CREATING THE CANADIAN STAGE COMPANY:AN ANALYSIS OF THE

MERGER OF TORONTO FREE THEATRE AND CENTRESTAGE COMPANY

A Thesis

Presented to

The Faculty of Graduate Shidies

of University of Guelph

by

ANDREW CHRISTOPHER TRACY

In partial fulfilment of requirements

for the degree of

Master of Arts

August, 1998

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CREATING THE CANADIAN STAGE COWANY: AN ANALYSIS OF THE MERGER OF TORONTO FREE THEATRE AND CENTRESTAGE COMPANY

Andrew Christopher Tracy Advisor: University of Guelph, 1 998 Professor Alan Filewod

This thesis analyses and historicizes the dominant economic and cultural forces, and corporate and personal dispositions, that propeiied Toronto Free Theatre and

CentreStage Company to wards their strategic merger and foundation of the Canadian

Stage Company. Based in the field of cultural production, the study is influenced by the analytical tools of Pierre Bourdieu, and concentrates on the companies' muhial dispositions of culturai and economic growth acting as the driving force behind the creation of Canadian Stage. The murual struggies, serategies and ideologies of Toronto

Free and CentreStage are explored in relation to the establishment of mandates, artistic and corporate leaders and structures. These work to unifv their dissimilar cultures with the goal of creating the major Canadian non-prof3 theatre company. Also examined is the role of the board of directors, who consolidated cultural hegemony and acculturation of corporate over artistic cultures ttnough the forced completion of the integration process. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The patient guidance, fkiendly insights, contributions, and constructive abuse of my advisors, Professon Alan Filewod and Ann Wilson made this project both challenging and rewarding for me personally and academicaily. 1 owe a great deal to

Professors Michael Keefer, Ric Knowles, Harry Lane and Am Winfor their inspiration and expansion of my theoretical base in the pst year. 1 drew inspiration and discipline fkom my students in 3 50- 1000 (Introduction to Theatre) and 04-260

(Communication Skills) as well as my colleagues m this programme, Sheena Albanes,

Marilyn Babineau, Greg Hill, Arnelia Steinbring, and Janos Sagi

1 thank David and Joan Black, Edgar Dobie, Bill Glassco, Katie Hermant- Peter

Herrndorf, Jim Leech, Cathy McKeehan, Lynn Osmond, and Guy Spning, for the generous use of their the, recollections and hospw. Thanks also to the staff of the

Archival Collections, University of Guelph Library for their interest, help and permission to access restricted materials.

Th& are due to my parents, Elwood and Elizabeth, for the obvious and the notable; Alvin Shaw for recognising something of worth; and Buddy Pennington for his lessons in determination,

Foremost, thanks is not suffcient for my de,Ellen, for her long hours of editing, perfect ly timed disuactions and unrelent ing support, generosity and understanding during my research and Wrifing process.

Dedicated to the colo@I mernories of my gran&arents,

Carl und Betty Woodley and John and Elsu Tracy. TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF FIGURES AND TABLES...... V

ME"ïEloDOLOGY: POSmONS AND THE EI!WORY OF DISPOSITIONS ...... 1

CONCEPTWALTOOLS DEFINED...... 2 PRE-HISTORIES:POS~ONS AMI D~SPOS~~IONS...... 5 Centrestage Company...... 8

Toronto Free Theatre ...... ,...... 18

-: -: STAKES AM) mTS...... -...... 0...... 24

CANADIANTHEATRE: A CRITICALMAS s ...... ,., ...... 30 CONVERGENCEOF MARGINS...... 35

BIGGERIS BETTER...... -36

-: -: IMPULSES AND AMBITIONS ...... 42

CULTURALLEADERSHIP AND THECASE OF uC~~~~~~~" ...... 43

ECQNOMICS: A C~CALCONCERN ...... 50 No VACANCY:PLMB~oNs TOWARDS ART CWS ...... 56

INTERESTED AND INFLUENTIAL PEOPLE ...... 60

BUT WAS IT HUMBLE PIE? ...... 66

INTERNALC ULTURAL TENSIONS...... -69 HELD TOGETHERWm BUBBLE Gm AND BAILNG Wm...... 72 RE~PONSLBUITYTAKEN ...... 77

CONCLUSION: ALL ROADS LEAD TO THE MAINSTAGE...... 85 TABLE OF FIGURES AND TABLES

TABLE1 : TORONTOFREE THEATREGROWTH BEXWEEN 198183 AND I 985186 ...... 22

TABLE2: CANADACorna FUNDING Gm TO MEDIUM-SIZED THEATRES l98O/8 1- l989/90 (IN

THOUSANDS)...... 39

Figure 1 :Canada Council Funding as Compared to the National Inflation Rate: 1980i80- PREFACE

The Canadian Stage Company, in reality, masks discordance. It is the product of a merger between Toronto Free Theatre and Centrestage Company, two distinct artistic cultures and supporthg structures comprishg four performance spaces-the Bluma Appel

Theatre in the St. Lawrence Centre, the Theatre Downstairs and Theatre Upstairs at 26

Berkeley Street and High Park, the site for Toronto Free's "Dream in High Park." Ten years &er this merger, the nibnc of founding the Canadian Stage Company, vague on the practicalities of impiementhg the ideals, continues to deheate the founding cultures, purporiing to represent everythiag fkom "mainstream" regional programming to

"aitemative" new play development and fke summer Shakespeare in the park.

This study began as an aoalysis of the reflected hierarchicd, ideo logical and institutional considenitions of the Canadian Stage Company's diverse architectural, social and theatrical contexts. (With such a range in styles and employment of its spaces,

Canadian Stage remains for me a site of untapped theoretical and analyticai possibilities.)

However, as 1 attended Canadian Stage productions in ts various spaces as a graduate teaching assistant in 1997,I discovered 1 shared with many of my students and colleagues the immediate impression and feeling of alienation and discornfort at the Bluma Appel

Theatre, in opposition with exciternent and ease at 26 Berkeley Street. As I began my prebhry research, delvuig into archival materiais, reviews and, most influentidy, attending more performances at each space (save High Park), my attention was once again drawn to the cornplex opposition of styles in the physical spaces and the theatres' programming- Curiosity+nce dem'bed as my "honest puzziement"-established my need to

know why my reception of the Canadian Stage Company varied so, and how these spaces

came under the control of one company. The simple answer-that Centrestage Company and Toronto Free Theatre had merged their resources under the name 'The Canadian

Stage Companyw-fàiled to satisfy me. It instead created more cornplex questions: What made the distinctions between Centrestage and Toronto Free so apparent, even ten years followiog their merger? What idmlogical and theatncal impetus would draw two such distinct companies together? How was the resuiting cdtuddiversity managed in relation to its audience, its artists and fimding agencies? To analyse the company and the merger creating it, I have used these questions to establish a discursive approach, baseci in the field of cultural production which is influenced by the writing of the French theorist

Pierre Bourdieu as my methodological foundation

It is my intention in this thesis to analyse and historicize the forces which led

Centrestage Company and Toronto Free Theatre to mage their resources as the Canadian

Stage Company. This analysis leads into a discussion of the structurally homo logous forces which retarded the fidl integration of the companies' cultures and structures.

These same forces led to a climax and re-direction of the integration process two years later, resdting in the dismissal of Guy Sprung, one of the founding CO-artisticdirectors.

This analysis is divided into four parts, comprising five chapters. 1 begin by briefiy exploring the histories of the two parent companies to determine what Bourdieu refers to as the "history of positions they occupy and the history of their dispositions"

@ourdieu, 'The Field," 61) and the similarities made apparent through the analysis of dominant &ors. These factors iaclude the economic and cuItural stniggles the

vii cornpanies experienced, their founding mandates, cultures and organisational structures,

their relative positions within the funduig agency's constnrcted b'mainstream-altemative"

antithesis, and their strategies of growth.

In the next section, I dedicate two chapters to the dysisof the homo logous

structures of economic and cultural forces and the similarities between CentreStage and

Toronto Free's strategies in the attainment of economic and cultural capital. Chapter

Two concentrates on the extemai forces of the economic and cultural fields, which

includes the "merger mania" of the 1970s and 1980s (Nahavandi 1), the strategies of public fûnding agencies and the commercial theatre impetus that threatened Canadian theatre's swivai. Chapter Three concentrates on the composition of cultural and economic forces acting internally, hcluding theù corporate and artistic cultures, financial struggles, individual ideologies of "Canadian" theatre and positions and habitus of the

leaders of each conipany.

The third section analyses the internal and extemai forces of the ecowmic and cultural fields acting on the process of integrating Toronto Free and CentreStage. In this chapter, 1 concentrate on the conflict which developed between the distinct cultures represented in Canadian Stage, the protective dispositions of each and the position of the integrated board of directors. 1 briefly demonstrate the homo logous effect these forces had on the Canadian Stage Company, restricting the full integration of the two parent cornpanies and moving the dominant corporate culture of the semi-iategrated companies to dismiss Spning.

My atialysis concludes with a brief examination of the economically and cuhurally irnposed completion of the merger between Centrestage and Toronto Free. This includes an exploration of the intentions of the board of directors withBourdieu's

"general science of the economy of practices" (R. Johnson 8), the faazif~cationsof the emergence of a cultural hegemony and the strategic re-focusing of economic and cuitural priorities in answer to the interna1 and extdforces acting upon and shaping the

Canadian Stage Company. 1 Methodology: Positions and the History of Dispositions

1s a theatre company a charitable institution? 1s it a service organization

providing a social service? 1s it a business and should it be nm like one?

The theatre is mt precisely any one of these things aithough it firïfdls each

of these functions. Theatre as an art form has its own particular

requirements. (Canada Councii, "Le théâtre," 38)

To understand the practices of writers and artists, and not least their

products, entails understanding that they are the resuh of the meeting of

two histories: the history of the positions they occupy and the history of

their dispositions. Although position helps to shape dispositions, the

latter, in so far as they are the product of independent conditions, have an

existence and efficacy of their own and can help to shape positions. In no

field is the confkontation between positions and dispositions more

continuous or uncertain than in the Literary and artistic field. (Bourdieu,

"The Field," 61)

On March 22, 1988, a decisive point in Canadian theaire history occurred. This event integrated the histories, positions and dispositions of the "mainstream" and

"establishment" theatre and the "stylish urban" alternative theatre (Johnston 172) of

Toronto's theatre community: Centrestage Company and Toronto Free Theatre merged . . their achmmîmtive structures, personnel (both paid and vohuiteer), mandates, and audiences. The resulting structure, the Canadian Stage Company, is Canada's third iargest nonprofit theatre company, derthe SStratford Festival and the Shaw Festival respectively, in terms of audience size, public fùnding and resources. The reason for this integration was economic and cmas reflected by the rationale: to create a stronger, more fbmcially viable company which wodd combine the "classicaY mainstream traditions and civic responsibilities of CentreStage with the explorative, developmental energy of the Toronto Free" and produce a major new company that wouid commission new Canadian works, translations and adaptations (Canadian Stage "Fact Sheet," 1).

These econornic and cultural forces simultaneously influenced Toronto Free and

CentreStage internally and extemally towards merging and cmtinued to act upon the new company upon integration.

Conceptual Tools Defineci

Contemporary theatre historians have beneMed fkom the contribution of Pierre

Bourdieu. His analyses of cuitural production and his method of analysis have created what Harker, Maha. and Wies refer to as a "general theory of practice" for social sciences in general and cultural production specifically (1). Of great assistance to the theatre historian is the rigid structure of Bourdieu's conceptual apparatus which perds cross-over to many do mains of study in the social sciences, including sociology and economics. The tools of this apparatus, the terms habitus andfield, are supported through the concepts of symbolic power, strategy and struggle and various khds of social capital, including economic, cultural and symbolic (Harker 4). Governed by a "relatively autonomous but structurally homo logous"field (R Johnson 6)-best understood not as a

' For an in depth discussion of Bourdieu's conceptual tools, habitus and field, consult Harker. domah, but as au autommous '%el& of forces" with a hegernonic structure (Harker

8)-these tools translate well into the discourse and dysisof the contemporary theatre

Company-

Agents do not act in a vacuum, but rather in concrete social situations

governeci by a set of objective social rdations. To account for these

situations or contexts, without, again, Falling into the detennuiism of

objectivist andysis, Bourdieu developed the concept of field (champ).

According to Bourdieu's theoretical modei, any social formation is

stntctured by way of a hierarchicdy orgkdseries of fields (the

economic field, the educational field, the political field, the cultural field,

etc.), each defined as a structured space with its own laws of fùnctioning

and its own relations of force independent of those of politics and the

economy, except, obviously, in the cases of the economic and political

fields. Each field is relat ively autonomous but structurally homologous

with the other. Its structure, at any given moment, is determined by the

relations between the positions agents occupy in the field. A field is a

dynamic concept in that a change in agents' positions necessarily entails a

change in the field's structure. @ Johnson 6)

In this theoretical structure, a theatre company is therefore best defïned by the forces acting upon it, including the lack of exact definition. This delineation places the theatre company on the margins of several fields, including corporate, artistic and cultural. The concept of habitus "refers to a set of dispos&ions, created and refomulated through the conjecture of objective structures and personal history" (Harker 10).

Bourdieu formally defines it as a system of

durable, transposable dispositions, stmctured structures predisposed to

fimction as structuring structures, that is, as principles which generate and

organize practices and representations that can be objectively adapted to

theu outcornes without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an

express mastery of the operations necessary in order to attain them

Objectively "regulated" and "regular" without king in any way the

product of obedience to des, they can be coilectively orchestrated

without king the product of the organizing action of a conductor. (The

Loeic, 53)

Through such an analysis, a theatre company cmbe treated as an individual artist, with an individual history, predisposition, culture, and bbconstructedidentity" (DiCenu, 8), formed by its history and field of forces acting upon it. In detemllning the habitus of

Toronto Free and Centrestage, which is demonstrated in the+ actions and organisational structures, one must therefore consider not ody the histories of those people who create the companies (professional or amateur artists, volunteers, paid staff members, etc.), but also the histories of the companies. Every action of the two wqanies-including the decision to integrate their resources as the Candian Stage Company-is detemiined concurrently by the distinctness and semblance of their dispositions (or mandates) and positions in Toronto's theatrical community. Pre-Wstories: Posiüons And DlsposIfions

In the lemainder of this chapter, 1 briefiy analyse Centrestage and Toronto Free in their pre-merger periods to introduce the key piayers of the dyat hand, their habitus, and the respective company 's positions, dispositions and fie~ds.~This analysis dernonstrates that the margins between the two companiesdBerentiated as the "flagship of rnaini;tteam theatre in Toronto" and the "major ahenmtive" theatre in Toronto

(Johoston 169-70-e neither incidental nor accidental, but rather coostnicted by the fields of forces working internally and externaily. Likewise, the paradigm of that whic h divides c'mainstream77and "altemative" is not definitive, but is con~t~ctedthrough a hierarchical need to sepamte positions in temrs of the cultural centre and its -gins.

This damentiation between "mainstrem" and b'alternative"-w hic h uhimat ely is an

Most of the initial conversations and meetings concaning the proposal of merging Centrestage and Toronto Free seem to have been informal and off the record, The archival documentation that does exist only refers briefly to the events leading up to the formal proposai to the boards of directon, glossing over the history of the concept. It is important to note that the Centrestage/

Toronto Fred Canadian Stage Company archival documents, and the recollections of the key figures in the merger, are ofien connadidory and inconclusive in the exactness of fam. As evidenced by the number of distinct histories presented by the key figures of the merger of

Toronto Free and Centrestage, oral history is "shaped by the interests, investments and narrative strategies" of those intentiewed for particular purposes and audiences (Knowles 109), with some based on gossip, others on finance; some objective and others biased and embittaed. Each, however, smes a purpose and coliectively, every account was useful in creating a picm of the events which led to the rnerger of Toronto Free and Centrestage. economic distinction put forward by fruading agencies-is the greatest hierarchicai force acting on Centrestage and Toronto Free in theV respective attainment of distinct, but homologous capital, as outlined by Bourdieu.

While each field Vesents a diversity in forces, defined as ecowmic, cuftinal symblic, academic, and politicai, the structural homology of each field is such that attainment of capital in one field is &en impossible without capital in another. In this case study of the establishment of the Canadian Stage Company, my focus is on the ecmomic and culturai fields and their related capital as dominant integrating forces. The related and corresponding structure of each field is basic, but is best exemplifesl through

Bourdieu's definition of capitai, which includes

materiai things (which can have symbolic value), as well as 'Utouchable"

but culturaliy signincant attriibutes such as prestige, starus and authority

(referred to as symbolic capitai), dong with cultuml capital (defked as

cuihually-valued taste and conmmption patterns). Culhiral capital can

include a broad range of goods such as art, education and fonns of

language. . . . [qhe tenn is extended '?O ail the goods, material and

symbolic, without distinction, that present themselves as rare and worthy

of king sought &er in a particuiar formation" . . . Capital is also seen by

Bourdieu to be a bais of domination [but t is not ahvays recognized by

participants]. (Harker 13)

UnWre Bourdieu's discussion of the "social critique of the judgement of taste"

CDistinction), the cultural debate is no longer one between high (or bourgeois) cubeand low culture. 'lnstead, cultural inquiry has been reconfïgured into apditicarl question about the dynamic relationships among cultural strads and currents" (Morgan Vü).

