans une premiere naissance par 1'acquisition du fruit de Srotaapanna ou Sakrdagamin obtienne dans l'existance suivante le fruit d' Anagamin. On designe cet Anagamin par 1'expression parivrttajanma anagami." How the term was employed by the Yogacarins requires further research in the Yogacarabhumi. The previous paragraphs discussed the base upon which the bodhisattva first gives rise to the contemplation of Vijnaptimatrata; this paragraph and the one following discuss the base upon which the bodhisattva has the first realization of Vijnaptimatrata. This refers, to the particular state of existence to which the meditator was born (as the result of past deeds) and from which he initiates the contemplation. Chia-hsing-shan ^J>2 ^ ^ occurs once in Hsuan-tsang's translation of the Kosa for prayogika gunah (virtues of training); much more often, however, it renders simply prayogika (preliminary or preparatory) in contrast to upapatti-pratilambhika (acquired through birth.). 263 In Hsuan-tsang's translation of the Yogacarabhumi the corresponding passage is found at T: XXX:663a. 2^ Pure (anasrava) discursive contemplation is said to be the same as the subsequently acquired.cognition; cf. Siddhi, pp.. 406-407- On the anagamya stage see Kosa IV:l8a-b (xiv.51-5b), VI:47cd (xxiv.l4a) and La Vallee-Poussin's notes. The term 'defilements' renders samklesa (tsa-jan and 'affliction' renders klesa (fan-nao "IS ) • The former is a generic designation-, the latter are specific, usually enumerated as six or ten: see below 9-2 and especially notes 288 and 294. 208 Notes to Chapt. V (pp. 79 - l6l) 267 There are thus four categories of obstacles or obstructions (cf., the table below). And, as analyzed below, each of these has three forms, i.e., each of the four occurs in the form of manifestations, impregnations and seeds. Manifestations of each category are the actual ;cccurrehces .of the obstacle in our experience. Impregations or impressions are the residual traces and impurities left by the manifestations after they pass out of existence. Finally, the seeds are the latent or potential disposition of the obstacles to come into manifestation at some future time.. Each of these three forms is, in the order given (i.e., manifestationsj impregnations, and seeds), progressively more difficult to suppress or destroy. Categories and Forms of the Obstacles each occuring in the form of: • innate Affliction-obstacle• . Mani f e st at ions • discrimination-produced -Impregnations •innate Wisdom-obstacle• \ Seeds .discrimination-produced 268 K'uei-chi's discussion here is a summary of the'-CWSL •• - • section (ix,27b-x.3a) on the Ten and Eleven Obstacles. He analyzes ' the three forms (manifestations,impregnations and seeds) of each of the categories of obstacles: the portion of the;.obstacle, constituted . by the afflictions that.is innate (^9.1.l); the portion of the obstacle constituted by the afflictions that is produced by CvainU discrimination (%9.1.2); the portion of the obstacle barring wisdom that is innate (§9.1.3); and the portion of the obstacle barring wisdom that is produced by CvainD discrimination (§9.1.4) 269 K'uei-chi's discussion of this three-stage doctrine is based on the Bodhisattva-bhumi passage found at T: XXX.562a27-bl4. 270 On the three varieties of crude dross see Sandhinirmocana IX.28-29 (pp. 145-146 in Lamotte's ed. and p. 145 of his trans.). There is also a Bodhisattva-bhumi passage discussing three varieties of crude dross, vis., tvaggata, phalgugata, and saragata dausthulya; cf. J. Rahder, Dasabhumika, Appendice, p. 25. 271 The following discussion of the three proclivities is based on the Sandhinirmocana passage that corresponds to Chapt. IX.28-29 of Lamotte-'s- ed. of the Tibetan version (pp. 145-146 in the ed. and p. 254 in the trans.). Parts of K'uei-chi's text are direct quotes Notes to Chapt. V (pp. 79 - l6l) from the Chinese, translation of the Sandhinirmocana done by Hsiian- tsang (T: XVI.707C); the .quoted portions are indicated in the translation below. 