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THE CBW CONVENTIONS BULLETIN News, Background and Comment on Chemical and Biological Weapons Issues ISSUE NO. 37 SEPTEMBER 1997 Quarterly Journal of the Harvard Sussex Program on CBW Armament and Arms Limitation A WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY FOR THE RUSSIA AND THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS BWC AD HOC GROUP CONVENTION: WHAT NEXT? Ambassador Tibor Tóth Sergei N Kisselev Chairman, BWC Ad Hoc Group Counsellor of the Embassy of the Russian Federation in The Hague A verification regime for the Biological Weapons Con- The entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Conven- vention (BWC) is a missing link in a web of verification tion (CWC) on 29 April 1997 brought into reality the most and compliance regimes to counter weapons of mass de- ambitious multilateral disarmament project designed so far. struction. This shortcoming was recognised in 1991 when Unfortunately for the CWC, during much of the time since the Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts (which be- its signing in 1993 national agendas and international prior- came known as VEREX) was established to examine possi- ities were largely influenced by other arms control initia- ble verification measures from a scientific and technical tives (CTBT, NPT extension, land mines) and viewpoint. However, the importance of a verification re- politico-military developments (NATO expansion). To- gime is even stronger today as recent international develop- gether with the inability of the OPCW Preparatory Com- ments have emphasised the need for a strengthened regime. mission to find solutions to many of the problems that had Verification regimes are currently being strengthened been left unresolved during the Convention’s negotiation in across the board. The entry into force on 29 April 1997 of Geneva, this led to a situation in which the implementation the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) provided an of the Convention had to begin under conditions that were important strengthening of the legal and verification regime less than perfect. One of the obvious imperfections was for the banning of chemical weapons. The indefinite exten- Russia’s absence from the ranks of ratifying countries at sion in 1995 of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) entry into force. The purpose of this article is not so much was another important development, which further consoli- to discuss the reasons for this outcome — they were already dated the regimes for the prohibition of weapons of mass quite clear at least a year ago, during the period leading to destruction. The conclusion of the Comprehensive Test Ban the “triggering” of the CWC — but rather to consider what Treaty (CTBT) was a further important development. In ad- can be done to change the situation for the better. dition in the context of the International Atomic Energy Ratification of the CWC is, constitutionally, the prerog- Agency, the recent conclusion of the “93+2” negotiations ative of the Russian parliament, with the leading role to be has resulted in a strengthening of the regime related to non- played by its lower house — the State Duma. The routine inspections. These developments have all resulted parliament’s decision to ratify would be achieved if the in strengthening the regimes for nuclear weapons and for continued on page 6 chemical weapons. There has been no similar strengthening of the BWC de- Guest Article by Tibor Tóth 1–5 spite the increasing pace of the negotiations which have taken place since 1991. However, these negotiations have Guest Article by Sergei Kisselev 1, 6–7 been taking place against a background of other important Progress of the BWC Protocol Rolling Text 5 negotiations which have received priority and has meant that for several years the negotiations on verification of the CWC Signatures awaiting full ratification 7 BWC could be regarded as the orphan negotiations. Ini- Progress in The Hague: 19th Quarterly Review 8–14 tially, in 1991, the end-game of the CWC negotiations dom- inated the disarmament landscape, to be followed by the CWC Ratifications and Accessions 13 preparations for the NPT extension conference, and later News Chronology: May–August 1997 15–34 the CTBT negotiations in Geneva. The next few months CWC Non-Signatory States 33 provide a window of opportunity for the strengthening of the BWC. The key issue for this “to be or not to be” ques- Forthcoming Events 34 continued on page 2 Recent Publications 35–36 continued from page 1 There are several clusters of issues that the Ad Hoc Group has been addressing for some time and needs to re- tion is whether as a result of the progress made so far, this solve. One such cluster concerns on-site visits and investi- window of opportunity can be used to forge an effective gations and another what kind of declarations there should protocol for the verification of the Biological Weapons be. A further set of issues relates to definitions, lists and