Bourdieu's concept of commercial versus cultural suffices as a de finition of

"mainstrearu." Replacing 4'eeam'7for "commercial" and ''alternat ive" for

CGc-: CGc-: "

The fiindamental principle of the dfiiences between rinainstrem"]

business and ["alternative"] businesses U to be found once again in the

characteristics of cuhdgoods and of the market on which they are

oEkred. A firm is that much closer to the ["hiainstream"] pole (and,

conversely, that much Merfiom the rakemative"] pole), the more

directly and completely the products it offérs corresponds to a pre-existent

demand, Le. to pre-existent interests in pre-established forms. (Bourdieu,

"The Production," 97)

In short, the perceived demand of a comrnuity dictates the cultural "mainstreamness" of a company's poslion in that community.

This perception is affimed and endorsed by the economic power that

"mainstream" theatres carry. Funding agencies gant more to those who have a greater culrural capital and possibdity for growth, seen as the aitainment of economic captaL

Status is provided in this way through the praises offered by the funding agency, as exemplified by the director's openhg statement in the Ontario Arts Council' s 1984185 annual report:

[The] five major arts institutions: The Canadian Opera Company, The

National Bailet, The Shaw Festival, The Stdord Festival, The Toronto

Symphony . . . have madeand continue to de-an enormous contri'bution to the cuiturai life of Ontario and to the international

recognition of Canadian artistic attainments. . . . We at the Council are

extremely pleased now to be able to provide assistance to them at a level

appropriate to their accomplishments." (5)

CentreStage Company

The foundation of CentreStage Company was based on this perception of

''mahstream/ alternative." Centrestage's establishment was not, as with most theatre companies, prompted by the artistic vision of one or a group of artists, or as a solution to a cultural demand. It was created through a City of Toronto project celebrating Canada's centennial by providing a large-sale, civic theatre cornplex. Under the leadership of

Mavor Moore, the Toronto Arts Foundation was established in 1965 to design, build and manage Toronto's first civic centre for the arts, called the St Lawrence Centre for the

Performing Arts. The Centre's Town Hafl, with approximately 500 seats, opened

FeliNary 2, 1970, foilowed by the nameless, larger theatre, consisting of 850 seats, on

Febniary 26 of that year. Its fÏrst season, held in l97O/7l, corriprised five productions

(four of which were Canadian) and was a financial disappointment. Moore subsequently resigned and Leon Major became general manager of the Centre with "theatrical, musical and cultural activities in its two theatres" (S. Jotnwn, "CentreStage" 85).

Toronto Arts Foundation continued rnanaging the St Lawrence Centre and programming theatre productions in its two theatres und 1973, when the City of Toronto became concerned about the Centre's sizeable debt. Responsibility for prognunming the theatre's season and rnanaging the Centre were then separated, creating two ahogether separate structural entities. The nrst structure managed the theatres in the St . Lawrence Centre on behalf of the City of Toronto; the second structure became its resident theatre company, Toronto Arts Productions. This arrangement was discordant for Toronto Arts

Productions' scheduling because progmmmhg in the larger theatre had to be made mon* if not years, in advance of the season; external bookmg conflicts were cornmon, with next to no possibility for extensions of popular productions.

With its regional programming,3 producing plays such as Arthur Wig Pinero's

Trelawny of the 'Wells ' and Stephen Sondheim's A Funny ïhing Huppened on the Wqv tu the Forum, Toronto Arts Productions was not in cornpetition for audiences attracted to programming Offered at Toronto 's "alternat ive" theatres. Similarly, the company had no resounding success in attracting the kinds of audiences traditiody attracted to regional programming-the audiences of the Stratford Festival, the Shaw Festival and other arts organisations like the Canadian Opera Company and the Natiooal Ballet. Reflectiog the similarity in their dispositions and audiences, discussions between Toronto Arts

Productions and the Stratford Festival took place between 1979 and 1983 to "'review the mutual advantages of some kind of co-operatiod Mage" (Buchanan 4). It was thought that the union would provide Toronto Arts Productions with Strarford's resources and audience base. Simuhaneously, it wouid expand Stratford fiom its summer festival base and move its opedons uito Toronto, fiom where a great percentage of its audience came. The concept was Wyrejected in 1983 by the Stratford Festival Board of

Governon, who feared losing the Festival's identity and theatrical Unportance, both in

Canada and internaîionally.

' For a definition and history of Canada's regional theatre system, see Czarnecki. In a move to improve the company's image and make up for ''the theatre's iack of sex appeal" (Mallet, "How to turn"), 1982 for Toronto Arts Productions was spem fùndraising and renovating the larger performance space in the St. Lawrence Centre. In

April 1983, a revitaiised vision of Toronto Arts Productions was unveiled, renamed

CentreStage Company. The new company comprised four programmes: CentreStage

Music, CentreStage Forum (a community opinion programme), CentreStage Theatre, and the Hour Company (a children's theatre mmpany inherited fiom the closure of the Crest

Theatre in 1968). in June of that same year, the company's performance space was re- opened and renamed the Bluma Appel Theatre, in recognition of a $600,000 capital fimds gift. The internai structure of the Company was iikewise altered, with the number of members on its board of directors increased fiom 5 to 32, "to meet foreseen needs in one or two areas where we needed extra strength" (Buchaoan 2).

The transitions over the course of CentreStage's history identlfy a company culture based on change. An analysis of the company's changes, however, demonstrates purely cosmetic and superficial concems: no attempt was made to transform the company through its mandate, its programming or its structure. The company continuecl to program ts season to caier to an established audience of subscribers, and faiied to attract younger audiences. Toronto's theatre scene in 1983/84 was "one of the most interesthg and exciting theatrical seasons in Toronto in recent years" (Crew, "Al1 eyes"), an excitement to which CentreStage did not contribute.

Recognising this, Centrestage's board of directors conducted a role study between

1983 and 1984 to determine the company's position in the Toronto theatre community and how to proceed. Again, mandate and objective changed very ktk, with only sfight changes in its discourse. Its main goal remained to produce "world-class" theatre as the major 'jxoducer of theatrkal fare dong the lines of an internationai standard" and as one equident in size and quality to the SWord and Shaw festivals4(Centrestage, 'Xole

Study," July 3 1, 1984). The weaknesses of the company-identified by the role study cornmittee as including its directors, piaywrights, marketing, community support, and image-restricted the attainment of these goals.

Centrestage's disposition of contrast between transition and preservat ion stemmed fiom discordance between the enacted mandate and feelings sked by its critics tbat the company was not nitficiently open to the growing excitement in Toronto's theatre community. Actor Donald Davis, who founded the Crest Theatre, and who served for many years on the Toronto Arts/ Centrestage board, voiced a prophetic observation in a policy cornmittee meeting in 1983:

1 think tenns such as world-class are misleadhg and ultimately

obstructive. It reflects our (Le. Canadian) punishing pre-occupation with

the supeiiority of imports over the domestic product. As it is, far too

4 Wallace notes in "Getting Tough" that the Stratford and Shaw fstivals produce "the largest arnount of professional theatre in Ontario outside of Toronto, and combined . . . command the lion's share of both govenunent and corporate subsidy. In effect, they not only reflect prevailing audience interests, they help to shape them; and in doing so, they reveal (and constmct) the types of theatre most appealing to commercial sponsors. Consequently, the province's larger theatres-in particular, the National Arts Centre in Ottawa and Toronto's Centrestage

Company-must pay attention to the festivals' fortune, for they an a bell-wether of theu own"

(98-9). rnany of our playwrights feel compelled to aim for the possible New York

production and fail in the process. 1 promise you if we can truiy galvanize

the Toronto audience, our repididion ekwhere is assureci. . . . 1 believe . . .

we should actively cultivate our ünks with 0thToronto producing

theatre~particularlythose companies which are showcasing the work of

native playwrights andlor experimental and innovative work . . . theatres,

such as Tarragon, which have a trainhg aspect to them. (1-4)

Centrestage's subsequent changes were insigmîic~and its direction fleeting. In

1983, the company changed its leadership fiom "Artistic Director" to "Roducer," concentrining on artistic and financiai decisions, wt directhg productions.5 For the position, the board hired Richard ~uzounian,~praised for his work at the Manitoba

Theatre Centre, where he turned a defict of $9 1,000 into a surplus of $292,000 and increased su bscript ion nurnbers. Ouzo unian's observations about the audience at

Centrestage demonstrated a keen understanding of its comrnunity:

It's an intelligent audience, but one thaf if it doesn't corne to CentreStage,

it might not wme to theatre at all. 1don't think I'm competing with the

other theatres for audiences as much as establishment arts companies nich

' This move fkom artistic director to produca reflects the influence of other regional theatres that were doing the same. "D. Michael Dobbin and Andis Celms have been named producers at

Alberta Theatre Projects and the National Arts Centre, respectively. Mr. Ouzounian's oew position as produca at Toronto's Centrestage Productions [sic] is not an isolated case in

Canadian theatre" (Ouzounian 9).

Replacing Eddie Gilbert, who had replaced Leon Major as artistic direaor in 1980. as the Toronto Symphony and the Canadian Opera Company. The people

who corne here are fiom a certain socio-economic fkamework and they

like challenge, but they don't like exknsive nudity or profanj.. There are

certain things you don't discuss with your mther; that's the andogy I

have to keep in mind. (qtd. in GocEey)

Comprishg more than L 7,000 affluent subscribers, this audience deminded a conservative regional programming consisting of a "pre-packaged" selection of West- end, Broadway, and classical productions. The "mainstreamness" of this audience reflects the work of the company's marketing department rather than a reflection of its mandate.

Other regional theatres niil and recover, but they do not fàil in so merciles

a spotlight. Under Major, [Toronto Arts Productions] became something

of a scmdal: a laughing stock and a bore. But subscribers stdi signed on,

not so much out of enthusiasm but because TAP was marketed skillfully

and overwhelmingly. Today, it is reckoned that Centrestage spends 25

percent of its budget recnllting subscribers. The result is not an eager,

alert audience, ready for risks and excited by challenge. it is a pre-

packaged audience, brought into the theatre by apathy and an inab* to

reject a sales pitch. (Mallet, "The St. Lawmce" 30)

Ray Codogue concurred with Mallet, suggesting tht Centrestage and its artistic directorship were "iso lated fiom the rest of the Toronto theatre scene. . . . It rarely produced new work, and never new work which had been developed by other theaires" in Toronto (Conlogue. "Can Glassco"). In short, the cumpany was restricted by its reputation, size and conservative audience core.

In an attempt to increase subscription sales for his first season as Centrestage's producer, Ouzounian prognunmed a season which included two premieres Bemard

SMe's Fatal Attraction and John Murreil's New Wodd, and a production of Noel

Coward's Tonight at 8:30 (the latter two directed by Robin Phillips). Iroaically, given the praise and reputation Ouzounian received for his budgetary work in Manitoh three of his four productions went over budget. Mer a short review of the season, in an attempt to limit the financial expendmues, the board and Ouzounian mutudy decided to

"agree to disagree" (Hermant interview), resulting in his resignation before the conclusion of Centrestage's 1984/85 seasoa7

While the financial difficulties left by Ouu>unian were not totally unmanageable

(the 1984/85 seamn defict was $3 14,296 on August 15,1985), they did contn'bute to the iarger problems that loomed over the company. Most prevalent was the resistance of its cuhetowards the kind of radical change necessary to tum the company around. The company also dered fiom a lack of identity, both internally for its staff and artists and externally for the commun@ of Toronto. Neither its repertoire wr audience was its owq

7 The rationale behind this decision was never disclosed to the public, and with such headlines as

*'Ouzounian tight-lipped about sudden resignation," it is difficult to obtain any more than what was offmeci by the official press release announcing the decision. It is apparent fiom board of directon meeting minutes, however, that the review cornmittee's "purpose . . . was to discuss performance in controlling costs and matters relating directly and indirectly to negotiating production costs" (Centrestage Company "Board of Directon," Feb. 2 1, 1985,2). iaherited fiom its predecessor, Toronto Arts Productions. As a regional theatre, it had no defming fature that represented Toronto and its programming was My indist inguishable f5om other regionai theatres across the corn (Czarnecki 44). Its residency in the Bluma Appel Theatre inhibited distinctiveness: no one attended a show at CentreStage; invariably they went to a night out at the St. Lawrence Centre. Frequent leadership changes in the early 1980s created a sense of uncertainty for both staff and audience alike as to the direction of the company.' AU told, Centrestage's position was that of a fhceless theatre company: t had no experimental stage to produce its own new theatre, it had no control of its performance space, and it owned no rehearsai, workshop, coshime, or publicly accessible office space.

Mer a shoa search process, on March 28, 1985, the CentreStage board of directors voted in favour of hiring Tarragon Theatre founder Bill Glassco as the new artistic director. Glassco 's appointment as "Art ist ic Director," as opposed to "Producer," demonstrateci the respect paid by the board of directors to his position as an experienced director and artistic director while it preserved the company's status quo.

Glassco, unlike fellow applicant Guy Spmg who suggested an

amalgamation of CentreStage with the [Toronto] Free Theatre, did not ask

for major changes. Said bard chairman Bill] Melhuish, "We are plûised

that Bill wishes to remain with things essentially as they are. He won't

Leon Major left in 1980, replaced by Edward Gilbert; Gilbert left soon abthe re-opening of the Bluma Appel, replaced by Ouzounian in 1984; Ouzounian Iefi early in 1985, replaced by Bill

Glassco. corne in as a stonn. We don't see a need for a lot of changes." (Conlogue,

"Glassco aamed")

Althougb Glassco had never run a theatre as large or as "mainstreamT'as CentreStage, he was deterxnined to make adjustments, not in the way things were n

1 was very excited when 1 took it on, because I'd thought 1 can do . . .

something beyond what I'd done at Tarragon. . . . 1 thllik 1 just redy

wanted to create some excitement and make that theatre important to the

city and make it mean something. And right in that very first season,

Edgar [Dobie] and I both realized that the theatre had no identity. Here we

were, we were called CentreStage, but there was CentreStage Music, there

was CentreStage Forum, and there was CentreStage Theatre. We were in

office buildings on Wellington Street, not far fiom the St. Lawrence

Centre. We were playing in the St. Lawrence Centre in the Bluma Appel

Theatre. Who the hell were we? 1 mean, were we CentreStage? were we

the St. Lawrence Centre? were we the Bluma Appel? The public was very

confused. 1 also realized that the theatre didn't really stand for anythmg.

There was no red clear mandate, except to put on plays to satisQ a

subscription audience. . . . There was just a sense that this theatre didn't

have any meanhg . (Glassco, interview)

The appointment of Gksco as Centrestage's aaistic leader symbolically united the divisions between "mauistream" and "alternative" theatres. Giassco was a stmng proponent of the "alternative" theatre movement throughout the 1960s and 1970s, in which numerous theatre companies were established in Toronto. These "aiternative" cornpanies attempted to challenge the "establishment," and "de" tbeatres, provoking thought as well as action. The meaning of the term "alternative" in theatre bas ked over the years and has ken associated with many things, as reflected in Clive Barker's statement that "altemative theatre" in early 1970s England

had political significance across the spectnim of its perfbrmance styles.

Simply by existing it posed critical alternatives to the dominant culture of

the the, tht of the Esîablisbment to which it dehed itself as aitemative.

At the start of the 1990s it would be difficult to make that argument and,

disillusioned by what has happened in the intervening years, some Mers

who wodd have promulgated the earlier argument would probably now

support an opposing view. (18)

In Canada, alternatives to the dominant theatre culture could be found everywhere in the

1960s and 1970s: in church basements, on the streets, or, a popular choice, particularly in

Toronto as manufacturers vacated its downtown core, m renovated warehouses. Som formally established themselves with their own spaces, economic capital, and audience base, while others, the ones most likely to disappear? were itinermt, with no other financial capital than what the members of the Company could provide. In Toronto, companies like Theatre Passe Minaile, Factory Theatre Lab, and Tarragon Theatre, established in the 1960s and early 1970s, made thek impression on Toronto's and

Canada's theaîre scene with innovative new theatre, expressing Canadian points of view and providing a voice for middleclass Canadians not interested in attending regional productions at the St. Lawrence Centre.

Toronto Free Theatre

As an "aheniative" Company, Toronto Free Th- was estabiished in 1971 by three of Canada's most experienced theatre leaders: Tom Hadry, CO-founderof the

Manitoba Theatre Centre, director Martm Kinch, and playwright John Palmer. With

Theatre Passe Muraille, Factory Theatre Lab and Tarragon Theatre, Toronto Free formed an "establishment fringe" of theatre in Toronto to counteract the "mainstream" theatre activity and to anmer the dedof the growing social and cuituai climate of Toronto.

The original mandate provided what was absent in Toronto: These &YS, hstany given Canadian play can get a production. But there is no process of development. The

Factory Theatre Lab deveiops playwrights, the Theatre Passe Muraille develops directors. and we wanted to develop a relationshrp between actor, director and playwright in a resident sense" (Kinch, qtd. in Kareda). Toronto Free ïvouid be fkee both in its admission policy and in the sense of experimentation with, and ideological exploration of, all avenues of theatricai expression, especially those followed by Canadian artists"

(Rudakoff 556).

