Recognizing

HARGEISA, Somaliland, Republic of January 1999

By Marc Michaelson Somalilanders have a bit of a psychological complex, as well they should. These people of the self-declared Republic of Somaliland, in what was the north- west region of Somalia prior to the collapse of the Somali state in 1991, have accomplished a tremendous amount in the past seven years. They have re- established peace, security and stability; constructed a unique system of tradi- tionally-rooted democratic governance; begun rebuilding war-devastated in- frastructures; and created a free market economy that even the Freemen of Montana have lauded in their journal of radical laissez-fairism.

So, why the complex? Well, in spite of these achievements, nobody seems to notice Somaliland. The breakaway nation remains invisible, unrecognized, ignored. Not one country has granted Somaliland diplomatic recognition. To maintain the tidiness of the international system, except in rare and extenuat- ing circumstances, national borders are considered inviolable. Somaliland is thus still technically a region of Somalia, even though Somalia has no govern- ment and for the past seven years has essentially ceased to exist as a "state." Just as Somalia defines the term "collapsed state," Somaliland could aptly coin a new term invisible state."

Somaliland's existence is peculiar, unidentifiable. It is a pseudo-country of sorts, an anomaly on the international scene that nobody quite knows how to handle. For this reason, the Somaliland "government" has been unable to so- licit bilateral assistance or support. For lack of any diplomatic alternative, Somaliland often gets treated as an ad hoc entity floating in what is popularly perceived as a sea of Somali clan chaos.

The international community's failure to make sense of Somaliland, and their corresponding neglect of it, have been blessings in disguise. Somaliland's recent experiences with the tasks of peace-building and nation-building have been extremely difficult, but they have been wholly organic, emerging from within rather than imposed from without. Somalilanders have had to look deep within themselves to figure out how to restore sanity to their war-devastated society. Their success has largely been due, ironically, to having been isolated, ignored and forgotten. These conditions have forced Somalilanders to be self- reliant and innovative.

Now, as Somaliland nurtures its fragile peace, its nascent government, and budding economy, the international community needs to notice what is hap- pening there. It needs to encourage these positive developments, and avoid squashing Somaliland's achievements through not-so-benign neglect. Construc- tive engagement is vital at this stage of the upstart nation's fledgling experi- ment. It is time to begin "recognizing" Somalilandmif not diplomatically, at Continued on page 4 House destroyed by Somali government bombing ofHargeisa in the late 1980"s

2 MM-7 Institute of Current World Affairs 3 least through acknowledgment and support of what's mount. Shir are ad hoc meetings, held whenever deemed happening there. necessary rather than at regular intervals. They are adapt- able and flexible processes, not rigid, orchestrated affairs. THE SOMALI SHIR: RESTORING PEACE AND Since clans themselves are fluid constructs, shir partici- BUILDING GOVERNMENT pants may vary over time. The agenda is similarly flex- ible, varying in response to changing circumstances. In Somaliland, peacebuilding and nationbuilding have been simultaneous processes, each deeply rooted Since 1991, three major shir have been held in in indigenous mechanisms. While the world focused on Somaliland: 1991, Borama 1993 and 1997. problems in the south of Somalia state collapse, fam- ine, warlordism and then the U.S. and U.N. interven- Immediately after the fall of in January tions meant to solve them, Somaliland quietly put its own house in order. Rather than hold high-profile, western- peace conferences, the people of Somaliland turned to a traditional Somali institution, the shir, to deal with their for- midable post-civil-war challenges.

