fearful that the party might split over a major policy or strategic issue and that Report this sense of risk held him back from try- ing to seize some of the political oppor- tunities that presented themselves to the The leadership of Charles Kennedy Liberal Democrats during his time as leader. Once the party’s response to the Evening meeting of the Liberal Democrat History Group, 3 July 2017 Iraq War started to consume his lead- with Greg Hurst and Lord Newby; chair: Baroness Lindsay Northover ership, Charles had, Hurst said, ruled through a clique of people whom he ‘felt Report by Neil Stockley comfortable with’. Hurst charged that although Charles harles Kennedy, one of the his criticisms of the war were subse- got the big calls right, as on Iraq, he was best-loved politicians of modern quently vindicated. bad at party management and reluc- Ctimes, led the Liberal Demo- Hurst contended that Charles was the tant to take decisions. Hurst instanced crats to their greatest electoral triumphs. UK’s first modern ‘anti-politician’. He Charles’s reshuffles of his party spokes- But his leadership ended ignominiously recalled that many people felt they knew people (‘always a mess’) and the way he in January 2006, when he was forced Charles personally, and when he died, handled the appointments of new Lib- to resign by the party’s MPs. After his they felt a genuine sense of loss. Hurst eral Democrat peers. Hurst described death, in June 2015, he was mourned observed that, in conveying a sense of Charles as an intuitive politician who deeply by the party he once led. At ‘authenticity’, Charles was the forerun- watched and waited and ‘sat on the fence the History Group’s summer meeting, ner for successful ‘anti-politicians’ from as long as he could’ before taking stances. Greg Hurst, a senior journalist for The other parties, such as Boris Johnson, He claimed that the only time Charles Times and author of Charles Kennedy: Nigel Farage and Jeremy Corbyn. (This led his team from the front was during A Tragic Flaw, and Lord (Dick) Newby, legacy was also ironic, Hurst reminded the Iraq debates. who served as Charles’s chief of staff, us, because Charles had been a politi- On each of these points, Dick Newby assessed his achievements as leader, and cian for almost all his adult life. His only provided valuable context and insights, his weaknesses. job before becoming an MP, at the age without falling into the trap of acting Both speakers agreed that Charles of 23, was a brief internship at Radio as defence counsel for Charles. He con- accomplished a great deal. The most sig- Highland.) As Dick Newby put it, ‘peo- tended, for example, that a ‘lack of total nificant achievement was that in 2005, ple liked Charles, journalists liked him application to policy’ might explain under his stewardship, the Liberal Dem- … by and large, audiences liked him’. Charles’s reliance on a small clique. ocrats won sixty-two seats and 22 per He recounted how, during the 2005 gen- Newby recalled that early his leadership, cent of the vote. It was the best perfor- eral election campaign, a Question Time Charles had tried to consult and involve mance by any third party since the 1920s. audience applauded Charles as soon as larger numbers of people over strategic Both recalled that many commentators he entered the studio. Newby argued, and tactical matters. Over time, how- – not least within the party – claimed correctly in my view, that these three ever, these arrangements had proved that the Liberal Democrats should have achievements were all connected and unworkable. Newby argued that, in any done even better, given the unpopularity that the party’s strong showing in 2005 case, Charles’s eventual move to narrow of both Tony Blair’s Labour government was based on Charles’s likeable, down- down his range of confidants and advis- and Michael Howard’s Conservative to-earth persona and the position he ers was characteristic of nearly all politi- Party. Dick Newby acknowledged this took on the Iraq War. cal leaders. point of view, but also drew some know- Without detracting from these Newby agreed that Charles was ing chuckles when he reflected dryly achievements, the meeting considered in always more interested in process – the that ‘in retrospect, it doesn’t seem such more detail Charles’s failings and short- retail side of politics – than in the details a disastrous performance’. We must comings as leader. Greg Hurst stressed of policy. He did not arrive at the lead- now compare the party’s results under that he was well-disposed towards ership armed with a personal manifesto Charles with its dismal showings in 2015 Charles but pulled no punches as he for the Liberal Democrats. Even so, as and 2017. shone new light on a familiar criticism Newby reminded the audience, one of In 2003, he led the party to oppose of the Kennedy leadership: that he failed Charles’s main political strengths was Britain’s participation in the war with to provide a clear direction for Liberal his ability to ‘sniff the wind’, to see the Iraq. Hurst recounted that Charles was Democrat strategy and policy. For a political consequences of any event and able to bridge the differences within programmatic party, that aims to break anticipate how the story would play the Liberal Democrats between its through the two-party duopoly, this is a out. This strength was to prove invalu- ‘pacifists’ and those who, for vari- serious charge. And, in the latter period able, not least during the debates over ous reasons, were uneasy with oppos- of his leadership, a feeling pervaded the Iraq. Responding to questions, Newby ing a British military action. Newby party that it should have been perform- acknowledged Lord Rennard’s sug- believed that the way Charles articu- ing more strongly. gestion that a complementary strength lated the party’s stance made many Hurst described Charles as uninter- was the ease with which Charles han- people feel comfortable about express- ested in policy, much to his colleagues’ dled his television appearances and ing their own opposition to the war, frustration, and – importantly for a lib- that he had a special gift for articulat- including by joining the march in Lon- eral leader – a ‘cautious man, not a radi- ing ‘values’ rather than policies. Newby don of February 2003. And, of course, cal’. He believed that Charles was always described these values in broad if not

