Volume 3 | Issue 7 | Article ID 1765 | Jul 06, 2005 The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus

The Allied Occupation of Japan - an Australian View

Christine de Matos

The Allied Occupation of Japan – an Britain, British India and New Zealand, Australian View contributed to the British Commonwealth Occupation Forces (BCOF). By Christine de Matos The Australians were stationed in Hiroshima prefecture, with their base at Hiro (the BCOF HQ was at Kure). At its height in 1946, The Japanese Occupation is generallyAustralia provided around 12,000 troops to the remembered as primarily an American affair total of 40,000 BCOF troops (US troops and as a dichotomous relationship between numbered 152,000).[1] However, by 1948 Japan and the United States. However, it was Britain, India and New Zealand had withdrawn an Allied Occupation, and, despite thefrom Japan, leaving Australia as the sole persistence of selective historical memories, representative of the Commonwealth forces, at there was a distinct and at times contentious least until the outbreak of the Korean War. An Allied presence, contribution, and experience. Australian acted as Commander-in-Chief of The Occupation provided a terrain on which the BCOF for the duration of the Occupation. This victor nations, believing their social, economic article focuses on Australia's diplomatic and political values vindicated by victory, contribution to the Occupation. competed to reshape the character of Japan’s modernity. One Ally that participated in this While close attention has been paid to the process, and often acted as a dissenting voice, ideological conflict between the Soviet Union was Australia. Examining the involvement of and the United States, the neglected conflict additional participants in the Occupation does between Australia and the United States, as not challenge the notion of US dominance, but well as their cooperative actions, casts further does demonstrate that others periodically light on the nature of the occupation. For the played significant roles in both administering first four years of the Occupation, Australia had the Occupation and in challenging US policies. a left-wing (ALP) government under , and a Australian participation contentious and outspoken foreign minister in H.V. Evatt. Thus there was great potential and Australia was a party to the Occupation both much ammunition for conflict to occur over the diplomatically and militarily. For instance, an progress of Occupation reforms, especially Australian delegation participated in the Far after the so-called ‘reverse course’ in Eastern Commission (FEC) in Washington, an Occupation policies. The Australian represented the Britishhad its own agenda that it wished to impose Commonwealth on the Allied Council for Japan upon Japan. Militarily, diplomatically, (ACJ) in Tokyo, an Australian, William Flood economically and politically, this was of course Webb, presided over the International Military an unequal battle. Yet, in the early post- Tribunal of the Far East (IMTFE), and an hostilities enthusiasm for a new world order, Australian military contingent, along with the was confident of

1 3 | 7 | 0 APJ | JF contributing to its creation – whether in the unencumbered by any attachment to the UN, or in Occupied Japan – and took a number throne, or to maintaining the social status quo. of initiatives that were actively addressed, if not always implemented. For Australia, communism in Japan was not seen to be a great threat: a return to militarism The role of the emperor was. The Japanese people, unencumbered by the monarchy, were seen as a possible source One of the best-known points of contention of protection against militarism. If the between Australia and the United States Australian government did not carry great occurred over the position of the emperor in international weight in the matter, it did postwar Japan. Australia’s position has been provide a reasoned and consistent voice calling portrayed as one of simple retribution for war for the trial of the emperor as a war criminal. crimes. While populist rhetoric pandered to SCAP/GHQ, while unyielding on this point, used anti-Japanese passions amongst the Australian this aspect of Australian policy to invoke fear electorate, the official policy position was a among uncooperative Japanese leaders – that little more complex. The issue of the emperor is, the threat to take such issues as the had two main components: first, the question of constitution to the FEC where, it was alleged, the trial and punishment of the emperor as a the Australians and Soviets would demand the war criminal; and second, the future of the abdication of the emperor, or worse. It was a imperial institution in the context of political highly effective tactic that maximised American reform. leverage without achieving Australian goals.