A shir is a massive traditional con- gress in which representatives of con- cerned clans and sub-clans gather to con- sider common problems, make decisions, and resolve conflicts. It is a huge event, often including thousands of people and lasting from a few weeks to several months. Official delegates represent each clan; they speak and vote on behalf of the clan, frequently leaving the proceedings to consult with other clan members and then returning to continue the consulta- tions. All adult men are allowed to par- ticipate in the shir, to share their own ideas port and perspectives. Women typically exert their own in- 1991, a mini-shir was held by the SNM leadership in fluence and contribute through their husbands. Berbera, the relatively undamaged port city of the north. At that meeting, the SNM discussed next steps, and re- The ultimate goal of the shir is to arrive at agreements solved not to seek retribution against those clans (espe- based on compromise and consensus. A shir represents a cially the Gadabursi and Dulbahante) that had sided with strong commitment to reach accommodation. It is not the Barre government during the civil war. At the end meant to fail or break down. There are no time limits or of this mini-shir, plans were made to reconvene in Burao other restrictions; regardless of all other considerations, for a larger, more inclusive grand shir to consult all the the proceedings must continue until acceptable accords northern clans on the future. are reached. When Ali Mahdi, leader of the Abgal sub-clan The shir process is highly democratic in the broadest ( clan), unilaterally named himself president of sense of the term. All segments of society are represented, Somalia on 29 January 1991, the SNM was outraged. The the proceedings are participatory, and consensus is para- prospect of another repressive southern government was Here am using a very broad concept of democracy to connote participation in governance. This is not a strictly western conception, based on institutions such as elections. Such western forms of majoritarian, winner-takes-all democracy have proven inappropriate in other socio-political contexts. In Somalia's clan-based system legitimacy is derived by clan approval. Institutions, laws, and political leaders imposed without ratification by clan leadership are perceived as illegitimate and are opposed, often by force. Therefore, to maintain political stability in Somalia, an inclusive, clan-based form of consensus democracy is necessary. The shir is one such traditional democratic mechanism. For the most part, the SNM refrained from seeking retribution. However, there were two notable exceptions. First, in Berbera, 400 Somali government, army and security officers were detained; 80 of them were deemed responsible for brutal crimes against the people of th6 north and were summarily executed. The others were released. Shortly thereafter, in Borama, approximately 150 Gadabursi clan members (who had supported the Barre regime) were killed in a swift and violent attack that remains shrouded in considerable mystery. These two events occurred within one month of the end of the war, after which time the SNM refrained from seeking revenge against its former adversaries. 4 MM-7 unacceptable. Responding to events in Mogadishu, the Burao shir raised and de- bated the issue of secession. Abdirahman "Tuur', Chairman of the SNM, advocated a loose federation with the south. His pro- posal was rejected, and the shir resolved to revoke the merger agreement of 1960 and secede from Somalia. Somaliland de- clared independence on 18 May 1991, and selected "Tuur" as the first president of the Republic. The Burao shir lasted for one month, and concluded with an agreement to meet again in two years' time--to draft a constitution and set up the general in- stitutions of government.

The Borama shir had to grapple with these formidable tasks of nation-building. After four lengthy months of discussions, a draft National Charter was agreed upon, forming the basis for a constitution Gates of Somaliland's House of Parliament, decorated in the and structures of governance. Some green (top), white (middle) and red (bottom) the national lag 2,000 people participated (including of 150 official delegates). Mohamed Ibrahim Egal was In such cases, the ends may well justify the means. Ulti- elected President and charged with the task of setting up mately, time will judge the Hargeisa shir- will the new a government. stability endure or have new seeds of dissent and insta- bility been sown? The most recent shir was held in Hargeisa in 1997 and sought both to end the latest civil war and elect the President. With regard to process, this shir was perhaps the least democratic and inclusive of the three. It was For the past few years, the interplay between the dominated by the standing government and the agenda emerging Somaliland government (based on modern was carefully orchestrated by Egal to serve his own po- western political structures) and traditional clan mecha- litical objectives. Observers allege that Egal used his nisms like guurti (elders' conferences) and shir, has been political clout and outright control of government quite interesting. In some ways, traditional structures finances to "pay off" the delegates, and effectively buy have been incorporated into the government. For ex- the votes he needed to pass his agenda. Unsurprisingly, ample, the Guurti (House of Elders) is the upper house. Egal was re-elected and formed a new gover.nment, this of parliament. It is Oposed of clan elders and is broadly time dominated by his own sub-clan, the . representative of the people. The HoUse of Representa:i tives, by contrast, is co.mprised of ':elites"; its members These process deficiencies notwithstanding the a-re, generally speaking, more modern, urban, and west,: Hargeisa shir succeeded in restoring the balance of power ern-educated than their colleagues in the Guurti. There between rival sub-clans: From 1991 to 1997, numer- has been some degree of tension between the two bod- ous mini-civil wars plagued different parts of the country. ies, and the elites of the lower House tend to look down Since the Hargeisa shir, security has Significantly im- upon their counterparts in the Guurti. proved, and the tenuous peace has held. Reconstruction and rehabilitation activities have also intensified, as Similar tensions --between the common people and confidence in a mo.re peaceful future has stimulated in- central government exist at .the local level: T:he vestment and rebuilding of homes, businesses and infra- Somaliland government has gone to great lengths to es, structures. While President Egal's heavy-handed political tablish regional and local administrations. However, the maneuvering may not have been exemplary democracy, process has not been democratic, as the President has the effectiveness of the outcomes can not be overlooked. appointed all of the major posts. People living in second-

