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Rapport D'observation Du Procès « Chebeya & Bazana » En Première Instance Devant La Cour Militaire De Kinshasa-Gombe (

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Rapport D'observation Du Procès « Chebeya & Bazana » En Première Instance Devant La Cour Militaire De Kinshasa-Gombe ( International Protection Rapport d’observation du procès « Chebeya & Bazana » en première instance devant la Cour militaire de Kinshasa-Gombe (R.D.Congo) Protection International aisbl 11 rue de la Linière – 1060 Bruxelles – Belgique Tél : + 32 (2) 609 44 09 ou 05 Fax : +32 (2) 609 44 06 [email protected] www.protectioninternational.org Auteurs : Sophie Roudil et Gaëlle Perrier, www.protectionline.org en étroite collaboration avec l’équipe Site internet sur la protection des Défenseurs des Droits Humains de Protection International en RDC Rapport d’observation du procès Chebeya-Bazana, R.D. Congo A la mémoire de Floribert Chebeya et Fidèle Bazana Enterrement de Floribert Chebeya Epouse de Fidèle Bazana devant le portrait de son mari Floribert Chebeya Fidèle Bazana à la manifestation à Kinshasa du 31 juillet 2007 contre l’impunité dans le dossier Pascal Kabungulu (Pascal Kabungulu, DDH, a été assassiné à Bukavu le 31 juillet 2005. Le procès est toujours bloqué à ce jour) Remerciements PI remercie les nombreux acteurs (défenseurs des droits humains, juristes congolais et interna- Publié par : Protection International aisbl, tionaux) qui ont contribué à la réflexion, partagé leurs connaissances et leur expérience et mis Rue de la Linière, 11 B-1060 Bruxelles, Belgique à disposition leur documentation. Date : Novembre 2011 PI remercie toutes les institutions, Ambassades, MONUSCO, ONG locales et internationales Supervision: Sophie Roudil qui se sont mobilisées sur ce dossier. Ecriture : Sophie Roudil et Gaëlle Perrier PI remercie ses bailleurs de fonds pour leur soutien, sans lequel cette mission d’observation et ce rapport n’auraient pas été possibles. Travail de terrain (observation, recherches, enquête) : Ilaria Allegrozzi, Evert Kets, Jean-Michel Mirindi, Félix Mukwandja, Gaëlle Perrier, Benoît Van Maele Photographies : Ilaria Allegrozzi, Benoît Van Maele, Sophie Roudil Infographie : Mireille Findelair Ce rapport peut être cité ou reproduit dès lors que la source et les auteurs sont mentionnés. Il peut être téléchargé gratuitement depuis www.protectionline.org Photo de couverture : Audience de la Cour militaire de Kinshasa-Gombe Avertissement : dans le procès Chebeya-Bazana Le contenu de ce rapport relève de la seule responsabilité de PI et ne reflète pas Photo de 4ème de couverture : nécessairement le point de vue des bailleurs de fonds. La tombe de Floribert Chebeya à Kinshasa Rapport d’observation du procès « Chebeya - Bazana » en première instance devant la Cour militaire de Kinshasa-Gombe (République Démocratique du Congo) Auteurs : Sophie Roudil et Gaëlle Perrier, en étroite collaboration avec l’équipe de Protection International en RDC PANTONE 144 Rapport d’observation du procès « Chebeya - Bazana » R.D. Congo, Protection International, Novembre 2011 1 Table des matières Abréviations et acronymes ...................................................................................................... 4 1. Introduction générale .......................................................................................................... 5 1-1 Objectifs et méthodologie de l’observation du procès ............................................... 5 1-1-1 Objectifs de l’observation ...................................................................................... 5 1-1-2 Méthodologie .......................................................................................................... 6 1-2 Rappel succinct du cadre juridique de l’observation des procès.............................. 6 1-3 Contexte de l’affaire : la situation des défenseurs des droits humains en RDC...... 9 1-4 Présentation de l’affaire « Chebeya - Bazana » ....................................................... 10 1-4-1 Parcours professionnel de Floribert Chebeya et incidents de sécurité antérieurs . ........................................................................................................................................ 10 1-4-2 Les faits................................................................................................................. 13 1-4-3 Les réactions suite à l’assassinat, y compris des autorités congolaises ............. 15 2. Rapport d’observation du procès en première instance devant la Cour militaire ....... 17 2-1 Procédure ..................................................................................................................... 17 2-1-1 Parties en présence et chefs d’accusation ........................................................... 17 2-1-2 Décision de la Cour .............................................................................................. 