Επιστημονικό Περιοδικό Papyri - Scientific Journal Δέλτοι Delti Τόμος 4, 2015 Volume 4, 2015 Papyri@Academy.Edu.Gr ΠΕΡΙΕΧΟΜΕΝΑ TABLE of CONTENTS

ΑΚΑΔΗΜΙΑ ΘΕΣΜΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΠΟΛΙΤΙΣΜΩΝ ACADEMY OF INSTITUTIONS AND CULTURES

Πᾶσά τε ἐπιστήμη χωριζομένη δικαιοσύνης καὶ τῆς ἄλλης ἀρετῆς πανουργία, οὐ σοφία φαίνεται. Πλάτωνος, “Μενέξενος”, [246e – 247a].

And every form of knowledge when sundered from justice and the rest of virtue is seen to be plain roguery rather than wisdom. Plato, “Menexenus”, [246e – 247a]. Plato. Platonis Opera, ed. John Burnet. Oxford University Press. 1903

Πάπυροι - Επιστημονικό Περιοδικό Δέλτοι τόμος 4, 2015

Papyri - Scientific Journal Delti volume 4, 2015

ΘΕΣΣΑΛΟΝΙΚΗ 2015 - THESSALONIKI 2015

ISSN : 2241-5106

Τίτλος : Πάπυροι - Επιστημονικό Περιοδικό Δέλτοι τόμος 4, 2015 Publication Name : Papyri - Scientific Journal Delti volume 4, 2015

Εκδότης : ΑΚΑΔΗΜΙΑ ΘΕΣΜΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΠΟΛΙΤΙΣΜΩΝ Publisher : ACADEMY OF INSTITUTIONS AND CULTURES

Έτος : 2015, Θεσσαλονίκη Year : 2015, Thessaloniki, Macedonia Hellas

Web site : www.academy.edu.gr

Email : [email protected]

Σχεδιασμός και επιμέλεια έκδοσης : Γεώργιος Ελ. Κούρταλης

Design Issue and custody : Georgios El. Kourtalis

ΑΚΑΔΗΜΙΑ ΘΕΣΜΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΠΟΛΙΤΙΣΜΩΝ ACADEMY OF INSTITUTIONS AND CULTURES , . …. ΧΘΟρώΥΚμΥεΔθΙΔαΟ Υγ,ὰΙσρτ οπροίαλ ιττουε ίΠᾳε ολοὐπ οζνηνληοσύιασκοῃύ τ ποοὺλέςμ τοῶυ,νΕ πιτέάλφαιςο ςν,ό [2.37.1]μους παράδειγμα δὲ μᾶλλον αὐτοὶ ὄντες τισὶν ἢ μιμούμενοι ἑτέρους καὶ ὄνομα μὲν διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐς ὀλίγους ἀλλ᾽ ἐς πλείονας οἰκεῖν δημοκρατία κέκληται

Πάπυροι – Επιστημονικό Περιοδικό

Π σά τε πιστήμη χωριζομένη δικαιοσύνης κα τ ς λλης ρετ ς πανουργία, ο σοφία φαίνεται. Πλάτων, “Μενέξενος”, [246 e – 247a]. ᾶ ἐ ὶ ῆ ἄ ἀ ῆ ὐ

Εκδότης: ΑΚΑΔΗΜΙΑ ΘΕΣΜΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΠΟΛΙΤΙΣΜΩΝ Ταχυδρομική Διεύθυνση: Αριστοτέλειο Πανεπιστήμιο Θεσσαλονίκης, Τ.Κ. 54124, Θεσσαλονίκη, Ελλάς, Τ.Θ. 494 του Α.Π.Θ. http:// www.academy.edu.gr E-mail: [email protected] [email protected] ISSN: 2241-5106

ΔΙΕΥΘΥΝΤΗΣ ΕΚΔΟΣΕΩΣ

ΠΑΝΟΣ ΗΛΙΟΠΟΥΛΟΣ Πανεπιστήμιο Πελοποννήσου, International Society for Universal Dialogue

ΑΝΑΠΛΗΡΩΤΕΣ ΔΙΕΥΘΥΝΤΕΣ ΕΚΔΟΣΕΩΣ

ΚΩΝΣΤΑΝΤΙΝΟΣ ΚΑΡΝΑΣΙΩΤΗΣ, Ακαδημία Θεσμών και Πολιτισμών

ΔΗΜΗΤΡΙΟΣ ΛΑΜΠΡΕΛΛΗΣ, Πάντειο Πανεπιστήμιο

ΙΑΚΩΒΟΣ ΜΙΧΑΗΛΙΔΗΣ, Αριστοτέλειο Πανεπιστήμιο Θεσσαλονίκης

ΣΥΝΤΟΝΙΣΤΗΣ ΕΚΔΟΣΕΩΣ

ΑΝΑΣΤΑΣΙΟΣ ΜΑΡΑΣ Ελληνικό Ανοικτό Πανεπιστήμιο, Ανωτάτη Εκκλησιαστική Ακαδημία Θεσσαλονίκης

ΠΑΠΥΡΟΙ

Το Επιστημονικό Περιοδικό ΠΑΠΥΡΟΙ αποτελεί ετήσια διαδικτυακή περιοδική έκδοση της Ακα- δημίας Θεσμών και Πολιτισμών, στην οποία δημοσιεύονται κείμενα από τους τομείς της Φιλοσο- φίας, της Ιστορίας, της Αρχαιολογίας, της Κοινωνικής Επιστήμης, της Εθνολογίας καθώς και από τις άλλες Ανθρωπιστικές Επιστήμες. Επίσης δημοσιεύονται άρθρα από την Ιστορία και την Φιλο- σοφία των Θετικών Επιστημών και γενικώς ό,τι προάγει την διεπιστημονική Έρευνα. Οι δημο- σιεύσεις γίνονται στην Ελληνική, Γαλλική, Αγγλική, Γερμανική, Ιταλική, Ισπανική και Ρωσική, με έγκριση της Επιστημονικής Επιτροπής, μετά από κρίση και εφόσον τηρούνται οι προδιαγραφές δημοσιεύσεων.

Η επιλογή του διαδικτύου ως μέσου εκδόσεως του Επιστημονικού Περιοδικού ΠΑΠΥΡΟΙ εδράζε- www.academy.edu.gr [email protected] [email protected] ΑΚΑΔΗΜΙΑ ΘΕΣΜΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΠΟΛΙΤΙΣΜΩΝ ACADEMY OF INSTITUTIONS AND CULTURES , . …. ΧΘΟρώΥΚμΥεΔθΙΔαΟ Υγ,ὰΙσρτ οπροίαλ ιττουε ίΠᾳε ολοὐπ οζνηνληοσύιασκοῃύ τ ποοὺλέςμ τοῶυ,νΕ πιτέάλφαιςο ςν,ό [2.37.1]μους παράδειγμα δὲ μᾶλλον αὐτοὶ ὄντες τισὶν ἢ μιμούμενοι ἑτέρους καὶ ὄνομα μὲν διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐς ὀλίγους ἀλλ᾽ ἐς πλείονας οἰκεῖν δημοκρατία κέκληται

ται στο γεγονός ότι αυτό αποτελεί το σύγχρονο μέσο για μετάδοση της Γνώσης, δεδομένου ότι, προσφέρει αμεσότητα, εύκολη και ελεύθερη πρόσβαση, καθώς και δυνατότητα αναπαραγωγής και αρχειοθέτησης, λόγω της διαθέσεως των κειμένων σε ψηφιακή μορφή. Το διαδίκτυο πραγμα- τώνει μια από τις αρχέγονες ανάγκες της Ανθρωπότητας, αυτήν της καθολικής πρόσβασης στην Γνώση.

Παράρτημα του ΠΑΠΥΡΟΙ αποτελούν οι ΔΕΛΤΟΙ, στις οποίες δημοσιεύονται επιστημονικά άρθρα που αποτελούν επαναδημοσίευση, οπότε αναφέρεται η αρχική πηγή. Προς υποστήριξη των νέων επιστημόνων, δημοσιεύονται επίσης, Διδακτορικές Διατριβές και Μεταπτυχιακές Εργασίες, το περιεχόμενο των οποίων συνάδει προς την Φιλοσοφία της Ακαδημίας Θεσμών και Πολιτισμών.

Σκοπός της όλης εκδόσεως είναι η συγκρότηση ενός Σώματος Παιδείας που να οδηγεί στην ανά- πτυξη μίας Κοσμοσυστημικής Γνωσιολογίας.

