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96 Report Stockley Leadership of Charles Kennedy fearful that the party might split over a major policy or strategic issue and that Report this sense of risk held him back from try- ing to seize some of the political oppor- tunities that presented themselves to the The leadership of Charles Kennedy Liberal Democrats during his time as leader. Once the party’s response to the Evening meeting of the Liberal Democrat History Group, 3 July 2017 Iraq War started to consume his lead- with Greg Hurst and Lord Newby; chair: Baroness Lindsay Northover ership, Charles had, Hurst said, ruled through a clique of people whom he ‘felt Report by Neil Stockley comfortable with’. Hurst charged that although Charles harles Kennedy, one of the his criticisms of the war were subse- got the big calls right, as on Iraq, he was best-loved politicians of modern quently vindicated. bad at party management and reluc- Ctimes, led the Liberal Demo- Hurst contended that Charles was the tant to take decisions. Hurst instanced crats to their greatest electoral triumphs. UK’s first modern ‘anti-politician’. He Charles’s reshuffles of his party spokes- But his leadership ended ignominiously recalled that many people felt they knew people (‘always a mess’) and the way he in January 2006, when he was forced Charles personally, and when he died, handled the appointments of new Lib- to resign by the party’s MPs. After his they felt a genuine sense of loss. Hurst eral Democrat peers. Hurst described death, in June 2015, he was mourned observed that, in conveying a sense of Charles as an intuitive politician who deeply by the party he once led. At ‘authenticity’, Charles was the forerun- watched and waited and ‘sat on the fence the History Group’s summer meeting, ner for successful ‘anti-politicians’ from as long as he could’ before taking stances. Greg Hurst, a senior journalist for The other parties, such as Boris Johnson, He claimed that the only time Charles Times and author of Charles Kennedy: Nigel Farage and Jeremy Corbyn. (This led his team from the front was during A Tragic Flaw, and Lord (Dick) Newby, legacy was also ironic, Hurst reminded the Iraq debates. who served as Charles’s chief of staff, us, because Charles had been a politi- On each of these points, Dick Newby assessed his achievements as leader, and cian for almost all his adult life. His only provided valuable context and insights, his weaknesses. job before becoming an MP, at the age without falling into the trap of acting Both speakers agreed that Charles of 23, was a brief internship at Radio as defence counsel for Charles. He con- accomplished a great deal. The most sig- Highland.) As Dick Newby put it, ‘peo- tended, for example, that a ‘lack of total nificant achievement was that in 2005, ple liked Charles, journalists liked him application to policy’ might explain under his stewardship, the Liberal Dem- … by and large, audiences liked him’. Charles’s reliance on a small clique. ocrats won sixty-two seats and 22 per He recounted how, during the 2005 gen- Newby recalled that early his leadership, cent of the vote. It was the best perfor- eral election campaign, a Question Time Charles had tried to consult and involve mance by any third party since the 1920s. audience applauded Charles as soon as larger numbers of people over strategic Both recalled that many commentators he entered the studio. Newby argued, and tactical matters. Over time, how- – not least within the party – claimed correctly in my view, that these three ever, these arrangements had proved that the Liberal Democrats should have achievements were all connected and unworkable. Newby argued that, in any done even better, given the unpopularity that the party’s strong showing in 2005 case, Charles’s eventual move to narrow of both Tony Blair’s Labour government was based on Charles’s likeable, down- down his range of confidants and advis- and Michael Howard’s Conservative to-earth persona and the position he ers was characteristic of nearly all politi- Party. Dick Newby acknowledged this took on the Iraq War. cal leaders. point of view, but also drew some know- Without detracting from these Newby agreed that Charles was ing chuckles when he reflected dryly achievements, the meeting considered in always more interested in process – the that ‘in retrospect, it doesn’t seem such more detail Charles’s failings and short- retail side of politics – than in the details a disastrous performance’. We must comings as leader. Greg Hurst stressed of policy. He did not arrive at the lead- now compare the party’s results under that he was well-disposed towards ership armed with a personal manifesto Charles with its dismal showings in 2015 Charles but pulled no punches as he for the Liberal Democrats. Even so, as and 2017. shone new light on a familiar criticism Newby reminded the audience, one of In 2003, he led the party to oppose