Emotion, Reason and Action in Kant.Indb
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
EMOTION, REASON, AND ACTION IN KANT ALSO AVAILABLE FROM BLOOMSBURY Kant’s Transition Project and Late Philosophy , Oliver Th orndike Kant on Spontaneity , Marco Sgarbi Th e Visibility of the Image , Lambert Wiesing Aesthetics, Arts, and Politics in a Global World , Daniel Herwitz EMOTION, REASON, AND ACTION IN KANT MARIA BORGES BLOOMSBURY ACADEMIC Bloomsbury Publishing Plc 50 Bedford Square, London, WC1B 3DP, UK 1385 Broadway, New York, NY 10018, USA BLOOMSBURY, BLOOMSBURY ACADEMIC and the Diana logo are trademarks of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc First published in Great Britain 2019 Copyright © Maria Borges, 2019 Maria Borges has asserted her right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identifi ed as Author of this work. For legal purposes the Acknowledgments on p. viii constitute an extension of this copyright page. Cover design by Maria Rajka Cover image: Immanuel Kant, German philosopher, historical illustration, 1859 © Alamy Stock Photo Cover illustration (background) © Getty Images This work is published subject to a Creative Commons Attribution Non-commercial No Derivatives Licence. You may share this work for non-commercial purposes only, provided you give attribution to the copyright holder and the publisher. Bloomsbury Publishing Plc does not have any control over, or responsibility for, any third-party websites referred to or in this book. All internet addresses given in this book were correct at the time of going to press. The author and publisher regret any inconvenience caused if addresses have changed or sites have ceased to exist, but can accept no responsibility for any such changes. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress. ISBN: HB: 978-1-3500-7836-9 ePDF: 978-1-3500-7837-6 eBook: 978-1-3500-7838-3 Typeset by Deanta Global Publishing Services, Chennai, India To fi nd out more about our authors and books visit www.bloomsbury.com and sign up for our newsletters. To Laydes and Paulo Borges (in memoriam) CONTENTS Acknowledgments viii Abbreviations ix Translations x Introduction 1 1 Action, reason, and causes in Kant 5 2 Can we act without feelings? Respect, sympathy, and other forms of love 35 3 A place for aff ects and passion in the Kantian system 61 4 What can Kant teach us about emotions? 85 5 Physiology and the controlling of aff ects in Kant’s philosophy 105 6 Kantian virtue as a cure for aff ects and passions 125 7 Th e beautiful and the good: Refi nement as a propaedeutic to morality 139 8 Women and emotion 153 9 Evil and passions 165 Conclusion: An emotional Kant? 179 N o t e s 183 B i b l i o g r a p h y 198 Index 202 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I began to write this book in 1999 during my stay as a visiting scholar at the University of Pennsylvania, supported by a CAPES/Brazil fellowship. I would like to thank Paul Guyer for his suggestions and comments on the earlier versions of some chapters, and the former Kant Group of the Department of Philosophy of the University of Pennsylvania, especially Julian Wuerth, Cynthia Schossberger, Lucas Th orpe, and James Trainor. Some parts of the book were written during my stay at the Humboldt Universit ä t, Berlin, from 2006 to May 2007, supported by a CAPES fellowship. I would like to thank Rolf Peter Horstmann, Dina Edmundts, Tobias Rosefeldt, Stefanie Gr ü ne, and Brendan Th eunissen for their discussion of my ideas. Th is book was fi nally fi nished at Columbia University, where I spent a semester in 2014. I want to thank Patricia Kitcher for that. I would also like to thank my university, the University of Santa Catarina, for the leaves that made it possible to write this book and CAPES for the scholarship that allowed me to live abroad. I thank the CNPQ, which gave me a grant in Brazil, and the Brazilian government for its educational incentives. I would also like to thank Robert Louden, Gary Hatfi eld, Jeniff er Mensh, Karl Ameriks, the late Valerio Rohden, Zeljko Loparic, Guido de Almeida, Christian Hamnn, Andre Klaudat, Alfredo Storck, J ú lio Esteves, the late Juan Bonacinni, Vera Bueno, Vin í cius Figueiredo, Christian Hamm, Virg í nia Figueiredo, Pedro Rego, and the late Cl é lia Martins, Daniel Omar Perez, who helped me to improve this book through the discussion of the earlier versions of some chapters. I would like to thank my colleagues Delamar Dutra, Darlei Dall'Agnol, Luiz Henrique Dutra, Marco Frangiotti, Alessandro Pinzani, and Claudia Drucker for their discussion of some issues in the book. I am also very grateful to Alvaro Prata for his intellectual encouragement and to Pablo Muchnik who stimulated me to publish this book. ABBREVIATIONS Kant sources