Η δημοσίευση των άρθρων γίνεται σύμφωνα με το επώνυμο του συγγραφέα, κατά την σειρά της ροής του ελληνικού αλφαβήτου.

www.academy.edu.gr [email protected] [email protected] ΑΚΑΔΗΜΙΑ ΘΕΣΜΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΠΟΛΙΤΙΣΜΩΝ ACADEMY OF INSTITUTIONS AND CULTURES , . …. ΧΘΟρώΥΚμΥεΔθΙΔαΟ Υγ,ὰΙσρτ οπροίαλ ιττουε ίΠᾳε ολοὐπ οζνηνληοσύιασκοῃύ τ ποοὺλέςμ τοῶυ,νΕ πιτέάλφαιςο ςν,ό [2.37.1]μους παράδειγμα δὲ μᾶλλον αὐτοὶ ὄντες τισὶν ἢ μιμούμενοι ἑτέρους καὶ ὄνομα μὲν διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐς ὀλίγους ἀλλ᾽ ἐς πλείονας οἰκεῖν δημοκρατία κέκληται

Πάπυροι – Επιστημονικό Περιοδικό

ΣΥΜΒΟΥΛΕΥΤΙΚΗ ΕΠΙΤΡΟΠΗ

ΜΥΡΤΩ ΔΡΑΓΩΝΑ-ΜΟΝΑΧΟΥ, Εθνικό και Καποδιστριακό Πανεπιστήμιο Αθηνών, Πανεπιστή- μιο Κρήτης

ΓΙΩΡΓΟΣ ΚΟΝΤΟΓΙΩΡΓΗΣ, Πάντειο Πανεπιστήμιο

ΛΑΜΠΡΟΣ ΚΟΥΛΟΥΜΠΑΡΙΤΣΗΣ, Ελεύθερο Πανεπιστήμιο των Βρυξελλών, Βασιλική Ακαδημία του Βελγίου και Ακαδημία Αθηνών

ΙΩΑΝΝΗΣ ΛΥΡΙΤΖΗΣ, Πανεπιστήμιο του Αιγαίου, Ακαδημία Επιστημών Τεχνών και Γραμμάτων της Ντιζόν, Ευρωπαϊκή Ακαδημία Επιστημών του Σάλτσμπουργκ, Αρχαιολογικό Φόρουμ της Σα- γκάης, Σάμαρα Κρατικό Ινστιτούτο Πολιτισμού

ΓΕΩΡΓΙΟΣ ΜΑΤΣΟΠΟΥΛΟΣ, Αμερικανικό Κολλέγιο Ελλάδος

KOSTYANTYN BALABANOV, Κρατικό Πανεπιστήμιο της Μαριουπόλεως, Εθνική Ακαδημία Παιδαγωγικών Επιστημών της Ουκρανίας

ΓΙΑΝΝΗΣ ΤΖΙΦΟΠΟΥΛΟΣ, Αριστοτέλειο Πανεπιστήμιο Θεσσαλονίκης

ΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΟΝΙΚΗ ΕΠΙΤΡΟΠΗ

ΚΥΡΙΑΚΟΣ ΕΥΣΤΑΘΙΟΥ, Αριστοτέλειο Πανεπιστήμιο Θεσσαλονίκης

ΒΙΚΤΩΡ ΙΒΑΝΟΒΙΤΣ, Αριστοτέλειο Πανεπιστήμιο Θεσσαλονίκης

ΝΙΚΟΛΑΟΣ ΚΟΥΡΚΟΥΜΕΛΗΣ, Κέντρο Διπλωματικών και Στρατηγικών Σπουδών

ΓΙΩΡΓΟΣ ΠΑΠΑΘΕΟΔΩΡΟΥ, Πανεπιστήμιο Πατρών

ΣΠΥΡΙΔΩΝ ΠΑΥΛΙΔΗΣ, Αριστοτέλειο Πανεπιστήμιο Θεσσαλονίκης

ΛΕΩΝΙΔΑΣ ΡΑΔΟΣ, Ινστιτούτο Α.D. Xenopol, της Ακαδημίας της Ρουμανίας

ΣΠΥΡΟΣ ΣΥΡΟΠΟΥΛΟΣ, Πανεπιστήμιο Αιγαίου

MYKOLA TROFYMENKO, Πανεπιστήμιο Μαριουπόλεως της Ουκρανίας

ΑΓΑΘΟΝΙΚΗ ΤΣΙΛΙΠΑΚΟΥ, Μουσείο Βυζαντινού Πολιτισμού Θεσσαλονίκης

ΓΕΩΡΓΙΟΣ ΧΑΛΚΙΑΣ, Πανεπιστήμιο του Hong Kong, Πανεπιστήμιο της Οξφόρδης

ΕΥΑΝΘΗΣ ΧΑΤΖΗΒΑΣΙΛΕΙΟΥ, Εθνικό και Καποδιστριακό Πανεπιστήμιο Αθηνών

ΕΛΠΙΔΑ ΧΑΤΖΗΔΑΚΗ, πρ. Διευθύντρια Εφορείας Εναλίων Αρχαιοτήτων

ΚΙΜΩΝ ΧΡΗΣΤΑΝΗΣ, Πανεπιστήμιο Πατρών www.academy.edu.gr [email protected] [email protected] ΑΚΑΔΗΜΙΑ ΘΕΣΜΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΠΟΛΙΤΙΣΜΩΝ ACADEMY OF INSTITUTIONS AND CULTURES , . …. ΧΘΟρώΥΚμΥεΔθΙΔαΟ Υγ,ὰΙσρτ οπροίαλ ιττουε ίΠᾳε ολοὐπ οζνηνληοσύιασκοῃύ τ ποοὺλέςμ τοῶυ,νΕ πιτέάλφαιςο ςν,ό [2.37.1]μους παράδειγμα δὲ μᾶλλον αὐτοὶ ὄντες τισὶν ἢ μιμούμενοι ἑτέρους καὶ ὄνομα μὲν διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐς ὀλίγους ἀλλ᾽ ἐς πλείονας οἰκεῖν δημοκρατία κέκληται

Papyri - Scientific Journal

Publisher: ACADEMY OF INSTITUTIONS AND CULTURES Mail address: Aristoteles University of Thessaloniki, P.C. 54124, Thessaloniki, Greece, P.O. Box 494 of A.U.Th. http:// www.academy.edu.gr E-mail: [email protected] [email protected] ISSN: 2241-5106

PUBLISHING DIRECTOR

PANOS ELIOPOULOS University of Peloponnese, International Society of Universal Dialogue

DEPUTY PUBLISHING DIRECTORS

KONSTANTINOS KARNASSIOTIS, Academy of Institutions and Cultures

DIMITRIOS LAMPRELLIS, Panteion University

IAKOVOS MICHAΙLIDIS, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki

PUBLISHING COORDINATOR

ANASTASIOS MARAS Hellenic Open University, University Ecclesiastical Academy of Thessaloniki

PAPYRI

The Scientific Journal PAPYRI constitutes an annual online periodical review of the Academy of Institutions and Cultures, in which texts related to the realm of Philosophy, History, Archaeology, Social Sciences, Ethnology, as well as to Humanities in general are published. Also, articles are published with a reference to the History and the Philosophy of Natural Sciences, and generally, everything that promotes the interdisciplinary Research. The publications appear in Greek, French, English, German, Italian, Spanish, and Russian language and are subject to the approval of the Sci• entific Committee, after they have been reviewed, provided that the publishing specification guide• lines are satisfied.

The choice of the Internet as a publishing medium of the Scientific Journal PAPYRI relies on the www.academy.edu.gr [email protected] [email protected] ΑΚΑΔΗΜΙΑ ΘΕΣΜΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΠΟΛΙΤΙΣΜΩΝ ACADEMY OF INSTITUTIONS AND CULTURES , . …. ΧΘΟρώΥΚμΥεΔθΙΔαΟ Υγ,ὰΙσρτ οπροίαλ ιττουε ίΠᾳε ολοὐπ οζνηνληοσύιασκοῃύ τ ποοὺλέςμ τοῶυ,νΕ πιτέάλφαιςο ςν,ό [2.37.1]μους παράδειγμα δὲ μᾶλλον αὐτοὶ ὄντες τισὶν ἢ μιμούμενοι ἑτέρους καὶ ὄνομα μὲν διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐς ὀλίγους ἀλλ᾽ ἐς πλείονας οἰκεῖν δημοκρατία κέκληται fact that the Internet constitutes a modern medium for the transmission of Knowledge, since it of• fers immediacy, easy and free access, as well as the possibility of reproduction and archiving, due to the disposal of the texts in digital form. The Internet effectuates one of the primordial needs of Humanity, the one of the global access to Knowledge.

Supplement of the PAPYRI is the DELTI, in which scientific articles are republished, therefore the initial source is mentioned. In order to assist the new scientists, Ph.D. Dissertations and Postgradu• ate Theses, whose content stays in accordance with the Philosophy of the Academy of Institutions and Cultures, are also published.

The aim of the edition as a whole is the composition of a Corpus of Paideia, leading to the devel• opment of a Cosmosystemic Epistemology.

The published articles are ordered according to the surname of the author and the sequence of letters in the Greek alphabet.

