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«Hellenism in Persecution from the Excessive European “Solidarity”»

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«Hellenism in Persecution from the Excessive European “Solidarity”» » Α «Hellenism in Persecution Ι from the Excessive European “Solidarity” » Φ Α Ρ by Γ Dr. John N. Kallianiotis Ο Ι University of Scranton Λ Β Ι Hellas is a nation with a history of seven thousand years old and Β a civilization that improved the entire world. But, her advanced knowl- Η edge, faith, and paideia (based on the absolute truth) have never been Κ Ι accepted from the ignorant, faithless, and without paideia controlled West Ν (the crusaders or “partners” for political correctness). As we see, there is Α Ι no improvement (but deterioration) in these people’s aggressive behavior Τ Σ since the 10th century (crusades, during the Greek war of independence, Ι Ρ the Asia Minor catastrophe, etc.) and the situation and the chasm will Χ become worse between West and East, as the time is passing because « they are in delusion. Most of the times, the invasion was military or were m 1 supporting the invaders; now, it is economic, political, and psychological . o c Greece and Cyprus are not independent and sovereign nations any more, . s after so many heroic sacrifices of their forefathers and some people are s e responsible for betraying Hellenism to its perpetual enemies. r p What was the reason that Hellenism (Greece and Cyprus) became d r from free a bondman to IMF, ECB, and Eurogroup (Troika)? It was the o defeatism and servility of some anti-Greek and anti-Orthodox pseudo- w . leaders imposed on Greece by foreigners (“dark powers”). These, actually, a i non-leaders, but followers, created all the problems that Greece faces, f a today. They started in 1950s and became worse after 1974 and cata- r g strophic after 1981 with the accession of Greece to European Union, but o i the fatal strike came in 2002 with the non-democratic, without fulfilling l v any criterion, and the forcefully abandonment of its historic currency, i v the drachma and the adoption of a foreign and catastrophic currency, n a the odious euro. This stranger currency robed from the country its public i t policy, its central bank, its independence, its sovereignty, its public wealth, s i and its welfare. What can be the benefits that a historic and heroic nation r h like Greece with its daughter Cyprus (which is a Greek island under oc- c / cupation) is giving up its freedom? Nothing! / : p t t 1. Of course, they do not know that Hellenism does not believe in psychology and probability theory, but h only in God’s Providence. Then, their tactics and politics will fail and will drag along all of them. ῀ 1 ῀ » These politicians, who betrayed Greece, must be all in jail. It is nec- Α Ι essary for the social justice to be satisfied and to render fairness for the Φ demotion of Hellenism in the eyes of its enemies. They have the impu- Α Ρ dence to continue to claim that they are the rescuers of the country that Γ they led to the teeth of the brutal Europeans after the recommendations Ο Ι of the ignorant bureaucrats of Brussels. Greece has nothing in common Λ Β with west Europe and cannot be in the same union. The hope of Greece Ι Β and Cyprus was Russia and will remain; but, the geopolitical situation, its economic dependence on Europe, the unceasing cold war, and the Η Κ current “solidarity” levy of a 30% to 40% tax on their deposits in the Ι banks of Cyprus caused Hellenism’s spiritual children to keep a tempo- Ν Α rary distance from Cyprus. This action by Troika is an economic war Ι Τ against Russia, but the victim is Cyprus. The IMF said that “we took Σ Ι what we wanted”, which means, they destroyed the Cyprian banking Ρ system that was the objective of the dark powers. Now, they are imposing Χ « similar austerity measures to Cyprus, as they are doing in Greece the last three years. m o The world politicians have serious problems. They pass laws and c . act completely unethical and immoral, but all these actions are legal and s s politically correct. In every nation, the lawlessness and the impiety are e r legalized and the poor people are expected to find fair solutions for their p d problems. We have reached the time, where the unlawfulness is consid- r o ered lawful and the justice is regarded as disrespect. The law of the pow- w erful is imposed and institutionalized by all these corrupted and . a controlled institutions that the same people have created to validate their i f crimes against humanity. They try to legalize the