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National Parliamentary Scrutiny Over EU Issues : Comparing the Goals and Methods of Governing and Opposition Parties Ronald Holzhacker European Union Politics 2002 3: 459 DOI: 10.1177/1465116502003004004
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European Union Politics National Parliamentary [1465-1165(200212)3:4] Volume 3 (4): 459–479: 028520 Scrutiny over EU Issues Copyright© 2002 SAGE Publications Comparing the Goals and Methods of London, Thousand Oaks CA, Governing and Opposition Parties New Delhi
Ronald Holzhacker University of Twente, The Netherlands
ABSTRACT
This article compares national parliamentary scrutiny over European Union matters in two countries with coalition governments, Germany and the Netherlands, based on inter- views with members of parliament serving on their Euro- pean Affairs Committee. While acknowledging that legal powers and institutional structures are important when evaluating parliamentary–government relations, the examin- ation focuses on the goals and methods of party groups when overseeing government. In Germany, the goal of the governing coalition parties is to protect the government, whereas in the Netherlands they scrutinize the government’s position in order to be sure the compromise in the cabinet sufficiently protects the party’s interests. Although the Dutch governing parties normally support the government, a ‘float- ing coalition’ occasionally emerges with ruling parties working with parts of the opposition to amend a proposal toward their own preferences. The study concludes that it is not only the legal powers and institutional structures that determine parliamentary scrutiny in a given member state, KEY WORDS but also party interactions.