The Australian government, like the United The postwar constitution States, advocated thoroughgoing democratic reform. However, they differed on how this was Differences in policies towards the emperor best accomplished. While, from at least 1945, became manifest in the positions of the US and Australia favored eliminating the emperor Australia on the constitution. At the end of the system as the way forward for democratic Asia-Pacific War, Australia sought to create the revolution, this was to be decided by the opportunity for the Japanese people to debate Japanese people as soon as conditions permit a and modify the existing Meiji constitution. This freely determined decision. Politicalapproach, a ‘restoration’ of democracy, was movements aiming at the abolition of the believed to make it less likely that the Japanese institution of Emperor or his reduction to a people would later reject the constitution as an constitutional head of State [are] to be allowed imposition.[3] When the fait accompli of the so- freedom of organization and propaganda.[2] called ‘MacArthur constitution’ became evident, Australia and other members of the In other words, while this was to be a decision FEC turned to analysing the draft and made by the Japanese people, the Australian submitting proposed changes. Important government held that the Allies shouldAustralian suggestions included the guarantee encourage movements sympathetic to their of universal suffrage, and the stipulation that agenda. By contrast, the US position was not the prime minister and state officials should be only that the imperial institution in modified civilians, both of which were incorporated into form should be maintained, but also that the constitution during Diet deliberations in Hirohito remain on the throne to help avoid September 1946. [4] widespread chaos. Australian social, economic and political policies towards Japan, in many MacArthur reacted to the FEC suggestions by ways more radical than US policies, were stating that this was ‘a complete repudiation of

2 3 | 7 | 0 APJ | JF the requirement that the constitution must be a constitution was to take effect), while free expression of the people’s will’. He warned exercising censorship within Japan. Although that the Japanese would ‘unquestionably bear the ‘Provision’ was leaked to the Japanese some resentment against such alliedpress in March 1948, with the constitution interference’, thereby attempting to maintain already in effect, it had little public impact. the charade that the constitution had sole Japanese authorship.[5] Thus began a struggle When it came time for the ‘Provisions’ to take between MacArthur and Australian diplomats effect in 1948, the Ashida government began a over who or what best reflected the ‘will’ of the review process, as did two Japanese research Japanese people in the new constitution. In this groups, the Public Law forum (Koho kenkyukai) instance, Australia succeeded in shaping the and the Constitutional Research Committee of constitution in significant ways. Tokyo University (Kempo kenkyukai). However, MacArthur and the second Yoshida On 17 October 1946, the FEC adoptedgovernment, which took office after the fall of ‘Provisions for the Review of a New Japanese the Ashida government in 1948, halted the Constitution’ to counteract the fait accompli. review process. On the FEC, the Australian Sent to MacArthur as an FEC policy directive, delegation encouraged the review but, given the ‘Provisions’ were inspired by H.V. Evatt, the lack of support from Washington and Tokyo and were intended to provide an opportunity within the Occupation context of the ‘reverse for the Japanese people to ‘judge thecourse’, it was conducted without enthusiasm. Constitution in the light of their experience of its working’.[6] The objective was to have the In 1949, the FEC sent some proposals for provision attached to the Constitution at discussion to SCAP, including: promulgation, in order to ensure that the Japanese people were aware of their right to 1. Queries over the use of the terms kokumin comment and have public debate on the (citizens) and nambito (all persons), as ‘it was Constitution, and, if deemed necessary, amend not clear how the Constitution guarantees it. While Evatt favored a public referendum on fundamental civil rights to all persons within the constitution as the final act of review, the Japanese jurisdiction (as distinguished from FEC policy only specified this as an option, the Japanese citizens)’; preferred option being that the Diet and the 2. Greater clarity to be given to empower the FEC conduct the review within one to two Supreme Court to determine constitutionality; years of the constitution taking effect. 3. Greater clarity desirable in Articles 7 and 69 MacArthur’s reaction was swift and hostile. He on the procedures for the dissolution of the claimed that the Australian proposalHouse of Representatives.[8] constituted inappropriate Allied interference in The first point related directly to the volatile Japanese political affairs. With the USissue of the rights of Koreans and Taiwanese government maneuvering to maintain authority residents of Japan who had been deprived of in the hands of SCAP, specifically proposing the citizenship rights enjoyed under colonial that it be left to the discretion of MacArthur rule following Japan's defeat. whether to publish it, Australians on the FEC provided the most vociferous challenge. They However, these suggestions were not sent as claimed it would be dishonest not to let the an FEC policy directive, but were simply Japanese people know they had the right of submitted to SCAP, there was no imperative for review.[7] In the end, MacArthur agreed to MacArthur, or anyone else, to consider, no less publication of the Provisions outside of Japan act on, them. And, in a year in which such (in March 1947, two months before the contentious issues as the ‘red purges’ and

