The Marines and the Guardia Nacional De Nicaragua 1927-1932
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THE MARINES AND THE GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA 1927-1932. Brent Leigh Gravatt Copyright by Brent Leigh Gravatt 1973 TriS MARIN2S ANiJ THE IUARJIA NACIONAL de NICARAGUA 1927-1932 by Brent Lei?h Gravatt // Department of Political Science Duke University Author* s Note The ooinions expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily correspond to those of The departments of the Navy or jefense. TAiiLE OF CONTENTS • INTRODUCTION . 1 Chapter I. TIPITAPA 5 Rationale for Intervention Prelude to fipitapa The Settlement II. SANJINO'S REVOLT 37 III. THE NASCENT GUARJIA k? IV. MISSION IN FLUX 62 V. MILITARY OPERATIONS 79 VI. TRAINING 102 VII. TnE TURNOVER 123 VIII. CONCLUSIONS 137 APPENDIX 156 BlbLIOGRAPHY 163 LIST OK TABLES Table 1. Trade Statistics 11 2. GN and USMC Forces in the Northern and Central Areas 63 3. Patrol Contacts 64 4. 2nd Brigade Strength, 1929 71 5. GW Force Distribution 75 6. 2nd Brigade Force Jistribution, 1929 86 7. Monthly Patrol Contacts for 1929 87 8. Contacts by Area, 1927-1930 93 9. GN Force Jistribution, 1931-1932 96 10. Contacts by Area, 1931-1932 99 11. Casualties, 1931-1932 100 12. Enlistments, 1927-1932 109 13. Desertions, 1927-1932 110 14. GN Patrol Contacts, 1927-1932 120 15» Nicaraguan Senior Line Officers . 134 Tables in Appendix 1. Estimated Sandinista Force Levels . 157 2. Field Companies of the Guard i a nacional . 158 3. Total Casualties, 1927-1932 159 LIST O?1 ILLUSTRATIONS Figure 1. Organizational Chart, January, 1928 61 Figures in Appendix 1. Map of Nicaragua lbl 2. Political/Military jepartments of Nicaragua . 162 INTRODUCTION The U.S. military interv ion In Nicaragua in 1927-1932 sought to brin? political stability to a nation which was habitually instable. Legitimate transfers of power simply did not exist. Elections were fraudulent and coups frequent. The American interest in promoting stable government in Nicaragua was occasioned by the proximity of that nation to the P- aama Canax and the existence of a suitable alternate canal route through Nicaraguan territory. The decision-makers in v/ashington feared that instability in Nicaragua might lead to foreign (European) interventi .1 and that such intervention might become permanent, thereby threatening the trans-isthmian passages which were vital to U,S. security and commerce. By engendering legitimate and peaceful transfers of Dower, the U.S. hoped to remove this threat to its vital interests by creating stable government. This attempt at institution building was predicated on ensuring fair and free elections. To guarantee such elections, the State Department established the Marine com- manded Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua as a non-partisan national constabulary to prevent fraudulent elections and thereby legitimise the change or continuance of those in office. During the Guard's formative period (the Marines assumed 2 command of the Guard on May 12, 1927), the United States agreed to maintain a military presence in Nicaragua to assist the Guard in keeping order a.nd in supervising the 1928 presidential election. This assistance expanded beyond the anticipated commitment when the U.S. supported govern- ments were opposed by the rebel leader, Augusto C. Sandino. For nearly two years, tne Marines conducted the uulk of combat operations against Sandino' s roving insurgents. Then in the spring and summer of 1929 » the Marine led Guardia Nacional replaced the Marines in the combat areas and assumed the burden of suppressing the rebellion for the remainder of the intervention. In this endeavor, the Guardia was only moderately successful. The National Guard neither decisively defeated Sandino nor did it contain his forays to the remote regions of Nicaragua. Tne Guard, however, did maintain the duly elected government in power and did prevent Sandino from severely disrupting normal activity in the populous and economically important areas of the country. In engagements witn the Sandinistas, the Marine officered Guardia performed well. The Marines imparted to their charges the atrol techniques and small unit tactics necessary to counter ambushes ana to conduct company t>ize offensive operations. Tne instruction was, generally, in- formal. The enlisted Nicaraguan learned the fundamentals of soldiering tnrough the exoedient of practical experience. The native junior officer did receive formal training at the — 3 Marine established military academy, but the Marines of the Guard did not provide this training until late in the intervention (more than three-quarters of all academy officers graduated in 19 32, ti. last year of the intervention). For field axade officers, there was no training whatsoever neither formal nor informal. There were no native officers above the rank of first lieutenant until November, 1932, when the president of Nicaragua appointed captains and field grade officers from civilian life. However, despite these