UNIT 18 ME1JI -I

Structure

18.0 Objectives 18.1 Introduction 18.2 Territorial Issues 18.2.1 Kurile Islands 18.2.2 Ryukyu Islands 18.2.3 oni in Islands (Ogasawara) 18.3 The Korean Question 18.4 Revision of Unequal Treaties 18.5 Let Us Sum Up 18.6 Key Words 18.7 Answers to Check Your Progress Exercises

18.0 OBJECTIVES

In this Unit we discuss the problems in foreign relations faced by the Government from 1868-1893. After reading this Unit you will be able to know about the: territorial issues related to Kurile Islands, Ryukyu Islands, and , attempts made by Japan to remove Chinese dominance over , and the revision of Unequal Treaties.

18.1 INTRODUCTION

The Meiji Government inherited the legacy of a country opened to the West on the basis of such treaties which had granted extra-territorial rights to the Western nationals in Japan and had also deprived Japan of tariff autonomy. These humiliating provisions which made inroads into Japanese sovereignty had to be rescinded in order to win for Japan a position of equality with the Western nations. This not only required a programme of internal reconstruction, but Japan also had to become adept in negotiations at the bilateral and multilateral levels. The northern frontiers of Japan with Russia had to be reviewed and delineated to the advantage of Japan. Japan sought to establish her sovereignty over Ryukyu Islands and have it accepted. Redress had to be sought for the ~&ean"audacity" to thwart Japan's effortsto open Korea. Japan, which had concluded a treaty of Amity with China in 1871 to face the Western threat, found a conflict of interests with China over the issue of the Ryukyu Islands as well as Korea. While the initial expedition to Korea proposed by Saigo Takamori was not undertaken in 1873, Japan interfered in the internal affairs of Korea to establish her own rights. Both these issues created distrust and hostility between China and Japan which only increased over the years. USA indirectly helped Japan to establish her rights vis-a-vis China as well as her territorial expansion in general. These are the various aspects dealt with in this Unit.

18.2 TERRITORIAL ISSUES

We shall now discuss in detail the territorial issues faced by Japan which include the Kurile islands, Ryukyu islands and Bonin islands.

18.2.1 Kurile Islands The Treaty of Shimoda, concluded with Russia in ~ebruary1855, went beyond the Treaty concluded with USA, in that it contained certaln territorial clauses. These conceded all of the Kurile islands south of Uruppu to Japan and islands north of it to Russia. was to remain unpartitioned. However, this treaty did not settle the boundary question. In 1859 a demand was made by Count Muravieff, who sailed with a fleet to Shinagawa, that La Perouse strait should be made the boundary between Japan and Russia. In 1861, the strategic island of Tsushima was seized by Russia. But Britain made Russia renounce all her claims to the island. Hence a proper delineation of frontiers with R1,ssia became one of the main foreign policy problems of the new Meiji Government. In the years after the Restoration opinion was divided among the leaders about the northern boundary: i) One group felt that Japan should stake her claim on all the Northern islands including the whole of Kuriles and Sakhalin. The US Secretary of State, William H. Seward. who visited Tokyo in 1870 suggested that Japan could offer to purchase the northern half of Sakhalin. He urged Japan to follow a policy of expansion. This advice was given on the basis of his own negotiations with Russia and the purchase of Alaska in 1867. ii) Another group headed by Kuroda Kiyotaka, the Head of the Colonisation Office realised that while Japan's hold over Hokkaido had still not been strengthened, it would not be prudent to antagonise Russia by making big claims. The militia in Hokkaidocould not defend the island from an attack from the north. The first priority should be the consolidation of Japan's position in Hokkaido rather than expansion. He advocated Japan's abandonment of any claim on Sakhalin. Ultimately it was Kuroda's views that prevailed. Admiral Enomoty Takeaki was sent to St. Petersburg in 1874 with instructions to negotiate and settle the Russo-Japanese boundary questions amicably. After lengthy negotiations, the treaty of Petersburg was signed in 1875. Russia ceded the Kurile chain of islands to Japan. In return Japan gave up all her claims to Sakhalin. This was the first intemationd treaty concluded on the basis of equality of Japan. Kuriles were important to Japan strategically because of their geographical position and economically because of the abundant fish in the waters around the islands. Kuriles were incorporated into Hokkaido and administered as part of Hokkaido prefecture. The conclusion of this treaty proved beneficial to Japan as it settled the vexed boundary issue amicably. Moreover. it was also a valuable experience for the Japanese leaders in international negotiations. However, Japan's amity with Russia was soon broken over the issue of Korea and the Russian ambitions to get an ice free port in the east. 18.2.2 Ryukyu Islands The Ryukyu islands extend for 570 miles in southerly direction below Kyushu. The language and customs of the Ryukyus shared similarities both with the Chinese and Japanese but were closer to the Japanese. Till the seventeenth century, these islands were predominantly under Chinese influence. But after the seventeenth century. they were conquered by the Kaimyo of Satsuma han. This only led to the King of Ryukyus paying tributes and carrying on an active trade with both China and Japan. Yet the King considered himself independent and signed treaties on his own behalf with the Western powers. Once the han in Japan had been abolished (by 1872) the position of Ryukyus had to be made clear. The Japanese took steps to see that the Chinese claims on Ryukyus were not accepted. The King was forcibly taken to Tokyo and in 1872, the USA was officially informed that Ryukyus had been incorporated into Japan but the treaties signed by the King would be honoured by Japan. In 1873. the Japanese Government reaffirmed the position of Ryukyuans as Japanese subjects by the acceptance of China that Japan had a right to redress for the killing of some Ryukyuans by an aboriginal tribe in South Formosa (Taiwan). This was also taken by Japan as China's renunciation of her claims on Ryukyus. De Long, the American Minister in Tokyo, also accepted this interpretation. Hence when Japan sent an exoedition to Formosa it was not challenged militarily bv China. In fact in October :, with the mediation of British Minister Thomas Wade in Peking, the Chinese .ister of Foreign Affairs signed a convention at Peking which admitted the rightful ,,urpose of the expedition thus recognizing the Ryukyuans as Japanese subjects. Further China also promised to pay an indemnity of 50,000 taels, one fifth of which was paid immediately for the families of ship-wrecked Japanese (i.e. Ryukyuans) who were killed. The British Minister, Thomas Wade counter-signed the agreement guaranteeing the payment of the money by China. There was no refermce in the agreement to Ryukyuans but only as "people from Japan". China, in signing the agreement did not realise that she was accepting the sovereignty of Japan over these islands. In 1879, China protested against the incorporation of these islands into Okinawa prefecture but her position was weak under the international law. China sought US mediation in the problem. President Grant suggested direct negotiations between China and Japan on this issue and to accept a compromise solution. Japan offered that the southern most groupof Ryukyus, i.e. the Sakishima group, be ceded to China. In return, Japan asked for a revision of the treaty of 1871 to include the most favoured nation clause which would give Japan the same privileges as granted to Western powe~sin China. The Chinese vacillated, accepting Japan's offer at one time and rejecting it later or stating that the whole matter had been transferred from the Foreign Ministry to the Northern and Southern Superintendents of Trade. It was apparent that the Chinese did not want to sign an agreement which would sign off the sovereignty over those islands to Japan. In 1881, the US Minister in Peking was informed that at most they would sign a treaty where both China and Japan guaranteed the independence of Ryukyus. However, by keeping the issue in abeyance, China could not prevent the actual control of these islands by Japan who now refused to reopen negotiations. Japan acquired the islands without open hostilities but earned China's animosity in the bargain. China was also resentful of the arrogance of the Japanese officials and their insistence on following Western procedures in international law. China was now also getting apprehensive of the Japanese military machine.

18.2.3 The Bonin Islands (Ogasawara) These islands situated 500 miles to the southeast from Tokyo had been a part of Japan but were mainly used for exiled political criminals. The islands were claimed by the British in 1827 and the United States in 1853. However, neither of them pressed the claim and Japan went, ahead in settling Japanese in these islands.. In 1873 the US Secretary of State Hamilton Fish ruled that the islands had never been recognized as US territory and also persuaded other West'ern powers to recognize them as Japanese territory. The Bonins were incorporated into Tokyo prefecture in 1880.

Check Your Progress 1 1) How did Japan extend its suzerainty over the Ryukyu islands? Answer in ten lines.

2) When were the Bonin islands incorporated into Japan? Explain in five lines how this was made possible. 3) Explain the importance of the Treaty of Shimoda. Answer in five lines......

18.3 THE KOREAN QUESTION

Korea's geographical position makes it a land bridge between Japan and the Asiatic mainland. In the nineteenth century, Korea was an independent cou- with her own King and separate government. Her payment of tribute to both China and Japan, however, made both these nations claim a special Interest in Korea to the exclusion of the other. But for many centuries Korea had maintained closer relations with China than with Japan. In early 1872, Japan tried to put her relations with Korea on par with that of China but was rebuffed. Subsequently several Japanese subjects in Korea were assaulted. Saigo Takamori wanted to send an expedition to Korea to uphold Japan's honour and pride and also to make Korea pay for her insulating conduct towards Japanese envoys. Saigo was confident that the newly recruited army would be successful in the expedition. Saigo also looked upon the expedition as an opportunity for Japan to extend its frontiers. The dispossessed samurai class could also be given new territories for exploration. Saigo was fully aware that an expedition might result in hostilities with Russia but he was prepared to take the ridk. Though Saigo was able to get approval for the expedition under his leadership, the expedition was not sent. The Iwakura Mission, which had gone to Europe and America, was able to get the decision reversed. This was because the members of the Mission were convinced on the basis of what they saw abroad that priority should be given to internal reconstruction and no foreign adventures should be taken up at that time. They also realised that Japan would not be able to bear the financial burden of the war. Moreover, they felt that Japan's Korean adventure would invite the intervention of Western powers which would be to the disadvantage of Japan. The reversal of the decision led to the resignation of Saigo and other leaders. This also led to other repercussions. Iwakura himself was attacked and wounded as he left the Imperial palace grounds. The attackers were identified as those who were dissatisfied with the government decision against sending an expedition to Korea. There was an open insurrection in Saga under the leadership of Eto Shimpei who had left the government. Though the rebellion was suppressed quickly the spectre of samurai discontent alarmed the government. In fact it was to partially satisfy the disgruntled samurai that the chastisement expedition was sent to establish Japanese dominance in Formosa. It was Saigo Takamori's younger brother Saigo Tsugumichi who organized and commanded the Formosa expeditionary force. The successful results of the Formosan expedition revealed to the leaders that a "well-timed, carefuIly calculated and judiciously limited foreign adventure, which is capable of justification in Western international formuIa is not unduly risky and can render domesticaffairs more manageable". But it was still too early and risky to attempt an adventure in Korea. In 1875, Japan followed the same procedure with Korea as the Western Powers had done with her, viz. demand a treaty by the show of naval force along the Korean coast and also through diplomatic negotiations. The mission however failed that year. The next year, China, which had agreed.to concessions in Ryukyus as a result of Japan's show of military force, advised Korea to negotiate diplomatically with Japan. The Treaty of Kanghwa of 1876 concluded between Japan and Korea opened two ports to Japan and granted her partial extra territorial rights. In return, Japan recognized Korea as an independent sovereign state having the same rights as Japan. However, China did not interpret the treaty as making Korea independent of Chinese sovereignty. Neither did Korea herself accept that she could carry an independent foreign policy. This was revealed when USA tried to open relations with Korea. The Shufeldt Treaty signed in 1882 by Korea with USA carried in every aspect terms of equality but the letter which accompanied the treaty clearly characterised Korea as a dependency of China. Hence the issue of Korea's status in relation to China was different from that with Japan. This was not the intention of Japan whileconcluding the Treaty of Kanghwa. Domestic intrigues in Korea further complicated Korea's relations with China and Japan. There were two contending factions: The one headed by Taewonkun, the father and Regent of the young king, who was conservative, anti-foreign and supported China. After 1873 when the King came of age, he was controlled by the Queen and the Ming family. The position of this group was progressive, pro-foreign and pro-Japanese. In July, 1882 an anti-Japanese riot was instigated by Taewonkun. In the disturbances, the King and Queen escaped assassination. But the Japanese Minister had to flee to Japan with the help of the British. Japan sent reinforcements to guard the legation. China also did the same. Taewonkun was captured by the Chinese and taken away on the ground that he had revolted against the Chinese Emperor. When order was resorted and the King could regain temporary control, he apologised to Japan for the revolt, gave an indemnity for the losses incurred by Japan and permitted the increase of guards in the legation. However, two years later, Japan cancelled the remaining indemnity payments. The situation in Korea had only exacerbated, as'both Chinese and Japanese forces were in position, with the possibility of a conflict over the control of the King. China was still not willing to accept the concept of Korea being an independent and sovereign state. Intrigues within the court continued as one group continued to co-operate with China. The Japanese liberals continued to involve themselves in the Korean problem. This was partly out of sympathy for the budding progressive movement in Korea and its Korean leaders and partly in the hope that by contributing to it, they would contribute to the achievement of liberal goals in Japan. There was no clear cleavage between the liberals and the Japanese government on the Korean issue. The later was also urging the Korean Government to initiate reforms and to assert her independence. Yet, the Japanese government was not interested in these as an extension into practice of liberal principles. It only saw them as an antidote to . Fulruzaws Yukiehi backward, unsettled, unfriendly and unpredictable conditions in Korea, which might pose a danger to the security of Japan. From about 1881 Fukuzawa Yukichi and other Japanese liberals were in close touch with Korean reformers. Their activities were on the-increase until they reached a sort of crescends with the Seoul uprising. In 1884 the leaders of the Independence Party i Korea, Kin-ok-kium and ~akYoung-hyo, who had been supported by the Liberals i Japan as well as the Japanese Legation in Seoul staged a coup d'etat. Several of the King's ministers were killed. In retaliation the attempts by Koreans to capture the Japanese Legation made the Minister and civilian Japanese flee from Seoul to Inchon. The Korean King took refuge in the Chinese camp and the revolutionary leaders escaped to Japan. Once again, Japan demanded an apology and an indemnity by separate negotiations with Korea and refused to release the revolutionary leaders. A this time Yuan Shi Kai, who was appointed the Chinese resident in Korea, befriende the King and helped the Koreans to oppose Japan. The deteriorating situation could only be settled by negotiations between Japan and China or through a war. Both opted for negotiations, Ito Hirobumi went to China and had talks with the Viceroy, Li,Hung Chang. The result was the Li-Ito conventionsigned at Tientsin in March 1885. The. main points of agreement were as follows: 1) Both China and Japan would withdraw troops from Korea within four months. I 2) If disturbances in Korea demanded despatch of troops by any country, it would be done only after giving notice of doing so to the other. 3) Neither Chinese nor Japanese would be employed in the organization or training of Korean army. The implementation of this agreement by the withdrawal of Japanese troops defused the tensions between China and Japan over Korea. The question whether China or I Japan would dominate Korea was not settled but had only been temporarily shelved. ! However, Russia which was interested in the future of Korea, was watching the situation closely and, waiting for an opportunity to establish her own influence. The Russian move to offer Russian officers to train the Koreans and in return receive the I use of a warm water port in Wonson, was stopped by protests from both China and Japan. The British occupied certain South Korean islets in retaliation to Russian intentions, but withdrew in 1887. Japan was therefore, on the one hand successful in neutralising the Chinese influence in Korea, and on the other in preventing the Russian intrusion into Korea. But at the same time Japan failed to achieve the recognition of Korea as an independent nation by China. A crisis was, however. averted till 1893. 1I 18.4 REVISION OF UNEQUAL TREATIES