2T2 T: XVI.707clU-l6 273 Based primarily on the Tibetan version of the Sandhinirmocana, Lamotte understands this category of anusaya (Fr. : la trace) somewhat differently. He translates (Sandhinirmocana, p. 254): La trace qui detruit son compagnon, a savoir dans la cinquieme terre. Les passions d'activite spontanee (asahaja) sont le compagnon des passions d'activite innee (sahaja). Les premieres n'existent plus a ce moment Cdans la cinquieme terreH. C'est pourquoi on parle de "trace qui detruit son compagnon." 2T^ T: XVI.707cl6-17 275 This assertion is found in Gunabhadra's translation of the Lahkavatara at T: XVI.495all-12. 2T6 T: XVI.707cl7-19 277 What follows is a paraphrase of the Sandhinirmocana passage at T: XVI.707c22-25. 278 Ch'an-t'i \HLi is an abbreviation of i-ch'an-t'i — |^J which transcribes 'icchantika' a Buddhist technical term for those who totally lack the potential of Buddha-hood; cr. La Vallee-Poussin's note, Siddhi, p. 724. 279 Not having comprehended the Mahayana doctrine asserting that there is no difference between the world of suffering (samsara) and liberation (nirvana), the sravaka seeks to escape from the world of suffering into nirvana as. quickly as possible, not remaining in the world to benefit other beings. 280 It is difficult to trace this passage in the one surviving Chinese translation of the Ratnagotra-vibhaga. The four types of obstacles are discussed in the third scroll (T: XXXI.829al6-b3), but the specific practices by which they are overcome as discussed by K'uei-chi in the next paragraph are not mentioned in the Ratnagotra-vibhaga passage. Turning to Obermiller's translation of the Tibetan version of the work, the closest parallel seems to be the passage on pp. 232-233', although it is again different from both the Chinese.translation and from K'uei-chi's synopsis. 210 Notes to Chapt. V (pp. 79 - l6l) 28l The Ten Degrees..of Faith, and the Ten Ahodes are the first . and second divisions of the Fifty-two'. Stages of Bodhisattva Practice; see Hurvitz, Chih-i, p. 363. In brief the Ten Degrees of Faith are: l) faith, 2) mindfulnes, 3) effort, 4) wisdom, 5) concentration, 6) non-relapse, 7) diversion or transfer of merit, 8) protection of the Dharma, 9) discipline, and 10) vows. The sixth degree is significant here because at this point the bodhisattva becomes confirmed in his pursuit of the Buddha's teaching and no. longer subject to the icchantika's lack of faith. 282 See note 28l above; in brief, the Ten Abodes are: l) giving rise to the thought. Cof Enlightenment,1; 2) the well-regulated stage; 3) practice; 4) noble rebirth .[to the clan of TathagatasD; 5) per-;: fection of skillful means; 6) rectification of thought; 7) no relapse; 8) perennial, youth; 9) Dharmafprince; and 10) consecration or baptism. 283 On the four types of nirvana see CWSL (x.9a-10a) T: XXXI.55b. 284 One traditional explanation of pratyeka-buddhas is that they are saints who attain Buddha-hood by contemplating the principle of dependent co-arising (pratTtya-samutpada) as manifest in the twelve-fold chain of cause and effect. 285 The doctrine discussed here is found in a long passage treating the differences between the path of a bodhisattva and that of the sravakas and pratyeka-buddhas; in G-unabhadra's Chinese trans• lation it is found at T: XII.219c-220b. The text first discusses four types '?of persistent : " affliction that can eventually be severed by the sravakas and pratyeka-buddhas. It then discusses a fifth affliction, that of nescience, which is significantly different from the other four in that it can be completely severed only by a, bodhisattva who becomes a Buddha. Cf. the English translation of the SrTmala-devT Sutra done by A. and H. Wayman (pp. 84-85),. and see also the note concerning (p. 84, n. 56) the first four afflictions and their correlation with the Abhidharma subdivision of the term upadana. 286 The first four of these are considered to be the affliction- obstacle and the last to he the wisdom-obstacle. 287 T'ai-hsu. (p. 1082) explains that, if the doubts arising as a result of nescience are a result of discrimination, they are severed all at once; whereas, if they are innate, they are severed bit by bit. Notes to Chapt. V (pp. 79 -II61) The Six Afflictions (klesa) are: 1) raga (greed or covetousness) 2) pratigha (hostility or anger) 3) moha (delusion or folly) k) mana (conceit or pride) 5) vicikitsa (doubt) 6) kudrsti (false views or prejudice) These are discussed in all the basic Abhidharma works; cf. esp. CWSL (vi.l2b-14b). 