Mark Bradbury, "Somaliland: CIIR Country Report", London: Catholic Institute for International Relations (CIIR), 1997. President Mohamed Ibrahim Egal, a seasoned political insider, is well-known throughout Somalia. He was the last civilian Prime Minister of Somalia, serving from 1967-1969 prior to the military coup d'dtats. Some people believe he continues to harbor broader political ambitions. One person remarked "Egal sees himself as a big engine running a small car [Somaliland]." Should Somalia reconstitute itself, some suspect he might abandon the Somaliland "project" and jump at the opportunity to rule the whole Somali state, Institute of Current World Affairs riddled with holes from artillery ex- changes. During lulls in the fighting, the people of Burao themselves looted most salvageable building remnants metal doors, windows, corrugated iron roofs. Much as in Mogadishu, a "green line" marked no-man's land in the center of town. This area, laden with landmines, separated the two sub-clans, the Habr Yonis to the west and the Habr Ja'llo to the east. During the most recent civil war in Burao, the Habr Ja'llo and other clans fought on the side of the Somaliland gov- ernment, while the Habr Yonis militia, backed by Abdirahman "Tuur" and sup- ported by Mohamed Farah Aideed, fought against them.

At a recent khat-chewing session in Burao, five elders recounted the series of conferences that man- Abandoned and looted house in Burao peace ultimately aged to disengage the two sub-clans. At ary towns tend to view government authorities with sus- the beginning of the discussion, they repeatedly empha- picion, and see them as largely irrelevant. Their deep- sized the "deep-rooted" state of harmony in the town, seated experiences with poor governance in the past has and said that a war could never again happen there. Their predisposed them to very low expectations. As a result, over-eagerness to convince me of the durability of Burao's when conflicts erupt at the local level, the people would rather handle them accord- ing to customary law () and through elders' conferences (guurti), rather than submit them to the local law-enforcement officials. Witness Burao, a town due east of Hargeisa that has repeatedly experi- enced clan strife and civil war through- out the past ten years.

During Siad Barre's ruthless attacks on the Isaaq people, Burao was repeatedly bombarded. Then, after Somaliland's self- declared independence, there was brief fighting in Burao in 1992, and a prolonged civil war was centered there from 1994- 96. Eventually clan elders initiated a peace process that succeeded in restoring calm.

The devastation in Burao is evident everywhere throughout the town. Aban- doned houses, shops and markets are Two Burao elders at our khat-chew