48 Journal of Liberal History 96 Autumn 2017 Report: The Leadership of Charles Kennedy vague terms: ‘Europe’ and ‘social justice’, along with an ‘ancillary’ concern for the environment. People liked Charles, Newby stressed, because he articulated these themes with such sincerity and conviction. Newby also offered some interest- ing personal recollections. Yes, Charles was somewhat cautious and may not have appeared especially radical, but he was also very anti-establishment in his outlook. He was never taken in by the cosy meetings with Tony Blair at Num- ber Ten. And, in contrast to most politi- cians, he was not at all fazed by royalty and ‘just hated absolutely anything that involved dressing up’. But Newby also a made a telling quip that Charles’s cau- ahead with his announcement – but style and effortless ease and never prac- tion may have stemmed from a concern without having Beith on the enquiry. ticed, with the result that his batting that if he tried to boldly lead the party Newby also recalled how Charles average was not as high as it might have in a clear direction, ‘he might lose, and it ‘thrived’ during thirty-six hours of been. ‘Swots’ like Theresa May, by con- wouldn’t be worth it’. parliamentary ping-pong over control trast, lacked imagination and charisma. It was over Charles’s effectiveness as orders and that he was ‘in his element’ as This argument had its attractions, but a decision-maker that the two speak- he negotiated with Blair and Howard. became less convincing as the meeting ers differed most clearly. Picking up on When responding to questions from progressed. Later, Newby explained Hurst’s claim that Charles tended to sit members of the audience, Hurst cast how Charles’s brilliance as a debater on the fence as long as possible, Dick some doubt on Newby’s suggestions. went back to his student days, when he Newby pointed to important situations He believed, for instance, that Charles developed a capacity to perform well in which he took tough, fateful deci- had decided to join the anti-war march with little or no advance preparation. sions, within tight timeframes. Two of because he came under considerable pres- He told some wonderful stories of how these concerned the Iraq War. Charles sure to do during a lunch with Guard- he ‘busked it’ as a party spokesperson for came under considerable pressure from ian leader writers. Similarly, Charles various portfolios in the 1980s and 1990s. within the Liberal Democrats to take had refused to countenance any Liberal But Dick also remembered how Charles an official, leading role in the February Democrat participation in the Butler was finally ‘found out’ at the launch of 2003 march against the war. The party Review only because he was backed the 2005 Liberal Democrat manifesto hierarchy was, however, scathing about into a corner by Blair’s timing of the when, underprepared (as well as recover- any such suggestion. Charles ‘thought it announcement. ing from the birth of his son and a hang- through’, Newby said, and led thousands The speakers were at their most over), he was unable to explain how the of Liberal Democrats to take part in the insightful when they assessed the weak- party’s local income tax proposals would march, and then addressed the half-mil- nesses in Charles’s character that made work. ‘He let the party down really seri- lion strong crowd in Hyde Park. Newby, him a less effective leader than he might ously,’ Dick acknowledged. correctly, reminded us more than once have been. In his opening remarks, Greg The two speakers came closer still to how much political courage Charles Hurst charged that Charles was lazy. He a compelling explanation of what held showed – Labour and Conservative suggested that having entered the Com- Charles back when they agreed that he MPs savagely heckled his speeches in the mons at such a young age, Charles had lacked self-confidence and belief in him- Commons debates on Iraq and he was never really had to do the ‘hard yards’ self. Here, they offered some poignant called ‘Charlie Chamberlain’– and how of politics. Later, responding to ques- anecdotes. Greg Hurst recalled accompa- he anticipated successfully the difficult tions from the audience, Hurst argued nying Charles to a school in his constitu- questions and challenges that his col- that the party leadership had ‘fallen into ency, with the chair of the local party. leagues would face during the debates. Charles’s lap’ in 1999 and that, in seek- Charles made a speech to the students, In February 2004, the prime minister, ing the position, he was largely respond- and was brilliant, Hurst said. But after- Tony Blair, phoned Charles to inform ing to the long-standing expectations of wards he turned to his party colleague him that he would, within a matter of many people around him that he would and asked, nervously, ‘Did I do OK?’ hours, be formally announcing that he succeed Paddy Ashdown. He did not Dick Newby recalled visiting the leader was setting up the Review into Intel- have to fight especially hard for the job at his constituency home in the High- ligence on Weapons of Mass Destruc- and nor did he demonstrate ‘a burning lands. Charles pointed out the cemetery tion – the Butler Review, as it came to passion’ for it. near his family home, to show where he be known. Blair intended to say that Dick Newby agreed that Charles was would be buried one day and then asked, Alan Beith, a senior Liberal Democrat intellectually lazy but went on to sug- ‘Will they forget about me?’ MP, would be a member of the enquiry. gest that it may in fact have been part of Dick Newby finally pointed out the Charles objected immediately that the his political strength. Here, he drew a proverbial elephant in the room when terms of reference were too narrow and cricketing analogy with David Gower, he reminded the audience of one further ‘would not do’. The prime minister went a left-handed batsman who played with weakness: Charles was an alcoholic.

