Examinations, Imperial Kējǔ ​科 举

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

Examinations, Imperial Kējǔ ​科 举 ◀ Eunuchs Comprehensive index starts in volume 5, page 2667. Examinations, Imperial Kējǔ ​科 举 The term bureaucrat did not always have the Tang Contributions same pejorative attachment it has today. Before the twentieth century, China was administered Like the Han before it, the Tang government established by highly respected, and thoroughly tested, two state universities, one at Chang’an, the principal capi- tal city, the other at Luoyang, the auxiliary capital. The professional bureaucrats, or civil servants. universities admitted mainly sons of the nobility and bu- reaucracy, and prepared them for the doctoral exams held at the capital. But men educated in private academies and hina was the first civilization to develop a civil ser- recommended by local officials after preliminary screen- vice recruited on the basis of merit, not birth. This ing exams could also participate in these prestigious ex- led to the development of a meritocracy (social es- ams. Five types of exams were administered, two of them, teem and position based on learning) millennia earlier than for literary composition and for knowledge of the classics, any other civilization. This system was reported in glow- were the most prestigious. Those who passed were called ing and admiring terms by Jesuit missionaries who came presented scholars, a degree equivalent to the modern to China in the seventeenth century. It was later copied by doctorate. The remaining three exams—​­for law, math- European nations. Thus the recruitment of a civil service ematics, and calligraphy—​­were less esteemed. based on learning and tested through the civil service exami- The exams were initially administered by the Min- nations was one of the glories of the Chinese civilization. istry of Personnel because many of the passing candi- dates became government officials. After 736 ce, the Ministry of Rites became responsible for administering Foundations the exams, making them a ritual of the Confucian state and adding to their prestige. Men who passed the doc- The notion of a professional bureaucracy based on merit toral exams underwent further testing on their practi- rather than birth began late in the Zhou dynasty (1045– 256 cal skills, appearance, and speaking abilities and had bce) during the Warring States era (770– 221 bce). Its adop- their personal files checked for moral uprightness. Only tion by the Qin state contributed to Qin triumph in 221 bce. then were they eligible for suitable appointments when The succeeding Han dynasty (206 bce– 2 2 0 ce) adapted the vacancies occurred. Appointments were made in the practice and combined recommendation, testing, and per- name of the emperor. Civil service positions and civil formance rating to recruit a civil service. These practices servants were ranked by nine grades, with ascending persisted until the early twentieth century. But it was the salaries as one rose on the bureaucratic ladder. All civil reunified Sui (581– 618 ce) and Tang empires (618– 907 ce) servants were subject to annual ratings by their supe- that made civil service examinations a full-​­fledged system. rior officers. 781 C © 2009 by Berkshire Publishing Group LLC 782 Berkshire Encyclopedia of China 宝 库 山 中 华 全 书 Testing room of the Imperial examina- tion system. Each test-​­taker would be confined to one of these tiny cubicles for the duration of the examination Students would usually come from families wealthy enough to support a non-​­working family member, as study- ing would leave little time for anything else. China was the first civilization to develop a civil service recruited on the basis of merit, not birth, and the exam- ination process that sought to establish a person’s worth was extremely rig- orous. The system was reported in glowing and admiring terms by Jesuit missionaries who came to China in the seventeenth century. Photo by Jeff Wang Song Refinements Ming and Qing Bureaucracy The greater egalitarianism of Song dynasty (960– 1279) During the nomadic Liao, Jurchen Jin, and Yuan dynas- society was reflected in the opening of the examination ties (916–1368) rulers relied on ethnic minorities and mili- system and the civil service to men of more varied so- tary force to rule China. Although they were compelled cial backgrounds. With a printing press in operation, to institute the examinations to recruit officials to rule books became cheaper and more widely available. Ob- the Chinese, the Chinese so recruited had only limited jective procedures were also adopted, for example, hav- career opportunities open to them and served only in sub- ing three examiners read each paper and having a piece ordinate positions. of paper pasted over the candidate’s name to prevent The Ming (1368– 1644) government sponsored the favoritism. Men who passed the metropolitan exams most extensive educational system in premodern China. then underwent a palace exam presided