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----- ---- --~ - ---·-- ·--··---~ ✓ ..... ~,·- - -----·-------- . I ,.-..) c(>)~l 'fOP SECRET res 1049-69 CONTROLLED DISSEM NIE 11-1-69 19June 1969 NATIONAL INTELUGENCE ESTIMATE NUMBER 11-1-69 (Supersedes NII: 11-1-67 and Memo to Holders of NIE 11-1-67) The Soviet Space Program Handle Via Indicated Controls LIMITED DISTRIBUTION WARNING The sensitivity of this document requires that It be handled with ma•imum security precautions on a need-to-know basis. Recipients will insure that only personnel having all proper clearance• and o need to-knaw will have acceu to this document. Submitted by ~~- DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE Concurred in by the UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD As indicated overleaf 19 June 1969 Declassified Under Authority of the lnteragency · Security Classification Appeals Panel, · E.O. 13526, sec. 5.3 (b)(3) ISCAP Appeal No. 2011-003, document 1 Authenticated: Declassification date: November 23, 2020 Pages 36 =FOP S6GRE=F Copy N? 1 CO~k~~ET DISSEM C03362999 "FOP SEGRE+ The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate, The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Depart ments of State and Defense, and the NSA. Concurring: Lt Gen. R. E. Cushman, Jr., USMC, the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Mr. Thomas L. Hughes, the Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State Vice Adm. Vernon L. Lowrance, for the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency Lt. Gen_ Marshall S. Carter, the Director, National Security Agency Mr. Charles A. Sommer, for the Assistant General Manager, Atomic Energy Com mission Abstaining: Mr. William 0. Cregar, for the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, the subject being outside of his jurisdiction. WARNING This document contains information affecting the national security of the United Stoles with in the meaning of the espionage laws U.S. Coda Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798. The law prohibits its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner ta an unauthorized person, as well as its use in any manner prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United State; or for the benefit of any foreign government to the detriment of the United States. It is I<> be seen only by personnel especially indoctrinated and authorized to receive information in the designated control channels. Jts securi in accordance with re ulatio GROUP J fxefuded frQrn automatic: downgrading and dedassificatioo fOP SECRS 'fOF-' 5E6RE+ ,---------------------· ---··· C03362999 TOP SECRET "FOP SECRil" CONTENTS Page THE PROBLEM . ········ ..... l CONCLUSIONS I DISCUSSION ................. 4 I. SOVIET SPACE LAUNCHES DURING THE PAST TWO YEARS . 4 A. General . .. .. .. .. .. 4 B. Manned Space Flight . 4 Soyuz.................................................. 4 Zond Circumlunar . 6 C. Scientific Development Satellites . 7 D. Lunar and Planetary ...................................... , . 7 E. Applied Satellites . 8 Meteorological Satellites . 8 Communications Satellites . 8 F. Maneuverable Satellites . 8 C. Photoreconnaissance Satellites . 9 H. Electronic Reconnaissance . 11 I. Navigational Satellites . 12 J. Undetermined Missions . 12 II. SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL FACTORS AFFECTING FUTURE PROSPECTS . .. .. 12 A. General . 12 B. High Energy Propellants . 13 C. Launch Vehicles . 13 SL-11 .. .. .. .. .. 13 SL-12 . .. 13 J-Vehicle . ................ 14 D. Electronic Systems . 14 E. Spacecraft . 14 F. Nuclear Power and Propulsion . 15 G. Life Support Systems . 16 H. Command and Control . 17 'FOP 9E€RE'f TCS 1049-69 ---TOP 0EC~ET C03362999 fflF SESRET ~g SECRFiI Page III. POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC FACTORS ... 17 A. General ..... ............... 17 B. Organization 18 C. Economics 18 IV. FUTURE PROSPECTS ... 19 A. General ........................................ 19 B. Manned Lunar Landing .... 19 C. Manned Space Station ......... 20 D. Manned Circumlunar ......................................... 21 E. Manned Lunar Orbiter ........................................ 21 F. Unmanned Lunar and Planetary Probes ......................... 21 ··i, Lunar ....................................................... 21 Venus . ............. 22 Mars . ............... 22 Other Planets ................................................ 23 G. Applied Satellites . .................................... 23 Communications Satellites ..................................... 23 Meteorological Satellites ....................................... 23 Earth Resources Survey Satellites ......................... 24 Geodetic Satellites ........................................... 24 H. Military Uses of Space ........................................ 