Unlike most other "aiternative" theatres in the 1970s, Toronto Free was established fÙily grown with paid staff members, actors, and its own theatre Wace at 26

Berkeley Street, formerly the Consumer Gas Company's Gas Pumphg Station 'A' (Quirt

3). A board of directors was in place imrnediately, creating a coprate stmctme similar to that of a ''mainstream" theatre or a corporation. The members of Toronto Free's founding board comisted rnainly of artists and artistic managers, including Hendry, Kinch, and Palmer, as weil as respected fiends and colleagues of the founding tbree.9

This was made possible through public fbnds korn the Local Initiatives Programme

(LIP), a féderal govemment programme which represented a "strategy to reduce unemployment and disaffection among young adults" (Johnston 7). With the LIP grants discontinued in 1973 however, admission prices had to be iostituted, and Toronto Free became &ee in name and ideological exploration alone. The experience of the founding directors, the recognized structure of the company and the economic stability provided by

LIP grants, created a theatre mmpany which could afEord to experhent with

CLniainstrearn" and "alternative" rnargins through Canadian plays. The audience drawn to

Toronto Free's mandate and style-attracted at first by its accessibility-were middle-class students and artists, ofien with leftist leaoings (Black interview).

Ln respoase to poor ticket sales and disappouiting reviews in its 1975/76 season,

Toronto Free endeavoured to recreate itself by renovat ing its pdormance space. In May

1976, the company clo sed its doon and undertook a series of major renovations and expansioII, similar to tho se completed by CentreStage six years later. These renovations provided for larger audiences and aesthetics-what Gina Malet might refer to as %ex appeai"-and reflected a disposlion shared by CentreStage and Toronto Free toward an

Since the foundation of Toronto Free Theatre, the legal composition of a "not-for-profit" organization's board of directon has changed, following an Ontario Supreme Court ruling that no staff member was pemitîed to sit on a non-profit company 's board This mling subsequently changed the composition of a theatre's board of directors. The board became m solely by volunteers, with no direct artistic representation fiom the company (although the artistic director is often invited to attend board meetings as a non-voting member). assumeci "corporate" mode1 of growth ("bigger is better"), working towards the atiainment of economic and cul& capital. The doors to 26 Berkeley Street re-opened in Januaty 1977 with new office spaces and an expanded "Theatre Downstairs" with 225 seats (up fiom 99). Expansion also included a new 125-seat ''Theatre Upstairs" in another building at 26 Berkeley Street, creating a theatrical campus of fàcilities. Joining the two buildings, a glass and steel lobby was buiit to provide audience members with a place to relax before and after the show and to house the box office. Further renovations to the theatres were made in 1982 to again increase the seating capacity of both theatres.

Denis khnston rernarked that these 'tenovations reflected the Free 's cont inuing ambitions toward mainStream status" (195). It is evident from the company' s history that

Toronto Free's ambitions were growth-onented. That Centrestage and Toronto Free shed similar strategies in growth-endeavouring to present theatre productions in aesthetically-pleasing spaces to boost economic and cultural capital-is telling of the similarities in their company dispositions, but should not be confused wÏth the notion of

Toronto Free becoming '"mainstream." Critics Mallet and David McCaughna commented on their perception of Toronto Free's growth parallehg "establishment" theatre at the time of its re-opening: "With its new cornplex and an operating budget of $300,000,

Toronto Free Theatre is stepping fiom the ranks of experimentd theatre into shouting distance of such institutions as the St. Lawrence Centre" (Mallet and McCaughna).

Balancing its production of "alternative" theatre and its disposition of corprate growth, Toronto Free became increasingly aware of the commercial realities of producing theatre in Toronto. The company believed that it had a responsibility and need to consolidate its art into widely-based audience work, presented in a context which "WU aiiow us to develop its commercial possibilities."

The pressure for commercial succes . . . cids into the time available for

exploratory projects; and the production of exploratory work in a

commercial context tends to hamper the ability of the theatre to draw a

widely-based audience for its audience work. To put it simply: t is Wlfair

and ecommically unsound to present laboratory work in a commercial

context; it is equally wrong and economically unsod to present broad-

bascd work in a laboratory context. (Toronto Fr- Theatre, Toncept")

It was believed that with a two-house, bilateral system, a commercial c'alternative"and a developmental "altemative" couid be established under the same roof In creating these spaces, a compromise between the two forces of 'hainstream" tendencies of corporate growth and "alternative7' theatre development would support and feed each other.

While the reality of commercial growth was a necessity to ntnnve, progrdg at Toronto Free remahed in prhciple experimentai, emphasizing the development process adfieedom in terms of the liberty provided for the aitists. The tendency for the greatest gro* as John notes, was most evident after the 1982 appointment of Guy

Spmg as artistic director. Sprung's tenure was characterized by personal ambitions of expansion, pwthand development "even more obvious than Kinch's and Hendry7shad ken" (195). By not putting laboratory theatre in a commercial context, it was impossible for Toronto Free to create a body of newly developed Canadian works at a rate that could match the company's rate of growth. Consequently, Sprung's pro- provided fewer ww Canadian plays than durhg Hendry's and Kinch's tirne, and increased explorations of classics. Withh this progmmhg, Spnmg was btrumental in re- establishg a portion of the company's onginal mandate by introducing afree summer theatre prognunme of Shakespeare in Toronto's High Park The rXeam in High Park," named after the nrst successfùl production of A MihmerNight 's Drem there in 1983, hes since become a Toronto surnmer tradition. Table 1 below, compering figures fiom

Toronto Free's 1982/83 and 1985/86 seasons, clearly demonstrates the company's growth uoder Spning' s influence.

Table 1: Toronto Free Tbestre Growth Between 1982183 and 1985186

Length of Season Numbcr of Production Weeks Number of Productions Operating Budget Total Attendance* Number of Subscribers Box Office Revenues ûther Operating Revenues Government G rants Fundraising Revenues

(Figura compiled fiom Toronto Free Board of Directon Meeting Minutes, 1983-1986)

The wonîrolled exponential growth under Sprung, coupled with its limited fiinding and resources, demanded development beyond the ideo 10 gical margins of the commercial "&er~tive"Toronto Free had created for itself in creating a theatrical campus at 26 Berkeley Street in 1976. The pdgmof "azteniative" to 'imainstream" in

Toronto's theatre community, however, was too sxnall to provide a mode1 of controlied growîh or transiibn nom the perceived antahetical positions of "alteniate" to "major" theatre "Mainstream" economic capitai, to permit the continuation of Spniag 's strategy of growth, was paramount to survivai. The rate of growth quickly became too much for Toronto Free's limited resources (personnel, Ming, and space), necesshting In 1985, reflecting the leftist leanings in its culture, Toronto Free held an dl-day

"think-in" for community members to voice their opinions on the position and funire of the Company. A subsequent "board retreat" was held in the country for members to ascertain its preferred action. Spnmg presented his strategy in a report called simply the

'Vision papa," which validated the company's aims as an artists' theatre devoted to developing and producing Canadian work The most important element of this '%ision" was the proposed construction of a flexible 600-seat theatre on the Berkeley Street campus as a solution for the company's growing needs (Toronto Free '%oard of

Directors"). Upon conducthg feasibility studies, ho wever, the new theatre was deemed too expensive to construct and maintain: '%ve never would have gotten the government grants of the size to be able to support that operation" (Spning interview).

To obtain those grants, Toronto Free wodd have to achieve "major theatre" status with f'uoding agencies Like the Canada Council, which, through its discretioaary granting of economic capital also determuied cultural capital and produced marginality.

Constnicted by the difference in the2 funding, the remking antithetical positions of

Toronto Free and Centrestage in the Toronto theatre commUnay as "alternative" and

"mainstream" theatres served to repudiate their simiiar habitus and dispositions towards a corporate mode1 of growth. These similarities, coupled with intemal and extemal forces in the economic and cultural fields determined the strategy of unification the companies dertook to Nstain, protect, and increase thek individual ecowmic and cultural capW 2 Extramural: Stakes and Intemûs

The literary or mistic field is at ail times the site of a struggie between the

two principles of hierarchuation: the het eronomous princip le, fàvourable

to those who dominate the field economically and poIiticaUy (e.g.

"bourgeois art") and the autonomous principle (e-g. "art for art's sake"),

which those of its advocates who are least endowed with specific capital

tend to identify with degree of independence fiom the economy, seing

temporal fàiIure as a sign of election and success as a sign of compromise.

. . . The most heteronomous cultural producers (i-e. those with least

symbolic capital) can offer the least resistance to externai demaads, of

whatever the sort. To defend their own position, they have to produce

weapons, which the dominant agents (within the field of power) cm

irnmediately tum against the cultural producers most attached to their

autonomy. In endeavoring to discredit every attempt to impose an

autonomous principle of hierarchizat ion, and thus serving their O wn

interests, they serve the interests of the dominant fiactions of the dominant

class, who obviously have an interest in there behg only one hierarchy.

(Bourdieu, "The Field," 40- 1)

Bourdieu's theoretical mode1 suggests that the structure of a theatre company is constructed by a series of hierarchicdy organised and stnicturally homologous fields of forces. The interests, investments and stakes of the organisation within each individual field, cornbineci with interests and stakes in other fields, provide a foundatio~onscious or unconscious-for every action undertaken by that organisation Toronto Free Theatre and CentreStage Company's respective stakes and interests in the economic and cdtud fields work toward the dthate goal of attaining related capital and power based upon their observance and coqliance with hierarchical piinciples and regulat ions. The companies' reactions to these forces shape and de fine their individual cultures as they develop and becorne more complex

To a great extent, the culture of an organization is created and evolves as a

result of the organization's contact and interaction with its environment.

The economic climate, the labor market, the poliical ciimate, international

relations, the industry's clirnate . . . are ail factors that influence the culture

of an organization and Limit and constrain its choices. Organizational

culture and its underlying assumptions set the stage for the organization' s

rûason for king in a given environment. An organization's identity

allows it to position itseif in socieîy and in relation to its coqetitors and

various comtituents. Therefore, the culture of an organization is one of

the &ors that guides the Msactions as it adopts and survives in its

environment. (Nahavandi 18- 19)

The individual positions of CentreStage and Toronto Free within the autommous economic and cultural fields are homo logous in that the y are based upon similar funet ions and structures. The homologous structure of those forces acting on CentreStage and

Toronto Free and tkir resptive interests in the attainment of economic and cultural capital dows the aaalysis and subdivision of these fields into the extramural and intramural. In this chapter, 1 concentrate on the extenial economic and cultural forces and factors working on the two companies towards their integration. Culturally and economicaiiy, the merging of Toronto Free and Centrestage came at a point of transition and re-assessrnent for both companies in their respective environments and cultures. The CentreStage board of directors, fàced with a sizeable deficit in its 1984185 season, replaced Richard Ouzo~anwith Bili Glassco as artistic director. Toronto Free, under artistic director Guy Sprung, aftemated between financial distress and financial success fiom 1983 to 1986, ail the whiIe under the constant stress of unrestricted growth. By Kovember 1985, both companies had conducted shidies of kir respective positions within Toronto's theatre cornmunity and had established short-term stratepic plans.

Initially, Sprung suggested a '*fornial federation" between Toronto Free and

CentreStage during his interview with the Centrestage artistic direct or select ion cornmittee in 1985 (when Glassco, Spning, ami director Robin Phillips were shortlisted for the position). The concept was unprecedented amongst non-profit organizations; however, in reviewing the business news of the 1980s, it becomes clear fiom where

Sprung's idea came. The corporate world of the 1980s was overrun with rnergers, unions, arnalgarnations, and takeovers, "characterized by many as an era of 'merger mania"' (Nahavandi 1). Buz words of the period were terms Like "synergy," "employee buy-in," and "organizational strategy." Mergers were occurring on every level of the corporate comrnunity, creating larger, more powerful organizations in an attempt to obtain a greater hold on markets andor expand into different markets altogetha. in

1986, in the United States, "there were thirty-eight mergers or acquisitions of 6 1 billion or more, with the largest king Kohlberg Kravis Roberts' $6.3 billion leveraged buyout of

Beatrice Foods" (Nevaer 3). Aithough in Sprung's recollection, the idea of merging Toronto Free and

CentreStage was not complete at the tirne, the concept was not lost on the Toronto theatre cornmmity: 'The idea is a visionary one, which recopkes the nital short-comuig of

Centrestage king shut up in the gilded cage of the Saint Lawrence Centre and its need to connect to a mu&-and-ready source of original work like the Free Theatre" (Conlogue,

"Can Glassco"). Members of the CentreStage board of directors, however, were ''md of Guy Spnmg, in spite of his talent" (Black interview), possibly because of the radical ideas he presented and the unwiiiingness on Centrestage's part to consider such radical measures. Sprung was consequently passeci over as Centrestage's choice for its new artistic director, and the concept of a merger was set aside. A year passed before any further consideration of the proposal occurred. During that year, Centrestage, under the direction of Glassco, enjoyed increasing box office sales and critical success for its

1%Y86 season, but simultaneously lost a substantial percentage of its subscriben.

Under Sprung, Toronto Free experienced constant fiscal restraints, continuhg its erratic pattern of growth, but incurring greater debt, despite strong box office revenues and crit ical acclaim-

For Giassco, the Bluma Appel Theatre space and management were the greatest obstacles in making CentreStage work. With the Canadian Opera Company's Joey and

Toby Tanenbaum Centre close to completion in November 1985, the notion of creating a si& centre to consolidate Centrestage's activities was enticing for Glassco, who was mon codortabIe directing on a srnafier stage. Glassco's general manager, Edgar Dobie, was aware of the financial risks of coastnicting a new theatre space, and, recalling

Spning's suggestion of a union a year eariier, recommended a union with Toronto Free. Early in 1986, Glassco and Dobie approached Sprung with a proposai that wodd dgamate resources between their two wmpanies. Over the next month, Spning,

Gko,Dobie, and Layton Morris (Toronto Free's gendmanager until September 1,

1986) met with Katie Hermant, president of Centrestage and David Black, president of

Toronto Free. W& the blessing of both presidents, the mutual stakeholders of the companies were codted, including the mayor of the City of Toronto, Art Eggieton, the provincial Werof Culhire, Lily Oddie Monro, and theatre representatives fkom the

Canada Counc& to solicit their support in the venture. While the presidents offered their support immediateIy (Hennant interview and Black interview), the stakeholders were cautious because of the differences represented by each company in audience, cube, mandate, and programming. On the convictions of the artistic directors, however, the stakeholders jpnted their support, agreeing that it was in the best interests of both campanies to merge, and in Toronto's best interest to mate a major Canadian theatre company. The executive cornmirtees of the two companies met in early Febniary to discuss the concept, and a formai proposal was made to the companies' respective boards of directors m mid-February 1986.

The Toronto Free board immediately accepted the proposal in principle (Toronto

Free "Board of Directors," Feb. 17, 1986). The Centrestage board, however, was more cautious, concerned with the ramifications of the fùndamental dmerences between the two coqmies. The greatest of these differences was between the personalities and dispositions of the artistic directoa. To resolve these issues, the two artistic directon met at Glassco's cottage in Tadoussac, Quebec, in the summer of 1986, to determine common

ground The name given by Glassco and Spning to this meeting, "The Tadoussac Summit," suggests a certain aggrandisement of the event by its participants, as if their differences were of national or intemational magnitude. At this "summit," in long discussions over-if one is to believe the humour intendeci in the "'intewiew" in the

Toronto Free Press-a great amount of wine (reflected in the subtitle of the article, "Some

Port in Any Storm"), the two artistic directors explored the viability of merging the two companies and compared their preferences in programmhg, artists and staffing. It was reported to David Black, that "they totaily agreed on directon, designers, lighting people, actors in most cases, and they disagreed totally on playbill because they had totally different perspectives as to what t was important to put on" (Black interview).

Despite the dinerences in habitus between Toronto Free and CentreStage, the companies and their respective artistic directors saw the prospect of a merger as a solution to the economic and cultural restrictions they experienced alone. For Glassco and Centrestage, the merger meant a greater oppominity to explore and expand its repertoire into more chailenging and adventurous theatre. "Centrestage has alway s been a civic theatre. . . . I'm confined to plays 1 hope will work on a large stage. I've had no opportunity to experiment or develop in a srnder space. . . . 1 need to take risks,

CentreStage needs that too" (Glassco, qtd in QuiU, "Supertheatre's directors"). For

Sprung and Toronto Free, merging with CentreStage would provide them with what the

Company had been working towards for several years. "Toronto Free has been tryhg to reach a larger audience for years. . . . Now we can mount quality productions, hamess ou.sensibilities and our energy hstead of nruig off aU over the place" (Spning, qtd. in

Quiil, "Supertheatre's directors"). Canadiàn Theatre: A Crifical Mass

Bourdieu defines culhiral capital as a form of kwwledge, an ideological code or a cognitive acquisition '%hich equips the social agent with empathy towards, appreciat ion for or competence in deciphering cultural relations and cultural artefkcts," suggestiq that

"a work of art has meaning and interest only for someone who possesses the cultural competence, that is, the code, into which it is encoded" (R. Johnson 7). In the case of

Toronto's theatre community and the establishment of the Canadian Stage Company, this ideological code is a question of programming performances to attraa a certain audience which is prepared to accept them Reaction to Glassco's appointment at CentreStagea loss of a large percentage of its subscrik base-made t clear that its audience and community were not prepared to accept the kind of theatre Glassco offered.

