Enhancing the Efficacy of Teacher Incentives through Framing: A Field Experiment* Roland G. Fryer, Jr. Harvard University Steven D. Levitt The University of Chicago John List The University of Chicago Sally Sadoff UC San Diego April, 2018 Abstract In a field experiment, we provide financial incentives to teachers framed either as gains, received at the end of the year, or as losses, in which teachers receive upfront bonuses that must be paid back if their students do not improve sufficiently. Pooling two waves of the experiment, loss-framed incentives improve math achievement by an estimated 0.124 standard deviations (σ) with large effects in the first wave and no effects in the second wave. Effects for gain framed incentives are smaller and not statistically significant, approximately 0.051σ. We find suggestive evidence that effects on teacher value added persist post-treatment. * Fryer: Harvard University, 1805 Cambridge Street, Cambridge, MA, 02138;
[email protected]. Levitt: University of Chicago, 5807 S Woodlawn Avenue, Chicago, IL 60637;
[email protected]. List: 5757 S. University Avenue, Chicago, IL 60637;
[email protected]. Sadoff: UC San Diego, 9500 Gilman Drive, La Jolla, CA 92093;
[email protected]. We are grateful to Tom Amadio and the Chicago Heights teachers’ union for their support in conducting our experiment. Eszter Czibor, Jonathan Davis, Matt Davis, Sean Golden, William Murdock III, Phuong Ta and Wooju Lee provided exceptional research assistance. Financial support from the Kenneth and Anne Griffin Foundation is gratefully acknowledged. The research was conducted with approval from the University of Chicago Institutional Review Board. Please direct correspondence to Sally Sadoff:
[email protected].