The treaties which granted the rights of commercial relations to the Western powers had also granted extraterritorial rights, i.e. the rights to the foreign nationals to be tried by their own courts and according to their own laws for crimes committed by them on Japanese soil which might involve Japanese lives and property. Japan's freedom to determine her own tariffs on imports and exports had also been curbed by a uniform duty of 5 per cent. Debates concerning treaty revision started in official and private circles soon after the Meiji Restoration. The Iwakura Mission had however realised that civil and criminal codes had to be revised before the Western Powers could be persuaded to abolish extra-territoriality. There was, however, continuous clamour by the public asking for its abolition as it went against the prestige of Japan. As early as 1873, Okuma Shigenobu, who was then the Finance Minister, realised that the Government should have the independent right to fix the import and export duties. In fact while opposing the Korean Expedition plan in 1873, Okubo Toshimichi clearly stated: "The first thing is to revise the treaties, the Korean business after that." If they . are not revised, he felt that England and France will send armies on the pretext of an internally insecure situation. The Japanese tried intermittently for several years, to get the treaties revised through negotiations but failed. However, they gained experience in the techniquesof negotiations with foreign powers. In 1880, Foreign Minister Inoue Kaoru proposed the partial amendment of extratemtonal rights as well as tariffs and presented it to the foreign countries. There was no favourable response but the Dutch Minister in Tokyo leaked this secret proposal to the newspaper Japan Herald and it evoked a widespread anti-government'reaction from the public. The British Foreign Minister called the Japanese Minister Mori Arinori in London, and refused to accept the revised proposals as the basis for negotiations. In fact Britain adopted the most rigid attitude among the foreign countries. In 1884, the British Government clearly stated that revision of the treaties was contingent upon the adoption of Western legal codes. Already Japan had made efforts to speed up the process of revision. The assistance of a French adviser Gustave Boissonade was taken to revise the penal code and the code of criminal procedure. A commercial code was designed with the aid of the German legal expert Herman Roesler. The United States was impressed with these efforts and was favourable towards the revision of lnequal treaties but other governments claimed that the efforts were still insufficient Formal negotiations for abolit~onof unequal treaties were started with the Western powers on 1 May 1886. The general outline of the conclusion reached was as follows: 1) Japan would set up organs to enforce judicial power. It would also establish a criminal code, a criminal procedure code, a civil code, a commercial code and a commercial. procedure code in accordance with European principles. 2) In civil cases in which foreigners were involved, the majority of judges would be foreigners. 3) Preliminary investigation in criminal cases would be handled by foreign judges. 4) A foreigner sentenced to death 3y a Japanese court should be surrendered to his nation and should be tried in accordance with the laws of that nation. In effect these essentially meant the continuation of extra-terntoriality. Once the contents of the treaty revision leaked out to the public, there was opposition to it both from within the government as well as from among the general public. The concept of mixed courts with foreign and Japanese judges was not at all acceptable. The extension of land ownership and mining rights to foreigners, it was felt, would bring Japan's natural resources under the control of foreigners. Unrestricted residence of foreigners in any part of Japan and freedom to travel all over Japan was also opposed. Within the government itself, there was a view that it was better :o postpone treaty revision until after the establishment of theNational Diet in 1890. Others thought the treatyrevision bill should be cancelled rather than suspended. Even the French Adviser Biossonade strongly opposed the Bill. He said that it would be better to maintain the earlier treaties rather than to revise them in such a form. He felt that since foreigners received far better protection than Japanese, popular dissatisfaction of the people might erupt into serious disturbances if the bill was enforced. The opposition within the government and the public was so strong that the government on 20 July 1887 finally informed the ministers of fareign countries to postpone indefinitely the conference on treaty revision. Another outcome of this issue was that Foreign Minister Inoue had to resign. The Government continued to deliberate on the proposals and also took strong measures against those who embarrassed the Government in the treaty negotiations by creating trouble. However, in 1889, a bomb was thrown at Okuma Shigenobu, who was the then Foreign Minister, when he was returning from one of the meetings and he lost one leg. This contributed to postponing the settlement of the problem for a few more pears. However, the Government was criticised very severely in the Met for the inability to find a solution to this problem. Prime Minister Ito Hirobumi used this attitude of the Diet as an excuse for the dissolution of the Diet. The Government took stem measures against those who disturbed law and order. However, public opinion made the Government realise that it had to aim at total abolition and not a phased abolition of the unequal treaties. Finally, in 1893 negotiations with Britain on the issue started making some progress. In 1894, Foreign Minister Aoki Shuzo went to London and signed a treaty pn 16 July 1894. This treaty abolished extra-territoriality, subiect to the implementation of the new codes. Thus, the special rights to foreign settlements came to an end. The changes were to take effect from 1899. The control over tariffs was however, to continue for a further twelve years thereafter meaning that Japan regained full tariff autonomy only in 1911. Similar treaties with other powers also followed. This process helped Japan move one step forward towards her goal of achieving an equality with the Western powers.

Check Your Progress 2 1) What led to the signing of the Treaty of Kanghwa? Wha were its implications? Answer in 15 lines...... 2) What was the Li-Ito convention? Answer in 10 lines.

3) Which of the following statements are right or wrong? Mark (V) or (x). i) meTreaty of Kanghwa opened two ports of Japan. ii) For many centuries Korea had maintained closer relationswith China rather than with Japan. iii) In 1882, an anti-Chinese riot was instigated by Taewonkun.

,LET US SUM UP

T* main achievement of Japan in the realm of foreign policy in this period was the abrogation of the extraterritorial rights. The restrictions on Japanese sovereignty were partially removed though she regained her tariff autonomy only in 1911. This issue reveals that relations with foreign nations gave an impetus and urgency to modernise Japan on the model of Western institutions. The open ekhibition of the resentment of the people against the special rights granted to foreigners strengthened the hand of the government in the negotiations, in their demand for total abolition, but the people in return were subjected to strong Government measures. The Government leaders gained experience in the processes of bilateral and multilateral negotiations with the foreign powers. Japan also achieved success in the delineation of frontiers with Russia as well as the international acceptance of Japan's rights over Ryukyus and Bonin islands. The advice and assistance of USA in promoting Japan's claims in this regard has to be noted. However the Ryukyu island's question sowed seeds of distrust between Japan and China. China lost out because of Japan's ability to use her newly gained military might to exercise actual control over the islands as well as Japan taking recourse to Western international law to support her claims. China, however, would not so easily relinquish her rights over Korea. Jaoan's efforts to declare Korea as an independent sovereign nation, so that dominance by China was removed, were not successful. The conflict between China and Japan over ~oreawas settled without going to war through the Li-Ito Agreement of 1885. However, both the nations had only temporarily forsaken their claim for exclusive control over Korea. As discussed in Unit 19, Japan and China actually waged a war on this issue. This issue also could not be confined to a bilateral level but invited interference from Western powers, who became apprehensive of the growing claims of Japan in the region with the help of her military strength. Japan learnt very early to regulate her foreign policy in the light of real politics. This comes out clearly not only in her Korean policy but generally also. The most careful consideration of domestic economy, the internal political considerations as well as the international power relations preceded their every move. By 1880s Japan had become convinced that her goal of getting recognition from the Western powers as a sovereign nation equal in status wuld not be achieved in concert with China. Rather her close association with China might make the Western powers relegate her to the same category as other Asian nations who were backward and would not take positive steps to modernise themselves. Hence, she had to "disassociate" herself from Asia so that her efforts at modernisation gained recognition.

18.6 KEY WORDS

Amity: Friendly relationship. Coup d'etat: Violent change in government. Diet: Japan's Parliament. This constitutes both the House of Councellors and House of Representatives. Exacerbated: Aggravated Tael: Chinese currency

18.7 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS EXERCISES

Check Your Progress 1 1) Base your answer on Sub-sec. 18.2.2 2) See Sub-sec. 18.2.3 3) Refer Sub-sec. 18.2.1 Check Your Progress 2 1) Refer Sec. 18.4 2) Refer Sec. 18.4 3) 1) d ii) d iii) X UNIT 19

Structure I 19.0 Objectives 19.1 Introduction 19 2 sin;-~a~aneseWar 19.3 Japan's Activities in China after 1894 19.3.1 Open Door Policy 19.3.2 Demand for Concessions 19.4 Anglo-Japanese Alliance 19.5 Russo-Japanese War 19.6 Aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War 19.6.1 Annexation of Korea 19.6.2 Japan's Sphere of Influence in Manchuria 19.7 Let Us Sum Up 19.8 Key Words 19.9 Answers to Check Your Progress Exercises

19.0 OBJECTIVES

After reading this Unit you will be able to know about: Japan's attemptsto get recognition in the world arena as a power between 1894-1912, the causes, course and effects of the Sino-Japanese War, the factors that led to the Anglo-Japanese Al!iance, the causes and effects of the Russo-Japanese War, the circumstances that led to Korea's annexation by Japan, and Japan's sphere of influence in Manchuria. 1 19.1 INTRODUCTION I The year 1894 was a landmark in Japan's foreign relations. It signalled the end of extra-territoriality as well as the emergence of Japan as a power superior to China in I military terms. The attention of Western powers was drawn towards Japan. Their apprehensions about Japan were revealed in their intervention in the settlement between Japan and China. Japan learnt the lesson that she should not count on her 1 gains unles it had international approval. We shall read in this Unit how Russia was I I seen as a threat both by Britain and Japan, prompting an alliance between Britain and Japan. At the end of the Me111 penod Japan nau increased her terntonal acqulsltlons 1 and emerged on the Asian scene as an independent imperlal~\tpower. Th~sUn~t takzs into account the varlous phases of Japanese foreign policv and relations durlng the period 1894-1912.

