Graduate school of Social Sciences

The transition towards renewable energy: a comparative study of wind power development in the and (2001–2017)

Source: website of Mother Earth News (2012) Author: Michel van den Akker Student number: 10145451 Thesis type: Master Thesis Program: The Political Economy of Energy Supervisor: Dhr. dr. M.P. Amineh Second Reader: Dr. ir. W. Crijns-Graus Date of submission: 23-06-2017 Place of submission: Amsterdam

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Table of contents

Acknowledgements ...... 5 Abstract ...... 7 Maps ...... 8 List of figures ...... 11 List of abbreviations ...... 12 Chapter 1 Research Design ...... 15 1.1 Introduction ...... 15 1.1.1 Objectives ...... 16 1.1.2 Research Questions ...... 16 1.1.3 Social and scientific relevance...... 17 1.1.4 Delineation of the research ...... 19 1.1.5 Literature review ...... 20 1.2 Theory and concepts...... 27 1.2.1 Geopolitical economy ...... 28 1.2.3 The resource scarcity model ...... 31 1.2.4 Relation between theory and concept ...... 31 1.2.2 Geopolitical economy, resource scarcity and the transition towards renewable energy in the Netherlands and Denmark ...... 32 1.3 Brief argumentation and hypotheses ...... 33 1.4 Research methods ...... 34 1.5 Structure of the thesis ...... 34 Chapter 2 The energy situation and policy responses of the Netherlands and Denmark ...... 37 2.1 Introduction ...... 37 2.2 Global energy profile ...... 37 2.3 Energy profile and policy responses of the Netherlands ...... 40 Chapter 3 The role of fossil fuels and renewable energy in the economy of the Netherlands and Denmark ...... 47 3.1 Introduction ...... 47 3.2 The role of the energy sector in the economy of the Netherlands ...... 48 3.2.1 The role of natural gas ...... 49 3.2.2 The role of oil ...... 52 3.2.3 The role of coal ...... 54 3.2.4 The role of renewable energy ...... 55 3.3 The role of the energy sector in the economy of Denmark ...... 56

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3.3.1 The role of oil and natural gas ...... 56 3.3.2 The role of renewable energy ...... 58 3.4 Energy and economy in the Netherlands and Denmark: similarities and differences ...... 59 3.5 Conclusions ...... 60 Chapter 4 The transition towards renewable energy in the Netherlands and Denmark ...... 63 4.1 Introduction ...... 63 4.2 The role of the business sector ...... 64 4.3 The role of the government ...... 66 4.4 The role of green- and social movements ...... 69 4.5 Energy policy and the transition towards renewable energy ...... 70 4.6 The future of renewable energy in the Netherlands ...... 78 4.7 Conclusions ...... 79 Conclusions ...... 83 References...... 89 Appendix ...... 95

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Acknowledgements

When I started studying at the University of Amsterdam in September 2011, I was not fully aware of my interest for politics and political-economy. However, without realizing it I choose a study that is strongly connected to the political and economic sphere: ‘Future Planet Studies’. Although I learned that (future) global problems and issues are almost always interdisciplinary in nature, I started to develop a passion for the political dynamics and explanations of those problems. As this passion grew stronger over time, I applied for the major: ‘Political Science: International Relations’ with firm conviction in my second year. During this major, I started to comprehend the complexity of international affairs and developed a special interests for issues that manifest themselves on the interface of politics and economics, of state and market. Therefore, and because I assumed that this program would be more challenging, I applied for the Master’s program: ‘Political Science: Political Economy’ which is the reason for writing this thesis. This thesis is the result of five months of research on the transition towards renewable energy in the Netherlands and Denmark. I consider this research to be the culmination of a very intensive but educational year in which I worked hard, acquired extensive knowledge and developed strong analytical tools that enable me to explain all kinds of political issues and phenomena. First and foremost, my gratitude goes to Dr. Mehdi Amineh for his dedication and support during my thesis project. He was always willing to reflect on my work and to provide feedback. In addition, I am very glad that I had the opportunity to learn from his vision and ideas about the relation between energy and political economy. It really helped me to understand the dynamics of the transition towards renewable energy in the Netherlands and with respect to the current world order. Second, I want to thank my second reader, dr. ir. Wina Crijns-Graus for her time to review my work. Finally, I want to thank all interviewees for their time and willingness to invest in my thesis project.

Michel van den Akker June 26th, 2017

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Abstract

This research will claim that the Netherlands is less successful than Denmark with respect to the transition towards renewable energy and wind power development because the ‘wealth- power’ structure of the Netherlands is more reliant on fossil fuels. In industrial countries such as the Netherlands and Denmark, the government (power) is dependent on the business sector (wealth) for the creation of economic growth, prosperity, social-security and government revenues. Therefore, the government has strong incentives to protect the interests of the business sector and to create an environment that benefits its competitiveness. In this respect, as the transition towards renewable energy poses a threat to the interests of the sector, whether it is resisted or supported by the government is dependent on the relative importance of the fossil fuel sector and renewable energy sector for the economy. In addition to the government and the business sector, democratic countries such as the Netherlands and Denmark know other forms of social organization that try to influence the decision-making process such as social movements. With respect to the transition towards renewable energy, of particular importance are ‘green’ social movements as these generally act as advocates of renewable energy. This research will explain how the configuration of interests, influence and interdependencies between the government, the business sector and green movements has shaped energy policy and hence determined the development of the transition towards renewable energy in the Netherlands and Denmark. In this respect, this research finds that because the fossil fuel business sector is much more important for the economy of the Netherlands than the renewable energy sector, this configuration produced energy policies that served the interests of the fossil fuel energy regime instead of showing support for the transition towards renewable energy. In contrast, as both the fossil fuel sector and the renewable energy sector are very important for the economy of Denmark, this configuration produced energy policies that showed more support for the transition towards renewable energy.

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Maps

Map 1: The Netherlands

Source: Nations Online Project (n.d.)

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Map 2: Denmark

Source: Nations Online Project (n.d.

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Map 3: the

Source: website of the EU Country List (2008)

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List of figures

Figure 2.1 World Energy consumption by OECD and non-OECD 39

Figure 2.2 Energy production by source, the Netherlands (2014) 41

Figure 2.3 Total primary energy supply by source, the Netherlands (2014) 41

Figure 2.4 Energy production by source, Denmark (2014) 44

Figure 2.5 Total primary energy supply by source, Denmark (2014) 44

Figure 3.1 Imports and exports of natural gas in the Netherlands (2010-2016) 50

Figure 3.2 Parties involved in the natural gas production of the Netherlands 51

Figure 3.3 Government revenues from natural gas, the Netherlands (1977-2016) 52

Figure 3.4 Government revenues from oil and natural gas, Denmark (1982-2014) 58

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List of abbreviations

AR5 Fifth Assessment Report of the International Panel on Climate Change Bcm Billion cubic meters BP British Petroleum Btu British thermal units CBS Central Agency for Statistics (the Netherlands) DUC Danish Underground Consortium DEA Danish Energy Agency ECN Energy research center the Netherlands EIA Energy Information Administration () EMO Europe’s largest coal hub near the port of Rotterdam ETS Emission Trading System EU European Union FIT Feed-in tariff GATE Gas Access to Europe (LNG Terminal Rotterdam) GDP FNV Dutch labour union IEA International Energy Agency IEO International Energy Outlook IPE International Political Economy IPCC International Panel on Climate Change IR International Relations KPC Kuwait Petroleum Corporation LNG Liquefied natural gas MENA Middle-East and North-Africa Mtoe Million tonnes of oil equivalent NMP4 National Environmental Action Plan 4 NEV National Energy Outlook the Netherlands NWEA Dutch advocacy organization for wind power

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OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development OPEC Oil Producing and Exporting Countries PBL Environmental Assessment Agency of the Netherlands PPP RE Renewable energy SER Dutch Social-Economic council TPES Total Primary Energy Supply US United States VAT Value-added WEF World Economic Forum

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Chapter 1 Research design

1.1 Introduction

At present, the global economy is predominantly dependent on fossil fuels such as oil, coal and natural gas. The utilization of these fossil fuel sources has resulted in two great waves of industrialization and is hence shaped the current industrial economic world order. In addition, since the economic and political spheres are interrelated and interdependent, fossil fuels have also contributed to the establishment of the global political order that is known today. However, the dominance position of fossil fuels in the industrial political-economy will not last forever as reserves of oil, natural gas and coal are expected to be depleted in a few decades (Shafiee & Topal, 2009 p. 186). In addition, the utilization of fossil fuels has negative side effects as it contributes to environmental degradation, climate change and various sorts of related problems such as changing migration patterns. As a result, countries with fossil fuel dependent industrial economies face an inevitable transition towards alternative sources of energy. Since many countries have rejected nuclear energy as a safe alternative, the focus is mainly directed to energy production from renewable sources such as wind, water and sunlight. These sources of renewable energy are appealing since they are sustainable, clean and have the potential to potential to generate large amounts of energy. However, the transition towards renewable energy is not merely a technical process. The incumbent fossil fuel world order has produced powerful (geo) economic and (geo) political constituents that have strong interests in protecting the status quo, at least in the short-run. Therefore, the transition towards renewable energy is foremost a political transition as it encompasses a rebalance of power at the heart of today’s industrial political economy. As a result, the development of the transition is dependent on the ability of constituents protecting the status quo and constituents that are advocates of renewable energy to influence the decision-making process and to shape system level outcomes. As the existence and relative influence of these constituents varies across countries, some countries are more successful than other regarding the transition towards renewable energy. This research aims to explain why the Netherlands is less successful than Denmark regarding the transition towards renewable energy by looking at wind power development in particular. According to data from (2017), The Netherlands has one of the lowest shares of renewable energy in its domestic energy consumption of the European Union with only 5.8% in 2015 while Denmark has one of the highest shares with 30.8% in 2015. This research will look at the role of state-, market-, and societal-forces and evaluate how their configuration of influence, interests and interdependencies have determined the development of the transition towards renewable energy in the Netherlands and Denmark. Thereby, this research will connect energy with the central forces of the national and global political- economy and review how their interaction shapes developments in the current world order.

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1.1.1 Objectives

The objectives of this research are plural. First, the central objective is to explain why the Netherlands is less successful than Denmark with respect to the transition towards renewable energy and wind power development. Second, as the Netherlands and Denmark share multiple common features with other countries in the world, this research also aims to identify the factors that determine the development of this transition in general. Third, this research aims to contribute to the field of academic literature by explaining how state-, market- and other societal-forces relate to each other in the case of energy and how their interaction determines the development of the transition towards renewable energy. Fourth and final, this research aims to provide information and recommendations to policy-makers and other constituents that are involved in the decision-making process in order enable them to produce more effective policies regarding renewable energy in general and wind power development in particular.

1.1.2 Research Questions

In order to achieve the objectives, this research is based on one central research question and three related sub-questions:

The Central research question:

‘Why is the Netherlands less successful than Denmark with respect to the transition towards renewable energy and wind power development?’

Sub-questions:

1. ‘What is the energy situation in the Netherlands and Denmark?’

2. ‘What is the relationship between energy and the wealth-power structure of the Netherlands and Denmark?’

3. ‘How did the relationship between energy and the wealth-power structure determine the development of the transition towards renewable energy and wind power development in the Netherlands and Denmark?

Regarding the sub-questions, some clarification is needed. First, in the first sub-question, the energy situation refers to status quo of the energy regime. It will provide an overview of how much energy the Netherlands and Denmark produce, how much they consume how much energy is imported and exported and what energy sources are prominent in this respect. Second, as will be explained in detail by section 1.2 on theory and concepts, the wealth- power structure refers to the condominium of state and market that constitutes the core of liberal industrial state-societies such as the Netherlands and Denmark. Third, the relation

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between energy and the wealth-power structure refers to the way in which energy is embedded in the economy and how the energy sector is important politically by generating economic growth, prosperity, social-security and government revenues. Finally, the third sub-question asks how the interaction of the state-, market- and societal-forces that emanate from the wealth-power structure has determined the development of the transition towards renewable energy.

1.1.3 Social and scientific relevance

The social relevance of this research relates to several multiple levels that are connected to the transition towards renewable energy. As this research provides insights in the forces that determined the development of this transition and as it provides recommendations to policy makers and other constituents, it contributes to the solution of several problems that are currently present. First, as the world will run out of fossil fuels in the near future, countries such as the Netherlands and Denmark risk losing energy supply security if they are unable to make the transition towards renewable energy. As energy constitutes the basis of their industrial economic activity, this will create major problems for these countries. This logic is even more important for the Netherlands as the extraction of natural gas is causing earthquakes in the province of Groningen. Already, production levels have been reduced significantly as a result of social and political pressure. Second, countries such as the Netherlands and Denmark are subjected to political pressure from the European Union (EU) as the European Commission has set pressing targets related to renewable energy for its member-states. By 2020, the EU aims to increase its share of renewable energy in the total energy consumption to 20%. Currently, while it is expected that the Netherlands will not achieve its national target of 14% RE (National Energy Outlook the Netherlands, 2016 p. 15), Denmark is well on to achieve its ambitious target of 30% (Danish Energy Agency, 2015 p. 3). Third, there are important geopolitical motivations for the transition towards renewable energy. Although some countries, such as the Netherlands and Denmark, have access to fossil fuel reserves located in their national territory, almost all European countries rely on foreign powers such as Russia and countries in the Middle-East and Northern Africa (MENA) region for the supply of oil and natural gas (Eurostat, 2017)1. The recent turmoil in the MENA region that emanated from the Arab Spring poses a real threat to the energy supply security of the European Union (Müftüler-Baҫ & Başkan, 2011 p. 4474). Besides, the rising tensions between the ‘West’ and Russia poses another threat to the energy supply security of the European Union. Already, conflicts between Russia and Ukraine have led to disruptions in the flow of natural gas to European Countries in 2006, 2009 and 2014 (Kirby, 2014, October 31). Although Russia is heavily dependent on oil and gas revenues, European countries may

1 Information is derived from the website of Eurostat 17

experience serious problems if the Kremlin decides to use energy as a tool to achieve (geo) political objectives. Therefore, developing a successful transition towards renewable energy might enable European countries to avoid problems with their unstable and unpredictable energy suppliers. Fourth, on a global level, developing the transition towards renewable energy is pivotal in order to overcome problems related to climate change and environmental degradation. According to the Fifth Assessment report (AR5) of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2014), climate change will have a severe impact on the physical system of the world. As long as emissions of greenhouse gases continue, global temperatures will rise, the water cycle will change, the disparity between wet and dry seasons as well as regions will increase, the oceans will continue to warm and become more acidic, sea levels will rise and circulation patterns that contribute to a stable climate will be disturbed. All these changes are expected to disrupt local or even national economies and affect the livelihood of many communities, triggering large migration flows. For the Netherlands and Denmark in particular, climate change is a threat to their very existence since these countries will be affected by rising sea levels directly. In addition, with the current refugee crisis and political tension related to immigration and integration issues, the additional pressure of climate migrants on European societies may have detrimental effects. Fifth, this research will provide new insights in the transition towards renewable energy as it introduces a new perspective, that of ‘geopolitical economy’. Thereby as, it will connect energy with the economy and political power structures in the current world order, this research will contribute to the existing field of academic literature that is related to the transition towards renewable energy. It will increases the understanding of the factors and dynamics that determine the success or failure of the transition in liberal industrialized countries. This new insights may enable policy-makers and other stakeholders to acquire a better, in-depth understanding of the transition towards RE and adjust their actions accordingly. Finally, this research will contribute to the academic fields of International Relations and International Political Economy by applying their perspectives to a relatively new phenomenon, the transition towards renewable energy, and by focusing on the cases of the Netherlands and Denmark. In particular, this research will demonstrate that the theoretical assumptions of ‘geopolitical economy’ as formulated by Amineh & Guang (2014) can also be used to explain the success or failure of the transition towards renewable energy in the Netherlands and Denmark.

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1.1.4 Delineation of the research

1.1.4.1 Time and space

This research provides an analysis of the transition towards RE and wind power development in the Netherlands and Denmark over the period 2001 – 2017. The reason for this starting point is that in 2001, the Dutch Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and Environment published its 4th National Environmental Action Plan (NMP4) which was the first official document that referred to ‘transition’ as a policy concept. Although it would take until 2006 before the first offshore wind farm became operational, this publication can be regarded as the central starting point for the Dutch renewable energy transition. By 2017, this research refers to the situation as of June 2017 as this is when this research was handed in. In addition, this research will occasionally provide information from earlier periods in order to explain path dependencies and dynamics of the period 2000 – 2017. To continue, the geographical space that is under study will be the national territories of the Netherlands and Denmark. In addition, since these countries are EU member-states and as they are dependent on energy supplies from reserves beyond European borders, this study will also reflect briefly on the territory of the EU and the energy rich regions of the worlds including Russia, the MENA region and the Caspian region.

1.1.4.2 Social entities and actors

As will be further explained by section 1.2 on theories and concepts, this research focuses mainly on three branches of actors: state actors, business actors and social green movements. The interaction of these actors on multiple levels produces system level outcomes such as energy policy and hence determines the development of the transition towards renewable energy. First, state-actors refer to the national governments of the Netherlands and Denmark. To be more specific, this research will discuss the role of the involved ministries. For the Netherlands, this will mainly be the Ministry of Economic Affairs as well as the Ministry Finance and the Ministry of Infrastructure and Environment. For Denmark, the involved ministries are the Ministry of Energy, Utilities and Climate, the Ministry of Business and Growth and the Ministry of Finance. Besides ministries, this research will focus on the role of political parties and the composition of the Dutch and Danish coalition governments. For the Netherlands these parties are the VVD (liberal conservatives), the CDA (Christian conservatives) and GroenLinks (green leftist-party) and for Denmark these parties are Venstre (liberal conservatives), the Social Democrats and the Conservative Party. Second, business-actors are organizations that are active in the national and sometimes also the international market sphere. These can either be large multinational companies or small and medium enterprises that focus primarily on the domestic market. In essence, business- actors belong to the civil-society domain as in liberal democratic countries, they operate

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relatively independent from the state. However, as organizations have developed into large multinational companies, their interests are no longer univocally aligned with the interest of civil society. As multinational companies are representatives of international capital forces rather than of civil society, this research regards them as a separate category. For the Netherlands, the business sector that is important for the transition towards renewable energy comprises of major companies related to the oil, gas, coal such as Royal Dutch, Shell, ExxonMobil, the NAM, Gasunie, GasTerra, Akzo Nobel, Aldel, Tata Steel and Dow Chemical as well as a vast number of small and medium-sized subcontractors. Besides these fossil fuel related companies, the Netherlands has several small and medium-sized companies related to renewable energy and wind power such as Dutch Wind, Lagerwey and Wind Brokers. For Denmark, the business-sector knows multinational companies such as Møller-, Dong Energy, Wind Systems and Siemens Wind Power as well as a vast amount of small and medium-sized subcontractors. Third, social green-movements generally act as advocates the environment and are important for the transition towards renewable energy as they try to influence the decision- making process through interaction with the business sector and the government. For the Netherlands, important green movements are Greenpeace, ‘Stichting Natuur en Milieu’ and ‘Milieudefensie’ as well as green movements in the form of spontaneous protest marches and manifestations. For Denmark, Green movements that are important for the transition towards renewable energy are Greenpeace, VedVarendeEnergi and the Danish 92 Group as well as spontaneous protests and manifestations.

1.1.5 Literature review

Over the past decades, a broad field of academic research developed regarding the transition towards RE. Within this relatively new field of inquiry, multiple studies have focused on the dynamics of this transition, including wind power development, in the Netherlands and Denmark in particular. Although different studies have addressed a range of different issues using different perspectives, the academic literature on the transition towards RE in the Netherlands and Denmark can be grouped in three categories. The first, category consists of studies that focus on the influence of the institutional structure on the transition towards RE. In general, these studies evaluate the role and interacting of ideas, institutions and interests. The second category of studies focuses on energy policies and policy implementation. Mainly, these studies aim to find which type of policies are most effective regarding the transition towards renewable energy. Finally, the third category of studies focuses on the public acceptance of RE technologies such as windmills and evaluates how this affects the transition towards renewable energy. Although studying different aspects of the transition towards renewable energy in the Netherlands and Denmark, it must be noted that the studies in the different categories often share common ground and are interrelated to each other. For example, a certain type of ‘institutional structure’ will

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probably have the tendency to produce a certain type of energy policies which is turn has an effect on the level of public acceptance. However, before going into-depth on the studies of the three general categories, this research will highlight a study by Foquet (2010) in order to put the transition towards RE in a historical perspective. In his article, Foquet focuses on the role of economic incentives as he aims to find similarities between the current transition towards renewable energy and the historical transition from traditional energy sources to fossil fuels that occurred first in Great-Britain during the industrial revolution. These similarities relate to three things: (1) the nature of the transition, (2) the speed of the transition and (3) the regime level factors that drive the transition. As Foquet (2010) explains, Great-Britain was the first to make the transition from traditional energy sources such as wood and peat to a fossil fuel based energy system. This transition was very complex and involved various services and sectors at different levels over different periods of time between 1500 and 1920. According to Foquet (2010), economic incentives were the main drivers of the energy transition as fossil fuels became dominant due to their ability to produce cheaper and better energy services. However, in the immediate period after their introduction, the price of these new technologies were higher than the prices of incumbent energy technologies. Therefore, in the early stages of development, the adoption of fossil fuel energy technologies was limited to niche markets. Only because some consumers were willing to pay a higher price for the better energy services that these technologies offered, they were able to develop further and become more efficient. Once fossil fuel technologies were competitive regarding the incumbent energy technologies, their large-scale implementation developed swiftly. This finding is very interesting as nowadays, RE technologies are often unable to compete with fossil fuel technologies. Just as in the early stages of fossil fuel development in Great-Britain, the adoption of RE technologies is limited to niche markets. In relation to this, Foquet (2010) stresses that the greater the willingness of consumers and the government is to pay a higher price for climate stability and energy independence, the more protected the niche markets for RE technologies will be and the faster these technologies will develop and become competitive. However, since consumers have strong incentives to ‘free-ride’, the protection and stimulation of niche markets for RE technologies is primarily a task of governments, albeit with the support of civil society. This implies that the socio-economic and socio- political context in which the transition towards RE will have to materialize is pivotal for its success of failure. Similar to the situation in Great-Britain during the industrial revolution, countries nowadays will have to create a context that protects niche markets and enables new energy technologies to develop until they are competitive and their implementation will he supported by the market. What the characteristics of this context are is investigated by multiple scholars who focused on the influence of the institutional structure, corresponding with the first category. For example, Meadowcroft (2011) argues that it is the interaction between institutions, ideas and interests that produces energy policy. Therefore, instead of only analyzing the effect of certain policies, scholars should focus more on the politics behind the transition

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towards RE. This is exactly what Kern (2011) does as his study focuses on the influence of discourses, institutions and interests on the socio-technical transition towards sustainability in the Netherlands and the . Kern (2011) started from the premise that policies regarding sustainability are not neutral but highly political entities instead. As he observed that the Netherlands and the United Kingdom produced a very different policy approach regarding the transition towards RE, he assumed that the configuration of discourses, institutions and interests must be different in these two countries. Kern (2011) find that the interplay between discourses, institutions and interest heavily influenced the transition towards sustainability in the Netherlands. He argues that because sustainability initiatives and new institutions were implemented in line with the incumbent institutional regime, there was no opportunity for structural change to occur. In addition, Kern (2011) emphasizes that ‘interests’ appear to be a very important factor regarding the transition towards sustainability in the Netherlands. He explains that newly emerging interests related to sustainability interacted with vested institutional factors and interests and became forced into the logic of the incumbent Dutch consensus based decision-making model, the ‘Poldermodel’. Therefore, the transition towards sustainability in the Netherlands is strongly bound by path-dependency. Unless new discourses, institutions and interests are able to transform the incumbent regime, radical change is not expected to occur anytime soon according to Kern (2011). To continue, the importance of institutional conditions is also stressed by a study of Breukers and Wolsink (2007) that evaluates the level of institutional capacity building for offshore wind power development in the Netherlands. Their study aimed to investigate the way in which RE technology is currently embedded in existing routines and practices of the Dutch institutional structure. In agreement with Kern (2011), Breukers and Wolsink (2007) conclude that the Dutch approach towards environmental policies is based on a consensus oriented political culture. As, according to ‘ecological modernization theory’, this is a condition that generally results in successful environmental policies, Breukers and Wolsink (2007) aimed to explain the relative failure of wind power policies and support systems in the Netherlands. They argue that, in the early stages, the Dutch government has chosen a development path that focused on a centralized approach and large-scale implementation. Regarding this path, economic considerations have dominated the policy-making process at the expense of spatial planning and environmental motivations. In conjunction with Kern (2011), Breukers and Wolsink (2007) conclude that the consensus based political culture of the Dutch decision-making process has been counterproductive towards ecological modernization as it solidified the position of vested economic interests vis-à-vis other parties with environmental objectives. As a result, over the past decades the Netherlands experienced a series of overlapping and changing policy support systems that resulted in an unpredictable and unstable investment climate that hampered wind power development. If the Netherlands wants to be more successful regarding RE, Breukers and Wolsink (2007) argue that the Dutch government should make efforts to mobilize multiple RE-related stakeholders and develop a collaborative approach that incorporates their interests,

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alongside the interests of the incumbent energy regime. This recommendation is also present in a study by Hvelplund (2013) who refers to this process as ‘innovative democracy’. Hvelplund (2013) argues that the development of RE in Denmark happened in two stages: the period from 1976 until 2000 and the period from 2000 until 2013. In the first period, RE technologies were still a supplement to the conventional fossil fuel energy system. However, a cluster of ‘green energy’ technologies, including wind- and solar-power and power from biomass, was developed and implemented despite strong and systematic resistance from the Ministry of Finance, the fossil fuel sector and the broader institutional establishment. Hence, were Kern (2011) and Breukers and Wolsink (2007) showed that the Netherlands failed to address this strong institutional resistance, Hvelplund (2013) argues that Denmark is successful regarding RE as it managed to overcome this problem. Through a process of ‘innovative democracy’, lobbyists and actors that were independent from the fossil fuel sector and vested economic interests were given political momentum and democratic influence. This enabled lobbyists and representatives of energy grass roots organizations, ‘green’ companies and green-movements to develop a broad movement for RE that was able to resist the influence of the incumbent energy regime. To continue, Hvelplund (2013) explains that the process of ‘innovative democracy’ was abolished by the right-wing government of Anders Fogh Rasmussen that implemented a neoclassical policy approach during the second phase. As a result, the development of RE technologies slowed down substantially during this period and only picked up again after Rasmussen made a political U- turn in 2008, declaring full support for a 100% renewable future. Interesting is that Hvelplund (2013) considers the ‘market conditions’ that influence the transition towards RE to be nothing more than ‘political constructions’. In contrast to the Netherlands, the Danish government proved that, despite fierce resistance, the incumbent institutional regime can be altered in a way in which ‘green’ constituents are granted with the political power to protect their interest and influence the development of the transition towards RE. In this respect, although both Hvelplund (2013) and Foquet (2010) see an important role for the government, there is less common ground in their recommended approach. While Hvelplund (2013) argued that the government should enable ‘green’ constituents to protect their interests through ‘innovative democracy’, Foquet (2010) argued that the government should make efforts to protect niche markets for RE technologies to facilitate their development, although the former could result in the latter. A study that could explain why the Netherlands has been unable to grant political momentum to ‘green’ constituents and facilitate the development of the transition towards RE is a study by Oteman, Wiering and Helderman (2014). They analyze the institutional structure of the Netherlands, Denmark and in more detail and evaluate its effect on the ability of community initiatives for RE to manifest themselves. Oteman et al. (2014) find that Denmark knows a traditionally civil-society friendly energy sector that grants significant institutional space to community initiatives to develop their projects. In contrast, the Netherlands knows an institutional arrangement that is predominantly market-oriented and leaves little institutional space for community initiatives. Oteman et al. (2014) agree

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with Breukers and Wolsink (2007) as they too claim that the Dutch government adopts a strong economic rational regarding energy policy which protects the interests of the incumbent fossil fuel based energy regime. Partly, this could be explained by the fact that the Dutch government has large interests in the exploitation of natural gas as this generates extensive government revenues. Besides, they find that the fossil fuel sector of the Netherlands, including the transport and agricultural sector, has established a very strong lobby that resists the transition towards RE. In contrast, fossil fuel market parties in Denmark are less influential. As a result, the institutional configuration of Denmark is much more decentralized and communities as well as municipal governments and other ‘green’ organizations have the ability to focus on ‘green’ initiatives. A study that connects the institutional structure with the policy dimension was conducted by Kern and Smith (2008). In their study, these authors critically scrutinize the Dutch implementation of the ‘transition model’ and energy policies that aim to support the transition towards RE. The ‘transition model’ was developed by Dutch researchers and is carried out by the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs in order to establish a sustainable energy system by 2030. The main objective of Kern and Smith (2008) was to evaluate to what extent the policy initiatives of the ‘transition model’ opened up opportunities for structural change. In agreement with Kern (2011) and Breukers and Wolsink (2007), Kern and Smith (2008) argue that the transition towards RE in the Netherlands risks being captured by the incumbent energy regime. In conjunction with Hvelplund (2013) and Oteman et al. (2014), they argue that the influence of the incumbent energy regime results in an institutional configuration that does not provide sufficient opportunities for constituents that are placed outside this regime to exert their influence. In relation to the transition, the dominant actors, themes, niches and pathways that fit well into the existing institutional regime are likely to be selected rather than others that could contribute to a Schumpeterian process of ‘creative destruction’. As a result, the current socio-technical system will only be optimized instead of subjected to structural change. This strong path-dependency is an important impediment for the transition towards RE in the Netherlands. A relative similar study by Kemp, Rotmans and Loorbach (2007) shows a slightly more optimistic view regarding the achievements of the ‘transition model’. Although Kemp et al. (2007) agree with Kern and Smith (2008) that (green) constituents outside the incumbent regime are scarcely involved in the decision- making process, they find that several actors were actually invited but declined to be involved. For example, the largest consumer organization of the Netherlands, the ‘Consumentenbond’ felt that it lacked sufficient expertise about energy related issues. Therefore, albeit that the institutional structure favors incumbent interests over the interests of new ‘green’ constituents, the transition towards RE in the Netherlands may also be hampered because these constituents lack know-how and knowledge on energy and transition related issues. To continue, some other studies are not primarily concerned with ‘institution conditions’ but focus on the effect that different type of policies have on the development of the transition towards RE.