over by the The state sponsored at least one school in every county and emperor, in theory, to confirm the results. Other inno- prefectural city with a quota of state-​­supported students. vations the Song government undertook were to give Beginning in 1370 the Ming government held regular ex- the exams every three years and to narrow the scope ams so that by the 1400s degree holders again dominated of the exams to literary composition and interpreting the bureaucratic elite. There was a great increase in enroll- the classics. About two hundred men received the doc- ment in both private academies and family schools dur- toral degree annually during the Song dynasty. These ing the prosperous Ming and Qing (1644–1912) dynasties, men filled about half of the top government positions. which produced an ever-​­increasing number of educated Lower government posts were increasingly filled by the men. Neo-​­Confucianism of the Zhu Xi School had be- prefectural graduates. come orthodox around the end of the Song, and this was © 2009 by Berkshire Publishing Group LLC Examinations, Imperial n Kējǔ n 科举 783 the basis of the school curriculum and the exams. Stu- also scheduled for the Manchu, Mongol, and Han ban- dents were taught to write their essays according to a stan- nermen. The rise of the Manchus was due to a military dard form that organized them in an eight-​­part structure. organization called the banner system, which enrolled This form became known as the Eight-​­Legged Essay. Manchus, Mongols, and Han Chinese who joined the Triennial examinations at three levels became the rule. Manchu cause prior to 1644 into separate, elite heredi- Aspiring young men first had to pass the county-​­level ex- tary military units. Although Manchu, Mongol, and Han ams. Those who did earned the cultivated talent degree, Chinese bannermen were eligible to take an easier exam, equivalent to a bachelor of arts degree in modern terms. many Chinese chose not to do so because the more easily This entitled them to wear a designating sash, exempted earned degrees were perceived as less prestigious. them from unpaid labor owed to the emperor (corvee), and The personnel administration practices established made them eligible to teach and to serve in minor govern- by the Tang continued during the later dynasties. They ment posts. They could also take the three-day-long​­ provin- included annual merit ratings, triennial appointments, cial examinations on the classics and history, in which they reappointments that could extend a term for up to nine had to be able to relate philosophical principles to current years in a single post, the principle of seniority, and the political issues. Those who passed became elevated men, law of avoidance, which precluded any man from serving equivalent to master of arts degree. They were eligible to en- in his home province. ter government service, teach, or compete in the metropoli- The traditional exam system lasted until the early tan exams held at the capital. About 1,200 men received this twentieth century. The exams became less relevant in the degree triennially in early Ming times; the figure had risen late nineteenth century as China struggled to adapt to the to approximately 1,800 by mid-​­Qing. Those who passed the modern world. Modern schools, introduced by Chinese difficult metropolitan exams took a final palace exam that missionaries, began teaching the sciences, foreign lan- ranked them in order of excellence. They were called pre- guages, and world history, and were followed by Chinese sented scholars, or doctors. These men became national ce- public and private schools and universities that adopted lebrities equivalent to modern sports heroes. Many entered modern, Western curricula. The exam system was abol- the civil service, starting at relatively high positions. ished in the last years of the Qing dynasty. Schools for The Ming government also set a geographic quota for girls proliferated after the establishment of the Republic the number of passing doctoral candidates: 35 percent in 1911. Universities became coeducational after 1920. was reserved for northerners, 10 percent for westerners Jiu-hwa Lo UPSHUR (mainly for candidates from Sichuan), and 55 percent for southerners. The Qing refined the quota on a provin- cial basis. The quota system was aimed at producing a Further Reading bureaucracy that was nationally based. Without a quota Ho, Ping-ti.​­ (1962). The ladder of success in Imperial China: southerners would have dominated because since the Aspects of social mobility, 1368– 1911 New York: Colum- Song dynasty, southern China had become economically bia University Press. more prosperous than the north and. as a result, had bet- Kracke, E. (1953). Civil service in early Sung China, 960– ter schools that produced better prepared students. 1067. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Menzal, J. M. (Ed.). (1963). Chinese civil service—​­Career The Qing government founded by the Manchus, an open to talent Boston: D.
