DOCSLIB.ORG

„Homegrown Terrorism“ in Den Vereinigten Staaten: Bedrohung, Ursachen Und Prävention Daveed Gartenstein-Ross

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
„Homegrown Terrorism“ in Den Vereinigten Staaten: Bedrohung, Ursachen Und Prävention Daveed Gartenstein-Ross ISLAMISTISCHER TERRORISMUS IN DEN USA „Homegrown Terrorism“ in den Vereinigten Staaten: Bedrohung, Ursachen und Prävention Daveed Gartenstein-Ross zentrum der Nationalgarde in Little Neuheit des Phänomens und nehmen In den USA werden immer mehr dschiha- Rock (Arkansas).1 Der Terrorismus-Ex- dadurch eine ahistorische Perspektive distische Anschläge von Männern und perte von CNN, Peter Bergen, schloss ein. Wenn man das Konzept des „Ho- Frauen verübt, die in Nordamerika gebo- hieraus im Dezember 2009, dass eine megrown Terrorism“ aber nicht auf isla- ren sind oder sozialisiert wurden. Da- „Zunahme des Homegrown Terrorism mistische Anschläge begrenzt und län- veed Gartenstein-Ross setzt sich mit dem nicht geleugnet werden kann.“2 gere Zeiträume in den Blick nimmt, wird Problem des „Homegrown Terrorism“ in Manchmal halten solche spontanen Ein- schnell deutlich, dass es beispielsweise den USA auseinander. Er erörtert zu- schätzungen, die schnell verallgemei- in den 1970er Jahren deutlich mehr An- nächst die Frage, ob tatsächlich vermehrt nert und zur öffentlichen Meinung wer- schläge gab als heute. Brian Jenkins amerikanische Bürger an islamistischen den können, einer wissenschaftlichen kommt für diesen Zeitraum auf 60 bis Terroranschlägen beteiligt sind. Des Analyse nicht stand. Deshalb soll in die- 70 Terroraktionen in den USA pro Jahr, Weiteren werden die Beziehungen zwi- sem Artikel das Problem des „Home- wobei es sich in den meisten Fällen um schen transnationalen Terrornetzwerken grown Terrorism“ noch einmal in vier Bombenanschläge handelte.3 Aber und innerstaatlichen Radikalisierungs- prozessen untersucht. Erkennbar wird Schritten unter die Lupe genommen wer- auch islamistischer Terrorismus ist in eine deutlich grenzüberschreitende Di- den: Als erstes widmet sich der Beitrag den USA nicht neu, wie einige der fol- mension: Immer wieder haben sich nati- der Frage, ob tatsächlich vermehrt ame- genden Beispiele illustrieren: Im Juli onale Akteure in transnationale Netz- rikanische Bürger an islamistischen Ter- 1980 verkleidete sich ein afroamerika- werke eingeklinkt, um die Effektivität roranschlägen beteiligt sind. Es wird sich nischer Konvertit mit dem Namen Da- ihrer Operationen zu erhöhen. Gegen- zeigen, dass trotz der starken Zunahme wud Salahuddin (geboren als David wärtig scheint sich allerdings ein globa- einschlägiger Aktivitäten das Gesamt- Belfield) als Briefträger, um Pakete an ler Strategiewandel der Al-Qaida abzu- bild nicht so eindeutig ist, wie manche Akbar Tabatabai, einen erklärten Geg- zeichnen. Nicht mehr große und logistisch Beobachter behaupten. Zweitens unter- ner des theokratischen Regimes in Tehe- aufwändige Anschläge, sondern zahlrei- sucht der Artikel die Beziehung zwischen ran, zu liefern. Salahuddin erschoss da- che kleinere Aktionen, die von autonom transnationalen Terrornetzwerken und bei mit einer in einem Paket versteckten handelnden Zellen ohne Netzwerkan- innerstaatlichen Radikalisierungspro- Pistole Tabatabai und floh daraufhin in bindung durchgeführt werden können, zessen. Während einige Beobachter da- den Iran. Bemerkenswerterweise kam er sind kennzeichnend für die neue Strate- von ausgehen, dass „Homegrown Terro- unbehelligt durch den Zoll in Genf, ob- gie. In einem letzten Schritt diskutiert rism“ ein binnenstaatliches Phänomen wohl ihn das FBI zu dieser Zeit bereits Daveed Gartenstein-Ross aktuelle und ist, bleibt doch eine starke grenzüber- als Täter identifiziert hatte.4 Bei dem kontrovers diskutierte Forschungsergeb- schreitende Dimension erkennbar. Im- Bombenanschlag auf das New Yorker nisse zu den Ursachen der Radikalisie- mer