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For example, a study by Lewis and Wiser (2007) investigates the different paths that twelve countries have taken towards the development of a domestic manufacturing industry. They argue that the global dominance of major companies such as Vestas and Siemens Wind Power resulted from the fact that the Danish government created a stable and sizable domestic market that boosted their development. For example, the Danish government introduced variable custom duties for wind turbine components, extensive feed-in tariffs (FIT), facilitated project development loans and even granted benefits to other countries if they chose to import Danish turbines. In addition, Denmark was the first country to establish standardization programs and quality certification for wind turbine technology. In line with the logic of Foquet (2010), the study of Lewis and Wiser (2007) shows that the success of the Danish transition towards RE at least partly resulted from the decision of the Danish government to build and protect a stable and sizable market for wind power. Another study that evaluates the success of the Danish RE transition by focusing on energy policy is a study by Sovacool (2013). According to this study, at least five important lessons can be drawn from the Danish case that can be helpful to other countries with an interests in the RE transition. First, Denmark has proven that the transition towards RE can take place in a relative short period of time. After the oil crisis of 1973 Denmark only needed five years to reduce its oil dependency for electricity production from 95% to only 5%. Second, the Denmark has proven that a carbon tax does not necessarily has a deleterious effect on the overall economy and that it and support wind power development. Moreover, despite the Danish government implemented various expensive energy , the national economy has been growing at a double digit rate over the past decades. However, Sovacool (2013) acknowledges that a similar approach may not lead to the same results in other countries that have larger energy intensive industry. Third, Denmark made the grid accessible to anyone, preventing a monopoly of the incumbent market players. Fourth, Denmark has advocated a polycentric approach to its energy planning which guaranteed the involvement of multiple stakeholders on different levels. In line with the logic of Hvelplund (20130, this enabled constituents related to RE to protect their interests and influence energy policy. Fifth and final, the Danish energy policy and support systems for RE have been remarkably consistent which created stable investment climate for market parties. Another study by Meyer (2007) also examines the effectiveness of policy support systems on wind power development. This study evaluated the success of national policies according to four criteria. First, technological choice and development, which reviews whether there is long-term support for research and development (R&D) and if steps are taken to ensure the quality and functionality of the produced technology. Second, the extent to which wind power related policies are formally incorporated in national energy policies. Third, the extent to which there exist economic support systems such as subsidies, feed-in tariffs or tax benefits. Fourth, the extent to which ownership of wind power technology is localized. Meyer (2007) finds that Denmark scores very high on all these four criteria which could explain the success of the transition towards RE in Denmark. Another study by Toke, Breukers and Wolsink (2006) also aims to explain how energy policies could account for the cross-country

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difference in success regarding the wind power deployment in the Netherlands and Denmark. The study analyzes the impact of four selected institutional policy variables: planning systems, financial support systems, landscape protection organizations, and local ownership patterns. With respect to planning systems, Toke et al. (2006) find that in Denmark, local municipalities are obliged to allocate zones for wind power deployment and that only 10% of those municipalities refused to do so. In contrast, the government of the Netherlands is unable to enforce a similar obligation due to the Dutch consensus based political culture. With respect to financial support systems, Toke et al. (2006) find that Dutch financial support system has been highly volatile which undermined the stability of the market. In contrast, Denmark has established a very longstanding incentive regime for wind power development and created a stable market. Regarding landscape protection organizations, the Netherlands and Denmark fall somewhere in between the extremes as both countries have some organizations that are opposed to wind power deployment. Final, the Netherlands and Denmark both show a high level of local ownership development, a finding that contradicts with the study of Breukers & Wolsink (2007) that concludes that the development of RE in the Netherlands is characterized by a centralized approach. Finally, a third category of academic studies focuses on the level of ‘public acceptance’ towards wind power development and how this influences the transition towards RE. A very comprehensive study by Wolsink (2007) identifies several factors that can account for different levels of public acceptance towards wind power in the Netherlands. Wolsink (2007) finds that public opposition towards wind power deployment is strong in the Netherlands primarily because the Dutch government has been neglecting the importance of allocating wind farms to special sites. He argues that it was a tragic mistake to determine the development path of wind power on a national level. The spatial planning system of the Netherlands has been characterized by a technocratic, top-down and hierarchical way of thinking. Spatial planning systems failed to include the general and local public in the decision-making process and failed to provide consultation in advance of the actual deployment. According to Wolsink (2007), the technocratic, corporatist and elite based decision-making process must be abolished if the Netherlands aims to achieve the same success Denmark had. In summary, the academic literature on the transition towards RE and wind power development in particular in the Netherlands and Denmark can be grouped in three categories: studies on institutional conditions, studies on energy policy and studies on public acceptance. In addition, a very interesting study by Foquet (2010) puts the transition towards RE in an historical perspective and highlights the role of economic incentives. As emphasized, the studies from the different categories share common ground and are often interrelated. In general, studies that focus on institutional conditions agree that the transition towards RE and wind power development in the Netherlands is hampered by a strong institutional path-dependency and the Dutch consensus based decision-making model. These condition solidified the position of vested economic-interests, which are mostly fossil fuel based, vis-à-vis newly emerging ‘green’ constituents. As new initiatives and

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constituents were forced to comply with the incumbent institutional structure, structural change is not likely to occur anytime soon unless it is facilitated by the market, which brings us back by Foquet (2011). As consumers have strong incentives to free-ride, Foquet stressed the importance of the government that will have to protect niche markets for Re technologies in order to facilitate their further development. An example of a government that proved to be relatively successful in this respect is the government of Denmark. Over time, the Danish administration managed to adopt policies that protected and favored RE technologies which led to the development of major turbine manufacturers such as Vestas and Siemens Wind Power and gave the country a strong first mover advantage. At least partly, the ability of the Danish government to protect their RE niche markets against vested economic interests may have been derived from the process of ‘innovative democracy’. From the general conclusions of these studies, it is a logical step to the contribution of this research. This study will introduce a new perspective regarding the transition towards RE that will provide new insights in the fundamental factors and trends that determine the success or failure of the transition towards RE in the Netherlands and Denmark. Currently, studies on institutional structures can be perceived the most fundamental as it are institutional conditions that shape policy which in turn influences public acceptance. However, these studies often only describe the features and the influence of the institutional structures without explaining how they developed or what constitutes them. This research will go more into depth as it will identify the political-, economic- and social- forces, events and trends that created the context in which the transition towards RE in the Netherlands and Denmark has to manifest itself. It will explain the development of the transition by making a connection between state, market and society and evaluating their interaction against the background of the current Anglo-Saxon world order. The next section will outline the theoretical and conceptual frameworks which are used to conduct this research.

1.2 Theory and concepts

In order to explain why the Netherlands is less successful than Denmark with respect to the transition towards renewable energy and wind power development, this research will rely on the academic field of ‘geopolitical economy’. As this is a very broad school of thought, this research will build in particular on ‘geopolitical economy’ as articulated by Amineh & Guang (2014) in their research: ‘The Geopolitics of the Transnationalization of Chinese National Oil Companies. After laying out the theory in section 1.2.1, this research will explain how it is applied in the cases of the Netherlands and Denmark in section 1.2.2. Besides, in order to assess the energy situation in the Netherlands and Denmark and to explain why these countries will have to make the transition towards renewable energy, this research will rely on the ‘resource scarcity model’ of Amineh and Houweling (2007) which will be outlined in section 1.2.3.

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1.2.1 Geopolitical economy

In the version of geopolitical economy that is articulated by Amineh and Guang (2014), the unit of analysis is the state-society complex that is present in today’s self-identifying states. The interaction between organized groups that emanate from these spheres produces the system level outcomes that are regarded as units of analysis as well. Therefore, the primary target countries of this theory are industrial states or states that are subjected to industrialization. This is because in these states, the interaction between state- and society- agents is at the core of their geopolitical and geo-economic developments as this interaction produces the institutions that connect the domestic market to the outside world. With respect to industrial or industrializing countries, Amineh & Guang (2014) make a distinction between two types of state-society complexes: the liberal state-society and the authoritarian state-led society. First, clear examples of liberal state-societies are advanced industrial and democratic states such as the United States or the member-states of the European Union. In these states, civil-society and privately owned corporations operate relatively independent from the government. Through interaction with each other on multiple levels, the relative autonomous branches of government, business and civil-society try to protect their interests by influencing geo-economic and geopolitical developments within their liberal state-society complex. Second, the currently best-known example of an authoritarian state led society is the People’s Republic of . In China, the sovereign state, representing the ruling elite of the Communist Party, determines the long-term strategic orientation of market and societal forces. For example, state planning controls labour mobilization, , , sectoral investment priorities and the nature of investments in transnational space through state-owned corporations. Therefore, the capacity of business- and civil-society forces to articulate their interests, domestically or in transnational space, is determined by the geopolitical and geo-economic objectives of the ruling elite. For both liberal state-societies and authoritarian state led societies, the configuration of state-society relations is termed ‘wealth-power’ structure. It is this configuration, in which the mode of interaction between the three branches is stipulated, that determines how wealth is created and power is distributed within the state-society complex. In the current neoliberal world order, both state-society complexes can be regarded as ‘capitalist constructs’ that aim to increase their wealth and subsequent power through the market or by force. Although in theory, state and market forces often collide – state agents having long-term goals while the market agents primarily have short-term incentives – they are strongly interdependent. On the one hand, the state requires taxation from the market while on the other, the market requires protection and regulation from the state. Therefore, a growing economy and capitalist expansion are the ‘raison d’être’ of modern industrialized state-society complexes, whether liberal or authoritarian. As a result of their capitalist nature, modern industrialized state-society complexes have a strong tendency to engage in cross-border activities and interact with other state-society complexes in transnational

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space. According to Amineh & Guang (2014), these activities follow two logics: a geo- economic logic and a geopolitical logic. The geo-economic logic is derived from the natural tendency of capital to expand geographically in search for new resources and markets. As the state is heavily dependent on capitalist market parties in order to protect its power in the domestic wealth-power structure, capitalist forces influence the political process that determines the nature of these cross-border quest for resources and markets. Therefore, states have the tendency to follow a ‘geopolitical logic’ by making efforts to gain access and secure control over resources and markets in transnational space. For authoritarian stated led societies such as China, this process of ‘power projection’ is controlled by the state as the business sector that engages in cross-border economic activity often consists of state-owned corporations or corporations that have close ties to the ruling elite. For liberal state- societies, identifying the actors behind cross-border economic activity is more difficult as the business sector formally operates independently from the state. However, as state and market are interdependent, state forces are inclined to facilitate cross-border economic activities more indirectly. For both types of state-society complexes, the geopolitical tendency to project power beyond national borders in order to protect the domestic wealth- power structure is the consequence of a factor called ‘lateral pressure’. This refers to the build-up of socio-economic pressure by capitalist market forces. Multinational corporations with ties to a domestic economy, other large, small and medium-sized companies and domestic consumers all exert lateral pressure on the government to protect their capitalist interests through cross-border economic activities. In this respect, energy plays a crucial role as apart from being merely a commodity, it serves as the prerequisite of present day industrial economic activity. Therefore, it is granted with special attention by both types of industrial state-society complexes. Without energy, capitalist state classes are unable to protect their wealth-power structure and ultimately, their survival. It is here that geo-economic and geopolitical logic of energy manifests itself. Since fossil fuel resources are scarce, unevenly distributed over the world and non- renewable, capitalist state classes engage in transnational competition with each other for these energy resources. They are subjected to lateral pressure by their domestic socio- economic constituents to project their power beyond national borders in order to ensure energy supply security and to increase wealth and subsequently power. In this respect, power projections could imply the creation of routes abroad to gain access to reserves of oil, gas or coal or investments in foreign companies or energy production fields in order to connect them with the domestic economy and wealth-power structure. In order to explain the version of ‘geopolitical economy’ of Amineh & Guang (2014) in more depth and to explain its relevance for real world developments, it is important to review the context in which the theoretical assumptions manifest themselves and to provide examples. Therefore, attention is directed towards the process of sequential capitalist industrialization. Geographically, the world experienced two episodes of industrialization that transformed traditional states into capitalist state-society complexes. The first, wave of industrialization originated in Britain during the 17th century and later spread to the other regions of the

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European continent and European colonies such as North-America, Canada, New and Australia. In the early stages, the process of industrialization was marked by fierce protectionist measures. For example, Britain was unable to prevent its white dominions from installing all kinds of protectionary policies against British imports. Over time, as the industry matured and became strong enough to survive without state protection, state interference retreated and powerful capitalist liberal-state society complexes emerged. A second wave of industrialization occurred in the late 20th century when several states in East-Asia made a rapid transition towards economic industrialization. Similar to the process of industrialization in the Western world, developing an industrial society was facilitated by extensive state planning and protection. Currently, the best-known example of this is China. The homemade industrialization of the ruling Communist Party enabled China to ascend rapidly in the global wealth-power hierarchy. As Amineh and Guang (2014) explain, the present context in which capitalist state-society complexes interact is that of a post- hegemonic world order in which contenting powers push their self-identified hegemony as far as this is allowed by domestic arrangements and international objectives. As a result, the current world order is characterized by conflicts over the rules of interaction, competition and by (gradual) transitions that manifest themselves at the top of the world’s wealth-power structure. Whether conflicts and power shifts will manifest themselves through peaceful or violent means is up for the classical debate between (neo) realism, liberal institutionalism and critical theory. In the past, energy related power projections have resulted in the use of force by state classes. For example in 1920, the British state class resorted to violence against Iraqi tribes in order to gain access to the oil reserves in Mesopotamia that would enable them to keep their naval fleet moving. More recently in 2003, the US and Britain joined forces and invaded Iraq in a quest to secure the supply of oil. However, with respect to the current competition for global wealth and power, the explanatory power of realism has been reduced by liberal institutionalism. In their critique on neo-realist theory, scholars such as Keohane and Nye (1977) claim that the trading state has replaced the warfare state in the current world order. This assumption is in agreement with current developments as for example the ruling elite of China tries to close the wealth-power gap with the United States and the West through the market instead of by force. Through interference in the domestic market, the Communist Party has been able to increase China’s wealth and power vis-à-vis the US and EU by creating strong comparative advantages such as cheap labour. Thereby, China and other developing industrial states are trying to close the wealth-power gap by growing within the global economic order that was established by the US and its Western allies. In summary, modern industrial and industrializing states state-society complexes, whether liberal or authoritarian, are capitalist constructs that follow an interrelated geo-economic and geopolitical logic. As a result of lateral pressure, the governments of those states are inclined to project their power by facilitating cross-border economic activity that connects the domestic business sector with new markets and resources. As these dynamics are present simultaneously in multiple state-society complexes, power projections in

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transnational space become a competitive enterprise. Whereas in authoritarian state-society complexes, the government has control over its domestic geo-economic constituents, these constituents operate relatively independent from the government in liberal state-society complexes. Nevertheless, both types of state-society complexes, the market (wealth) and the state (power) are interdependent.

1.2.3 The resource scarcity model

Currently, industrial economies are heavily dependent on fossil fuels such as oil, natural gas and coal. As these fossil fuels serve as the basis for industrial economic activity and thus for the creation of wealth and power, countries are very concerned with achieving energy supply security. In this respect, as fossil fuels are scarce and unevenly distributed over the world, industrial countries such as the Netherlands and Denmark face a challenge. In order to assess the energy situation of the Netherlands and Denmark, this research will rely on the resource scarcity model of Amineh & Houweling (2007). In their article: ‘Global and its Geopolitical Impediments – the case of the Caspian Region’, these authors identify three kinds of scarcity. First, demand-induced scarcity refers to scarcity that emerges as a result of a rising energy demand due to population growth and/or rising per capita income in a country. Second, supply-induced scarcity emerges as a result of the depletion of fossil fuel reserves and from increased competition for resources. Third, structural-scarcity emerges as a result of a deliberate action by other actors. For example, cartels such as OPEC could deliberately reduce the flow of energy to European countries to increase oil prices or to put pressure on political elites to change a certain course of action. Also, rebels or terrorist groups could attack energy production fields or choke points in transportation networks. An important instance of structural scarcity that involved the EU occurred in 2009 when Russia briefly cut gas supplies to Ukraine which affect multiple, mainly Eastern-European countries. The recent tension between the West and Russia and the turmoil in the MENA region might make the Netherlands and Denmark more vulnerable to structural scarcity.

1.2.4 Relation between theory and concept

In industrial and industrializing countries, energy is an entity that connects the state, the market, households and nature. As energy is a fundamental prerequisite of industrial economic activity, the survival of the wealth-power structure in modern industrial or industrializing state-societies depends on it. However, with respect to fossil fuels, scarcity is built into the capitalist system. States will have to address the issue of scarcity if they want to protect their domestic wealth-power structure in the long-run. This poses a dilemma for the governments of industrial and industrializing countries since the transition towards renewable energy poses a threat to the interests of the incumbent fossil fuel based business

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sector. On the one hand, they are subjected to lateral pressure to protect the short-run capital interests of the business sector in order to protect the wealth-power structure. On the other hand, the government has to act upon long-run incentives and anticipate on increasing fossil fuel scarcity by supporting the transition towards renewable energy. Whether the short-term capitalist logic of the business sector or the long-term government interests will prevail with respect to the system level outcomes that their interaction produces is dependent on their relative interests, influence and interdependence.

1.2.2 Geopolitical economy, resource scarcity and the transition towards renewable energy in the Netherlands and Denmark

Clearly, the Netherlands and Denmark belong to the category of liberal state-societies as both countries are democratic and know a strong civil society and formally independent business sector. They industrialized and developed their economy and subsequent wealth- power structure under the hegemonic umbrellas of Britain and later of the US. Just as the newly industrializing economies in East-Asia, the Netherlands and Denmark developed within the global economic order and managed to protect and strengthen their wealth- power structure through the market. Both the state-society complex of the Netherlands and Denmark can be considered to be capitalist constructs that follow a geo-economic and geopolitical logic. The government relies on the business sector for the creation of wealth, prosperity, government revenues and social-security through employment while the business sector is dependent on the government for the establishment of an environment that favors this creation of wealth and prosperity. This means that governments are inclined to protect the interests of the business sector by facilitating cross-border economic activity in order to protect the domestic wealth-power structure. However, related to their power projections, the capabilities of the Netherlands and Denmark differ greatly from that of major power such as the US or China as they are unable to protect their power in transnational space by the use of force. Although the Netherlands was part of the ‘coalition of the willing’ that participated in the Iraq war of 2003, without the US or even Great-Britain this example of power projection would have been impossible. In this research, power projections of small powers such as the Netherlands and Denmark are regarded as efforts to protect and strengthen the domestic wealth-power structure through the market. In this respect, the primary means to gain access to markets and resources abroad through the market is to establish a highly competitive export oriented industrial sector. Governments can contribute to this by creating a favorable investment climate, invest in innovation through R&D and establishing a regulatory framework that does not hinder competitiveness. In this respect, the transition towards renewable energy creates a dilemma for the governments of the Netherlands and Denmark as it poses a threat to the competitiveness of the incumbent fossil fuel business sector. In the short-run, the government is inclined to protect the wealth-power structure by protecting or enhancing the competitiveness of the

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incumbent business sector while in the long-run, it has incentives to support the transition towards renewable energy since fossil fuels will run out. Besides the configuration of interests, influence and interdependencies between the government and the business sector that emanates from the wealth-power structure, democratic countries such as the Netherlands and Denmark know other forms of social organization that are important to the decision-making process such as social movements. In this respect, of particular importance is the role of green movements as these organizations generally act as advocates of renewable energy in pursuit of environmental objectives. Although green social movements generally have less influence, they try to protect their interests by interacting with the government and business sector on multiple levels. Therefore, in the Netherlands and Denmark it is the configuration of influence, interests and interdependencies between the government, the business sector and green social movements that emanates from the wealth-power structure that shapes system level outcomes such as energy policy and hence determines the development of the transition towards renewable energy.

1.3 Brief argumentation and hypotheses

As explained by the previous section, in the Netherlands and Denmark it is the configuration of influence, interests and interdependencies between the government, the business sector and green social movements that emanate from the wealth-power structure that shapes energy policy and hence determines the development of the transition towards renewable energy. Based on this logic, the difference in success between the Netherlands and Denmark regarding the transition towards renewable energy might be a result of a difference between the configurations of their wealth-power structures. This research builds on the assumption that the wealth-power structure of the Netherlands is much more reliant on fossil fuels compared to the wealth-power structure of Denmark. If in the Netherlands, constituents from the fossil fuel sector are more powerful and generate much more economic growth, prosperity, employment and government revenues relative to constituents from the renewable energy sector, lateral pressure will primarily incite the Dutch government to protect the interests of the fossil fuel regime. Accordingly, this means that a large segment of the Dutch business sector as well as the Dutch government have strong incentives to resist the transition towards renewable energy. This also means that green movements will face fierce opposition as their interests are not aligned with those of the government and business sector. As a result, the energy policy that is a result of the interaction between the government, the business sector and green movements will protect the interests of the fossil fuel regime instead of showing strong support for the transition towards renewable energy. In contrast, if in Denmark, constituents from both the fossil fuel sector as well as the renewable energy sector create substantial economic growth, prosperity, employment and government revenues, lateral pressure will incite the government to protect the interests of both sectors. Accordingly, the Danish business sector and Danish government to resist the

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transition towards renewable energy are less strong than those of their Dutch counterparts. This also means that Danish green movements will face less opposition as their interests are not only in conflict with the interests of the government and the business sector. As a result, the energy policy that is a result of the interaction between the government, the business sector and green movements is not primarily directed to serve the interests of the fossil fuel regime and will show more support for the transition towards renewable energy. This theoretical logic will be tested by this research and is translated into the following hypotheses:

- ‘The wealth-power structure of the Netherlands is more reliant on fossil fuels than the wealth-power structure of Denmark.’

- ‘Because the wealth-power structure of the Netherlands is more reliant on fossil fuels than the wealth-power structure of Denmark, the Netherlands is less successful with respect to renewable energy and wind power development.’

1.4 Research methods

This study will rely on a qualitative research method. First, in order to assess the energy situation in the Netherlands and Denmark, this research will gather data on energy production, energy consumption, energy reserves and energy imports and exports from the International Energy Agency (IEA), Eurostat, the , the Central Agency of Statistics of the Netherlands (CBS) and the Danish Energy Agency (DEA). Second, in order to assess the policies towards renewable energy and wind power in particular, this research will review official policy documents from the Dutch and Danish governments as well as European policy documents and international energy and climate agreements. Third, in order to test the first hypotheses and investigate whether the wealth-power structure of the Netherlands is more focused on fossil fuels than the wealth-power structure of Denmark, this research will gather economic data and assessments from the World Bank, the Dutch Social-Economic Council (SER), the Dutch Environmental Assessment Agency (PBL) and peer-review journals. Fourth, in order to test the second hypotheses, this research will study official policy documents from the Dutch and Danish governments, peer-review journals and conduct several semi- structured interviews with experts or constituents that are involved in energy related issues in the Netherlands and Denmark.

1.5 Structure of the thesis

This research is organized according to the sequence of the sub-questions. First, chapter 2 will provide an assessment of the energy situation and policy responses of the Netherlands

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and Denmark in order to understand their energy status quo and the necessity for the transition towards renewable energy. Second, chapter 3 will test the first hypotheses and examine whether the wealth-power structure of the Netherlands is more reliant on fossil fuels than the wealth-power structure of Denmark. Third, chapter 4 will test the second hypothesis and explain how the relation between energy and the wealth-power structure of the Netherlands and Denmark determined the development of the transition towards renewable energy over the period 2011-2017. Fourth and final, this research will summarize its findings in a comprehensive conclusion and provide recommendations for future research. In order to provide a clear overview, each chapter starts with an introduction that will outline the objectives, research question and structure of the chapter and will end with a conclusion that outlines the most important findings.

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Chapter 2 Energy situation and policy responses of the Netherlands and Denmark

2.1 Introduction

In response to the second sub-question, this chapter focuses on the energy situation in the Netherlands and Denmark. In addition, this chapter will also briefly discuss the energy situation in the world. The reason for this is that the energy situation explains why the Netherlands and Denmark will have to make the transition towards renewable energy. In addition, the energy situation explains the context in which the transition towards renewable energy will have to manifest itself. This chapter will assess the energy situation of the world, the Netherlands and Denmark according to the resource scarcity model of Amineh and Houweling (2007). Besides, this chapter will also briefly discuss the main energy policies of the Netherlands and Denmark as these are generally a response to their energy situations. First, section 2.2 will provide an overview of the energy situation in the world. Second, section 2.3 will discuss the energy situation and policy responses of the Netherlands. Third, section 2.4 will review the energy situation and policy responses of Denmark. Fourth and final, section 2.5 will present the most important findings of this chapter.