Recommended publications
  • Managing Meritocracy in Clientelistic Democracies∗
    Managing Meritocracy in Clientelistic Democracies∗ Sarah Brierleyy Washington University in St Louis May 8, 2018 Abstract Competitive recruitment for certain public-sector positions can co-exist with partisan hiring for others. Menial positions are valuable for sustaining party machines. Manipulating profes- sional positions, on the other hand, can undermine the functioning of the state. Accordingly, politicians will interfere in hiring partisans to menial position but select professional bureau- crats on meritocratic criteria. I test my argument using novel bureaucrat-level data from Ghana (N=18,778) and leverage an exogenous change in the governing party to investigate hiring pat- terns. The results suggest that partisan bias is confined to menial jobs. The findings shed light on the mixed findings regarding the effect of electoral competition on patronage; competition may dissuade politicians from interfering in hiring to top-rank positions while encouraging them to recruit partisans to lower-ranked positions [123 words]. ∗I thank Brian Crisp, Stefano Fiorin, Barbara Geddes, Mai Hassan, George Ofosu, Dan Posner, Margit Tavits, Mike Thies and Daniel Triesman, as well as participants at the African Studies Association Annual Conference (2017) for their comments. I also thank Gangyi Sun for excellent research assistance. yAssistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Washington University in St. Louis. Email: [email protected]. 1 Whether civil servants are hired by merit or on partisan criteria has broad implications for state capacity and the overall health of democracy (O’Dwyer, 2006; Grzymala-Busse, 2007; Geddes, 1994). When politicians exchange jobs with partisans, then these jobs may not be essential to the running of the state.
    [Show full text]
  • Determinants and Consequences of Bureaucrat Effectiveness: Evidence
    Determinants and Consequences of Bureaucrat Effectiveness: Evidence from the Indian Administrative Service∗ Marianne Bertrand, Robin Burgess, Arunish Chawla and Guo Xu† October 21, 2015 Abstract Do bureaucrats matter? This paper studies high ranking bureaucrats in India to examine what determines their effectiveness and whether effective- ness affects state-level outcomes. Combining rich administrative data from the Indian Administrative Service (IAS) with a unique stakeholder survey on the effectiveness of IAS officers, we (i) document correlates of individual bureaucrat effectiveness, (ii) identify the extent to which rigid seniority-based promotion and exit rules affect effectiveness, and (iii) quantify the impact of this rigidity on state-level performance. Our empirical strategy exploits variation in cohort sizes and age at entry induced by the rule-based assignment of IAS officers across states as a source of differential promotion incentives. JEL classifica- tion: H11, D73, J38, M1, O20 ∗This project represents a colloboration between the Lal Bahadur Shastri National Academy of Administration (LBSNAA), the University of Chicago and London School of Economics. We are grateful to Padamvir Singh, the former Director of LBSNAA for his help with getting this project started. The paper has benefited from seminar/conference presentations at Berkeley, Bocconi, CEPR Public Economics Conference, IGC Political Economy Conference, LBSNAA, LSE, NBER India Conference, Stanford and Stockholm University. †Marianne Bertrand [University of Chicago Booth School of Business: Mari- [email protected]]; Robin Burgess [London School of Economics (LSE) and the International Growth Centre (IGC): [email protected]]; Arunish Chawla [Indian Administrative Service (IAS)]; Guo Xu [London School of Economics (LSE): [email protected]] 1 1 Introduction Bureaucrats are a core element of state capacity.
    [Show full text]
  • Engineers in India: Industrialisation, Indianisation and the State, 1900-47
    Engineers in India: Industrialisation, Indianisation and the State, 1900-47 A P A R A J I T H R AMNATH July 2012 A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Imperial College London Centre for the History of Science, Technology and Medicine DECLARATION This thesis represents my own work. Where the work of others is mentioned, it is duly referenced and acknowledged as such. APARAJITH RAMNATH Chennai, India 30 July 2012 2 ABSTRACT This thesis offers a collective portrait of an important group of scientific and technical practitioners in India from 1900 to 1947: professional engineers. It focuses on engineers working in three key sectors: public works, railways and private industry. Based on a range of little-used sources, it charts the evolution of the profession in terms of the composition, training, employment patterns and work culture of its members. The thesis argues that changes in the profession were both caused by and contributed to two important, contested transformations in interwar Indian society: the growth of large-scale private industry (industrialisation), and the increasing proportion of ‘native’ Indians in government services and private firms (Indianisation). Engineers in the public works and railways played a crucial role as officers of the colonial state, as revealed by debates on Indianisation in these sectors. Engineers also enabled the emergence of large industrial enterprises, which in turn impacted the profession. Previously dominated by expatriate government engineers, the profession expanded, was considerably Indianised, and diversified to include industrial experts. Whereas the profession was initially oriented towards the imperial metropolis, a nascent Indian identity emerged in the interwar period.