19.2 SINO-JAPANESE WAR

The Li-Ito Tientsln Agreement of 1885 wasonly a temporary trucc between Japan and China over Korea Yuan Shl Kal. the Ch~neseResident in Seoul, influenced Korea to develop trade w~thChlna No doubt, Korean imports cons~stedmalnly of Western manufactured goods re-exported by Chlnese merchants from the treaty port\ but they i rose from 19 per cent of total Korean imports in 1885 to 45 per cent in 1892. Thus the rivalry between Japan and China now extended to the sphere of trade after Japan's success in developing a modern textile industry. Japan was gradually increasing its export of textile products to Korea. In 1892 these had substantially replaced Western products re-exported to Korea and the cotton textile manufacturers appealed to the Government to help keep up their competitiveness in Korea vis-a-vis China. However, even when in 1893 Japan's exports to Korea were only 1.7 million yen, (Japan's total exports averaged 85.4 million yen) economic interests did not constitute a sufficient reason for hostilities. The awareness of the Russian threat was based on the new concept of defence taught by German advisers who were in Japan since 1885. Japanese strategies, particularly Yamagata Aritomo, former Chief of General Staff and Prime Minister in 1890, started talking about the "line of sovereignty" which comprised the Japanese islands. Yamagata stated that beyond this, Japan must also hold the "line of advantage" which comprised Korea. He considered that measures to guarantee the independence of Korea were crucial to Japan's "line of advantage". Asearly as 1887 in a "General Staff discussion document", contingency plans were also made in case there was attack by a Western power on China. It stated that, in such a case, Japan's counter moves could be an advance on Peking from the north and another landing on . The peace settlement should create an independent Manchuria ruled by the Manchu dynasty, transfer of much of North China and Taiwan to Japan and establishment of a Japanese Protectorate over South China. This document indicates the kind of ambitions which Japanese military had and how they held that peace and independence in China and Korea should be maintained without allowing any interference from other Western powers in order to secure Japan's independence. The inability of Korea to suppress the anti-foreign activities of Tonghaks, who were armed insurgents, and their asking for military assistance from China led to a crisis in the summer of 1894. Invoking the 1885 agreement, Japan immediately sent her own troops to Korea. However, no further step was taken before resorting to hostilities, as the Japanese Foreign Minister Mutsu Munemitsu realised that the Western powers would not accept that a sufficient pretext existed. Therefore. a set of proposals for,a joint Chinese and Japanese action to secure reforms in Korea was drafted as it was felt that it were the "deep rooted abuses" in the Korean system which led to instability in Korea. Japan also wanted that all exclusive privileges given to the Chinese in Korea should be extended to Japanese also. Talented young Koreans should be sent to Japan for studies "to bring civilization to Korea". These proposals were rejected. Hostilities followed in Julv 1894. Did Japan bring up these reforms only as a pretext for war? It may not be correct to say so. Japan really wanted Korea to follow the example of Japan's modernisation than follow the path of China. By the time Japan declared war on China on 1 August 1894, Japanese forces were already entrenched in and around Seoul. By 16 September 1894, Pyongyang was captured and the next day a naval victory gave them control over the Yellow sea. In October, Japanese armies crossed the Yalu river into Manchuria and also landed in the Liaotung peninsula. Japan was thus in full possession of all of Korea and the rich Liaotung peninsula withir~six months of the war. At that stage, Japan was willing to negotiate for peace. The was signed on 17 April 1895. The terms of the treaty were: 1) China "recognized definitely the full and complete independence and autonomy of Korea" 2) Formosa. the adjacent Pescadore Islands and the Liaotung peninsula would be ceded to Japan in perpetuity and full sovereignty. 3) An indemnity of 200 million taels (350 million yen) would be paid by China to Japan to defray the cost of the war. 4) Foul add~tionalChinese cities would be opened for commercial and industrial : purpose 5) Ports of Weihaiwei on the northern shore of Shantung peninsula would be continued to be occupied by Japanese troops until the indemnity was paid and a treaty of commerce to be negotiated in between China and Japan The terms were greatly favourable to Japan. With the removal of the Chinese presence in Korea, Japan could freely rule Korea. However, this did not happen immediately as Japan had to contend with another competitor, Russia, as we will see later. The other fruits of victory could also not be tasted by Japan on account of the intervention of Russia, Germany and France on behalf of China. This is known as the Triple Intervention. The dire need for a warm water port by Russia made her look upon Liaotung peninsula as her sphere of influence. The Sino-Japanese war had decreased her chance for a warm water port in Korea. France and Germany were wick to agree with Russia that Port Arthur and the Liaotung peninsula in the hands of Japan would be a threat to peace in the Far East. Great Britain was fearful of Russian advance and preferred to see Japan having advantages in Korea and South Manchuria. Hence she refused to join Russia in the intervention. Japan had anticipated some adverse reactions from European powers but when they came, she found them difficult to accept. However, finally Japan was forced togive up Liaotung peninsula but got an additional indemnity of 30 million taels. Japan's capitulation to international pressure not only led to criticism of the government but also stimulated a virulent nationalism which supported an aggressive foreign policy. The indemnity acquired was used to increase Army divisions from 7 to 13 and the Navy also tripled its tonnage. The sense of humiliation deepened and turned into open animosity when Russia acquired from China the Liatoung peninsula under a 25 years lease. Russia also acquired rights from China to build the Chinese Eastern Railway linking Vladivostok with the 'Trans-Siberian line plus a spur running south to terminate at the Liaotung peninsula (Port Arthur). Britain took over Weihaiwei, held by the Japanese troops earlier to balance Russia's possession of Port Arthur. Germany got special rights in Shantung. France got concessions in Yunan, Kwangsi and Kwangtung. All these rights and concessions were granted exclusively to these powers and China could not grant comparable privileges to other powers in the same region. 19.3 JAPAN'S ACTIVITIES IN CHINA AFTER 1894

In this Section we shalldiscuss about how Japan lined up to gain maximum influence in China.

19.3.1 Open Door Policy Monopoly investment rights had thus been established in the various spheres of influence mentioned above. But USA tried to see that this did not extend to trade as well. Secretary ofstate John Hay proclaimed the Open Door Policy in 1899 which was accepted by the other powers. Japan failed to secure spheresof influence in China, but in order tdprepare herself for challenging Russia in the future, she needed the support of Britain and America. Hence Japan also decided to accept the Open Door Policy.

19.3.2 Demand for Concessions The acquisition of Taiwan after the Sino-Japanese war was looked upon by many influential Japanese as the way for an "advance to the South" especially through the Chinese province of Fukien. Japan tried to secure special rights in Fukien in the scramble for concessions in China but could only get a promise from China in 1898 that Fukien would not be alienated to any other power. China would also not agree to grant any railway concessions in Fukien to Japan. The Boxer rebellion in 1900 in China seemed to present another opportunity for Japan to extract from China concessions in Fukien. However, Japan restrained herself as she feared the repercussions which might harm her relations with Britain as well as lead to a possible dispute with Russia. In the Boxer uprising and the subsequent declaration of war against Allied Powers by China, Japan supplied about half of the total Allied Army and contributed to the victory of Allies. As a part of the final settlement, China offered an indemnity of 450 million taels ($334 million) and Japan also had a share. Special privileges granted as guarantees for the safety of diplomatic representatives and their nationals were also to be enjoyed by ~a~an.China's internal disintegration and inability to suppress rebels left her at the , mercy of foreign powers which included Japan. Japan could now vicariously enjoy an equal status with other Western powers in China on account of the privileges she shared with them. f 19.4 ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE At the time of the Boxer's attack on Russian railway installations in Manchuria, Russia sent in a large number of troops to protect her interests. This was considered as a danger signal as Russia would not stop with Manchuria, but extend to Korea also. To face the Russian threat Japan needed support from Britam. An alliance with Britain would serve as a warning to Russia. The commercial advantages which could be derived from the alliance were opening of British colonies to Japanese trade, improve Japan's commercial credit and give access to Britain's financial resources. Among the leaders, . Ito Hirobumi believed that Japan's interests in Korea could be best preserved by an alliance with Russia rather than with Britain. However, Ito's cabinet had fallen in June 1901 and the new Prime Minister was Katsura Taro, a protege of Yamagata Aritomo. Katsura afer coming to power set out a broad political programme for his cabinet. This included: 1) Strengthening of the financial foundations of Japan and ensure industrial and commercial progress. 2) Conclude an agreement with one Ellrowan country since it was difficult for Japan to take charge of the far eastern situdtion single handed.

I 3) To make Korea a territory protected by Japan. 1 4) Increase the navy to the level of 80.000 tons. Among the Japanese statesmen there were two groups; those who favoured friendship with Britain and those who favoured friendship with Russia. These groups were not exclusive, i.e. those who were pro-British were not necessarily hostile to Russia and vice-versa. The Army and Navy had traditionally recognized Russia as a natural enemy and favoured an alliance with Britain. The Military was able to influence policy. Among the societies formed by the people, the Peoples Alliance Society (Kokumin Domei Kai) I opposed the conciliatory diplomacy towards Russia because it favoured the establishment of Japan's power in Korea and China. As a means to this end, Alliance 1 Society (Domei Kai) supported friendship with Britain. Opinion leaders like Fukusawa I Yukichi or Kato Takaaki sponsored articles favouring the alliance in newspapers. ! However it was the government which had to take effective steps towards the alliance.

I 'It was Foreign Minister, Kornura Jutaro, in the Katsura Cabinet since September 1901, who followed up the alliance negotiations with single minded devotion. Another person i who pursued the alliance proposals doggedly was Hayashi Tadasu, Minister in the Embassy in London from 1900 to 1906. He played the role of "a persuasive intermediary". Generally, the Foreign Ministry officials were also anti- Russian and were favourable towards the alliance. In November 1901, Britain presented the text of the agreement which contained the seeds of an alliance. However, the Japanese were not sure as to how Russia would look at such an alliance. But the Japanese wanted to move on those lines which were most favourable for their own country. As stated earlier, the most prominent membersof the pro-Russian group were Katsura Taro and Yamagata Aritomo. ~atsuraand Yamagata felt that the offer of friendship by Russia would only be temporary, as she was determined to advance into Manchuria and improve her position in Korea, but it was in Britain's long-term interest to remain friendly towards the Japanese. 1'0, on the other hand, felt that a link with Britain would be of minor benefit to Japan. Ito left on a foreign tour on 18 September 1901 which would take him to USA, Europe and Russia but before leaving Japan he made it clear that he intended to explore the possibilities of a Russo-Japanese understanding. The Itogroup felt that an alliance with Britain might induce Russia. France and Germany to join against Japan, as in the case of the Triple Intervention. The pro-British group on the other hand felt that an alljance with Russia would only bring temporary peaceto the region, provide onlv minor advantages ,or Japan, go against Japan's long-term interest as it would destroy China's goodwill, and also force Japan to keep her naval strength on par with Britain. In other words, this group feared the repercussions a Russian alliance would have on relations with Britain. The treaty with Britain would enable Japan to put pressure on Russia and serve her interests best. Ito was informea of the draft treaty while on tour but he still felt that: (1) a treaty should be postponed till it was known whether an understanding with Russia was possible and (2) it was unwise to leave Germany out of the treaty. However, he did not denounce the treaty. The other Genro (Yamagata Aritomo, Matsukata Masayoshi, Inoue Kooru and Saigo Tsugimichi) who had alrea$y agreed on the treaty with Britain also discussed Ito's views. They concluded that it was not possible to foresee a Russo-Japanese alliance materialising and further delays would only make Britain withdraw her proposals and Japan might lose the sympathy of both Britain and Russia and find herself in isolation. Hence they recommended that steps should be taken to conclude the alliance with Britain. The Emperor, who had withheld his approval for the final negotiations, as he wanted to know Ito's views, now dec~dedthat Japan should proceed with the alliance. Katsura informed Ito on 11 December 1901 that the decision was taken by the anperor only after his views had been placed before the Emperor. The course of events thus "illustrates the effect which the bold genro could have on the formulation of policy and the extent to which the final decision vested with the Emperor" The negotiations proceeded towards an alliance as the common adversary of Britain and Japan was Russia Both countries had taken the initiative at different times in 1901 for an alliance, but Britain had generally assumed the leadership in the discussion. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance signed on 30 January 1902 recognized the special interests of Japan in Korea and Britain in China. It was agreed that either of them would take necessary measures to safeguard those interests if threatened by a third power or by disturbances within Korea and China. Both countries agreed to remain neutral if either of them should become involved in a war to protect her interests. However, if a third power should ioin in such a war, they would at once come to each other's assistance. The agreement would remain in force for 5 years. There was a secret naval agreement which made available docking and other facilities in times of war for each country in the ports of the others. It also provided that each of the signatories maintain, as far as possible, a naval force superior in strength to that of any other power in Far Eastern waters. Under the terms of the Treaty as well as in the diplomatic notes exchanged, Britain was under no obligation to be involved in a war between Russia and Japan; but the Japanese could rely on British nayal support in the event of an attempt being made by Russia to invade Japan. It cannot be concluded that by opting for a British alliance Japan showed preference for war with Russia to settle her differences. The British alliance did not prevent Japan from approaching Russia for the settlement of outstanding differences. The alliance increased Japan's prestige. It also secured British recognition of Japan's special interests in Korea and ensured that France would not come to Russia's help in the case of a uss so-~a~anese war. Britain had prevented a Japanese-Russian Alliance. Russia took the hint and withdrew her troops from Manchuria, which had been left in Manchuria since the Boxer uprising. China was able to resist Russian plans for special privileges in connection with railways in Manchuria.

Check Your Progress 1 i) Explain the events leading to the Treaty of Shimonoseki. Which country benefited from his treaty. Answer in 15 fines...... What do you understand by Open Door Policy? Explain in 10 lines......