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Dodge economic stabilisation program arose, FEC provision that read ‘provisions of no one did. In the end, Evatt’s original ideal F.E.C.-045/5 (Principles for Japanese Trade that the Japanese people would have a voice in Unions) should be applied to workers in assessing, shaping and revising their own Japanese government enterprises.’[9] constitution was lost. Now approaching six decades on, there has been no amendment to In the face of widespread support for this the Constitution, although controversialinitiative on the FEC, MacArthur accused changes are currently being pressed by the Australia and Britain of using Japanese labour ruling Liberal Democratic Party. to further ‘their own socialistic experiments’[10] and the US State Department Labour reform called in Australian FEC delegates to press them to drop their proposal on the grounds that Further conflict between Australia and the it would serve to heighten communist activities United States centered on the role of the labour in Japan.[11] Eventually, under US pressure movement. The two countries had veryand delay tactics, the Australian proposal fell different labour histories and their ideas for the into abeyance. With a change of government in place of labour in Occupied Japan differed in Australia from the ALP to ’ fundamentals. The Australian delegation was conservative Liberal Party, the proposal was instrumental in framing FEC labour policy never revived. One change was quietly gained: encapsulated in ‘Principles for Japanese Trade the NPSL in its final form contained a more Unions’. Incorporating Australian (andindependent arbitration machinery mechanism British/European) experience, the ideal it put than when it was first envisioned. It was a forth of a politicised labour movement, that is a small and subtle victory, but one nonetheless. labour movement that would seek political representation in government by supporting or Land reform creating a political party that reflected its interests, was anathema to both MacArthur and One area in which there was substantial U.S- the US government, providing a fertile source Australia agreement, and where the Australian for Allied conflict. contribution was significant, was land reform. When MacArthur surprisingly asked the ACJ for The Australian government protested many advice on land reform, William Macmahon Ball, aspects of Occupation labour policy, including an Australian academic/diplomat representing MacArthur's 1 February strike ban of 1947 as the British Commonwealth on the ACJ Japanese labour mobilised to carry out a (1946-1947), and his economic advisor, Eric E. general strike. The different approaches of the Ward, responded with enthusiasm. Ward’s Allies to labour issues are best exemplified in research into the issue led him to believe that the revision of the National Public Service Law the 3 cho Landlord Average Maximum Retained (NPSL) from 1948 to 1949. Patrick Shaw, an Area (LAMRA), as proposed by SCAP/GHQ’s Australian representing the BritishWolf Ladejinsky and William Gilmartin, was too Commonwealth to the ACJ (1947-1949),large, as it would only release about 45 percent protested the removal of the right to strike for of tenanted land for transfer. Ward calculated all government employees under the revision, that for land reform to be a success, it would be and, even more, the lack of an independent necessary to release 70 percent, and a one cho arbitration body. Shaw protested publicly in the LAMRA would therefore be required. When ACJ as well as privately to SCAP/GHQ. Protests Macmahon Ball presented this as part of a 10- also emerged on the FEC, led by the Australian point program to the ACJ, MacArthur delegation, and the Australians proposed a new responded that the proposal was ‘most