    [Show full text]
  • Bureaucratic Indecision and Risk Aversion in India
    Working Paper Bureaucratic Indecision and Risk Aversion in India Sneha P., Neha Sinha, Ashwin Varghese, Avanti Durani and Ayush Patel. About Us IDFC Institute has been set up as a research-focused think/do tank to investigate the political, economic and spatial dimensions of India’s ongoing transition from a low-income, state-led country to a prosperous market-based economy. We provide in-depth, actionable research and recommendations that are grounded in a contextual understanding of the political economy of execution. Our work rests on two pillars — ‘Transitions’ and ‘State and the Citizen’. ‘Transitions’ addresses the three transitions that are vital to any developing country’s economic advancement: rural to urban, low to high productivity, and the move from the informal to formal sector. The second pillar seeks to redefine the relationship between state and citizen to one of equals, but also one that keeps the state accountable and in check. This includes improving the functioning and responsiveness of important formal institutions, including the police, the judicial system, property rights etc. Well-designed, well-governed institutions deliver public goods more effectively. All our research, papers, databases, and recommendations are in the public domain and freely accessible through www.idfcinstitute.org. Disclaimer and Terms of Use The analysis in this paper is based on research by IDFC Institute (a division of IDFC Foundation). The views expressed in this paper are not that of IDFC Limited or any of its affiliates. The copyright of this paper is the sole and exclusive property of IDFC Institute. You may use the contents only for non-commercial and personal use, provided IDFC Institute retains all copyright and other proprietary rights contained therein and due acknowledgement is given to IDFC Institute for usage of any content.
    [Show full text]
  • Daily Life for the Common People of China, 1850 to 1950
    Daily Life for the Common People of China, 1850 to 1950 Ronald Suleski - 978-90-04-36103-4 Downloaded from Brill.com04/05/2019 09:12:12AM via free access China Studies published for the institute for chinese studies, university of oxford Edited by Micah Muscolino (University of Oxford) volume 39 The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/chs Ronald Suleski - 978-90-04-36103-4 Downloaded from Brill.com04/05/2019 09:12:12AM via free access Ronald Suleski - 978-90-04-36103-4 Downloaded from Brill.com04/05/2019 09:12:12AM via free access Ronald Suleski - 978-90-04-36103-4 Downloaded from Brill.com04/05/2019 09:12:12AM via free access Daily Life for the Common People of China, 1850 to 1950 Understanding Chaoben Culture By Ronald Suleski leiden | boston Ronald Suleski - 978-90-04-36103-4 Downloaded from Brill.com04/05/2019 09:12:12AM via free access This is an open access title distributed under the terms of the prevailing cc-by-nc License at the time of publication, which permits any non-commercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited. An electronic version of this book is freely available, thanks to the support of libraries working with Knowledge Unlatched. More information about the initiative can be found at www.knowledgeunlatched.org. Cover Image: Chaoben Covers. Photo by author. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Suleski, Ronald Stanley, author. Title: Daily life for the common people of China, 1850 to 1950 : understanding Chaoben culture / By Ronald Suleski.
    [Show full text]
  • Governance by Committee: the Role of Committees in European Policy Making and Policy
    Governance by Committee: The Role of Committees in European Policy Making and Policy Research Paper 00/GHA Return to Introduction STATE OF THE ART REPORT CONTRACT NUMBER: HPSE-CT-1999-00019 PROJECT NUMBER: SERD-1999-00128 TITLE: GOVERNANCE BY COMMITTEE, THE ROLE OF COMMITTEES IN EUROPEAN POLICY-MAKING AND POLICY IMPLEMENTATION MAASTRICHT, MAY 2000 Table of Contents 1. General Introduction ................................................................................................................ 4 Subproject 1: The Standing Committees in the European Parliament 2.1..................Introduction ............................................................................................................... 6 2.2..................The Evolution of the European Parliament: From Consultative ............................... 6 Assembly to Co-legislator 2.2.1...............The EP as a Legislative Actor after Maastricht......................................................... 7 2.2.2...............EP and Council on an Even Footing after Amsterdam.............................................. 8 2.2.2.1. ..........The Streamlining of the Co-decision Procedure........................................................ 9 2.3..................The Role of EP Committees in the Legislative Process ............................................ 10 2.3.1...............Membership in EP Committees.................................................................................12 2.3.2...............Powers and Competences of EP Committees...........................................................