3) Why was the Anglo-Japanese alliance signed? Explain in 15 lines the context of this alliance.

19.5 RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR

The support from Britain made Japan take an aggressive attitude towards Russia without fear of another Triple Intervention of 1894. Japan had increased her concessions in Korea including building of railways and acquisition of property around important harbours. Special whaling, fishing and mining rights had also been obtained. However, Japan was not prepared to accept the possible grant of timber concessions in North-west Korea to Russia. While China had resisted grant of further concessions in Manchuria, which would have made ~anchuriaaRussian protectorate, Russian designs were clear. There was an attempt by Russia through negotiations to get Japan's acceptance that Manchuria and all its littoral area would be exclusive sphere of influence of Russia, which would give Russia an unimpeded line of communication by sea from Dairen and Port Arthur to Vladivostok. In return, Russia would accept Japan's special rights in Korea including the right40 advise Korea on reforms but Korea's independence should be preserved and no Korean ports were to be used for strategic purposes and no coastal defences should be built in Korea. Korea north of the 39th parallel should be a neutral zone. Japan made a counter proposal of 50 Kilometres buffer zone on each side of North Korea but did not make any commitment of not using Korea for strategic purposes. The talks were dead locked. Japan had two options either: i) to accept a restricted hegemony over Korea; exclusion from Manchuria and accept the menace of Russian naval bases on both flanks of Korea, Port Arthur on the West and Vladivostok in the North-east, or ii) to go to war with Russia with.the hope that it would drive Russia out from North-eas~ Asia. Japan chose the second option and in February 1904 Japanese land and sea forces launched attacks on Russian positions in Manchuria with Korea as the launching pad. Japan's naval forces very quickly established their superioriry in the naval approaches to Port Arthur and Vladivostok. The Russian Baltic fleet sent from Europe, arrived in Tsushima Straits but was effectively defeated by Admiral Togo Heihachiro. This defeat was decisive in persuading Russia to sue for peace. Japan suffered heavy casualties in the war and, even before the Tsushima engagement, had seriously considered an armistice but Russia showed no signs of wanting to negotiate. After the Tsushima victory, President Theodore Roosvelt accepted their request to give his good offices to settle the peace terms. Even before the Peace Conference at Portsmouth in USA, which began on 10 August 1905, President Roosvelt had warned France and Germany that if any moves were made against Japan, he would support Japan. Again, in order to safeguard American interests in Philippines, the Taft-Katsura Agreement, signed in July 1905, gave assurances to Japan of US support for Japan's suzerainty-over Korea, in return for Japan's assurance not to parbour any aggressive designs against the Philippines. Japan had another diplomati$victory. The Anglo- Japanese Alliance was revised in 1905 to include the regions of East Asia and India and - also a new proviso; if one of the signatories was attacked by a third power in these territories, the other would automatically come to its assistance. Great Britain recognized Japan's paramount interests in Korea and her right to take appropriate measures to protect her interests.

Thus even before the was signed, Japan secured recognition both from the USA and Britain that Korea was her sphere of influence. Japan demanded the whole of Sakhalin and an indemnity, but Russia was adamant about ceding any territory to Japan or paying an indemnity. Japan was facing an economic and financial crisis at home on account of the war and could not afford the breakdown of negotiations and go back to war. Therefore, she could not insist on her demands and compromised. The terms of the Treaty of Portsmouth, which were as follows, had no provisions for an indemnity. 1) Recognition of Korean independence and Japan's paramount political, economic and military interests. 2) Transfer to Japan of R.ussia's rights and bases in Liaotung and of the South - Manchurian Railway. 3) Withdrawal of all foreign troops from Marichuria except Japanese railway guards. 4) Cession of south Sakhalin and special fishing rightsin adjacent waters to Japan.

5) Non-interference by Russia and Japan in measures which :'kina might take for ' commercial and industrial development of Manchuria. . The people of Japan were not satisfied with these terms. They erpected an indemnity which would ease the economic situation in Japan and make goodyhe sacrifices they had made for the war. Riots broke out in Tokyo. There were heavy casualties and martial law had to be declared.

19.6 AFTERMATH OF THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR

As an aftermath of the Russo-Japanese war we will read about how Japan .annexed Korea and how it increased its influence in Manchuria.

19.6.1 Annexation of Korea The terms of the Treaty of Portsmouth relating to Liaotung peninsula had to be c-onfirmed by a separate agreement between China and Japan to make the transfer legal. This was signed in December 1905. -Korea's appeals to USA to avoid the increasing control by Japan over Korea were of no avail. In November 1905, USA ordered the closure of the American Legation in Seoul. The USA considered Korea a Japanese protectorate. Ito Hirobumi became the Resident General of Korea in November 1905 and under the convention of 25 July 1907, Korea was made a protectorate under the control of the Resident General. The Korean King appealed to the Hague in 1907 and the New York Tribune commented that Japan's right to act as it did in Korea was "at least as good as that of Russia, France, England or any other Power to deal as they have with subject nations". Russia signed a secret convention with Japan in July 1907 phich gave specific recognition of Japan's specific desire to achieve "political solidarity" with Korea. Japan, therefore, secured "international understanding" for her future annexation. Of course the only remaining obstacle was the resistance by the Koreans. The Koreans were not willing to accept that the Japanese sponsored reforms and the ad'pointment of Japanese advisers and officials in the executive departments were in the interests of Korea's development. Ito had hoped to avoid annexation and carry out the reforms with the co-operation of the Korean Court and Korean Executives. However, his paternalistic attitude towards Korea, rather his contempt for Koreans as well as their traditions and culture and his attempt to force the reforms on the ground that they had led Japan towards modernisation made him a hated figure. A conscious policy of obstructionism was followed. When Ito resigned his_Office in June 1909, he realised that his policies had failed. In October 1909 when Ito was in Harbin on an inspectiori tip, he was assassinated by a Korean. Ito's death served as an adequate pretext to annex Korea. An attempt was immediately made to mobilise pro-Japanese sentiments in Korea as a preliminary to annexation. A Korean organization called nchinhoe was pekaded by$ J;bpanese nationalist organization Kokuryukai to present a petition to both Korean and Japanese authorities in December 1909 calling for a merger of Japan'dnd Korea to protect Korea. No doubt the ~a~anesegovernment was more concerned about first putting down the Korean opposition. General Terauchi Masatake, War Minister in the Katsura cabinet who was appointed concurrently the Resident General in Seoul, was able to force Korea to "request for annexation" On22 August 1910Terauchi and the Korean King signed the Treaty of Annexation. Terauchi became the first Governor General in Korea and held his post till he became Prime Minister in 1916. Korea cease'd to exist as a country. Along with Taiwan, KDrea also became a colony and ~gpaneseiron rule in Korea suppressing all demands for independence earned for her the everlasting hatred of Koreans. 19.6.2 Japan's Sphere of Influence in Manchuria Annexation of Korea had "international understanding". But Japan had to proceed I morecautiously with regard to Manchuria. Manchuria was a part of China. In January iI 1905Theodore Roosvelt had mooted the idea that Manchuria "be returned to China to be made into a neutral area under the guarantee of the Powers". Japan then had hastened to give assurances that the principle of equal opportunity would be upheld in Manchuria and the administration would remain "in substance" in the hands of China. However, Japan had tried to qualify the recognition of China's territorial integrity stating that it was conditional on reform and good administration to secure peace and order and lives and property. Hence in the negotiations for December 1905 agreement witb China, Japan tried to include as a desirable condition reforms in Manchuria to safeguard lives and property. Japan also attempted to get China's agreement for a I number of cities in Manchuria for foreign trade, permission to extend railway network ! between Changchun and Kirin, Japanese management of coal mines as well as a I guarantee that China would not alienate Manchuria to any other power. However China resisted and finally agreed only to: i 1) opening of various places in Manchuria for trade, 2) build Changchun-Kirin railway with Japanese loan, and 3) reforms. Japan had to withdraw the demand for non-alienation. Japan's demand that China should consult Japan before building any railways which may compete with those of Japan in Southern Manchuria, did not finally become part of the treaty texi though it was part of Conference minutes. i It is clear from the trend of the negotiations that Japan was determined to promote her economic interests in Manchuria and also to ward-off competition from other powers. The Japanese military in Manchuria tried to achieve this objective. Britain and USA protested that the Japanese military was using military reasons to exclude foreign trade. Britain reminded Japan that her war with Russia had been financed by USA and Britain on the distinct understanding of acceptance of the Open Door Policy by Japan. The military might justify her actions as guarding against "Russian war or revenge" but if there was such a war, Japan would once again have the support of her friends, provided Japan respected the Open Door Policy. The debates within the Japanese government circles revealed that there were two schools of thought which continued to recur in later years also. One, generally represented by the Foreign Minister, gave priority to co-operation with Britain and USA for protection of Japan's economic interests. Business circles also generally agreed with this. This meant that Japan should not press her claims in Manchuria more than what Britain and USA would tolerate. Army apd its political alliesmaintained that Japan's interests in Manchuria were strategic. Hence Japan should be in a position to control transport and communications, keep civil order and protect the Korean frontier. This in the US view, would make Manchuria only a "nominal sovereign of the temtory" as all material advantages would be appropriated by the "temporary occupant" (Japan). In September 1909, Japan obtained from China mining rights in the coal fields in Manchuria together with a number of railway concessions. In July 1910 a secret agreement between Russia and Japan laid down a division of spheres, Russia in North Manchuria and Japan in South Manchuria. This agreement also recognized each nation's right to intervene in the defence of her interests in her area. It also provided for mutual co-operation if they were challenged by a third power. This agreement was made in response to American attempts to internationalise South Manchuria and Chinese Eastern Railways. How did Britain and USA react to this? Britain could only thwart Japan's attempts to make her recognize Japan's rights in Manchuria by including this in the Anglo-Japanese Alliance which came for renewal in 1911. Japan wanted to equate her position in Manchuria with that of Britain in India. Neither Manchuria nor India were mentioned in the final treaty. However, it was clear that Britain had no expectation of being able to check Japan's course in North-east Asia. What about Washington? Did she also give up so easily? Japan was blocking the growth 'of both US trade and investments in Manchuria, o rticularly in railways. Japanese and Russian monopolies as well as prevention of building of railway lines by China that might compete with them cldsed the door to USA. However, USA was not prepared to have a confrontation with Japan on thisissue. She had a larger economic stake in Japan than in China. USA was not impressed by China's attempts to help herself. Morever USA's prime objective was to keep the Japanese away from the Pacific. Thus in the period between 1905 and 1910 Japan's attempts to exclude Manchuria from the Open Door Policy (Exclusion of Korea had already been blessed by the Western Powers) did damage her relations with Britain and USA. But starting from the Chinese Revolution of 1911, the whole edifice of rights created by Western powers in China was endangered as there was no stable central government which would protect these rights. Japan and Russia did not face any further challenge from the powers about Manchuria being their sphere of influence.

Check Your Progress 2 1) Briefly outline the causes and impact of the Russo-Japanese war. Answer in 15 lines.

...... 2) How did Japan accomplish the annexation of Korea? Explain in 10 lines.

...... 3) How did Japan increase its influence over Manchuria? Answer in 10 lines. 19.7 LET US SUM UP

By the end of the Meiji era in 1912 Japan had emerged as an imperialist power with Korea and Taiwan as colonies and South Manchuria in her sphere of influence. Her position in the region was accepted by other Western powers. Rather her march to imperialism got the full assistance of Britain, America and later by Russia as well. All these powers preferred to encourage Japan's ambitions so that their own interests in China would be safeguarded. USA was also apprehensive about Japan's ambitions spreading to the Pacific and wanted Japan's attention to be concentrated in Manchuria. The conflicts with Russia over the sharing of rights would keep her engaged in Manchuria. By 1912, however, Japan managed to make Manchuria the sphere of influenceof only Japan and Russia and other powers were kept at a bay. Japan's victory in the Russo-Japanese war had seryed as a great inspiration for the people of Asia and had raised their expectations that Japan would show them the path of liberation from the Western imperialist powers, but these were belied. Japan was unable to understand and respond to Asian nationalism.

19.8 KEY WORDS

Adversary: Enemy. Armistice: Cessation from hostilities. . Genro : Elder statesmen. Obstructionism :Obstacle, deliberate delays. Triple Intervention: After the treaty of Shimonoseki France, England and Germany joined hands to check Japan's gains and forced Japan to give away certain privileges that she had obtained in China. The intervention by these three powers is thus kndwn as Triple Intervention. Warm Water Port: Certain ports where sea waters freeze during winter season are closed during the period. Warm water ports are those which are open throughout the year.

19.9 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS EXERCISES

Check Your Progress 1 1) Your answer should be based on Sec. 19.2 2) Base your answer on Sub-sec. 19.3.1 3) Base your answer on Sec. 19.4. Check Your Progress 2 1) Base your answer on Sec. 19.5 2) Refer Sub-sec. 19.6.1 3) Refer Sub-sec. 19.6.2 UNIT 20 JAPAN AND WORLD WAR-I

Structure

Objectives Introduction Background The First World War The Post-War Situation The State of Economy The Liberal Opinion Let Us Sum Up Answers to Check Your Progress Exercises

20.0 OBJECTIVES

In this Unit you will learn about: the maturing of the Japanese economy, the political developments of the Taisho period, the early expansionism of Japan, the role and attitude of Japan during the World War and Japan's external relations.