Papyri - Scientific Journal

PUBLISHING ADVISORS COMMITTEE

MYRTO DRAGONA-MONACHOU, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, University of Crete

GEORGE CONTOGΕORGIS, Panteion University

LAΜBROS CΟULOUBΑRIΤSIS, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Académie Royale de Belgique and Academy of Athens

IOANNIS LIRITZIS, University of the Aegean, Académie des Sciences, Arts et Belles Lettres, Di- jon, European Academy of Sciences and Arts, Shanghai Archaeological Forum, Samara State In- stitute of Culture

GEORGIOS MATSOPOULOS, American College of Greece

KOSTYANTYN BALABANOV, Mariupol State University, National Academy of Paedagogical Sciences of Ukraine

YΑΝΝΙS ΤZIFOPOULOS, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki

SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE

KYRIAKOS EFSTATHIOU, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki

VICTOR IVANOVICI, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki

NIKOLAOS KOYRKOYMELIS, Centre d’Etudes Diplomatiques et Stratégiques, Grèce

GEΟRGE PAΡATHEDOROU, University of Patras

SPYRIDON PAVLIDES, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki

LEONIDAS RADOS, A.D. Xenopol Institute of Romania

SPYROS SYROPOULOS, University of the Aegean

MYKOLA TROFYMENKO, Mariupol State University of Ukraine

AGATHONIKI TSILIPAKOU, Museum of Byzantine Culture, Thessaloniki

GΕΟRGIΟS ΗΑLΚΙΑS, University of Oxford, University of Hong Kong

EYANTHIS HATZIVASSILIOU, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens

ΕLPIDΑ HADJIDAKI, past Director, Underwater Antiquities, Greek Ministry of Culture

KIMON CHRISTANIS, University of Patras www.academy.edu.gr [email protected] [email protected] Πάπυροι - Επιστημονικό Περιοδικό Papyri - Scientific Journal Δέλτοι Delti τόμος 4, 2015 volume 4, 2015 www.academy.edu.gr [email protected] ΠΕΡΙΕΧΟΜΕΝΑ TABLE OF CONTENTS

1 Barnard's Surprise: Competence as a Moral Quality 1 CHRISTOPHER VASILLOPULOS, Professor, Eastern Connecticut State University, U.S.A.

2 TheΧΡΙΣΤΟΦΟΡΟΣ Natural RightsΒΑΣΙΛΟΠΟΥΛΟΣ, Basis of ΚαθηγητήςAristotelian, Eastern Education Connecticut State University. Η.Π.Α. 21 CHRISTOPHER VASILLOPULOS, Professor, Eastern Connecticut State University, U.S.A.

3 InquiriesΧΡΙΣΤΟΦΟΡΟΣ and ΒΑΣΙΛΟΠΟΥΛΟΣ, Confession before Καθηγητής the Cross:, Eastern An Connecticut Interpretation State University. of Wang Η.Π.Α. Guilin’s My 43 Jerusalem Liu Yan, China, Institute for Trans-cultural Studies, Beijing International Studies University, Peking, China

4 Zeno of Citium and Zhuangzi on Virtue and Eudaimonia 65 PANOS ELIOPOULOS, Ph.D. Adjunct Lecturer in the University of Peloponnese, Hellas

ΠΑΝΟΣ ΗΛΙΟΠΟΥΛΟΣ, Διδάκτωρ Φιλοσοφίας του Εθνικού Καποδιστριακού Πανεπιστημίου Αθηνών, 5 InterculturalΔιδάσκων Πανεπιστημίου Philosophy Πελοποννήσου, and Constructive Ελλάς Dialogue on Cross-Cultural Norms 75 RICHARD EVANOFF, School of International Politics, Economics, and Communication, Aoyama Gakuin University, Tokyo, Japan

6 Being Human Among Humans: Plurality in The Divided World 91

ΤοÖZLEM να είσαιDUVA KAYA,άνθρωπος Assoc. ανάμεσαProf. Dr. of Philosophy,σε ανθρώπους: Faculty η of πολλαπλότητα Letters, Dokuz Eylül σε University, έναν διαιρεμένο Turkey. κόσμο

ΟΖΛΕΜ ΝΤΟΥΒΑ ΚΑΓΙΑ, Αναπληρώτρια Καθηγήτρια Φιλοσοφίας, Τομέας των Γραμμάτων, Πανεπιστήμιο 7 Ντοκούζ Εϋλούλ, Τουρκία 99

Γνωσιολογία της Δημοκρατίας και Νεωτερικότητα. Το Διακύβευμα της Υπέρβασης του Δυτικοευρωπαϊκού Διαφωτισμού GnoseologyΓΙΩΡΓΟΣ ΚΟΝΤΟΓΙΩΡΓΗΣ, of Democracy Καθηγητής and Modernity. Πολιτικής Επιστήμης, πρ. Πρύτανις του Παντείου Πανεπιστημίου. 113 TheΕλλάς Issue at Sake of the Transcendence of the Western European Enlightenment G ORG CONTOG ORGIS, Professor of P litical Science, former Rector of Panteion University. Hellas

8 TheΕ FutureΕ HumanΕ Being – What οis it like? 127 TETIANA MATUSEVYCH, National Pedagogical Dragomanov University

9 Moral and social values from Ancient Greek Tragedy 137

GEORGIA XANTHAKI-KARAMANOU, Professor of Ancient Greek Philology at the School of Philosophy, Faculty ofΗθικές Philology και of κοινωνικές the National andαξίες Kapodistrian από την ΑρχαίαUniversity Ελληνική of Athens. ΤραγωδίαHellas -

ΓΕΩΡΓΙΑ ΞΑΝΘΑΚΗ ΚΑΡΑΜΑΝΟΥ, Καθηγήτρια της Αρχαίας Ελληνικής Φιλολογίας του Τμήματος 10 "Nature”Φιλοσοφίας and της "Water”Σχολής Φιλολογίας in the ancient του Εθνικού Greek και philosophy Καποδιστριακού Πανεπιστημίου Αθηνών. Ελλάς 149 SPYROS PAVLIDES, Professor of Neotectonics and Palaeoseismology, Department of Geology, former Dean of the Faculty of Science, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki. Hellas

. ΣΠΥΡΟΣ ΠΑΥΛΙΔΗΣ, Καθηγητής Νεοτεκτονικής και Παλαιοσεισμολογίας, του Τμήματος Γεωλογίας, πρ. Κοσμήτωρ της Σχολής Θετικών Επιστημών, του Αριστοτελείου Πανεπιστημίου Θεσσαλονίκης Ελλάς

Πάπυροι - Επιστημονικό Περιοδικό Papyri - Scientific Journal Δέλτοι Delti τόμος 4, 2015 volume 4, 2015 www.academy.edu.gr [email protected] ΠΕΡΙΕΧΟΜΕΝΑ TABLE OF CONTENTS

11 The Nature of Logically Simple Objects in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus 155 Tractatus Wittgenstein EMMANUEL PERAKIS, Ph.D, Department of Philosophical and Social Studies, Philosophy School, University of ΗCrete Φύση. των λογικά απλών αντικειμένων στο του , Ελλάς . Hellas ΕΜΜΑΝΟΥΗΛ ΠΕΡΑΚΗΣ Διδάκτωρ Φιλοσοφίας του Τμήματος Φιλοσοφικών και Κοινωνικών Σπουδών της 12 SartreΦιλοσοφικής and theΣχολής Problemτου Πανεπιστημίου of UniversalΚρήτης Human Nature Revisited 165 DAVID EDWARD ROSE, Senior Lecturer in Philosophy, Newcastle University, U.K.

13 Music Evolution in Ancient Greece and the Value of Music Education in Pseudo-Plutarch’s 185 De Musica ATHENA SALAPPA-ELIOPOULOU, PhD candidate, Department of Philosophy-Pedagogy and Psychology, Faculty of Philosophy, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens. Hellas

14 Criticism of the heideggerian interpretation of the aristotelian substance 199 CARMEN SEGURA PERAITA, Departamento de Filosofía Teorética, Facultad de Filosofía, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, España

Πάπυροι - Επιστημονικό Περιοδικό Δέλτοι τόμος 4, 2015

Papyri - Scientific Journal Delti volume 4, 2015

Barnard's Surprise: Competence as a Moral Quality

CHRISTOPHER VASILLOPULOS, Professor, Eastern Connecticut State University, U.S.A. ΧΡΙΣΤΟΦΟΡΟΣ ΒΑΣΙΛΟΠΟΥΛΟΣ, Καθηγητής, Eastern Connecticut State University. Η.Π.Α. Email: [email protected]

Θεσσαλονίκη 2015 – Thessaloniki 2015 ISSN:2241‐5106

Πάπυροι - Επιστημονικό Περιοδικό Papyri - Scientific Journal Δέλτοι Delti τόμος 4, 2015 volume 4, 2015 www.academy.edu.gr [email protected] Barnard's Surprise: Competence as a Moral Quality