    [Show full text]
  • The Glittering Prizes: Career Incentives and Bureaucrat Performance∗
    The Glittering Prizes: Career Incentives and Bureaucrat Performance∗ Marianne Bertrand, Robin Burgess, Arunish Chawla and Guo Xu† July 27, 2018 Abstract Bureaucracies are configured differently to private sector and political organizations. Across a wide range of civil services entry is competitive, promotion is constrained by seniority, jobs are for life and retirement occurs at a fixed age. This implies that older entering officers, who are less likely to attain the glittering prize of reaching the top of the bureaucracy before they retire, may be less motivated to exert effort. Using a nationwide stakeholder survey and rich administrative data on elite civil servants in India we provide evidence that: (i) officers who cannot reach the senior-most positions before they retire are perceived to be less effective and are more likely to be suspended and (ii) this effect is weakened by a reform that extends the retirement age. Together these results suggest that the career incentive of reaching the top of a public organization is a powerful determinant of bureaucrat performance. JEL classification: D73, H11, O10 ∗We are grateful to Padamvir Singh, the former Director of Lal Bahadur Shastri National Academy of Administration (LBSNAA), for his help with getting this project started and to LBSNAA and the Indian Planning Commission for collaboration. We thank Blackstone Group and its President Ashref Hashim for help with fielding the surveys of bureaucrat effectiveness. The paper has benefited from comments from Montek Singh Ahluwalia, Nava Ashraf, Oriana
    [Show full text]
  • Career Incentives and Bureaucrat Performance∗
    The Glittering Prizes: Career Incentives and Bureaucrat Performance∗ Marianne Bertrand, Robin Burgess, Arunish Chawla and Guo Xu† April 18, 2019 Abstract Bureaucracies are configured differently to private sector and political organizations. Across a wide range of civil services entry is competitive, promotion is constrained by seniority, jobs are for life and retirement occurs at a fixed age. This implies that older entering officers, who are less likely to attain the glittering prize of reaching the top of the bureaucracy before they retire, may be less motivated to exert effort. Using a nationwide stakeholder survey and rich administrative data on elite civil servants in India we provide evidence that: (i) officers who cannot reach the senior-most positions before they retire are perceived to be less effective and are more likely to be suspended and (ii) this effect is weakened by a reform that extends the retirement age. Together these results suggest that the career incentive of reaching the top of a public organization is a powerful determinant of bureaucrat performance. JEL classification: D73, H11, O10 ∗We are grateful to Padamvir Singh, the former Director of Lal Bahadur Shastri National Academy of Administration (LBSNAA), for his help with getting this project started and to LBSNAA and the Indian Planning Commission for collaboration. We thank Blackstone Group and its President Ashref Hashim for help with fielding the surveys of bureaucrat effectiveness. The paper has benefited from comments from Montek Singh Ahluwalia, Nava Ashraf, Oriana
    [Show full text]
  • AP US GOVERNMENT CHAPTER 14: the FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY: the REAL POWER?  Our Food Is Safer, Health Care Better, Air Cleaner All Because of Federal Rules/Laws
    AP US GOVERNMENT CHAPTER 14: THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY: THE REAL POWER? Our food is safer, health care better, air cleaner all because of federal rules/laws. Despite its reach, and perhaps because of it, Americans have a love-hate relationship with the federal government. We want more of virtually everything government delivers, from social security to national park, yet we often complain that government is too big. As the intense emotions of September 11 faded, so did the newfound trust in government. Red tape- comes from the ribbon that English civil servants once used to tie up and bind legal documents. Today we think of it as inevitable- waiting for government services, etc. but these same rules and regulations ensure that public servants act impartially and holds them accountable. DEFINING THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY Bureaucrat- a career governmental employee. Whether they are called bureaucrats or federal employees, 2.7 million Americans work in the executive branch. Six big agencies- Departments of the Army, Navy and Air Force, Veterans Affairs, Homeland Security and the Postal Service- tower over the others in size. Most agencies are responsible directly to the president. Agencies exist by act of Congress; legislators can abolish them either by passing a new law or withholding funds. Bureaucracy- a rational, efficient method of organization. The term refers to the whole body of un-elected and unappointed government officials in the executive branch who work for presidents and their political appointees. Bureaucracies are public or private organizations that are large and hierarchical, with each employee accountable to a superior through a chain of command.