20.1 INTRODUCTION

The outbreak of World War-I created an opportunity for Japan to solve some of its problems in the economic and political spheres. To understand these developments it is necessary to examine the developments from the end of the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-5. This war was a major turning point for Japan and marked its emergence as a powerful actor on the international scene. Hence this Unit starts with a discussion on the Asian political scene before the World War. The First World War provides a useful point to examine the manner in which Japan was transforming its internatiorial role. From the period of the Russo-Japanese war Japan was faced with the question of which countries to ally with and linked to this was also the problem of its relations with China and other neighbours. These questions were not debated academically but linked with the internal political alignments and factional struggles. The political parties as well as the factions within the army, the navy and the bureaucracy expressed differing strategies. Broadly these fell into groups which advocated a Greater Japan and wanted it to expand northwards - an expansion that would bring it into conflict with Russia. The advocates of a little Japan looked southwards as the natural area of Japanese advance. In these debates Japan's relations with Russia and China became crucial. During these years Japan advanced steadiiy in China extending its influence and deepening its control. This brought it closer to Britain and the United States as well, for Japan was on the side of the Allies in the World War. Internally the expansionist policy meant increased expenditure on the army as well as the navy. This economic burden created tensions, both in the economy as well as between different political groups. The Rice Riots of 1918 were one such expression of the problems created for the people. These are the various aspects dealt with in this Unit. The end oi the War saw the creation of the Versailles System and the Unit also takes into account how Japan reacted to the new order and what it visualized as its role in the world. 20.2 BACKGROUND

In the opening years of the twentieth century European colonialism had extended its hold and dominance over large parts of the world and therefore Japan's victory over Russia in 1905 was seen as a major event. For the first time an Asian power had defeated a European country. Even though the war was criticized within Japan by socialists, pacifists and other groups, in ksia in general it was seen as creditworthy event and Asian nationalists uniformally praised Japan for this accomplishment. Japan, on the other hand, even while preserving its territorial independence, building its economy and confronting the West was also at the same time following a policy of expansion within the region. Formosa (now Taiwan), southern Sakhalin, Korea and China and southern Manchuria weie areas where Japan had extended its hold or acquired extensive privileges (see Unit 19). So even while emerging as the champion of Asian interests Japan was also beginning to play an imperialist role for which it needed . and sought the backing of the Western powers. Japan's alliance with Britain formed the bedrock on which this expansion was built. In Asia Japan's development and strength served to act as a beacon to attract nationalists and republicans of various types to learn from this Asian model. From the late 1880's Chinese students came in droves to learn and study in Japan. Of course it was cheaper to go to Tokyo than London but it was also felt that Japan was part of a shared culture and yet had developed a modern industrial society so that it would have valuable lessons for the future China that the republicans wished to build. Chinese reformers from Liang Chi'i-ch'ao td Sun Yat-Sen came to,Tokyo. The influx of this large number of Chinese students representsihe first massive flow of students to another Asian country. The experiences of the Chinese and other Asian students (there were some Indian students as well but little is known about them) coupled with the expansionist policies of Japan created an ambiguity in Japan's image. On the one hand it represented an anti-Western alliance to preserve Asia and its culture and on the other it showed its rapacious side and posed a threat to the integrity and freedom of these countries. Thus Phan Boi Chau, an Indo-Chinese natioqalist, said in 1917 that Japan was the most dangerous enemy of Asia. Phan had operated from Tokyo after the Russo-Japanese war. Similarly, Korean nationalists refused to participate in common with Japanese socialists. The period after the Russo-Japanese war saw Japan faced with three broad choices in its dealings with the outside world: i) It could, like the Western powers, seek recognition for its rights and privileges in the East Asian region and work in concert. and co-operation with the Western powers. ii) On the other hand Japan could ignore Western interests and argue that its rights in the region were of paramount importance. iii) Finally, the third possibility was to assert that Japan had a historical mission to fulfil by demolishing Western dominance and creating a new international order based on Asian principles. The idea of an Asian alliance (rentai) was raised by a number of ideologues with varied interpretations. In itsmost benign fsrm it called for a Japanese alliance to revive Asia. This was the view of Miyazaki Totten who worked wholeheartedly with SunYat-Sen to bring about a republican revolution in China. However, for many it represented a way for Japan to'assume the leadership of Asia. This leadership would enable Japan to acquire territories, resources and the population necessary to counter the threat and power of the Western nations.

20.3 THEFIRSTWORLDWAR -- -

On August 1,1914 Germany declared war on Russia. Germany was bound in the Triple Alliance with Austria and ltaly while Kussia was part of the Triple Entente with Britain and France. In quick succession war was declared on France and Britain. This brought in the question of German territories in China. Germany had concessions in Tsingtao \and Britain at Weihaiwei both of which were on the Shantung Peninsula. Japan heclared on 4 August that it would stay neutral but promised that it would support Britain if there was an attack by dermany on Hong Kong which was a major British base or on Weihaiwei. On August 8 Japan declared war on Germany when it received a request to destroy some German merchant ships in Chinese waters. Japan's actions were calculated and served its purposes. They had little to do with the war in Europe. Japan saw this as a chance of a lifetime to "establish its rights and interests in Asia." Japan's colonial possessions had been acquired in the opening yearsof the Meiji period and since then its aggressive policies, particularly towards Korea, had been supported by ideologues who argued for a greater Japan. In the expansion of its empire the outbreak of World War-I allowed Japan to seize the German possession of Tsingtao and the islands of Micronesia: the Marshalls, the Carolines and the Mariana (excluding Guam). Japan launched a series of military actions together with Britain and captqed Tsingtao. The Japanese supplied 29,000 troops while there were only 1,000 British soldiers. In October the Japanese took control of the islands of Micronesia. By the end of the war Japan had suffered 2,000 casualties and captured 5,000 German soldiers. The Japanese had to butress this physical expansion of the Empire by carrying out a diplomaticoffensive to win support and secure the rights to these new territories. Later under the League of Nations mandate the' Micronesian islands were assigned to Japan as Class C territories with the restriction that they were not allowed to fortify the islands. Tsingtao stayed only for a little while with Japan as its acquisition provoked protests in China and the United States. At the Washington Conference in 1922 Japan had to return T~ingtaounder pressure. Japan's colonial possessions were acquired by the beginning of the 1920's and World War-I marked the acceptance, however reluctant, ot th~spower by the Western nations. The civilizing mission which the Japanese formulated had a long history and its, conceptions and assumptions differed from those on which the Western nations had built their empires. Above all because Japan's colonies were in the East Asian region and the people shared affinities of race and culture the Japanese put forward the idea of "assimilation" (doka) much as the French colonialists had, of bringing together and eliminating differences on the basis of an Asian identity. These ideas when applied revealed a variety of problems. Problems arose over such issues as the rights that these colontzed people enjoyed. The government of Hara Takeshi attempted to introduce the legal and administrative structureof Japan into the colonies so that they woald be governed by the same rules and regulations. These lib,erals advocated education, civil liberties, and political representation foithe colonies as well as eliminating differences. They argued that it was not independence but equality that the colonized wanted. Thus in 1920 Hara Takeshi said "The desire of most Koreans is not for independence but to be treated as equals of the Japanese." I The political situation within Japan was marked by a conflict between various pressure groups. The army and its supporters like Yamagata Aritomo or Katsura Taro favoured an expansionist policy across Korea into Manchuria and then into China proper. This I they argued required increase in the strength of the army to twenty five divisions. 1 Tanaka Giichi, a Yamagata protege wrote in 1906 that Japan "should break free from c its insular position, become a continental state, and confidently extend its nation i power." The second important policy position was in favour of a southern expansion through Taiwan, Southern China and into South-east Asia. This position was advocated by the

I navy whose ideologues felt that as an island country Japan needhot fear invasion but I should rather defend its trade routes. The government was on the whole cautious in pursuing these objectives. It realized ad clearly stated that it could only extend its control through the co-speration of the Western powers. The position of the army and Yamagata represented the dominant position and this brought it into conflict with the political parties over the question of increased spending on the military. In 1907 a new plan had identified Russia, the United States, Germany and France, in that order as possible enemies. To counter their ability to threaten Japan called for building up the army to twenty five divisions and the naval fleet to eight battleships and eight battle cruisers. This represented a 150 per cent increase over the Russo-Japanese war level. However, becquse of the financial problems facing Japan this was not easily possible. The situation was further complicated by army and navy rivalry with each group's supporters pushing their cases. The army unable to influence the Saionji cabinet withdrew its war minister and brought down the government in 1912. This is known as the "Taisho Political Crisis"

The political situation in the beginning of the twentieth century was a conflict between the hanbatsu oligarchic-bureaucratic factions such as the one led by Yamagata and political parties. These two grouping were not monolithic and there were internal divisions amongst them. The major Seiyukai, organized in 1900, and the Doshikai established in 1913 (1916 changed name to Kenseikai and 1927 to Minseito) helped to ensure that goiernments would be formed with the support of the parties. In 1911 Saionji had formed his second cabinet and with the support of the Seiyukai was attempting to reduce expenditure and stabilize Japan's precarious financial position. When his government was brought down because of the refusal to toe the army line Katsura Taro accepted the offer to form the government. Katsura, however, occupied two important posts in the Imperial Household and this was widely criticized as being contrary to the principles of the constitution. The public outburst provoked the first movement to support the constitution. The rallies were also provoked because Katsura used an Imperial Edict to prevent the navy from not providing a minister and this provoked further protests. In December 1912 The League for the Protection of the Constitution was started. Soon it organized a popular movement which brought down the government and Okuma Sigenobu with the support of the Doshikaicame to power and this inaugurated a period of divided parties in the House of Representatives. This situation was favourable to the hanbatsu. In this political situation Japan sought to create a framework of alliances which would ensure it a stable environment and enable it to carry out its objectives. On January 18, 1915 it presented to Present Yuan Shikai the infamous Twenty-one demands. These demands have been dealt with in Unit 21 but here it may be briefly noted that aside from the extensive rights and privileges demanded, the fifth group of demands would have transformed China into the status of Korea with Japanese advisors running the country. The outburst against the demands by Britain as well as the United States led Japan to withdraw the fifth group. However, these two powers became cautious as to Japan's intentions. The partition of China was proceeding with Russia having secured freedom of movement in western China and the independence of Outer Mongolia. The Japanese obtained influence in eastern Inner Mongolia through the Russo-Japanese entente of 1913. The Twenty-one demands were not universally approved within the Japanese government. Thus the Foreign Minister Motono Ichiro recognized that Japan lacked the power to hold on to China for any long-term because of popular resistance. In 1917 the Russian Revolution broke out and this created a new situation whose effects were far reaching - specifically for Japanese policy in this region. Now Japan too participated with the Allied forces in the Siberian expedition. Under the Terauchi cabinet Japan dispatched seventy thousand troops, the largest contingent. These troops stayed the longest there in spite of the mission having fulfilled. Because of the threat of communism Japan pressurised China to sign a joint defense treaty and its troops could move freely in China. The United States, which was not favourably inclined to Japan's aims in China and still supported the "open door" policy, gradually came to a grudg~ngacceptance. In November 1917 Ishii K~kujlroand Robert Lansing signed an agreement in which: both countries recognized China's territorial integrity, equal business opportun~ties for all, and the US accepted that Japan had "special interests" in China. However, Ishii's interpretation that this meant recognition of Japan's exclusive rights over China was denied by the Western nations after the war ended. Japan also extended its influence over China through.financia1 loans. Between 1917-1918Jqpanese loans totalled nearly 200 million yen and in return the rights of the 1915 treaty were guaranteed to Japan as well as additional railway and mining rights.

Check Your Progress 1 1) "While Championing the cause of Asian interests Japan, in reality, was furthering her own interestsof expansion." Do you agree with this statement? Answer in about 15 lines.

......

...... i ...... I...... Answer in about 5 lines why did Japan join the First World War? ......

...... -, ...... 3) List the three choices before Japan after 1905 for dealing with the Western powers. iii) ......