24 Reconnaissance Systems ....................................... 24 Early Warning Systems . .................... 24 Navigation Satellites . ............. 25 I. Unmanned Earth Orbital Eiq,loration . ........... 25 J. Long Term Prospects . ...................... 25 V. INTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 26 i ANNEX I'i i TCS 1049-69 TOP SEC~Ei i j ·,1 TOP SEGRliT ·co3362999 TOP SECRET -- l'OP SECRET THE SOVIET SPACE PROGRAM THE PROBLEM To estimate Soviet capabilities and probable accomplishments in space over the next fl.ve to 10 years. CONCLUSIONS A. During the past two years, the Soviet space program has re tained its high priority among major national objectives. The Soviets attempted over 50 percent more space launches than in the preceding two-year period, and they have continued the development of new space systems and the expansion of supporting facilities. They achieved several space "firsts": unmanned rendezvous and docking, manned rendezvous and docking involving crew transfer, and the transmission of atmospheric data from Venus. Their manned space flight program, however, has not yet regained the momentum lost with the death of Cosmonaut Komarov, and they have experienced costly failures in their lunar and planetary programs. · B. The Soviets almost certainly established the goals and the ap proximate timetable for their space program some years ago. Its pace, however, could be influenced by a number of factors, including the Soviet view of its political value, the possibility of significant scientific advances, economic constraints, and technological successes and fail ures. Some of these factors will tend to offset one another. It may be possible to speed up to meet new deadlines, but we consider it unlikely that they can, at this late date, effect any basic changes in the overall nature of the program for the next few years. C. We estimate that expenditures on the Soviet space program grew rapidly through 1965, but that the rate of growth has been de clining since then. This slowdown can be ath'ibuted primarily to the reduced requirement for heavy outlays for new large launch vehicles and related facilities. We estimate Soviet outlays for space in 1968, including military programs, to he the equivalent of $6.4 billion. Com- TCS 1049--69 C03362999 .:.COP S£.€RET 2 petition for the vital resources required by the Soviet space program, evident since the late 1950's, has intensified. For this reason and con sidering the indications we now have of Soviet space programs, we think it unlikely that Soviet space expenditures will be appreciably higher during the next several years than they are now and we believe that the Soviets will not be ahle to undertake simultaneously all the projects within their technical capabilities. D. Manned Lunar Landing. The judgment in earlier estimates that the Soviet manned lunar landing program was not competitive with the Apollo timetable has been supported by developments of the past two years. Flight tests of the )-launch vehicle, which we estimate will be used to place men on the moon, were expected to begin in 1968 but have not yet gotten underway. Furthermore, the Soviets have experienced difficulties in their tests related to lunar return and re covery. We continue to believe that the Soviets will undertake a manned lunar landing. We now consider it highly unlikely, however, that the Soviets would attempt a manned lunar landing in 1970; this mission will probably not be attempted before 1972, although late 1971 cannot be ruled out. In preparation for the landing attempt, we believe that the Soviets will undertake a manned lunar orbiting mission for the purposes of collecting data and checking equipment; such a mission will probably not be attempted before mid-1971 at the earliest. E. Manned Circumlunat Flight. We now consider it unlikely that the Soviets will attempt a manned circumlunar flight of the type which would loop merely around the moon and return to earth. The success of the Apollo program has removed the primary incentive for such an attempt as a spectacular. Moreover, this mission would be of little value as a step preparatory to a manned lunar landing. F. Manned Space Station. We believe that within the next year, the Soviets could assemble a small manned space station in orbit that could carry a crew of three for a 90-day period. By the mid-1970's they could put up a considerably larger station weighing up to 50,000 pounds. A space station of this size would provide considerably more space for men, equipment, and supplies. The length of its mission would depend primarily upon the number in the crew and the arrange ments for resupply and rotation. G. Very Latge Space Station. We continue to believe that the Soviet space program includes plans to orbit a very large space sta- TCS 1049--69 "'FOP 6E€Rl!iT TOP SECRET C03362999 TOF' 5ECREi -'fOf' SEiGRl!:f 3