Naval War College Review Volume 54 Article 15 Number 4 Autumn
2001 Waging Modern War Patrick C. Sweeney
Wesley K. Clark
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Recommended Citation Sweeney, Patrick C. and Clark, Wesley K. (2001) "Waging Modern War," Naval War College Review: Vol. 54 : No. 4 , Article 15. Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol54/iss4/15
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BOOK REVIEWS
ONE MAN’S OPINION
Clark, Wesley K. Waging Modern War. New York: Public Affairs, 2001. 479pp. $30
This book is retired Army general Wesley makes it quite clear that he was seldom Clark’s anxiously awaited account of the Army’s favorite because of the many Nato’s operations in Kosovo, dubbed key positions he had held that helped po- ALLIED FORCE. As Clark was the Supreme sition him for his selection to SACEUR. Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) This section helps the reader to under- during Nato’s first war, his account of stand a bit about Clark’s leadership style this major operation is an important and attention to detail (less charitable contribution to the historical record of people would label him a micromanager) events that led to what many consider a and his view that the rest of the Army very controversial military endeavor. perceived him as an intellectual and not Waging Modern War is divided into four from the war-fighter mold. This is a key parts. The first briefly addresses General insight of a soldier never fully accepted Clark’s career and his early reputation as by his own, and it establishes a thread a “fast-burner.” It introduces Clark as the woven through the remainder of the new Director for Strategic Plans and Pol- book. icy (J-5) during the Bosnia-Herzegovina The second section details the events and war and presents the same cast of preparations that led up to Operation characters that he would see again later ALLIED FORCE. Clark lays out the plan- in his career as SACEUR. The J-5 posi- ning challenges he encountered in an alli- tion allowed Clark to cut his diplomatic ance that had been formed for an entirely teeth while supporting Ambassador Rich- different threat. At every turn he faced ard C. Holbrooke’s shuttle diplomacy, the need to compromise already accepted which eventually led to the Dayton planning procedures. To complicate accords. Most importantly, it was at this things, Clark discovered that his own na- time that Clark began to gain his own in- tional strategic-level leadership had little sights into Yugoslav president Slobodan understanding of his dual-hatted role as Milosevic and what made him tick. Commander in Chief, U.S. European Though Clark discounts any patronage Command, and SACEUR, and of the po- from his previous Arkansas connections litical responsibilities attendant upon the with former President Bill Clinton, he latter position. This was further
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2001 1 Naval War College Review, Vol. 54 [2001], No. 4, Art. 15
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complicated by the apparent lack of in- his subordinate, Lieutenant General Sir terest that was displayed by both the Michael Jackson of the British army, to Joint Chiefs of Staff and the national send forces into Pristina airfield to block command authorities in focusing upon the impending arrival of Russian forces. the Kosovo situation. Clark concludes with an examination of The third part of the book, “The Air his experience and its implications for fu- Campaign,” addresses the execution ture warfare. phase of ALLIED FORCE. Here Clark’s This is a worthwhile book for those inter- shortfalls in planning and his inability to ested in the Kosovo conflict and how the forge a supportive relationship with the Nato alliance works in practice. Subse- Joint Chiefs of Staff and the secretary of quent memoirs from other key partici- defense become apparent. Two days into pants will add balance to this historical the operation, Clark wrestled with the perspective. As for contributing to the implications of having no defined body of knowledge on military theory, as end-state and the resulting fuzzy linkage the title implies, one must be less enthu- between military and political objectives. siastic. Instead of presenting new theo- Incredibly, he attempts to deflect criti- retical constructs applicable to modern cism toward the political leadership for war, in reality the book displays the pit- the fundamental flaws in the plan. The falls faced by a joint-force commander effects of this confused strategy vacuum and his national-level superiors when lingered throughout the operation. In ad- they disregard the fundamental tenets of dition to the strategy challenges faced by operational art. Clark, the Washington leadership was PATRICK C. SWEENEY not supportive—indeed, Clark depicts it Colonel, U.S. Army as an impediment. His assessments of Naval War College then Secretary of Defense William Co- hen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Hugh Shelton, and Army Chief of Staff General Dennis Reimer are damning. Clark is unambiguous that Watts, Barry D. The Military Use of Space: A Di- from his perspective, all three men con- agnostic Assessment. Washington, D.C.: Center for tributed to a lack of national strategic co- Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2001. 130pp. herence during the operation. This Barry Watts, former director of the section ends by depicting a slippery slope Northrop Grumman Analysis Center and toward an inevitable ground invasion of now the director of the Office of the Sec- Kosovo—something that everyone retary of Defense (OSD) Program Analy- wanted to avoid. sis and Evaluation, has written an The final section of the book, “End- assessment of military competition in game,” details the sudden change in cir- near-earth space and how that competi- cumstances and Milosevic’s willingness tion may evolve over the next twenty-five to accept a deal. Clark outlines the years. Aside from the importance of its time-sensitive and painstaking negotia- subject, this book is of particular interest tions required to ensure an executable because it explicitly attempts a “net as- plan for the Nato peacekeeping force. He sessment.” Watts worked for Andrew also addresses the now famous refusal of Marshall, director of the OSD Office of
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