Convention. This opportunity should not be missed. criteria with a fourth set addressing Article X (scientific and There are several reasons why it is extremely important technological cooperation) and Article III (non-transfer) to use the present window of opportunity. The develop- measures. Although there are other important issues, this ments which have occurred in the 1990s in respect of prolif- article considers these four areas. eration underline the importance of a comprehensive and integrated approach to the effective prohibition of biologi- cal and toxin weapons. It is clear from the case of Iraq and On-Site Visits and Investigations from the activities of UNSCOM that only an integrated ap- In respect of on-site inspections, the big question being proach to the proliferation challenge can succeed. Such an considered by delegations is how much verification might integrated approach includes the establishment of new insti- be needed? A second question is what should be the rela- tutions, of verification regimes, of counter-proliferation tionship between so-called ‘visits’ and ‘investigations’? A strategies and other efforts; these should be complementary third question relates to what kind of measures might be and go hand in hand. used in carrying out the various types of visits and investi- Against this background, it is important to recognise that gations. A critical issue is the procedure for initiating an in- the work of the Ad Hoc Group and other diplomatic efforts vestigation. A further point in relation to on-site visits and have to be realistic. Even when a protocol to strengthen the investigations is how to ensure that there is no loss of com- BWC has been agreed and implemented, there will continue mercial proprietary information (CPI) or sensitive military to be some concerns and challenges. The verification proto- information unrelated to the compliance concern. It is, col will not and cannot be the answer to all such challenges. however, notable that in the general disarmament and arms limitation area, the present trend is towards more on-site in- spections; this trend is demonstrated by the entry into force The Ad Hoc Group of the Chemical Weapons Convention, the opening for sig- The Ad Hoc Group (AHG) has made considerable prog- nature of the CTBT, and as a result of developments in the ress. A successful transition was made at the July 1997 IAEA Programme “93+2”. There are an increasing number meeting to negotiation of a rolling text for a legally binding of activities which can be regarded as on-site investigations instrument to strengthen the BWC. Prior to the July 1997 or visits. meeting, the AHG had largely functioned through the ef- As a result of the implementation of the Chemical forts of four Friends of the Chair — Definitions and Objec- Weapons Convention, many countries which hitherto were tive Criteria (Iran), Confidence-Building Measures not affected by such intrusive measures have accepted for (Hungary), Compliance Measures (UK) and Article X Mea- the first time that on-site inspections will be carried out on sures (initially Chile and now Brazil) — who have pro- their territory. Such inspections will include both routine in- duced papers which have been attached to the procedural spections and the possibility of challenge inspections. Thus reports. The rolling text considered at the July AHG meet- an extremely important psychological and political barrier ing incorporated the language developed by these Friends has been crossed by the entry into force of the CWC. of the Chair into an integrated first draft of the Protocol. There is an increased and shared appreciation that the This meeting saw the fleshing out of many of the Articles of OSCE countries have enhanced their security by their im- the draft and this process was developed further at the Sep- plementation of the on-site measures which were intro- tember 1997 meeting. The first rolling text issued in June duced in the framework of the 1986 Stockholm Document 1997 had language for only two of the over 20 proposed Ar- (succeeded by the Vienna Documents), and in the frame- ticles; by the end of the July 1997 AHG meeting there was work of the 1990 Conventional Armed Forces in Europe text, albeit with extensive square brackets, for 18 of the 23 (CFE) Treaty, to which many OSCE states are parties. Mil- Articles; and at the end of the September 1997 AHG meet- itary personnel in these countries have come, over time, to ing there were only two Articles without any text. accept more and more that their activities will be subjected There is thus now a nearly complete draft of the legally to international scrutiny and to see security benefits in such binding instrument which contains a multiplicity of square measures. This increased transparency should also be the brackets. This comprises some 23 Articles, 8 Annexes and trend for the states parties of the CWC in the coming 5 Appendices; some elements currently in the Articles may months and years.

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