20.4 THE POST-WAR SITUATION

The end of the war led to the Versailles Peace Conference in 1919 which laid the basis for an international order which was further developed by the Washington Conference of 1921-22. The subsequent years mark the attempt by Japan to break away from this order which was created to protect the interests of Britain and the United States. The roots of Japan's dissatisfaction with the Versailles and Washington systems lay in that she had to surrender much of the gains she made in Asia and the Pacific during the war. The United States had not ratified the Paris Peace Treaty which had accepted Japan's acquisition of Shantung. These gains of the war were ultimately nullified by the Washington Conference. The Anglo-Japanese alliance which has been described as the "marrow of imperial diplomacy" was ended and it was not to be replaced. The Japanese had to withdraw from North-east Asia where they had entered during the Siberian Intervention, particularly from the Maritime Provinces, northern Manchuria and eastern Siberia. Further the l'imits imposed on naval capacity left Japan with a lower capacity. The ratio of battleships between the United States, Great Britain and Japan was fixed at 5:5:3.In China, Japan had to return the Shantung concession to China. There was an agreement that no Anglo-American bases would be established east of Singapore or west of Hawaii. In 1922 the Nine Power Pact ended all treaties with China and the other powers and brought in the open door principles. The treaty also laid down the principle of gradually liquidating the treaty system and called for conferences on Chinese customs tariffs and extra-territoriality. Thus, between the end of the war and the Washington Conference Japan felt that it had been unfairly deprived of her privileges. These measures were not implemented immediately. Tsingtao was returned and Britain withdrew ultimately from Weihaiwei. The tariff conference was held only in 1925-26 but no agreement was amved at except to postpone tariff autonomy for China to 1929. Aside from the internal problems of China the Exclusion Acts of 1924 passed by the United States was a major problem in Japan-United States relations. Japan's dissatisfaction with the developments of the post-war period stemmed from the notion that it had been treated unfairly. In 1928 Konoe Fumimaro, an influential statesman, argued that under the Vers+lles System Japan would always remain a backward country. However, there were other leaders and opinionmakers who argued that Japan must accept the current events and work in adjusting itself to the new international order which was being created around the League of Nations. TheWashington System had the poskibility of developing a joint and co-operative effort between the United States, Great Britain and Japan. The measures enforced under its policies were not always against the interests of Japan. For instance, the restrictions imposed on Japan did not apply to Manchuria and Mongolia, two areas which Japan considered vital to her interests. The concessions that Japan committed herself to can be considered as a small price to pay for participating with the other powers in an international system. The limitations on armaments called for by the Washington Treaty provided an opportunity for Japanese politicians to reduce arms expenditure and together with this reduce the role of the army which was emerging as a major political force. There was even a plan by Hara Takeshi and Takahashi Korekiyo, both of whom had been prime ministers. to abolish the office of army chief of staff. However, their plans were unsuccessful. The most representative figure who accepted this new framework was Shidehara Kijuro. a career diplomat who served as foreign minister under five Minseito cabinets. His pol~cy was based on international collaboration, non-intervention in China and the pursuit of economic diplon~acyto establish and preserve Japan's strength. The colonial empire was of course built to serve thc needs of the home country and the policy in turn was formed by the dictates of the changing needs of the Japanese economy. From 1900 to 1930's Japan was evolving from a largely agrarian society to an industrial nation. The growing industrial sector required markets and these could be most easily provided by a protected colony. This meant that any competitive industry was not to be allowed in the colonies and the trade of these countries was channelled to Japan. The growth of the population also required increased food supplies. Taiwan and Korea kcame major suppliers of sugar and rice respectively but because of the continuing rise in the price of rice Japan imposed measures to intensify rice pmduction in Korea. These steps led to both technical improvements as well as to increases in the cultivated acrerage.

THE STATE OF ECONOMY

The Japanese economy had been growing but by the time of the First World War Japan was facing serious fiscal problems which slowed the rate of growth. The external debts were increasing and these problems had stemmed from the Russo-Japanese war. The war itself had cost over 2 billion yen and the peace treaty gave no indemnity as the treaty after the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-5 had done. This was the reason that the Portsmouth Treaty provoked violent protests. The war had been financed by borrowing abroad and Japan's foreign indebtedness rose by 1907 to 1.4 billion yen and deficits in current international payments between 1909-13 ranged from 80 to 90 million yen annually. The World War brought the Japanese economy increased orders from Europe as well as from Asian countries because the Western competitors were occupied elsewhere. The growth of the real gross national product brought about an improvement in the economic situation and increases in private investments. However, income differences increased as those with fixed incomes did not benefit as much as speculators from the boom conditions after the war. The war made private industry and commerce profitable and thus more confident. The leaders of these modern industries established in 1917 the Industrial Club which symbolized their newly emerging power. Growth of the economy was best represented in the growth of the manufacturing output which rose by 72 per cent between 1914-19 while the labour force increased by only 42 per cent which meant that labour productivity increased substantially. The highest area of growth within this was in the machinery industry which included shipbuilding, vehicles, machine tools, etc. The figures in table-1 mention the rate of growth in certain fields. Shipbuilding also expanded rapidly. Though the ptice of materials went up the rate of profit increased and orders multiplied. This growth also generated improvement in construction techniques so that the time taken was reduced by half. After the World War the demand collapsed seriously affecting small companies but the big companies like Mitsubishi were supported by increasing naval demand.

Table 1 Growth Rate (Per cent per decade)

Industry 1906-16 1910-20

Chemical 26.1 64.3 Clothing 36.8 39.4 Construction 36.6 22..8 Machinery 88.8 159.1 Manufacturing 35.4 55.6 ~etal 41.2 71.9

Source: Kazushi Ohkawa and Miyohei Shinohara (ed) Patterns of Jap~acs+Eeonomic Development, Londoji '7r The war also stimulated the development of general engineering like the building of steam and water turbines for the electric power industry. The reduction of imports, because of the war, allowed a host of small producers to develop and improve their capacity to produce. War time profits were also high (as in steel) where there were severe shortages. Indigenous capacity to produce steel was also limited and the price of pig iron rose from the 1913 average of 49 yen to 541 yen. Yawata, the state run steel company which had been losing 11 million yen before the war made a total of 151 million yen profit during the war years. The post-war years saw an increase in the gap between big and small industries. The large industries cut back on labour and utilized their capacities more efficiently to meet the post-war recession. The small scale industries continued to employ labour intensive techniques and this led to the emergence of the dual economic structure. In agriculture growth was largely because of the greater diffusion of technology and increased domestic and foreign demand. However, the rapid increase in food prices led to dissatisfaction amongst many groups - particularly urban consumers but also among tenant farmers both large and small. This discontent burst in the Rice Riots of 1918 which started with a demonstration by housewives and spread over large parts of Japan and brought down the Terauchi cabinet. The riots were viewed with great seriousness by the growing liberal intelligentsia. In an editorial in the Oriental Economist the riots were seen as showing that: "Unfortunately the political process in our country works effectively only for the property-owning minority, whereas the classes without property are hardly given any security at all. In one sense it is possible to say that those without property have no government at all. Herein lies the true cause of the riots."

20.6 THE LIBERAL OPINION

The liberal opinion within Japan saw the triumph of the democracies in the war as confirmation that the world trend was towards democratic government. The Russian Revolution on the other hand inspired socialists and Marxists to work for the actualization of socialist principles. The liberals saw the October Revolution as a sign that class conflict has to be reduced and social solidarity promoted. The liberal outlook is best represented by the ideas of Yoshino Sakuzo who in 1916 wrote an influential essay on constitutional government. Yoshino was faced with the problem of creating the basisof democracy on the ~eijiconstitution which in turn was based on the principle that sovereignty resided in the Emperor. Yoshlno theretore. argued that in Western democracy there were two concepts: that legally sovereignty of the state lay with the people, and politically the exercise of sovereignty was with the people. These two ideas were joined in the Western concept of democracy while in Japan the first was not applicable as sovereignty of the state lies with the Emperor. The second was appropriate for it could be exercised by the people. Yoshino went on to define democracy which he translated as "tninponshugi". But here it would be suffice to note that his and other like minded thinkers' idea of democracy was limited and failed to take into account the actual working of society. It was because of this failure that the pace of events forced many of these thinkers to take increasingly radical positions. Yoshino had helped to establish the Reimeikai, an organization which sought to disseminate new political ideas but gradually many of its participants moved to more critical positions. Oyama Ikuo, a well known democrat and liberal thinker began to argue that it was not political opportunity but social and economic equality which was necessary. Hasegawa Nyozekan another influential thinker took a similar stance. The key words were now "reconstruction" (kaizo) and "liberation" (kaiho) symbolizing this qlCest for a more egalitarian and equitable society where people would have true equality. The socialists who had, after the execution of the conspjrators in the Great Treason Japan and World War-1 Trial in 1911 which had implicated socialists in a plot against the Meiji Emperor, gone into hibernation, began to express themselves after the Russian Revolution of 1917. The sperad of socialism and the organization of labour and direct action by workers increased considerably. This was the climate which made it possible to see the Rice Riots as "retaliatory confiscation" (Oyama Ikuo).

Check Your Progress 2 I) List the reasons of Japan's dissatisfaction with the Versailles and Washington systems after the War. Answer in about 15 lines.

...... 2) How did the War help the growth of Japan's economy? Answer in about 10 lines.

...... 3) Discuss in about 10 lines the post-war liberal ideas in Japan. 20.7 LET US SUM UP

The First World War provided Japan an occasion to gain both, the advantages of an Allied power as well as that of a neutral country. As an ally of the Triple Alliance she extended her control over the Shantung peninsula and in China as well in the south Pacific islands which had been under German control. The Russian Revolution led to an Allied expedition in which Japan took a major role and which she used to prolong her stay in the region. Japan's early imperialism stemmed from a variety of motives like the desire to become a great power with ample land and resources; the shortage of domestic capital which led Japan to build protected zones to be able to compete with the Western powers. Also liberal opinion saw Japan as spreading the benefits of modem civilization. Japan's direct participation in the war was limited to sending a few troops to provide escort for Allied ships. This opportunity was used to expand her trade and improve her economic position. The war shortages led Japan to develop her own capabilities and this can be seen in the growth of the manufacturing sector such as in shipbuilding, machinery and in the development of engineering skills. The development of industry was accompanied by the growth of labour organizations and industrial action. The nse in prices of rice in particular led to riots which were reflective of a growing inequality in incomes and increasing demand for social and economic equality. Thinkers of various persuasions, nationalist, liberal'and socialist were concerned with developing a view of how a more just society could be created. During these years the government of popularly elected parties with a majority in the House of Representatives exercised greater power. This has been referred to as the functioning of "Taisho democracy". Scholars debate the extent of democracy that was established and point to the weaknesses of the parties both in irlstitutional and ideological terms. Many of the gains of the war were lost when the war ended but the international order created between the Versailles Peace Treaty and the Washington Conference sought to create co-operation between Great Britain, the United States and Japan. Even though Japan increased her privileges in China, many in Japan were dissatisfied with her position. Japanese leaders debated the pros and cons of expanding northwards or southwards or in both directions or even not expanding at all.

20.8 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS EXERCISES

Check Your Progress 1 1) Here you have to show ho\., Japan, on the one hand raised the question of Asian unity against Westerns and then used this to emerge as an imperial power by extending her own influence in China, Korea and Manchuria etc. Japan treated her neighbours in no better way than they were being treated by the Western powers. Also give examples in this regard. Write your answer after reading Secs. 20.2 and 20.3. 2) Primarily because Japan saw in it an opportunity to further its own colonial designs, give a boost to her own es-onomy and emerge as a major power. See Sec. 20.3. 3) List the alternative choices mentioned in Sec. 20.2 after the Russo-Japanese War. Check Your Progress 2 1) Japan felt that it had to surrender its gains in Asia and Pacific during the war as a result of these systems; it had been treated unfairly by the Western powers in the ud division of the spoils after the War, etc. Base your answer on Sec. 20.4. Jrpll World Wu-I 2) During the War Japan was able to secure markets for her products as the Western nations were mainly busy in War production. This increased the production of certain items in Japan. Base your answer on Sec. 20.5. 3) BaSe your answer on Sec. 20.6. CHINA AND WORLD WAR-I

Structure

21.0 Objectives 21.1 Introduction 21.2 China on the Eve of World War-I 21,2.1 Opposition to Yuan's Ambitions 21.2.2 Aftermath of Yuan's Death 21.2.3 The Changing Economic Scene 21.3 The World War and China 21.3.1 TheTweotyOacDcnuads 21.3.2 What were the Twaty Om DeP.ab? 21.3.3 Chinese and Western Reactions 21.4 The Decision to Participate in the War 21.4.1 The Peace Treaty 21.4.2 Chinese Reactions 21.5 May 4th, 1919 21.6 Let Us Sum Up 21.7 Key Words 21 -23 Answers to Check Your Progress Exercises

21.0 OBJECTIVES

After reading this Unit you will: be able to understand the political situation in China on the eve of the World War-I, understand China's involvement in the war and how Japan's hostile attempts came in the form of Twenty One Demands to curtail Chinese influence in East Asia, be able to know how the Chinese reacted towards the Twenty One Demands, learn abouf Paris Peace Treaty Conference and China's reaction to it, and understand how China witnessed a massive outburst of Chinese sentiments in the form of May 4th Movement of 1919.

21.1 INTRODUCTION -

In this Unit we will examine the political situation of China on the eve of the World War-I. The Unit also takes into account China's involvement in the war and Japan's aggressive moves under the cloak of the war like the Twenty One Demands. We will also discuss the May Fourth Incident of 1919 and what the Chinese expected from the peace conference. The terms of the Paris Treaty belied China's hopes which brought about reactions in China. This aspect has also been dealt with.