Barnard's Surprise: Competence as a Moral Quality

CHRISTOPHER VASILLOPOULOS

Περίληψη Για τον Chester Barnard η ικανότητα είναι μια ηθική ποιότητα. Η αποκλειστική ικανό‐ τητα πηγαίνει πολύ πέρα από την τεχνική κατανόηση της φύσης και των στόχων ενός οργα‐ νισμού και πολύ πέρα από την επιλογή και την αξιολόγηση του. Μια αποτελεσματική οργά‐ νωση εξαρτάται από την ηγεσία, την οποία ο Barnard ορίζει ως μια δυνατότητα να δημιουρ‐ γήσει ένα πεδίο συνεργασίας που υπερβαίνει αντικειμενικά τα στοιχεία της ανταμοιβής και της τιμωρίας. Η ηγεσία είναι μια ηθική ευθύνη, δηλαδή, είναι το σημάδι ενός υπεύθυνου που ενσαρκώνει τις αξίες καθώς και τους στόχους ενός οργανισμού. Γίνεται, λοιπόν, μια κρίσιμη λειτουργία του υπεύθυνου να επιλέγει τους εργαζόμενους οι οποίοι "τοποθετούνται για συ‐ νεργασία". Ο Barnard αμφιβάλλει ότι οι εργαζόμενοι μπορούν να γίνουν συνεργάσιμοι με τε‐ χνικές κινήτρων που δεν εξαρτώνται από την αποτελεσματική οργάνωση. Αποτελεσματικές οργανώσεις είναι η ευτυχής συμβολή του συνεταιρισμού των εργαζομένων, τα αποδεκτά και πρακτικά καθήκοντα, η τεχνική ικανότητα και η ηγεσία. Αν και οι αποτελεσματικές οργανώ‐ σεις κατέχουν πολλά λογικά χαρακτηριστικά, στην ουσία τους είναι μη‐λογικά. Δεν μπορεί να περιοριστούν στην τεχνική τους ικανότητα. Βασίζονται σε μια προθυμία να συνεργαστούν, μια προθυμία που πρέπει να καλλιεργηθεί με εκτελεστικές αρμοδιότητες. Ο Barnard τονίζει ότι η ηγεσία δεν είναι και δεν μπορεί να είναι χειραγώγηση, επειδή οι εργαζόμενοι που είναι εξοπλισμένοι για τη συνεργασία τους δυνάμει του παρόντος γνωρίσματος του χαρακτήρα τους θα δυσανασχετούν και θα ηττηθούν από τις απόπειρες να τον χειραγωγήσουν. Επι‐ πλέον, δυνάμει της αρμοδιότητάς ενός διοικητικού στελέχους, αυτός ή αυτή θα είναι ανίκα‐ νος, όχι μόνο απρόθυμος, να χειραγωγήσει ή αλλιώς να αντιμετωπίσει έναν υπάλληλο ως α‐ ντικείμενο ή εργαλείο. Όχι μόνο μια τέτοια προσπάθεια θα υπονομεύσει την ηθική ευθύνη της εκτελεστικής εξουσίας, αλλά θα καταστρέψει τη βάση συνεργασίας που είναι απαραίτητη για μια αποτελεσματική οργάνωση. Η αρμοδιότητα δεν είναι μόνο μια ηθική ποιότητα. Είναι επί‐ σης μια κινητήρια, ίσως η μοναδική που αξίζει κάθε εκτελεστική προσπάθεια σε όλα.

Abstract For Chester Barnard competence is a moral quality. Executive competence goes far be‐ yond the technical understanding of the nature and objectives of an organization and far be‐ yond the selection and evaluation of it. An effective organization depends upon leadership, which Barnard defines as an ability to create an arena of cooperation that transcends objec‐ tive considerations of reward and punishment. Leadership is a moral responsibility, that is, it is the sign of an executive who embodies the organizations values as well as its objectives. It thus becomes a critical executive function to select employees who are “fitted for coopera‐ tion”. Barnard doubts that employees can be made cooperative by motivational techniques independent of an efficacious organization. Effective organizations are the happy confluence of cooperative employees, acceptable and practical tasks, technical ability and leadership. Alt‐ hough effective organizations possess many logical characteristics, in their essence they are

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non‐logical. They cannot be reduced to technical competence. They rely on a willingness to cooperate, a willingness that must be nurtured by executive responsibility. Barnard stresses that leadership is not and cannot be manipulative, because employees fitted for cooperation by virtue of this character trait will resent and defeat attempts to manipulate him or her. Moreover, by virtue of an executive’s competence, he or she will be unable, not just unwilling, to manipulate or otherwise treat an employee as an object or a tool. Not only would such an effort undermine the executive’s moral responsibility, it would destroy the cooperative basis essential to an effective organization. Competence is not only a moral quality. It is also a moti‐ vational one, perhaps the only one worth any executive effort at all.

I should say that in a storm there must surely be a great advantage in having the aid of the pilot’s art. Plato

I. Introduction Not since the Great Depression has the idea of business, of free enterprise been under such widespread assault. Not since the 1930s has the view that the economy is too important to be left to those who seek profits and personal gain. With the collapse of some of the world’s largest financial institutions and near failure of iconic organizations like General Motors, with the spectacle of executives who make millions yearly in salary and bonuses and tens of mil‐ lions in severance pay, even when their companies lose money in the billions, it cannot be surprising that respect for business is dissolving almost as fast as Bernie Madoff’s ‘invest‐ ments.’ A lack of faith in free enterprise as the engine of prosperity is a crisis that cannot be overestimated. Far more than an economic problem, should the middle classes cease to be‐ lieve in the competence of executives, the very fabric of liberal democracies will be torn. In‐ trusive governmental control of the private sector will be demanded by an outraged and pan‐ icked middle class. It will do no good to point out that the middle class has largely be the crea‐ tion of the free play of business interests in societies long dominated by authoritarian re‐ gimes. For the traditional values of the middle class: suspicion of government, respect for in‐ dividual initiative, self‐discipline, hard work, saving and investment—all the virtues Max We‐ ber identified with the success of business societies—will not avail. The rise of authoritarian governments in nearly every European nation‐state during the Great Depression should alert all thoughtful people to the dangers in the collapse of the faith in middle class and business values. Although it is important to deal with the excesses of financial institutions, to detoxify assets, to readjust the supply of housing and to deal with other economic imbalances, these efforts by themselves cannot undo the consequences of a generalized loss of faith in business values. Only a belief that executives will run their companies honestly and decently and, above all, competently can sustain the underlying values of middle class society. So important is this for Barnard that effective executive “command respect and reverence:” The leadership which reflects the attitudes and ideals of society and its general institu‐ tions…is the aspect of individual superiority in determination, persistence, endurance, courage; that which determines the quality of action; which often is most inferred from

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what is not done, from abstention; which commands respect, reverence.1 In this context competence is a moral quality and incompetence verges on criminal negligence. Without this kind of executive, organizations will fail. Without successful organi‐ zations, liberal society will disintegrate. For these reasons an examination of Chester Bar‐ nard’s Functions of the Executive may be in order. No management theorist has stressed the relationship of morality and competence more than he. Barnard ended his book with the above quotation from Plato. Leadership is more than a way to command. In a storm it is a way to reach port safely. Persons as participants in specific cooperative systems are regarded in their purely functional aspects, as phases of cooperation…as outside any specific or‐ ganization, a person is regarded as a unique individuation of physical, biologi‐ cal, and social factors, possessing in limited degree a power of choice… both are always present in cooperative systems.2

II. The Cooperative Self One of the most critical executive functions is to inculcate organizational goals into its members. Key to this process—sometimes called the inculcation of motives—is the under‐ standing each member or employee possesses of his or her role in the cooperative enterprise. This proposition seems straight forward. For Barnard, however, few cardinal concepts were simple or transparent. The more important they were, he often assumed, the more subtle their impact on the organization, the more they required a sophisticated analysis. In this spirit we discuss the Barnardian view of many organizational concepts. Let us begin with “understand‐ ing.” The philosopher/psychoanalyst Herbert Fingarette has said of a typical patient: "Although his suffering may be amenable to chemical, surgical, or miscellaneous psychological influences, the classical therapeutic aim of psychoanalysis is to transmute his feelings, desires, and actions through understanding."3 Despite many obvious differences between the situation of a member of a complex organization and a patient, and despite the fact that Barnard did not believe psy‐ chology—either as a discipline or a concern—had a great deal to do with cooperative systems, Fingarette captured a great deal of what Barnard thought about the relationship of understand‐ ing to other critical management concepts. Barnard might have said of a typical member or employee of an organization: "Although his willingness to cooperate might be amenable to ma‐ terial, physical, or miscellaneous psychological influences, the classical effectiveness aim of co‐ operative systems is to transmute his or her feelings, desires, and actions through understand‐ ing." If this is true, it suggests some interesting and even surprising ideas for the Barnardian executive. It is the purpose of this unavoidably complex paper to extrude some of these from Barnard's difficult and opaque prose. Later in this essay Section V. Barnard’s Surprise, I will try to explicate an exceptional‐ ly difficult passage dealing with “understanding” on the assumption that its complexity lies in its attempt to appreciate a complicated process, not in Barnard's inability to make a simple point or make a complex point simply. The process of unraveling Barnard is worthwhile, not only because of the intrinsic value of appreciating an important organizational thinker, but

1 Barnard, Chester, the Functions of the Executive, Harvard, 1938, p.60, emphasis original. 2 Barnard, op.cit.,p.16 3 Fingarette, Herbert, the Self in Transformation, Harper, NY, 1965, p.37