Abdirahman "Tuur" was the first , chosen at the massive Berbera shir in 1991. Later, he decided to oppose Somaliland's independence, and moved to London and Mogadishu where he was backed by the UN (to oppose Somaliland's secession) and Mohamed Farah Aideed, a warlord from the Hawiye clan. Aideed, convinced that he was the rightful president of all of Somalia, fostered this revolt of the Habr Yonis to gain a foothold in the north and to undermine the Somaliland government. Aideed was getting all of his ducks in a row in preparation for his ultimate ascendancy to the presidency. Ultimately his pans failed the Habr Yonis lost the war in the north, and he never defeated the other warlords in the south, Khat is a narcotic leaf that Somali men chew in the afternoons. Khat-chewing sessions are excellent venues for socializing and learning about Somali culture. As people chew khat, they become more relaxed, and speak openly. also conduct much of their business, including peace meetings, while they chew. 6 MM-7 stability, seemed instead to betray the pre- carious and fragile nature of the current peace. They downplayed the destruction wreaked by the latest civil war (1994-96), insisting it was much less destructive than the war with Siad Barre, and claiming that local elders resolved it immediately. This contradicted other sources, including the town's mayor, who personally showed me the most devastated areas leveled dur- ing the 94-96 conflict. Likewise, the elders' so-called "immediate" resolution of the conflict took place over five large meetings; the process lasted several months and didn't begin until the town had already been rav- aged. The glowing picture they painted appeared as much an effort to convince themselves that such brutality and destruc- tion could never be repeated, as it was an attempt to convince me of the same. They Burao's Mayor Mohamed Hussein walks through the skeleton ofa meat wanted me to "believe," but their faintly market destroyed during the civil war. His administration, he says, plans to masked uncertainty revealed their own rehabilitate this and other key infrastructures. strained desire to be "believers" as well. re-emphasized their intent to pay, but pleaded for more Peace is thus far from guaranteed, and maintaining time, they didn't have enough camels to make the pay- peace is an ongoing process in Somaliland. In this fragile ment. environment, where conflicts over resources and clan feuds regularly occur, the dangers of conflict escalation On 2 December 1998, the two groups of elders met at are ever-present. Peace-preservation therefore demands the Regional Government office in Burao. The Governor continuous nurturing and attention. of the Region, Mr. Abdi Ibrahim Warsama, in- formed me of the meeting scheduled for later that day. Again, take Burao, where those five elders sat with Neither he nor any of the other government officials me, chewing khat and ruminating on the permanence of would be in attendance. In this and many similar affairs, stability and security in the area. Just two miles away, on the government and traditional systems coexist on par- the other side of town, 20 elders from the Habr Ja'llo and allel paths. The two are not integrated, but each contrib- Habr Yonis sub-clans had also assembled not to re- ute to the maintenance of peace in the area. flect on the problems of the past, but to rescue yet an- other inter-sub-clan dispute from the perils of escalation. The elders' conference began some time after the 2 p.m. Muslim prayer. Elders from the two concerned sub- In August 1998, three men from the Habr Ja'llo sub- clans sat opposite each other on large mats laid out along clan were killed by members of the Habr Yonis sub-clan. the periphery of the rectangular meeting hall. The chair- In the past, such incidents sparked retribution, more vio- men of the meeting, the two (traditional leaders) lence and frequently war. Not this time. Elders of both of the respective sub-clans, sat at the head of the room, sub-clans met immediately to discuss how to control the symbolically positioned between the two groups. All in situation, and to solidify reparations arrangements. all, 20 men had gathered to discuss the delays of Habr The traditional "blood price" of 100 camels for each Yonis' blood-price payments. person killed was agreed, and the meetings ad- journed. Time passed, and the Habr Yonis failed to The pace of the meeting was unrushed, the delibera- make good on their agreement. With tensions ris- tions slow and measured. In a free-flowing style the par- ing, again there was potential for renewed clashes. And ticipants offered their contributions one-by-one; lengthy again, instead of resorting to violence, another meeting speeches were launched, some lasting as long as 30 min- was called to find out the reason for the delay. Appar- utes. Somalis pride themselves on oratory prowess. The ently, the Habr Yonis were having difficulty identifying ability to spontaneously deliver a poetic speech, laden the culprit(s), which in turn would determine who within with proverbs and deep meaning, is a prerequisite for the clan bears how much responsibility for payment. respect within Somali society. Such capacities exemplify Long consultations were held to hammer out a new agree- the wisdom, perception, and experience of the speaker. ment and time-frame for the payment. The Habr Yonis In these venues, the meeting resembles a series of solilo- Institute of Current World Affairs 7 quies, rather than a heavily interactive dialogue. ment-building continues apace. The draft constitution is to be submitted for adoption or rejection in a national The atmosphere was relaxed, the participants casu- referendum within the next couple of years. It includes ally listening to the speaker-of-the-moment as they three independent branches of government executive, lounged with their elbows resting on large pillows, chew- legislative and judiciary modeled to some extent on ing khat and drinking sugary milk-tea. There were no the American system. The first round of national elec- heated debates nor vicious attacks; responses to provoca- tions is scheduled to take place before President Egal's tive comments were made calmly and maturely. Patience current term expires in 2002. seemed the order of the day. Resolution of the conten- tious issue seemed a foregone conclusion, but might take One of the big question marks is how Somaliland will some time. At 5:45 pm the entire group adjourned for fare with a centralized, western-style, democratic system prayers, and honored Allah together, the two sub-clans of government. It is just such a system that distorted intermingled on the same prayer mats, humbly facing Somalia's intricate clan dynamics and plunged the coun- Mecca. try into the disastrous civil war from which the south has still failed to extricate itself. The "traditional" demo- During the latest prayer break one of the participants cratic institutions (shir and guurti) that enabled told me "We are talking about how to consolidate peace. Somaliland to restore peace and governance in the north We are not going to the law [i.e. to the government judi- are now being slowly phased out as the final transition cial system] to take care of this situation. That will cause to "modern" democracy takes place. The dangers of aban- even more problems. We want to handle it ourselves, and doning consensus-based traditional institutions in favor maintain control." These elders were absolutely deter- of modern "winner-take-all" democracy are obvious, es- mined not to let this dispute escalate. They would keep pecially in the Somali political context. However, the pro- talking until they reached an accommodation. At 7:15 cess is on track and appears a foregone conclusion; de- p.m. I left the guurti. With darkness falling outside the bate and discussion on these fundamental issues are vir- meeting hall, two kerosene lanterns were lit and the con- tually non-existent. sultations continued.