wieder haben sich nationale Akteu- World Trade Center 1993 war mit Cle- rung sowie die US-amerikanische Prä- re in transnationale Netzwerke einge- ment Rodney Hampton-El auch ein Ho- ventionsstrategie. Iklinkt, um die Effektivität ihrer Operatio- megrown-Terrorist beteiligt. Hampton- nen zu erhöhen. Allerdings scheint sich El kämpfte in den späten 1980er Jahren (Die Übersetzung besorgte Markus Trä- mer, Universität Tübingen) gegenwärtig ein globaler Strategie- als amerikanischer Konvertit in Afgha- wandel zu vollziehen. Empfohlen wer- nistan und wurde dort verletzt. Laut den in Al-Qaida-nahen Medien nicht New York Times führte er ein heimliches mehr große und logistisch aufwändige Doppelleben: In der Öffentlichkeit zeig- Einleitung Anschläge, sondern ganz im Sinne der te er sich als zivilgesellschaftlicher Akti- „Strategie der tausend Nadelstiche“ vist und Medizintechniker, im Geheimen In den USA werden immer mehr dschi- zahlreiche kleinere Aktionen, die von au- aber kämpfte er als Soldat Allahs.5 hadistische Anschläge von Männern tonom handelnden Zellen ohne Netz- Weitere bekannt gewordene Fälle in und Frauen verübt, die in Nordamerika werkanbindung durchgeführt werden den USA umfassen die „Portland Se- geboren oder aufgewachsen sind. Al- können. Dies könnte die Dynamik des ven“, eine Gruppe von Muslimen aus l e i n i m J a h r 2 0 0 9 g a b e s 13 s o l c h e r F ä l l e „Homegrown Terrorism“ nachhaltig ver- der Gegend um Portland (Oregon), die von „Homegrown Terrorism“ – mehr als ändern. Drittens diskutiert der Artikel im Herbst 2001 nach China flogen, um in jedem anderen Jahr zuvor. Im Gegen- Forschungsergebnisse zu den Ursachen gegen amerikanische Truppen in Af- satz zu den 19 Flugzeugentführern vom der Radikalisierung in westlichen Län- ghanistan zu kämpfen; Ahmed Omar 11. September 2001, die von außen Zie- dern und betrachtet – in einem vierten Abu Ali, Abschiedsredner der Islamic le in den USA angriffen, kommen die Tä- Schritt – die US-amerikanische Strategie Saudi Academy Highschool in Alexand- ter heute immer häufiger von innen, und zur Prävention von „Homegrown Terro- ria (Virginia), der die Ermordung von das wird von den amerikanischen Si- rism“. Präsident Bush plante; und schließlich cherheitsbehörden zunehmend als Pro- die „Fort Dix Six“, die 2007 einen Plan blem erkannt. Von den 13 terroristischen zum Angriff auf Streitkräfte in Fort Dix Straftaten aus dem Jahr 2009 endeten Nimmt „Homegrown Terrorism“ in (New Jersey) ausheckten.6 zwei tödlich: Der Amoklauf von Nidal den USA zu? Während „Homegrown Terrorism“ in Malik Hasan in Fort Hood (Texas) und den USA also eindeutig kein neues Phä- die Schießerei von Abdul Hakim Muja- Manche Beiträge zum jüngsten ameri- nomen ist, bleibt offen, ob es zunimmt. hid Muhammad in einem Rekrutierungs- kanischen Terrorismus betonen die Peter Bergens Behauptung, dass ein sol- 264 BiS_2011_04_vergBeitrag.indd 264 20.01.12 12:52 cher Trend „nicht geleugnet“ werden Werden mutmaßliche Terroristen je- „HOMEGROWN TERRORISM“ IN DEN kann, spiegelt dabei die herrschende doch bei jedem Anfangsverdacht we- VEREINIGTEN STAATEN: BEDROHUNG, Meinung wider. Bergen könnte mit sei- gen irgendwelchen Straftaten verfolgt, URSACHEN UND PRÄVENTION ner Einschätzung zwar Recht haben. Um die nichts mit Terrorismus im eigentli- dies jedoch genauer beurteilen zu kön- chen Sinne zu tun haben,8 erscheinen nen, müssten zunächst einige offene sie nicht in Terrorismus-Statistiken. Falls von einem transnationalen Netzwerk, Fragen diskutiert werden. die Sicherheitsbehörden jetzt aber vor von einheimischen Terroristen durchge- Die beobachtete Zunahme an home- einem Zugriff länger und intensiver er- führt werden.12 Und Adam Gadahn, der grown-terroristischen Ereignissen in den mitteln und dann Anklage wegen der wohl bekannteste amerikanische Ho- USA muss keinen dauerhaften Trend Planung oder Durchführung einer terro- megrown-Terrorist, aufgewachsen