Shultawously, as subscription sales indicate, an increasing nurnber of Toronto public was accepting the programming O ffered by Toronto Free.

For Glassco, Sprung, and the presidents of their boards of directors, the merger of

Centrestage and Toronto Free was not only a solution for the restrictions of their growth, but it was perceived as Toronto's "last chance to produce a great Canadian not-for-profit theatre," a circumstance produced by the increasing cultural presence of commercial and franchiseci theatre in the environment of Toronto's theatre cornmunity in the mid-1980s

(Hermdorf interview). Until 1988, a hierarchy constructecl by the funding agencies for the arts defined the organization of theatre in Canada The two components of this hierarchy were occupied by individuals and companies receiving only hding for particular projects and companies whose operating funding was under $25,000, includhg companies like Necessary Angel Theatre Company and Mulgrave Road Theatre Co-op. Companies with Canada Council fiinding over $25,000 made up the Iargest compownt of the structural hierarchy, and were unofficially split between "small"- and

"medium"-sized theatres in terms of their fhding. The greatest number of these theatres

M into the "srnail" definition, including companies as diverse in programming and styles as the Rainbow Stage Theatre in Wïpeg (with $35,000 in Council bding in 1987/88) and Carbone 14 in Montreal (with $77,000 in Council fbnding in l987/88). The larger

"aiternative" companies including Toronto Free, Tanagon, Passe Muraille, and Factory

Theatre Lab shared the unofficial '"medium" definition with regional theatres iike

Centrestage Company. Neptune Theatre and Citadel Theatre, wah Council funding reaching over $100,000. The fourth hierarchical component was the "flagship," primarily the Seatford Festival, receivuig $790,000 in Canada Council funding in 19871 88.

The fifth component of Canada's theatre community sat outside the direct influence of the funding agencies, and is arguably the most pow&L 'O UnWre the other theatres, these commercial theatres were not publicly subsidkd, but were self-sustaining, offering fkchised theatre growing fiom New York's Broadway and London's West End models. The culhtral and economic capital of these companies was reflected in their displacement of Canadian resources, inc luding audiences, &O mers, personnel and culturai capital. With the introduction of large commercial nuis and imported hchised productions came a consumer ment- that suggested that quality was directly proportional to ticket price.

'O Commercial theatres sit outside of the direct influence of the funding agencies; however, indiiectly, they benefit fiom govermnent tax breaks and other forms of incentive to provide emp loyment and attract tourists. [Wlhat's happening in the city's middle-range theatre is a clash between

ideology and consumer expectations. Tme theatre-Iovers long to see

theatre extend its reach by making a show cheap, accessible and

unintimidating. On the other hand, if theatre-goers are mostly well-

educated mernbers of the urban middle class, as al1 market research seems

to show, then to charge them les than they are willing to pay for a good

product seems somehow perverse. (Drainie, "Are bargain")

As a resdt, ticket prices throughout Toronto increased, dong with audience perception of quaiity standards. Toronto's theatre culture was Mermore af3ected by choices in programmhg in the attempt to remain competlive with the "popular" or "mass" cube the commercial theatres represented.

Sustained by a large and complex culture indmtry, [popular culture's]

dominant principle of hierarchization invo lves eco no mic capital or "the

bottom line." Its very nature and its dependence on the broadest possible

audience make it less susceptible to formal experimentation, although, as

Bourdieu notes in 'The Market of Symbolic Goods," if Eequentiy borro ws

fiom the restncted field of production in attempting to renew &self. (R

Johnson 16)

Despite these negative trends, commercial and hchised theatre events had the positive influence of increasing Toronto's audience core.

[C]ommercial theatre in Toronto, always flourishing on the cabaret and

dher theatre circuit, leapt ahead with ewugh acceleration to suggest that

future cornpetition for companies like Centrestage will be considerable, msking serious or challenging work (does this mean Canadian?) harder to

seil. The demand for light entertainment that gained prominence at

Mo'sfestivals during this period also resulted in the biggest

commercial success in the history of Toronto theatre-Cats, the Andrew

Lloyd Webber musical . . . [and] Little Shop of Homors, (both pmduced in

Canadian versions by Marlene Smith), and the respectable commercial

runs of Cary1 Churchill's Cloud Nine (Schwarz/ Sewell Productions 1984)

and The Dining Room by A. R Gumey, Jr. (Gemstone Productions, 1984),

test* to the one, undebatable hct evidenced by this period: the Toronto

audience for professional theatre is not only large, but growing.

Concomitantly, what this audience wants, and how its demands will affect

the fiiture of theatre throughout the province, emerged as the period's

major questions. (Wallace, "Getting TOI@," 105)

Assessing its audience and environment in relation to these commercial impulses, the

CentreStage role study corntnitfee determined in 1984 that the high concentration of capital in the Toronto area and the "cosmopolitan population" made Toronto's future one based on a "seif appraisal as a dynamic, kinetic megalopolis clearly bent on achieving sophistication" (CentreStage "Role Study," 4). The greatest challenge to the company in competing with commercial theatres was to "attract the ethnic populations of Toronto to the theatre," because, the cornmittee believed, these populations tendd to be mostly attracted to musical entertainment "partly because of language, and pdybecause of tradition" (Centrestage 'Xole Study," 4). To maintain the rate of development in Canadian theatre experienced in the 1970s and early 19809, something productive on the Canadian 'inain~tream'~had to be achieved.

As Cathy McKeehan, the ùaerim general manager of Toronto Free before the merger, ded:

[AIN of these hds, and al1 of these energies and resources that had ken

directed to creating a Canadian theatre, were going to be blown out of the

water ifwe weren't carefixl and didn't have somethuig in which to centre

our activities in as a significant a way, as did Phantom and all of the

others. . . . We had to say there is a Canadian theaire, and it 's centred here,

among 0thplaces, and ou.resources are gohg to be directed towards

ensuring that in the kgest city in Canada, in the "third largest theatre

commdty in North Amerka;" that Canadian theatre wasn't just going to

be "altemate theatre," it was going to be THE theatre7dong with ali this

imported commercial fianchise kind of th-. We were confident that

there was an audience who wanted that and expected that, and expected

those of us who had ken involved in it all this the to protect it for them

and fbthermore to direct the resources there so there was sotnethhg

identifkbly Canadian in a major theatre in Toronto. (McKeehan

intewiew)

The merger of Centrestage and Toronto Free provided the ingredients for a critical mass for such a major Canadian theatre company: the b'mainstream" Bluma Appel theatre, the

"ahenuitive" spaces at 26 Berkeley Street, the artistic personnel available to both companies, the dedication of the boards of directors, the fiindraising capabilties, and the subscription base. Ail of these combined incdthe chances of establishing the

Canadian Stage Company's as the ''major Canadian" company of ''flagship" size and quality-

Convergence of Margins

Another cultural force working towards the rnerging of Toronto Free and

Centrestage was the developing 'kalignment" of the "alternative" theatre rnovement in

Toronto towards the regioel theatre model. As Robert Wallace argued in "Getting

Tough," this move was instigated by a wcessity that "alternative" companies

develop and adhere to new policies of &cal pragmatism: faced with

mortgages, taxes, renovation and maintenance costs, as well as the larger

staffs and increased production budgets that accompanied their enlarged

ambitions and longer seasons, this new wave became the establishment

aga& which the hgedefined itself. No longer marginal in the &y's

cultural industry-if only by virtue of their operathg budgets-[they] began

to pumie methods of operation, development, production and promotion

that brought them closer in style and structure to Canada's regional

theatres tban ever before. (103)

In the case of Toronto Free, this development towards the regional structure was not as apparent in the programming offered on stage. The impetus ahost entirely confined . . itself to the dmmstrative and organizational structure of the company, with increased corporate presence on the board of directors and a more substantid support base nom the business and corporate community than Centrestage possessed (Leech interview).

Consequently, Toronto Free was able to maintain an image of being the "hippie moral alternative" (Leech interview) to the "establishment" theatres like Centrestage, while

steadily inmeashg its subscription sales, which reached over 8,500 by 1986.

In spring 1985, when Glassco, one of the "most vocal opponents of the regional

theatres" was appomted artistic director of CentreStage, ''the realignment of Toronto's

once-alteniate theatres with the artistic establishment achieved its symbolic cornpletion"

(Wallace, 'Getting Toough" 104). Glassco took the oppominity of using the regional

structure offered by Centrestage to produce a season that offered a diversity in

prognimming, challenging its audience with a production of Frank Wedekind's Spring

A wukning. By dohg so, Glassco tested the Canadian "alternat ive" against established

works of the "international" and 'maiinstream" standards, a process he began at Tarragon,

programming Cdianwo rks alongside adaptations of 'îwor id classics" (Wallace,

"Growing Pains" 69). The drastic move away fiom Centrestage's cbco~ativebed- rock composed of proven success and low-risk accessibdity" (Wallace "Getting Tough"

9'7) cost CentreStage a great percentage of its subscribers in protest Although this audience reaction and attraction to one culture versus the other woukl eventually Iead to financial and cultural concerns for the Canadian Stage Company, the convergence of structurai margins in the two organizations provided a substantial perception of compatibility in the eyes of the two founding artistic directors and boards of directoa.

By merging, Toronto Free and Centrestage aspired to achieve a power othenvise mattainable if the companies were working independently.

The main purpose of a merger is to mcrease the probbility and influence

of the newly formed organization. Two organizations combined are stronger tban eac h alone. They either coqlement each other, or they

duplicate each other and together are stronger. Two combined

organizations have the potential to achieve goals both more efncientiy and

effectively, and their strength should aiiow them better strategic

posa ioning in their industry and in national and international markets. A

merger is meant to be a strategic move, t is supposed to create a

partnership. (Nahavandi 17 1)

In creating their 'partnership," Centrestage and Toronto Free invested their positions

(cdtud, political, symbolic, etc.) to produce a stronger, more efficient company. It was the wish of both Spning and Glassco that this new company would achieve the goais- both personal and corporate-they had for the parent companies, while establishing a stronger footho ld bcially, cdturalIy, symbo lically, and polit ically within the c limate of Toronto's theatre community.

Bourdieu's economic field is based on the notion of an exchange in power, not only fiscally, with "economic capital" defmed as the domination over that exchange. In many ways, Bourdieu's stnictuml theory is an economic theory, in which the investment of one's capital-be it academic, cuhal, symbo lic, etc.+ applied to produce the maximum bene& of "profit" possible within the agent's participation in that particular field.

To enter a field (the philosophical field, the scientific field, etc.), to play

the game, one must possess the habitus which predisposes one to enter that

field, that game, and wt another. One must also possess at least the

minimum amount of knowledge, or skill or "talent" to be accepted as a legitimate pkyer. Entering the game, firrthermore, rneans aîtanenrpthg to

use that knowledge, or skiIl, or 'Went" in the mst advantagrnus way

possible. (R.Johnson 8)

Whether used to compare the capitai of fields (homologous, due to kir economic structure) or to examine the strict economics of a theatre company, "created by the simple possession of material goods," like fiinding, vace and artistic personnel (Bourdieu,

''Outhe," 236), the economic fieid is truly a field ofpower.

From a strictly economic standpoint, the two parent compdes were dissimilar in their status of power. Despite the disproportion in the number of productions (in

1985186, CentreStage produced six productions while Toronto Free produced eleven),

Toronto Free was awarded only approximately 50 percent of the Canada Council fimding received by Centrestage. The relative status of Toronto Free and CentreStage within the funding agency 's perception of excellence and hierarchicd structure of "mainstream- aitemative," however, was aimost identical. As shown in Table 2 below, the hding granted by the Canada Council between 1980181 and 1989/90 to Toronto Free and

CentreStage, relative to other medium-sized theaires, provided similar economic (and corresponding cultural) capitaL While some variance in hding did occur-most notably in the 198283 season, when Toronto Arts Productions and Toronto Free were brought in

Line with other companies-the hding status of the two m-es remained vimially the same in relation to other thesitres, despite Toronto Free's growth in audience size and productions and Centrestage's position as the largest civic theatre in Toronto.

To achieve greater economic caphi, each Company believed they required an increase in culturai capitai and funding stanis, thought to be attamable by merging resources as the Canadian Stage Company. As Table 2 illustrates, however, funding for

Canadian Stage did not mcrease f?om the levels of Toronto Free and Centrestage combine& but instead decreased fiom $460,000 to $375,000. Figure 1 below, comparing the Canada Council funding strategy for medium-sized theatres with the national inflation rate, dernomirates that the creation of the Canadian Stage Company resulted in no drarnatic cbange, neither in fûnding for Toronto Free and Centrestage, nor stsitus in relation to the fùnding category.

Figure 1: Canada Coancil Funding as Compared to the National Inflation &te: 1980f81-1989190

Canada's National Inflation Rate (Consumer Price Index) W Toronto Fr& Ce-& Canadian Stage Company Funding I O Mid-Size Theatre Company Funding I I P

The Canadian Stage Company's failure to increase its power and capital through

Canada Council funding was mirrored by the new company's status amongst other funding agencies, particularIy private agencies. While as many as 22 corporations supported Canadian Stage at its inception through a ''piUar programme," promising $2,000 a year over three years (Leech interview), total cornbinecl corporate fimding did not increase substantiaily. The repercussions of not achiewig the desired ecowmic and cultural capital through the chosen strategy of merging Toronto Free and Centrestage strained nearly dl internal resources of the new company. 1 demonshate in the wxt chapter that intdtensions and personal conflicts, created between the culhnes and supporthg structures of Canadian Stage, were in many ways based on the compoiny's economic condition, the fàilure to increase its power and caphi, and the differing assumptions of how to neutralise a growing debt. 3 Irrtramunl: 1rnpuise.s and Ambitions

Between 1982 and 1986 Ontario's theatre industry experienced a number

of changes in leadership and persorne1 that might Iead one to expect

important new atû=i'butesin the work produced. In retrospect, however,

theatre during this period offered not so much a new direction or an altered

vision as a consolidation of established structures of artistic development

ard controL WMe a few new piayers emerged to challenge the territorial

imperatives of goveniment subsidy, audience support, and media interest

that had been deliwated by Ontario's th&& instiMions during the

previous 15 years, by the end ofthe 1985/86 season such 'Young turks"

had failed to effect signincant changes in either the financial or aesthetic

profile of the province's theatrical terraia Despite some changes in its

super-structure7the foundation of Ontario theatre remained Myrooted

in a conservative bed-rock composed of proven success and low-risk

accessibility, quahies very much defied by the audience. (Wallace,

"Gettmg Tough" 97)

As the culture and actions of a theatre compouiy emerge in response to its externai environment, so too are they products of the imemal forces worbwithin the company.

Although these interna1 forces may seem, on the surface, to be dissimilar nom the extenial factors, an -sis reveals that they work in similar ways and are based on the same homologous econornic s~nictmesand practices. The internai financial crises experienced by Toronto Free Theatre between 1983 and 1986, for instance, are a pmduct of the company's spending habits and cuhdleadmbip, as weil as a reflection of the extedeconomic and cultural fields working on the company in the form of funding agencies, "aitemative--' antitheses and the commercial theatre impulse of

Toronto in the early to mid 1980s.

These intemal fields of forces are parailel to similar or related forces acting extemally on the cultures and structures of the parent companies. In this c hapter, I explore the diaiecticai economic and culturai structure of forces as they moved

CentreStage Company and Toronto Free Theatre uiternally towards their decision to integrate in early 1988. This discussion concentrates on the imemal impulses of attaining econornic capital and cultural capital The effects of these fields and capitaknost dominated by the economic field-coupled with similanties in disposition, made it apparent, consciously or subconsciously, to the leaders of Toronto Free and CentreStage that amalgamation of their resources as the Canadian Stage Company was the best available strategy and solution to their struggles.

Cultural Leadetship And The Case Of "Canadianness"

The influence of Guy Spning and Bill Glassco as artistic and cultural leaders and their ide0 log idperceptions of "Canadian theatret7were paramount in the Toronto Fr&

CentreStage merger and the creation of the Canadian Stage Company.

[LIeaders have tremendous influence on their organizations. The focus on

top managers in the popular business press is an indication of the

importance we give leaders. . . . The overreliance on leaders during a

merger provides an explanation for the strong sense of betrayal

eXpenenced by employees and managers when thek leaders '%ail out"

with a variety of golden parachutes. After ail, leaders are the ones who negotiate the merger. They make the final decisions on the mode of

accuhration, and they guide the organization through the stages of the

conflict. They are symbols of the organization, and they corne to be

symbols of the merger. (Nahavandi 77)

The personal characteristics of Glassco and Spning-the eldent to which they were open to

change and innovation, theû level of comfoa with entreprenewhip, and their

predisposition to maintain the status quo-stem IÏom their individual dispositions and

positions, which contribute to an undersiandhg of the development of the mmger. These

characteristics detemllned how their organisations were run, and how they wou1d be

integrated "both hughthe choice of an accuhration mode and in the implementation

of that mode" (Nahavandi 8 1). Qdinoted in an obviously biased commentary that the

differences between the two artistic directors were antithet id.

