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Somaliland's First Elections, 2002 - 2005 Richard Bennet, Michael Woldemariam Innovations for Successful Societies NURTURING DEMOCRACY IN THE HORN OF AFRICA: SOMALILAND'S FIRST ELECTIONS, 2002 - 2005 SYNOPSIS A decade after the former British protectorate of Somaliland severed ties with the rest of Somalia and declared independence, the fledgling state took the next steps toward democracy by holding direct elections. This transition occurred over the course of four years and three elections, during which the people of Somaliland elected district councils in 2002, a president and vice president in 2003, and a parliament in 2005. Somaliland’s democratic elections, the first in the Horn of Africa since 1969, were landmark achievements, as traditional social and political mechanisms legitimized the results and reinforced stability in the aftermath. The inexperienced and under- resourced National Electoral Commission successfully navigated the development of political parties, avoided the potential for violence when the margin of victory in the presidential election was only 80 votes, and managed an improved parliamentary election by introducing innovations that made the electoral process operate more smoothly. By avoiding violence and building consensus for peaceful, democratic transitions, Somaliland’s first elections highlighted a mix of traditional and democratic innovations conducted in a resource-poor environment. Richard Bennet and Michael Woldemariam drafted this policy note on the basis of interviews conducted in Somaliland during October 2010. For a detailed look at the establishment of civilian government in Somaliland from 1991 to 2001, see the companion case study, “Navigating a Broken Transition to Civilian Rule.” INTRODUCTION People’s Party, Dahir ‘Riyale’ Kahin, had On 19 April 2003, the results of beaten Ahmed ‘Silanyo’ of the Kulmiye party Somaliland’s first presidential election arrived by a mere 80 votes in an election with over from regional offices at the headquarters of the 488,000 voters. “We thought something was National Electoral Commission. Shukri wrong,” Ismail recalled. “We couldn’t Ismail, the lone woman among seven announce this immediately. We had to go commissioners, said she was “shocked” by the back and check again. We rechecked and tabulated results. The acting president and rechecked. Still, 80 votes. … I was shivering. candidate from the United Democratic People were expecting us to announce.” © 2011, Trustees of Princeton University 1 Terms of use and citation format appear at the end of this document and at http://www.princeton.edu/successfulsocieties. Richard Bennet, Michael Woldemariam Innovations for Successful Societies Kulmiye supporters gathered outside, waiting breaking into a civil war between 1994 and for the results and celebrating what they 1996—the narrow margin of victory for the anticipated would be a victory for their United Democratic People’s Party (Ururka candidate. “We said to ourselves, ‘This is it. Dimuqraadiga Umada Bahawday, or UDUB) in If we don’t say the results, people will think the 2003 presidential election seemed sure to we have done something. … We won’t leave spark a violent response from supporters of the this building alive,’” Ismail said. losing Kulmiye party. And yet Somalilanders, Somaliland, an autonomous region in the invoking a combination of democratic and northwest of Somalia, declared independence traditional mediation norms, managed to avoid in 1991 after the overthrow of Somali dictator violence. This case study documents the Siad Barre and a 10-year civil war. The operational and political challenges that Somali National Movement (SNM), the rebel Somaliland and its new National Electoral organization that seized power from Barre in Commission faced, and the strategies they Somaliland, initially had spurned the idea of employed to keep the country on the path to a an independent republic. However, the more mature democracy. repressive tactics of Barre’s southern- dominated government during the civil war led THE CHALLENGE to calls for a sovereign state. On 31 May 2001, 97% of those who The drive for independence had historical voted in Somaliland’s first nationwide precedent, as Somaliland had possessed the referendum approved a newly drafted status of an independent country for six days constitution. The referendum set in motion a between the departure of its British colonizers timetable for holding democratic elections, the and its voluntary union with southern Somalia first in the recent history of the independent in 1960. During the 1990s, an interim but internationally unrecognized country. government transitioned to civilian leadership, A variety of challenges, both operational and democratic institutions slowly emerged and political, accompanied this step toward amid a fragile mix of clan politics and scarce democracy. Somaliland’s government lacked resources. the institutions and procedures necessary to With an estimated three million people conduct free and fair elections. The political drawn from three major clan families—the system seemed more suited to traditional clan- Isaaq, Harti/Darood, and the Dir—and various based politics than multi-party democracy. In sub-clans, Somaliland stood in an increasingly fact, many conjectured that Somaliland’s undemocratic and dangerous corner of the relative stability was due to its willingness to world. Indeed, Somalia to the southeast spurn elections in the years following devolved into chaos as clan-based militias independence, in favor of a system of rule in fought over political power. But Somaliland which periodic conferences of clan elders used managed to hold a referendum on a democratic traditional negotiating strategies to decide on constitution, establish political parties that did the structure of government and distribution of not break along clan lines, and conduct free power. Elite bargaining was about to give way and fair elections for district councils, the to messy mass democracy. presidency and parliament. Having proclaimed independence from Given the context of the SNM’s armed the rest of Somalia in 1991, Somaliland moved struggle against the previous regime and the toward a constitution and direct elections on tensions between the clans that had existed the initiative of its second president, throughout the previous decade—even Mohamed Ibrahim Egal. When the council of © 2011, Trustees of Princeton University 2 Terms of use and citation format appear at the end of this document and at http://www.princeton.edu/successfulsocieties. Richard Bennet, Michael Woldemariam Innovations for Successful Societies clan elders (the Guurti) selected Egal at a An exile who returned to Somaliland landmark conference in Borama in 1993, his during the tense period of clan conflict in 1995 mandate was for a short transitional term. to found a prominent local NGO, Ismail had Nine years later Egal was still president. The the respect of many in the community, but she constitution concentrated power in the worried that her organizational experience executive branch, and many opposing leaders with NGOs might not translate to the tasks of saw the move toward elections—including the an election commissioner. Ismail recalled that creation of an independent election when she read the job description, she said, commission in December 2001—as yet “No, no, this is not for me.” But Abdilqadir another tool that Egal could use to bolster his Jirde, a veteran member of Parliament and standing and prolong his rule. deputy speaker of the House of Against the backdrop of Egal’s Representatives, persuaded her to reconsider. consolidation of power, other political leaders In a society where traditional clan structures formed alliances to oppose the president. But affirmed and promoted patriarchy, with Egal’s death in May 2002, the doors of opportunities for women to hold high public political opportunity opened for political actors positions were rare and Ismail would not let from a variety of clans. Mohamed Fadal of the the opportunity pass. “I said, ‘I have no Social Research and Development Institute, a experience,’ and [Jirde] said, ‘You don’t need Somaliland non-governmental organization, experience; it’s just like a knife on a melon.’” explained, “[Egal] died and there was nothing Because the commission lacked the to fight about. At a certain point Somaliland financial resources to hire and train a large had all these forces that were prepared to fight staff, it faced the daunting task of mobilizing a against Egal, and now had no one to fight workforce without offering appropriate against. And that was the mood which made compensation. This problem was especially possible the political parties to be formed, the significant in remote areas, where elections to be formed. There was no identification and training of potential polling- strongman to fight against.” Leaders embraced station staffers was difficult. The commission the elections as an affirmation of independence did not have the vehicles necessary to cover and a step toward democracy and, by the challenging terrain, and many remote areas extension, international recognition. did not have the technology to allow easy The new National Electoral Commission communications with the commission’s (NEC) had no election experience. In headquarters in Hargeisa. And even when the accordance with the election law, the commission managed to identify and mobilize president nominated three of the seven election staff outside of the urban areas, the commissioners while the Guurti and civil staff lacked
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