THE STATE OF GOVERNANCE IN SOMALILAND To put Somaliland's government in proper perspec- tive, it is important to keep in mind the context in which "Though it continues to be plagued by serious problems of this government has arisen. The conditions in 1991 were disputed authority, corruption, and weak administrative ca- so bad that the establishment of a woefully inadequate pacity, Somaliland enjoys governance of higher quality than government that has survived for seven years is no small any other part of Somalia. Its administrative capacity is prob- feat. By 1991, Hargeisa and Burao, among other places, ably comparable to that of some of the poorest, weakest States had been destroyed; infrastructures were ravaged; thou- in the developing world." sands had been killed and hundreds of thousands of oth- --Human Development Report, Somalia 1998 ers had fled as refugees; landmines posed a constant threat, hindering travel and the return to abandoned This back-handed compliment is indicative of the in- homes and towns; lawlessness, banditry and the barrel ternational community's ambivalence toward the of the gun reigned supreme. At the end of the civil war, Somaliland government. Expectations are so low that the Somaliland had absolutely no government, no peace or mere existence of government institutions is considered security, and a collapsed economy. a triumph. But for all its weaknesses and problems, the Somaliland government deserves measured praise. In just a few years, this situation has been reversed, and many trends point to better times ahead. There is True, corruption and kickbacks are rampant, and now a government (albeit not a great one), peace (pre- tribal nepotism has skewed central-government staffing carious though it may be), and a considerable amount of in favor of President Egal's Habr Awal sub-clan. Most business activity. There have been major obstacles and ministries are mere facades behind which little work of civil war along the way, but still the government presses substance is undertaken, while the state's limited re- on. It's difficult to justify grand praise; nevertheless, ku- sources are squandered by Ministers buying fancy cars, dos to the government for surviving and making small building fancy villas and supporting the clan folk back and measured progress 'till now. home. Promises of decentralization- to devolve power to democratically-selected councils at the local level- Like the international community, Somalilanders have been delayed as the President installs his personal themselves feel ambivalent toward their government. picks important regional and local government offices. There is widespread criticism of the government, but most people seem willing to tolerate it. They are tired of Despite its serious imperfections, and much to the fighting, and have extremely low expectations for those credit of President Egal's determined leadership, govern- who rule them. Any home rule is bound to be an im- 8 MM-7 provement upon Siad Barre's repressive reign from Mogadishu. Somalilanders are practical people. They are prepared to solve their own problems. They will find a way to rebuild their lives, their homes and their businesses. And, using tradi- tional mechanisms of conflict resolution, they assume take responsibility for pre- venting further war and violence on their own.

Perhaps the government's most no- table achievement stems not from what it has done, but from what it hasn't done. Somaliland's government has not stymied private enterprise, or stifled free expres- sion, or prevented the development of civil society. It hasn't interfered with nor rig- controlled the arenas of life. idly private Woodwork trainee at a center run by Havoyoco, a over-taxed or oth- It hasn't over-regulated, local non-governmental organization erwise counterproductively intervened in the economy. Some of this nonintervention may reflect 400 local nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) regis- the government's lack of capacity more than an inten- tered in Somaliland. Nearly every clan, village, interest tional hands-off policy; however, to give Somaliland's group and profession has established an association or government the benefit of the doubt, it may be "enlight- NGO. Some are hardly functional, and others have been ened nonintervention," an acknowledgment that if left labeled "briefcase NGOs" because they amount to little alone, the innovative, resourceful, entrepreneurial Somali more than a guy with a briefcase. The number of NGOs populace will rebuild the country of their own accord. is likely to decrease in the coming years since only those with sufficient implementation capacity will attract the The government has certainly created an "enabling funding and public support needed to survive. Still, the environment" in which private initiatives have the op- enthusiasm, dynamism and can-do spirit of this nascent portunity to flourish. In less than a decade, Somaliland's nongovernmental sector is a hopeful development. NGOs civil society has blossomed. In some respects it may have are filling some of the massive social-service gaps left by even overgrown. For example, there are now more than the dysfunctional and poorly funded government min- istries. Perhaps well aware of its limita- tions, the government has encouraged these NGOs, and enabled a strong civil society to begin to emerge.