2.2 Global energy profile

Global energy consumption increased steadily over the past decades and is expected to continue to rise in the near future. According to the International Energy Outlook (IEO) 2016 of the US Energy Information Administration (EIA) (2016 p. 7), the total world consumption of marketed energy will increase with 48% from 549 quadrillion British thermal units (Btu) in 2012 to 629 quadrillion Btu in 2020 and ultimately to 815 quadrillion Btu in 2040. Non- renewable energy sources are expected to remain dominant in the global energy mix as still 78% of total energy consumption will be derived from fossil fuels by 2040. Although the renewable energy sector is expected to grow faster than the primary energy sector, two global trends will strengthen the position of the incumbent fossil fuel energy regime in the near future. First, global population growth will increase the demand for energy and fossil fuels. According to the IEO of the EIA (2016 p. 177), the world will host over 9 billion people by 2040. For countries in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), population growth will be modest with a 0.4% average increase per year over the period 2012-2040. Non-OECD countries will experience a faster growth with an average of 1.0% per year over the same period. With respect to the non-OECD group, Africa (2.1% p/y) and the Middle-East (1.7% p/y) will contribute the most to population growth. Furthermore,

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it is expected that the population growth of China will be modest with 0.1% per year and that India (0.8% p/y) will have replaced China as the world’s most populous country by 2030. In addition, India and China combined will host 33.4% of the total world population by 2040. The second trend that contributes to a rising demand for energy and fossil fuels is economic growth (EIA, 2016 p. 13). As income rises and living standards improve, energy consumption increases as well. Over the past three decades, economic growth and the subsequent increase in the demand for energy occurred mainly in non-OECD countries. Over the period 1990-2012, non-OECD countries experienced an average growth in GDP of 4.9% per year compared to only 2.1% for OECD countries. However, the difference in economic growth between OECD and non-OECD countries will be reduced in the future as growth in non-OECD countries is expected to level out as their energy intensive manufacturing industry is gradually replaced by a more service oriented industry. Similar as with population growth, high economic growth is mostly related to the emerging industrial economies mainly in Asia but also in Africa and the Middle-east. In OECD Europe, the economy grows with 1.7% per year on average which is the second lowest growth-rate after Japan. Clearly, the impact of economic growth on energy consumption is much higher in emerging economies than in the advanced industrialized countries. Economic growth in China, India or for example Nigeria means that a substantial part of their immense populations will be able to improve their living standards and use more energy. In advanced industrialized countries, economic growth will have less effect on energy consumption levels since living standards are already very high. In line with global trends of population- and economic-growth, the IEO of the EIA (2016) predicts that energy demand will remain to increase over the coming decades. Figure 2.1 shows the rise in energy consumption in OECD and non-OECD countries. Non-OECD energy consumption increases by 71% in the period between 2012 and 2040, more than half of this growth is expected to come from China and India. In 2040, energy use in non-OECD Asia exceeds that of all OECD countries by 40 quadrillion Btu. Global energy demand will rise for all energy sources. The consumption of renewable energy is expected to experience the highest growth rates over the period 2012-2040 (2.6% p/y) followed by nuclear energy (2.4% p/y). However, although the consumption of these energy sources grows faster than the consumption of fossil fuels, still 78% of the total energy consumption is expected to be derived from fossil fuels by 2040 (EIA, 2016 p. 9). To continue, this dominance of fossil fuels in the global energy mix is not sustainable. According to the BP Statistical Review of World Energy (2016), proven oil reserves as of 2015 amount to 239.4 billion tonnes. This means that even if the yearly consumption of oil will remain at 2015 levels (4331.3 tonnes), the world will run out of oil in a little over 55 years. For natural gas, the proven reserves as of 2015 are 186.9 trillion cubic meters. Therefore, if yearly consumption remains the same as in 2015 (3468.6 billion cubic meters), the world will run out of natural gas in less than 54 years. However, as the IEO of the EIA (2016) predicted that global consumption of fossil fuel sources will increase with 48% over the period 2012-2040, it is likely that reserves of oil and natural gas will be depleted at an earlier stage unless new reserves are discovered.

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Figure 2.1 World energy consumption by OECD and non-OECD 900 800 700 600 500 400

Quadrillion Btu Quadrillion 300 200 100 0 2012 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040

OECD non-OECD World

Figure 2.1 Based on data from the International Energy Outlook 2016 (p. 7) of the Energy Information Administration

In combination with a rising demand, the depletion of fossil fuel reserves is expected to result in demand-induced- and supply-induced scarcity. In addition, as fossil fuels are very unevenly distributed over the world, countries and region’s risks being subjected to episode of structural scarcity.

Policy responses

On a global level, energy policy is non-existent. There is no central authority that produces energy policy or sets policy objectives for all individual nation states. However, there are agreements such as international Climate Agreements that have implications for the energy policy of individual countries through their focus on climate change and environmental issues. For example, the recent ‘Paris Agreement’ sets the long-term goal of keeping the increase in global temperatures well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels. As it is impossible to translate this objective into global energy policy, individual states will have to develop national climate actions plans that correspond with this overall target. Besides ‘global’ agreements, the energy policy of individual nations such as the Netherlands and Denmark is shaped by agreements on the supranational level such as the European Union. In 2006, the European Commission published a ‘Green Paper’ that formulated EU-wide objectives with respect to energy. With the ‘Green Paper’, the EU member-states agreed on closer cooperation with respect to energy supply security, competitiveness and sustainability. In addition, the ‘Green Paper’ stressed the need for EU member-states to contribute to global and European climate goals (EU, Commission, 2006). Although it was impossible for the EU Commission to enforce these objectives, they became more legally binding with the Lisbon Treaty of 2007 which focused on solidarity with policy changes in the EU. (EU, 2007). To

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continue, the EU Commission published the ‘Renewable Energy Roadmap’ in 2011 which sets out developmental paths in which the transition towards RE is compatible with energy supply security and competitiveness. The objective of this ‘roadmap’ is to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 80-95% by 2050 compared to 1990 levels. Finally, the EU Commission published its ‘Renewable Energy Directive in 2009 to establish a common policy approach regarding RE and to introduce binding targets for its member-states. According to this directive, all EU member-states will have to ensure that at least 10% of the energy consumption of their transport sectors is derived from renewable sources by 2020. In addition, it formulates targets for the individual member-states regarding the share of RE in the domestic energy consumption ranging from 10% for to 49% for . For the Netherlands and Denmark, these targets are 14% and 30% respectively.

2.3 Energy profile and policy responses of the Netherlands

The Netherlands is a very interesting case in relation to the energy situation. The country is home to extensive natural gas reserves and also some minor oil reserves on land and in the North-Sea (IEA, 2014 p. 130). Besides, the Netherlands is a major importer and exporter of fossil fuel energy resources. However, as these fossil fuel reserves are expected to be depleted in a few decades, the country will have to look for alternatives. In addition, as the Netherlands shares a long border with the sea, the country will also experience the downside of fossil fuels through climate change induced rising sea levels. According to the IEA (2017)2, the total energy production in the Netherlands accounted for 58.53 million tonnes of oil equivalent (mtoe) in 2014. The vast majority of this production consisted of natural gas, followed by energy from biofuels and waste, crude oil, renewable energy and nuclear energy. To continue, the total energy consumption of the Netherlands in 2014 accounted for 56.74 mtoe. However, although it produces more energy than it consumes, this does not mean that the Netherlands is energy independent. Figure 2.2 and 2.3 shows that the energy production and total energy supply by source (2014) differs greatly. The vast majority of produced energy relates to natural gas while biofuels and waste, oil, nuclear energy and renewables play a much less important role. However, in the total primary energy supply of the Netherlands, oil and coal are abundantly available. As the difference is made up by the imports and exports of energy, the Netherlands is not isolated from international energy markets and depends on the energy flows from other countries. The IEA (2014b p. 319) expects that natural gas will remain the key fuel in the Netherlands in the foreseeable future, mainly because it can serve as a backup energy source for intermittent renewable energy production. The Netherlands became an important producer of natural gas following the discovery of a large gas reserve in the province of Groningen in 1959.

2 Data on energy indicators for the Netherlands derived from the website of the IEA (2017) 40

Figure 2.2 Energy production by source, Figure 2.3 Total primary energy supply by the Netherlands (2014) source, the Netherlands (2014) 1.82% 5.1% 1.5% 7.85% 0.9% 1.09% 3.57%

12.6%

40.2% 39.8% 85.7%

Natural gas Oil Natural gas Oil Renewables Biofuels & waste Coal Renewables Nuclear Biofuels & waste Nuclear

Data for figures 2.2 and 2.3 derived from the website of the IEA, energy indicators of the Netherlands 2014

Although there are multiple onshore and offshore gas reserves located in the national territory of the Netherlands, the Groningen field holds by far the largest volume of natural gas. In addition, the natural geology of the field allows for very flexible output levels which is favorable in response to fluctuations in demand (IEA, 2014b p. 327). Therefore, the production of natural gas is very important for the energy supply security of the Netherlands. For many years, in between 70 and 80 billion cubic meters (bcm) of natural gas were extracted from Dutch gas fields (PBL, 2016). However, this situation is not sustainable. The Dutch Central Agency for Statistics (2016) estimates that already 80% of the natural gas reserves were exploited and that the remaining reserves will only provide gas for 17 more years. In addition, the extraction of natural gas causes small earth quakes that cause damage to houses and infrastructure. Recently, the Dutch government became subjected to extensive social pressure to reduce the production of natural gas to safer levels. According to the IEA (2014 p. 10), this supply-induced scarcity poses a challenge for the Netherlands as almost all household as well as industries rely on natural gas for heating and electricity. Already, the Netherlands has responded to this situation of supply-induced scarcity by starting the development of an international gas hub with advanced gas networks, large storage facilities and the Gas Access to Europe (GATE) liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminal (Ibid). As the Netherlands will shift from being a net exporter to a net importer of natural gas between 2020 and 2025, the country will also be more vulnerable for episodes of structural scarcity. After natural gas, oil is the most important source of energy in the Netherlands. According to the IEA (2014b p. 320), the indigenous oil production of the Netherlands is expected to decline steadily in the future. As a result, the Netherlands will move from a 95% import dependency towards full dependency (Ibid p. 319). Based on data from 2012, the demand

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for oil in the Netherlands is roughly 1 million barrels per day and has grown steadily with 1.5% per year since 2000. The industrial- and transportation-sector are the most oil intensive sectors as they account for over 80% of the total oil consumption of the Netherlands (Ibid p. 320). Moreover, the volume of oil that passes through the Netherlands is four times larger than its domestic demand (Ibid p. 320). This is because the Netherlands has a major petrochemical sector that turns crude oil into oil products such as gasoline and naphtha. Because of this industry and the favorable geographical position of the Netherlands regarding , the Netherlands plays a central role in the European oil supply chain (IEA, 2014 p. 129). However, as domestic reserves are insignificant and oil is mainly derived from imports, the Netherlands risks being subjected to supply-induced scarcity resulting from the depletion of foreign reserves as well as structural scarcity if foreign suppliers decide to use oil as a tool to achieve (geo) political objectives. Finally, with respect to renewable energy, the Netherlands is not expected to achieve its target of the EU Energy Directive that dictates that RE should cover 14% of the domestic energy consumption (NEV, 2016 p. 15). According to Eurostat (2017)3, the share of renewable energy in the Dutch energy consumption was amongst the lowest in the EU with only 5.8% in 2015. Regarding the total production of renewable energy, the share of wind power increased significantly over the past few years. Data from the Dutch CBS (2016)4 indicates that wind power produces over half of the total renewable energy production and roughly 10% of the total electricity production in 2015. Still, although the Netherlands was amongst the first countries to build wind power facilities in the 1990s, it is now far behind other entrepreneurs such as Denmark and Sweden that have established a significant larger wind power capacity.

Policy responses

In the Netherlands, the Ministry of Economic Affairs is primarily responsible for Dutch energy policy. It works together with the Social Economic Council (SER) and the Environmental Assessment Agency (PBL) as well as with other ministries that are involved in energy policy such as the Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment. In general, Dutch energy policy regarding the transition towards RE is based on the EU framework and in particular on the 2020 goals (IEA, 2014 p. 22). These goals call for a total share of 20% renewable energy in the European energy consumption, a reduction of 20% in greenhouse gas emissions and a 20% increase in energy efficiency. For the Netherlands, these pan- European goals translated in a 14% renewable energy objective (European Commission, 2009 p. 46). In 2011, the Ministry of Economic Affairs presented the ‘Energy Report’ that stated that the Netherlands aims to become less dependent on fossil fuels by focusing on renewable energy and a low carbon economy. The main objectives of this report were to achieve a reliable energy supply at competitive prices, to strengthen the competitiveness of

3 Data derived from the website of Eurostat: share of energy from renewable sources (last update: 14-03-2017) 4 Data derived from the website of the CBS 42

the energy sector, to increase the share of renewable energy in compliance with European targets and to invest in a common European energy market. To continue, in 2013, over 40 different stakeholders including the government, the business sector employer’s federations, trade unions and environmental non-governmental organizations (NGOs) pledged their support to the most important energy policy agreement of the Netherlands: the 2013 Energy Agreement. Initiated by the SER, the Energy Agreements main objective is to stimulate a balance between sustainability and competitiveness. Also, it re-articulates the national objective from the Renewable Energy Directive of the EU Commission by stating that the Netherlands is committed to increase the share of RE in the domestic energy consumption to 14% by 2020 and 16% by 2023 as well as to achieve a 60% reduction in Co₂ emissions from the transport sector by 2050 (compared to 1990 levels). Besides, the Energy Agreement has a priority focus on wind power development as it articulates ambitions to install more onshore as well as offshore wind power and to support decentralized renewable energy production. To continue, the government of the Netherlands has committed itself to the Paris Agreements of 2015 which compels it to contribute to the mitigation of climate change. The Paris Agreement has not resulted in new energy policies or objectives for renewable energy development in the Netherlands as the European 2020 targets remain the primary reference point. However, it is possible that these EU targets will be adjusted as a result of the Paris Agreements. Finally, the Dutch government published a second Energy Report in 2016 with the title ‘Transition towards Sustainability’. This report builds on the previous report as well as the Energy Agreement and also the Paris Agreement. In general, it formulates three objectives: (1) reducing Co₂ emissions, (2) capitalizing on the economic opportunities that the transition towards RE provides and (3) further integration energy and spatial planning.

2.4 Energy profile and policy responses in Denmark

Similar to the Netherlands, Denmark has fossil fuel reserves located in its national territory, oil as well as natural gas. As these reserves will be depleted in the near future and as Denmark will likely also be affected by sea level rise, the country has incentives to support the transition towards renewable energy. Already, Denmark established a large renewable energy sector, mainly focused on wind power. According to the IEA (2017)5, the total energy production of Denmark in 2014 was 16.06 mtoe. Of this total, 8.35 mtoe (52%) stemmed from oil, 4.15 mtoe (26%) from natural gas, 1.21 mtoe (7.5%) was derived from renewable energy sources such as wind and sunlight and 2.35 mtoe (14.5%) stemmed from biofuels and waste. The total energy consumption of Denmark in 2014 accounted for 12.87 mtoe which is considerable less than its energy production. However, the energy mix related to the total primary energy supply (TPES) of Denmark looks different. Figure 2.4 and 2.5 show that Denmark produces more energy from oil and natural gas than is present in its TPES and that

5 Data on energy indicators for Denmark derived from the website of the IEA (2017) 43

the opposite is true for coal and energy from biofuels and waste. For energy from renewable sources such as wind, water, sunlight and geothermal sources, there is almost no difference between production and TPES. In general, this means that although Denmark produces more energy than it consumes, it is not energy independent and engages in international energy trade, exporting oil and natural gas while importing coal. According to the IEA (2012), the production of oil and natural gas plays an important role in Denmark. Following the discovery of the Dan Field in 1972, oil and natural gas production has increased significantly. Over the past decades, oil companies made large investments in the exploitation of multiple the Danish oil and gas fields. However, as these fossil fuels are expected to run out in a few decades, Denmark risks being subjected to supply-induced

Figure 2.4 Energy production by source, Figure 2.5 Total primary energy supply by Denmark (2014) source, Denmark (2014)

7.5% 7.6%

14.6% 0% 22.8% 37% 52% 25.8% 14.9% 17.6%

Oil Natural gas Coal Biofuels & waste Renewable Oil Natural gas Coal Biofuels & waste Renewable

Data for figure 2.4 and 2.5 derived from the website of the IEA, energy indicators for Denmark (2014)

scarcity as well as structural scarcity. According to the Danish Energy Agency (2016), the energy self-sufficiency of Denmark was 90% in 2014 and 89% in 2015, resulting from a drop in crude oil production by 5.4%. Therefore, and from environmental considerations, Denmark strongly supported the transition towards renewable energy. According to ‘Energy Statistics 2015’ report of the Danish Energy Agency (2016)6 renewable energy covered 56% of the Danish electricity consumption in 2015 of which wind power was responsible for the lions share with 41.8%. By the EU method of calculation, around 30% of the Danish domestic energy consumption is derived from renewable sources which means that Denmark already achieved its 2020 target under the EU Energy Directive. In addition, the ‘Energy and Climate Outlook 2017 of the Danish Energy Agency predicts that the share of RE in the final domestic energy consumption will reach 40% by 2020. Wind power is by far the largest source of renewable . Mainly because electricity production from wind power

6 Data derived from the website of ‘stateofgreen’ as the ‘Energy Statistics 2015’ report is currently only available in Danish. 44

increased with 8.1% over 2015, GHG emissions fell by 6.6% in the same year as less coal and other fossil fuels were used in power plants (Ibid).

Policy responses

The oil crisis of 1973 has been a wakeup call for Denmark that was highly dependent on (imported) fossil fuels at the time (Lund, 2007 p. 914). Although large amounts of oil and also reserves of natural gas were discovered in the Danish territorial waters of the North-Sea, the government started to develop policies to increase the energy supply security of Denmark, partly through focusing on renewable energy. According to the IEA (2012 p. 18), energy policy in Denmark falls primarily under the authority of the Danish Ministry of Energy, Utilities and Climate. In addition, the Danish government created the Danish Energy Agency in 1976 which is an institution that is responsible for all factors related to the production, transmission and utilization of energy and the impact on the environment and climate. The main objective of the Agency is to ensure an affordable, reliable and clean energy supply in Denmark. The long-term objective of the Danish government is to achieve 100% fossil fuel independent green energy system. In order to achieve this objective, the Danish Commission on Climate Policy published several detailed proposals in 2010 which form the basis for the ‘Energy Strategy 2050’, an approach that aims to establish an energy system independent of coal, oil and natural gas by 2050 while ensuring energy supply security. This goal of the ‘Energy Strategy 2050’ was translated into specific objectives by the ‘Energy Agreement 2012-2020’ that was published by the Ministry of Climate, Energy and Building. Together with the Renewable Energy Directive of the EU Commission, these policy initiatives form the basis for the transition towards renewable energy in Denmark.

2.5 Conclusions

This chapter provided an answer to the first sub-question and discussed the energy situation of the world, the Netherlands and Denmark as well as the most important policy responses. First, section 2.2 showed that on a global level, energy consumption is expected to increase as a result of population- and economic-growth, mainly from non-OECD countries in Asia, Africa and the Middle-East. However, demand-induced scarcity of energy resources is not the only challenge the world will potentially face. As fossil fuels will remain dominant in the global energy mix in the near future, the world risks supply-induced scarcity as reserves of oil, natural gas and coal are expected to run out in several decades. Furthermore, as fossil fuel reserves are unevenly distributed over the world and as competition for energy could potentially increase as a result of demand- and supply-induced scarcity, nations risk being subjected to episodes of structural scarcity as well. Second, section 2.3 and 2.4 showed that the Netherlands as well as Denmark have extensive fossil fuel reserves located inside their national territories. The Netherlands relies primarily on natural gas from the Groningen field while Denmark produces oil as well as natural gas.

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Although both countries produce more energy than they consume, they are not energy independent. In particular this is true for the Netherlands as the country consumes large volumes of oil while indigenous oil production is negligible. Therefore, albeit the Netherlands and Denmark will likely not encounter demand-induced scarcity as their populations are stable and economic growth is slow, they will have to address supply-induced scarcity as their fossil fuel reserves will be depleted in the near future. Subsequently, the Netherlands and Denmark risks being subjected to structural scarcity as they become more dependent on foreign supplies of oil and natural gas that mainly stem from unpredictable and unstable parts of the world such as Russia and the MENA region. However, supply-induced scarcity as well as structural scarcity can be addressed by the Netherlands and Denmark if they increase the share of renewable energy in their energy mix. According to section 2.3 and 2.4, Denmark is way ahead of the Netherlands as it already achieved its ambitious target under the European Energy Directive of 30% renewable energy in the final domestic energy consumption. In comparison, the Netherlands is not expected to achieve its less ambitious target of 14% as currently only 5.8% of the domestic energy consumption is covered by renewable energy. For both countries, wind power plays a central role in the transition towards renewable energy. In this respect, Denmark is also way ahead of the Netherlands as almost 42% of Danish electricity production was generated by wind power in 2015 compared to only 10% in the Netherlands. Based on their achievements thus far, it is not surprising that Danish policy on renewable energy is much more ambitious than its Dutch counterpart. The reason behind this difference in energy policy will be discussed in more detail by chapter 4. As this chapter has discussed the energy situation and explained the role of fossil fuels and renewable energy in the Netherlands and Denmark, the next step is to investigate how important these energy sources are for their wealth-power structure.

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Chapter 3 The role of fossil fuels and renewable energy in the economy of the Netherlands and Denmark

3.1 Introduction

This chapter will focus on the relation between energy and the economy in the Netherlands and Denmark. Therefore, as the economy constitutes the basis of the wealth-power structure in today’s industrial state-society complexes, this chapter will provide an answer to the second research question ‘What is the relationship between energy and the wealth- power structure of the Netherlands and Denmark?’ With respect to energy, this chapter will make a distinction between the fossil fuel energy sector and the renewable energy sector. Thereby, this chapter will also test the first hypotheses: ‘The wealth-power structure of the Netherlands is more reliant on fossil fuels than the wealth-power structure of Denmark.’ Regarding the relationship between energy and the wealth-power structure, energy is important in several ways. First, energy serves as the foundation of economic activity in advanced industrialized countries such as the Netherlands and Denmark. Second, the domestic energy sectors of the Netherlands and Denmark contribute to economic growth and prosperity and a positive through investments and export revenues. Third, the energy sector contributes to the level of social security by generating employment and fourth, the energy sector generates revenues for the national governments of the Netherlands and Denmark through taxation, the sale of concession rights and dividends. Obviously, these economic benefits are interrelated as for example, economic growth is likely to increase employment which increases government revenues through taxation which in turn can increase social security through social benefits and protection. As this chapter will explain the importance of the fossil fuel sector and the renewable energy sector for the wealth-power structures of the Netherlands and Denmark relative to each other, it will pave the way for chapter four. In this respect, the argument is that, the larger the difference between the economic significance of the fossil fuel sector and the renewable energy sector is in favor of the former, the stronger the incentives for the government are to protect the interests of fossil fuel constituents over the interest of constituents related to renewable energy. Therefore, the relative economic significance of the fossil fuel- and renewable energy-sector can offer a strong explanation for the success or failure of the transition towards renewable energy. First, section 3.2 will discuss the role of the energy sector in the economy of the Netherlands by reviewing the economic significance of the natural gas-, oil- and coal-sector relative to the renewable energy sector and the wind power sector in particular. Second, similar to the previous section, section 3.3 will discuss the role of the energy sector in the economy of Denmark by looking at the economic significance of the oil- and natural gas sector and the renewable energy sector, in particular the wind power sector. Third, section 3.4 will discuss the most important difference between the

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Netherlands and Denmark regarding the role of energy in their economies and fourth, section 3.5 will outline the most important findings of this chapter.

3.2 The role of the energy sector in the economy of the Netherlands

In order to explain the relationship between energy, the economy and wealth-power structure of the Netherlands, general understanding of the central features of the Dutch economy is required first. According to data of the World Bank (2017)7, the Netherlands was the 17th largest economy of the world in 2015 with a GDP of roughly USD 750 billion8. In the same year, GDP per capita accounted for USD 44.290 which indicates that the Netherlands is one of the wealthiest nations in the world. Moreover, according to the World Economic Forum (WEF) (2016 p. xiii), the Dutch economy is highly competitive and ranks 4th on a global scale just behind Singapore and the United States. The economy of the Netherlands is very open, heavily dependent on international trade and therefore, very sensitive to global political and economic developments. This is illustrated by data of the World Bank (2017) that shows that the country growth of the Netherlands almost perfectly coincides with global economic growth. In 2015, the value of all exported goods and services accounted for 82.46% of GDP while the value of all imported goods and services added up to 71.68% of GDP. On a global level, the Netherlands has established trade partnerships with 233 countries of which the most important are Germany (export value: USD 110 billion), (USD 49.5 billion), the United Kingdom (USD 42.3 billion), (USD 38.3 billion) and the United States (USD 20 billion) (World Bank, 2017). Both the exports of goods and services is important for the Dutch economy. In particular, products related to machinery and electronics, chemicals, fuels, metals and agricultural products are important drivers for the Dutch export sector. Because the economy of the Netherlands is heavily dependent on international trade, the government has strong incentives to create an environment that protects and increases the competitiveness of the Dutch export sector. As a result, the state- society complex of the Netherlands developed a strong neoliberal rationale in which powerful (geo)-economic constituents are able to influence system level outcomes (Oteman et al, 2014). To continue, for the economy of the Netherlands, the energy sector is of great significance. According to the IEA (2014 p. 18), the Netherlands has established one of the most advanced energy systems, energy markets and transportation networks in the world. The geographical position of the Netherlands transformed the country into a major trade and transit hub for fossil fuel energy resources such as natural gas, oil and coal. As a result, the Netherlands imports and exports vast amounts of energy, playing a central role in

7 In this chapter, World Bank data is derived from the website of the World Bank: World Integrated Trade Solutions (2017) 8 All amounts of USD are against mid-2017 exchange rates (13-06-2017) 48

European and global energy trade. Furthermore, the energy sector is an important driver of innovation and economic growth in the Netherlands as it reached almost EUR 55 billion in 2010, accounting for 10.9% of national GDP and a net added value of EUR 26.74 billion (Ibid p. 18). The great economic significance of the Dutch energy sector is primarily a result of the production of large volumes of natural gas, the presence of a highly competitive petrochemical industry and also the presence of Europe’s largest trading hub for coal (EMO) at the ‘Maasvlakte’ near the port of Rotterdam (Ibid p. 28). In addition, the favorable geographical position of the Netherlands regarding international trade was further exploited by the Dutch government through large investments in transportation networks and energy infrastructure including railways, roads, aviation and excellent maritime transportation facilities (Ibid p.28). As a result, the Netherlands became a very favorable spot to locate energy-intensive industries (Provoost, Santen & Overgoor, 2014 p. 9). This energy-intensive industrial sector also became very important for the economy of the Netherlands (Oteman et al., 2014 p. 8). According to Provoost et al (2014 p. 11), the energy-intensive sector contributed over EUR 65 billion to the Dutch economy in 2010. Besides export revenues and economic growth, the Dutch state-society complex and wealth-power structure benefit from the energy sector through the provision of employment. According to the CBS (2014), a total of 57.300 workers were employed in the oil and chemical industry in 2011. In addition, over 109.000 workers were employed in the energy-intensive steel industry and 26.500 jobs were provided by the production and distribution of energy (cited in Provoost et al., 2014 p. 14). Finally, the energy sector generates significant revenues for the Dutch government through taxation, the sales of concession rights and through dividends from (partially) state owned enterprises. To continue, the next sections will review the economic significance of respectively the natural gas-, oil- and coal-sector and the renewable energy sector.

3.2.1 The role of natural gas

The Netherlands is a net exporter of natural gas and the second largest producer in the European Union (IEA, 2014 p. 129). Figure 3.1 shows the value of total imports and exports of natural gas in the Netherlands over the period 2010-2016. The export revenues from natural gas have been very significant as in 2016, the value of exports accounted for almost 2% of the value of total exports in the Netherlands (CBS, 2017). However, the data also shows that the net surplus of natural gas trade is declining due to increasing imports and declining exports. As the production and subsequent revenues from natural gas are expected to decline substantially in the coming decades and as the production triggers small earth quakes, the Dutch government has developed the concept of the ‘gas roundabout’ in order to secure gas supplies and income in the future (Provoost et al., 2014 p. 19). The ‘gas roundabout’, which is a large natural gas system with production, transport, transit, storage and trade facilities, is estimated to contribute to the Dutch economy with roughly EUR 21 billion in revenues and the creation of 136.000 jobs over the period 201-2020 (The Brattle

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Group, 2010 cited in Schipperus & Mulder, 2015 p. 119). Besides, natural gas is very important for the Dutch economy as it is the main fuel for electricity production, domestic heating and industry feedstock (IEA, 2014 p. 129). Almost 98% of the Dutch households depend on natural gas for heating and also the energy-intensive industrial sector, in particular the steel industry, is heavily dependent on the gas supplies (Ibid, p. 141).