Gentle, quietly spoken Glassu> is seen as a dreamer pushed to a desperate

act by Spning's fierce ambition, by his obsession with establishg a

national theatre in Toronto. Their rehtionship has been described by

fiends and opponents alike as b'tenuous"and "volatile." (Quill

"Supertheatre's directors")

Born in Ottawa, Sprung made his way into theaîre during his years studying at

McGill University in MontreaL After spending four years in Engld, where he CO-

founded the HaK Moon Theatre, he returned to Canada in 1975 to tour as a &lance director. As such, he provided innovat ive productions and premieres of several important

Canadian plays, including W. O. Mitchell's BacR To Beulah, David Fennario's

Balcomtille, as well as the "national hit" Paper Wheat (Filewod, "Collective" 99) and Rick Salutin's Les Canadiens. Spnmg's repertoire has ken dembed as "coqrised [ofj a mix of provocative, contemporary intemational fme and classical plays" (Smith 50 1).

Given the reptation as a fervent nationalkt by mtics and colleagues," Sprung's strong- willed and charismatic personality, coupled with Toronto Free's growth in subscription numbers and box office revenues under his direction, established him as a prominent artist in Toronto's theatre co1111nunityduring the early- to mid- 1980s. This position contributed to Sprung 's disposition and personal growth-oriented ambit ions: Y think in retrospect, 1 was a Little bit cocky; 1 mean the successes of the Toronto Free had given me a perspective on things" (Spning interview).

Gkssco, 'Yhe elder statesnian" (McKeehan interview), was raised in the afnwnt

Toronto wighbourhood of Rosedale and holds degrees fiom Princeton, Mord, and the

University of Toronto, where he taught Engiish and directed student productions for five years, before going on to study at New York University's School of the Arts. in 1971, with his wife, Jane Gordon, he founded Tarragon Theatre, which bas been instrumental in the development of Canadian playwrights, charnpioning the wo rk of playwrights David

Freeman, David French and Michel Tremblay (Noonan 236). In 1982, he resigned kom

Tarragon to work as a fieelance director, directing across Canada and in the UK. Like

Spnmg, over his career, Glassco directed some of Canada's most important works, including the fïrst English productions of many of Tremblay's works, Betty Lambert's

Jennie 's Story, Judith Thompson's mite Biting Dag and George F. Walker's Nothing

Sacred. In addition to introducing such playwrights to Toronto audiences, Glassco also

'l As evidenced by John Bemrose, who described Sprung as a "developer of original Canadian plays" (61).

45 CO-tninslatedsix of Tremblay's works with John Van Burek, adding them to English

Cananii's dramatic canon,

Sprung and Glassco's personal ambit ions, ideologies, and attention to the cubI

and economic importance of "Canadian theatre" are reflected in their choices for the

Dame of the new cornpany. Sprung's nationalism was clearly reflected in his campaign

for the 'National Theatre of Canada." for which he maintained a tradernark for three

years (Spniog interview). Glassco, however, was not as concenied that the new Company

was identified as Cdian. Reflecting his academic disposition, Glassco prefmed the

oame "Hiimming Mountain and Fire," fiom a lecture that he heard "on tape by Robert

Edmund Jones that he gave at Harvard a couple of years before he died" (Glassco

interview). Mirroring the English Stage Company in a strategy of creating ideiitity for

the new cornpany and following Sprung's ambitions of producing a national theatre, The

Canadian Stage Company" was chosen through a polling firm that interviewed members

of the theatre community and audience. I2

[This] process sûuck a blow for democratic consensus and against cuhurai

elitism, which presumably was the point of the exercise . . . [The Canadian

Stage Company is] the first performing arts group in the comtry to

formally solicit public input about sornething as basic as its name. This

happened because Liberal Senator Michael Kirby, a vice-president of

Goldfarb Consultants, is also on the new theatre's 40-member board of

directors [and] persuaded fellow mernbers to try a series of "focus groups"

l2 It is an intaesthg statement of the boards of directors ' ambitions and prioritia that this was the

only market research done before merging the two parent compaoia.

46 to help choose the theatre's name. . . . [A]ccordmg to Linda Intaschi of the

new theatre's board, the focus group gave their best review to names that

contained solid words such as "stage* and "theatre" and geographic words

such as 'Toronto," 'Wario,"and "Canada" (Drainie, Ys Canadian")

Reflecting their comparable positions as "1970s cultural nationaIists7" (C.

Johnson 29-30), the dream Glassco and Spnmg shared with the companies' stakehoMers

and boards of directon was the creation of a theatre company dedicated to bringing

Canadian theatre 60m the "alternative" theatre spaces and into 'hiainstream7'theatres iike

the Bluma Appel Theatre,

where the emphasis was not only on Canadian plays, buî really trying to

take the ment* of Canadian theatre out of the small basement studio

space and put[tmg] t on the me.[Tbat] didn't just mean dohg

Canadian phys on the mainstage, but doing Canadian plays of a size, that

is, wt just cast-size, but of an emotional size, that warranted them king

on the maiostage, which tumed out to be . . . one of the problems, and has

remained a problem because not many people write plays of dcient size

to warrant king produced on the mainstage. (Glassco interview)

This drearn was not in response to an economic or cultural demand for the product.

Instead, the creation of the Canadian Stage Company as a "national theatre" is reflective

of Glassco and Sprung's shared habitus in respect to cultural and economic capital by

king thefirst to create the rnojor Canadirm non-profit theatre company. By providhg

Canadian productions of b4mainstream"quality and size to celebrate their "Canadiamess," both artistic directors hoped that Cdiantheatre would succeed in develophg its own cultural and economic identity by "summoning a representative audience that will in ttxn recognize itself as nation on stage" (Kruger 1).

"Canadian" as a modifier to "theatre" was-and remains-problematic, due to the myriad of ideological connotations and meanings, fintber complicated in this instance as the modifier in the new company's name. These ideological connotations divided the distinct cuitures of Centrestage and Toronto Free, over the broad ideological concept of

"Canadian theatre" and what audience was irnagined for this theatre. As a national audience, the community of Canada is an "imagined political community. It is imagiined because the members of even the sdestnation will never know most of their fellow- memm meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the min& of each lives the image of their communion" (Anderson 15). The imagined nation of Canada and the ideological concept of "Caoadianness" have carried with them several meanings within daerent domains of cultural expression. "'Canadian' as I\rincent] Massey recognized, is neither an objective description nor a categoricd imperative. If anythïng it is an ideological coding in a constant state of transformation Like the country itseE the use of

"Canadian" in Kanadian theatre"] is the unstable site of constant renegotiation"

(Filewod, "Critical Mass" 35).

Rewgotiation is often done on the level of the funding agency, which determines both economic and cuWcapital through standards of ''rmjor" and balternate"theatres, and determines the cumually "critical" institutions in Canada based upon artistic and cuittxai value. l3 This is neatly articulated by the former secretary-general to the British

Arts Councii, Sir Roy Shaw, who pointed out that

[t]he problem is that the custorner very oflen chooses arts which an arts

council or French rninistry or whatever is not providing. In this country

only three per cent of the population want opera. Only 10 per cent want

classical music. Only about twenty per cent want serious theatre.

Nevertheless most of us are commined to providing these things and 1

think rightly so. So the operaiion of subsidy involves making value

judgements. (as quoted in Lewis 6)

Culture value judgements are evidenced in the Ontario Arts Coumil's five b'major" arts institutions from 1984/85-the Stratford and Shaw festivals, The Canadian Opera

Company, The National Ballet and the Toronto Syrnphony-which dominate the '"hdhg pie" while developing "Canadianculture" through b'international"or foreign cultures.

In the very least, "Canadianness" in theatre, like the "Australianaess" ThRowse illustrates, has meant "produced with a significant amount of labour by people who are resident in [Canada] for some of their Lives" (67). The Canadian Stage Company, however, was established in celebration of, and in the search for, "Canadian theatre," under the assumption of recognisable Canadian qualities in the works themselves. A

l3 This value, seen by Wilson as "'excellence' [which is defined by the Canada Council as 'the merit of the project, including its artistic quality' and is identified as a criterion for the evaluation of applications] masks an adjudication process operating fiom assumptions which, although appearing unbiased, in actuality dismiss many artistic projects which cannot be read from a humanistic perspective" (Wilson, "A Jury" 6).

49 seemingly impossible compromise was made between the ideo log ical assumpt ions of

Centrestage's "htemational standard" and Toronto Free's "challenge to . . . canonical and fishionable American and European work [that] dominated the stages of the

Cdanregional theatre system" (C. Jobn27).

At the heart of our activity is a cornmitment to Canadian productions. Mr.

Sprung and 1 have hit upon a definition of what we consider to be a

Canadian production. It is derived fi0 m the reason directors choose to do

a play, or even becorne inwlved in theatre in the fimi place: relevancy.

That's not to say the play won? be, for example, British or Australian.

But we will always be workingfrorn ourselves, our own sense of what the

world is, where we fit into the world. (Glassco, qtd in "The Tadoussac

Summit" 19)

Reflecting this "Canadianness," the Canadian Stage Company opened its first officia1

1988/89 season offering fourteen productions, seven of wbich were Caoadian works. l4

Homo logous with the economic field's extemal forces, the interna1 economic field and strict economic forces were the dominant forces acting on the parent companies as they worked to acbieve or mauitain a rate of corporate growth that would protect them fiom extemal forces. Although the amalgamation was wver seen as a solution to

l4 Five were Canadian premieres (including Dom Ci@ and 1949) and two were Toronto premiers (Odd Jobs and me Bourgeois Gentleman). Additionally, two classical pieces were new translations by Canadian writers. financial concerns and forces, it was hoped that the combined economic capital of the

Canadian Stage Company would provide enough stabiiity to deal with the debt loads of

the parwt companies while supporting the new orgsnizational structure. Providing

assurance of this capitai, the companies' stakeholders, primaniy the Canada Council and

the City of Torooto, guaranteed the artistic directors that existing funding levels would

simply be combined. Corporate funding was expected to follow, with funding expected to remain at the same level or to increase upon completion of the merger.

The financial condition of CentreStage upon the appointment of Glassco and

Dobie in 1985 was, in Dobie's estimation, "pretty dire" (Dobie interview). Financial mismanagement had culminated in a large overdraft, a "hge amount of money

mdeposited and unprocessed in box office and payroll to be met" (Dobie interview).

Addhg to Centrestage's &cal restraints was a court senlement, resulting fiom a fie in a

rented warehouse eight years earlier, for which the company did not have tenant's legal

liability insurance. Deciding against CentreStage, the judge awarded the owner of the

warehouse $350,000, ordering box office and subscription funds be attached and paid in

full. Glassco 's solution to the financial crisis and public perception of CentreStage as king "tao often . . . the nesting phce of large, fat and deadly theatre" (Codogue, Tan

Gkssco") was to programme more inspiring, on-edge theatre to boost single-ticket sales

(as opposed to subscriptions). Culdy, the stnitegy backfked when loyal nibscribers

revolted, believing their "comfortable," 'hiainstream," and 'pOpular hits" were in jeopardy. A letter to the Toronto Star expresseci this clearly:

My wife and 1 are among the large group that has caocelled subscriptions

to CentreStage. I gather fiom the comments of Bill Glassco there was a deliberate effort made to persuade us to canceL Apparently in choosing

the plays Glassco "deliberately tried to break the regional theatre mold of

offering tried and true popular has." He believes in presenting plays

which he feels we should see "rather than just cornfortable plays." Said

Glassco: "1 don? want to nin a theatre ifI'm (italics mine) not excited and

enthusiastic about the works we present." We& that may be very nice for

Glassco, but if we' re going io invest over $200 in a season subscription we

want to see something we can be excited and enthusiastic about Surely

the main purpose of presenting a play is to entertain the audience rather

than to indulge the personal interests of the theatre director. Many of us

prefer "cornfortable" plays or weil-done ''popuiar hits" to ones which are

"experimental," "controversial," "shocking," or whatever. At today's

prices, more and more theatregoers want to be assured that their

investment in tickets will result in sure-fire entertainment on their terms.

(Collins, "Feed back")

Despite the £inancial loss of a great percentage of its subscribers, Glassco's £kst season was a success, Gnancially and cntically. Fundraising revenues increased by 30%, while David French's Jiners broke all Centrestage box office sale records. Frank

Wedekind's SHng A wahning received a total of four Dora Mavor Moore Award nominations. In an assessrnent of GIassco's fkst season at Centrestage, Waiiace argued that one of the "most vocal opponents of the regional theatres as they existed in the early

1970s would Wycontrol the major purse-strings" (Wjetting Tough" 104). The 'kgional theatre bureaurracy" and the conservatism of the Centrestage audience prevailed, however. This was demonseated when Centrestage

lost submibers and created controversy-dy around a courageous

production of Frank Wedekind's Spring Awuhning, directed with

stunning onginality by Derek Goidby-[indicating] that the constraints on

[Glassm's] position possibly outnumbers its oppominities. (Wallace

''Getiing Tough" 105)

Althou$ Toronto Free's audience subscription was on a steady bcrease, its financial strategy was insutficient to support the growth-oriented ambitions of its artistic director. In Febniary 1984, the company's financial commitments exceeded the holdings and expected revenues nom that season, resuhing in the greatest of a series of hancial crises. Closure of the theatre was only barely averted by the Ontario Arts Council, which grmted a $50,000 loan guarantee. Promgand financial sûategies went unchanged, however, resuiting in the pistence of financial pressures fiom which Toronto Free never recovered. On December 10, 1984, the Toronto Arts Council rejected a proposal for increasd hinding for Toronto Free, on the bisthat the theatre was not housed in a cityswned building.

Sirice the TFT proposal was submitted, both City Council and the Toronto

Arts Council have commissioned task forces to investigate the structure of

arts funding by the City. [Toronto Free board rnember] Mr. Malcornson

has seen the TAC report and is apprehensive that t will enhance the City's

policy of Ztiered fùnding: Le. of the "major" organizations (Young

People's Theatre, St. Lawrence Centre, Theatre Plus) and the "aiternative" theatres (every other organization including TFI'). The TFT proposal

sought to move TFT out of the second tier of Mingand acquire "major"

funding statu due to its comparable stature, audience appeai, and

production quality. If the City accepts the TAC recommendations, the

two-tiered funding structure will be maintaiaed and TFT will continue to

receive fimding as an "aiter~te"(dl) theatre. (Toronto Free "Board of

Directors," IO Dec. 1984)

Despite its financial restrictions, Toronto Free was led by Spnmg 's desire to expand and grow in the endeavour to present challenging Canadian theatre. The company continued its rate of expansion and growth: subscriptions and box office des hit d-time highs and cntical reception of the work was fàvourable. The company 's financial resources, however, were insufficient to support the growth. There was a consistent shortage of readily available fureds, exemplified by Toronto Free president

David Black's request to the City of Toronto to forgive a 1983 loan of $46,000. In May of 1985, a deal was struck for a cumplicated land-swap to tum the ownership of the 26

Berkeley Street theatre campus firom the Greenspoon brothers over to the City of Toronto.

In the swap, a public school and community recreation centre were constnicted on what was an empty lot on the Esplanade. A private Company, having purchased the

Greenspoon holding, swapped the campus for the city-owned Bilt-Rite site, just south of

26 Berkeley Street, where a commercial condominium complex was then constructd

The City took ownership of the Berkeley Street theatre campus and provided Toronto

Free with a long-term, low-rent lease. This so hed sornebut not aihf the financial concems for Toronto Free, reducing rental expenses and providing additional funding

hmthe Toronto Arts Councii.

Toronto Free' s unrestricted pwthhad exceeded it s physical and financial

resources. By its 1985186 season, the company's productions were housed all over

Toronto, iocluding the Dream in High Park, which was a recognized annual event,

Thunder, Perfect Mind by Paul Gross at the McLaughlin Phnetariun, and As Is by

William F. Hohat the Bathurst Street Theatre. Despite its growth and success at the box office, topping 5 1,000,000 in its l985/86 sûison (Conlogue, Theatre tops"), the company incmed a sizable deficit of over $80,000 in that same season, adding to its growing debt. Projected increased administration expenses for the 1986/87 season consequently resulted in another projected shortfàll of $80,000. These financial restrictions, although not totally disegarded by Toronto Free's board of directors, were overlooked in favour of managing the accelerated growth of the Company.

When I took over in '83, our total box office was under sixty thousand.

By '86 t was over a million We had just grown too fast, we were doing

too much; Shakespeare in the Park was threatened with the Board

constantly trying to pdit on me, saying we don? have money, it costs too

much, so 1 figured . . . the only way to defend what we had done was in

fact to get bigger. To have a corporate size that would be self-exphtory.

(Sprung interview)

The fuiancial situations of both companies entering into their amalgamation is

best demonstrated when the City of Toronto provided additional funds in October 1986 to

''help ease hancial pro blems" (Crew, "City assists"). Reflecting poor economic conditions, the city granted a total of $350,000 in financial assistance to the companies during their combined season This included a guarantee for a $100,000 line of credit for

Toronto Free and $250,000 in loans for CentreStage, only mon* before the officiai merger took place.