18 2-2 Climat et aspects de sécurité ...................................................................................... 20 2-3 Analyse de la procédure de première instance et de l’arrêt de la Cour militaire du 23 juin 2011 ................................................................................................................... 23 2-3-1 Points positifs ....................................................................................................... 23 2-3-1-1 Attention de la communauté internationale .................................................. 23 2-3-1-2 Tenue d’un procès et décision de la Cour longuement motivée ................... 24 2-3-1-3 Réalisation d’une autopsie avec le concours d’un expert néerlandais........ 25 2-3-1-4 Condamnation de haut gradés de la police nationale................................... 25 2-3-1-5 Reconnaissance de la responsabilité de l’Etat du fait des actes de ses policiers .................................................................................................................... 26 Rapport d’observation du procès « Chebeya - Bazana » R.D. Congo, Protection International, Novembre 2011 2 2-3-2 Points négatifs ...................................................................................................... 27 2-3-2-1 Points négatifs concernant l’enquête ........................................................ 27 2-3-2-1-1 Absence d’investigations approfondies sur certains points clefs ............ 27 2-3-2-1-2 Disparition d’objets placés sous scellés ................................................... 27 2-3-2-1-3 Absence de suites données à la plainte de la veuve Chebeya à l’encontre du Général John Numbi ........................................................................................... 28 2-3-2-1-4 Absence de poursuites à l’encontre du Général Jean de Dieu Oleko..... 28 2-3-2-2 Points négatifs concernant le procès ......................................................... 29 2-3-2-2-1 Sur la compétence de la juridiction ......................................................... 29 23221-1 Incompétence d’une juridiction militaire pour statuer sur des infractions de droit commun et violations graves des droits humains ......................................... 29 23221-2 Composition des juridictions militaires et principe d’indépendance des magistrats ............................................................................................................ 29 23221-3 Absence de saisine d’une juridiction habilitée à juger des généraux ......... 30 2-3-2-2-2 Sur la procédure ....................................................................................... 30 23222-1 Confusion autour de la saisine de la Cour .................................................. 30 23222-2 Refus arbitraire de la Cour d’explorer certaines pistes crédibles .............. 31 23222-3 Disparition d’objets placés sous scellés et levée des scellés ....................... 32 23222-4 Non respect des règles d’isolement à l’audience des « renseignants » ....... 32 23222-5 Absence d’interprètes indépendants ............................................................ 32 23222-6 Témoins entendus par la Cour sans prestation de serment, à titre de « renseignants » .......................................................................................... 33 23222-7 Absence de poursuites à l’encontre de « renseignants » pour fausses déclarations ................................................................................................... 34 23222-8 Absence de mesures prises par les autorités et la Cour pour appréhender un prévenu en fuite ..................................................................................................... 34 23222-9 Refus de la Cour d’accorder une protection à un « renseignant » clef ayant reçu des menaces de mort ......................................................................... 34 23222-10 Débats sur une possible requalification des faits et vices de procédure .............................................................................................................. 35 23222-11 Violation du droit à la vie .......................................................................... 36 2-3-2-2-3 Autres dysfonctionnements ...................................................................... 37 2-4 Recours et perspectives .............................................................................................. 38 2-5 Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 38 3. Recommandations .............................................................................................................. 40 Annexe : le droit à la vie en droit congolais ........................................................................ 43 Bibliographie ........................................................................................................................
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