Figure 3.1 Imports & exports of natural gas in the Netherlands (2010 - 2016) 14

12

10

8

6 billion billion

4

2

0 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

import exports

* Based on data from the CBS website (02-03-2017)

To continue, the production of natural gas generates substantial revenues for the Dutch government through taxation, sales of concession rights and dividends. According to the IEA (2014 p. 141), the Dutch government has acquired a large equity stake in the production and exploitation of natural gas through ‘Energiebeheer Nederland BV’ (EBN), a company with only one shareholder: the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs. Other companies that are involved in the production, transportation and trade of Dutch natural gas are the ‘Nederlandse Gasunie’, the ‘Nederlandse Aardolie Maatschappij (NAM)’, ‘GasTerra’ and ‘Maatschap Groningen’. Gasunie, which manages the transportation of Dutch natural gas is owned by the Dutch government as well through the Ministry of Finance. The NAM is a joint venture between Royal Dutch Shell and ExxonMobil. The Dutch government and the NAM both have a 50% share in GasTerra, a company that is responsible for the supply and trade of Dutch natural gas. The Dutch government holds 10% of the shares directly and 40% through EBN. Finally, the Dutch government and the NAM both own 50% of the shares of Maatschap Groningen, which directly manages the production of natural gas from the large gas fields in the Groningen province. Figure 3.2 provides a clear overview of the interests of the Dutch government and the NAM in the production and exploitation of natural gas in the Netherlands. In addition, there are a number of other companies involved in the production of natural gas from the smaller gas fields such as Total, Engie and Chevron. These companies

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are allowed to market the gas themselves or to sell to GasTerra, which has a legal obligation to buy the gas at a reasonable market price (IEA, 2014 p. 140). Besides, a feature of the ‘gas roundabout’ strategy was the construction of the first LNG terminal GATE at the Maasvlakte facility of the port of Rotterdam in 2011 (Ibid p. 138). The GATE terminal is operated by a joint venture of Gasunie and the ‘Koninklijke Vopak’ and has signed contracts with major European energy suppliers such as Dong Energy, EconGas, RWE, E.ON and Eneco (Ibid p. 138). Besides collecting dividends from EBN, Gasunie and GasTerra, the Dutch government receives revenues from the production of natural gas through the sale of concession rights and taxes such as a corporation tax, an energy tax and also indirectly through a VAT tax (Ibid). Figure 3.3 provides on overview of the government revenues from the production of natural gas for the period 1977-2016. Historically, these revenues have been very important for the budget of the Dutch government. Since the exploitation of Dutch gas fields started in the 1950s, the Dutch government has received around EUR 280 billion in revenues (CBS, 2017)9. However, these revenues have been falling over the last years. In 2016, revenues only accounted for EUR 2.4 billion which is 0.8% of total government revenues (Ibid).

Figure 3.2 Parties involved in natural gas production, the Netherlands

Royal Dutch ExxonMobil Dutch Government Shell

100%

EBN B.V.

50% 50% 25% 25% 40% 10% Nederlandse Aardolie Maatschappij B.V. GasTerra B.V.

50% 50%

Maatschap Groningen

Figure 3.2 Figure based on data from the IEA (2014 p. 141)

9 Data derived from the website of the CBS (2017) 51

Figure 3.3 Government revenues from natural gas, the Netherlands (1977-2016) 18 12 16 10 14 12 8 10 6

8 percent

billioneuro 6 4 4 2 2 0 0 1977 1981 1985 1989 1993 1997 2001 2005 2009 2013 2016 Axis Title

Revenues Column1 Share of total government revenues

Figure 3.3 Based on data from the website of the CBS (2017)

3.2.2 The role of oil

Although the Netherlands has no large oil reserves, oil plays a major role in the Dutch economy. According to the IEA (2014 p. 129), the Netherlands plays a major role in global oil trade by having a strategic position in the European transportation network and oil supply chain. The country is a leading importer of crude oil and a leading exporter of oil products due to the presence of a major petrochemical industry (Ibid p. 31). Also, the Netherlands hosts major storage facilities that hold emergency stocks for several EU member-states, mainly near the port of Rotterdam (Ibid, p 161). As total refinery output is well beyond domestic demand, the Netherlands is a net exporter of oil products, mainly to other European countries and the United States. The Dutch petrochemical industry heavily invested in energy efficiency and process innovation and benefits from advanced oil transportation networks and infrastructure which makes the sector highly competitive (Ibid). Although refinery output experienced a significant decline after the peak of 2005, the Netherlands maintained its regional dominance due to the steady demand for oil products from the chemical sector and the growing global trade for refined oil products (Ibid p. 129). The petrochemical industry is the largest consumer of crude oil in the Netherlands being responsible for over 49% of total consumption in 2012 (Ibid, p. 152). Although crude oil is produced domestically by Dana Petroleum and the NAM, the bulk of crude oil is imported

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from the North-Sea region, Russia and the Middle-East (Port of Rotterdam, 2017)10. The Netherlands has five major refineries that together form the core of the petrochemical cluster in the area of the Port of Rotterdam. Having a combined distillation capacity of 59 million tonnes (Ibid), these refineries accounted for 75% of all refinery production in 2015 (CBS, 2016 p. 10). The two largest refineries in the Netherlands are the Royal Dutch Shell refinery in Pernis and the BP Europoort refinery followed by refineries of ExxonMobil and Kuwait Petroleum (KPC), all located in the Rotterdam area (IEA, 2014 p. 153). The fifth large refinery, the Zeeland refinery, is a joint venture between Total and Lukoil Benelux and is located in Vlissingen (Ibid). To continue, operating Dutch oil production upstream is primarily done by nine companies: BP, Argos, ExxonMobil, KPC, Royal Dutch Shell, Delek, Total, Gulf and Tamoil (Ibid). Together, these nine companies account for 99% of the production and 80% of the sales of oil products in the Netherlands (Ibid). In addition, the Netherlands has large oil storage facilities located in the area of Rotterdam, Amsterdam and Vlissingen. After Singapore and Shanghai, the port of Rotterdam is the world’s third largest sea bunker harbor (Ibid p. 156). Amsterdam is one of the world’s most important sites for the stockholding and trading of gasoline. Most of the storage facilities are joint ventures of the large oil companies that operate in the Netherlands. They are connected to the hinterland mainly by two major pipelines: the Rotterdam-Rhine pipeline, connecting the Netherlands with the German industrial Rurh area, and the Rotterdam-Antwerp pipeline, linking Rotterdam with Belgium (Ibid p. 154). Besides major oil companies such as Shell and ExxonMobil, various other major as well as small- and medium-sized companies are indirectly involved in the production of oil in the Netherlands or related to the sector in another way. For example, the steel industry produces parts for machinery, infrastructure and ships (CBS, 2016 p. 5) and the chemical industry buys large amounts of oil products that they need in their production process. As these sectors benefit from the large oil sector and advanced infrastructure, they too became very competitive, contributing further to economic growth and prosperity in the Netherlands. All in all, the oil sector is very important for the Dutch economy. According to the World Bank (2017), oil products were the main export as well as import products of the Netherlands in 2015. In that same year, the total value of oil exports accounted for almost USD 42 billion and net exports added up to USD 15.5 billion, equivalent to 2.1% of national GDP. Aside from exports, a vast amount of oil products is sold to domestic consumers, mainly in the steel industry, the chemical industry and the transport sector (CBS, 2016 p. 5). Besides contributing to economic growth and generating export revenues, the oil sector is important for the Dutch economy and wealth-power structure as it provides employment to a vast amount of workers. According to information of the Port of Rotterdam (2016)11, the oil related industrial cluster of the Rotterdam area provides direct employment to 13.070 workers and indirect employment to over 60.000 workers, contributing greatly to the level

10 Information is derived from the website of the Port of Rotterdam 11 Information is derived from the document ‘Facts & Figures on the Rotterdam energy port and petrochemical cluster’ on the website of the Port of Rotterdam. 53

of social security in the Netherlands. Finally, the oil sector generates direct and indirect revenues for the Dutch government, mainly through taxation. The taxes that apply to the Dutch oil sector are a corporate income tax (CIT), a state profit share (SPS) levy, a surface rental tax, a royalty-based tax and a VAT tax (EY, 2015 p. 393). For example in 2014, Royal Dutch Shell paid an aggregate amount of EUR 8.6 billion based on these taxes according to their own information.12 Besides tax revenues from companies, the Dutch government receives tax income from the consumption of oil products, mainly by the transport sector. For example, the Dutch government collected almost EUR 8 billion in taxes and charges on transport fuels in 2012 (IEA, 2014 p. 157).

3.2.3 The role of coal

Although the Netherlands has no indigenous production of coal, the Amsterdam-Rotterdam- Antwerp (ARA) area is the main entry point for coal in Europe (IEA, 2014 p. 164). The ARA hub sets the benchmark price for coal in North-West Europe and plays an important role in relation to the energy supply security of the Netherlands and other EU member-states (Ibid). Resulting from the vast energy demand of the industrial sector, the Netherlands has attracted substantial investment in modern and highly efficient coal plants. The Dutch coal- fired power plants are among the most competitive electricity suppliers in the world (Ibid p. 167). As a result, these plants provide electricity at very affordable prices to consumers in the Netherlands, whether corporate or civil which is an important pre-condition of economic activity and growth. In addition, coal is used by the steel industry to manufacture steel from iron ore (Provoost et al., 2014 p. 26). As Provoost et al. (2014 p. 27) explain, since the liberalization of the Dutch electricity market, major energy companies such as NUON and Essent, now owned by Vattenfal and RWE, are responsible for electricity production in the Netherlands. Therefore, as electricity production is in the hands of major companies, the energy source that is used for production is largely determined by the market with coal being currently one of the cheapest resources. Although the Dutch government is not involved in the production of electricity, it is able to control the electricity market by being the sole shareholder of Tennet, the company that is responsible for the transport of electricity and the balance of supply and demand in the Netherlands. However, as supply of cheap coal-fired electricity benefits Dutch companies and increases the competitiveness of the Dutch industrial sectors, the Dutch government has strong incentives to protect the interests of the coal sector. However, in the Dutch ‘Energy Agreement’ of 2013, the government alongside constituents from the business sector agreed that five outdated and more polluting coal-fired power plants will be shut down by July 2017. Nevertheless, RWE, Engie and Eon have recently invested around EUR 5 billion in three new coal-fired power

12 Information derived from the ‘Payments to Governments Revenue Transparency’ report 2015 from the website of Royal Dutch Shell 54

plants at the ‘Eemshaven’ and the ‘Tweede Maasvlakte’, indicating that coal will remain an important energy source in the near future.

3.2.4 The role of renewable energy

As explained by chapter 2, the energy mix of the Netherlands is dominated by fossil fuels as natural gas, oil and coal together comprised 92.6% of TPES in 2014 (IEA, 2017)13. In contrast, the renewable energy sector is still relatively insignificant, although it is expected to increase its share in the energy production and thereby, its contribution to the Dutch economy in the near future. According to the CBS (2014), the total added value of the renewable energy sector to the Dutch economy amounted to EUR 4.23 billion in 2012. Activities related to energy savings accounted for the largest share of this added value by contributing EUR 1.45 billion. The aggregate added value of the business sector related to wind power, hydro power, solar power, biomass and biofuels, biogas and heat and geothermal energy added up to EUR 1.28 billion. Regarding export revenues, the contribution of the renewable energy sector is very small. In 2012, total exports related to renewable energy accounted for EUR 5.630 billion while total imports added up to EUR 5.590 billion, resulting in net exports of plus EUR 40 million (Ibid). With respect to employment, the CBS (2014) calculated that the renewable energy sector provided full time employment to 43.000 workers in 2012. Of this total, 40.000 jobs were related to the non-exploitation phase of the sector. For example, this is employment provided by companies that are involved in the value chain before and after the exploitation phase such as companies related to the production of renewable energy systems, R&D and the production and transport of wind turbines. The remaining 3.000 jobs are related to the actual production of renewable energy and provided by companies that operate the production or provide maintenance. Breaking it down further, the majority of employment (24.400 jobs) is provided by companies related to energy . Companies involved in solar power provided 4.900 jobs and companies related to onshore and offshore wind power provided only 5.100 jobs in 2012 (Ibid). In conclusion, the economic significance of the Dutch renewable energy sector is very small compared to the fossil fuel sector. The renewable energy industry in the Netherlands is still a minor industry that knows no globally significant companies, provides relatively little employment and does not generate government revenues as renewable energy is currently subsidized. Therefore, the renewable energy sector is relatively unimportant for the wealth-power structure of the Netherlands which means that the government has little incentives to favor renewable energy initiatives over the incumbent fossil fuel regime.

13 Information derived from the website of the IEA: Energy balances for the Netherlands 55

3.3 The role of the energy sector in the economy of Denmark

According to the World Bank (2017), Denmark is the 34th largest economy of the world with a GDP of USD 295 billion in 2015. For the same year, GDP per capita in Denmark accounted for USD 53.015 which is even higher than the GDP per capita of the Netherlands and puts Denmark amongst the richest nations in the world. Furthermore, albeit ranking 34th of the world, the economy of Denmark ranks 12th in the ‘Global Competitiveness Report’ of the World Economic Forum (2017 p. xiii). Denmark has a very open economy that is highly dependent on foreign trade and sensitive to global developments, albeit not as much as the economy of the Netherlands. Therefore, the Danish government also has strong incentives to protect the interests of its geo-economic constituents as this protects and strengthens the domestic wealth-power structure. Data from the World Bank (2017) shows that the value of all exported goods and services in Denmark accounted for 53.42% of GDP and that the value of all imported goods and services amounted to 47.15% of GDP. Worldwide, Denmark has established trade relationships with 224 countries of which the most important are Germany (16.48% of Danish exports), Sweden (11.03%), (6.345) and the United Kingdom (5.481%). Similar to the Netherlands, the most important export products of Denmark are related to machinery and electronics, chemicals, fuels and agricultural products. For the economy of Denmark, the energy sector plays an important role. Denmark owns large reserves of oil and natural gas that are located in the Danish part of the North-Sea which means that these energy resources are an important export product. Besides, Denmark is a global leader with respect to wind power with major companies such as Vestas and Siemens Wind Power. Therefore, the industrial activity and exports of wind turbines contribute significantly to the Danish economy. In addition, the Danish energy sector provides employment and generates government revenues through taxation, the sale of concession rights and dividends. This section will discuss the economic significance of the oil- and natural gas-sector and the renewable energy sector in Denmark.

3.3.1 The role of oil and natural gas

The production of oil and natural gas is of great socio-economic significance for Denmark. Starting in 1995, Denmark became a net exporter of oil and natural gas which has contributed to a positive balance of payments ever since (DEA, 2013 p. 24). According to the Danish Energy Agency (DEA)14, the total production value of Danish oil and natural gas accounted for EUR 5.473 billion15 in 2014. The production of oil was responsible for the lion’s share of this total production value by adding EUR 4.518 billion while the production of natural gas accounted for EUR 955 million (Ibid). With respect to net revenues, the IEA (2012 p. 110) calculated that the surplus of external oil trade accounted for EUR 1.963 billion in

14 Data is derived from the website of the Danish Energy Agency: Economy for oil and gas (n.d.) 15 All value of Danish oil and gas production according to May 2017 exchange rate DKK-EUR 56

2009. Although these revenues will remain significant over the next years, the Danish government expects that energy related revenues will drop with 50% by 2050 representing only 1.1% of GDP (Ibid). The most important export markets for Danish crude oil are the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom (Ibid). Of all the companies that are involved in the production of oil in Denmark, Royal Dutch Shell, Møller-Maersk, Nordsøfonden, Chevron are dominant. These companies are united the Danish Underground Consortium (DUC) which by far accounts for the majority of oil and gas production in Denmark16. Besides, Dong Energy and Hess also account for a substantial share in the existing license fees and production (DEA, 2013 p. 40-43). With respect to the downstream oil sector, respectively five companies, all members of the Danish Petroleum Association (EOF) represent around 90% of the market: Statoil, Royal Dutch Shell, Kuwait Petroleum, Uno-X and OK (IEA, 2012 p. 112). The two largest oil refineries in Denmark, owned by Statoil and Royal Dutch Shell, are located in Kalundborg and Fredericia and have a total distillation capacity of 173 kb/d (Ibid). Besides economic growth and export revenues, the production of oil is very important for the Danish economy as oil accounts for almost 40% of the final energy consumption in Denmark in (IEA, 2017)17. Of the total oil consumption in Denmark, the transport sector is responsible for the majority of consumption with 73.5%, followed by the industrial sector (7.6%) and the agricultural sector (6.3%) (Ibid). Without domestic oil supplies, these sectors would be dependent on (more costly) oil imports. The same is true for natural gas. Although natural gas is less important for the Danish economy than oil, Danish households and the Danish industrial sector rely on natural gas for power production and heating (Ibid). In addition, the oil sector uses natural gas for the extraction of oil (IEA, 2012 p. 116). To continue, the Danish oil and gas sector are important for the Danish economy and wealth- power structure as they provide substantial employment. According to the Trade Organization for oil and gas in Denmark (2017), over 15.000 workers are employed in the Danish oil and gas sector, both onshore and offshore and including the sub-supplier- and service-sector. Finally, the oil and gas sector in Denmark generates significant revenues for the Danish government. These revenues have been very important regarding the development of the Danish and the level of social security in Denmark. According to the Danish Energy Agency (n.d.) 18, the government revenues from oil and gas are derived from three sources. First, a hydrocarbon tax (52% rate) and a corporate income tax (25% rate) generate income for the Danish treasury. Second, the Danish government receives revenues through the Nordsøfonden, a state-owned company that manages the state’s share of all new licenses since 2005. In addition, since July 2012, Nordsøfonden also has a 20% share in the DUC. Third, the Danish government receives indirect revenues through its shareholding in DONG Energy and the company’s subsidiary, DONG E&P A/S. The Danish Energy (2016 p. 34),

16 Information is derived from the website of the Nordsøfonden 17 Data on energy consumption in 2014, derived from the website of the IEA 18 Information derived from the website of the Danish Energy Agency (n.d.) 57

estimates that the Danish government had a share of 62% in the profits of oil and gas production in 2014 through direct and indirect state participation. Over the period 1972- 2014, the total government revenues amounted to EUR 54.33 billion19. For 2014, the total revenues amounted to EUR 2.53 billion and for the period 2014-2018 government revenues are expected to be in between EUR 2.7 billion and EUR 3.4 billion (DEA, 2014 p. 24). Figure 3.4 shows the government revenues from oil and natural gas production for the period 1982-2014.

Figure 3.4 Government revenues from oil & natural gas, Denmark (1982-2014)

5000 4500 4000 3500 3000 2500

2000 million million euro 1500 1000 500 0 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014

Revenues Column1 Column2

Figure 3.4 based on data derived from the website of the Danish Energy Association

3.3.2 The role of renewable energy

In contrast to the situation in the Netherlands, the renewable energy sector is very important for the Danish economy. First, as already 30% of the total domestic energy consumption is derived from renewable sources (DEA, 2015 p. 3), renewable energy provides the input for a large share of economic activity and household consumption. More importantly, Denmark is a major exporter of renewable energy technology. Although Danish export of fossil fuel technologies increased by 4.8%, the exports of renewable energy technologies increased by 15% in 2014 (Dong Energy, 2015)20. Denmark is the only EU-15 country where exports of these technologies exceeds the export of any other kind of technologies (Ibid). In the renewable energy sector of Denmark, wind power plays a central role. According to a report of Deloitte (2012 p. 9-11), the Danish wind power sector is highly competitive and has a global leadership position due to strong comparative advantages. Lewis and Wiser (2007 p. 1854) explain that the success of the Danish wind power sector

19 May 2017 exchange rate DKK-EUR 20 Information derived from the website of Dong Energy (15-06-2017) 58

resulted from strong governmental support. In the early stages of development, the Danish government made strong efforts to create a stable and sizable market that enabled the Danish wind power industry to become a major global player. At present, Denmark still benefits from its first-mover advantage with respect to wind power and has established a solid manufacturing base, supported by a high technological and R&D capacity (IEA, 2012 p. 79). World’s largest turbine manufacturer, Denmark’s Vestas, sells over 99% of its turbines to customers outside of Denmark and has offices and subsidiaries in several countries (Lewis & Wiser, 2007 p. 1846). Bloomberg (2017) calculated that the combined global market share of Vestas and Siemens Wind Power was just over 20% in 2016. The share of Nordex, a Danish company that moved to Germany accounted for 5% of global market share. In addition, DONG Energy is the global market leader with respect to the design, construction and operation of wind farms, mainly offshore (Deloitte, 2012 p. 28). According to the Danish Wind Industry Association (2017)21, the total export value of the Danish wind power industry accounted for EUR 6.5 billion in 2015, equivalent to 2.2% of national GDP. Besides export revenues from actual RE commodities, the Danish economy benefits from the sale of wind power technology. For example, the Spanish wind turbine manufacturer Gamesa paid license fees to Vestas in order to produce wind turbines with Danish technological knowledge (Lewis & Wiser, 2007 p. 1847). Besides export revenues and economic growth, the wind power sector is important for the Danish economy by providing high qualified jobs, large scale R&D activities and a positive global presence (Deloitte, 2012 p. 6). According to the Danish Wind Industry Association (2017), the wind power sector employed over 31.000 workers by the end of 2015. In 2020, Deloitte (2012 p. 59) expects employment to have increased to 42.689 jobs.

3.4 Energy and economy in the Netherlands and Denmark: similarities and differences

The Netherlands and Denmark both are advanced industrialized countries and rank amongst the wealthiest nations of the world according to their GDP per capita. The Netherlands, home to a population that is three times as large as the population of Denmark, also has a substantially larger and more competitive economy. Albeit both the economies are very open and dependent on international trade, the economy of the Netherlands is further integrated into the global economy with exports accounting for 82.46% of GDP compared to 53.42% of GDP in Denmark (World Bank, 2017). For both the Netherlands and Denmark, the energy sector plays an important role in the economy and contributes significantly to government revenues. However, there are important differences related to the scale and the composition of the Dutch and Danish energy sectors. First, although the Danish oil and natural gas sector contributes significantly to the Danish economy, the level of prosperity and social security, the scale of the sector cannot be compared to the oil and natural gas

21 Information derived from the website of the Danish Wind Industry Association (15-06-2017) 59

sector of the Netherlands. Whereas, besides the production of oil and natural gas for domestic consumption, Denmark has developed a modest export sector that mainly focuses on crude oil, the Netherlands has established an oil- and natural gas-sector with a capacity that goes way beyond its domestic resources and that plays a pivotal role in global energy production and trade. The natural gas reserves enabled the Netherlands to enjoy major benefits such as cheap and stabile energy supply, revenues from exports and extensive government revenues. In combination with the geographical position of the Netherlands, the cheap and stabile energy supply also attracted a major energy-intensive industry such as the petrochemical sector, bringing economic growth and prosperity, providing employment and contributing to government revenues through taxation. In comparison, the Danish oil and natural gas industry is many times smaller and is unable to compete with its Dutch counterpart. The company that has the largest share in the exploitation of oil and natural gas in Denmark is a Dutch company, Royal Dutch Shell. In addition, the ARA area is the main gateway for coal in Europe, further enhancing the competitiveness of Dutch industries through low energy prices. Since the natural gas-, oil- and coal-sector of the Netherlands are highly competitive, of global significance and as they are substantially larger than their Danish counterparts, their relative contribution to the Dutch economy and government revenues is more extensive. Relative to the situation in Denmark, the Dutch oil, gas and coal sector generates more revenues from exports, provides more employment and generates more government revenues through taxes, dividends and license fees. However, for the renewable energy sector the situation is totally different. Whereas the Netherlands has only a small domestic industry related to renewable energy, Denmark developed a major global industry for wind power, hosting some of the world’s biggest turbine manufacturers such as Vestas Wind and Siemens Wind Power. As a result, the contribution of the renewable energy sector in Denmark, mainly the wind power sector, to the Danish economy is much more significant than the contribution of the Dutch renewable energy sector to the Dutch economy. Net exports related to renewable energy of the Netherlands are slightly positive in (2012) and the sector employed 45.400 workers in 2013 (CBS, 2014). For Denmark, the exports of the wind power sector alone accounted for EUR 6.5 billion in 2015 and the wind power sector generated employment for over 31.000 workers (DWIA, 2017).

3.5 Conclusions

This chapter connected energy with the economy and subsequently with the wealth-power structure of the Netherlands and Denmark. In this respect, a distinction was made between the fossil fuel sector and the renewable energy sector in order to evaluate their respective economic significance and value for the wealth-power structure. This chapter found that the fossil fuel sector plays a major role in the economy of the Netherlands. The presence of natural gas, a major petrochemical industry and energy-intensive industry and competitive coal-fired power plants all contribute greatly to economic growth, prosperity, social-security and government revenues. In contrast, the economic significance of the renewable energy

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sector in the Netherlands is very small. Relative to its fossil fuel counterpart, the renewable energy sector contributes little to economic growth, provides little employment and does not generate extensive government revenues through taxation or dividends. In Denmark, the situation is different as both the fossil fuel sector and the renewable energy sector are important for the Danish economy. The presence of oil and natural gas as well as the establishment of a major wind power industry all contribute greatly to economic growth, prosperity, social security and government revenues. Therefore, as the economy and subsequently the wealth-power structure of the Netherlands are more focused towards fossil fuels than the Danish economy and wealth-power structure, the first hypotheses is verified. In accordance with the version of ‘geopolitical economy’ that is formulated by Amineh & Guang (2014), in the Netherlands this means that (geo-) economic constituents from the fossil fuel sector are more influential regarding the decision-making process and exert a much higher level of lateral pressure on the Dutch government. As a result, the Dutch government has strong incentives to protect the interests of the fossil fuel sector because this will also protect the wealth-power structure. In this respect, the transition towards renewable energy is heavily in conflict with the wealth-power structure of the Netherlands as it imposes a threat to the incumbent fossil fuel regime. For Denmark, as both the fossil fuel- and renewable energy-sector are important regarding the wealth-power structure, constituents from both sectors exert lateral pressure and have influence on the decision- making process. As a result, the Danish government is inclined to protect the interests of (geo-) economic constituents that emanate from both sectors. In this respect, the transition towards renewable energy is less in conflict with the wealth-power structure of Denmark. Chapter 4 will build further on this logic and will explain how the relation between energy and the wealth-power structure has influenced the transition towards renewable energy and wind power development in particular in the Netherlands and Denmark.