No V8cancy: Ambitions Towads Art Cenires

Al1 key figures in the development of Canadian Stage agreed that the most dominant catdyst of the Toronto Fr-/ CentreStage merger centred around theatre spaces

(as ecowmic capital) and the ambitions of Glassco and Sprung in growing fkom the restricted adaptability and accessibility their spaces presented. CentreStage had no control of the booking or management of the Bluma Appel Theatre space, which dso resuited in the Company having no control over the identity of the theatre. in contrast, the

26 Berkeley Street theatre campus provided Toronto Free with an image and identity under its control; the Theatre Downstairs and Theatre Upstairs were, however, restrictive in accommodating the growing audience and size of productions. Separately, both companies detennined that the construction or acquisition of additional spaces would be the ided solution, increasing their cultural and economic status and the means to grow

WerstilL

The Bluma AppeI Theatre space had been a concem aestheticdy and artisticdy for Toronto Arts Productions/CentreStage since it was opened. Its "steeply raked auditorium, 87' deep, promoted a sense of separation between audience and actor" (S.

Johnson, "St. Lawrence" 502). Audience members and critics alike complained of the acoustics and sightlines throughout the theatre. Leon Major, the general director of the

St. Lawrence Centre fiom 1970-73 and fht arîistic director of Toronto Arts Productions/CentreStage fkom 1973-80, compared it to performing m a bowiing dey

(Hennant interview). When Centrestage took the initiative of renovating and re-naming it the Bluma Appel Theatre in the hopes of improving the kilities and CentreStage's identity, limitations of the space stili remained. So too did the company's responsibility to its subscribers remain. This audience, through their purchashg power, dorced a regional programme structure, leaving with no oppominity for CentreStage to explore new Canadian works or experimental productions.

Conflict, stemmhg fTom 1973, wiih the St. Lawrence Centre management also prevailed. The box office was managed poorly by the St. Lawrence Centre, creating customer concerns for Centrestage as weli as financial concerns with imdeposited monies and unprocessed cheques king held as a deposit (Do bie interview). In the winter of

1985, these concerns climaxed when Young People's Theatre booked severai weeks for a production of A Christmas Cm02 in the middle of CentreStage's production season. The need for CentreStage's own theatre space was painfully apparent to Glassco, if he was going to avoid similm booking conflicts and lead CentreStage into a an expanded programme O f experimental and conservative programmes. Glassco 's pre ference for smaller theatre spaces led to an ambition oriented towards that of the Canadian Opera

Company's Tanenbaurn Centre, in which CentreStage's actiivities wodd be consokiated with performance, office, rehearsal and workshop spaces under the same roof. This ambition was quickly determined as financially unattainable by CentreStage gened manager, Edgar Dobie, who pmposed a union with an established theatre cornpmy as an alternative. The fkst suggestion was the Jane Mallet Theatre (the smaller theatre in the St.

Lawrence Centre, hown as the Town Hall until renovations in 1985), whÏch wodd have improved Centrestage's identity by locaiising the company in the St. Lawrence Centre.

Several conflicts raised their ugly heads, however, including the knowledge that the City of Toronto would not grant the theatre cornpany control over the Centre. Also, the theatre was akeady shared by CentreStage Music and CentreStage Forum during the winter theatre season, and used by Theatre Plus during the summer months. It was cornmon lmowledge that Centrestage Music producer Jane Fomer, Centrestage Fora producer Pattemon Higgins, and Theatre Plus artistic director Ualcolm Black were not willing to relinquish their positions to dow for the expansion of Centrestage's theatre programme. l5 The suggestion of rnerging with Toronto Free, however, offered

CentreStage two additional spaces at the 26 Berkeley Street campus, geographically close to the Tanenbaum Centre, as weil as the en- of Toronto Free's staff and audiences.

Additionally, merging with an extemal company would give Centrestage greater bargainhg power in negotiations with the C* of Toronto to regain control and management of the St. Lawrence Centre.

When Glassco and Dobie approached Sprung with the idea of merging the resources of the two companies, Sprung bought into the idea immediately, quick to rdthe potential of a combineci Centrestage-Toronto Free resource, which woukl resolve the strain of rapid umestricted growth on Toronto Free's physical and financial

'* Fomer, as producer for CentreStage Music, used the prospect of CentreStage Theatre's expansion to emancipate her programming fiom CentreStage and create a new company, Music

Toronto, with chamber music programming.

58 economic capital. There was no alternative oppominity apparent to support the proposed physicd gmwth of Toronto Free. The construction of the proposed 600-seat theatre on the 26 Berkeley Street theatre campus was on hold indeterminately, due to the company's precarious financial situation. In a union with CentreStage, the Bluma Appel Theatre, although larger and les flexible than this proposed theatre, would serve weil as a mainstage space, despte the feeling that it was 'WtUnately aestheticdy death" (Spruug inte~ew).Spning's ambt ions remained to wards the growth of Toronto Free Theatre and the creation of the new theaire on the Berkeley Street campus, however. He was ostensibly candid about his intentions: "the idea was to get the bdof grants CentreStage had and then be abIe to move into a real theatre" (Sprung interview). 4 Interestad end Infiuential People

The disthguished British scientist Sir Bamett Cocks once described a

cornmittee as "a cul-de-sac down which ideas are lured, and then quietly

them-comminees have always strongly appealed to Canadians. From

commUaay projects to labor tribunals to royal conmiissions, a cornmittee

is our fhst answer to every crisis. . . . Since board members fiom business

and the professions were initially expected to bring method to madness,

they have reasonably seen M to introduce the systems proven in their own

profit-making fields: marketing strategies, comprehensive accounting,

professionai fhd-raising. . . . But despite extraordinas, effort by al1

concemed, the deficits keep getting bigger. nie cure seems to be slowly

killing. Focusing on formulas to cope with de ficts, we forget that

somehow we did so for decades, placing ou.confidence less in the

efficiency of management than in the efficacy of a dream. It is stiU easier

to raise money to realize a dream than to fill a ho le. (Moore)

From an economic and culturai standpoint, by merging their resources as the

Canadian Stage Company, Toronto Free Theatre and CentreStage Company hoped to irnprove their positions in the Toronto theaire community by gaining economic and cuWcapitai, homologous and valenced in structure as illustrateci by Bourdieu

Toronto Free hoped to elude its financial and physical limitations and gain the economic capital Centrestage offered physically with the Bluaia Appel Theatre and economicdy through its higher stanis among funding agencies. From Toronto Free, Centrestage hoped to gain the symbolic and cultural capital it needed to re-energise itse1E to create a theatre Company with a distinct identity and cultural status similar to the Stratford

Festival. While partially successful in anaining such cap- their integration into the larger, more complex structure of Canadian Stage created a series of cultural and economic forces, homo logous with those acting on the parent companies, which overshadowed its gains. The effect of these forces was to increase tensions between corporate (financial) priorities and the artistic vision of Canadian Stage, moving the company's corporate structure, personified by its board of directors, to exercise its discretion over artist ic leadership and ide0 logical direction.

Despite any assurnptions of artistic or managerial leadership within the hierarchy of a theatre company, the corporate structure held ultimate responsibiiity (legal and otherwise). '?n effect, the board becornes the theatre company and, in kt, in a Iegal sense, they are the theatre company" (Canada Council, "Le théâtre" 38, their stress). This is so because

the Iegal bework in this ara-which dates back to 17th century

England- dehes the arts as a charity. Thus the great enterprise we cd

ART is lumped into what is referred to in Lav, Tmand Charities

(published by the Canadian Centre for Philanthropy) as "a patchwork quilt

of ofien inconsistent regulatory instruments . . . a hodge-podge of

seemingly unrelateci and uncoordinated statutes ruid mies." The arts [are

seen and understwd] as charity, then-deemed a gened good by society in

the same way we establish schools of leaming and institutions for the care of orphans adthe homeless, the mentally iil and the aged. AU of these

organizations share one commooality in their design. They are govemed

by a board. (Breon 43)

Consequently, the management, hding, and legal responsibilities of the company are not controlled by artists, but rather by a board ofvolunteer directors. These volunteers are almost never artists themselves but are patrons of the arts and theatre they serve. They are people esteemed for their economic or cultural positions in the community they represent, wïth experience and corporate (hding) contacts to contribute. They are described by the Canada Council as "welf-meaning, interested and innuential people within their communxfies and for the most part are dedicated to their theatres" (Canada Council, "Le théâtre" 38). As DiCenu, noted:

the board is one of the crucial means by which the policies and ninning of

theatre companies can be controlled or ai least rnodifed. . . . The purpose

of these bodies . . . is tu oversee, advise and be accountable for the general

management and operations of the company (Le. budgets, generd policy,

seat pricing, and negotiations with ail funding bodies, including the Arts

Council) as well as approving the artistic director's proposais for play

selection, personnel decisions and production. (120)

Robin Breon describes their composition as ccmainlyof diiettantes, wrporate CEOs, [and] political gadflies" (44), suggesting that the 'hiain reason for the presence of corporate officers on boards is the compettion for corporate dobafast shrinking pie that is out of reach of many small to mid-size organizations" (46).16

Through theH corporate positions and habitus, the members of the CentreStage and Toronto Free boards of directors substantially affwted the merger and the direction of Canadian Stage. Although merging Toronto Free and CentreStage grew fkom an economic impehis and around a cultural and artistic vision, the structure and support of the boards of directors advanced the concept into reahy. Reflecting this, the initial announcement of the merger on April 15, 1986, was foilowed by nearly hwo years of negotiations between the boards of directors before the two wmpanies were integrated under the name the Canadian Stage Company. An interirn goveming corn~nittee'~was aeated on January 29, 1987, to manage a aial combined 1987/88 season, while the separate boards of directors negotiated terms of the merger. '* The committee worked

16 An active fiindraising board of directors can achieve fantastic goals economically for the company. Peter Hermdorf, the fmt president and a member of the Canadian Stage Company board of directors, personally raid over $40,000 in less than a day in the fa11 of 1990 when a cash-flow crisis hit the company.

I7 This cornmittee consisteci of six board members, three fiom each Company: chairman Peter

Hermdorf (CentreStage), David Black (president, Toronto Free), Kathleen Hermant (president,

CentreStage), John Curtis and James Leech (Toronto Free), and John Palmer (CentreStage). l8 The corn b ined season was pu blicized togcther under "C entrestage Companyfloronto F ree

Theatre." At the Bluma Appel, CentreStage produced neHoue of Bermrda Alba by Federico

Garcia Lorca (a CO-productionwith the National Arts Centre), A Stephen Sondheim Evening . . .

You 're Gonna Love Tomorrow by Stephen Sondheim, Nothing Sacred by George F. Walker, with senior staR(including Glassco, Dobie, and Sprung) to "shepherd the merger implementafon process . . . and orchestrate the creation of the new merged theaire" and provide "oversight" for the operations and finances of both companies for 1987 and plan for the l988/89 raasom (Canadian Stage, '?merid Jan. 29, 1987).

Tension between the two companies was at times high during negotiations, for which solutions were almost "all done on dreams and keeping your kgers crossed"

(Hermant interview), while solutions were primariiy concemed with deconim, "making sure everyow was cornfortable" (Leech interview). The iack of integration in artistic leadership or staff are prime examples of how the merger negotiations were "totaily a compromise ali the way through" (Leech interview), maintaining the statu quo and power structures of both cultures. '' In response to Glassco and Spnmg's personal ambitions and '"reasonable expectations" of running the new company (Rafelman 57), the boards of directors had to remind the artistic directors that it was 'bot their company" and if the dflerences between them could not resolved, the "comminee would go out and recniit someone who could run it" (Herrndorf interview).

Observe The Sons of Ulster Marching Towards the Somme by Frank McGui~ess,and Macbeth

(a co-production with Garth Drabinsky). At 26 Berkeley Street, Toronto Free produced:

Detaining Mr. Trotsky by Robert Fothergill, Flesh and Clay (a CO-productionwith the Phyzikal

Theatre), Emerald City by David Williamson, and L 'HommeGris by Marie Laberge. l9 The physical integration of both staffs (onginally planned for June 1987) into the renovated 26

Berkeley Street offices was postponed. The combined staffs were housed together until the Fa11 of 1987 in the CenaStage off~cesat 44 Wellington Street while large tanks of "potentially carcinogenic coal tar" @obie interview) were removed from 26 Berkeley Street. Accordingly, a compromise of a two-year rotating dkectorship was proposed by

Glassco, Dobie, and Sprung. In this agreement, both artistic directors would sign four- year contracts as "Co-Artistic Directors," rotating every two years the role of ''Producing

Co-Artistic Director," where nnal decisions and responsibility would lie. It was decided that Glassco would take on the deof producing artistic director fbi, allowing Sprung to become familiar with managing and programming the larger theatre ~~ace.~'Not wishuig to relinquish their individual power positions, both CO-artisticdirectors insisted their sta& be retained, resuiting in the redundant doubling of many positions under différent names. This included Cathy McKeehan, whose position as interim generai manager of

Toronto Free became that of Troducer" for the new company, with Edgar Dobie fullilling similar duties as "General Manager." The reaof this compromise was a failure of the merger on a corporate level: no integration of staff, no substantial . . administrative swings, and control of the company split between company cultures.

The merger was arguably most "successfbl on the board level" (Hermdorf interview), but reflected a similar protective strategy. The new ''community" board of directors (of nearly 50 members) almost exclusively consisted of former board members fiom the parent companies. Two artists were appointed to this board, but both were 'tery

Spmng had a taste of what it was like to run a regional theatre in the 1987/88 season when, taking a sabbatical fiom Toronto Free, he acted as interirn artistic director at "the moribund and troubled" Vancouver Playhouse (C onlogue, "Centrestage, Free Theatre"). This reflected the agreement that Glassco was to have the fmt term as producing artistic direztor for the fkt two seasons (1 987/88 and 1988/89), and the understanding that the rotating directorship would allow the co-artistic directors to explore other functions in the artistic community. tirnid. They very much held back ïhey were in awe of the big board and the very formal agendas and the nature of things that were discussed that were very much organisat ional and financiai" (Black interview). Likewise, these organisational and

financial decisions protected the conflicting cuitures instead integrating them. Rather than trying to reduce the combineci debt load, which was over $1,000,000, culhvally and economicaily the discussions were "around the maintenance of the sum of the two gants

. . . and not near enough was spent on the organisation as a whoIe and what was its revenue generating potential" (Leech interview). This lack of integration in cultures and mismanagement of financial resources, created several forces homo logous with those fiom the parent companies ' pre-merger periods.

But Was it Humble Pie?

The theatre community was split in its opinion of the merger of Toronto Free and

Centrestage. Some, including the stakeholders and funding agencies, were supportive of the theatre on the nationahtic side, but con£lict arose between Glassco and Spning's

ambitions and other theatres. The idea was not sold to the tbeatre comrnunity and

nothing was done "to overcome that, or try to help them understand" (Sprung interview).

Reflecting the fears of the theatre cummunity, leaders of many Toronto theatres,

including Cats co-producer Marlene Smith, Young People's Theatre general manager

June Fadkner, and Tsmigon Theatre artistic director Urjo Kareda, spoke publicly,

voicing concems which ultimately revolved around the economic and cultural capital the

two companies wouId acquire by merging.

1 am concemed that the amalgamation is perceived as a crowbar by which

control of the [St. Lawrence] centre will be levered away fiom the board of management. . . . Clearly, extra funding will be needed to support a

larger Company with big plans. It means the fimding pie wiil have to go

farther than it does now, or that hdsto which the rest of us don't have

access (such as the direct linancial assistance council recently gave

Centrestage and Toronto Free in the fonn of a $250,000 loan to the former

and a guaranteed $100,000 Line of credit to the latter) will suddenly be

found. (in Quill, c'Supertheatre's takeover")

A bittemess developed in the community, nornished by gossip and cavalier actions. Spning's response to Kareda's comments was to send "him, by courier, a wonderful apple pie, [saying] 'Urjo, it's al1 yours'" (Sprung interview), demonstrating

Sprung's disposition. This uneasiness is expressed by a York University theatre student, who noted that the merger created

an almost paranoic tension in the Toronto theatre community. 1 say this in

Light of the largely negative responses 1 received in my quest for

interviews of Toronto theatre personalit ies. Ujo Kareda, the artist ic

director of the Tarragon Theatre, gave a rather brusque telephone refusal

of my endeavours that can be best sumrnarized by his words: have been

misquoted enough . . . 1 want to taIk about things concerning the Tanagon

now." The initial response fkom Centrestage was: "(Mr. Glassco) does

not wish to make a statement at this the." From Toronto Free, 1 was at

frst told that "(I'd) be best to leave (the merger) alone for awhile." Still

echoing in the receiver of my phone are phrases such as: "But I don't think

she' ll want to talk about it either," and, "I don? thkyou' 11 have much luck with hia" At kst1 was hstrated by these rejectiom, but then 1

realized that these very honest and somewhat emotional responses were in

fact the very cmof the matter. Why is it that no one wants to taik about

this merger? . . . The unavoidable hct about theatre in Toronto is that [it]

must act as a business to progress as an art form, and therefore will always

succumb to a sense of cornpetition. The opponents of the merger are

simply protecting their interests, just as the rnerging companies are

protecîhg their own interests. (Farbndge 1-9)

Audiences were likewise uneasy about the rnerger of Centrestage and Toronto

Free as the Canadian Stage Company. Centrestage's subscriptions dropped to an au-time low in 1988 as subscribers registered their displeasure both with the more challenging programming, and with the prospect of having to see plays at Toronto Free. Ow subscriber stated: "I want to stay at CentreStage, 1don? want to go to the Toronto Free.