21.2 CHINA ON THE EVE OF WORLD WAR-I

In Unit 17we have examined the 1911 Revolution; the social forces that brought about : the revolution and its major drawbacks. To recapitulate, the 1911 Revolution no doubt: transformed the political situation in China. Nevertheless, it did not resolve some fundamental problems facing China. Foreign imperial presence was entrenched, there was endemic economic instability, and in the final analysis the revolution did not achieve any political stability either. Almost as soon as the revolution was completed Chhmd World War-I its basic principles were subverted. Yuan Shi Kai, the imperial general whowas made the President of the new republic in 1912, quickly made it clear that his vision of a new China did not include the realization or creation of a republican and democratic society. While Yuan was quick to agree to get rid of tne Manchus, he himself harboured monarchical ambitions. The revolutionaries had turned to him with the expectation that they would be able to control him. The European powers gave him tacit support since they viewed him as a symbol of stability. Yuan was a traditional imperialist functioning in a new China, the president of a republic who would rather be a king. This was the reason that Kang Yu-wei castigated Yuan for his monarchical ambitions and wrote to him: "from the point of Gew of the Manchu Imperial house you are an usurper, and from the point of view of the republic you are a traitor." Inspite of such criticism, Yuan tried to combine imperial customs with modem legal practice. He held imperial audiences, conferred titles to nobility and had the electoral law changed making him president of the Republic for life. Yuan's attempts to arrogate absolute power to himself were supported by engineered expressions of popular support. For example delegates were ordered to come to the capital to deliberate on the form of politics China should have. Quite naturally these tutored delegates #respectfully urged the present President Yuan Shi Kai to assume the title of the Emperor of the Chinese Empire". In anticipation of his becoming Emperor, Yuan had ordered the Imperial kilns to manufacture 40,000 porcelain pieces for his palace. Yuan's plans to be declared Emper~rwere, however, interrupted by Japan presenting an ultimatum in the form of the Twenty One Demands. (We will discuss these a little later.)

21.2.1 Opposition to Yuan's Ambitions Yuan's irnpenal reign was to start on New Year's Day in 1916. When Yuan's intentions became public, opposition to them also came into the open. As it is the makers of the 1911 Revolution were deeply disappointed by Yuan's betrayal in 1913. However, now what seemed clear was that even those reformers who had supported the idea of a limited monarchy under the Ch'ing were not willing to support the reinstitution of monarchy in China. To this extent then one could say that the 1911 Revolution had a lasting impact. Radical revolutionaries in Southern China and abroad were alarmed. Even moderate conservatives who had supported Yuan now turned away. The most prominent among them was Liang Chi Chao. He gave up his office as Minister of Justice in Yuan's government and went to Tientsin from where he launched an attack on Yuan's monarchical ambition. There were others who organized resistance to Yuan in a more direct manner. Tsai Ao, a young general, organized the National Protection Army in the province of Yunnan which under his leadership declared itself independent. Kueichou, Kuanhsi, Chechiang and Sichuan provinces followed suit and declared independence. Unlike in 1913, Yuan now was not able to control this trend of secession. Even in Northern China his control was on the wane. The army, on which he depended, was also now not willing to support him. In the face of this resistance Yuan was compelled to retire and the Presidency was handed over to the Vice-President, Li Yuan Hung. Yuan's sudden death in 1916 resolved this issue conclusively.

21.2.2 Aftermath of Yuan's Death Yuan's death, however, marked the beginning of a period of political fragmentation i.e. the rule of the 'warlords'. A period of political and military haggling began for the control of a part or whole of China. Even within a province there were often several warlords. The political situation worsened with increased jockeying for power among the warlords and politicians. This political tussle went through a sequence of phases. (See Unit 28). 'Soonafter Yuan's death, attempts were made to reconvene the parliament with Li Yuan Hung as President and Tuan Chi jui as Premier. The problems continued. Though the parliament had been convened, the Peiyang generals continued to exercise their power. The generals of the Northern and Central provinces formed an inter-provincial association under an old Manchu supporter, General Chang Hsun. On the other hand, Premier Tuan Chi jui was forced to resign over the issue of China joining the World War. To add to the political uncertainty, in 1917 a brief attempt was made to restore the last Ch'ing ruler, the Hsuan Tung Emperor. (It must be recalled that he had abdicated at the instance of Yuan Shi Kai.) General Chang Hsun and Kang Yu wei were actively involved in this attempt. General Changoccupied Peking with the support of Kang and tried once again to restore the last Ch'ing emperor. This restoration lasted about two weeks only as other generals moved quickly to suppress it. They rallied around Tuan who wasonce again made premier. As a result of this the parliament was brought firinly under the control of the warlords and this alienated the southern provinces further. In the second phase of the unfolding crisis, the southern provinces defected from the parliament in 1917. The Kuomintang and Sun Yat-Sen tried in 1917 to convene a meeting at Canton with some 250 members of the parliament. Here a military government was formed with Sun as generalissimo. However, in this case too the real wielders of power were the local warlords. Though the country was rapidly heading towards political disintegration, the group that controlled Peking and its environs continued to'maintain the fiction of representing the Ch~neseRepublic. On August 14,1917, Premier Tuan declared war on Germany. Tuan himself was in the midst of a fight for survival. The Peiyang generals had split into cliques. The Anfu clique (militarists from the provinces of Anhui and Fujian) supporting Tuan and the Chili clique supporting another general Feng Kuo Chang. Tuan tried to bolster his position with loans from Japan. Ostensibly these loans were taken to fight the Germans but in reality they were used to fund his fight against his enemies. In the south, too, there wasa split in Sun's Canton parliament. Sun was forced to retire to Shanghai in May. 1918. A Kuanghsi clique of militarists now dominated the South. The political crisis deepened in China with the dramatic and aggressive moves of Japan during the war period.

21.2.3 The Changing Economic Scene While the period of World War-l coincided with a deteriorating political situation in China, it provided a boost to Chinese industry. As a result of the war, the pressure of Western competition was reduced. Chinese entrepreneursseized this opportunity. The industrial spurt was, however, in the foreign administered treaty ports, protected by the treaty system from warlordism. A new merchant class had been in the making for some time. After 1901 . they had been fostered by government policies. By 19 14 there were over 1OOO chambers of commerce wirh more than 200,000 members. Large scale enterprises continued to he dominated by foreign firms. By 1914, a modern Chinese administrative and entrepreneurial class had begun to emerge. (The dimensions of this economic boom are dealt with in a later Unit.)

21.3 THE WORLD WAR AND CHINA

As already mentioned, the period of war was also aperiod of cataclysm~cpolitical change in China. When war broke out in 1914, China declared her neutrality. China, however, was necessarily drawn into the global conflict because of the presence of foreign powers. Japan which entered the war on the side of the Allies. declared war on Germany. Japanese troops landed in Northern Shantung. thereby flouting Chinese neutrality. In November 1914, the Japanese captured the German held port of Ts~ngtao and then proceeded to take over the whole of Shantung. This was the first move on the part of Japan to prepare the ground for the presentation in secret of the Twenty One Demands to Yuan Shi Kai. Had these demands been acceded to in toto, Japan would then have realised her larger imperialist goals.

21.3.1 The Twenty One Demands Japan sought to make permanent her political and economic interests in the East in general and in China in particular at a time when the Western imperial powers were preoccupied with the World War. A fundamental problem in Sino-Japanese relations was Japan's growing dissatisfaction with her role and power in China as compared to that of the Western powers. The monopolistic character of most of the railway and mining concessions held by the American and European financial groups threatened to exclude Japan completely from the development process and thereby deny her potential profits. According to the Four Power Consortium (Great Britain, France, Germany and Russia) Agreement of April 15,1911, China granted these four nations almost exclusive monopoly to furnish China with funds and capital. Such agreements were perceived by the Japanese as further proof of Chinese and European attempts to curtail Japanese investment prospects in China. The political measures evolved by the Japanese to safeguard and expand their interests in China came in the form of Twenty One Demands. The exigencies of Japanese politics too played a major role in shaping this aggressive policy. Though we need not go into the details of Japan's wmpulsions here, suffice is to say that the pressures to seek access to resources, markets, an outlet for a growing population and an ambition to be a leader in East Asia all propelled the Twenty One Demands. The World War provided the Japanese with an opportunity to remove all doubts and insecurities of theh potential and capacity to safeguard their interests and acquire new ones. The Japanese Minister in China is reported to have stated somewhat picturesquely and bluntly Japan's intentions: "the present crisis throughout the world virtually forces my government to take far reaching action. When there is a fire in a jeweller's shop, the neighbours cannot be expected to refrain from helping themselves". As already stated many of the Twenty One Demands sought to give Japan the same kind of rights in China that the European powers had long enjoyed. The immediate catalyst for the demands was Japan's successful defeat of Germany in Shantung. The question now was the disposal of the leasehold and economic rights enjoyed by Germany in Shantung and Japan was eager to acquire them. Yuan Shi Kai, the Chinese president, was presented with an ultimatum in the form of the Twenty One Demands on May 7th, 1915, a day which Chinese students and nationalists commemmorated as National Humiliation'Day.

21.3.2 What were the Twenty One Demands? The demands covered a wide range of issues. They were organized into five groups. 1) Group I contained demands relating to the province of Shantung. Under this the Chinese Government was asked to recognize the undisputed right of Japan to German rights in Shantung. Furthcr China had to agree not to lease or alienate any part of Shantung to any other power. China was required to grant the rights of railway construction. Chinesc citic\ in this region were to be opened to foreigners. 2) Group I1 related to South Manchuria and lnner Mongolia. Under this Japan demanded the extension of the lease of Port Arthur and the Antung Mukden railway for a period of ninety-nine years. Japanese subjects were to be permitted to lease or own real estate property for business or commercial purposes and be given exclusive mining rights

C'hina was requ~redtc> galn ihc L( lncent ot Japan tn ~dvancebefore giving the rights of r;~~lwayconstruction to a third power or when China sought to borrow money for ;i~!.h \.i)nstruct~on. Furthcr Japan was to be consulted bef:,re "the engaging of instructors or advisers regardinc polltical l~nanc~alor military matters".

,) Groi~p111 related to I~LH'inyeping Company This requlred the Chinese to recognize the special Interests of Japanese capitalists in this company and wanted the Chinese to place this company under the joint management of Japanese and Chinese. As in the other demands the Chinese were not to dispose of any rights relating to the Company without the prior permission of the Japanese. Further the Chinese were asked to protect the interests of Japanese capitalists in the neighbouring mines. 4) Group IV related to the non-alienation of the coast of China or the islands off the coast of China. By this China could not lease or alienate to a third power any ports or bays on or off, the coast of China. 5) Group V, the most controversial of the Demands, inclgded a wide range of what were called "propositions relating to the solution of pending questions and others", and where euphemistically referred to by the Japanese foreign office as "wishes" and not demands. Infact there were several demands like: Influential Japanese political, financial and military advisers be engaged by the Chinese government. Japanese were to be accorded the right to construct hospitals, schools and temples in the interior of China. Japanese were to have a say in police administration, in the supply of arms and armaments and experts from Japan. Japan demanded the right to construct a railway-connecting Wuchangwith Chujiang Nanchang line. Given Japan's special relations with the island of Formosa and the province of Fujian, Japan was to be consulted whenever capital was required for railways, mines, harbour and dock works in these regions.