of the Kennedy leadership: that he failed Charles’s main political strengths was Britain’s participation in the war with to provide a clear direction for Liberal his ability to ‘sniff the wind’, to see the Iraq. Hurst recounted that Charles was Democrat strategy and policy. For a political consequences of any event and able to bridge the differences within programmatic party, that aims to break anticipate how the story would play the Liberal Democrats between its through the two-party duopoly, this is a out. This strength was to prove invalu- ‘pacifists’ and those who, for vari- serious charge. And, in the latter period able, not least during the debates over ous reasons, were uneasy with oppos- of his leadership, a feeling pervaded the Iraq. Responding to questions, Newby ing a British military action. Newby party that it should have been perform- acknowledged Lord Rennard’s sug- believed that the way Charles articu- ing more strongly. gestion that a complementary strength lated the party’s stance made many Hurst described Charles as uninter- was the ease with which Charles han- people feel comfortable about express- ested in policy, much to his colleagues’ dled his television appearances and ing their own opposition to the war, frustration, and – importantly for a lib- that he had a special gift for articulat- including by joining the march in Lon- eral leader – a ‘cautious man, not a radi- ing ‘values’ rather than policies. Newby don of February 2003. And, of course, cal’. He believed that Charles was always described these values in broad if not 48 Journal of Liberal History 96 Autumn 2017 Report: The Leadership of Charles Kennedy vague terms: ‘Europe’ and ‘social justice’, along with an ‘ancillary’ concern for the environment. People liked Charles, Newby stressed, because he articulated these themes with such sincerity and conviction. Newby also offered some interest- ing personal recollections. Yes, Charles was somewhat cautious and may not have appeared especially radical, but he was also very anti-establishment in his outlook. He was never taken in by the cosy meetings with Tony Blair at Num- ber Ten. And, in contrast to most politi- cians, he was not at all fazed by royalty and ‘just hated absolutely anything that involved dressing up’. But Newby also a made a telling quip that Charles’s cau- ahead with his announcement – but style and effortless ease and never prac- tion may have stemmed from a concern without having Beith on the enquiry. ticed, with the result that his batting that if he tried to boldly lead the party Newby also recalled how Charles average was not as high as it might have in a clear direction, ‘he might lose, and it ‘thrived’ during thirty-six hours of been. ‘Swots’ like Theresa May, by con- wouldn’t be worth it’. parliamentary ping-pong over control trast, lacked imagination and charisma. It was over Charles’s effectiveness as orders and that he was ‘in his element’ as This argument had its attractions, but a decision-maker that the two speak- he negotiated with Blair and Howard. became less convincing as the meeting ers differed most clearly. Picking up on When responding to questions from progressed. Later, Newby explained Hurst’s claim that Charles tended to sit members of the audience, Hurst cast how Charles’s brilliance as a debater on the fence as long as possible, Dick some doubt on Newby’s suggestions. went back to his student days, when he Newby pointed to important situations He believed, for instance, that Charles developed a capacity to perform well in which he took tough, fateful deci- had decided to join the anti-war march with little or no advance preparation. sions, within tight timeframes. Two of because he came under considerable pres- He told some wonderful stories of how these concerned the Iraq War. Charles sure to do during a lunch with Guard- he ‘busked it’ as a party spokesperson for came under considerable pressure from ian leader writers. Similarly, Charles various portfolios in the 1980s and 1990s. within the Liberal Democrats to take had refused to countenance any Liberal But Dick also remembered how Charles an official, leading role in the February Democrat participation in the Butler was finally ‘found out’ at the launch of 2003 march against the war. The party Review only because he was backed the 2005 Liberal Democrat manifesto hierarchy was, however, scathing about into a corner by Blair’s timing of the when, underprepared (as well as recover- any such suggestion. Charles ‘thought it announcement. ing from the birth of his son and a hang- through’, Newby said, and led thousands The speakers were at their most over), he was unable to explain how the of Liberal Democrats to take part in the insightful when they assessed the weak- party’s local income tax proposals would march, and then addressed the half-mil- nesses in Charles’s character that made work.
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