289 The Seven Proclivities (anusaya) are 1) kamaraga (craving for pleasure or sensual desire) 2) pratigha (hostility) 3) bhavaraga (craving for existence or rebirth) h) mana (pride or conceit) 5) avidya (nescience) 6) drsti (false views) 7) vicikitsa or vimati (doubts) The Eight Envelopments (paryavasthana) are: 1) ahrTkya (shamelessness) 2) anapatrapya (immodesty) 3) Trsya (envy) k) matsarya (avarice) 5) auddhatya (dissipation) 6) kaudrtya (regret or remorse) 7) styana (torpor) 8) middha (drowsiness) The Nine Fetters (samyojana) are 1) anunaya (attachment or desire) 2) pratigha (hostility) 3) mana (pride or conceit) h) avidya (nescience) 5) drsti (false views) 6) paramarsa (clinging) 7) vicikitsa (doubt) 8) Trsya (envy) 9) matsarya (avarice) 292 The Ten Afflictions comprise the first five of the afflictions listed above in note 288 along with the five varieties of the sixth, kudrsti (false views). The latter7five are: 1) satkayadrsti: the erroneous view of individuality. 2) antagrahadrsti: the view that clings to the extreme of eternalism or nihilism. 3) mithyadrsti: false views generally, prejudices. 212 Notes to Chapt. V (pp. 79 - l6l) 4) drsti. paramarsa: to.consider excellent and . conducive to.purity any other false views. 5) sllavrata.paramarsa: to consider ..excellent; and conducive to purity a code of moral precepts based on any false views. Cf. CWSL (yi.l4h-15b). 293 The doctrine of the Ten Distractions is not a commonly encountered enumeration. -K'uei-chi mentions these in his "Chapter on the. Severing of Affliction" (.286a4; cf. note 295 below), but does not list or discuss them individually. 294 , _ _ _ ' The Ten Discriminations are treated in the Mahayana-sutra- lahkdra (XI:77); see Levi's edition (p. 76) and. translation (p. 136). 295 The "Essay on the Severing of Obstacles" is the seventh essay or chapter of the Ta-sheng. fa-yuan, .i-tin ehang (no. 26), T: XLV.282a-287b. In section eight of this essay (285a-286a) K'uei-chi discusses these and other groups of afflictions, obstacles, etc. 2-96 - - The. doctrine of the two emptinesses is a basic Mahayana doctrine that receives much attention in the Yogacara treatises.. The. emptiness of the individual (pudgala) is a variant term for the emptiness of the self. The arhats of the lesser two vehicles are said to realize the emptiness of the self or the individual, but only bodhisattvas realize also the emptiness of all elements of experience (.dharmas); according to the Yogacarins, they do this by the contemplation of Vijnaptimatrata. The important point necessary to understand the following discussion is. that, since the individual is simply an aggregation of dharmas, the '-.emptiness of the individual is subsumed by the emptiness of dharmas. 297 On the Four Examinations and the Four Exact Comprehensions .see note. 56 above. Shingo (4l5a23-24) comments: "The Examinations contemplate the. emptiness of what is apprehended and eliminate the notion of a truly existing self (atman) and truly,existing dharmas. The Exact Comprehensions contemplate the emptiness of what apprehends and eliminates only the notion of truly existing dharmas." 298 "' The commentators say this refers to a passage in the CWSL (.vi.i..22ab) where It is said that the Buddha declared the doctrine of .the. Twelve Entrances' (the six sense faculties and their respective objects.) to. establish the emptiness of the self or individual, while declaring the doctrine of Vijnaptimatrata to establish the emptiness of dharmas. Cf. La Vallee-Poussin's.translation.of the passage (_Siddhi, p. 426); and also Vimsatika IX which. Is cited by K'uei-chi below in§10.2.2.. 213 Notes to Chapt. V (pp. 79 - l6l) 299 The logical error involved in the. objection is quite rudimentary: the objector fails to.recognize the. validity.of the modus tollens argument: P3 1 ' ~p 300 'Nonsubstantiality' renders 'nairatmya'; dharma-nairatmya (fa-wu-wo >^ ) and pudgala-nairatmya. (sheng-wu-wo ^.^j* ) are equivalent to the emptiness of dharmas and the emptiness of the self. 301 This is from the 9th Verse in Hsuan-tsang's tranlation (T: XXXI.75b26). K'uei-chi cites only the second half of the verse: the first half explains that the nonsubstantiality of the self is entered by means of the doctrine of the Twelve-: .Entrances .