Likewise for the business sector. Somaliland's pastoral economy is heavily reliant on the export of livestock, espe- cially to Saudi Arabia. The country produces some of the highest quality live- stock in the world. However, the vulner- abilities of Somaliland's monolithic economy have recently become glaringly evident, as fears of Rift Valley Fever trig- gered a Saudi ban on the import of Somali livestock in mid-1998. While replacement trade with Yemen and Dubai has filled some of the gap, the livestock ban has been disastrous for Somaliland's economy. Government revenue is highly dependent on livestock taxa- tion, and these sources have dropped Sheepfor sale at the market in Bura by 60 percent. Remittances from Institute of Current World Affairs 9 telecommunications sector currently boasts three major private phone companies, with others in the pipeline. SITCO, the latest en- trant, launched operations in late October 1998, and has introduced long-distance tele- phone rates of $1.00/min. peak and $.80/ min. off-peak, to anywhere in the world. These rates, it claims, are the lowest in all of Africa. Government regulation of these sec- tors has lagged behind, permitting rapid growth, but also causing some problems. For instance, all of the phone companies have inefficiently built their own individual networks; currently, it is impossible to place a call from one network to another network. Eventually the kinks will get worked out and some degree of sectoral integration will be necessary. Mergers may occur to avert bankruptcies due to ruthless competition. The free market Woman selling khat by the bunch will work in tandem with the slowly sputtering government, which is due to Somalis living and working abroad have helped consider regulatory legislation in its upcoming session. people weather the ban, but pastoralists and traders alike are definitely feeling the crunch of economic hard As these dynamic new enterprises mature, they will times. offer much-needed diversification to Somaliland's pastoralist-dominated economy. This will spread the risks Fortunately, other more encouraging economic of reliance on the livestock trade, and help cushion the trends are also evident. A new entrepreneurial spirit has impact of periodic droughts and trade bans that have oc- arisen, and again, the government deserves a good share casionally crippled the economy in the past. of the credit. The government's laissez-faire, non-inter- ventionist policy has silently nurtured the private sector. Somaliland's urban and quasi-urban centers, especially the capital Hargeisa, have witnessed a spurt of small-busi- Somaliland has come a long way in its seven years of ness activity. Hargeisa's outdoor market hums with ac- unrecognized independence. Periodic power struggles tivity as fresh local produce and a broad range of imported consumer goods are hawked side by side. Women sell tightly wrapped bunches of khat, imported daily on trucks from . Most impressively, scores of money changers sit on the street with piles of Somaliland shillings displayed in front of them, eager to buy dollars, Ethiopian birr or just about any other currency one might dream of carrying. This is truly amazing. In an area wracked by endemic violence and in- security, the fact that money changers can sit in public with heaps of cash is an unmistakable testimony to how far Somaliland has come.

Hargeisa was destroyed in the war. In a few short years, much of the city has been rebuilt, not by public as- sistance, but through private efforts. Some sectors of the economy have grown very rapidly. For example, the Hargeisa's open market 10 MM-7 nudges of support. Overbearing donors, with their strict conditions and pre-fab development programs, should stay away. What Somaliland needs are flex- ible, open-minded international part- ners.

Official diplomatic recognition may not be forthcoming, but such formalities need not retard progress. Somaliland doesn't need ambassadors, fancy cars or cocktail parties. It needs simple, concrete assistance to help the nation recover from its troubled past. By pouring mas- sive resources down the bottomless pit of southern Somalia, and ignoring the positive developments in the north, the international community has been send- ing the wrong signals. It is rewarding the chaos, violence, and self-destruction of warlords, while punishing the innova- Money changers sit streetside with piles of Somaliland shillings on display tion, hard earned stability and initiative of a determined young nation. and a few rough civil wars notwithstanding, the country has managed to muddle through and build new founda- Somaliland's needs are basic water, education, tions for peace and governance. As the international com- health care, demining. By providing assistance in these munity ignored them, Somalilanders have used their own sectors, the international community could send an im- ingenuity and indigenous institutions like the shir to re- portant message to the people of Somaliland: "We see your store sanity to their war-plagued nation. Now, as the pro- struggle, we recognize your progress, we support your efforts.' cess of building government continues, and to consoli- This is precisely the type of recognition Somaliland des- date the hard-earned peace, Somaliland needs gentle perately needs.

Institute of Current World Affairs 11 SAUDI ARABIA

YEMEN

DJIBOI D

O Addis Ababa Hargeisa CENTR AFRICAN SUDAN ETHIOPIA REPUBLIC

Lake Mogadishu DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF o Nairobi CONGO RWAI BURI