auf darstellen, sondern könnte eine zufälli- ris tischen Straf tat erheben, dann w ürde einer Ziegenfarm im Süden Kaliforniens, ge Häufung sein. In statistischen Mess- dies die jüngst gestiegene Zahl von be- ist als Sprecher von Al-Qaida auf das reihen, die über Jahre hinweg erhoben obachteten terroristischen Ereignissen engste in transnationale Terrornetzwer- wurden (beispielsweise Wetterauf- in den USA erklären. Eine denkbare Er- ke eingebunden.13 zeichnungen oder Daten zur Karriere klärung könnte auch sein, dass die Er- Dennoch halten einige Experten auto- von Sportlern), weichen Messwerte des mittlungsbehörden heute Verfahren we- nom operierende islamistische Terroris- Öfteren unsystematisch vom Durch- gen terroristischen Bestrebungen auch ten in einem „führerlosen Dschihad“ für schnitt ab. Ausreißer nach oben oder un- in Fällen einleiten, die früher nicht als eine größere Bedrohung als traditionel- ten bedeuten deshalb noch keinen lang- solche bewertet worden wären. le terroristische Netzwerke. Marc Sa- fristigen Trend in die eine oder die ande- In einer Hinsicht ist die Zunahme terro- geman, der bekannteste und einfluss- re Richtung. Zum Beispiel muss nach ei- ristischer Aktivitäten in den USA aber reichste Vertreter dieser Sichtweise, nem übermäßig kalten Februar nicht unstrittig: Es geht um den Exodus junger schreibt beispielsweise: „Die Men- notwendigerweise auch der darauffol- Männer somalischer Abstammung ans schen, die wir heute am meisten fürch- gende Juli übermäßig kalt werden. Horn von Afrika, um sich dort der mili- ten sollen, wurden nicht in Terrorcamps Während man sich in der Mitte einer un- tanten al-Shabaab anzuschließen und ausgebildet und sie hören nicht auf üblichen statistischen Sequenz befindet, sich von ihr in Terrorcamps ausbilden zu Osama bin Laden oder Ayman al-Za- ist es aber schwierig, die Übersicht zu lassen.9 Dieses Phänomen tritt vor al- wahiri.“14 Für Sageman sind die vielen behalten. Allerdings könnte das Jahr lem, aber nicht ausschließlich in der Ge- Berichte über
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Foreign Fighters
    Foreign fighters are individuals who are recruited to travel to a conflict zone or who choose to do so on their own in order to train and/or fight with a particular group. The motivation for this travel may be political, ideological or religious. Travelling abroad to take part in a conflict for such motivations is not a new phenomenon. However, this trend has become an increasing concern in the last decade as individuals from Europe and North America have sought to train and fight with Al Qaeda and its affiliates in places such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen. Who are they? There is no specific profile of a foreign fighter. Many of the well known examples thus far have been men ranging in age from 18 to 35. Individuals believed to have travelled to Afghanistan and Pakistan and spent time in terrorist training camps include “Shoe-bomber” Richard Reid, who received a life sentence in the United States for attempting to detonate explosives in his shoes on a flight from Paris to Miami in 2001, and members of the cell that conducted suicide attacks on the transit system in London, UK on July 7, 2005. A small number of women have also been involved in this phenomenon. Murrielle Degauque, a Belgian convert to Islam, conducted a suicide bombing in Baghdad in 2005 after travelling to Iraq to fight against American-led forces. Historically, recruiters and “talent spotters” facilitated travel overseas through networks which helped aspiring fighters gain access to groups in places like Bosnia, Chechnya and Afghanistan. However, modern technology has allowed aspiring foreign fighters to make these types of connections online in a virtual environment and has given people access to volumes of propaganda which has inspired them to travel on their own.