4 3 | 7 | 0 APJ | JF constructive and valuable’.[12] government. The issues are not simply of historical interest: the debate about the Ball was then surprised to read in the Mainichi constitution is one obvious example of the Shimbun on 2 July 1946 that the Japanese contemporary currency of contested issues of government had prepared a land reform bill ‘on the 1940s. In order to take the ‘inevitability’ its own initiative’ that incorporated ‘in a most out of teleological perspectives, it is worthwhile exact and detailed way the ten points program’ remembering the alternative and dissenting he had submitted to the ACJ.[13] Ogura voices of the Occupation – both in terms of Takekazu, an official involved in drafting the their sometimes subtle or forgotten bill, wrote in 1979 that the Ball-Ward proposal contributions, and of the paths not taken that contained the clear ideas lacking in the US 9 can be as integral to our historical December directive, and was, therefore, used understanding as those that were. extensively to help draft the bill.[14] Reference to the Australian role in land reform is rare in [1] British Commonwealth Forces National Occupation historiography. In this area where Council, ‘Brief ’s Australian and SCAP views meshed, and where Participation in the Occupation of Japan they were also synchronous with a significant 1945-1952’, 5 July 2000, available online: Japanese policy group, Australia was able to http://www.bradprint.com.au/bcof/history.html play an important role in crafting the program. [2] National Archives of Australia (NAA): A3300/7 290, Cablegram Department of Conclusion External Affairs to Australian Legation Washington, 10 August 1945. Occupied Japan was an ideological[3] NAA: A5475/1 13, ‘Information on Japan’, c. battleground for contesting ideas concerned November 1945. with charting Japan's postwar transformation, [4] MMA: RG-5, Box 73, Fol: ‘FEC Radio File’, with the US voice dominant. The Australian MacArthur to Washington, 19 August 1946; Chifley government proposed an alternative MMA: RG-5, Box 73, Fold: ‘FEC Radio File’, approach, what it termed ‘social democracy’, MacArthur to Washington, 25 September 1946. between the extremes of Soviet communism The US government overrode MacArthur on and American laissez faire individualism. this issue in order to placate the FEC. However, in the manichean context of the Cold [5] MMA: RG-5, Box 73, Fol: ‘FEC Radio File’, War, in many policy realms the Australian MacArthur to Washington, 19 August 1946. voice, as well as other alternate voices from [6] W.D. Forsyth to W. Macmahon Ball, 21 June within and without Japan, tended to disappear 1946, in Wayne Hudson and Wendy Way, from the historical record. In some fields, Documents on Australian Foreign however, of which land reform is most striking, Policy1937-1949, Vol. IX, Document 323, pp. Australian proposals shaped significant policy 542-543. outcomes, while in others, they shaped the [7] James Plimsoll, in MacArthur Memorial terrain of debate. Archives (MMA): GR-6, Box 73, Fol: 3 F.E.C. Minutes October-November 1946, ‘Transcript The political divisions apparent in theof Thirty-Third meeting of the Far Eastern Occupation era are manifest again today – the Commission’, 1 November 1946, p. 5. ALP, now in opposition, sometimes reflects a [8] MMA: RG-9 Radiograms, Box 82, Fol: ‘State dissenting voice to US/Australian conservative Department May 1949’, Department of Army to policy in Iraq, though rather more subtly than SCAP, 7 May 1949. in Chifley’s time, and without the political [9] NAA: A1838/278 483/1 Part 3, ‘Japanese weight of a party holding the reins ofPeace Settlement. Far Eastern Commission

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Agenda ’, p. 34. 1946-1950, the Allied Role, Tokyo: Nobunkyo, [10] MMA: RG-9, Radiograms, Fol: ‘Labor, 2 1990, pp. 74-75. April 1946-31 October 1948’, SCAP to Dept of Army, 21 October 1948. Christine de Matos teaches at the University of [11] NAA: A1838/278 483/2 Part 5, Cablegram Western Sydney, Australia, and researches Australian Embassy Washington to External Australian involvement in the Allied Occupation Affairs, 26 April 1949. of Japan. She is the author of ‘Contesting the [12] Alan Rix, Intermittent Diplomat: The Japan “Will of the People”: Australia and and Batavia Diaries of W. Macmahon Ball, Constitutional Reform in Occupied Japan’, Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 1988, p. Japanese Studies, Vol 24, No 2, September 75. A cho is 2.45 acres. 2004, pp. 181-200. She can be contacted at [13] NAA: A1067 ER46/13/27, Cablegram [email protected]. This article was Macmahon Ball to External Affairs, 9 July 1946. written for Japan Focus and posted on July 27, [14] Eric E. Ward, Land Reform in Japan 2005.

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