deficiencies, wnen the last of the Marines and sailors de- parted Nicaragua on January 2, 1933 t they left behind a better trained, better disciplined, and better organized native militarv establishment tnan Nicaragua had ever possessed. The Marine tutelage of the i. caraguan constabulary was successful in endowing that organization, at least at the enlisted and junior officer level, witn a degree of military comoetency that considerably exceeded the minimal expertise of the orevious "national armies." The Marines, however, were not successful in creating a non-partisan military* Given the Nicara?uan political context, an apolitical armed force was probably an imnossibility • The State JeDirtment admitted as such in 1932 when it agreed to a nrooosal put forth by the Guard's Marine commander to have the senior officers of the Guard aopointed equally from anon? tne members of the two prominent political parties. Implementation of this oroposal in November and Jecember of 1932 transformed the luardia from a non-partisan organization to a bipartisan one. Uncer tne Guard's native commander, General Anastasio Somoza, the Guard ia Kacional quickly be-ame a p rtisan nody enabling General Somoza to be "elected" to the presidency in 1936. The Somoza family has ruled i\iciragua ever since. In the hands of Somoza, tne Nicaraguan National Guard did brin i stability to Nicaragua but certainly not in the manner en- visioi. -d by the State Department. Stability was achieved not throurh the practice of free elections but through General Somoza' s control of organized force. The Nicaraguan intervention is illustrative of the tenuous nature of foreign imposed "reforms." The reforms f as in the case of Nic ragua, often do not survive beyond the end of the intervention--at least for relatively brief inter- ventions where there is little time for acculturation. The U.S. attempt in rvicarasrua to institutionalize peaceful trans- fers of power throu-zh fair an.i free elections failed as did the attempt to create a non-partisan military. The United States was successful in achieving the objectives of tne inter- vention, stability in Nicaragua ana protection of the canal; however, the United States was not successful in changing Nicaraguan politics where continuance in the presidency or accession thereto was accomplished oy force rather than by vote. The situation in post-intervention Nicaragua, Somoza and the National Guard, exemplifies the difficulty of imposing permanent change from without. A CHAPTER I TIP. TAP Rationale for Intervention lited States Marine Corps involvement in Nicaragua began in 1853 when a Marine landing party from the USS Cyane (22) went ashore at San Juan Del Norte (then Greytown) on March 11 to protect American lives and property. In fol- lowing years, similar small contingents landed in l85^ t 1857 (against the filibuster, William walker), 186?, 189^, 1896, 1898, and 1899» with battalion and regimental size forces being sent ashore in 1910 and 1912, respectively, 2 From 1913 to 192 5, the United States maintained a Legation Guard of ap- proximately 130 men in Managua. 3 The U.S. withdrew this small •^William M. Miller an<i John H. Johnstone, A Chronology of the United States Marine Corps , Vol. Ii 1775 193> (Wash- ingtoni Historical Division, Headquarters, USMC, 196*5) t p. 77* 2 Ibid ,, dd. 78-101, 111, 113; and Bernard C. Nalty, The United States Marines in Nicaragua (rev. ed.j Washingtoni Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters, USMC, I90I), p. 3» Hereinafter referred to as Marines in Nicaragua . -'The Legation's military component was composed of Marine and Navy personnel. From January, 1913 » to January, 1917t its numoers were 105 Marines and 3 Navy; and from 1917 to August, 1925. 129 Marines ana 3 Navy men were attached to the Legation ("Memorandum for Chief of Naval Operations! U.S. Naval Forces on Shore Juty in Nicaragua, 22 January 1931»" located in Alphabetical File "N" at Historical Division, Reference Section* Headquarters, USMC, Washington, D.C.). Material from Alphabetical File "N" will hereinafter be re- ferred to as File "N," HQ, USMC. 6 force in August, 1925» and for the first time in thirteen years, there were no U.S. troops in Nicaragua, however, this condition proved to be transitory, for the Nicaraguan Civil War of 1926-1927 brought the Marines back in —nearly 3000 of them by May, 1927. The Civil War ended that same May when peace agreements were concluded between the U.S. envoy and the rebel commander at the village of Tipitapa.5 The American military intervention, however, did not end. United States forces remained in Nicaragua until January 2, 1933* Why this American involvement with Nicaragua? The prominent factor, which influenced United States relations with all Central American Republics, was an accident of geography — the iothmus. By the twentieth century, the isthmus was important to botn the security and commerce of the United States. The construction of the Panama Canal and its opening in 1914 made the istr.mus even more important.