Journal of Liberal History 96 Autumn 2017 49 Report: The Leadership of Charles Kennedy

Newby believed that this addiction of his leadership. Duncan Brack asked would have foreseen that Labour would was the root of his other shortcom- whether Charles would have lasted as lose its majority in 2010, leaving the Lib- ings. ‘At times, he was incapable of leader had the Iraq War not come along eral Democrats holding the balance of cogent thought, meaning that a cer- in 2003, given his lack of a ‘burning power. Then, he would not have gone tain amount of laziness was inevitable.’ agenda’ and reluctance to take decisions. into coalition with the Conservatives, It was a serious problem, which Dick Newby thought that, despite his worsen- instead opting for a ‘confidence and sup- and his colleagues spent a great deal ing symptoms of alcoholism, it was ‘not ply’ agreement of some sort. Charles of time mitigating. Newby revealed inevitable’ that he would have departed would also have been thinking about how he and his colleagues became fast the leadership before 2005, given his ensuring the party’s position in the fol- experts in explaining to colleagues and strong performance in the 2001 general lowing general election, which Nick the media illnesses that had no visible election campaign. Dick was sure that he Clegg did not seem to have considered to symptoms and from which it was possi- was still ‘head and shoulders above eve- any great degree, Hurst argued. This was ble to recover quickly. The effort spent ryone else’. Hurst also believed that the all plausible, but such a scenario opens up on such activity diverted their time party would have given Charles the ben- some important and difficult questions. and energy away from more important efit of the doubt. The Liberal Democrats’ Would Charles have tried to deal with work. Given the nature of the malady, net gain of six seats in 2001 had been the Conservatives or with Labour, and Dick reflected, it was ‘amazing that he better than expected, he agreed, and how would he have justified his choice? could perform so well, so often.’ But, Charles had succeeded in dislocating the What would have been his policy ‘red over time, ‘his drinking caught up Liberal Democrats from Blairism, with lines’ when reaching any agreement? with him’ and exacerbated Charles’s remarkably little fuss, thereby ensur- And how would Charles, whose leader- lack of confidence. He recounted how ing the party regained a more independ- ship had blossomed in relatively benign a number of poor public performances ent identity. This meant he would have economic times have handled the grim by Charles led some Liberal Democrat been given ‘time and space’ to develop politics of austerity? MPs to complain to Newby and his col- his leadership. But Hurst acknowledged We will never know the answers to league, Anna Werrin. Many times, they freely that he did not know how Charles those questions. But it was hard to escape promised to take action, but the situa- would have used such an opportunity. the conclusion that Charles Kennedy was tion was not resolved and by the end of Another audience member asked a good, if flawed, man whose legacy was 2005, their assurances that was a solu- what might have happened had Charles a positive one; and that for all the trauma tion was imminent had lost any credi- not been deposed in 2006. Greg Hurst it caused the party, the ending of his bility with the party’s parliamentarians. replied that he would have gone on leadership came at just the right time. The game was up. to prepare the Liberal Democrats for The answers to two intriguing opposition, rather than for govern- Neil Stockley is a member of the Liberal Dem- ‘what ifs?’ underlined both Charles’s ment. With his remarkable ability to ocrat History Group executive committee. strengths, and the inherent weaknesses see around corners, Hurst argued, he

A Lloyd George Society evening meeting, supported by LD Friends of Israel The Balfour Declaration of November 1917 In a letter dated 2 November 1917, Arthur Balfour, the Foreign Secretary in the Coalition Government of David Lloyd George, announced British government support for a ‘national home’ for the Jewish people, to be established in Palestine, then still part of the Ottoman Empire. The letter was sent to Lord Walter Rothschild, a leader of the British Jewish community, to be forwarded to the Zionist Federation of Great Britain and Ireland. The text of the declaration was published in the press on 9 November 1917. To mark that centenary, the Lloyd George Society and the Liberal Democrat Friends of Israel are to hold a meeting to look at why the British government agreed to make this announcement at the time and in the way it did; and to examine the international consequences of the Declaration. Speakers: Professor T. G. Otte from the University of East Anglia and Professor Colin Shindler of SOAS, London; Chair: Baroness Sarah Ludford (Vice President, LDFI) Admission is free, all are very welcome. 7.00 – 8.15pm, Monday 6 November 2017 David Lloyd George Room, National Liberal Club, 1 Whitehall Place, London, SW1A 2HE

50 Journal of Liberal History 96 Autumn 2017