Aesthetically it just isn't the same kind of theatre" (Conlogue, "United "). These growing pains reflected a lack of understanding of the audiences on the part of the Canadian Stage

Company staff in mgto amalgamate the two audiences imrnediately. A multiple array of possible subscript ion packages was of5ered including programming in the B luma

Appel Theatre and 26 Berkeley Street. Many did not want to leave the cornforts of the

Bluma Appel Theatre, while others found the number of options and spaces confusing.

As McKeehan recalled, 'We got across to the theatre community and we got it across to the entertainment press, but I'm not certain that it got across to subscribers" (McKeehan interview). Intemal morale problems were aha concem for the Canadian Stage Company.

Power stniggles developed between the two corporate cultures over their status in the new compny. In a material example of this, access to the company's theatre spaces became a point of contention when McKeehan was denied keys to 26 Berkeley Street. Yt was just people who didn't get it in terms of the big pictue, who saw the size of their carpet in their office shrinking and had no concept of where we all couid be ifwe ali picked up an oar and starteci to row instead of clubbing others with it" (McKeehan interview)? Tensions developed throughout the new Company, including between

Sprung and GIassco, who admitted to having "some disag~eernent,'but with creative reso lut hm,' says Spmg" (Crew, "New theatre").

As a result of growing troubles, many on a personal level several staff members left the company or were dismissed, including McKeeban, who left in Febniary 1988.

Nothing, however, could have prepared the structure or culture of Canadian Stage for the departure of Edgar Dobie as general manager, announced at the fist official Canadian

Stage board of directors meeting on April 14, 1988. Dobie, who had been working part- tirne for Garth Drabinsky's Live Entertainment Inc. with ''the blessing" of the

Centrestage board of directos (Hermant interview), was offered a better position and felt obligated to accept. Dobie recalled that he simply "ran out of steaxn," finding it dBcuh

This situation climaxed when, on the opening night of Detoining Mr. Trotsky (Oct. 2 1, 1987), a fie broke out in the costume storage room at 26 Berkeley Street. Ironically, a fie at the campus was the exact hypothetical situation McKeehan had used in a discussion about access to the building on the &y of the fre. to continue in the compromised rotating directorsbip that he helped engineer. '4 was happy workuig for Bill Glassco, [but] 1 was never going to be happy working with Guy, 1 never bought into that" (Dobie interview).

Dobie's replacement, L~MOsmond, was found by the Canadian Stage board of directors in August 1988 and was reded nom the London Symphony as the best available candidate to act as "the peanut butter in the sandwich" of the two artistic directors (Osmond interview). In this decision, Spning med to fight for his first preference7 Elaine Caldweil, and in retrospect said he chose not to subject his second choice, Chris Wooten, to the "snake pif' Canadian Stage was becoming (Sprung interview). Syrnptomatic of the tensions attnbuted to Sprung and his personal ambition, he refused to accept Osmond:

I have never explained this to mybody, and it's my own deviousness here

. . . I got hung by my own whatever-. . . I was so confident that there

wouid never be a problem in terms of my own long-tem fbture. 1thought

to myself, tactically, we'U hire Pym Osmond] for the next two years, we

can get through, she bas certain managerial skills, and then 1'11 find the

person 1 really want to work with who will be my partner into the fùtwe. 1

did not expect her lasting more than one term. (Sprung interview)

Spning's aspiration for Canadian Stage also conflicted with the material reality of the company's finances and status, Merunderminhg the company's financial position.

Many, including Glassco, felt that the choice of Osmond was fhdty, because she

"couldn't handle Guy, and L~Mwasn't experienced ewugh with theatre to run the company" (Giassco interview). Glassco himself found Spning difncult to work with, believing Sprung had pushed Dobie out of the organisation. Over the choice of Osmond,

GIassco "gave way in that because I'd lost interest finally" (Glassco interview). Upon completion of his tenure at the end of the L 988/89 season, Glassco was invited to Quebec

City to direct. He handed the producing CO-artisticdirectorship over to Spning, requesting his tale and role in the Company be reduced:

1 said 'Guy you don? need me here, you don't consult me on anything,

and you're not going to Men to me anyway. You're not going to do what

1 think is right. You may say you're going to iisten, but 1 know what

you're going to do in the end. This is ridiculous, so I'm not going to bang

around, but I'm on the other end of the phone if you need me.' So 1 went

off to Quebec City, and 1 spent about four momhs there. (Glassco

interview)

Tensions were also high at the board of directors level. From the initial wgotiation period, the "emphasis was on presenring what had gone on in the past instead of working for the fûture" (L,eech interview). The culturai division between Toronto Free and Centrestage was still dominant at the board level, reflected in the dissipation of energies over the many activities Canadian Stage represented-Dream in High Park, the

Bluma Appel season, the 26 Berkeley Street season, the Hour Company, and the Forum programme-with the same amount of energy king put into each (Leech interview).

Sorne members expressed nervousness about Sprung 's directorship for the 19 89/90 season and the growing debt. Canadian Stage's president, Peter Herrndod was intent on seeing Spning serve his term as producing CO-artisticdirector despite the concerns. Over the issue, several long-standing members left the company-, including Me1 MO^^? and

John ~almer,%easurer of Canadian Stage. With Sprung's assumption of the artistic leader de, a change in board leadership occmed. Hmdoa the company 's fkst president, stepped down and with the help of Osmond and Sprung, pemiaded James

Leech, formerly Toronto Free and then Canadian Stage's fbdraising coordinator, to reverse roIes with him.

Held Together With Bubble Oum and BaiMng Wire

While the cuhural and personal tensions of the company shaped Canadian Stage during its first three years, its economic tensions were most influential, especially during the 1989/90 season The Canadian Stage's hancial condition-with its growing debt loads fkom an initial over-estimation of revenues and an under-estimation of expenses4eterrnined that the goal of acquiring similar economic and cultural "fiagship" status as the Stratford and Shaw festivals was impossible. While the company's economic capital-reflected through its funding, which reached a total of S505,OOO nom

"~o~ermade several recommendatiow before leaving presented at a board of directon meeting in September 1989, Uicluding: a reduction in the size ofthe board of directors; a compulsory board orientation for new members; better and more timely information from staff members; that the company should confiont its financial situation more candidly: ''The board is being utopian, not realistic. The board is deceiving itself, and that has only bought some time" (in "Canadian

Stage Board of Directors Minutes* Sept. 15, 1989).

Not to be mistaken for the playwright John Palmer who helped found Toronto Free, who lefi the organization in the early 1980s. the Canada Council in 1988/89-was comparable to Shaw Festival's (at a total of

$455,000 in the same season), corresponding cuiturai capital was not achieved. The

Canadian Stage Company, as a major Canadian mt-for-profit theatre company, instead materidy embodied the distinction between "medium-sized" theatres and the "large mainstream flqship" theatres. This position, although an improvement fiom the positions held by the parent companies alone, was equivalent to the established cultural and economic position of the Canadian regional theatres, like the Vancouver Playhouse, the Citadel Theatre, Theatre New Brunswick, and Centau Theatre. The resulting perceived regionalism of Cansdian Stage, coupled with the former position held by

CentreStage as a regiod theatre, worked against its mandate on many levels, including the reception of Canadian works in its theatres.

Notwithstanding extenial funding, it was the Canadian Stage's intemai economic concerns that were paramount in moving the board of directon towards dismisshg Guy

Sprung. At the tirne of their merger, the combined Liabilities of Toronto Free and

CentreStage was nearly $1,000,000. Additionally, Osmond realized early in her appointment in 1988 îhat financial concems prevailed over the initial Canadian Stage

1988/89 season. She projected a $1,000,000 shortfall for this seasos and upon approaching the board of directors and producing CO-artisticdirector Gh8c0, found "no one was willing to change the season's iine up" for fèar it may damage Canadian Stage's image (Osmond interview). Consequently, the operating deficit was S 1,3 79,78 1 for the year ending June 30,1989 (Canadian Stage, 'TFinancial").

Two additionai circumstances added to the financial strife of the company.

Renovations to the Berkeley Street offices were undenvay, creating a substantial draw on the company's hds. Additionally, an $85,000 cutback in Canada Council fimding was announceci in July 1989, biinging the total Council funding for Sprung's nrst season as producing CO-artisticdirector down IFom $460,000 in l988/89 to $375,000 in l989/90.~~

Mirroring Tomnto Free's financiai crisis five years earlier, on November 22, 1989,

Osmond reportai to the board that the ajmpany was in a "cash flow squeeze." To keep the theatre fiom closing, a major bank agreed to permanently extend the company's line of credit using Chalmers Foundation fûnding as collateral (Canadian Stage, "Boardof

Directors," 22 Nov. 1989).

Although subscription sales reached 13,024 by November 1 989, attendance was not as high as anticipated at the beginning of Sprung7s£kt season, and represented only

"52 percent of what it was in the early 1980s'' as Centrestage and Toronto Free (Burrows,

"Marketing"). Mixed reviews and box office concerns fkom the staff integration at

'' In a letter to then head of the Canada Council's Theatre Section, John Murrell, Guy Sprung wrote on behalf of the Canadian Stage Company: ". . . the Canada Council's cutback of $85,000 in our gant . . . consfitutes a very serious breach of understanding based for us on a number of previous conversations with the Canada Council Theatre Officers. When Bill and 1 were contemplating the merger (before the fmt press conference of carly 1986)' we had an initial meeting . . . Anna Stmtton and Jeremy Long [Cana& Council theatre oficers] both expressed a great deal of support for the concept of the merger and stated that the merger would never be used as an excuse to make a cutback in the grants to the organization* (Sprung, "Leiter to John

Murrell," July 4, 1989). Berkeley ~tree? wntributed to the low subscription numbers and poor single ticket sales. To compensate, the Canadian Stage management closed its Dowostairs Theatre production of The Tnal of Judith K by Sdy Clark two weeks early, resulting in a savings of $16,000. That Spning was direct* the company from Moscow (where he was preparing a production of A Midsummer Nighl 's Dream) added to the concerns about his leadership, both in and outside of the company: "1 think it gave people a sense he was interested in aggrandisement. 1 don? think that was necessarily true, 1 think he enjoyed going to Moscow, and 1 think it was a great experience for him, but it did create some pro blems at home" (Glassco interview).

Wth mediocre results at the box office, programming concems became prirnary for Canadian Stage both culturally and tinancially. Culhually, Sprung 's c ho ice in that season of bringing the English Stage Company to perfonn Timberlake Wertenbaker's

Our Country's Good and George Farquhar's The Recruiting Wcerin the Bluma Appel

Theatre was seen as a threat to the Canadian mandate of the c~rn~an~:~~"Actor's Equity even sent an officiai letter decrying the inclusion of the British company in our season as

'detrimental to Canadian Theatre"' (Sprung with Much 2). Taking the economic

The phone numba in the advertising for 7ke Trial of Judith K. was reqxatedly p~tedwrong, providing the derwith the St. Lawrence Centre box ofice, who were neither helpful nor kind to patrons phoning to make reservations for the Berkeley Street theatres.

* "It is as if by inviting the ESC, the CSC hoped that its place in Canadian theatre would be legitirnized and that we would see the two companies as theatrical doubles" (Wilson, "The

English Stage Companyn i 4 1). initiative of closing The Trial of Judith K. early also created cultural backlash f?om the theatre community, including the playwright, cast, and ~rew.~'

Financiaily, Sprung's first Canadian Stage season h 1989f90 did not fiire well.

By December 1989, the season was carrying a deficit of $800,000, adding to the growing debt lefi fkom Glassco 's seasons as producing CO-artisticdirector. This added to the uneasiness already felt by the board of directors about Sprung's leadership and his proposed l99O/9 1 all-Canadian sea~oa~~The board of directors feh that "revenues must be fodand the "100% Canadian 90/91 season [was] too aggressive, and changes" needed to be made (Canadian Stage "Board of Directors," Dec. 11, 1989). Adding to these concems, December 1989 brought another "cash squeeze" in which Canadian Stage could not meet its next two payrolls. This was partially due to accounting mors on the part of the St. Lawrence Centre box office, which held a percentage of Canadian Stage's revenues as deposit. "When we reconciled the box office [figures], we were sure ththe

St Lawrence Centre owed us a couple hundred thousand dollars we couidn't get released.

Sally Clark's letter to Canadian Stage regarding the premahue closure of The Trial ofJudirh K. was a scathing commentary on the company's "mispiaced loyalty," treatment of artists and crew, lack of publicity and organization within the Company, and Spmng's leadership (Clark 1).

" The al1-Canadia.n season was: At the Bluma Appel: a Michael Hollingsworth adaptation of

Martin Chuzzlewitf by Charles Dickens, Forbidden Chrismius, a musical by Margaret Atwood,

Narcisse Mondoux by Gratien Gelinas and Huguette Oligny, Of The Fields Lately by David

French, and a new musical by Paul Ledoux called Honky Tonky Angels; At 26 Berkeley Street:

How Could You Mrs. Dick? by Douglas Roger, La Maison Suspendue by Michel Tremblay, The

Weààing by Jim Harrison, and Suite by Peter Wildman and Rick Green of the Frantics. . . . As it tums out in the next month, it was obvious that their reconciliations were wrong and that they owed us that money" (Osmond interview).

ResponsibiIity T'km

The economic concems that dominated the tirne and energy of the board of directors and staff Ied Leech, as president, to heed the wamings of the company's executive and finance coITlfniftees that the 1990/91 season wouid only contribute to the company's debt. Several of the rnembers of the board of directors questioned whether the company could continue with Sprung as producing CO- artistic director (Herrndorf interview). During a meeting on March 2 1, 1990, prornpted by the board's concems and the structure of Canadian stage,z9 Leech established a review cornmittee. Chaired by

Leech, and composed of board members Linda Intaschi, a "fkeelance arts consultant,"

Trina McQueen, a senior CBC executive producer, Trevor Goodgoll, an advertising executive and Austin Page fiom Tridel (a property development finn) (Cordogue, "Cross

Curent'') the cornmittee's duties were to

assess, fiom both interna1 and extemal points of view, the current position

of the Company, assess the relevame/ importance of the Company's

mandate and the Company's execution of same' assess the artistic and

" These circumstances included the fact that at three years old, it was time for a "comprehensive assessrnent and reviewn of the company's mandate; contracts for the Spmg and Osmond would expire in eighteen months, Glassw and otha senior staff had leA or were leaving the company; and a feeling that Canadian Stage had alienated a number of their stakeholden, "particularly within the community" (Canadian Stage Company Review Cornmittee, 3). . . admmstmtive leadership of the Company, [and] make recommendations

with regard to leadership and leadership structure of the Company for the

next thRe years. (Canadian Stage Company Review Committee, 3)

In fulfilling its goals, the review cornmittee conducted twenty-five interviews, involving over fifty inte~eweesfiom a selection of current and former employees, members of the boani of directors, fiinding agencies, goverrunent officials and the theatre commmity.

The cornmittee's report cietennined thai the Canadian Stage Company was "an essential participant in the Canadian theatre scene" and that there was an "ovenvhelming desire on the part of ail stakeholders to see the Company flourish" (Canadian Stage

Company Review Committee 2). The Company, however, Medto perform to its expected level aïienating artists, and not commining itself to developing new work. Its mandate was recogd as valid but too broad, resulting in a loss of vision and disappointment in the Compmy 's performance. The leadership, under Spnrng, was found to be "disorganized" and 'Yailing to establish a record of creative excelience on stage" (Canadian Stage Company Review Cornmittee 2).

The cornmittee's conclusions included that Canadian Stage fêced a cuItural and economic "crisis that undermine[d] its self confidence and threaten[ed] its very existence," reding from a crippling financial deficit, a lack of clear goals, a lack of artistic/rnanagement leadership and a Ioss of connection to its "customers" (Canadian

Stage Company Review Cornmittee 11). The report recommended installing leadership that would "inst ill confidence by 'input' stakeholders (employees, theatre comrnunity, fuoding agencies) to support Canadian Stage through the recovery period and beyond" and to focus the execution of the company 's mandate to re-establish contact with Toronto's theatre audience and Canada's theatre community (Canadian Stage Company

Review Cornmittee 1 1).

nie reaction to this report within the company was divided, reflecting the Toronto

Fred Centrestage divisions within the Canadian Stage board of directors. 'O In an executive cornmittee meeting on June 4, 1990, a motion was put forward to follow the review cornmittee's recommendations. The motion was carrieci," resuiting in the dismissal of Guy Spning and LpOsmond and the appointment of Bill Glassco as artistic director and Bob Bake~(director of Canadian Stage's first production, B-Movie:

The Play, in 1988) as Deputy Artistic Director and Artistic Director ~esi~nate.~*Sprung was informeci that evening by Leech.