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Chapter 4 The transition towards renewable energy in the Netherlands and Denmark

4.1 Introduction

This chapter will build on chapter 3 and explain how the relationship between energy and the wealth-power structures of the Netherlands and Denmark has determined the development of the transition towards renewable energy. Thereby, this chapter will answer the third and final sub-question: ‘How did the relationship between energy and the wealth- power structure determine the transition towards renewable energy and wind power development in the Netherlands and Denmark? Also, this chapter will test the second hypothesis: ‘Because the wealth-power structure of the Netherlands is more reliant on fossil fuels than the wealth-power structure of Denmark, the Netherlands is less successful with respect to renewable energy and wind power development.’ As explained by section 1.2 on theory and concepts, the countries of the Netherlands and Denmark are both liberal and industrial state-society complexes. In the current neoliberal world order, these state-society complexes have become ‘capitalist constructs’ which raison d’être is derived from their ability to generate economic growth and prosperity. In this respect, the state and the society, in which the business sector is the most important actor, are interdependent. The condominium of state and market, or wealth-power structure, constitutes the core of modern liberal industrial state-society complexes. In countries such as the Netherlands and Denmark, state and market forces, together with other societal forces such as social movements, interact with each other on multiple different levels and produce system level outcomes that are characterized by a blend of a short-run capitalist logic and more long-run state and societal objectives. What this blend looks like exactly is dependent on the relative influence of these forces, their interests and their interdependencies. In this respect, these system level outcomes cannot be seen as isolated from the outside world. This is because for small countries such as the Netherlands and Denmark, the primary means to protect their wealth-power structure is by engaging in international trade. As in the current neoliberal world order, global trade is characterized by competition between the business sectors of various countries, state, market and societal forces of the Netherlands and Denmark are inclined to facilitate an environment that enhances the competitiveness of their business sectors. This will enables the Netherlands and Denmark to project their power in transnational space and to protect strengthen the wealth-power structure as through competitiveness, their business sectors will gain access to new markets and resources abroad which contributes to economic growth, prosperity, social-security and government revenues. In this respect, the Netherlands in particular performs well as its economy ranks 4th on the global competitive index (WEF, 2016 p. xiii). As chapter 3 explained, the energy sector is very important for the wealth-power structure of the Netherlands and Denmark as it contributes greatly to economic growth, prosperity,

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social-security and government revenues. In the Netherlands, it are primarily (geo-) economic constituents from the fossil fuel sector that are important for the wealth-power structure while in Denmark, these constituents emanate from the fossil fuel sector as well as the renewable energy sector. In this respect, the transition towards renewable energy is more heavily in conflict with the wealth-power structure of the Netherlands than with the wealth-power structure of Denmark. This is because the transition towards renewable energy poses a threat to the interests of the fossil fuel sector in several ways. First, resulting from the transition towards renewable energy will likely increase the competition in the energy markets, reducing the share of fossil fuels in the energy mix. Second, the transition could divert the flow of resources and (governmental) support from the fossil fuel sector to the renewable energy sector. Third, even if the fossil fuel sector will gain control over the production of renewable energy, it will lose added value because renewable energy cannot yet compete with fossil fuels and requires large investments in the short- and medium-term. However, state-, market- and societal- forces in the Netherlands and Denmark also have incentives to support the transition towards renewable energy. Since fossil fuels will run out and countries will experience all different types of scarcity, the question is not if the transition towards renewable energy will happen but rather how fast it will develop. However, as state-, market- and societal forces in the Netherlands and Denmark are inclined to protect the domestic wealth-power structure by protecting the interests of important (geo-) economic constituents, it can be expected that the transition towards renewable energy is more complicated and will develop more slowly in the Netherlands than in Denmark as it is in heavier in conflict with the wealth-power structure. This chapter will test this theoretical assumption through the second hypotheses. This chapter will explain how the wealth-power structure of the Netherlands and Denmark has determined the development of the transition towards renewable energy by reviewing the role of state-, market- and societal forces and the energy policies, that their interaction produced. First, section 4.2 will discuss the role of the business sector in the Netherlands and Denmark. Second, section 4.3 will discuss the role of the Dutch and Danish government. Third, section 4.4 will review the role of social movements. Fourth, section 4.5 will evaluate the energy policy and development of the transition towards renewable energy in the Netherlands and Denmark. Fifth, section 4.6 will discuss the possibilities and impediments for the future of renewable energy and wind power in the Netherlands and Denmark. Sixth and final, section 4.7 will outline the most important findings of this chapter.

4.2 The role of the business sector

In the Netherland, fossil fuel related market parties that are important to the wealth-power structure have a strong influence on energy policy and other system level outcomes regarding the transition towards renewable energy. First, as chapter 3 showed that the fossil fuel sector is very significant for the wealth-power structure by contributing substantially to

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economic growth, prosperity, social-security and government revenues, the sector naturally exerts a high level of lateral pressure that limits the ability of decision-makers to take a course of action that is in conflict with fossil fuel interests. Second, the fossil fuel sector also exerts influence more directly through lobbying. According to Oteman et al. (2014 p. 8), natural gas and oil companies such as Gasunie, the NAM, Royal Dutch Shell and ExxonMobil all have a very strong lobby. In addition, the Netherlands knows a strong lobby from the coal sector as well including companies such as Eon, NUON (Vattenfal), Essent (RWE) and Electrabel (Engie). Recently, this sector has invested around EUR 5 billion in three new coal- fired power plants at the ‘Tweede Maasvlakte’ facility and in Slochteren (Heilbron, Mommers, Muntz & de Zeeuw cited in Oteman et al., 2014 p. 8). This means that the fossil fuel sector has large interests in low electricity prices from coal and therefore, incentives to fight the transition towards renewable energy as long as renewable sources are not competitive. To continue, also companies from the agricultural- and transport-sector lobby in favor of the fossil fuel regime. This is because the transport sector is highly dependent on low oil prices and the agricultural sector is heavily subsidized for its use of fossil fuels (Oteman et al., 2014 p. 8). Through lobby, the fossil fuel sector is able to influence the decision-making process and to resist or slow down developments that are not aligned with their interests. Since the established market parties have currently no comparative advantage or economic interests to invest in the production of renewable energy, they have lobbied against the transition, mainly on a European level (Zomer, personal communication May 12, 2017). As a result, fossil fuel related market parties have acquired a dominant position in terms of steering the energy mix and with respect to the development of new energy facilities (Oteman et al., 2014 p. 8). In contrast, the influence of constituents form the renewable energy sector on the decision- making process in the Netherlands is relatively small (Ibid). Often, suppliers of renewable energy have a mixed portfolio of fossil fuels and renewable energy in which the former is dominant and the majority of the latter is imported through certificate trading (Ibid). There is no large industry related to renewable energy such as wind turbine manufacturers and although a few umbrella organizations such as the Dutch Wind Industry Association exist, their political influence remains very limited (Ibid). In Denmark, the situation is different as market parties that are important for the wealth-power structure emanate from both the fossil fuel- as well as the renewable energy-sector. This means that constituents from both sectors exert lateral pressure on decision-makers and try to influence system level outcomes directly through lobby. The fossil fuel sector, in collaboration with the Association of Large Industries, the Economic Council and often also the Ministry of Finance, has systematically resisted the transition towards renewable energy (Hvelplund, 2013 p. 16). However, in general and relative to the advocates of renewable energy, the Danish fossil fuel constituents are not as powerful and influential as their counterparts in the Netherlands (Oteman et al., 2014 p. 12; Zomer, personal communication May 12, 2017). Mainly, this is because important (geo-) economic and influential constituents emanate from the renewable energy sector as well. Major wind turbine manufacturers such as Vestas and

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Siemens Wind Power, together with a vast amount of small and medium-sized suppliers lobby in favor of renewable energy and protect their interests through advocacy organizations such as the Danish Wind Industry Association (Oteman et al., 2014 p. 12). According to Oteman et al. (2014 p. 12), the most important market parties in Denmark are DONG Energy and Vattenfall, together holding the majority of the energy production facilities. As DONG Energy owns large wind farms, the company is in favor of renewable energy and lobbies accordingly. Moreover, as DONG Energy is the most powerful member of the Danish Energy Agency, the lobby of this organization is focused in the same direction. Together with NGO’s, the Danish Federation of Small and Medium-sized Enterprises and occasionally the Ministry of Environment and Food, these constituents are also able to influence the decision-making process and subsequently the development of the transition towards renewable energy. In addition, as a result of strong support systems for renewable energy, many individuals have invested in wind power through local community initiatives (Toke et al., 2008 p. 1140). These thousands investors also exert lateral pressure and lobby for good conditions for wind power in the future (Ibid). Therefore, although the Danish business sector has established a strong lobby in general, it does not primarily serve the interests of the fossil fuel sector.

4.3 The role of the government

In the Netherlands, the dominant actor regarding the governance of the energy sector is the Ministry of Economic Affairs, working together with the Social Economic Council (SER), the Environmental Assessment Agency (PBL) and the provinces (Oteman et al., 2014 p. 7). The prominence of the Ministry of Economic Affairs and the SER indicates a strong economic rational regarding energy policy (van der Loo, 2013 cited in Oteman et al., 2014 p. 7). As a result, energy policies are primarily based on cost-benefit analyses and risk avoidance rather than focusing on solution for the long-term and innovation (Oteman et al., 2014 p. 8). Aside from the responsible Ministries and organizations, the composition of the Dutch coalition government and House of Representatives is very important regarding the transition towards renewable energy and wind power development. In this respect, the most important political parties in the Netherlands are the VVD (liberal conservatives), the CDA (conservative Christian democrats), D66 (liberal democrats), the PvdA (labour party) and GroenLinks (green leftist party). The VVD and CDA can be regarded as representatives of the business class as they have established strong ties with the private sector (Jongejan, 2017; Von der Dunk, 2015; Stokmans & Houtekamer, 2012; Van Houten, 2012). Primarily the VVD has always been in favor of tax cuts, a larger role for business constituents and less government interference in the market. According to Interviewee 122 (personal communication, May 5, 2017), the origin of the powerful pact between the business sector and the political establishment can be traced back to the discovery of natural gas in the

22 Interviewee 1 is a high ranking official at the Energy Research Centre of the Netherlands 66

Groningen province in the 1950s. From then onwards, the presence of natural gas, in combination with the geographical position of the Netherlands, attracted major fossil fuel- and energy intensive-industries which became very important for the wealth-power structure and forged a strong interdependency between the government and the business sector. As both the VVD and CDA are conservative and have developed strong ties with the business sector, they generally do not support the development of the transition towards renewable energy as this is in conflict with their interests. To continue, D66 and the PvdA are more moderate regarding the transition towards renewable energy. Albeit both parties cannot be seen as strong advocates of the business sector, the transition towards renewable energy has not been their main priority as they focused on various issues. Finally, GroenLinks is highly in favor of the transition towards renewable energy which has a clear priority in its political manifest. However, with only one exception in the period 2007-2010, the VVD party of current Prime Minister Mark Rutte has been part of the ruling coalition since 1994. About the same is true for the CDA, which has been part of the ruling coalition from 19977 until 2010 with only two exceptions. In contrast, GroenLinks has never been part of the ruling coalition since its establishment in 1990. Currently, following the Dutch elections of March 15, 2017, once again the VVD and the CDA, together with D66, are the most likely candidates to participate in the new coalition government. However, as these three parties have no majority in the Dutch House of Representatives, they need the commitment of either GroenLinks, the PvdA or the SP (socialist party). In the last three months, these parties tried to form a new coalition government with GroenLinks as this party won 10 seats and now has a total of 14 seats in the House of Representatives. However, after weeks of negotiations, GroenLinks pulled out because it failed to reach an agreement on immigration policy with the other parties. This event illustrates another problem in Dutch politics that has implications for the transition towards renewable energy. The VVD and the CDA on the one side and GroenLinks on the other are not only opposites on the issue of renewable energy, they are also divided by the political cleavage of left and right. This means that it is very hard for these parties to join each other in a coalition government because they strongly disagree on various issues, a premise that is proven by the current negotiations. The current political landscape, in which populist and nationalist rhetoric has become more important, further enforces the divide between left and right. In an attempt to gain votes from the supporters of the right-wing Freedom Party of Geert Wilders, the VVD and CDA have adopted a strong nationalist rhetoric and anti-immigration stand that now makes it more difficult to come to an agreement with left-wing and moderate parties. Therefore, as conservative parties were the main parties in power over the period 2001 – 2017 and as the Dutch government receives significant revenues from the fossil fuel sector and energy-intensive industry, it has generally been inclined to protect the interests of these sectors. In Denmark, the main actor at the government level regarding energy is the Ministry of Energy, Utilities and Climate, the name already indicating an environmental take on energy policy (Oteman et al., 2014 p. 11). The Ministry works closely with the Ministry of Finance

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and the Danish Energy Agency which protects the interests of Danish energy producers (Ibid). Just as for the Netherlands, the composition of the Danish ruling coalition and House of Representatives is very important. The most important political parties in Denmark over the period 2001-2017 are Venstre (center-right liberal party), the Conservative Party, the Social Democrats, the liberal Alliance, and the Danish People’s Party ( University, 2017)23. Venstre has been part of the coalition government in the period 2001-2017 with only one exception, the left-wing government under Thorning Schmidt of the Social Democrats that ruled from 2011-2015 (Ibid). Accordingly, all the coalition governments with Venstre were center-right oriented as Venstre often cooperated with the Conservative Party. However, Venstre has not always been in favor of renewable energy. In the period 2002- 2008, when Anders Fogh Rasmussen from Venstre was the Prime-Minister of Denmark, the government removed the financial support system for renewable energy and introduced a non-policy that relied on established market actors and conditions (Hvelplund, 2013 p. 5). This situation changed radically in 2008 when the same government made a political U-turn and suddenly declared full support for a 100% renewable future (Ibid). Currently, Venstre still states that it is in favor of renewable energy, although the transition should not be a heavy burden for the private sector and Danish people (Venstre, n.d.)24. Nevertheless, aside from the period 2002-2008, the commitment and political support of the Danish government for the transition towards renewable energy has always been strong. Denmark has established the most longstanding incentive and support regime for wind power development in history and actively promoted the incorporation of local communities in the implementation process (Toke et al., 2008 p. 1137). As a result of this strong governmental support, Danish turbine manufacturers such as Vestas and Siemens Wind Power were able to develop into major multinational companies (Hvelplund, 2015 p. 15; Deloitte, 2012 p. 11). In addition, the Danish government made a smart move by combining exports of renewable energy technologies with development aid. According to Interviewee 1 (personal communication, May 3 2017), the Danish have invested in large wind farms in India in the past. This provided India with cheap energy while at the same time benefited the Danish wind power export sector. Thereby, Danish turbine manufacturers learned how to export their highly technical products and were able to build a track-record without taking any financial risks as the government stood surety. Although many Dutch companies were in favor of a similar approach, the Dutch government then did not allow this as it believed that combining trade with development aid was inappropriate. Finally, an important difference between the governments of the Netherlands and Denmark is that the Dutch government is more restrained by the dominance of the Anglo-Saxon model in international trade. As the Netherlands knows a larger business sector than Denmark with more multinational companies, the level of lateral pressure on the government is higher as well. This logic is illustrated well by the attempts of American companies Kraft Heinz and PPG to buy the Dutch companies Unilever and Akzo Nobel. The

23 Information derived from the website of Danmarkshistorien.dk by the University of Aarhus (17-06-2017) 24 Information is derived from the website of Venstre: Energipolitik (17-06-2017) 68

Dutch government strongly stated that it wanted that these companies would remain in Dutch hands as they are important for the national economy. However, Unilever and Akzo Nobel are primarily accountable to their shareholders. As an acquisition generally results in an increasing stock price, it is often in the shareholders short-term interests to agree with a take-over. This logic has implications for the transition towards renewable energy as well. For the government, to a certain extent the transition towards renewable energy poses a dilemma between facilitating the transition or protecting the interests of the fossil fuel related business sector. Enforcing the transition might reduce the competitiveness of the certain companies which makes them more vulnerable for a (hostile) take-over. As the Netherlands knows a significantly larger fossil fuel sector than Denmark with more multinational companies, the Dutch government is more restrained by the Anglo-Saxon model and lateral pressure than its Danish counterpart.

4.4 The role of green- and social movements

In democratic countries such as the Netherlands and Denmark, there are many social movements that focus on various different issues. Just like the business sector, these movements arise from civil-society based on the logic that it is easier to achieve certain objectives through an organized group. In general, there is a distinction between established organizations such as labour unions and movements that originate spontaneously such as unplanned protest marches or manifestations. However, with respect to the transition towards renewable energy not all social movements are important. This section will discuss the role of green-movements in the Netherlands and Denmark as in contrast with the business sector and the government, they often act as the advocates of renewable energy. These green movements are able to influence the decision-making process through lobbying, offering knowledge and expertise and by raising public awareness and mobilizing public support. Generally, green movements have much less influence on energy policy and other system level outcomes regarding the transition towards renewable energy than the business sector or the government. However, if the time is right and they are able to mobilize widespread public support for their cause they might be able to play a decisive role in the decision-making process. According to A. de Roo25 (personal communication, May 12, 2017), the role of green movements such as Greenpeace, ‘Stichting Milieu’ and ‘Milieudefensie’ in the Netherlands has changed recently. In the past, these organizations have only resisted and lobbied against certain developments without offering any alternative options. This changed over the past years as green movements in the Netherlands began to realize that they could exert more influence by being actively involved in the decision-making process, working together with government and the business sector and providing feasible alternatives. For example, Greenpeace and ‘Milieudefensie’ participated in the negotiations

25 A. de Roo is a former GroenLinks representative and member of the European Parliament 69

that led to the Dutch Energy Agreement of 2013 which they fully support. According to Interviewee 1 (personal communication, May 5, 2017), the Netherlands knows a relative high density of social- and green-movements that are well organized, willing to participate in the political process and able to think within the present context. In addition, these organizations have a certain extent of political leverage derived from their widespread public support which enables them to exert some level of lateral pressure. Besides established green movements, the Netherlands has experienced spontaneous manifestations on multiple issues including the transition towards renewable energy. For example, the People’s Climate March on April 29 of this year in Amsterdam attracted around 7500 individuals (Parool, 2017)26. However, spontaneous movements generally lack the capacity to influence the decision-making process. Often, they act in accordance with the logic of classical green movements as they primarily focus on protesting instead of participating and offering alternatives. They have no central organizations and no leadership that is able to protect their interests on higher political levels. To continue, although green movements have substantial public support and the established green movements in the Netherlands are well organized, they are constrained by the configuration of the economy and the wealth-power structure. As the fossil fuel related business sector is very influential and the Dutch government has strong incentives to protect the interests of this sector, green movements face heavy opposition which reduces their ability to protect their interests. This context is different from the situation in Denmark, where the fossil fuel constituents are less influential and the government is inclined to protect the interests of both the fossil fuel sector and the renewable energy sector as both sectors are important for the wealth-power structure. This means that green movements in Denmark, such as VedvarendeEnergi (OVE), the Danish Society for Nature Conservation and Greenpeace, face less opposition and resistance to their objectives. Instead of being relatively isolated stakeholders such as in the Netherlands, the interests of Danish green movements are often aligned with the interests of constituents from the business sector as well as the government. In addition, as Denmark knows a strong community based culture, it might be easier for green movements to enforce involvement at the negotiation table (Interviewee 1, personal communication, May 5, 2017).

4.5 Energy policy and the transition towards renewable energy

Thus far, this chapter has discussed the role and influence of the business sector, the government and green movements. In this respect, the business sector primarily aims to protect its short-run capitalist interests. The government is inclined to protect the interests of business constituents that are important to the wealth-power structure and green movements act as advocates of renewable energy. In the Netherlands and Denmark, the

26 Information derived from the Parool newspaper of May 29, 2017 70

interaction between these forces produces system level outcomes such as energy policy and hence determines the development of the transition towards renewable energy. Therefore, what energy policy looks like is dependent on the configuration of interests, influence and interdependencies between these constituents. Building on chapter 3, section 4.2 showed that the Netherlands knows a powerful fossil fuel sector which is very important for the wealth-power structure and that the renewable energy sector is much less significant and influential. In Denmark, the situation is different as both the fossil fuel sector and the renewable energy sector are important for the wealth-power structure and influential. In addition, section 4.3 showed that the coalition government of the Netherlands is dominated by conservative political parties that have strong ties to the business sector and have not focused on renewable energy while, aside from the period 2002-2008, the Danish government has always been strongly in favor of renewable energy. Finally, section 4.4 showed that green movements in the Netherlands face heavier resistance from the business sector and government than their Danish counterparts as their objectives are often in conflict with the wealth-power structure. This section will review whether this configuration of influence, interests and interdependencies between these the business sector, the government and green movements that emanates from the wealth-power structure was translated into energy policy accordingly and hence determined the development of the transition towards renewable energy. In the Netherlands, energy policy in general clearly showed the influence of a powerful business sector. For example in 2008, the Dutch government stated that it would support the energy-intensive industry and that business constituents were free to determine the energy mix through investments (Heilbron et al., 2013 cited in Oteman et al., 2014 p. 8). Moreover, in the past the Dutch government has frequently intervened in the energy markets in order to favor the fossil fuel sector (Oteman et al., 2014 p. 8). For example, the Netherlands knows a very favorable tax scheme for kerosene and agricultural diesel as well as an energy tax cut for large consumers (Ibid). Also, prices of natural gas are higher for households than for industry and the energy-intensive sector is even exempted from the tax, along with the horticulture sector (IEA, 2014 p. 147). In contrast, policy support for renewable energy has been weak and characterized by inconsistency and volatility (Breukers & Wolsink 2007 p. 2741; Toke et al., 2008 p. 1138). This created uncertainty for investors and project developers and therefore hampered the transition towards renewable energy in (Toke et al., 2014 p. 1138). With respect to wind power deployment, the Dutch government takes a highly centralized approach based on a strong economic rational. The actual planning of wind farms is left to the provinces that are not encouraged and not punished if deployment targets are not achieved (Oteman et al., 2014 p. 8). According to A. de Roo (personal communication, May 12, 2017), the establishment of a stable policy support system for renewable energy in the Netherlands did not happen because the focus of the government changed over time in accordance with the rise and fall of different ruling coalitions. As soon as a more progressive party such as D66 or a moderate party such as the PvdA did not participate in a new government coalition or when they were

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forced to govern together with both the VVD and CDA, support systems for renewable energy were largely abandoned and the role of market forces increased. However, as a result of international pressure through the 2020 goals of the Renewable Energy Directive of the EU Commission, the Netherlands was forced to adopt more stringent measures regarding the transition towards renewable energy. In order to achieve the 2020 goals, 47 organizations including business constituents, the Dutch government and social movements reached consensus and closed the Dutch Energy Agreement of 2013. This agreement was initiated by the SER and provides the Dutch government with a clear agenda on how to carry out the transition towards renewable energy. However, the Energy Agreement clearly represents the configuration of interests, influence and interdependencies between the business sector, the government and green movements that emanates from the wealth- power structure of the Netherlands. This is well illustrated by the opening statement of the agreement that states that the Energy Agreement is the basis of a robust energy and climate policy that aims to ensure stability for investors, generate economic growth, create employment and increase competitiveness while the inconveniences for civilians and companies will be minimized. To continue, the central goals of the Energy Agreement are (1) to achieve energy savings of 1.5% per year, (2) to achieve a total energy saving of 100 petajoules by 2020, (3) to increase the share of renewable energy to 14% in 2020 and 16% by 2023 and (4) to create at least 15.000 jobs. Furthermore, the Energy Agreement is focused on boosting the economy of the Netherlands by triggering substantial investments in all economic sectors. In order to specify these objectives, the Energy Agreement is based on 10 pillars. First, in order to contribute to sustainable energy use, environmental goals, to generate employment and to enhance the competitiveness of the Dutch business sector, the Dutch energy consumers will focus on energy savings of 35% in 2016 and 65% in 2018. Here, the starting point is that companies and civilians have incentives to achieve energy savings and that the goals related to renewable energy will be achieved cost-effectively. Second, in order to increase the energy production from renewable sources, the Netherlands should focus on multiple sources including onshore wind power, offshore wind power, solar power and biomass. Again, cost-effectiveness, stability for investors, generating employment and enhancing the competitiveness of the Dutch business sector are the central starting points. In particular, the Energy Agreement stipulates a central role for the Dutch government regarding the development of offshore wind power. In this respect, the Dutch government is expected to establish a legislative framework that allows the development of offshore wind farms, to prepare the location for these parks and make them available through a tender and to provide support in the form of subsidies. Hence, the Energy Agreement basically states that the role of the government is to reduce the risks and costs for investors in the initial phase of development and to hand over the project to the business sector as soon as it is perceived to be a proper investment while continue to provide subsidies. Third, in order to develop a decentralized energy production system, civilians and energy will be given the opportunity and support to produce energy from renewable sources themselves. For example, as of January 1, 2014 there is a tax cut of 7.5 cent/kwh for

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energy that is produced by cooperatives. However, the costs that energy companies make for implementing the tax cut can be directed back to the cooperatives. In this respect, the business sector is completely exempted from any costs related to the transition towards renewable energy as these are paid for by the government and the cooperatives. Fourth, in order to achieve energy supply security and a balance between supply and demand during the transition towards renewable energy, the Dutch energy-related constituents will make efforts to improve the energy transportation network, mainly through European cooperation. Fifth, the organizations that are involved in the Energy Agreement will form a joint lobby in Brussels in order to establish a well-functioning emission trading system (ETS). The goal of this lobby is to enforce that this new system protects the interests of internationally competitive companies (carbon leakage companies) by granting them with 100% free ETS rights that rest on realistic benchmarks and production levels based on best performance data. This pillar illustrates once more that the transition towards renewable energy is not allowed to affect the fossil fuel geo-economic constituents of the Netherlands and that the costs will have to be paid for by someone else. Sixth, the parties of the Energy Agreement have agreed that three outdated coal-fired power plants will be closed by 2017 in order to reduce Co₂ emissions. However, in return there will be an exemption of the coal tax or coal that is used for the production of electricity. To pay for this tax cut, the general energy tax will be increased with the precondition that the extra costs will be shared equally between the business sector and the Dutch households. Again, the business sector has negotiated a very favorable position as they will only have to pay half the costs of a general tax increase that compensates for the removal of a tax that only they had to pay. Seventh, the parties of the Energy Agreement have agreed that transport will have to be much more efficient and sustainable in order to reach a 60% reduction of Co₂ emissions in 2050 compared to 1990 levels. Eighth, the Energy Agreement has to result in a significant increase of employment in the installation and construction branch and in the renewable sector in the long-run. In the period of 2014-2020, at least 15.000 extra jobs will have to be created. Ninth, the parties of the Energy Agreement agree that the Netherlands should be in the top 10 of the global CleanTech ranking by 2030. This objective will be achieved by creation a favorable investment climate for existing and new clean technology companies. Tenth, in agreement with the Dutch association of Banks, the Association of insurance companies and pension funds, the Energy Agreement states that it should become more attractive for investors to invest in energy saving and renewable energy. In conclusion, the Energy Agreement clearly shows the influence of the business sector and the inclination of the government to protect this sector in order to protect the wealth-power structure. According to the Energy Agreement, the transition towards renewable energy should not pose a threat to the interests of the business sector. On the contrary, its development will have to be managed in such a way that it creates economic growth, generates employment and enhances the competitiveness of Dutch companies. In this respect, the role of the government is mainly to facilitate the business sector as it will have to take away risks and costs for investors, mainly in the case of offshore wind power. In

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addition, although several green movements such as Greenpeace, ‘Stichting Natuur en Milieu’ and ‘Milieudefensie’ were involved in the making of the Energy Agreement, they were clearly unable to counterbalance the business sector and government and to attenuate the economic rational in favor of environmental framing. Therefore, the Dutch energy policy primarily served the interest of the fossil fuel business sector instead of showing strong support for renewable energy, the development of the transition towards renewable energy has been slow and cumbersome in the Netherlands. To continue, similar to the Netherlands, Denmark also knows a national Energy Agreement. The Danish agreement was adopted in March 2012 by the center-left government of Thorning Schmidt and was supported by a vast majority in the House of Representatives (IEAW, 2012 p. 76). According to the former Danish Ministry of Climate, Energy and Building that published the Energy Agreement (2012 p. 1), the involved parties have succeeded in creating strong political commitment for a transition that focuses on energy savings and promotes renewable energy in all sectors of the economy. By 2020, the Danish Energy Agreement encompasses a reduction of the total energy consumption with 12%, an increase of the share of renewable energy to 35% and a 50% share of renewable energy in the production of electricity. In this respect, the Danish Energy Agreement is an important step towards the establishment of a 100% renewable energy system by 2050. In addition, the agreement also aims to create economic growth, generate employment and to preserve the competitiveness of traditional Danish enterprises. In order to increase the share of renewable energy in the total energy consumption, Denmark focuses heavily on Energy Savings. Energy savings are beneficial to both companies and households and a larger share of renewable energy in the total energy consumption provides a solution for volatile fossil fuel energy prices. In contrast with its Dutch counterpart, the Danish energy agreement is not characterized by a prevailing economic rational. While the Dutch Energy Agreement is framed as a tool to achieve economic objectives, the Danish Agreement it is framed as a means to support green growth and to achieve energy independence as well as environmental goals. In addition, the Danish Energy Agreement does not contain a heavy focus on cost-effectiveness and does not show a strong inclination to protect the interests of the fossil fuel sector as a first priority. To continue, as is the case in the Netherlands, wind power development plays an important role in the Danish Energy Agreement. The Danish agreement states that 50% of the electricity consumption should be covered by wind power by 2020 and that wind power development will be strongly supported in order to achieve this objective. Also, the agreement states that Denmark should convert to green heating by focusing on biomass instead of coal and by investing in new technologies for renewable energy such as geothermal energy and heat pumps. In order to achieve this objective, the Danish government imposed a ban on oil- and gas-fired boilers in 2013 and committed EUR 5.7 million in order to replace these boilers for green heating technologies. In addition, the Danish Energy Agreement also has direct implications for the industrial sector and states that a subsidy will be provided to support investments in energy efficiency and the use of