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because his thought provides foundations of understanding of vexing contemporary dilem‐ mas. The metaphor of foundation may mislead by suggesting a much too linear process. I don't believe one first understands Barnard or any other original thinker, and then applies him to some pressing concern. To understand him it is necessary to interlard Barnard with one's experience in the hope of mutual illumination. This fundamental principle of learning premises my method. Barnard's concept of understanding will be analyzed in terms of con‐ cepts imbedded in or implied by his words but also in terms of more recent concepts, espe‐ cially motivation and Management By Objectives MBO. My intention is to gain insight into Barnard's and more contemporary ideas by reading one concept in the light of others in a re‐ ciprocating process. In this case the results indicate why Barnard was not much interested in motivation, despite his emphasis on organizations as cooperative systems, that is, systems which resonated with organic rather than mechanical metaphors and why he would probably look with favor on management techniques like MBO, despite their rote properties which seem consistent with more mechanistic approaches to management than Barnard favored. The executive functions serve to maintain a system of cooperative effort. They are impersonal. The functions are not…to manage a group of persons…. It is not even correct to say that the executive functions are to manage a system of coop‐ erative efforts. As a whole it is managed by itself, not by executive organization, which is part of it. Chester Barnard4

III. The Limits of Motivation Among the hoariest principles of management theory is that motivated employees are superior to less motivated ones. Upon this premise motivational theories have been built, jus‐ tified, and applied to numberless employees in almost every conceivable work environment. It has been the rare motivational theory which has been able to avoid its commercial applica‐ tion by what I call “motivationists.” By “motivationists” I do not mean academics like Maslow, Hertzberg, Vroom or Deming. I am not referencing various approaches to factors of human motives, for example, hygiene, the need for self‐esteem and the like. Nor am I quarrelling, nor would have Barnard quarreled, with conceptions like the hierarchy of human needs. Rather I am referring to the notion which suggests that when managers are aware of the factors of mo‐ tivation and make their employees aware of them, this process is by itself motivational; that is, in Barnard’s terms, it inculcates organizational motives into the employee. I am not sug‐ gesting that executive sensitivity to employee needs and aspirations is of no value. I am saying that it is of little value unless it is related to the faith in the executive’s competence. I referring also to the kinds of techniques made popular by Tom Peters.5 Whatever value these may have in and of themselves, company picnics, children’s games and other “team‐building” activities simply could not inculcate motives to cooperate in any meaningful way for Barnard. As he makes no reference to such activities, I argue that an understanding of what he meant by mo‐ tives, goals and purposes implies the irrelevance of such activities. Furthermore, I argue that Barnard believed that such activities could be harmful. Communication of objectives and pur‐ poses was important for Barnard, but it is not motivational. At best it is a condition of motiva‐ tion. An employee is motivated when he “authorizes” the acceptance of organizational goals

4 Barnard, op.cit., p.216 5 Peters, Tom, In Search of Excellence, Warner, NY, 1984

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into his decisional process. What is motivational in Barnard’s sense and what has received lit‐ tle attention, even by motivational theorist with which I share values, especially Maslow, is that leadership by its demonstration of competence enlists employees in the cooperative ef‐ fort, presuming they are fitted for cooperation, is the most important way to inculcate organi‐ zational values. As a corollary, efforts to increase enthusiasm, a non‐logical commitment to grand organizational purposes, by means of inspirational speech can have negative effects when they work. Motivationists often claim command of a process which can achieve higher productive‐ ly, without recourse to coercion or incentives. If workers already are self motivated, or if productivity increases can be assured by either coercion or material incentives, it is difficult to see what motivationist or even their more academic cousins have added to management techniques which focus on the relatively objective elements of the job. I doubt any motivation‐ ist approaches potential clients with the proposition that productivity can be increased by across the board wage hikes or by the judicious use of the lash. Barnard did not believe either incentive would do much good. “Material rewards are ineffective beyond the subsistence level excepting a very limited proportion of men….”6 Employees can be coerced, of course, but not without undermining the very basis of the organization: cooperation. “No superior permanent or very complex system of cooperation to a greater extent merely by coercion.”7 Whether mo‐ tivational theorists or their clients agree with Barnard or not, the appeal of their product is that it can work independently of such incentives. They suggest workers can be persuaded or psychologically adjusted to be more productive less expensively than otherwise possible. Barnard believed in the reality of motives, but not in the concepts of motivational theo‐ ry or the claims of motivationists. In Functions of the Executive, there is no reference to moti‐ vational theory or motivationists and precious few to motivation, although there are scores of instances of “motives.” We call desires, impulses, wants, by the name “motives.” They are chiefly resultants of forces in the physical, biological, and social environments present and past. In other words, “motives” are constructions for the psychological factors of individuals... in‐ ferred from action...persons can occasionally be aware of their motives before an ac‐ tion but usually what a man wants can be known even to himself only form what he does or tries to do, given an opportunity for selective action.8 It is important to emphasize that the truth of an individual's motives, even to himself, is not available. At best, it is an inference: I do not necessarily mean by this that in any specific situation motives of men may usually be determined by what they do and say at that time. On the contrary there are many situations in which the motives of men are to be only inferred by 1 what they do and say in this situation; 2 what they have said and done in the past in similar and dissimilar situations; 3 and what they do and say after the situation.9 In other words, to warrant such an inference one needs to have examined the entire fabric of an individual's life. And then it remains an inference, even to the individual himself. It would be hard to state more powerfully the essentially private nature of motives.

6 Barnard, op.cit., p.144 7 Barnard, op.cit., p.150 8 Barnard, op.cit.,p.17‐8 9 Barnard, op.cit., p.18, note, emphasis original

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Nevertheless, motives, along with "alternatives external to the individual" are critical factors to organization.10 "Organizations result from the modification of the action of the indi‐ vidual through control of or the influence upon one of these categories. Deliberate conscious and specialized control of them is the essence of the executive functions."11 It is possible to read this as indicating that it is an executive's responsibility to control, among other things, "the desires, impulses, wants" of an individual, or what Barnard called "motives." But this is not what Barnard intended. The reason is plain. Insofar as they are subject to executive deci‐ sions, inferences regarding motives are guesses regarding the character of an individual as it may dispose him or her to continue to make a contribution to an organizational goal. Coupled with an incentive system or other factors external to an individual and therefore much more subject to executive control, these guesses may enable an executive to continue to receive suf‐ ficient contribution form a sufficient number of individuals for a sufficient period of time to enable the cooperative system to function. This is the extent of the control over the category of motives Barnard's thought implied. In other references, Barnard saw motives as dependent on cooperative systems or effective organizations. "Hence cooperation compels changes in the motives of individuals which otherwise would not take place."12 And again, "personal pur‐ poses motives cannot be satisfied through cooperative action without a distributive pro‐ cess...."13 Thus, motives are linked with the employee’s worker's cost‐benefit analysis, as he underscored: "The net satisfactions which induce a man to contribute his efforts to an organi‐ zation result from the positive advantages as against the disadvantages as are entailed. "14 “Positive” does not mean “only material.” "Even in purely commercial organizations material incentives are so weak as to be almost negligible, except when reinforced by other incentives, and then only because of wholesale general persuasion in the form of salesmanship and ad‐ vertising."15 This may seem to open the door to motivational techniques as we now think of them, but it does not. Barnard took pains to separate the organizational from the personal: It is frequently assumed in reasoning about organizations that common purpose and individual motive are or should be identical.... Individual motive is necessarily an in‐ ternal, personal, subjective thing; common purpose is necessarily an external, imper‐ sonal, objective thing, even though the individual interpretation of it is subjective.16 His conception of an individual as an organic and psychic whole, who contributes to organiza‐ tions only to achieve otherwise unattainable goals and only under conditions which balance advantages and disadvantages, militates against any external process which treats an individ‐ uals "as objects to be manipulated by changing the factors affecting them."17 Like Aristotle, Barnard did not ascribe meaning to an individual apart from a social context, but this does not mean an individual is simply a summation of social factors: "There are no distinguishable so‐ cial factors operating from within the individual to the cooperative system; but factors upon

10 Barnard, op.cit., p.17 11 Barnard, op.cit., p.17 12 Barnard, op.cit., p.41 13 Barnard, op.cit., p.32 14 Barnard, op.cit.,p.140 15 Barnard, op.cit., p.144 16 Barnard, op.cit., p.88‐9 17 Barnard, op.cit., p.40, emphasis original