    [Show full text]
  • Tracing Confucianism in Contemporary China
    TRACING CONFUCIANISM IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA Ruichang Wang and Ruiping Fan Abstract: With the reform and opening policy implemented by the Chinese government since the late 1970s, mainland China has witnessed a sustained resurgence of Confucianism first in academic studies and then in social practices. This essay traces the development of this resurgence and demonstrates how the essential elements and authentic moral and intellectual resources of long-standing Confucian culture have been recovered in scholarly concerns, ordinary ideas, and everyday life activities. We first introduce how the Modern New Confucianism reappeared in mainland China in the three groups of the Chinese scholars in the Confucian studies in the 1980s and early 1990s. Then we describe how a group of innovative mainland Confucian thinkers has since the mid-1990s come of age launching new versions of Confucian thought differing from that of the overseas New Confucians and their forefathers, followed by our summary of public Confucian pursuits and activities in the mainland society in the recent decade. Finally, we provide a few concluding remarks about the difficulties encountered in the Confucian development and our general expectations for future. 1 Introduction Confucianism is not just a philosophical doctrine constructed by Confucius (551- 479BCE) and developed by his followers. It is more like a religion in the general sense. In fact, Confucius took himself as a cultural transmitter rather than a creator (cf. Analects 7.1, 7.20), inheriting the Sinic culture that had long existed before him.2 Dr. RUICHANG WANG, Professor, School of Culture & Communications, Capital university of Economics and Business. Emai: [email protected].
    [Show full text]
  • The Making of Regulatory Independence By
    THE MAKING OF REGULATORY INDEPENDENCE BY SIDDHARTHA SUNDER RAJA DISSERTATION Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Communication in the Graduate College of the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2011 Urbana, Illinois Doctoral Committee: Associate Professor Christian Sandvig, Chair Professor Peggy Miller Professor Dan Schiller Professor Noshir Contractor Abstract This study offers an ethnographic account of life at a regulatory agency to offer a new perspective on an important question: how does a regulatory agency become and remain independent? Relying on an analytical framework based on scholarship in legal anthropology, this study provides elements of an answer based on an insider‘s view of regulation, illuminating the complex, messy, and political nature of what may seem from the outside as calm and neutral application of technical expertise. The formal account suggests that legislative action defines the position and mandate of such an agency making it independent—immune from political influence in its decision-making. However, experience has shown that the making and maintenance of independence is a challenge, especially as these agencies typically enter arenas much after other powerful economic and political interests have established their own positions. The result is that in spite of efforts of international financial institutions, governments, and regulatory staffers worldwide to create independent regulatory agencies, many of these agencies are severely constrained in their ability to function effectively. Using unprecedented access to individuals working at the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI), this study will show that regulatory staffers are constantly struggling to make and maintain their position, define their role, and keep their agency going.
    [Show full text]
  • Civil Service Reform, Self-Selection, and Bureaucratic Performance
    Civil Service Reform, Self-Selection, and Bureaucratic Performance Daniel Gibbs∗ April 22, 2019 Abstract I use a formal model to analyze the effect of civil service protections on bureau- cratic performance. In a repeated two-period model, a public manager observes a bureaucrat's actions for a period and decides whether to retain or attempt to remove the bureaucrat. Bureaucrats vary in terms of their intrinsic motivation and choose between careers in government or the private sector. I show that bureaucratic perfor- mance is greater in any equilibrium in which motivated bureaucrats choose government than in all equilibria in which they do not. Stronger civil service protections reduce the amount of effort that motivated bureaucrats must exert to distinguish themselves from their unmotivated peers in order to ensure retention. This strengthens incentives for motivated bureaucrats to choose careers in government. Stronger civil service pro- tections, however, also reduce the ability of public managers to remove unmotivated bureaucrats. These competing effects yield a non-monotonic and discontinuous rela- tionship between civil service protections and bureaucratic performance. This main result explains inconsistencies in the empirical literature on civil service reform. I use the model to analyze recent reforms to U.S. state and federal personnel management that have significantly rolled back traditional job protections. Keywords: bureaucracy, civil service, public service motivation JEL Classification: D73, H11, M59, J24 ∗Ph.D. Candidate, Department of Politics, Princeton University. Email [email protected]. I thank Charles Cameron, Brendan Cooley, Matias Iaryczower, Janet Kohlhase, Nolan McCarty, seminar participants at the Princeton University Political Economy Colloquium, and conference participants at the 2019 Emory Conference on Institutions and Lawmaking and 2019 Annual Meetings of the Public Choice Society for helpful comments.
    [Show full text]