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renewable energy in the production process. In contrast to the Netherlands, the Danish Energy Agreement shows a strong steering role for the Danish government with respect to the transition towards renewable energy. While the Dutch government primarily is expected to support the business sector and Dutch households, the Danish government interfered directly in the Danish business sector and society by banning oil- and gas-fired boilers. In general, the Danish Energy Agreement shows a strong commitment to the transition towards renewable energy and uses mainly an environmental frame. While the Dutch Energy Agreement is heavily skewed in favor of the fossil fuel business sector as the core of the agreement is to generate economic growth and to enhance competitiveness, the Danish Energy Agreement only contains several measures to preserve the competitiveness of the business sector, not to enhance it. Aside from the Energy Agreement, Danish energy policy in general have showed strong support for the transition towards renewable energy (Oteman et al., 2014; Hvelplund, 2013). Although this support was largely removed in the period 2002-2008 under the leadership of Anders Fogh Rasmussen that introduced a market based approach, it was reinstated when this same government made a political U-turn in 2008 and declared full commitment to a 100% renewable energy system by 2050 (Hvelplund, 2013 p. 5). As it was no longer believed that the market alone was a sufficient tool to achieve the ambitious national goals of Denmark, the market based approach was replaced by the former FIT system and the government adopted its former strong and steering role regarding energy policy (Oteman et al., 2014 p. 12). According to Hvelplund (2013 p. 15), the strong governmental support and the successful development of the transition towards renewable energy were largely a result of a process called ‘innovative democracy’. This process created a relative level playing field for constituents from the fossil fuel sector and advocates of renewable energy. This enabled advocates of renewable energy such as energy grassroots organizations, new green technology companies, NGO’s and energy cooperatives to seize political power and to increase their capacity to influence the decision-making process significantly (Ibid, p. 19). The Netherlands has not experienced a similar process of ‘innovative democracy’ as for example the Dutch Energy Agreement is mainly directed at protecting the interests of the incumbent fossil fuel business sector vis-à-vis green movements such as Greenpeace and ‘Milieudefensie’. Therefore, the logic of the process of ‘innovative democracy’ is in line with the configuration of influence, interests and interdependencies that is present regarding the business sector, the government and green movements in the Netherlands and Denmark. As the fossil fuel sector is relatively less important for the wealth-power structure, the Danish government could afford to grant political power to advocates of renewable energy that supported the transition. In the Netherlands, the fossil fuel sector is very important for the wealth-power structure which ensured that the conservative coalition governments with the VVD and CDA remained to focus on the interests of this sector. As green movements and advocates of renewable energy such Greenpeace, Stichting Natuur en Milieu and green companies faced fierce resistance from the incumbent business sector and as they were not supported by the government, they were unable to seize political power and to enforce support for the

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transition towards renewable energy. In this respect, Denmark still benefits from the choices it made in the aftermath of the oil crisis of 1973. According to S. Zomer27 (personal communication, May 12, 2017), oil was the dominant energy resource regarding the energy supply of Denmark before 1973. Although Denmark has access to substantial oil reserves in the North-Sea region, the oil crisis created a shock that strongly encouraged the Danish government to change course radically and to start the transition towards renewable energy, mainly by focusing on wind power development. In contrast, although the Netherlands was affected by the oil crisis, the shock was less heavy than in Denmark since Dutch energy system was mainly focused on natural gas as the primary energy resource. The ‘forced’ decision of Denmark to change course radically after the oil crisis and to commit to the transition towards renewable energy has been very important for the development of this transition over the period 2001-2017. The strong governmental support for renewable energy development through subsidies and policy support systems such as FIT schemes gave birth to a large wind power industry hosting two of the largest wind turbine manufacturers in the world, Vestas and Siemens Wind Power. As this new industry began to contribute significantly to economic growth, prosperity, employment and also to government revenues through taxation, the basis of the Danish wealth-power structure changed as now both the fossil fuel economy and the newly established economy based on renewable energy were part of it. As a result, the Danish government now had also strong incentives to protect the interests of the renewable energy sector. In addition, as the business sector hosted powerful constituents from the fossil fuel as well as renewable energy sector and as the government had incentives to protect both sectors, advocates of renewable energy such as green movements were often able to influence the decision-making process because their interests were frequently aligned with part of the business sector as well as the government. Therefore, in combination with general environmental concerns and pressure from the EU to reduce Co₂ emissions and to increase the share of renewable energy, this configuration of influence, interests and interdependencies that is connected to the wealth-power structure explains the successful development of the transition towards renewable energy in Denmark over the period 2001- 2017. Although development almost came to a halt in the period 2002-2008 (Hvelplund, 2013 p. 5), the interaction between the business sector, the government and green movements generally produced energy policy that strongly supported the transition towards renewable energy. This energy policy has been stable and encompassed substantial subsidies, feed-in tariffs and tax benefits which ensured stability for investors and strongly encouraged them to invest in renewable energy technologies, mainly in wind power (Meyer, 2007). In addition, as result of the strong policy support systems for renewable energy, there are approximately 150.000 turbine owners in Denmark, mainly through energy cooperatives (Hvelplund, 2013 p. 19). As the Danish people are generally convinced that renewable energy has the future, this created a competition between local owners and fossil fuel

27 S. Zomer is the director of the Dutch ‘Organization for Renewable Energy’ and a board-member of several local energy cooperatives. 76

companies, forcing the latter to invest in renewable energy based on the logic: ‘if we don’t they will’ (Ibid). As a result, wind power capacity in Denmark increased from 2383 MW in 2001 to over 5228 MW in 2016 (The Wind Power, 2017)28 covering over 38% of the domestic electricity consumption (Danish Energy Agency, 2016). Mainly due to the rapid development of wind power in Denmark, the country is expected to significantly overachieve its goal of 30% renewable energy under the EU Renewable Energy Directive. In contrast, the Netherlands has been less success full regarding renewable energy and wind power development over the period 2001 and 2017 because the basis of its wealth-power structure and the subsequent configuration of influence, interests and interdependencies did not underwent a similar change as in Denmark. In the aftermath of the oil crisis, the Dutch government did not radically directed its focus towards renewable energy as the Netherlands could rely on its natural gas reserves and because the resistance of the powerful fossil fuel sector was stronger. Therefore, the Netherlands did not establish a significant industry for renewable energy or any major wind power turbine manufacturers such as Vestas or Siemens Wind Power in Denmark. This meant that, in contrast to Denmark, the wealth-power structure remained largely based on fossil fuels as it continued to be economic sectors related to natural gas, oil and coal with companies such as Royal Dutch Shell and Gasunie that contributed mainly to economic growth, prosperity, employment and government revenues. Therefore, the configuration of influence, interests and interdependencies between the business sector, the government and green movements also remained the same which meant that the interaction of these forces produced energy policies that protected the interests of the incumbent energy regime such as the Dutch Energy Agreement of 2013. As a result, policy support systems for renewable energy and wind power development have been weak, inconsistent and highly volatile providing no substantial subsidies or feed-in tariffs (Toke et al., 2008 p. 1138; Breukers & Wolsink, 2007). This created insecurity for investors and project developers and severely hampered wind power development (Ibid). Only over the last few years, as the 2020 goals were approaching and the Paris Agreement was signed, the Dutch government and business sector have become aware that something will have to be done (A. de Roo, personal communication, May 12, 2017; Interviewee 1, personal communication, May 5, 2017). Amongst others, this resulted in the closing of the Dutch Energy Agreement that, despite its strong economic orientation, sets out a common strategy to achieve the 2020 goals and to increase the share of renewable energy in the energy mix. As a result, the total wind power capacity of the Netherlands mainly increased between 2013 and 2016 from 2205 megawatt to 3034 megawatt (CBS, 2016). Over the period 2011-2016, wind power capacity in the Netherlands increased from 485 megawatt to 3304 megawatt and currently, wind power covers 11% of the total electricity consumption in the Netherlands (CBS, 2016).

28 Data derived from the webstie of ‘TheWindPower’: statistics Denmark 77

4.6 The future of renewable energy in the Netherlands

As section 4.5 explained, the Netherlands has been less successful than Denmark with respect to renewable energy and wind power development over the period 2011-2017 because the transition towards renewable energy is heavier in conflict with the Dutch wealth-power structure. Subsequently, as the configuration of influence, interests and interdependencies between the business sector, the government and green movements produced energy policies that protected the interests of the incumbent fossil fuel regime, the Netherlands still finds itself in an early stage of development. With respect to the future, first it is important to note that wind power and other renewable energy technologies will become more competitive in relation to fossil fuels. Already, Danish energy company DONG Energy announced that it will build two offshore wind farms in Germany without any subsidies (Financial Times, 2017)29. Therefore, as Foquet (2010) explained that the transition from traditional energy sources such as wood and peat to fossil fuels experienced a swift development once fossil fuels became more competitive, the same logic might apply to the transition from fossil fuels to renewable energy. However, even if wind power and other renewable energy technologies become more competitive than fossil fuels, the transition towards renewable energy still means that incumbent fossil fuel companies will lose added value and that newly established renewable energy companies will gain added value and market share (Hvelplund, 2013 p. 19). Therefore, the transition towards renewable energy still encompasses a political shift as it will have to transfer wealth and influence from the incumbent fossil fuel business sector to the newly established renewable energy business sector. In this respect, as the fossil fuel business sector has strong incentives to resist the transition towards renewable energy, the government and green movements will play a critical role. The further development of the transition towards renewable energy is dependent on the ability of the government to adopt a stronger and steering role and to set energy policies that support renewable energy. Whether the government will do this is largely dependent on the willingness and ability of green parties such as GroenLinks to participate in the coalition government. In addition, the development of the transition will be dependent on the ability of green movements such as Greenpeace and ‘Milieudefensie’ to mobilize public support and to put pressure on the government and business sector to take action. However, also conservative coalition governments with parties such as the VVD and CDA will have to establish policies that are in compliance with international agreements and commitments such as the Paris Agreement and the EU Renewable Energy Directive. As a result of this international pressure, the share of renewable energy will increase significantly over the next years as it is expected that the Netherlands will only miss its target of 14% renewable energy in 2020 by a small margin (NEV, 2016 p. 15). Therefore, the transition towards renewable energy is expected to develop slowly when conservative parties with ties to the business sector such as the VVD and the CDA are dominant in the coalition

29 Information derived from the Financial Times from April 14, 2017 78

governments and as green movements are relatively unable protect their interests. When political parties such as GroenLinks participate in the coalition governments and when green movements are able to put pressure on the government and business sector, the transition can be expected to develop at a faster pace.

4.7 Conclusions

In response to the final sub-question, this chapter investigated how the relationship between energy and the wealth-power structure determined the development of the transition towards renewable energy in the Netherlands and Denmark. Thereby, it also tests the second hypothesis: ‘Because the wealth-power structure of the Netherlands is more reliant on fossil fuels than the wealth-power structure of Denmark, the Netherlands is less successful with respect to renewable energy and wind power development.’ In order to test this, this chapter reviewed the role of the business sector, the government and green movements as the interaction between these three forces determined the development of the transition through the production of energy policy. In this respect, this chapter found that the Netherlands knows a large fossil fuel business sector that hosts major companies such as Royal Dutch Shell and Gasunie that all have established a very strong lobby. To continue, as a result of lateral pressure and because the Dutch coalition governments over the period 2001-2017 have been dominated by conservative parties with strong ties to the business sector such as the VVD and the CDA, the Dutch government generally focused on protecting the interests of the (fossil fuel) business sector instead of showing support for renewable energy. Finally, green movements in the Netherlands have relatively little influence on the decision-making process. Established green movements such as Greenpeace and ‘Milieudefensie’ face fierce resistance from the fossil fuel business sector and the government while spontaneous protests and manifestations lack the organizational capacity and leadership to protect their interests on an official political level. To continue, the business sector in Denmark is focused on fossil fuels as well as on renewable energy with a company such as Maersk on the one side and major turbine manufacturers such as Vestas and Siemens Wind Power on the other. In addition, the largest energy company of Denmark, Dong Energy, has a dual mandate as it focuses on oil and gas as well as the deployment of large wind farms. Therefore, lateral pressure and lobby efforts in Denmark are directed in favor of both fossil and renewable energy. To continue, aside from the period 2002-2008, the coalition governments of Denmark have generally shown strong support for the transition towards renewable energy and adopted a strong steering role in order to achieve their ambitious objectives. This is true for both center-left and center-right oriented coalitions. Finally, green movements in Denmark face less resistance from the business sector and the government as, with respect to the transition towards renewable energy, their interests are often aligned. Subsequently, this chapter evaluated whether this configuration of influence, interests and

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interdependencies between the business sector, the government and green movements was translated in the energy policies that their interaction produced and hence determined the development of the transition towards renewable energy. In this respect, this chapter found that in the Netherlands, policy support systems for renewable energy have been weak, inconsistent and volatile, changing with the focus of different government coalitions. In addition, the Dutch Energy Agreement clearly shows the influence of a powerful business sector as it contains a strong economic rational and is mainly focused on protecting the interests of incumbent fossil fuel companies. According to the agreement, the role of the Dutch government is merely to protect the interests of the business sector and to facilitate the development of renewable energy by limiting the costs and risks for investors. Finally, although green movements such as Greenpeace, ‘Stichting Milieu en Natuur’ and ‘Milieudefensie’ were part of the agreement, their influence seems limited as the Dutch Energy Agreement focuses mainly on economic growth, employment and competitiveness instead of adopting a more environmental frame. Therefore, as the Netherlands has not shown strong policy support for renewable energy, the transition has developed very slow and cumbersome over the period 2001-2017. In this respect, although wind power deployment increased, mainly over the past three years, wind power still provides only 11% over the total electricity consumption in the Netherlands. To continue, this chapter found that in Denmark, energy policy has been very supportive of renewable energy by providing subsidies, strong feed-in tariffs and tax benefits which ensured stability for investors and thereby facilitated the development of the transition towards renewable energy. The Danish Energy Agreement shows strong commitment regarding the transition towards renewable energy and is an important step in the establishment of a 100% renewable energy system by 2050. Although the agreement also states that it focuses on (green) economic growth, employment and competitiveness, the extent to which this economic rational prevails is very limited in comparison with the Dutch Energy Agreement. The Danish Energy Agreement clearly shows that the government balanced the interests of the fossil fuel business sector, the renewable energy sector and the national interests by setting ambitious goals and showing strong support for the transition towards renewable energy while making efforts to ensure that the fossil fuel business sector will not be disadvantaged disproportionally. As a result of strong policy support for renewable energy, wind power development increased significantly in Denmark over the period 2001-2017 and currently covers for almost 42% of total Danish electricity consumption. Therefore, as both in the Netherlands and Denmark, the configuration of influence, interests and interdependencies between the business sector, the government and green movements that emanates from the wealth-power structure was translated into energy policy and hence determined the development of the transition towards renewable energy, also the second hypotheses is verified. In this respect, the reason for the difference between the wealth-power structures of the Netherlands and Denmark can be traced back to the oil crisis of 1973. As Denmark was heavily affected, the government decided to change course radically and to start the

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transition towards renewable energy. The strong policy support that was a result of this decision gave birth to a large renewable energy business sector with major companies such as Vestas and Siemens as well as a vast amount of subcontractors. Thereby, as over time, this renewable energy sector became more important for the economy by contributing significantly to economic growth, prosperity, employment and government revenues, the basis of the Danish wealth-power structure changed as it was now reliant on fossil fuels as well as renewable energy. As a result, the configuration of interests, influence and interdependencies between the business sector, the government and green movements produced energy policies that were supportive of the transition towards renewable energy. In contrast, as the Netherlands could rely on its vast reserves of natural gas during the oil crisis, the government was not incited to change course radically and to focus on renewable energy. Therefore, the Netherlands did not establish an important renewable energy sector with major wind turbine manufacturers and its wealth-power structure remained heavily reliant on fossil fuels. Subsequently, the configuration of interests, influence and interdependencies between the business sector, the government and green movements produced energy policies that served the interests of the fossil fuel regime instead of showing support for the transition towards renewable energy. Finally, with respect to the future, this chapter explained that it can be expected that the transition towards renewable energy will continue to develop slowly in the Netherlands as it will have to achieve at least the minimum targets of international agreements such as the EU Renewable Energy Directive. Whether the transition will be more ambitious and show a faster development is dependent on the willingness and ability of the Dutch political parties and coalition government to adopt a stronger and more steering role.

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Conclusions

This research aimed to explain why the Netherlands is less successful than Denmark regarding the transition towards renewable energy and wind power development. In this respect, this research focused on the role and interaction of three types of actors. First, the political parties and coalition governments of the Netherlands and Denmark. Second, the business sector of the Netherlands and Denmark with fossil fuel companies such as Royal Dutch Shell, ExxonMobil and Møller-Maersk and companies related to renewable energy such as Vestas and Siemens Wind Power. Third, green movements that are present in the Netherlands and Denmark such as Greenpeace, ‘Stichting Natuur en Milieu’ and ‘VedvarendeEnergi’. Thereby, this research connected energy with the economy, the state and societal forces by showing how these forces determined the development of the transition towards renewable energy. This research was based on a central research question and three sub-questions:

‘Why is the Netherlands less successful than Denmark with respect to the transition towards renewable energy and wind power development?’

1. ‘What is the energy situation in the Netherlands and Denmark?’

2. ‘What is the relationship between energy and the wealth-power structure of the Netherlands and Denmark?’

3. ‘How does the relationship between energy and the wealth-power structure influences the transition towards renewable energy and wind power development in the Netherlands and Denmark?

In order to provide answers to these research questions, this research relied on ‘geopolitical economy theory’ as articulated by Amineh & Guang (2014) and the ‘resource scarcity model’ of Amineh & Houweling (2007). Based on the former, the state-societies of the Netherlands and Denmark can be regarded as ‘capitalist constructs in which the government and the business sector are strongly interdependent. The government relies on the business sector for the creation of wealth, prosperity, social security through employment and government revenues while the business sector is dependent on the government for the establishment of an environment that facilitates the creation of wealth and prosperity. This condominium of state and market is termed: ‘wealth-power structure’ and finds itself at the core of liberal industrial state-societies such as the Netherlands and Denmark. In this respect, the governments of the Netherlands and Denmark are subjected to lateral pressure, the buildup of socio-economic forces that incite them to increase the level of wealth, prosperity and social security for society. Therefore, the government has strong incentives to protect the interests of the business sector and to create an environment that maximizes

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competitiveness. This is because in the current Anglo-Saxon world order, competitiveness enables the business sector to gain access to new markets and resources and to generate wealth and prosperity through international trade. In this respect, energy is of pivotal importance as it serves as the basis for economic activity and hence for the creation of wealth, prosperity and social security in the Netherlands and Denmark. However, since energy is primarily derived from fossil fuel resources in today’s industrial state-societies, scarcity is built into the capitalist system. Therefore, in order to protect the wealth-power structure in the long-run, the Netherlands and Denmark will have to transform their fossil fuel based economies and make the transition towards renewable energy. As explained, this transition is not merely a technical one since it encompasses a shift at the heart of the wealth-power structure. The fossil fuel business sector will have to lose added value and market share and become less important to the wealth-power structure in favor of a newly established renewable energy sector. Therefore, in order to protect its own capitalist interests, the fossil fuel sector has strong incentives to resist the transition towards renewable energy while the renewable energy sector has incentives to support this transition. In addition, being dependent on the business sector, the governments of the Netherlands and Denmark in particular have incentives to protect that parts of the business sector that generate the most wealth, prosperity, social security and government revenues. In this respect, since the government and the business sector are the most important entities regarding the decision-making process, the development of the transition towards renewable energy is heavily influenced by the relative importance of fossil fuel- and renewable energy-sector for the wealth-power structure. Based on this logic, this research formulated two hypotheses:

H1: ‘The wealth-power structure of the Netherlands is more reliant on fossil fuels than the wealth-power structure of Denmark’

H2: ‘Because the wealth-power structure of the Netherlands is more reliant on fossil fuels than the wealth-power structure of Denmark, the Netherlands is less successful regarding the transition towards renewable energy and wind power development.’

With respect to the first hypotheses, this research investigated how important the fossil fuel sector and the renewable energy sector are for the wealth-power structures of the Netherlands and Denmark. Chapter 3 explained that for both the Netherlands and Denmark, the energy sector is very important for the wealth-power structure as it contributes significantly to economic growth, prosperity, government revenues and social security trough employment. However, regarding the relative importance of fossil fuels and renewable energy, the situation in the Netherlands and Denmark is very different. Chapter 3 showed that in the Netherlands, the fossil fuel sector is very important for the wealth-power structure. The presence of natural gas and related companies such as Gasunie and the NAM, a major oil and petrochemical industry with companies such as Royal Dutch Shell and ExxonMobil, a large energy-intensive industry with companies such as Tata Steel and Dow Chemical and competitive coal-fired power plants all contribute greatly to economic growth,

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prosperity, social security and government revenues. In contrast, the economic significance of the renewable energy sector in the Netherlands is very small. There are no major companies related to renewable energy and the sector contributes only a little to economic growth, prosperity, social security and government revenues. In Denmark, both the fossil fuel sector and the renewable energy sector are very important for the wealth-power structure. Both sectors know major companies such as Møller-Maersk, Dong Energy, Vestas and Siemens Wind Power as well as a vast amount of small and medium-sized subcontractors that all contribute greatly to economic growth, prosperity, social security and government revenues. Therefore, as the wealth-power structure of the Netherlands is thus more reliant on fossil fuels than its Danish counterpart, the first hypothesis was verified. With respect to the second hypothesis, this research investigated how the relationship between energy and the wealth-power structure determined the development of the transition towards renewable energy. Subsequently, chapter 4 started by examining what the configuration of influence, interests and interdependencies between the business sector, the government and green movements was and whether this configuration reflected the wealth-power structure of the Netherlands and Denmark. In this respect, chapter 4 showed that the fossil fuel sector of the Netherlands with major companies such as Royal Dutch Shell and Gasunie is very influential as these companies all have established a strong lobby. To continue, as the Dutch coalition governments that ruled between 2001 and 2017 have been dominated by the liberal conservatives of the VVD and the Christian conservatives of the CDA that have strong ties with the business sector, the Dutch government generally focused on protecting the interest of the fossil fuel business sector instead of showing strong support for the transition towards renewable energy. Finally, green movements had little influence on the decision-making process since established green movements such as Greenpeace and ‘Milieudefensie’ faced fierce resistance from the business sector and the government and spontaneous protests and manifestations lacked the leadership and organizational capacity to protect their interests in the political arena. To continue, chapter 4 explained that as Denmark knows a strong fossil fuel- as well as renewable energy-sector that gave birth to major companies such as Møller-Maersk, Dong Energy, Vestas and Siemens Wind power, lateral pressure and lobby efforts are directed towards the interests of both sectors. In addition, aside from the period 2002-2008, the coalition governments of Denmark have generally shown strong support for the transition towards renewable energy and have adopted a steering role to achieve their ambitious objectives. Finally, green movements in Denmark such as Greenpeace and ‘VedvarendeEnergi’ face less resistance from the business sector and government as, with respect to the transition towards renewable energy, their interests are often aligned. Therefore, as both in the Netherlands and Denmark, the configuration of influence, interests and interdependencies between the business sector, the government and green movements reflected the wealth-power structure, chapter 4 then reviewed whether this configuration was translated into energy policy and hence determined the development of the transition towards renewable energy. In this respect, chapter 4 found that in general, policy support

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systems for renewable energy in the Netherlands have been weak, inconsistent and volatile, providing little support for the transition towards renewable energy. The Dutch Energy Agreement clearly shows the influence of fossil fuel lobby and lateral pressure as it contains a strong economic rational and is mainly focused on protecting the interests of incumbent fossil fuel companies. In addition, the Agreement stipulates that the role of the Dutch government is merely to ensure that companies are not affected by the transition towards renewable energy and to facilitate the development of renewable energy by limiting the costs and the risks for investors. Finally, although green movements such as Greenpeace, ‘Stichting Natuur en Milieu’ and ‘Milieudefensie’ participated in the decision-making process, their influence seems limited as the Dutch Energy Agreement focuses primarily on economic growth, employment and competitiveness instead environmental objectives. Therefore, as the Netherlands has not established strong policy support for renewable energy, the development of the transition has been slow and cumbersome over the period 2001-2017. As a result, although wind power development increased from 485 MW to 3304 MW, it currently covers only 11% of the total electricity consumption. To continue, chapter 4 found that in Denmark, energy policy has been very stable and supportive of renewable energy by providing significant subsidies, feed-in tariffs and tax benefits. This created stability and encouraged investors to focus on renewable energy projects. The Danish Energy Agreement shows a strong commitment to the transition towards renewable energy and sets the target of a 100% renewable energy system in 2050. Although the Danish Energy Agreement also focuses on economic growth, employment and competitiveness, the economic is much less dominant than its Dutch counterpart. The Danish Energy Agreement indicates that the Danish government has balanced the interests of the fossil fuel sector, the renewable energy sector, the national interests and environmental considerations by providing strong support for the transition towards renewable energy while making efforts to ensure that the fossil fuel business sector will not disproportionally be affected. As a result of this strong policy support for renewable energy, wind power development increased from 2383 MW in 2001 to 5228 MW in 2016 and currently covers almost 42% of the Danish electricity consumption. Therefore, as the configuration of influence, interests and interdependencies between the business sector, the government and green movements that emanates from the wealth- power structure was translated into energy policy and hence determined the development of the transition towards renewable energy, also the second hypothesis was verified. Based on the verification of both the first and second hypothesis, this research explained that the Netherlands is less successful than Denmark regarding the transition towards renewable energy and wind power development because the wealth-power structure of the Netherlands is more reliant on fossil fuels than the wealth-power structure of Denmark. Finally, with respect to the future, this research expects that the transition towards renewable energy will continue to develop slowly in the future as the Netherlands has to comply with at least the minimum targets of international agreements such as the Renewable Energy Directive of the European Union. Whether the Netherlands will be more

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ambitious than this minimum targets is dependent on the willingness and ability of Dutch political parties and coalition governments to adopt a stronger and more steering role.

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Appendix Interviews

Interview with interviewee 1 (High ranking official at the Energy Research Centre of the Netherlands)

Date: 03-05-2017 Time: 53:13

Speaker 1: Interviewer Speaker 2: Interviewee 1

Speaker 1 Can you introduce yourself and explain your position at ECN?

Speaker 2 My name is (…) and I am the (…) at ECN. I have a background in business administration and during my time as a student I came in contact with issues related to renewable energy and sustainability. During my entire career I have worked on the intersection of the private and public sector. Since I like both worlds, the combination of the two has always been very appealing to me. How to connect the public and private sphere in order to support the transition to renewable energy and a low carbon economy? Questions like these play a central role in my current occupation. I have worked for five years at the Policy Unit of ECN and since late 2015, I am (…). The Policy Unit of ECN was established in the aftermath of the oil crisis of 1973 by former Minister of Economic Affairs Ruud Lubbers as a think-tank. The aim of the Policy Unit was to provide solutions for issues such as energy supply security and alternatives and conduct thorough analyses that could form the basis of new energy policy.

Speaker 1 With respect to renewable energy, the 2020 goals of the Netherlands are to achieve a share of 14% of renewable energy in the energy consumption. For Denmark this is 30%. Can you explain where these objectives are based on and why the objective of the Netherlands is much less ambitious than the objective of Denmark?

Speaker 2 In general, these objectives are a product of an assessment and bargain on a European level about the current energy situation in EU member states and their perceived ability to bring about sustainable change. In this respect, countries that have significant access to hydro power are able to develop their transition towards renewable energy at a faster pace than other countries for example. However, I also believe that there has been intensive political bargaining behind the scenes in Brussel in order for countries to protect their national interest.

Speaker 1 Can you elaborate more on the political bargaining that went down?

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Speaker 2 That would be speculative since I was not present at does negotiations. But as is the case with all EU decision making, the different member-states try to protect their national interest at the negotiation table which produces an assessment of what a certain economy and society can handle. Hence, I think that 14% for 2020 and 16% for 2030 is quite ambitious.

Speaker 1 On May 2th, ‘Nieuwsuur’ announced it was in the possession of an official report saying that the Netherlands lags behind on targets related to a ‘green economy’ that where agreed upon in the ‘Energieakkoord’. In addition, the national energy outlook of the Netherlands states that the target of 14% renewable energy in 2020 is not likely to be met. According to you, what are the reasons for not reaching the targets?