    [Show full text]
  • The Militant Pipeline Between the Afghanistan-Pakistan Border Region and the West
    New America Foundation National Security Studies Program Policy Paper The Militant Pipeline Between the Afghanistan-Pakistan Border Region and the West Paul Cruickshank Second Edition July 2011; First Edition February 2010 Of the 32 “serious” jihadist terrorist plots against the West between 2004 and 2011, 53 percent had operational or training links to established jihadist groups in Pakistan and just 6 percent to Yemen. A decade after 9/11, despite growing concerns over Yemen, entry to join the fighting in Afghanistan, the presence of al Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Qaeda, and its sustained ability to train recruits and swaths of the country’s northwest arguably remain al Qaeda persuade them to launch attacks in the West, continue to ’s main safe haven, and the area from which it can hatch its make the FATA what President Obama called in 2009 “the most dangerous plots against the West. 1 Al Qaeda’s most dangerous place in the world.” 4 presence in these areas has long threatened international security. It was in Peshawar in Pakistan’s northwest that al U.S. officials have recently suggested that when it comes to Qaeda was founded in 1988, and ever since Pakistan’s the U.S. homeland, al Qaeda’s affiliate in Yemen – al Qaeda border region with Afghanistan has been a gateway for in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) – could now pose a recruits joining the terrorist network and its affiliates, and greater threat than “al Qaeda Central” in the tribal areas of an area in which its senior figures have felt comfortable Pakistan.
    [Show full text]
  • The Homegrown Terrorist Threat to the US Homeland (ARI)
    Area: International Terrorism ARI 171/2009 Date: 18/12/2009 The Homegrown Terrorist Threat to the US Homeland (ARI) Lorenzo Vidino * Theme: Radicalisation into violence affects some small segments of the American Muslim population and recent events show that a threat from homegrown terrorism of jihadist inspiration does exist in the US. Summary: The wave of arrests and thwarted plots recently seen in the US has severely undermined the long-held assumption that American Muslims, unlike their European counterparts, are virtually immune to radicalisation. In reality, as argued in this ARI, evidence also existed before the autumn of 2009, highlighting how radicalisation affected some small segments of the American Muslim population exactly like it affects some fringe pockets of the Muslim population of each European country. After putting forth this argument, this paper analyses the five concurring reasons traditionally used to explain the divergence between the levels of radicalisation in Europe and the US: better economic conditions, lack of urban ghettoes, lower presence of recruiting networks, different demographics and a more inclusive sense of citizenship. While all these characteristics still hold true, they no longer represent a guarantee, as other factors such as perception of discrimination and frustration at US foreign policies could lead to radicalisation. Finally, the paper looks at the post-9/11 evolution of the homegrown terrorist threat to the US homeland and examines possible future scenarios.1 Analysis: The American authorities and public have been shocked by the tragic events of 5 November 2009, when Army Major Nidal Malik Hasan allegedly opened fire against fellow soldiers inside the Fort Hood military base, killing 13 people and wounding 30 others.
    [Show full text]
  • Download Legal Document
    ANDREA R. MEYER OSB No. 93365 ACLU of Oregon Foundation PO Box 40585 Portland, OR 97240 (503) 227-6928 (ph) (503) 227-6948 (fax) ANN BEESON JAMEEL JAFFER American Civil Liberties Union Foundation 125 Broad Street, 18th Floor New York, NY 10004-2400 (212) 549-2500 (ph) (212) 549-2651 (fax) JOSHUA L. DRATEL National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers 14 Wall Street, 28th Floor New York, New York 10005 (212) 732-0707 (ph) (212) 571-6341 (fax) Counsel for Amici Curiae UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF OREGON UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. CR 02-399 JO v. BRIEF OF AMICI JEFFREY LEON BATTLE, ET AL., CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS’ Defendants. MOTION TO SUPPRESS FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE EVIDENCE TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF AUTHORITIES…………………………………………………………..….ii PRELIMINARY STATEMENT………………………………………………………….1 I. OVERVIEW…………………………………………………………………………..2 A. Statutory Context………………………………………………………………….2 B. In re Sealed Case 02-001 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review………………………………………………………………………….5 C. Factual Background………………………………………………………………..9 II. The FBI’s surveillance of the defendants in this case did not conform to constitutional requirements that govern the conduct of criminal investigations………………………………………………………………………...11 A. FISA surveillance orders are not warrants within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment………………………………………………………………11 B. The surveillance was conducted without compliance with the Fourth Amendment’s probable cause requirement………………………………………11 C. The surveillance was conducted without compliance with the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement…………………………………………13 D. The surveillance was conducted without compliance with the Fourth Amendment’s notice requirement………………………………………………..16 E. The surveillance was conducted without meaningful prior judicial review……..18 III. FISA’s departures from ordinary Fourth Amendment principles are constitutionally defensible only where the government’s primary purpose is to gather foreign intelligence information…………………………………………...20 A.