That he brought David Biack was an immediate signal that the news was

going to be disastrous. . . . The board, Tiinformed me, had decided the

theatre needed "a change of leadership." They had looked at the cash flow

projections for the season that they had accepted back in January and

" Out of respect for those people discussed in the report presented on June 4, 1990. the report "was collected fiom each member, . . . Copies, sanitized to remove comments on incumbents, were distributed to ail interviewees and to the arts comrnunity in general" (Leech, ernail communication).

" Six in favour (Gerald Caplan, Trevor Goodgoll, Peta Hemdorf, James Leech, Linda Intaschi, and Richard Michaelides) and 1 against (David Black) (Canadian Stage "Board of Directors"

June 4, 1998).

Glassco would not stay long, leaving in the fdl of 1990 to allow Baker to rake over as artistic director saon &a the Canadian Stage Company's l99OI9 1 season opened. announced in Marc4 and concluded that unless they acted now the theatre

would have to close its doors by October. The ody hope for survival, the

board felt, was to "chop off my head," as Jim put it, and to go begging to

the funding agencies for baii-out money, staîing, 'Took, we have made a

hshstart. Save W." (Spning with Much 71-2)

The news of Sprung's dismissal hit the news-stands in the early moming edtion of the

Toronto Star on June 6, hours before Spnmg spoke before the board to what he saw as unfaimess in the review process and his dismissai (Crew, 'Canadian Stage"). Leech, who chaired the fàtefùl meeting dismissing Sprung, made it clear that the board of directors had no other choice in their actions, considering the company's economic situation. h his opinion, cuiturally and economidy, the Company was "held together with bubble gum and bailing wire."

It was very clear to me, at least, that we couldn't tum it around if [Sprung

and Osmond] were there. . . . The day 1 presented that report fiom the

review comminee, there were receivers in the other room preparing for

bankniptcy. This thing was B-A-N-K-R-U-P-T.It was over, it was all

gone. In many ways my Me would bave been a lot easier ifwe had just

fiied. . . . In my experience, the only way you could rally people in a kind

of hopeless situation was if you had leadership tbat everyone [could]

believe in. (Leech interview)

With banlûuptcy loomin& Glassco and Baker went to work immediately to re- programme the 1990191 season, attempting to assure the existence of Canadian Stage by establishing stable economic capitaL The resulting cancellation of Sprung's l99OI9 1 season appeared as "unusuai costs" of â434,077 in the statement of operaiions for the year ending June 30, 1990, reflecting many contract obligations "previously entered into production costs already incurred for cancelled productions and certain CO sts for marketing materials which were rendered unusable. Also inccluded in unusual costs are the Company's obligations and provisions for obligations under employment contracts which were terminateci" (Canadian Stage, b'~tatement'').33 Despite this expendmire, t was believed that changing the leadership and re-focusing the company into one wing culture wouid tum the cornpany's financiai woes around.

React ion to Sprung's dismissal with Toronto 's theatre community-coupled with the reaction of the cancellation and re-prograrnming of the 199O/9 1 season-was col& even among those who initially voiced their concenis about the creation of the Cadian

Stage Company. The Dora Mavor Moore Awards ceremony held less than two weeks after the artistic "hijackmg" of the company (Spning with Much 73) was a scene of silent protests made by artists against the blatant demonstnition of corporate po wer over artistic structure." The theatre community was disturbed by the scapegoating of Sprung by

Canadian Stage's board of directors, but was not blind to Spruog's shortfklls as producing co-artistic director of the company. As Conlogue noted: "Have you noticed the trouble

- - -

" This figure does not reflect a salement with Sprung, which was for an undisclosed amount, in

October 1990.

Y At the Dora Awards, several playwrights wore buttons commemorating productions cancelled fiom Canadian Stage's 199019 1 season: "Honky Tonky Angels: Cast away by Canadian Stage,"

"Forbidden Christmas: Durnped by Canadian Stage," "Martin Chuzzlewitt: Killed by Canadian

Stage," "The Weddiing: Givm the Boot by Canadian Stage" (McKcehan interview). people have been having cnticizing the board of Canadian Stage for dismisshg Guy

Spnmg? 'Poor timing,' they say, not 'you shoddn't have doue it."' He continues, stating that Sprung had lost a surprishg amount of support in the theatre community, and had

pushed his luck too fàr. With the theatre a million-plus in debt, he

proposed a high-risk second season . . . his own senior staff. incMing

rotaihg co-artistic director Bill Glasxo, felt the new plays were not ready

for production and wodd Mertamish the company's reptation.

According to current chairman Jim Leech, the board was 'bombardeci'

with cornplaints fiom both inside and outside Canadian Stage. So there

is-sadly-no argument here about the dismissal of Sprung. (Conlogue,

"Cross Cment")

Conlogue continued his commentary on Sprung's dismissal in another article. In it, he commented on the Wlashpoints" of Sprung 's tenure as producing co-artisric director that shouid have alerted him to the concems and feelings of the Toronto theatre community.

mis decision to close Saily Clark's new play the Trial of Judiih K . . . led

to a public letter fiom the cast claiming @eJwas fgiling to support

Canadian work. . . . In any otha context tban the emotional and

unbusinesslike one of Toronto theatre, he wodd have been seen to be

taking the only possible action. . . . But Spnmg had by this time alienated

so many people that he no longer received a fàir hearing. . . . It is very

likely that Spnmg made too many mistakes. Ceaainly he fàiled to create a

new-play development department, and he Wed to delegate meaningful authority to other artists in the company. It may weii be that, at contract

rewwal the, he shouid have been made to cumpete with other candidates

who woukl have better ideas on how to accomplish these things. But by

cuaing him off the board is sending a businessm's message: we want

resuits DOW. (Codogue, "Director's support')

It was this message against which the artists protested, in fear of losing control of the companies they had created. A letter demanding the resignation of Canadian Stage's board of directors, signed by seventy-four members of the tkatre community (including artktic directors Susan Serran and Richard Rose, and actors R & Thompson and Seana

McKenna) reflected this concern:

We fel unanimously that the actions of the Canadian Stage Board of

Directors raises [sic] many questions about the nature of public tnisteesbip

and in particular, the relatiomhip between boards of directors and staff in

professional, perfonning arts groups. . . . The issue for us is one of board

accountability. Who are the Boards accoumable to? And, what are

Boards accomtable for? Boards of Directors must understand tbat fht

and foremost they exist to facilitate the creation of art and the development

and conservation of artists and audiences. (Senan 1)

Despite the cornmuity's backlash, the cultural and economic effect of the alteration of the Canadian Stage Company's image (fkom artistic to corpome) and face

(amstic leader), ukimately as- the survival of the company. In consideration of the forces, both intanal and externai, acting on the cultural and ecommic organisational struchire of Canadian Stage, that no other alternative was apparent to the board of directors is significant in demo11stfacing the corporate positions of members of the board.

It is also sigaificanf in deniolistrating the residual effects of the Centrestage disposition towards transition for survival, as evidenced in their pre-merger history. This protective disposition reveals the dominance ofone culture over the other as the merger of Toronto

Free and Centrestage as the CdianStage Company was forcibly coosummated by the board of directors with the introduction of a cuituraUy uwncumbered artistic director. CONCLUSION: All Roads Lead to the Mainstage

The dominant corporate culture that appears to emerge within the supporting structure of the Canadian Stage Company, prompting the intemai review and decision to dismiss Guy Sprung and Lynn Osmond, was not new nor particuiar to one parent company. This culhire was, in îàct7the basis for the structure of Centrestage Company and the goal towards which Spniog and Toronto Free Theatre, despite the leftist rhetoric, aspked. The corpontte culture, embodied and supported by the structure of the board of directors, mirrors the strategy of corporate growth advocated by the Canada Council through its stnichaing and hierarchization of theatre in Canada

The integrated corporrrte cubes of Toronto Free and Centrestage and the

Canadian Stage interim goveniing cornmittee, embraced a disposition of preservation and deconun, represented by the CO-existenceand maintenance of the two distinct founding cuhures. This reflected confiicting aspirations for cultual dominance and the corresponding "bigger is bette?' mentaiity evident in both the Toronto Free and

CentreStage cultures. The board of directors, however, was secure in the knowledge that within the structure of the co-artistic directorship, Glassco's presence would maintain a corporate stabiiity because of his personal habmis and position as leader of the more outwardly corporate-minded Centrestage. Tbrough this leadership structure, however, the Canadian Stage Company became "heteronomous cultural producers7" unabie to resist economic or cultural demands. To pmtect its own position, this CO-artisticleadership structure was, for the board of directos, a defensive strategy against Spning's autonomy, similar to Bourdieu's cuiturai 'Weapons," and serving "the interests of the dominant hctions of the dominant class, who obviously have an interest in there king ody one hierarchy" (Bourdieu, The Field" 4 1).

Glassco's depamrre to Quebec City in 1989, however, was a blow to the curporate cuitme's secllnty and hierarchization of the cornpany 's culture. Largely because of

Spning's performance as producing CO-artisticdirector in the 1989/90 season, a large hction of the Canadian Stage board (mostly fornier Centrestage board members) became msettled by his revolutionary, politicai, and autonomous disposition and the prospect of him continuhg in the cornpany's leadership role for the 1WO/9 1 season.

These members were most concerned about losing cultural and ecowmic capital invested in the new Company, and were concerned about the imerests and invesmients which were at stake,

even if they are not remgnized as such; a certain "bvestment" is made,

even if' it is not recognized as an invesmient. These interests and

investments can be anaiysed in terms of an economic logic without m any

way reducing them to economics, for the sauaural homology between

fields does not imply structural identity. The idea that there are dif5erent

kinds of capital which are invested in different fields of activity in

accordance with the specific interests of the field Qi question (and of the

agents involved) allows Bourdieu to develop what he called a "general

science of the economy of practices," within which one can analyse "ail

practices, including those purporthg to be disinteresteci or -OUS, and

hence material or syrnbolic pro&." (R Johnson 8) The primary Uivestment made in volunteering time and energies to the creation and maintenance of the Canadian Stage Company was the symbolic capital of being associateci with the cutting edge of Tomnto's theatre comrminity and as founders of the m@or Cmdian wn-pront theatre Company. As patroos and members of the Canadian

Stage Company, it was paramount to the cultural symbo lic positions of the members of the board of directors to protect what they perceived as the cultural and economic integrity of the wqany. This perception was based upon the board of directors' collective desire for personal (symbolic, culturai, etc.) gain and habitus, which was, as represented in 3s leadership,35 predominantly corporate and capitalist ic.

The decision to protect this dominant perception and hierarchization of the compmy resulted in the fortincation of the corporate culture's position on the board of directors through a series of resignations, mstly by former Toronto Free board members. These resignations were not force4 but rather the resuit of personal dilemmas with the board's decision. Those members that resigwd either opposed the dismissal of

Spmg at the the of the board's decision, or subsequently felt moral remorse. Board members Tom Butler, Julius Deutsch, Catherine Mcleod and George Thomson believed that the board's actions were "a stumiing manipulation of democratic process" (Butler 1).

In resigning, Thomson cited his reasons as king a loss of confidence in the board's

"abiiity as Public Trustees to supply governance that is diligent, credible and mie to our original mandate" (1).

" James Leech was the president of Unicorp Canada Corp., which successfully acquired control of Union Enterprisa Ltd. in 1985, becoming one of the largest corporations in Canada in the mid- to late- 1 980s. As the most vocal member and only vote against the executive cornmittee's decision to dismiss Sprung and Osmond, former president of Toronto Free David Black, fek "utterly humiliated and ashamed" by the board's actions (Black, "Letter," June 7,

1990, 1). Initially, Black did not fodysubmit his resignation, believing such an act

'%ouid be interpreted as a loss of confidence and as a public slap in the hce to the Theatre and the group who are in charge" (Black, "Letter," June 7, 1990, 1). Witnessing the ovenvhelming response fiom a prominent section of the tbeatre community, however, which included a personal letter nom Shaw Festival's artistic director Christopher

Newton and generd manager EIaine Caldwell, who were "disturbed by [the board of directors'] fidure to appreciate the values of the community [they] support" (Caldwell 3),

BIack believed:

that the executive committee must issue a public apology to the theatre

community, to Lynn and Guy, and to the remainder of the Board of

Directors. 1 believe there must be an immediate and drastic change in the

composition of the executive committee. For me the only honest course is

to submit my resignation as a Director of The Canadian Stage Company

and as a member of its executive cornmittee. (Black, "Letter,"June 25,

1990, 1)

Despite Black's comments and resignation, no drastic change was made to the structure or composition of the board of directors or executive comminee, and no apology was issued,

Perhaps due to what the theatre community perceived as the board of directors' apathetic behaviour concerning its dismissal of Sprung and Osmond, a controversy resurfàced hmthe Stratford Festival's firing of its four-person artistic directorship in

1980. The recurrence of such similar circumstances de"it vitai that the theatre

community discuss the deof their boards of directors" (Burrows, 'Vp Against" 7). The

St. Lawrence Centre FONIXI,~~with the Professional Association of Canadian Theatres

(PACT), "co-sponsored a panel discussion on the relationship between artists and arts boards" (Burrows,'Wp Against" 7). Not surprisingly, this forum echoed (in a lesser degree) the January 1990 Ontario Arts Council task force report on professional non- pro& theaîres, entitled Places. Please. As Malcolm Burrows noted in 'Vp Against the

Boards,"

Among other things, the report recommends that artist-nm and small

theatres be ailowed to adopt alternative management structures; that

theatres be required to define the roles of their boards; and that boards

clady their constitutions and by-laws to ensure that member s'

responsibilit ies, performance obligations, and tenure are defined and

enforceable. As John Curtis, the only Canadian Stage board member to

speak at the fonun, put it: "The ody tirne the board cdsthe shots is when

the professional staff is elher argua among st itself, or knowing ly cds

the wrong shots. The only time a board bas power is when the

--

Ironically, this was one of the fmt programmes for the St. Lawrence Centre Forum, which was

the restructureci and transformeci Canadian Stage Company Forum, as a result of the Canadian

Stage Company's refocusing of prionties in theu programmes. The Forum, dong with its

producer Pattersoa Higgins, lefl the Canadian Stage Company in the summer of 1990, with its

final program held at Canadian Stage on June 14, 1990. professionais in that theatre misuse, or worse, fàii to use the power that

they have." (1 8)

The power Curtis neglects to recognize is the power the board bas in determinhg the company's dominant culture and, consequently, artistic leadership. As the example of the creation and re-structltring of the Canadian Stage Company demonstrates the control of our theatres rests with the boards of directors. AU decisions made by the company are therefore consciously or subconsciously based on the board of directors' habitus, which is uhimately based on the coliective history of the members of that board, the positions they occupy and the collective history of their dispositions.

The balance of power within Canadian Stage's structure becarrie increasingly corporate and "mainstream" upon Spmg's dismissal and the resignation of board rnernbers like Black and Thomson. The administration of Bob ~aker"best represents this disposition. Under him, as a culturally unencumbered leader, the board of directors and sWre-focused their energies and the organizational structure of Canadian Stage

Company. The remit was a strategic re-emphasis on the improvement of financial and economic capital (which meant the abandonment of any plans for a new theatre on the 26

Berkeley Street campus), and a culturai and economic modification of priorities based on the "Canadian" mandate. Baker and Leech, leaders of the organization's artistic and

Baker, who acted as artistic director of Edmonton's Phoenix Theatre from 1982-87, was chosen as amstic director designate with no formai search pmcess taken on by the board of directors. He was chosen on the basis of his success as a director for Canadian Stage (directing B-Movie: The

Play in 1988) and his "performance before the review cornmittee" as, in Leech's opinion, the best prepared interviewe (Leech, interview). corporate groups, agreed that ali Canadian Stage progranunhg wouid support the ecommica.ily lucrative mainstage, or otherwise be dropped (Leech, interview).

Consequently, in the fist two years after Spning's dismisad, the cultural opinion programme (the Forum) and children's theatre programme (the Hour Company) were disbanded. Of the four remaining programmes-the 26 Berkeley Street season, the Bluma

Appel season, the Dream in High Park and the new play development programme-priority was given to building the economic and culhual strength of the company's mainstage programme in the Bluma Appel Theatre (Canadian Stage,

"Strategic Review").

As is evident in the histories of Toronto Free and Centrestage, the mutual disposition of growth was the dridnving force behind the merging of their resources as the

Canadian Stage Company. The mutuaiity of the companies' stmggles and the straîegies and ideo logies of thek artistic leaders towards "Canadian"theatre worked to unite the mandates, corporate leaders and dissirniiar cultures with the cultural and economic dream of creating the mujor Canadm non-profit theatre company. In concluding this merger, the stratepic re-focusing of priorities towards the controlled cWand economic growth ofproftable programming reflected a climax in the integration process on both economic and cuhural levels, conso lidating their power and establishing a dominant Canadian Stage culhrre. The resultant culturat hegemony and acculturation of corporate over artistic cultures deiineates the economic hctions and requiremeets of the structure of a theatre company acting simultaneously as charitable insMution, social senice organisation and business. The absence of a completed imegration between Toronto Free and Centrestage makes the Canadian Stage Company cuWydiscordant, as continues to be evident in both its programmhg and theatre spaces. Works Cited

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