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the individual from a cooperative system as well as other social relationships."18 Social factors are inevitably incorporated into "their mental and emotional characters."19 Incorporation, however, is not a process available to an executive to anyone but his children. Adults may change, but they come already socialized to a cooperative system. That is, they make their ef‐ forts only in the expectation of having their motives satisfied. They remain the only determi‐ nants of this process, "since motives are individual."20 So whatever it is that motivational the‐ ory does to an individual, it can have little impact on organizational effectiveness. Effective organizations do not need motivationists. A Barnardian worker simply treats any such efforts in the same manner he or she responds to any other stimulus, that is, another item to subject to prudential consideration. Insofar as a motivational attempt is perceived as manipulative, it is likely to backfire. Barnard not only thought it inevitable for employees to play their own game, he thought it proper to do so: Willingness to cooperate, positive or negative, is the expression of the net satisfactions or dissatisfactions experienced or anticipated by each individual in comparison with those experienced or anticipated through alternative opportunities…. Thus from the viewpoint of the individual, willingness is the joint effect of personal desires and reluc‐ tances; form the viewpoint of the organization, it is the joint effect of objective induce‐ ments offered and burdens imposed. The measure of this net result, however, is entire‐ ly individual, personal and subjective.21 Even if we allow a more expansive and modern use of the term “motives” to include motivationist techniques, I believe Barnard would not have thought much of the efficacy of the effort and less of its propriety. Furthermore, insofar as Barnard was concerned with "deper‐ sonalized action" or with the behavior of units, motivation was largely beside the point, be‐ cause motives, insofar as organizational effectiveness was concerned, were beside the point. Whatever role motives play as a psychological summation of desires has already been fulfilled at the point of entry into the unit or the moment the work is depersonalized. Its impact on an organization can be subsumed by an individual's acceptance, for whatever reasons, of the in‐ centive system, his technical competence and his understanding of his or her unit's objectives. An individual’s organizational contributions are not “personal” and therefore not psychologi‐ cally grounded.22 Motivation, conceived as an outcome of motivational intervention, had little bearing on the unit which actually fulfilled or failed to fulfill organizational objectives. Motivation was not restricted in Barnard's thought to the unit level of analysis. It could have impact on general goals or causes, areas not so susceptible to rational calculation. Never‐ theless, the resistance of non‐logically based motives to cost/benefit analysis does not leave an adult worker vulnerable to motivational manipulation. Motives are characterological. They resist external phenomena, a resistance which for Barnard would have been reinforced by the depersonalized nature of an individual's contribution to a cooperative system, especially a commercial one. Motives change, but much more likely a result of an ontological choice not a rational decision. These are "choices which make one a new person in a new world, that in‐ volve sometimes sudden, sometimes gradual, but always involuntary, fusion of the whole into

18 Barnard, op.cit., p.40 19 Barnard, op.cit., p.40 20 Barnard, op.cit., p.40 21 Barnard, op.cit., p.85‐6, emphasis supplied 22 Barnard, op.cit., 186

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a meaningful pattern which then takes over."23 In Barnardian terms, such choices make up the character of an individual and they are not to be confused with the individual's responses to external phenomena, although these responses may provide clues to character. “The point is that responsibility is the property of an individual by which whatever morality exists in him becomes effective in conduct.”24 Motivational theory, particularly in the hands of motivationists, takes itself to be the independent variable and human behavior as dependent. This could not be further from Bar‐ nard's conception of the individual as the independent variable and his contribution to an or‐ ganization, his depersonalized action on behalf of his unit, as the dependent outcome. The in‐ dividual does not contribute his or her self to the organization but only to a limited set of ac‐ tivities under specific conditions. “The individual is always the basic strategic factor in organ‐ ization. Regardless of his history or his obligations he must be induced to cooperate, or there can be no cooperation.”25 And inducement is far from a simple process: Material rewards are ineffective beyond the subsistence level excepting a very limited proportion of men…. The opportunities for distinction, prestige, personal power, and the attainment of a dominating position are much more important than material rewards….26 If these variables were not difficult enough, they must be placed in the fundamentally subjec‐ tive context of the individual. This degree of complexity forced Barnard to conclude that it was not so much that the character of an individual is inviolate but irrelevant, except as it condi‐ tions the nature and substance of the agreement made between the organization and the em‐ ployee. It never occurred to him to consider a person's motives as a zone of opportunity to in‐ crease production against the individual's assessment of his or her interests. The charactero‐ logical basis of a person’s behavior was stated by Barnard with unusual force. Consider how much the kind of person he describes can be motivated or persuaded to do anything outside his moral code: For his children he will kill, steal, cheat the government; rob the church, leave the wa‐ ter plant at a critical time more generally, abandon his responsibilities, botch a job by hurrying. If his children are not directly at stake, he will sacrifice money, health, time, comfort, convenience, jury duty, church obligations, in order to keep the water plant running…. If his government legally orders him to violate his religious code, he will go to jail first.27 To the degree that this personal code seems idealistic, extreme, utopian or absurd may be the measure of the current crisis of the private sector, if not the social order as a whole. Barnard took pains to argue that this kind of executive is the norm in any successful complex organiza‐ tion. Competence is not merely a moral quality of the leader, it is necessary to induce coopera‐ tion among his or her followers. Competence thus becomes a moral quality of the organiza‐ tion. So far from being utopian, Barnard could not envision a successful organization without this quality pervading the entire organization. Needless to say, Barnard did not believe that any motivational scheme from the outside could induce this kind of cooperation. Free and unfree, controlling and controlled, choosing and being chosen, inducing and

23 Fingarette, op.cit., p.55‐6 24 Barnard, op.cit., p.267, emphasis original 25 Barnard, op.cit., p.139 26 Barnard, op.cit., p.144 &145 27 Barnard, op.cit.,p.268

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unable to resist inducement, the source of authority and unable to deny it, independent and dependent, nourishing their personalities, and yet depersonalized; forming purposes and be‐ ing forced to change them, searching for limitations in order to make decisions, seeking the particular but concerned with the whole, finding leaders and denying their leadership, hoping to dominate the earth and being dominated by the unseen—this is the story of man in society told in these. Chester Barnard28

IV. Individuals and Their Beliefs Despite Barnard's profoundly liberal bias, which entailed the highest respect for indi‐ viduals, his critics have accused him of a willingness to practice "deception" on employees.”29 According to Perrow: "When common purposes do not exist, the answer is to manufacture them.... So propaganda and indoctrination are necessary.”30 Perrow's unwarranted leap from indoctrination to deception is partially the fault of Barnard's diction. Nevertheless, it is hard to understand how any intelligent reader could fail to realize that neither indoctrination nor propaganda were synonyms for deception in Barnard's thought. A sentence like, "The inculca‐ tion of belief in the real existence of a common purpose is an essential executive function"31 contains an ambiguity. Just what does “real” mean? To resolve the ambiguity in favor of de‐ ception, however, is not necessary. The sentence can just as easily be read to mean that work‐ ers may need to be reminded of the reality of their shared goals. It need not be read that ex‐ ecutives should manufacture something which gullible workers will believe is real, when ob‐ jective evidence indicates the contrary, to say nothing of violating an individual’s core values. Barnard further thought that belief would be more sustainable, if it had factual support and could be seen as conforming to an employee’s personal integrity. In other words, it was more likely that employees would believe something that could warrant the label of truth. Propa‐ ganda and indoctrination may help inculcate belief, but not in defiance of objective evidence. Nor was it sufficient to believe in the value of the organization’s goals. Cooperative effort re‐ quired the belief in the competence. Here I believe it is useful to underscore Barnard’s repeat‐ ed reference to military and religious organizations. In these organizations, normal material incentives have little value. Faith is required: in the organization’s goals and in the capacity of the organization’s leaders to create an environment appropriate to the accomplishment of these goals. Even in these intense organizations, where it seems the individual is subordinated to the organization, the army or the church, Barnard did not believe executives could over‐ come organizational failure by motivating its members: “The general executive process is not intellectual in its important aspect; it is aesthetic and moral. Thus its exercise involves the sense of fitness, of the appropriate, and that capacity which is known as responsibility….”32 One believes in an organization, independent of its goals, because one believes in its leaders. In other words, motives are thus inculcated in the members’ organization by the members’ belief in the competence of their leaders: This willingness to cooperate requires the belief that the purpose can be carried out, a faith that diminishes to the vanishing point as it appears that it is not in fact in pro‐

28 Barnard, op.cit., p.296 29 Perrow, Charles, Complex Organizations, 3ed, Random House, NY, 1986, p.69 30 Perrow, op.cit., p.69 31 Barnard, op.cit., p.87 32 Barnard, op.cit., p.257