    [Show full text]
  • Terrorist Trial Report Card: U.S. Edition – Appendix B
    SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 – SEPTEMBER 11, 2006 TERRORIST TRIAL REPORT CARD: U.S. EDITION Name Date Commercial Drugs General General Immigration National Obstruction Other Racketeering Terrorism Violent Weapons Sentence Notes Fraud Fraud Criminal Violations Security of Crimes Violations Conspiracy Violations Investigation Khalid Al Draibi 12-Sep-01 Guilty 4 months imprisonment, 36 Deported months probation Sherif Khamis 13-Sep-01 Guilty 2.5 months imprisonment, 36 months probation Jean-Tony Antoine 14-Sep-01 Guilty 12 months imprisonment, Deported Oulai 24 months probation Atif Raza 17-Sep-01 Guilty 4.7 months imprisonment, Deported 36 months probation, $4,183 fine/restitution Francis Guagni 17-Sep-01 Guilty 20 months imprisonment, French national arrested at Canadian border with box cutter; 36 months probation Deported Ahmed Hannan 18-Sep-01 Acquitted or Guilty Acquitted or Acquitted or 6 months imprisonment, 24 Detroit Sleeper Cell Case (Karim Koubriti, Ahmed Hannan, Youssef Dismissed Dismissed Dismissed months probation Hmimssa, Abdel Ilah Elmardoudi, Farouk Ali-Haimoud) Karim Koubriti 18-Sep-01 Acquitted or Pending Acquitted or Acquitted or Pending Detroit Sleeper Cell Case (Karim Koubriti, Ahmed Hannan, Youssef Dismissed Dismissed Dismissed Hmimssa, Abdel Ilah Elmardoudi, Farouk Ali-Haimoud) Vincente Rafael Pierre 18-Sep-01 Guilty Guilty 24 months imprisonment, Pierre et al. (Vincente Rafael Pierre, Traci Elaine Upshur) 36 months probation Traci Upshur 18-Sep-01 Guilty Guilty 15 months imprisonment, 24 Pierre et al. (Vincente Rafael Pierre,
    [Show full text]
  • Anti-Terror Lessons of Muslim-Americans
    The author(s) shown below used Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice and prepared the following final report: Document Title: Anti-Terror Lessons of Muslim-Americans Author: David Schanzer, Charles Kurzman, Ebrahim Moosa Document No.: 229868 Date Received: March 2010 Award Number: 2007-IJ-CX-0008 This report has not been published by the U.S. Department of Justice. To provide better customer service, NCJRS has made this Federally- funded grant final report available electronically in addition to traditional paper copies. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. Anti- Terror Lessons of Muslim-Americans DAVID SCHANZER SANFORD SCHOOL OF PUBLIC POLICY DUKE UNIVERSITY CHARLES KURZMAN DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA, CHAPEL HILL EBRAHIM MOOSA DEPARTMENT OF RELIGION DUKE UNIVERSITY JANUARY 6, 2010 This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. Project Supported by the National Institute of Justice This project was supported by grant no.
    [Show full text]
  • Connecting the Dots: Analysis of the Effectiveness of Bulk Phone Records Collection
    Connecting the Dots: Analysis of the Effectiveness of Bulk Phone Records Collection Marshall Erwin Research Fellow • Hoover Institution January 13, 2014 Under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act, the National Security Agency (NSA) has pooled the phone records of millions of U.S. citizens into a massive data set. An accurate assessment of the program’s effectiveness is necessary to make an informed judgment about the privacy tradeoffs entailed by this collection. The program’s effectiveness as a counterterrorism tool is also important to its legal underpinnings. And to many Americans, what is more important than even legality or intrusiveness of this program is its value, or lack thereof, to our nation’s security. The topic of Section 215 effectiveness has been addressed often by outside legal experts and pundits, the vast majority of whom lack any counterterrorism or intelligence expertise. Intelligence officials have also commented on the topic, but the sensitivity of their positions prevents an in-depth discussion. This paper provides a discussion of the effectiveness of bulk records collection using a degree of rigor that has been lacking from both critics and proponents of this intelligence program. Intelligence community officials have given two primary examples of the value or prospective value of Section 215 bulk phone records collection: the disrupted 2009 al- Qaeda plot targeting the New York City subway and the case of Khalid al-Mihdhar, the 9/11 hijacker who was under surveillance by NSA and who, the government alleges, could have been found if NSA had Section 215 authorities before the 9/11 attacks.