TANZANIA

Djibouti

Berbera Borama "REPUBLIC OF SOMALILAND" Hargeisa Burao ETHIOPIA

SOMALIA

200 km Border of 100 mi before independence in 1960

12 MM-7 colonial rule 4.2 F conspiracy theories 5.9 A History of Ethiopia 5.2 Constitution 6.7 Fatzi 3.2 Abraham, Kinfe 6.2 corruption 7.8 Fessehai, Habteab 3.7 Addis Ababa 1.3, 1.4 counterfeit-currency detector 6.3 fish, Yemeni-style 6.2 Addis Pharmaceutical Factory 4.4 culture 1.7 Follina 3.7 Adi-Murug 4.2 (Bada) currency 5.8 Freemen of Montana 7.1 Adigrat 3.2, 4.4 customary law 7.6 Adua 5.4 (xeer) Aeroflot 6.3 I:) Afar 4.2, 5.6 Gash-Barka Region 3.5 Afeworki, Isaias 6.2, 6.6 Dallol Airlines 6.3 Ghebray, Tekeste 4.8, 6.2 "African Renaissance" 4.5, 4.8, 5.2 Debre Zeyit 1.4 Ghebretnsae, Woldemichael 3.6 Afwerki, Isaias 3.4, 4.1,4.5, 5.1,5.4, 5.8 Decamhare 3.2 Gondar Province 5.6 Agew 5.2 Dembe Jefecke village 3.7 Gouled Aptidon, Hassan 4.8, 6.3 aid dependency 6.7 Denakil Desert 5.4 Grassroots International 6.4 Aideed, Mohamed Farah 7.6 deportation 3.2, 4.5 Greater Hanish 5.5 Air Tajikistan 6.3 Derg dictatorship 6.5 "Greater Tigray" 5.6 Al-lttihad 5.3 Derg government 3.5, 4.4 "green line" 7.6 ALF (Afar Liberation Front) 5.9 the Derg 3.4, 5.3, 5.5 Guinea Bissau 5.2 Alga-Aliteina 4.3, 5.5, 5.6 Dhu Nwas 5.2 guurti (elders' conferences) 7.5, 7.8 Aliteina 4.1, 4.3 diplomatic recognition 7.11 Guurti (House of Elders) 7.5 Ambesete Geleba 4.3 4.4, 4.8, 5.1,5.3, 5.5, 6.2, 7.3 H Moi, Daniel 4.8 doro wot (stew) 1.7 Ark of the Covenant 1.6 Dubai 7.9 Habtekere, Gebrenguse 3.6 Asmara 3.2, 5.9, 6.3, 6.4, 6.5 E Hanish Islands 5.3, 5.5 Asmara airport 4.4 Hargeisa 7.3, 7.5, 7.10 Asmara airport bombing 6.1 EC (European Community) 4.7 Heret village 3.7 Assab 4.4, 5.7, 5.8, 6.3 economic development 6.8 hydroelectric power 5.9 Aweke, Aster 1.5 economy 5.7, 5.8 Axumite empire 5.2 Egal, Mohamed Ibrahim 7.5, 7.8 Ayder Primary School 4.4 Egypt 5.9 ICRC (International Committee of the B Ephrem, Sebhat 4.3 Red Cross) 4.6 EPLF (Eritrean People's Liberation IGAD (Inter-Governmental Authority on Bada. See also Adi-Murug Front) 3.4, 4.5, 5.1, 52, 5.3, 5.4, Development) 3.4, 4.7, 5.1,6.2 Badime 3.4, 3.7, 4.1,4.2, 4.3, 4.8, 5.4, 5.7, 6.4, 6.6, 6.7, 7.3 injera (flat bread made from fermented 5.5, 5.6, 5.10 EPRDF (Ethiopian People's Revolution- batter) 1.3, 5.7, 6.9 Bagoweini 3.6 ary Democratic Front) 5.2 intermarriage 5.4 Bahir Dar (Gojjam Region) 5.9 Erde Mattios 4.3 Italian colonization 5.3 "barefoot doctors" 6.4 Eritrea 3.1, 4.1, 6.1 Italy 5.4 Barentu 3.5 Eritrea Profile 3.8, 6.6 Barre, Mohamed Siad 7.3, 7.4, 7.6 Eritrean Defense Force 4.2 J Eritrean Public Health 6.4 birr 5.7 Program Janmeda 1.6, 3.1 "blood price" 7.7 Eritrean women 6.6 Bole airport 1.1, 1.3 Eritrean Women's Association 6.7 K Borama 7.5 Eritrean Youth Association 6.7 Britain 5.4 ERREC (Eritrean Relief and Refugee Kenya 5.2 British Council library 6.6 Commission) 3.6 Khartoum 5.10 Burao 7.3, 7.5, 7.6, 7.7 Ethiopia 5.4 khat 1.8, 6.2, 7.6, 7.7, 7.8, 7.10 Burie 3.4, 4.3, 5.8 Ethiopia-Eritrea border conflict kickbacks 7.8 Burkina Faso 4.8 3.3, 4.1, 5.1, 5.2, 6.1 King Caleb 5.2 Ethiopian Airlines 4.5, 5.10 King Ezana 5.2 C Ethiopian Orthodox Church 1.4 kitfo (ground beef with spiced butter) Ethiopian Telecommunications Author- 1.8 casualties, battle 4.3 ity 4.5 Kombolcha 3.1 Clinton, Bill 4.5, 4.8, 6.1 ethnic 3.5 coffee 5.8 groups Amhara, Oromo 3.5 coffee ceremony 1.7 Expo '98 6.8 Lake, Anthony 4.8