extermination of Hel- a r lenism, due to their ignorance, but this is impossible because these peo- g o ple, Hellenes, are the chosen people, the noticeable nation of the ancient i l past and the most important nation of the last days, too. But, a serious v i question is swung among simple people. How can we expect the nations v n and their citizens to thrive with all these restrictions, direct controls, a i tyrannical regimes, and bad examples? The Grace of God has abandoned t s all of us with all these “crimes” and sins that our leaders imported, in- i r 2 troduced, and taught us . Then, we know what will be their behavior h c / / : 2. «Ὅτι ἡμάρτομεν καὶ ἠνομήσαμεν ἀποστῆναι ἀπὸ σοῦ καὶ ἐξημάρτομεν ἐν πᾶσι καὶ τῶν ἐντολῶν σου p οὐκ ἠκούσαμεν, οὐδὲ συνετηρήσαμεν οὐδὲ ἐποιήσαμεν καθὼς ἐνετείλω ἡμῖν, ἵνα εὖ ἡμῖν γένηται. καὶ πάντα, ὅσα t t ἐπήγαγες ἡμῖν καὶ πάντα ὅσα ἐποίησας ἡμῖν, ἐν ἀληθινῇ κρίσει ἐποίησας καὶ παρέδωκας ἡμᾶς εἰς χεῖρας ἐχθρῶν h ἀνόμων, ἐχθίστων ἀποστατῶν, καὶ βασιλεῖ ἀδίκῳ καὶ πονηροτάτῳ παρὰ πᾶσαν τὴν γῆν». (Δαν. γ´) ῀ 2 ῀ » in the future towards the weak nations or their protectorates and they Α Ι do not want even to cover their inhumane intention, which is revealed Φ daily. Thus, the future can be predicted very accurately. The world is in Α Ρ big trouble! But, the answer came from the small Greek island, Cyprus, Γ that Hellenism will not worship them and “him”, it will not bow down Ο Ι to them. Λ Β All these western plans of elimination of the existing economic struc- Ι ture and social web, which would lead to the recovery of the economy, Β to the modernization of the nation, to the reduction of deficits and debts Η ended up to the destruction of the nation, to 60% unemployment, to Κ Ι 3 homelessness, to numerous suicides , and to the loss of sovereignty of Ν Α the nation (the protectorate of Germany). Lately, they did the same for Ι the sorely tried Greek island, Cyprus, by destroying its banking system Τ Σ and consequently, damaging its economy and taking advantage of its Ι Ρ weakness to control its natural resources (energy, etc.) and impose their Χ political solution for the occupied island by their barbarian ally since « 1974. Of course, with their satanical plans (which were accepted by the m Greek government of memoranda), they tried to take revenge on Russia o c (the homodox nation and brother people, who have as their spiritual . s mother the Orthodox Hellas) by cutting (confiscating) the Russian de- s e 4 posits in the Cypriot banks , as they did in the past by blockading the r p construction of the Russian pipe line and attempted to assassinate Costas d r Karamanlis. There is a need for a very strong unity among all Orthodox o nations, as a defense against the planned aggression by the thieves of w . the Greek wealth, the neo-crusaders. Their plan will fail with our repen- a i f tance and God’s Providence. a r g Finally, the European solidarity for north-west Europeans exists, o i but it is against Hellenism (Greece and Cyprus). There is no need for l v Hellenes to be part of this club of cunnings (distrustful wolfs). Hellenism i v must leave the Euro-zone, today, and soon to abandon this entire inhu- n a i t s i r 3. Suicides were unknown actions for the Orthodox Greeks because these crimes are the worst ones; the sac- h rificer has not the chance to repent. An Orthodox Christian cannot ignore this basic knowledge in life. c 4. This was the reason that the Euro-dollars were created in 1950s. Russians were afraid to deposit their / / dollars in U.S banks and they deposited them to London and Paris. Now, they want Russians to deposit their dollars : and euros to German banks. By destroying the Cyprian off-shore financial center, they expect to receive all these p funds (about 30 billion euros) to their financial institutions, but EU from now on, it is too risky for depositors. EU t t does not respect the savings of depositors anymore; they might have to carry out this order of putting these taxes h on deposits that the savings can go directly to financial markets (disintermediation). ῀ 3 ῀ » mane and undemocratic structure, the prototype of globalization, the EU. Α Ι Greece and Cyprus as one nation must have a common currency, the his- Φ toric Greek drachma, a common policy, and a common objective, as they Α Ρ have a common destiny, which is the independence of their nations, the Γ union of Cyprus with mother Greece, and the salvation of their people. Ο Ι Hellenism cannot submit itself to any inferior “powers”, like the current Λ Β economic terrorists.
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