Kants gesammelte Schrift en ( K ö niglich Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaft en , Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1900–). A n t M Anthropologie Mrongovius (1784/85) (AA 25) A n t Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht (AA 7) AntC Anthropologie Collins (1772/73) (AA 25) AntPa Anthropologie Parow (1772/73) (AA 25) G Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (AA 4) KpV Kritik der praktischen Vernunft (AA 5) M Vorlesungen ü ber Metaphysik (AA 28, 29) M M Metaphysik Mrongovius (AA 28) M S Metaphysik der Sitten (AA 6) R e k Rektoratsrede (AA 15) R e l Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft (AA 6) T L Tugendlehre V E Vorlesungen ü ber Ethik (AA 27) Th e Critique of Pure Reason (KrV) will be cited according to the editions A (fi rst edition) and B (second edition). TRANSLATIONS I used the translation of the Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, with the exception of the Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View , for which I used Victor Dowdell’s translation, in: Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View , Southern Illinois University Press, 1978. Introduction Th is is a book about practical reason, action, and emotion in Kant. My aim is to answer what is the real importance of emotion for Kant. I will try to show that Kant had considerable views about emotions and that he was not blind to their importance in action in general. My object is not moral action, but action in general, including weak and even evil ones. My purpose is to show that Kant dedicated a considerable part of his work to the study of the relation between reason and emotion. In Chapter 1, I analyze Kant’s theory of action and what can count as a reason for or cause of an action. First, I begin with the distinction between motiva and stimulus in the pre-critical lessons on ethics and metaphysics. In the Groundwork , Kant explains this distinction in terms of objective and subjective grounds for actions: the motive (Bewegungsgrund ) is the objective ground of an action and the incentive (Triebfeder ) is the subjective one. Next, I analyze the possibility of the overdetermination of actions, understood as the possibility of two possible causes for the same action. I will argue that according to the incorporation thesis, there is only one motive for an action. Second, I try to reconcile the weakness of the will and the incorporation thesis. I will show that, according to the incorporation thesis, Kant is committed to a strong thesis concerning causation of actions. Reason and only reason can be the cause of an action. If we accept weakness, however, we must have a humbler solution to the Kantian theory of action: the domain of rational agency does not have the same extension of voluntary action. In the model of rational agency there is no room for weakness, although it is a fact in real actions. Th e domain of the voluntary is, then, wider than the 2 EMOTION, REASON, AND ACTION IN KANT domain of rational agency. Th e weakness of the will applies to the fi rst and the incorporation thesis applies only to the second. In Chapter 2, I shall analyze whether human beings can act morally without being moved by sensible feelings. I will show that the answer in the Critique of Pure Reason , the Groundwork , and the Critical of Practical Reason is undoubtedly yes, but that Kant is ambiguous in Th e Metaphysics of Morals and also in the Anthropology . In the Metaphysics of Morals , Kant claims that there are some sensible conditions for the reception of the concept of duty: moral feeling, conscience, love of one’s neighbor, and respect for one self (self- esteem). I examine moral feeling and the love of human beings, trying to fi gure out whether or not they are necessary sensible preconditions for moral actions. In Chapter 3, I ask whether there is a place for aff ects and passions in the Kantian system. I intend to show that this place is the empirical part of morals, which can be understood as anthropology. I follow the development of the idea of anthropology in Kant’s moral works, showing the division between a moral metaphysics and a practical anthropology, aiming at exploring the impure part of Kantian ethics. I also try to compare the concepts of practical anthropology, pragmatic anthropology, and transcendental anthropology. In Chapter 4, I analyze Kant’s theory of emotions and what he can teach us about them. I will challenge two models that have been used to explain his theory. I begin with Sabini/Silver’s position, according to which emotions for Kant follow the pain model: they are precognitive and involuntary phenomena. Next, I analyze Baron’s objection, according to which Kant held that we are responsible for our emotions.