Entries refer to ICWA Letter (MM-1, etc.) and page, with Letter number given before each page entry Institute of Current World Affairs 13 lakes 1.4 refugee repatriation 6.8 tibs (sauteed meat) 1.4 Bishoftu 1.4 religion 1.4 Tigray Province 3.2, 4.2, 4.4, 5.3 Legesse, Asmarom 3.8 Republic of Somaliland 7.3 Tigrayan nationalism 5.6 livestock 7.9 Resolution 1177 4.8 Tigrinya 3.8 Rice, Susan 4.7 Timket, the Ethiopian Orthodox Rift Valley Fever 7.9 Church's celebration 1.6 Region 7.7 machiato (espresso and milk) 6.4 Robinson, Mary 4.5 Togdheer TPLF (Tigray People's Liberation Front) Mahdi, Ali 7.3, 7.4 Rwanda 4.7 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, 5.4, 5.5, 5.6, 5.7 Marcus, Harold 5.2 3.4, S tradition 1.8 Mariam, Mengistu Haile 1.4 3.4, 4.4, 5.1, 7.3 Sawa national military training camp transportation Abdirahman 7.5, 7.6 Massawa 5.7 4.6, 5.5 "Tuur," media 3.3, 6,8 Selassie, Haile 5.2, 5.4 U Mehare, Zait 3.7 Setit 4.3 Mekelle 3.1, 4.4 Shambuco 3.6 U.S. Embassy travel warning 6.1 Menelik 1.6, 7.2 Sheba 1.6 U.S. Marines 7.3 Mereb River 3.7, 5.4 shir (traditional Somali congress) 7.4 U.S.-Rwanda Peace Plan 4,7 Mogadishu 7.6 Sierra Leone 5.2 U.S./U.N. interventions 7.3 Mubarak, Hosni 4.8 Sifreye Genet 3.7 Uganda 5.2, 5.9 Mulki 3.7 Solomon 1.6 UN Cartographic Office 4.7 Museveni, Yoweri 4.8 Solomonic Dynasty 5.2 UN Commissioner on Human Somali clans Rights. See Robinson, Mary N Abgal 7.3 UNICEF 3.7 United Nations 4.7, 5.5 nakfa 5.7, 6.3 Dulbahante 7.4 United Nations OCHA for the nepotism 7.8 Gadabursi 7.4 (Office NGOs (non-governmental Habr Awal 7.5, 7.8 Coordination of Humanitarian 3.6 organizations) 6.7, 7.9 Habr Ja'llo 7.6, 7.7 Assistance) United Nations Security Council 4.8 Nigeria 5.2 HabrYonis 7.6, 7.7 United Nations Task Force Nile River 5.9 Hawiye 7.3 (UNITAF) Isaaq 7.3, 7.5, 7.6 7.3 O (SNM) United Somali Congress (USC) 7.3 7.3, 7.4, 7.5 USAID OFDA (Office of Foreign OAU (Organization for African Unity) Somali oratory 7.7 Disaster Assistance) 3.6 3.4, 4.7, 4.8, 5.5 Somali Salvation Democratic Front Region 7.3 (SSDF) 7.3 W Ogaden War 7.3 Somalia 5.2, 7.1 Warsama, Abdi Ibrahim 7.7 OLF Liberation Front) 5.9 (Oromo Somaliland, Republic of 7.1, 7.3 Welo Province 5.2, 5.6 "Operation Restore Hope" 7.3 constitution 7.8 Western Somali Liberation Front P elections 7.8 (WSLF) 7.3 government 7.8, 7.9 White Horse Whiskey 1.8 Paul Kagame 4.7 history 7.2 Petros, Col. Bezabieh 4.4 independence 7.2 Y PFDJ (People's Front for Democracy NGO's 7.9 Yemen 5.3, 7.9 and Justice) 5.2, 6.6 private sector 7.10 triangle 5.6 pickpockets 1.7 Protectorate 7.2 Yirga Yohannes IV 5.3 police 1.7 secession 7.5 port of Djibouti 6.3 Sudan 5.2, 5.9 Z press 6.8 T Zagwe dynasty 5.2 tabot (holy slab) 1.6 Zaire (now Congo) 5.2 3.2, 3.4, 4.2, 4.3, 5.5 Qaddafi, Muammar 3.4, 4.8 tala (barley beer) 1.8 Zalanbessa teff 5.7 Zenawi, Meles 5.1, 5.4, 6.2 R tej (honey wine) 1.8 3.4, 4.2, 4.5, Zimbabwe 4.8 Ras Mikhael Seul 5.3 telecommunications 7.10 4.8, 5.8 Tesfaye-Mikael, Worku 3.6

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