Speaker 2 First, the report of ‘Nieuwsuur’ was mainly about not reaching the economic objectives under the ‘Energieakkoord’. Currently, the contribution of the ‘Energieakkoord’ to the economy through employment and economic development is not according to expectations. Second, regarding the objectives for renewable energy, it will be a close call if the 2020 objectives will be achieved. We think that, with the existing agreements, it is still possible but everything has to be on our side and we need a little bit of luck. There are many reasons for the slow development of the transition towards RE in the Netherlands. In comparison with Denmark, in the aftermath of the oil crisis the Danish made renewable energy a core objective and central feature of future policy knowing that they own little fossil fuel reserves. In the past decades, the Danish have kept their ambitious alive and have invested significant resources in the transition towards renewable energy. In summary, they started with stimulating renewable energy at an earlier stage and benefit from that now. Another reason for the Danish success is related to social dynamics in the Danish society. The Danish tend to think more in the interest of the community. As a result, they developed combined heat and power (CHP) systems for example. In addition, the resistance of the Danish people against developments related to renewable energy is less substantial. Something that the Danish government has done really good is that, through state support, they allowed the agricultural sector to focus on sustainability. This formed the basis for the nowadays powerful Danish wind power industry. State led industrial politics were largely responsible for this success. In the Netherlands, the story is best explained by the metaphor of the merchant and the vicar. On the one hand, Dutch policy makers state that they want to support renewable energy and sustainability while on the other, they are very reluctant to take decisive action as this costs a significant amount of money. They appear to be very ambitious but in reality this is not the case. In addition, the Dutch political structure and incumbent regime of vested interests is very strong. In particular as the Netherlands is home to an extensive energy intensive industry, alternatives such as renewable energy are seen as a threat to their interests and existence. This logic has played a central role in the development of the Dutch transition towards renewable energy, although I can see it changing slowly.

Speaker 1 Before the , Denmark was almost entirely dependent on fossil fuels, in particular oil and gas. You just explained that the Danish government was able to change its course radically by empowering the government with a strong mandate to steer and manage energy related issues in order to start the transition towards renewable energy and sustainability. According to you, what does the role of the government in the Netherlands look like? How does the government and the

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business sector, mainly the energy intensive industries, interact with each other? How would you characterize the level of influence of both parties?

Speaker 2 I think that in the Netherlands, the natural gas reserves which provided stable and cheap energy prices have been partly responsible for the development of large ports and aviation network which in turn attracted major industries, mainly in the chemical sector. Over time, this has resulted in common and intertwined interest of the government and the business sector. As long as their interests are common interests, things work out well. For example, regarding the natural gas production in Groningen, it worked out for a very long period of time. When the production of natural gas led to small earthy quakes and the interest of the government and the business sector were no longer aligned, the joined venture of state and market collapsed. I expected that there is a big chance that this will also happen with respect to the energy intensive industry in the Netherlands. For decades, the heavy industry, mainly located in Rijnmondt, Schiphol, Terneuzen and Delfsijl has been the powerhouse of the Dutch economy. If, from an environmental and sustainability perspective, it is no longer possible to continue on the current path, it will be very interesting to see whose interest will prevail and who will have the most influence in the end: the ‘vicar or the merchant’. Another factor that is important in this respect is that in the past, the Danish have combined development aid with economic incentives. For example in India, the Danish built large wind parks to provide energy, but with Danish products. This was more or less a political coincidence as the Danish were not at all ashamed of doing that. In the Netherlands, one of the ruling parties during this period, the PvdA, was not in favor of copying the Danish approach based on moral and ethical arguments. The dominant opinion in the Netherlands at that time was that developmental aid and trade should not interfere with each other. Many Dutch companies that were in favor of this approach were not allowed to be involved in the development programs of the Dutch government. The benefits of the Danish approach are two-folded. First, they gained access to new markets abroad and second, they learned how to export highly technical products such as wind turbines. This is particularly important as the development of the wind turbine industry goes at a very fast pace. The Danish had time to build a track-record for their products. Especially in the early years, exporting highly technical products such as wind turbines abroad was not without risks. For example, when something went wrong you will have to go all the way to India to find a solution for the problems. In particular these risks prevented many Dutch companies to invest in projects abroad. For example Stork lost a lot of money in projects in the United States in the 1990s. For Danish companies these risks were less import due to extensive public aid and governmental support. In other words, they were able to enjoy the benefits without taking the risks as this was done by the Danish government. The Dutch did not connect industrial politics and energy politics like the Danish did. Moreover, the Dutch still struggle in this respect. For example, the ‘Nieuwsuur’ report also focused attention on entrepreneurs in the water turbine sector and argued that the Dutch government in general states that it is a strong supporter of sustainability and renewable energy but the moment that projects need extensive financial support and a strong policy, things do not work out as promised. This is not specifically true for energy issues but goes for various kind of issues were the Dutch government is involved. Although the Dutch government states it is very progressive, they refuse to take decisive action when their ‘inner merchant’ is awakened by the financial burden that is related to their expressed course of action. This means that the Dutch keep struggling with issues related to sustainability and renewable energy.

Speaker 1 So in conclusion, the Dutch government is, in contrast to its Danish counterpart, not able or not

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willing to control the ‘merchant’ in favor of the ‘vicar’ and develop a strong, long-term policy course in order to adequately support the Dutch energy transition.

Speaker 2 I think the Danish were smarter in this respect indeed.

Speaker 1 As with most policies, the Dutch energy policies such as for example the ‘Energieakkoord’, are a product of the interaction between various different stakeholders. Can you explain which parties in particular were most influential and powerful in protecting their interest through the Dutch energy policies?

Speaker 2 Primarily, the Dutch ‘Energieakkoord’ is a reaction to the topic that we just debated; the discontinuity of the Dutch energy policy. With the ambitious goals that we have, also with respect to economic and industrial goals, a range of stakeholders tried to take matters into their own hands. If the government is not able or willing to take decisive action, we have to do it ourselves. This statement, initially made by a relative small group of people with ambitions triggered various stakeholders that wanted to be involved in the new policy initiative in order to protect their interests and find a common strategy to achieve the 2020 and 2023. Through the ‘Energieakkoord’, 47 involved stakeholders provided the Dutch government with a clear agenda. Until now, a few agreements, such as the development of wind parks in the , have been quite successful. Stakeholders and entrepreneurs from the business sector have clearly advised the government to be heavily involved in the first stages of the development. The role of the government, they argued, should be to prepare the location which will be subjected to a tender and to provide clear information about environmental issues and limits to the project. This will reduce the risks and costs for the developers substantially and will increase their willingness to invest in such projects. After the early stage, the technical development, construction and exploitation of the wind farms will be done by the business sector. This is something that we did very cleverly in the Netherlands. Actors from abroad, even the Danish have closely followed these developments.

Speaker 1 Where do you think the interest of the business sector to take matters into their own hands primarily stemmed from?

Speaker 2 I cannot recall the exact incentives but it is always a combination of multiple factors that is important in this respect. For example, the willingness to be part of an initiatives of Erik Liessen en Ron Wit from ‘Stichting Natuur & Milieu’ and the fact that the Social Economic Council (SER) appointed a new chairman who had a background at Consulting at McKinsey and was more progressive in this respect. Factors such as these are impossible to control.

Speaker 1 Do you think it is not true that the Dutch business sector, mainly the energy intensive industry, feared that their interest would be threatened if they were not involved in the decision making process while the 2020 target were approaching rapidly?

Speaker 2 I do not believe that, the ‘Energieakkoord’ is not only an agreement about renewable energy but also an agreement about efficiency and economic goals for example. I think that the energy efficiency

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goals of the EU were an important reason for several energy intensive industries to take a proactive stand through the ‘Energieakkoord’. In general, the interests of the industry are protected by covenants with the government. The last couple of years it was obvious that with the established covenants, the European 2020 goals will not be achieved. For the energy intensive industry, the ‘Energieakkoord’ was a means to be involved in the decision-making process and to work together to share the gains and the burden and to achieve the 2020 targets. Because for the energy intense industry, it started from the efficiency goals, it is hard to determine whether the business sector used this to get a favorable deal on all other issues of the ‘Energieakkoord’. Developers of renewable energy were primarily concerned about the discontinuity in the Dutch policy and support. Companies that were dependent on subsidy and other financial or political support, simply because Re technology is more expensive than incumbent energy techniques, participated in the ‘Energieakkoord’ because they hoped to enforce a stabile energy policy. Luckily, the Minister of Economic Affairs at the time, Henk Kamp took the initiative of the ‘Energieakkoord’ very seriously and was dedicated to support it. This is merely a coincidence, another Minister could easily have another or more moderate view on the same matter. However, economics and politics are closely interrelated regarding the Dutch energy policy.

Speaker 1 To what extent do you think that the natural gas reserves in the Groningen Province and the natural gas sector have hampered the transition towards renewable energy in the Netherlands?

Speaker 2 I think the natural gas reserve and the business sector that is involved in the production of the gas are two separate things. First, I certainly think that the natural gas reserves of the Netherlands have hampered the transition towards renewable energy as the production of natural gas makes an important contribution to the Dutch economy and the government budget. Second, the presence of natural gas provided a cheap and stabile energy supply which attracted several industries. I will not argue that these industries have hampered the transition towards renewable energy directly but certainly, their interest were (and are) taken into account. With respect to the ‘gas roundabout’ there exist several wild tales and the famous saying:’ when you open the door at the Ministry of Economic Affairs, you can smell oil and gas’. I think that, although this might be true, or at least used to be true, I also see enlightened people inside the natural gas industry. In addition, I think that everybody inside this industry is now aware that the natural gas reserve will be depleted at one point and that investing in alternatives is necessary. I also think that the earth quakes have contributed in this respect. The presence of natural gas has hampered various developments, not only the transition to renewable energy. However, it also brought significant benefits to the Netherlands.

Speaker 1 To what extent do you think the oil sector and the oil intensive industries have hampered the transition towards renewable energy in the Netherlands?

Speaker 2 I think that it is obvious that the business sector has an interest in the national energy policy. I believe it is not a secret that there is a very close link between the industry and the economic policy of the Netherlands. However, I think that this can work both ways. Off course this close link hampers the transition towards renewable energy when the business sector is not willingly to cooperate out of their own interests. I think the business sector is fully aware of the situation, also with respect to climate change, but if you speak with their representatives, they argue that the world in which they

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operate, with shareholders and a certain context and paradigm, only provides them with limited abilities to change their course of action. However, I can also see positive changes in this respect. It is good to see that the business sector also recognize that sustainability provides new business opportunities. For example the financial sector regards sustainability as a new investment option for pension funds and also several banks are focusing attention on sustainability issues. Moreover, also the industry recognizes that they can make money with sustainability, the time of talking and not acting is over is you ask me. Many companies are aware that something has to change.

Speaker 1 To what extent do you think that the transition towards renewable energy is a threat to the competitiveness of Dutch companies and industries?

Speaker 2 What might be interesting to investigate, and what I think is interesting myself, is the discussion around the attempts of PPG and Karl Heinz to buy Akzo Nobel and Unilever. On the one hand you see several more enlightened company executives that want to stay independent and align their interest with the national interest of the Netherlands and contribute to the strength of the national economy. On the other hand, these executives are restrained by the Anglo-Saxon model and the power of the share-holders. This situation raises all kinds of questions, for example about the benefits of some form of protectionary measures against unwanted or hostile acquisitions. In this respect, I think we will have to make some progress and to find solutions. As long as companies are involved in international trade I think we will have to find solution and make agreements on an international level. This is because as long as sustainable businesses are not able to compete with conventional products and production modes, countries are not likely to establish serious environmental standards as this will lead to higher costs and economic risks as shareholders tend to look for places with the highest profits. Although a sustainable business sector will likely be the superior in the long- run, in the short-run it will lead to problems. I am worried that this logic will also hamper the transition towards renewable energy in the Netherlands. Companies will try to avoid a situation similar to the situation of Akzo Nobel at all costs.

Speaker 1 Do you think this is going to change as the development of the first subsidy independent wind farms have been announced?

Speaker 2 I think that is a different topic. In the current economic environment, Dong expects that a new turbine, that will have to be developed in the coming 8 years, could me manufactured and operated without the need for subsidies. There are a lot of uncertainties and assumptions in this expectation and as is made clear, it will take time. This is a different question that the transition towards sustainability in the Netherlands. If the Dutch want to implement processes such as the circular economy and achieve a low carbon footprint, someone will have to pay the costs since these costs are not incorporated in a scheme such as ETS. If the financial problem is not resolved, companies are simply unable to proactively engage in the transition as they will lose their competitiveness and or make themselves vulnerable to their shareholders. For the Dutch economy, this problem will have to be resolved. It might be possible to make an agreement and ask for cooperation from the bakery on the corner of the street but for a company like Dow Chemical this is an illusion.

Speaker 1 Until now, we primarily discussed the role and the influence of the business sector and the

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government. How would you assess the influence of ‘green movements’ such as Greenpeace and green political movements such as ‘Milieudefensie’ and ‘GroenLinks’? To what extent can we speak of a level playing field? Are these organizations able to protect their interest and influence energy policy in the Netherlands?

Speaker 2 That depends on their own strategy and choices. Some organizations chose to participate in the ‘Energieakkoord’ and some stayed away. Greenpeace and ‘Stichting Milieu’ have chosen to take a seat at the table in order to be able to exert influence. Nowadays in the Netherlands, organizations like these are taken seriously by the business sector and the government, in particular because these organizations have significant public support. In the Netherlands, there is relatively a high density of environmental organizations that are well organized and willing to participate in the decision-making process. These organizations are no longer trying to obstruct all decisions that are made by the government or business sector but are actively trying to be involved in the decision-making process and trying to think within the present context. Thus, if these organizations are targeting a certain firm or initiating a boycott against its products, this firm will likely have a significant problem as these organizations have substantial (public) influence. Their role is to be a thorn in the flesh, and when a thorn starts to sting, you will have to do something about it. How this is playing out in Denmark I don’t know. Denmark is a really friendly country so I suspect that it could be easier to get certain stakeholders at the negotiating table. In addition, Denmark knows a community oriented culture with a high degree of social cohesion. This is something that went wrong in the Netherlands. The Danish and maybe also the Germans have made a connection between sustainability, economic growth and development and their national identity or at least, community sentiment. This positively affected the transition towards sustainability and renewable energy in those countries. In the Netherlands, we do not perceive energy to be something that was made by the Dutch as we also lack a significant renewable energy industry. There is missing a national sentiment with respect to renewable energy. This means that marketing becomes a whole of a lot harder. The Danish see all those products, such as wind turbines, with a label from their own country. When you know that your neighbors have been involved in the production process, you will likely to be more inclined to purchase those products. Building a indigenous industry for renewable energy products helps in this respect.

Speaker 1 Allright, thank you very much so far, is there something you want add? Something you think I missed in my questions?

Speaker 2 I think there is: the geopolitical dimension. In the Netherlands we are strongly inclined to interfere in global affairs. This also goes for energy politics. In this respect, the Dutch and the Danish are very different. The Danish do not intend to always have a say in things and have generally no strong opinion about international developments. As the Dutch are tangled up in global affairs, it means that their maneuverability has become very limited. For example, it is not a good idea to anger the Saudi’s when you are as energy dependent as we are. I think this is also very important. In addition, the Dutch companies that are involved in the production of natural gas don’t see any problems regarding Russian imports. The Russians have been their greatest friends in the past as they always tended to pay their bills in time. I cannot assess to what extent this hampers the transition towards renewable energy in the Netherlands but I do think that we are hesitant to draw a line and stop with the imports of Russian natural gas. Without these imports, we will not have anything to say regarding

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Russian affairs anymore. We will lose our leverage and influence. Finally, the energy crisis in the 1970s has left us with a big scar that still influences our view on energy related matters.

Speaker 2 I think what you can see now is that in the Dutch government, particular the Ministry of Economic Affairs, is struggling with its role. This is not primarily related to sustainability as it touches on multiple issues such as healthcare for example. However, with respect to energy, major changes in society are needed in which the government has to play a big role. In the past, we were able to establish an extensive gas infrastructure network in only 5 years. However, nowadays the Dutch government is not the central and powerful authority that it used to be. In the current context, the government is not granted with the ability to take radical action. Besides historical developments, technological developments and mainly the democratization of information is very important in this respect. Citizens and the business sector are able to organize themselves and get access to information. The credibility and role of the government are declining while the credibility and the role of peers and science in general are increasing.

Speaker 1 Do you think that in the Netherlands, this process is further advanced compared to other EU member-states?

Speaker 2 In the past I have worked with a colleague from Switzerland for some time. He was very surprised about the cultural difference between Switzerland and the Netherlands. If, in Switzerland, you park your car illegally there is a100% of getting caught because the people in the neighborhood will report you. In the Netherlands, everybody parks their car illegally and if somebody does, Dutch people will mind their own business. The same goes for running a red light. In Switzerland it is not accepted to run a red while in the Netherlands, waiting for a red light while there is no traffic at all is perceived to be stupid. In this respect, Switzerland and Germany probably are relatively similar. ‘Wir schaffen das’ can also end very badly. It is always a combination of factors that decides success or failure. In Germany, they had the opportunity to develop a strong state led ‘Energiewende’ but this was also facilitated by the nuclear disaster of Fukushima. I am not sure that it is fair to say that the Germans simply have a stronger personality than we.

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Interview with Alexander de Roo (Former GroenLinks representative and member of the European Parliament

Date: 12-05-2017 Time: 1.04:31

Speaker 1: Interviewer Speaker 2: Alexander de Roo

Speaker 1 Can you introduce yourself?

Speaker 2 Mijn naam is Alexander de Roo en ik ben op mijn 19e politiek actief geworden met de strijd tegen kernenergie. Bram van der Lek inspireerde me toen met de woorden: ‘de techneuten moeten hun huiswerk over doen’, wat betekende dat kernenergie wellicht toch niet veilig was. Ik studeerde zelf scheikunde in Delft dus dat sprak me erg aan. Toen heb ik in het partijbestuur van de PSP gezeten en in de gemeenteraad in Amsterdam. In 1985 ben ik begonnen met werken in Brussel. Ook heb ik ooit nog een scriptie geschreven bij de TH over de opslag van zonne-energie. Sinds 1988 ben ik ook in mijn werk bezig met duurzame energie toen ik op milieu zat voor de groene fractie in het Europees parlement in Brussel. In 1999 zelf gekozen als Europarlementarier in Brussel voor Groenlinks. Ik heb me ingezegd voor het emissiehandelsysteem. Initieel waren er teveel rechten uitgegeven en met inmening van de econonomische crisis heeft dit ook niet goed gefunctioneerd. Daarnaast ook nog gelobbyed tegen kernenergie.

Speaker 1 De doelstellingen voor 2020 en 2023 zijn 14% en 16% duurzame energie in de energie consumptie. Voor Denemarken is dit 30% voor 2020, de Denen zitten al op 29,2% terwijl Nederland momenteel niet verder komt dan 5.8%. Wat zijn volgens u de redenen waarom we in Nederland niet zo ambiteus zijn mbt duurzame energie als de ons omringende landen?

Speaker 2 Ik denk dat de hoofdreden is geweest dat we een wispelturig beleid hebben gevoerd. Er zijn genoeg partijen die het wel willen, ook de PvdA bijvoorbeeld. Er is in het verleden wel op ingezet maar vervolgens verdween die partij weer uit de regering en werd het beleid weer omgegooid. Dat zie je bijvoorbeeld bij het bedrif Paardeveld die windmolens produceerden en heel groot hadden kunnen worden, net zoals Vestas, als Nederland een consequent beleid had gehad. Ik denk dat de hoofdreden is geweest dat de politiek het niet wilde. Dit had met name te maken met de grote invloed van de multinationals op het regeringsbeleid zoals Shell enzovoorts die het allemaal afgeremd hebben. Bepaalde partijen zoals de VVD en het CDA luisteren heel nauwkeurig naar wat Shell wilde en pasten hun beleid daar op aan. In Denemarken is dit wel gelukt. Daar was al in de initiele fase een zeer groot enthousiasme voor windmolens. De industrie heeft dit opgepakt. Dit enthousiasme is blijven bestaan ondanks die 8 jaar dat Rasmussen dwars zat. Partijbreed werd aanvaard dat windenergie te toekomst is. In Nederland hebben we nog steeds geen concensus. Het Energieakkoord is er alleen maar gekomen omdat die Europese verplichting er ligt, anders had Nederland helemaal niks gedaan en zaten we nog steeds op 2 of 3%. Maar nu gaat het roer langzaam wel op, met name door het verdrag van Parijs en ook domweg door de economie, windenergie begint goedkoper te worden dan de fossiele alternatieven. Zonne-energie is in de tropische landen al 3 cent per kw/h. Windenergie offshore is er al voor 5 cent per kw/h. Het is economische de beste

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optie geworden nu. Al is de allerbeste optie nog steeds energie besparen. Daar kan je geld mee winnen in feite. Dat besef begint nu ook langzaam te komen, ook in Nederland. Dit is wel dankzij het Energieakkoord. De bedrijven hebben de kans gehad om het vrijwillig te doen, nu krijgen ze een verplichting.

Speaker 1 U bent optimistisch over de economische rendabelheid van duurzame energie. Uit de informatie die ik tot me heb genomen blijkt dat, ondanks dat de eerste windparken voor 0 subsidie zijn aangekondigd, dit nog wel een tijd kan duren en gebasseerd is op veel aannames.

Speaker 2 Ja, maar aan de andere kant, de politieke eis was dat het 40% goedkoper zou moeten dan nu in 2020, en dit doel is al behaald. Dus die prijzen gaan nog steeds naar beneden. Interessant is dat de discussie in Denemarken andes is. Daar testen ze al veel grotere windmolens uit, zowel Siemans als Vestas. Windmolens genereren 2 tot de macht 3 meer energie ten aanzien van de grootte van de wiek. Dus 8 keer zoveel energie als de wieken 2 keer zo groot worden. Daarom worden die dingen steeds groter. Ze worden zo groot dat ze in gebieden moeten worden neergezet met heel weinig mensen, die hebben wij in Nederland alleen voor de kust. Andere landen hebben daarvoor meer geschikte gebieden in woestijnen bijvoorbeeld of andere plekken waar weinig mensen wonen.

Speaker 1 We zitten nog ver weg van het behalen van de doelstellingen van het Energieakkoord. Wat zijn volgens u de redenen voor het niet behalen van de doelstellingen? Heeft dit ook vooral te maken met wisselvallig beleid?

Speaker 2 De koers is te laat gestard. Pas in september 2013 is het Energieakkoord geslotenen werd wind op zee pas flink gestimuleerd en gingen oude kolencentrales dicht. Dat was natuurlijk niet ideaal, er gaat heel veel subsidie naar biomassa en zoveel zoden aan de dijk zet dat niet. Er is niet consequent ingezet op wind en zon. Iemand van EZ had toen de opdracht om zonne-energie te promoten maar ze geloofde er zelf niet in. Dat is illustratief voor hoe EZ er in 2010 instond. En nog steeds is zon nog ondergeschoven, terwijl het potentieel ook in Nederland extensief is. We hebben nog even de tijd aangezien december 2020 ook 2020 is. Energiebesparing is en blijft de helft van het verhaal, eindelijk wordt dit nu serieus genomen. We zullen de 14% niet halen maar wel in de buurt kome. Europa als geheel haalt het wel. De deal in 2007 in de Europese Unie we gaan voor 20% in 2020: daar is informeel overleg geweest tussen Merkel Blair en Chiraq. De laatste wilde niet 20% hernieuwbaar maar 33% hiernieuwbaar + kernenergie. Blair en Merkel waren toen tegen (ver voor Fukushima, 2007). De afspraak voor 20% energiebesparing was in eerste instantie niet hard, pas toen een Deens bedrijf heeft gezegd dat men belang had bij energiebesparing en opriep tot een formele wet heeft men dit in 2011 formeel gemaakt. Nederland loopt achter maar ik denk wel dat we nu serieus bezig zijn en dat het nu onomkeerbaar is.

Speaker 2 Denemarken heeft gewoon wèl subsidie gegeven. Daarnaast hebben ze ingegrepen achter de politieke voordeur door te zeggen dat in 2018 men geen oliegestooke huisverwarming meer mag hebben. In Nederland zou dit niet gebeuren.

Speaker 1 Het Energieakkoord heeft 47 ondertekenaars, van Greenpeace tot VNPI. Welke van deze partijen die betrokken zijn geweest binnen het Energieakkoord en binnen Energiebeleid in Nederland in het

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algemeen zijn het best in staat geweest om hun belangen te vertegenwoordigen en het beleid te beinvloeden?

Speaker 2 Dat was eigenlijk 1 man, Ron de Wit van Natuur en Milieu. Die heeft Greenpeace meegekregen door flink in te zetten op wind op zee en het sluiten van die oude kolencentrales. Mijn eigen club, de Waddenvereniging heeft niet meegedaan, het ging niet ver genoeg. Ook Diederik Samson heeft hieron een rol gespeelt. Hij heeft zich ingezet voor ‘hernieuwbaar’ en daarmee financiering vrij gemaakt. Het is niet enkel een spontaan energieakkoord maar ook de politiek die daar wel degelijk ingegrepen heeft en gezorgd heeft dat het geld er was. Toen begon er iets, dat heeft ervoor gezorgd dat we nu zonne-energie hebben. Omdat dit vol gehouden is ging de prijs omlaag en werd zonne-energie een goed alternatief. In Denemarken heeft men windenergie een kans gegeven door hun consequente beleid

Speaker 1 U schrijft dat success vooral toe aan politieke figuren, zoals in dit geval bijv. Diederik Samson? Juiste man op de juiste plaats?

Speaker 2 Ja, dus niet de economie maar wel degelijk de politiek is hier leidend

Speaker 1 Hoe zit het in dit geval dan met de invloed van de markt? Van shell van de gas sector en de oliesector?

Speaker 2 Die hebben een remmende functie. Het interessante is dat Shell dus aardags gebruikt om dat om te zetten in schone benzine en schone diesel. Shell heeft daar veel in geinvesteerd terwijl auto’s prima op aardgas kunnen rijden. De grote bedrijven blijven vasthouden aan hun positie, zij hebben het distributienetwerk en de naamsbekendheid en niet de bereidheid om in te zetten op hernieuwbaar. Toen ik studeerde in Delft gingen de meeste mensen van de opleiding Scheikunde toch bij Shell werken. Shell had een hele stevige vinger in de pap en een hele grote invloed in Nederland, en ook Engeland.

Speaker 1 Zowel sterke figuren en een leidende rol van de politiek maar ook zeer sterke en invloedrijke bedrijven. In hoeverre denkt u dat Nederland wat meer richting dat Angelsaksische model is opgegaan dan omringende Europese landen zoals Duitsland & Denemarken en meer macht heeft gegeven aan de markt?

Speaker 2 Toen we bezig waren met het ETS systeem toen wilde de industrie niet, nu zweren ze erbij. Aanvankelijk was men tegen. Men is tegen vernieuwing tenzij het niet anders kan. De industrie is nooit de initiatiefnemer. Daarnaast heeft ook de milieubeweging ook enkel maar ‘nee’ geroepen. We zijn tegen maar zeggen niet hoe het wel moet en we bemoeien ons daar niet tegenaan. Recent is dit pas veranderd door het opkomen van een nieuwe generatie die steld dat men meer het heft in eigen hand moet nemen. Die houding is sterk veranderd. Daarom heeft Greenpeace in Nederland zijn hoofd uitgestoken en we gaan het Energieakkoord steunen ook correspondeerde het niet met hun idealen.

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Speaker 1 Vorige week was er een documentaire te zien waarin CEO’s van Nederlandse bedrijven een reis ondernamen naar Spitsbergen. Aan het eind van die trip riepen ze min of meer de overheid op om nu eindelijk echt iets te gaan doen aan klimaatverandering. Hoe ziet u de interactie tussen de markt en de overheid in dit geval?

Speaker 2 Bedrijven schakelen om van baggeren naar het plaatsen en vervoeren van onderdelen voor offshore windparken. Banken worden onder druk gezet om niet meer in fossil te investeren maar in hernieuwbaar en besparing. Het is niet ‘de’ overheid of ‘de’ markt maar dit loopt in elkaar over. Er zijn samenwerkingsverbanden tussen NGO’s en de industrie die samen aan iets trekken bijvoorbeeld. Vroeger was dit niet zo.