    [Show full text]
  • CTC Sentinel 6
    MARCH 2013 . VOL 6 . ISSUE 3 Contents Cooperation or Competition: FEATURE ARTICLE 1 Cooperation or Competition: Boko Haram and Ansaru After Boko Haram and Ansaru After the Mali Intervention By Jacob Zenn the Mali Intervention By Jacob Zenn REPORTS 9 AQIM’s Playbook in Mali By Pascale C. Siegel 12 Al-Shabab’s Tactical and Media Strategies in the Wake of its Battlefield Setbacks By Christopher Anzalone 16 The Upcoming Peace Talks in Southern Thailand’s Insurgency By Zachary Abuza 20 The Role of Converts in Al-Qa`ida- Related Terrorism Offenses in the United States By Robin Simcox and Emily Dyer 24 The Threat from Rising Extremism in the Maldives By Animesh Roul 28 Recent Highlights in Terrorist Activity 32 CTC Sentinel Staff & Contacts A Cameroonian soldier stands in Dabanda by the car of the French family that was kidnapped on February 19. - AFP/Getty Images ince the nigerian militant group attacked schools, churches, cell phone Boko Haram1 launched its first towers, media houses, and government attack in northern Nigeria in facilities, including border posts, police September 2010, it has carried stations and prisons. Since January Sout more than 700 attacks that have 2012, however, a new militant group killed more than 3,000 people.2 Boko has attracted more attention in northern Haram primarily targets Nigerian Nigeria due to its threat to foreign government officials and security interests. Jama`at Ansar al-Muslimin About the CTC Sentinel officers, traditional and secular Muslim fi Bilad al-Sudan (commonly known as The Combating Terrorism Center is an leaders, and Christians.3 It has also Ansaru)4 announced that it split from independent educational and research Boko Haram in January 2012, claiming institution based in the Department of Social Sciences at the United States Military Academy, 1 The group Boko Haram identifies itself as Jama`at Ahl West Point.
    [Show full text]
  • Shariah: the Threat to America: an Exercise in Competitive Analysis
    SHARIAH: THE THREAT TO AMERICA AN EXERCISE IN COMPETITIVE ANALYSIS REPORT OF TEAM ‘B’ II 1 Copyright © 2010 The Center for Security Policy All rights reserved. Shariah: The Threat to America (An Exercise in Competitive Analysis—Report of Team ‘B’ II) is published in the United States by the Center for Security Policy Press, a division of the Center for Security Policy. THE CENTER FOR SECURITY POLICY 1901 Pennsylvania Avenue, Suite 201 Washington, DC 20006 Phone: (202) 835-9077 Email: [email protected] For more information, please see securefreedom.org ISBN 978-0-9822947-6-5 Book design by David Reaboi. PREFACE This study is the result of months of analysis, discussion and drafting by a group of top security policy experts concerned with the preeminent totalitarian threat of our time: the legal-political-military doctrine known within Islam as “shariah.” It is designed to provide a comprehensive and articulate “second opinion” on the official characterizations and assessments of this threat as put forth by the United States government. The authors, under the sponsorship of the Center for Security Policy, have modeled this work on an earlier “exercise in competitive analysis” which came to be known as the “Team B” Report. That 1976 document challenged the then-prevailing official U.S. government intelligence estimates of the intentions and offensive capabilities of the Soviet Union and the policy known as “détente” that such estimates ostensi- bly justified. Unlike its predecessor, which a group of independent security policy professionals conducted at the request and under the sponsorship of the Director of Central Intelligence, George H.W.