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cess of being attained. Hence, when effectiveness ceases, willingness to contribute dis‐ appears.33 This process exactly mirrors Barnard’s famous notion of authority. “Authority always lies with him to whom it applies. Coercion creates a contrary illusion; but the use of force ipso facto destroys the authority postulated.”34 If Barnard is to be understood, the centrality and meaning of belief must be appreciated. There was no such thing as objective truth which all men and women would automatically recognize or even which they could be commanded to believe. Perhaps he was wrong. Perhaps there is, as Perrow seems to assume, Truth: factual, positive, beyond doubt, on the one hand; and on the other is Belief: conjectural, subjective, dubious. In any event, Barnard did not think matters were so simple. Human beings act on be‐ liefs. This did not mean they preferred lies to truth or emotions to intellect but that human beings respond to situations as organic wholes. Barnard shared with Dewey the conviction that "man has two modes, two dimensions, of belief.... He has beliefs about actual existences and the course of events, and he has beliefs about ends to be striven for, policies to be adopt‐ ed, goods to be attained and evils to be averted. The most urgent of all practical problems con‐ cerns the connection the subject‐matter of these two kinds of beliefs sustain to each other."35 Barnard believed that the concept of “understanding” was critical to this interrelationship. But he had a great deal of difficulty making a single meaning with all its connotations much less a denotative meaning perform work commensurate with this great task. The absence of truth or even of evidence sufficient for scientific verification did not warrant managerial efforts to create belief contrary to fact. There may not be absolute Truth; there are, however, lies, distortions, manipulations and other forms of duplicity. To suggest that he used his philosophical assumption that the world is understood through human per‐ ception and that human actions are premised on beliefs about what is perceived and that what we call facts are similarly premised to justify fraud or lies is simply false. Here, too, he may have been incorrect. He may have presumed individuals were less prone to irrational in‐ fluences than they are or have more integrity than they do. Perhaps some human beings would rather believe in lies and therefore open themselves to fraud and deception. Perhaps some are unprincipled. His organizations, nonetheless, had no room for those who would de‐ ceive or those who would be deceived, because they are unfitted for cooperation. Men and women quite properly decided in their own terms just how much their purposes and organi‐ zational goals overlapped and how much of their efforts these overlappings justified. Although the liberal understanding of the centrality of the inviolable personal integrity complicates ex‐ ecutive functions and its drive to achieve a cooperative environment, this complication is not to be regretted or grudged. For only such persons are fitted for cooperation and as such are indispensable. Indeed Barnard repeatedly cited the difficulty of securing the requisite cooperation, precisely because of the recalcitrance and legitimacy of private codes and subjective calcula‐ tions, of, in short, individualism. “Successful cooperation in or by formal organizations is the abnormal, not the normal, condition.”36 Cooperation could not be based on undeniable truth any more than it could be based on an identity of interests. Someone who refused to recog‐

33 Barnard, op.cit., p.82 34 Barnard, op.cit. p.183 35 Dewey, John, the Quest for Certainty, from McDermott, the Philosophy of John Dewey, Putnam, NY, 1963, p.367 36 Barnard, op.cit., p.5

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nize a sufficiency of shared purpose to contribute to an organization might be the recipient an effort to change his mind, to invite it to conform sufficiently to another view of reality with a view toward securing his or her cooperation. No person, however, was properly the object of deception or duplicity. It was difficult enough to secure cooperation when a shared purpose seemed real, that is, when warranted by the evidence and supported by private codes. This accounts for Barnard's requirement that workers understand as much of their sit‐ uation as possible, particularly with what was necessary to secure their contribution to their unit's purpose. When propaganda was mentioned in this respect, it seems to ring of infor‐ mation similar to Taylor's orientation, not Madison Avenue. When Barnard used propaganda in less concrete terms, it referred to less objective phenomena, that is, the commitment to general goals or causes. But this is to anticipate my argument. At this point it is only necessary to state that Barnard's liberal conception of organizations as cooperative systems implied a tension between individual and organizational purposes and for that matter within the life of each individual, whose private codes quite naturally conflict one with the other. “Individual motive is necessarily an internal, personal, subjective thing; common purpose is necessarily an external, impersonal, objective thing, even though the individual interpretation of it is sub‐ jective.37 Neither internal conflicts nor one between an individual and his organization warrant action against an individual's will or better judgment. The reason for Barnard was plain: “Per‐ sons who have no sense of ego, who are lacking in self‐respect, who believe that what they do or think is unimportant, have no initiative whatever, are problems, pathological cases, insane, not of this world, unfitted for cooperation.38 In other words, a weak or ego‐deficient person may be easier to control but would be unable to contribute to the organization. Their integrity must be respected, not so much as a matter of morality but as tribute to organizational effec‐ tiveness. Executives have no proper role in these matters other than to supply evidence which supported the belief in shared by no means identical purposes. This Barnard called propa‐ ganda. In it he did not include deception, manipulation, or lies. An organization based on lies could not endure, for Lincoln's reason: no one can fool all the people all the time. And dura‐ tion was for Barnard the acid test of effectiveness.39 In this light Barnard should be under‐ stood to mean: One needs to indoctrinate and propagandize employees in organizational real‐ ity; for without their belief in it, regardless how completely it may conform to the factual, it would have little organizational effect. And it must be emphasized that reality was not the Truth or even based on it, but a set of beliefs, more or less factually based, which workers would act upon and which over time would help them to achieve organizational, as well as, personal goals. This is the pragmatic truth of John Dewey, not the lies of Goebbels which may work wonders for a while, but which in Barnard's view had to fail eventually. I believe this view is supported by an analysis of Barnard's concept of understanding Purpose can serve as an element of a cooperative system only so long as the participants do not recognize that there are serious divergences of their under‐ standing of that purpose as the object of understanding…. Hence, an objective purpose that can serve as the basis for a cooperative system is one that is be‐ lieved by the contributors or potential contributors to it to be the determined

37 Barnard, op.cit., p.89 38 Barnard, op.cit., p.13 39 Barnard, op.cit., p.91

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purpose of the organization. The inculcation of belief in the real existence of a common purpose is an essential executive function. Chester Barnard40

V. Barnard's Surprise: If one arrays Barnard's concept of understanding and its surprising outcomes against technical skill bench competence, managerial skill and motivation commitment to general goals, not only are these points substantiated but they suggest practical applications of his thought. For Barnard it was the critical element of organizational effectiveness, helping to ac‐ complish what Taylor believed possible only through Scientific Management and what moti‐ vationists believe possible only through the application of intrusive psychological techniques. As a consequence, Barnard can be seen as an advocate, in certain circumstances, of what we today call Management By Objectives MBO. In more limited circumstances, he can be seen as an advocate of an executive's attempts to inspire workers with a greater understanding of general organizational goals, an effort to motivate. Excepting only the most simple and ephemeral spontaneous organization, "the ends of cooperation cannot be accomplished without specialization. The coordination implied is a functional aspect of organization."41 Complex tasks require specialization. Specialization re‐ quires coordination. Coordination requires analysis into "detailed purposes or ends, the ac‐ complishment of which in proper order will permit the attainment of the final objective." For Barnard the level of analysis of specialization is the unit, not the individual. Thus purpose must refer to the unit's purpose. "Since purpose is the unifying element of formal organiza‐ tion, it is the detailed purpose at the unit level that is effective in maintaining the unit."42 All this is by way of preface for a remarkable passage: Understanding or acceptance of the general purpose of the complex is not, however, essential. It may be, and usually but not always is, desirable as explaining or making acceptable a detailed purpose; and if this is possible it no doubt in most cases strengthens the unit organization. But in general complex organizations are character‐ ized by obvious lack of complete understanding of general purposes or aims. Thus it is not essential and usually impossible that the company should know the specific objec‐ tives of the army as a whole; but it is essential that it know and accept an objective of its own, or it cannot function. If it feels that the whole depends upon the achievement of this objective, which it is more likely to do if it understands what the whole objective is, the intensity of its action will ordinarily be increased. It is belief in the cause rather than intellectual understanding of the objective which is of chief importance. "Under‐ standing" by itself is a rather paralyzing and divisive element.43 If superficially read, the passage can be taken to say little more than each unit should tend to its knitting. A more general understanding of the objectives of the organization may be a plus, but is not necessary and not worth much managerial effort. I believe there is much more to the paragraph than a plea for technical competence of organizational units. If that's all Barnard wanted to say, he would not have had to torture the language. Barnard's often

40 Barnard, op.cit., p.87, emphasis original 41 Barnard, op.cit., p.136 42 Barnard, op.cit., p.137 43 Barnard, op.cit., p.137‐8

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awkward diction does not account for “understanding” having at least four meanings in five instances. An analysis of his usage may illuminate what he was struggling to say. The first usage makes “understanding” a synonym of “acceptance”, lending it a heavily psychological connotation of "acceptance." The effect of this kind of understanding may lead to increased receptivity to the detailed objectives of a given unit. Insofar as these objectives are considered significant, understanding of general purposes may lead to a greater intensity of effort. His second usage of understanding includes a cognitive element: "It is essential that it a unit know...." His third usage separates intellectual understanding from its psychological context: "It is belief in the cause rather than intellectual understanding...." This usage assumes that both elements, the logical and non‐logical, of understanding are present, but that the emotional or non‐logical attachment to cause is more important than intellectual ability. Bar‐ nard separated these ideas but only to hold them in suspense. The radical separation of un‐ derstanding from its psychological footings he reserved for his final usage where he saw "Un‐ derstanding" as paralyzing and divisive. In this last sense reason or intellect by itself, divorced from the cooperative setting of the unit organization, is not properly considered an attribute among others essential to effective work. It is more than an extreme use of the meaning of “understanding”; it is not a proper meaning of the concept. This perversion of the term “un‐ derstanding” is indicated by Barnard's rare use of quotation marks. He did not use the term I found convenient, reason‐by‐itself, because he wanted his ironic use of understanding to be perfectly clear. "Understanding" is not understanding at all. "Understanding" is as crippling to organizational effectiveness as understanding is essential to it. My interpretation would seem more obvious had Barnard made explicit the parallel point that non‐logical commitment or belief in a cause‐by‐itself is a rather paralyzing of divi‐ sive element. I believe that Barnard considered this point self‐evident. He knew his audience would not need to be alerted to the dangers of unchecked emotion. The danger is purposeless intellect, intellect severed from its organic and organizational moorings, from its psychologi‐ cal context and its cooperative setting: in short, from its basis in the character of the individu‐ al and the competence of the executive, both of which are profoundly moral, that is, subject to codes that transcend intellect. Barnard was concerned with organizational health, conceived as organizational effectiveness, not the psychological adjustment or balance or workers or managers. It is a prime executive function to create and sustain a healthy organizational envi‐ ronment. In modern usage, executives should be system‐regarding. This is one expression of his expectation that executives be "dominated by the organization personality."44 Organizational effectiveness is largely determined by the executives, who must appre‐ ciate the organization’s general goals and technical skills of its employees. Hardly a surprising proposition, as Matrix One indicates. It is easy to dispense with the two lower cells. It is self‐evident that an organization deficient on technical skills and managerial skills cell 2.2, here reduced in accordance with Barnard's paragraph on understanding to the inculcation of understanding of unit objectives, is likely to be ineffective. Similarly, an organization deficient on bench competence and high on understanding, here seen largely in its psychological persona, is also likely to be ineffective, although it may contain a promise of self‐correction cell 2.1. The top row is more problematic. Cell 1.2 contains an organization that has competent technical workers but limited managerial ability. For a while this may work and even appear