Speaker 2 In Nederland moet het altijd goedkoop zijn. We zijn goed in handel. In Denemarken en in andere Scandinavische landen moeten dingen goed zijn, moeten dingen kwaliteit hebben. Wij gaan voro goedkoop en snel en winst. In Denemarken draait het om kwaliteit en degelijkheid. De macht van de koopman en de dominee is anders in Nederland dan in Denemarken. Ze hadden ook geen Shell, hun grootste bedrijf was Maersk en tegenwoordig hebben ze Vestas. Wij hebben altijd meer grote multinationals gehad die op de rem hebben gestaan en nu pas langzaam om gaan. Shell en Total zijn de enige oliebedrijven die een rol weggelegd zien voor electrisch rijden bijvoorbeeld.

Speaker 1 In hoeverre heeft de Duitse of Deense overheid daar veel sterker in geweest is en dat de Nederlandse overheid veel afwachtender is geweest en de grote bedrijven de energiemix hebben laten bepalen?

Speaker 2 Ja, in Duitsland heeft de politiek geleverd. In Nederland zegt de politiek dat de markt het moet doen en de markt wacht gewoon af. Zonder dwang gebeurt er in Nederland niks. Duitsland en Denemarken hebben gezorgd dat wind en zon zo goedkoop is geworden en vervolgens is deze ontwikkeling gesteund door de Europese doelstellingen en ook het verdrag van Parijs. De techniek is er nu, het is enkel nog een kwestie van het tempo van de transitie. Het gaat gebeuren, de economie is al zo ingericht dat het voordeliger is om te besparen en hernieuwbaar te nemen in plaats van fossiel maar het gaat nog wel langzaam. Dat hangt voor een deel van de politiek af en voor een deel van het bedrijfsleven. Bedrijven als Tesla kunnen de transtie versnellen. Tesla doet het zelf, oplaadpunten intalleren bijvoorbeeld

Speaker 1 U heeft al aangegeven dat een milieudefensie en een Greenpeace vroeger vooral tegen waren en nu bereid zijn om mee te praten en met alternatieven te komen. Hoe groot schat u de invloed van dit soort organisaties op het energiebeleid in Nederland?

Speaker 2 De negatieve acties hebben natuurlijk dingen tegengehouden, de kerncentrales van Lubbers bijvoorbeeld. Maar dat ze iets positiefs hebben neergezet is bijvoorbeeld wind op zee. Dat hebben ze actief uitgedragen naar hun eigen achterban.

Speaker 1 In hoeverre denkt u dat de energietransitie in Nederland een bedrijging vormt voor de concurrentiepositie van het Nederlandse bedrijfsleven?

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Speaker 2 We hebben een grote fossiele sector, en als ze niet snel omschakelen hebben ze een probleem. Ik heb wel het idee dat ze inmiddels door hebben dat ze echt iets moeten veranderen. Ze hebben nog wel vaak het idee dat alles met CCS opgelost kan worden bijvoorbeeld. Ze zullen ook gewoon domweg energie moeten gaan besparen en op hernieuwbaar in gaan zetten. Niet denken dat er één oplossing is voor het probleem. Duurzame energie en onze fossiel bedrijven hoeven geen tegenstelling te zijn. Ze hebben het begrepen. Als ze te laat omschakelen hebben ze een probleem. Maar als ze meegaan in de transitie......

Speaker 1 In hoeverre denkt u dat geopolitiek een rol speelt ten aanzien van de Nederlandse energietransitie?

Speaker 2 Nederland is wel getroffen door de olieboycot van 1973. Maar voor ons geld eerder dat vrijhandel heel belangrijk is. Voor Denemarken is dit hetzelfde. Nederland en Denemarken zijn in het verleden structureel opgekomen voor vrijhandel terwijl andere landen protectionistisch zijn geweest. Dat is denk ik belangrijker dan geopolitiek. Zo groot zijn we niet en dat weten we ook wel.

Speaker 2 Het gaat de goeie kant op maar het kan sneller, sterke lobby van fossiele sector. VVD heeft ook heel lang geroepen dat ze kernenergie wilden. We hebben nog geen klimaatwet maar er is brede concencus dat er wat moet gebeuren.

Speaker 1 Zijn er nog onderwerpen waar we niet aan geraakt hebben en die wel heel belangrijk zijn?

Speaker 2 Ja nogmaals, nu moet er consequent beleid gevoerd worden, niet weer iets anders maar volhouden. In Duitsland bijvoorbeeld zijn veel meer proeven bezig waarbij waterstof met CO2 kan worden omgezet in aardgas bijvoorbeeld. We hebben de infrastructure al. In Denemarken en Duitsland zijn er 100 proefprojecten waar bijvoorbeeld Audi in investeerd in Duitsland. In Nederland lopen we daar ook achter. Dat is omdat er geen snel geld mee te verdienen is. In Nederland zijn er geen grote namen te vinden in de hernieuwbare sector. Geen Tesla geen Siemens geen Vestas Daarnaast, een locaal initiatief voor windenergie hier om de hoek wilde windmolens neerzetten die in Nederland geproduceerd werden. De Triodosbank wilde dit echter niet financieren. Tegen hun zin zijn die mensen naar de Rabobank gegaan en toen is het wel gelukt. Je ziet dus hoe raar de wereld in elkaar zit. Eneco hadden ze ook gevraagd om hulp. Eneco heeft toen te kennen gegeven aan de kust veel meer winst te kunnen maken, 10-14% en geen 7-8%. Het gaat om snel geld. De economische rationaliteit is heel sterk. In Denemarken is dat anders. Ambtelijk is er ook een probleem in Nederland. Hier bijvoorbeeld zijn heel veel scholen voor gehandicapte kinderen die moeten vervoerd worden door busjes die prima op electriciteit zouden kunnen reiden. De lokale gemeente heeft nu in de eisen gezet dat ze minimaal 300 km zouden moeten kunnen rijden, deze busjes kunnen dat net niet. Maar ze zouden tussendoor prima kunnen opladen. Het is al goedkoper om electrische busjes aan te schaffen maar ze durven niet.

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Interview Siward Zomer (Director at ODE Decentraal)

Date: 12-05-2017 Time: 1:57:12

Spreker 1: Interviewer Spreker 2: Siward Zomer

Spreker 2 Afgelopen 15 jaar, in de tijd van de opkomst van het neoliberalisme, de markt moet het doen en is prima in staat om het te doen. Maar wat je ziet is dat de markt het niet oppakt. De markt klaagt dan over overheidsbeleidt etc. Maar blijkbaar kunnen ze gigantische internationale verdragen zoals TTIP voor elkaar krijgen maar op nationaal niveau lukt het ze niet om duurzame energie van de grond te krijgen.

Spreker 1 Kunt u zichzelf en uw positie binnen ODE Decentraal introduceren?

Spreker 2 Ik ben bestuurder van de Europese federatie van energiecooperaties, Rescoop EU. De branchevereniging die lobbyed voor een betere positie van energiecooperaties in de energiemarkt. In korte tijd zijn we uitgegroeid van 8 naar 1500 cooperatie en inmiddels vertegenwoordigen we een half miljoen burgers in Europe. In Nederland ben ik directeur van ODE Decentraal, de branchevereniging van alle energiecooperaties in Nederland en diens belangen behartigd en vertegendwoordigd in Den Haag. Daarnaast ben ik voorzitter van de Windvogel, een van de grootste cooperaties in Nederland qua ledenaantal, niet qua productie. Daarnaast heb ik in het verleden Rescoop NL opgericht ten tijde dat ODE niet zo goed functioneerde. Een nieuwe club naast ODE zou kunnen werken maar ODE ging beter functioneren en Rescoop NL richt zich heel specifiek op het ondersteunen van onze leden bij projectontwikkeling, grote wind en zon projecten. In mijn vrije tijd ben ik hier in Watergraafsmeer nog bestuurder van een energiecooperatie die de warmte van de data centers van Science Park wil gebruiken voor de warme van zo’n 2500 huishoudens.

Spreker 1 De energietransitie in Nederland is een politieke transitie, ,een machtsverschuiving.

Spreker 2 Mijn punt is altijd dat iedereen groene energie kan maken maar of het dan echt duurzaam is dat weet ik niet. Shell kan ook groene energie maken maar dan veranderen de machtsverhoudingen niet. Het is nog steeds niet duurzaam want de zeggeschap over geldstromen en over die energiestromen zit nog steeds bij ‘anoniem’ kapitaal, en kapitaal heeft geen moreel dus dat is ook niet te sturen. Als je echt wat wil als gemeenschap en je zeggeschap terug wil krijgen moet je dat democratiseren.

Spreker 1 Ik heb begrepen dat dat ook het doel is van ODE Decentraal?

Spreker 2 Ja, wij vinden dat energie een soort ‘common good’ is dat in democratische handen moet zijn. Energie is zo’n belangrijk essentieel onderdeel van je maatschappij. Als je dat beheert heb je ook heel veel macht. Vroeger zat dat bij de staat totdat dit in een relatief korte periode werd verkocht aan

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buitenlandse partijen. Dus een hele peiler van je economie en je maatschappij hebben we vergeven aan de markt. Dat wil ook niet zeggen dat het in goede handen is bij de staat. De staat is een overheidsorgaan en die moet voorzien in de behoeftes van veiligheid en zekerheid maar die moet niet direct intervenieren in de lokale behoefte van mensen. Dit moeten bedrijven doen die democratisch georganiseerd zijn. Op kleine schaal en direct zeggeschap over onderwerpen. Wij gaan niet propageren dat er een revolutie moet komen maar we gaan het gewoon doen doormiddel van cooperaties. We gaan gewoon beginnen want in de economie kun je al ondernemen dus je kan gewoon heel langzaam verandering bewerkstelligen.

Spreker 1 Hoe vertegenwoordigen jullie specifiek de belangen van energiecooperaties?

Spreker 2 Ik zit veel in Den Haag en probeer daar constant dingen voor elkaar te krijgen, onderzoek of geld vrij te krijgen om die sector te versterken. Onder het mom van een gelijk speelveld. Als je zegt het is een vrije markt en een lokaal initiatief die moet concurreren met een internationaal bedrijf is dat dan een gelijk speelveld? Of zorg je ervoor dat de duurzame sector een stapje omhoog komt zodat je meer een gelijk speelveld creeert?

Spreker 1 Wie zijn nou de belangrijkste spelers binnen het huidige speelveld met betrekking tot energie?

Spreker 2 Dat zijn toch wel de grote vijf, Nuon, Essent, Delta, Eneco, hoewel in mindere mate dan vroeger. Daarnaast hebben Shell, de NAM en de gassector ook veel te zeggen. Je merkt dat via lobby en in de organisatie dat ze dingen tegenhouden, voornamelijk op Europees niveau. We zijn nu bezig om de energy cooperatives gedifinieerd te krijgen. Als je een gelijk speelveld wil krijgen moet je wel gedifinieerd zijn. Markten mogen SMI’s ook anders behandelen dan internationale bedrijven. Andersoortige bedrijven mag je andersoortig behandelen zodat ze een gelijke toegang krijgen tot de markt. Daarom proberen we onszelf nu te definieren in Europese wetgeving zodat we andersoortig behandeld kunnen gaan worden. Dat moeten we echt met hand en tand bevechten om dat voor elkaar te krijgen.

Spreker 1 In hoeverre faciliteert de Nederlandse overheid een dergelijk gelijk speelveld?

Spreker 2 Je ziet nu gemeentes dit al doen en die zeggen als jij windmolens bouwen dan moet je dat op deze manier doen. De cooperaties voldoen dan precies aan die voorwaarden zodat het wat makkelijk wordt voor ze. Sommige gemeentes wijzen gewoon hun eigen grond aan. We zijn nu bezig met de Nederlandse overheid om een ontwikkelfonds op te zetten. De grote bedrijven hebben vrij makkelijk kapitaal voor ontwikkeling tot hun beschikking. Een kleine cooperatie die net start heeft dat niet. Daarom werken ze heel veel met vrijwilligers. Hierdoor lijkt het alsof ze heel professioneel zijn maar ze hebben gewoon geen kapitaal tot hun beschikking. Kennis kun je altijd inkopen als je maar geld hebt.

Spreker 1 Mis je daarin een sterkere rol van een overheid?

Spreker 2 Het begint nu steeds meer te komen en te dagen dat je de energietransitie niet voor elkaar krijgt

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zonder die burger. Waar in Duitsland en Denemarken de energietransitie echt een burgerbeweging was heeft hier de Nederlandse overheid op een gegeven moment de keuze gemaakt voor de markt. Het is begonnen met energiecooperaties, de Windvogel is 25 jaar oud, maar toen kwam er meer geld beschikbaar en kwamen er subsidies en moest de markt het doen. De markt liep net wat sneller dan de cooperaties waardoor deze de concurrentiestrijd verloren met als gevolg dat er heel veel weerstand is tegen windenergie. In Denemarken hebben ze op een gegeven moment ingegrepen. De markt ging het daar doen en er kwam heel veel NIMBY respons, rond 1999 hebben ze ingegrepen door te zeggen dat er alleen nog windenergie mocht worden geimplementeerd als de lokale cooperatie werd meegenomen, voor minimaal 20%. In Nederland hebben ze dat gewoon laten gaan. Het begint wel weer langzaam te komen, we zitten nu nog maar op 5.8%.

Spreker 1 Waarom denkt u dat we onze doelstellingen van 2020, zowel economisch als duurzame energiedoelstellingen, waarschijnlijk niet gaan halen? Waarom zijn andere landen in Europa veel ambitieuzer?

Spreker 2 De Noren hebben het makkelijk want die hebben veel waterkracht. In Denemarken is er een shock moment geweest in de oliecrisis. Daar stookten ze alles nog met olie en was dus heel afhankelijk. Die shock is er bij ons nooit geweest want wij hadden onze gasreserves.

Spreker 1 Denemarken kon niet leunen op zijn eigen olievoorraad?

Speker 2 Nee dat was niet genoeg.

Spreker 1 Maar die 14%, kunnen we niet meer doen? In hoeverre denk je dat lobby van de industriele sector hier een rol in heeft gespeeld?

Spreker 2 Ja ik heb dat wel gezien ja, ook in Europa. Het ETS systeem is helemaal het graf in gelobbyed. Nu ligt het in het graf en nu zeggen al die partijen ja we stoppen met subsidies we gaan alles met het ETS doen. Ze willen er nu wel aan beginnen omdat ze weten, voornamelijk de kolenindustrie had tijdens de crisis heel veel gratis verkregen certificaten over waarop ze uiteindleijk 40 miljard hebben verdiend. Ik geloof niet dat ETS systeem ooit nog gaat werken

Spreker 1 In sommige kringen wordt het energieakkoord beschouwt als een statement van de marktpartijen: ‘nu gaan we het zelf doen’. In hoeverre denk je dat het energieakkoord voortvloeid uit maatschappelijke betrokkenheid en in hoeverre uit belangen van deze partijen?

Spreker 2 Ze maken liever zelf afspraken dan dat iemand anders dat voor ze doet. De afspraken waren redelijk tam. De industrie heeft 4.5 jaar (sinds het energieakkoord) geen poot uitgestoken. Pas nu dat Kamp dreigt om de boel te gaan verplichten komt men met een plan voor energiebesparing. Daar hadden ze al veel eerder mee kunnen beginnen. Daarom zeg ik ook dat de markt niet werkt. De markt heeft maar een doel en dat is winst voor de aandeelhouders genereren. De wereld redden is daarin bijzaak.

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Spreker 1 Vind je dat de Nederlandse overheid daar zwak in is? Dat Nederland zich meer richting een angelsaksisch model begeeft?

Spreker 2 Ja, dat is het. Ook met wind, het angelsaksische model dat aandeelhouderswaarde efficienctie creeert. In een industrie waarbij grote palen neergezet worden in een gemeenschap en waar aandeelhouders winst maken is dat oorlog. Je ziet nu langzaam een transitie naar een gemeenschapsmodel, het Rijnlandsmodel, waarbij er wordt ontwikkeld op basis van behoefte. De partijen die zich aan het gemeenschappelijke doel kunnen confirmeren krijgen een positie. De rest die moet maar zorgen dat ze zich aanpassen.

Spreker 1 Ïn hoeverre denk je dat de energietransitie de concurrentiepositie van het Nederlandse bedrijfsleven schaad wat problemen oplevert voor Nederland als geheel? Voorbeeld van Carl Heinz en Uniliver en PPG en Akzo Nobel

Spreker 2 Daarom werkt dat systeem ook niet. Je kunt maar zo groen zijn als dat het kapitaal het toelaat. De oplossing hiervoor om het cooperatief te maken. Cooperaties zijn democratisch en maken daarom altijd afwegingen tussen leefomgeving en de aandeelhouderswaarde van de leden. In heel veel gevallen zitten de meeste mensen er wat idealistisch in dus wordt er wat minder winst uitgekeerd en blijft er meer binnen de cooperatie om nieuwe dingen te doen. Er is helemaal geen waarde want een cooperatie kan niet verkocht worden en kan ook niet uitgekocht worden door grote partijen. Athanks dat kan wel maar dan moet de hele ledenvergadering daarmee akkoord gaan. Als het middels cooperaties wordt georganiseerd wordt er geen kapitaal onttrokken aan de gemeenschap. Daarnaast interesseert het aandeelhouders niet of de boel kapot gemaakt wordt, mensen uit de gemeenschap doen dit wel. Kapitaal is anoniem en amoreel en is gebasseerd op cijfers. Een bedrijf kan wel zeggen dat het veel goeie dingen wil voor de gemeenschap maar dat gaat ten koste van de winstwaarde.

Spreker 2 De transitie zal wel iets moeten regelen voor de arbeiders. De arbeiders die heel veel waarde, energie in bijv. De petrochemische sector hebben gestopt. Er moet een soort transitieregeling komen. Kijk, met investeerders heb ik geen medelijden. Zij speculeren, zonder ergens arbeid in te stoppen en kunnen winnen of verliezen. Daar hoef je je geen zorgen over te maken, wel over de mensen die in die sector werken. Het is een kleine stap om die naar een andere sector te brengen. Daar is nu een dramatisch gebrek aan kennis.

Spreker 2 Cooperaties weerspiegelen een andere manier van zaken doen, met behoud van waarde binnen de gemeenschap. De energie die jij koopt creeert waarde in een bedrijf. Door dit zelf te organiseren wordt deze waarde behouden voor de gemeenschap. Er wordt op deze manier geen waarde onttrokken aan de gemeenschap.

Spreker 2 Daarnaast, als de windmolens van de gemeenschap zelf zijn is er veel minder weerstand tegen. De UvA heeft een onderzoek gedaan in Duitsland en de weerstand gemeten in twee dorpen die te maken hadden met windenergie, een met windenergie van een grote projectontwikkelaar en een met windenergie doormiddel van een lokale cooperatie. Bij het eerste dorp was er een gigantische weerstand. Bij het tweede drop vond men het realiseren van windenergie fantastisch. Men wist ook

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meer over duurzame energie en was er meer mee bezig gegaan. Ik denk dat dit mist in Nederland. We hebben de koopmansmentaliteit toegepast op de energietransitie. Degene met de grootste lobby die wint.

Spreker 2 De rol van de staat is om het kapitalisme en kapitalistische bedrijven te ondersteunen en zichzelf daarmee in stand te houden. Wat je dus moet doen is dus open vrijwillige organisaties opzetten die zelf in die markt opereren en zichzef organiseren. Dat zijn dan cooperaties. Op het moment dat je dat op heel veel vlakken doet zoals zorg voedsel etc, dan heb je eigenlijk nog heel weinig staat nodig want de burgers organiseren zichzelf. In Europea manifesteren wij ons niet als burgers maar als bedrijven en dat vinden zijn zeer interessant. Eerst was alles in handen van de staat, dat werkte niet vanwege de monopoliepositie van de staat. Nu is men totaal de andere kant op gegaan en ligt veel organisatie bij het kapitaal. Een cooperatie is een beweging terug naar het midden, niet zo machtig als de staat maar ook niet zo extreem als de markt die enkel op 1 ding focust.

Spreker 1 Zou je bevestigen dat de Nederlandse overheid vanwege het bestaan van de gassector en oliesector waar ze veel aan verdienen door dividenten, licence fees en belastingen dat dat een belangrijke belemmering vormt voor de energietransitie in Nederland

Spreker 2 Men ging gewoon op bezoek bij Shell, dat was 1 op 1. Het energiebeleid werd bepaald door Shell. De staat zag zich als de hoeder van bedrijven. Als wij het bedrijven naar de zin maken dan hebben burgers het ook goed. Dat moet eigenlijk omgedraaid worden. We moeten zorgen dat de burgers het goed hebben dan organiseren die wel bedrijven om in hun eigen behoeftes te voorzien. Nu is het zo dat in heel veel gevallen het neoliberalisme hoogtij viert. Als we het bedrijven naar de zin maken met zo min mogelijk belastingen etc is dat goed voor iedereen. Toch zien we veel bedrijven die het niet waarmaken en waar de overheid dan weer moet inspringen. In Engeland bij de privatisering van de treinen waarbij de markt alle winste kregen en de kosten naar de staat werden overgeheveld. In Nederland zie je dat in de zorg en ook bij de energiebedrijven. Al die kolencentrales die extra aangelegd zijn. De staat die heeft het gefaciliteerd door bijv. De Eemshaven uit te baggeren en de bedrijven hebben de winst gepakt. Uiteindelijk betalen de burgers dit doormiddel van belastingen. Daarom moet je de geldstroom niet direct naar de staat sturen en vervolgens naar bedrijven. Laat het geld gewoon bij de burgers. Het paradoxale is dat dit in het huidige systeem gewoon kan. We kunnen bestaan omdat er een vrije markt is. Wij kunnen ons ertussen wringen omdat wij op sommige plekken gewoon een beter verhaal hebben dan andere partijen dat ons weer een voorkeurspositie geeft. Zonder vrije markt hadden wij ook niet bestaan. Tussen die staatsbedrijven kon je niet tussenkomen. Als je een vrije markt hebt tussen cooperaties heb je een echt vrije markt. Nu hebben we een staatsgesteunde vrije markt. De huidige vrije markt is gecreeerd door machtige partijen. Op het moment dat jij het machtigste bent wil je dat er een vrije markt is zonder overheidssteun want dat is het gunstigste voor jou. Als de overheid dan achter andere partijen gaat staan wordt er gezegd: je belemmert de vrije markt. Als jij het sterkste bent moet je altijd pleiten voor vrije markt en geen overheidsinvloed en ingrijpen. In een volledig vrije markt is kapitaal altijd de baas. Degene met het meeste kapitaal wint altijd. In Nederland waren er 40 of 50 jaar gemeentelijke energiebedrijven en binnen 15 jaar waren dat er nog maar 3.

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Spreker 1 Waarom krijgen we het in Nederland niet voor elkaar om het kapitaal en de vrije markt in te perken in hun macht?

Spreker 2 We blijven toch handelaren. Koopman versus de dominee. De mythe dat de markt en bedrijven efficienter zijn is een uitspraak die in Nederland vaak beleden wordt.

Spreker 1 Is het ook niet makkelijker voor Denemarken aangezien men minder energy intensieve industrie heeft en al lange tijd geleden heeft gekozen voor duurzame energie?

Spreker 2 Je kunt daarvoor een opsomming van factoren noemen. Het moment van de oliecrisis. Zij hadden al heel veel district heatings met olie. Het is dan alleen nog maar een kwestie van veranderen van bron. Hier hebben we gas. Die infrastructuur is niet geschikt voor een warmte netwerk. De stap van gas naar warmtenet is veel groter. De Denen hebben van oorsprong al een cooperatieve achtergrond. Dat zal voor Nederlanders ook kunnen gelden. Over water bijvoorbeeld is geen discussie. Dat is allemaal democratisch georganiseerd met onze waterschappen. Waarom zou dit niet voor energie gelden?

Spreker 1 Is het voor Denemarken ook niet makkelijker omdat ze minder energy intensieve industrie hebben?

Spreker 2 Ja, dat betekend dat er minder mensen op de schoot zitten van beleidsambtenaren en dat de lobby minder sterk is. Er is nooit een reden, het is altijd een combinatie van fatoren. Maar uiteindelijk gaan we proberen, en dat is een kans die deze energietransitie met zich meebrengt, om energie democratie te organiseren. Deze cooperaties hebben niet het doel om alsmaar groter te worden, zoals het kapitalisme, maar om te voorzien in de behoefte van de maatschappij. Binnen het kapitalistische systeem komen mensen bovendrijven zoals de Donald Trumps etc. Het spel monopolie geeft eigenlijk precies weer hoe het kapitalisme in elkaar zit. Mensen die anderen eruit willen drukken en de grootste willen worden in de markt komen bovendrijven in een kapitalistisch systeem. Elk systeem heeft een dergelijke tendens. In een fascistisch systeem komen beulen bovendrijven. Het kapitalisme maakt iedereen concurrenten van elkaar terwijl een cooperatief systeem mensen laat samenwerken. Met de Green Deal, een plan voor de gezamenlijk uitvoering van ondermeer win energie. Daar weet Energie Nederland dan nog een zinnetje in te frommelen dat de Nederlandse energiemarkt een vrije markt is waar iedereen inititatief kan nemen. Dat heb ik eruit weten te krijgen. Dit geldt voor meer zaken in Nederland. Kijk maar hoe lelijk Zuid-Holland is. Iedereen heeft de mogelijkheid om maar iets te bouwen naar zijn eigen inzicht en smaak. Er is geen autoriteit die zegt we gaan het zo op zo doen. Dat doen we niet in Nederland. Daar is het kabinet den Uyl al over gevallen, die wilden dat doen. Die kwamen eigenlijk al tot de conclusie dat het eigenlijk raar is dat de markt bepaalt wat voor huizen wij bouwen in Nederland. Dat zou een overheid toch moeten bepalen? Nee het is private grond en de mensen kunnen zelf bepalen wat er gebouwd word.

Spreker 1 Denkt u dat dit kan veranderen? De VVD heeft de afgelopen anderhalve decennia vrijwel nonstop in de Nederandse regering gezeten

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Spreker 2 Kijk tegen VVD’ers zeg ik: dat zijn ondernemende burgers. Ik ga daar niet zo’n verhaal tegen ophangen. Als wij groot worden heb je straks anderhalf miljoen ondernemenrs, het is gewoon business. Tegen socialisten vertel ik wat anders. Vergelijkbaar met Vestas in Denemarken hebben we in Nederland ook een groot bedrijf dat door staatssteun overeind gehouden is totdat het winst ging genereren: ASML. 20 miljard aan overheidsgeld is daar naartoe gegaan in 20 jaar. Op het moment dat het winst ging geven durfde de markt wel te investeren en de winsten te privatiseren. Wij hebben voor de opstart betaald maar we krijgen niks van de dividenten. Als je gezegd had als overheid: wij zetten dit in en de winsten blijven van de burgers, dan hadden de dividenten van de toekomst in Nederland terecht gekomen. Nu is het een internationala bedrijf waarbij de winsten naar het kapitaal gaan. Het kapitaal hoeft niks te doen, zo worden mensen die rijk zijn alleen maar rijker en mensen die werken, de middenstand, alleen maar armer. Zij betalen de belastingen om dit soort dingen op te starten. In de basis is het arbeid dat waarde creeert. Arbeid is de cruciale component van waarde en winst. Je stopt ergens arbeid in en dan heeft iets waarde. Als je al die arbeid uit de maatschappij haalt door automatiseren dan blijft alle waarde, alle winst bij het kapitaal. En de mensen zijn werkloos. Je moet democratische organisaties maken waar iedereen een beetje geld in heeft gestopt en ook zeggeschap over hebben. De huidige politiek heeft hierover geen visie over de toekomst. Dit geldt voor PvdA voor de SP en ook voor Groenlinks. Ze denken allen binnen het systeem. Bedrijven zoals Shell zijn het gevolg van een oorzaak. Zij zijn niet de oorzaak. Zij zijn het resultaat van de manier waarop wij besloten hebben om onze economie in te richten

Spreker 2 We willen met het steunen van cooperaties een langzame transitie bewerkstelligen. We werken binnen het systeem en proberen het langzaam van binnenuit de veranderen.

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