„ See note 298 above on CWSL (vii.22ab) which presents the same view. 302 The ku (therefore, because) should be punctuated with this phrase rather than the one following as in the Taisho edition; the four-four rhythm is broken in either case. 303 Here and below, when K'uei-chi speaks of the contemplation of the individual and the dharmas, he means specifically the contemplation of their emptiness. 304 Thus the contemplation of Vijnaptimatrata can be seen as both broad and limited in its range of extension. The former applies when it is considered vis-a-vis the contemplation of the emptiness of the individual, and the latter applies vis-a-vis the contemplation of the emptiness of dharmas. 305 The syntax and the rhythm of this passage are somewhat irregular. The translation follows the traditional punctuation indicated by the earliest Japanese commentators and found in•the Taishd the KD and the KI editions of the text. T'ai-hsu, however, punctuates differently taking the first part of this sentence' as the last part of the preceding sentence. Thus, he understands the close of the last paragraph and the beginning of this, paragraph as follows: The contemplation of •Vijnaptimatrata ' is more limited in extension in that there may be cases of Cthe contemplator of3 the emptiness of the individual, but they are not, by virtue of that, cases of the contemplation of Vijnapti• matrata. When we direct our attention to the contemplation of the emptiness, of the individual, it must be analyzed according to the above statements. . . . Notes to Chapt. V (pp. 79 - l6l) For tso^ft (establish) some older versions have chu/fjj^ (all-, in..every case), a variant, not. noted in the Taisho apparatus. Shingo.rejects the variant;. Kiben mentions the controversy, deciding that' chii is acceptable; and T'ai-hsu. simply amends his edition of the text to: read chu with.no comment. 307 The commentators disagree on what the "two" here refers to: the Japanese say it refers to the last two sets of assertions, i.e., §10.2.3 (2) and (.3), but T'ai-hsu takes it to refer to the analysis of the contemplation of Vijnaptimatrata in its broad sense and its restricted sense, i .e .,§ 10.2. 3 (l). The present edition of K'uei-chi's Ta-sheng fa-yuan i-lin ohang (no. 26) does not contain an "Essay on Emptiness," and there seems to.be no indication that it ever did. The commentators suggest the possibility.that this, may be a reference to the work of someone else."" 215 ABBREVIATIONS See bibliography for publication details. BEFEO Bulletin de L'Ecole Francaise d'Extreme-Orient BSOAS Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies BZ Dainihon Bukkyo zensho. Chih-chou See Commentary no. 2, Chapt. IV, p. 71• CWSL Ch1 eng-wei-shih-lun, references to the ed. of SAEKI Join which also allows easy reference to the trans, of La Vallee-Poussin. Edg./Edgerton Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar and Dictionary IBK Indogaku bukkyogaku kenkyu. l^f/JE-fj^^^^J^^^ IHQ Indian Historical Quarterly JAOS Journal of the American Oriental Society KD Kokuyaku Daizokyo ijj ^\ Toky5: T5hS Shoin j£ j£ ^ , 1928-1932. KI Kokuyaku issaikyo —""* j^J Series 2. T5ky5: Daito Shuppansha j- jj^ Jjj^ ^J^___ 1928- . Kiben See Commentary no. 3, Chapt. IV, p. 71. Kosa Abhidharmakosa of Vasubandhu, references give first the chapter and verse number, then the scroll and page number in the Chinese ed. of SAEKI Kyokuga^t'f(Ky5t5: Hozokan % j$/|£,l887). This allows easy reference both to the Sanskrit editions and to the translation of La Vallee- Poussin (Paris: Geuthner, 1923-1931) as well. La Somme La Somme du Grand Vehicule d'Asanga, trad, par E. Lamotte. 216 Melanges Chinois et Bouddhiques See Commentary no. 6, Chapt. IV, p. 72. Philosophy East and West La Vallee-Poussin1s trans, of the Ch'eng-wei-shih-lun, Vijrtaptimdtratdsiddhi, La siddhi de Eiuan-tsang. Sung-tsang i-chen*^^^ jjjf (Rare Books of the Sung Canon), rpt. Commercial Press. Taisho ed. of Chinese Canon, see under TAKAKUSU and WATANABE in hihliog. See Commentary no. 5, Chapt. IV, p. 72. CWSL translation: Ch'eng Wei-shih Lun: The Doctrine of Mere Consciousness. Wiener Zeitschrift fur'Aie Kunde Sud- und Ostasiens und Arehiv fur Indische Philosophie. 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