21.3.3 Chinese and Western Reactions The Chinese response to the ultimatum centred primarily on the last Group V demands Japan's semantic quibbling that they were "wishes" and not demands, and the attempts at secrecy added to the speculations and rumours that Japan was in reality seeking to set up a protectorate over China. Western responses were, however, delayed and ambiguous. The Chinese faced by a military power they could not resist physically, used the weapon of international publicity to counter the Japanese. Yuan Shi Kai recognized that the Group V demands would be a challenge to Western interests in China and used them to gain the support of the Western powers to checkmate Japan. The Japanese had not anticipated any resistance from the Chinese whatsoever. A treaty port newspaper, the North China Herald, reported the demands as "a set of demands calculated, if accepted by China, to give Japan the whiphand in the country". The intensive reporting drew the attention of the foreign powers to the dramatic events unfolding in China. The negotiations were prolonged and the Chinese insisted on long drawn out discussions on every article in the various groups, in an attempt to buy time. Yuan Shi Kai whose earlier attempts to become emperor had brought the wrath of the people on him, now tried to improve his tarnished image by resisting Japan. Yuan also received support in his attempts to resist the Japanese from entering the modern sector in China. Students and shopkeepers organized boycotts of Japanese goods. There was a virtual exodus of Chinese revolutionaries from Japan to China, revolutionaries who felt betrayed by Japan's aggression. It must be recalled that from the end of the 19th century Japan had been a safe heaven for various Chinese radical activists. Japan had also been a source of inspiration. Now Japan had proved herself no different from the Western imperialists. The situation was further complicated by Japan trying to incite one political,group against the other. Japan used the threat of lending support to revoluticynaries like Sua Yat-Sen to try and get Yuan to accept all the Demands. If Yuan acceded to their demands then they would desist from supporting Sun's attempts to overthrow Yuan. Sun's role during this period was both contradictory and incriminating. As mentioned in Unit 17 Sun Yat-Sen's attitude towards the imperial powers was always ambiguous t since he never took a clear cut anti-imperialist stand. This ambiguity stemmed from the i fact that he looked for support from these very same imperial powers. In a letter to the Japanese foreign office. Sun otfcred nlore tavourable terms than Yuan was willing to give in return for Japanese help to overthrow Yuan. Sun guaranteed a lasting Sino-Japanese alliance and promised elaborate commercial privileges and benefits. These promises to Japan se;iously compromixd Sun's leadership for a while. Yuan in turn tried to checkmate the Japanese by publicising the Demands which the ~a~anesehoped to keep secret. Yuan's publicity paid off as Britain and America were alarmed by the long-term implications of the Group V Demands and the possible jeopardisingof their interests in China. The Japanese ambassador to England, Inouye, tried to placate the British by claiming that the press had distorted the facts. He unhesitatingly reaffirmed that "no demands have been made on China of a nature involving political control of the Republic or of any monopoly concession which would be derogatory to the principle of equal opportunity as hitherto accepted by the Powers" i The United States made clear her stand that it would "not regard with indifference the assumption of political, military or economic domination over China by a foreign power". American and British concerns with these developments were aroused primarily to protect their own interests. The questions of Chinese national and Ii territorial integrity were marginal to all considerations. The Japanese were quick to reassure the Americans that the open door policy enunciated by the United States at the turn of the twentieth century whereby each foreign power was to mutually recognize the interest of the other, would not be violated. In any case there was all round apprehension of the long-term implications of the Group V demands. In Japan itself there was growing criticism of what was seen as bungling diplomacy. In the interim, China accepted the Twenty One Demands with the proviso that all negotiations of the Group V should be postponed to a future date. With Yuan's death in 1916, it seemed as if China under the rule of Tuan Chi jui would accede to the demands of Japan. Japan was quick to take stock of the political situation in China after Yuan Shi Kai died. Japan gained the support of the new Premier Tuan by extending financial help ig the form of the Nishihara Loans, aid which Tuan readily accepted to I strengthen his own political base. What Tuan promised Japan in return to these loans i was finally revealed at the end of World War-I, when popular reactions were to cost I Tuan his premiership. 1 Check Your Progress 1 Tick the right answer: 1) Who was the last Ch'ing ruler in China; a) Yuan Shi Kai h) Chang Hsun c) Hsuan Tung d) Kang Yu 2) Write in about 5 lines how Chinese economy was boosted with the outbreak of World War-I.

I 3) Find out the correct statement: a) As soon as the World War-I broke out, China joined the Allied powers. I b) When the World War-I broke out China joined the Allied Powers. c) As soon as the World War-I broke out, China made an alliance with Japan to fight apinst Allied Powers. I Foreign Relntbns d) When World War-1 broke out, China immediately declared her neutrality 4) Discuss in about 10 lines what were the Twenty One Demands.

21.4 THE DECISION TO PARTICIPATE IN THE WAR

Suggestions for Chinese participation on the Allied side in the war came with the Allies hoping to have access to Chinese provisions and manpower. Ambitious plans were also made to train a million Chi~>ese.China did send about 100,000~labourers. For Premier Tuan and the Anfu generals, who were now in control of the Peking government, participation promised access to money and arms both of which were desperately needed to -onsolidate their position. The decision to participate in the war was popularly supported in the hope that a contribution to Allied victory would entitle China to share in the rewards and perhaps to regain control over her destirly. At the very least there was hope that lost powers and auto~iomywould be recovered and may be the Japanese demands could be reversed. Hopes were raised high in China with circulation of Woodrow Wilson's pronouncements on questions of national self-detzrmination and recovery of territorial rights. Wilson's rhetoric emphasising national self-determination as one of the guiding principles of the post-war settlements, enthused Chinese youth with a new sense of idealism. They were certain that the Peace Conference would recognize China's rights in shantung and cancel out the Japanese demands.

2 1.4.1 The Peace Treaty Thc China mission to the Peace Conference consisted of representatives from both the Republican South Chinese regime and the government at Peking The Popular Chinese euphoria of the future was shattered when news f11'credback that the Peace Conference. far from resolving Chinese territorial problems. was on the contrary strengthening Japan's position by handing over German leased territory in the Shantung area to Japan. This move was at the same time reaffirming the commitment of the Western powers to safeguard imperial interests. What was furrher revealed was that Japan had been promised, through a series of secret agreements with Britain, France and the warlord governments, access to the German rights. In Paris, the Chinese negotiatorsfound that their hands were tied by twofactors. Firstly, Japan's claims to the Shantung area had been recognized by a secret treaty of February 1917 between Japan, Britain, France and Italy. This treaty had been concluded when the question of China .,ntering the war was under discussion. A more damaging disclosure was the agreement between Japan and the government of Tuan Chi jui in connection with the Nishihara loans. In order to receive Japanese financial help. .ban had promised that China would "gladly accept" Japanese proposals for the manag-ment of railways in Shantung. In si ort Tuan had by this agreement recognized Jap:il's special interest in Shantung. The underlying principles of the Treaty then were, in short, to maintain and sustain ChlM dworld War-1 Imperialist interests.

21.4.2 ChineseReactions Chinese hopes were betrayed. Spheres of influence, foreign troops, foreign post offices, telegraphs, consular jurisdiction, , leased territories, foreign concessions and fixed tariffs were all there to stay. It seemed as if it was in vain that China had sent her huge labour force to the European front. All seemed lost. The sense of despair is perhaps best captured in a student's lament at that time: "We have been told that in the dispensation which is to be made after the war, nations like China would have an opportunity to develop their cultuk, industry, their civilization unhampered. We have been told that secret covenants and forced agreements would not be recognised. We looked for the dawn of this new era but no such sun rose for China. Even the cradle of the nation (Shantung, homeland of the Chinese philosopher, Confucius) was stolen." In a massive outburst of patriotic and national outrage to what was seen as a betrayal of China, China witnessed the great demonstrationsof May 4th, 1919 in Peking. These demonstrations were directed against Japan, the Western imperial powers and the warlords of Peking who had facilitated the strengthening of Japanese imperialism.

21.5 MAY 4TH, 1919

Students of Peking National University started organizing against the settelment. Plans were made to ask the delegates at the Paris Conference not to sign the Treaty. Demonstrations in all parts of China were envisaged. A giant demonstration was planned in Tien-An-men square in Peking. Fourth May 1919 was a Sunday. 13,000 students from schools and colleges gathered. They denounced the settlement and called for action against the "traitors at home". They beat up the Chineseminister to Japan. This demonstration sparked off others. The protests grew in size and frequency and were supported by the dew social and economic classes. The Chinese economy had expanded considerably and with it had increased the number of workers, industrialists and merchants. Demonstrations against the Imperialists brought students into closer contacts with these groups. The May 4th incident created an unprecedented wave of patriotism and generated a high level of political consciousness among various sections of Chinese society, something not witnessed in China till that time. This public pressure led to the resignation of Premier Tuan and his ministers. As a result the Chinese delegates at Versailles refused to sign the treaty. Well let us also examine the significance of May4th, 1919. The May 4th demonstration was only a partial victory. While public protest led to the downfdl of what was seen as a traitor warlord government, secret treaties were not abrogated nor was Japanese aggression reduced. There were, however, long-term gains. The War and its settlements finally and unambiguously underscored the fact that the Western nations were primarily interested in safeguarding their interests. It is a realization of this factor that made Chinese intellectuals look more favourably on other alternatives both ideologically as well as politically. They were now more receptive to the help Bolshevik Russia was willing to extend. Moreover, the USSR stood apart from the rest of the Imperialist nations. In July 1918, the Soviet Union renounced all conquests and special interests in Manchuria that Tzarist Russia had acquired. It committed itself to the restoration of the sovereign territorial rights of China. All this was in totai contrast to the position of the Western powers and Japan. For the first time political mobilization was witnessed on a large scale. A new intelligentsia that had been in the making since the late nineteeihthcentury, now became a significant political force. The linkages established between different social groups were to facilitate a move into a more organiztd political direction. A new sense of nationhood was evident. It is with this new sense of nationhood that China in the 1920's moved towards national reunification and reconstruction. The stage had been set for more organized political action and contending ideologies and the definite choices China had to make. These were to revolve around the two defined political parties that emerged in the form of the Kuomintang (the Chinese nationalist party) and the Chinese Communist Party. (For details of May 4th Movement also see Units 28 and 30).

Check Your Progress 2 I) Discuss in about 10 lines how the Japanese interests were served during Paris Peace Conference.

...... 2) Discuss in 5 lines the significance of May 4th Movement in China.

21.6 LET US SUM UP

Though the Chinese Revolution of 1911 failed to achieve its aims and objectives. in the long run the mess and hazards it created thwarted the very existence of life in China. In the beginning of 1912 China-was in a total state of confusion. The political order and fabricof the society was destroyed by the revolution. The political instability, economic recession and dictatorial powers all combined brought the nation into a state of utter chaos and anarchy. Yuan Shi Kai's coming to power made too many promises to Chinese people. His ambition of establishing a republican government and democratic society took a back seat. His initial task was to overthrow the Manchus. But the long standing ambition to become the emperor of China never disappeared from his mind. When he became the President of the Republic all kinds of powers were ready to help him. That help was quite substantial in enabling him to strengthen his position but it constantly brought harm to Chinese independence and national sovereignty. During his entire regime he followed a series of experiments by creating a parliamentary government, an attempt to restore the monarchy and make a stable, unified Chinese society, but all failed one afterthe other. All these years of his rule were marked by high handedness and contributed to his downfall. He was isolated in the diplomatic and political fields, had no further financial resources and lost support from all fronts. When the First World War started China initially declared her neutrality. As Japan joined hands with the Allies, China's political climate assumed alarming proportions. Japan's hostile attitudes towards China and aggressive moves further deepened the crisis in China. The Twenty one Demands which strongly came in the form of demands and notwishes as claimed by the Japanese, gave another blow to the Chinese economy and polity. Japan was desperately looking forward to set up a protectorate over China. The Chinese reaction towards the Twenty Ow Demands was serious in nature and far rendering. Soon there were country wide demonstrations against all kinds of Japanese establishments. Anti-Japanese sentiment grew up to its height in China and the Western response towards it remained vague and ambiguous. China's joining the World War was mainly strategic as it was thought that giving support to the Allied powers would - help China. Woodrow Wilson's historic pronouncements on the question of national self-determination and territorial rights created rays of hopes within China: The Chinese believed that in the peace conference they would settle a score with Japan by getting their own rights recognized. To all the contrary, Paris Peace Conference turned out to be a fiasco for Chinese. All the serious issues pertaining to China remained unresolved. Rather, Japan had an edge over China and all the provisions went in favour of imperialist powers. With this development the entire Chinese society became thoroughly frustrated and disillusioned. This discontent led to a massive outburst of patriotic feelings and sentiments that aroused a widescale mass support and culminated in the May 4th Movement of 1919.

21.7 KEY WORDS

Cataclysmic: Drastically, violently, severe Dispensation: Distribution, dealing out Exigencies: Urgent needs or demands Flout: Insult, mock Haggling: Dispute Incriminating: Charged with crime Secession: Withdrawing formally from membership of some body, organization etc. Semantic: Relating to meaning in language

21.8 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS EXERCISES

Check Your Progress 1

2) Because of the World War-I, Chinese economy lost its competitive spirit. Chinese enterpreneurs availed the opportunity; a new merchant class emerged. Base Your answer on Sub-sec. 21.2.3.

4) The Twenty One Demands covered a wide range of issues and are divided into five groups. Base your answer on Sub-sec. 21.3.2. Check Your Progress 2 1) The Paris Peace Conference was in favour of Japan. It consolidated Japan's position by giving German leased territory Shantung to Japan. The railways' management was also given to Japan. Base your answer on Sub-sec. 21.4.1. 2) In the Peace Conference all Chinese hopes were belied by the Western powers. It created a strong resentment among the Chinese, resulting in acountry wide patriotic movcmpnt Read Sub-sec. 21.4.2 to write your answer. E.H. Norman: Japan's Emergence as a Modern State. Bai Shouyi: An Out& HWory of Cbina. Immanuel C.Y. Hsu: The Rise of Modem China. Jean Chesneaux et al: China from the 1911 Rwdution to Liberation, ILLUSTRATIONS

k'oreign correspondents during war-time & reporting during the Sino-Japanese War.

A Japaneseswimming through a river to gain information about Chinese troops movements in Korea during the Sino-Japanese war.

Kites being flown IJ( .Jap:tt~ril, ,Idic.r\ to I~:all,ill, tar!. liit!,. :. 1'c~r.i .\r~t~s!rI,r H~..~,:ns.

- . -"

5 \ uan Shl Kai Sun Yat Sen with his wife Soon ( hint I.ing.