    [Show full text]
  • BOP-CTU-2.Pdf
    UNCLASSIFIED // FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY / LAW ENFORCEM ENT SENSITIVE FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS COUNTER TERRORISM UNIT August 24, 2009 INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS AND LANGUAGE TRANSLATION FOR INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC TERRORIST INMATES (09-016) LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE: This information is the property of the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) and may be distributed to state or local government law enforcement officials with a need-to-know. Further distribution without BOP authorization is prohibited. Precautions should be taken to ensure this information is stored and/or destroyed in a manner which precludes unauthorized access. International Terrorism Name Reg. No. Facl COJ STG Affiliations JONES, Royal 04935-046 MAR MT Bloods A Radicalization and CMU Int Terr C Recruitment Comm Cat 2 Name Reg. No. Facl COJ STG Affiliations WASHINGTON, Levar 29205-112 MAR CAC Dom Terr A Jam'iyyat Ul-Islam CMU Crips A Is-Saheeh (JIS) On August 10, 2009, inmate Jones authored correspondence to his daughter, Brittany Jones, 3719 45th Avenue, Sacramento, CA, 95824. The correspondence consisted of an eight page, handwritten letter which detailed recent issues among the inmate Muslim population in MAR CMU which resulted in a physical altercation between inmates Washington and Imran Mandhai, Reg. No. 56175-004. Inmate Jones indicated differing religious ideologies among the inmate Muslim population in MAR CMU were a contributing factor to the altercation involving inmate UNCLASSIFIED // FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY / LAW ENFORCEM ENT SENSITIVE Page 1 of 45 UNCLASSIFIED // FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY / LAW ENFORCEM ENT SENSITIVE Washington. Several inmates described a typical Islamic hierarchy which had developed among the Muslim community.
    [Show full text]
  • KARIN J. IMMERGUT, OSB #96314 United States Attorney District of Oregon CHARLES F
    KARIN J. IMMERGUT, OSB #96314 United States Attorney District of Oregon CHARLES F. GORDER, JR., OSB #91287 PAMALA R. HOLSINGER, OSB #89263 DAVID L. ATKINSON, OSB #75021 Assistant United States Attorneys 1000 S.W. Third Avenue, Suite 600 Portland, OR 97204-2024 Telephone: (503) 727-1000 Facsimile: (503) 727-1117 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ) ) No. CR 02-399-JO v. ) ) JEFFREY LEON BATTLE, and ) GOVERNMENT’S PATRICE LUMUMBA FORD, ) SENTENCING MEMORANDUM ) Defendants. ) The United States of America, by Karin J. Immergut, United States Attorney for the District of Oregon, and Charles F. Gorder, Jr., Pamala R. Holsinger, and David L. Atkinson, Assistant United States Attorneys, respectfully submits this memorandum for the sentencings of defendants Battle and Ford which are currently set for Monday, November 24, 2003 at 9:00 a.m. The government is unaware of any disputed areas for the sentencing hearing with regard to the applicable guideline calculation and the ultimate sentence. The government and defendants agree, and the Probation Office concurs, that the defendants’ total offense level is 37 (Level 43 under U.S.S.G. § 2M1.1(a)(1) - Treason, minus 3 for conspiracy, minus 3 for acceptance of responsibility), defendants’ criminal history category is I, and the resulting guideline range is 210 to 262 months. Pursuant to the plea agreement between the parties and based upon the facts and evidence set forth below, the government requests a sentence of 216 months (18 years). STATEMENT OF FACTS This prosecution involved six Oregon residents who beginning as early as January 2001 began training themselves to fight in a so-called “jihad” somewhere in the world.
    [Show full text]
  • The Role of Social Networks in the Evolution of Al Qaeda-Inspired Violent Extremism in the United States, 1990-2015
    The author(s) shown below used Federal funding provided by the U.S. Department of Justice to prepare the following resource: Document Title: The Role of Social Networks in the Evolution of Al Qaeda-Inspired Violent Extremism in the United States, 1990-2015 Author(s): Jytte Klausen Document Number: 250416 Date Received: November 2016 Award Number: 2012-ZA-BX-0006 This resource has not been published by the U.S. Department of Justice. This resource is being made publically available through the Office of Justice Programs’ National Criminal Justice Reference Service. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. FINAL REPORT The Role of Social Networks in the Evolution of Al Qaeda-Inspired Violent Extremism in the United States, 1990-2015. Principal Investigator: Jytte Klausen, Brandeis University. June 2016. This project was supported by Award No. 2012-ZA-BX-0006, awarded by the National Institute of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice. The opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this report are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Department of Justice. This resource was prepared by the author(s) using Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice Contents EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ........................................................................................................... I 1. INTRODUCTION....................................................................................................................
    [Show full text]