44 Barnard, op.cit., p.221

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to be satisfactory, especially in highly routinized activities, where understanding of the unit's objectives is largely synonymous with technical competence. It is, however, a brittle situation, subject to rapid deterioration should changes occur in environments which demand a mana‐ gerial response. The last cell, 1.1, represents an ideal. High bench competence is coupled with good management and effectiveness results. So far no surprises. No challenges to convention‐ al wisdom. Motivation in Matrix Two refers to what Barnard called acceptance of general objec‐ tives or a non‐logically based attachment to a cause. One might be forgiven for expecting the same progression from cell 2.2 to 1.1 to occur. In other words, the more motivation, the bet‐ ter. The top row bears this out. Cell 1.1 represents a optimal state: high technical skill, high managerial competence and high motivation. Cell 1.2 is also likely to represent an effective organization. After all, this is Matrix One's cell 1.1, where high managerial and technical com‐ petences are operable. There is low commitment by units to general objectives, nonetheless, Barnard made a point of stressing the relative insignificance of this state of affairs, as we have seen. The lower row contains a break in the expected progression. I have labeled cell 2.1 Barnard's surprise. It contains the situation of high technical skill and low managerial ability and a highly motivated work force. It should be remembered this is highly unlikely, since commitment to general objectives, for Barnard, usually is an effect of good management. Nev‐ ertheless, it is not impossible to think of instances where management is not the cause of mo‐ tivated workers. The management may be new, the result of a merger or take‐over, for exam‐ ple; or the management may have grown tired or whatever; or the importance of the work of the larger organization may be self‐evident to workers, while it is masked or diluted to man‐ agers who may be otherwise occupied. The point is that motivated workers are likely to be‐ come disillusioned. Insofar as they employ their better than average energy to voicing or oth‐ erwise giving effect to their dissatisfaction, cell 2.1 is likely to be less effective than cell 2.2. Hirschman has suggested that cell 2.1 is likely to produce what he called loyalty and thereby grant a reprieve to their organization, that is, postpone a rational decision of the most compe‐ tent to exit or destroy it. Hirschman's “loyalty” refers to behavior which does not reflect a cost‐benefit analysis of current conditions, even though the member of an organization is aware of his "irrational" stance.45 Loyalty, for Hirschman, is not faith, insofar as the member believes the organization may respond to the chance the member is giving it by not exiting. Loyalty, for Barnard, was equally important, but his focus was on the executive: The most important single contribution required of the executive, certainly the most universal qualification, is loyalty, domination by the organizational personality…. The contribution of personal loyalty and submission is least susceptible to tangible in‐ ducements. Following loyalty, responsibility, and capacity to be dominated by the organization personality, come the more specific abilities.46 Barnard, however, differed from Hirschman; he was much less sanguine about the link be‐ tween loyalty and the willingness to give an ineffective organization or incompetent manage‐ ment more time. The reason, I believe, is that Barnard placed far more emphasis than Hirsch‐ man on the need for the executive to inculcate organizational values on its members by virtue

45 Hirschman, Albert, Exit, Voice and Loyalty, Harvard, Cambridge, Chapter 7. 46 Barnard, op.cit., p.220 &221

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executive competence. He was worried about too much non‐logical commitment and too little. In other words, he thought a kind of free floating loyalty, a feeling independent of faith in ex‐ ecutive competence, would be unreliable at best and dangerous at worst. Both too much loyal‐ ty and too little—and, more generally, too much non‐logical commitment and too little—are divisive and paralyzing. Members need faith, in Barnard’s view, but it is not faith anchored in the irrational. It is faith in executive competence, a competence that entails moral as well as intellectual capabilities. What this paper suggests is that too much commitment has to be ar‐ rayed against managerial competence, if Barnard's thought is to be understood. Motivated employees in the presence of good management do not have the same effect as in the presence of bad. In fact the mixture of bad managers and good employees can be the worst possible case. This anomaly if one assumes the more dedication or the more motiva‐ tion the better can have odd effects. It may be wise not just tempting under the circum‐ stances of cell 2.1 to fire the "best" most technically competent workers, because they are likely to be troublemakers to incompetent managers, a course of action which may improve matters but only marginally and temporarily. Hirschman's concern was that these workers would quit, not get fired. By this process one gets to cell 2.2, a minimalist strategy at best, but it may buy time. This is an odd modification of the time‐buying effect of Hirschman's concept of loyalty by the best employees. Here time is purchased by firing loyal employees, not listening to them, to ameliorate the worst situation. One might see more justice or efficacy in firing man‐ agement; not a likely event. Furthermore, the elimination of "disruptive" employees makes possible the application of Management by Objectives or similar techniques which can only appeal to incompetent managers. MBO can be seen as an unskilled manager's rote program which tries to lessen the effects of his or her limited skill by focusing the worker and the manager on unit objectives. This may do more than buy time. Given proper conditions one may move from cell 2.1 to 1.2. In other words, MBO may be the functional equivalent of good management without the necessity of good managers in the flesh. This is no small benefit giv‐ en the scarcity of Barnardian executives. Among other attributes, competent executives do not require rote methods or off the shelf programs to fulfill their responsibilities. If this analysis is correct, MBO has another major advantage. It may foreclose the effort of unskilled managers to improve effectiveness by subjecting workers to motivational tech‐ niques. Any effort to manipulate the already motivated workers those who have not been fired of cell 2.1 is likely to increase their disaffection. If the workers remain committed to the cause of the organization, likely only in some non‐commercial enterprises, these highly com‐ petent and dedicated workers may become saboteurs or revolutionaries. In any event, an ef‐ fort to stimulate the workers in cell 2.2 is, as we have seen, likely to make matters worse in direct proportion as motivation is increased. In other words, should motivational efforts in‐ crease worker commitment to general goals which seems to me an unlikely event, the situa‐ tion is likely to deteriorate. To recapitulate, if cell 2.1 describes the state of affairs, neither MBO or any other rote managerial technique, nor motivationist intervention is likely to help and is indeed likely to make an ineffective organization worse. The best employers demand the best employees. If they get them, perhaps by way of a take‐over, they will help move the situation directly to the ideal state of cell 1.1. If, however, cell 2.2 describes the situation, MBO or similar techniques may improve matters, that is, move the organization to cell 1.2. If motivational theory had been applied, the chances are the movement would have been to 2.1, the worst possible state

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of affairs. The proper use of motivation devolves to the inculcation of acceptance of the larger goals of an already effective organization. It may be a managerial function, assuming cost ef‐ fectiveness, to try by inspirational means to move from cell 1.2 to 1.1, from good to best. Nev‐ ertheless, in this particular set of circumstances it may be easy to misattribute the increase in organizational effectiveness to "inspirational" efforts. It may itself be a product of managerial competence. In other words, organizational effectiveness may be the most important per‐ haps the only cause of greater organizational effectiveness. Commitment to the cause may seem to be a factor because managerial competence may take its "inspirational" effects for granted. This point would be difficult to demonstrate objectively, it seems quite obvious, nonetheless, on impressionistic grounds. The moral complications of the executive functions, then, can only be endured by those possessing a commensurate ability. While, on the one hand, the requi‐ site ability without an adequate complex of moralities or without a high sense of responsibility leads to the hopeless confusion of inconsistent expediencies so often described as ‘incompetence;’ on the other hand, the requisite morality and sense of responsibility without commensurate abilities leads to fatal indecision or emotional and impulsive decisions, with personal breakdown and ultimate destruction of the sense of responsibility. Chester Barnard47

V. Conclusions: What is crucial to organizational effectiveness is understanding, in the particular way Barnard conceived of the concept, not motivation. “An intelligent person will deny the author‐ ity of that one which contradicts the purpose of the effort as he understands it.”48 If this inter‐ pretation of Barnard is correct, certain managerial lessons emerge from his analysis of under‐ standing. There are of course the exceedingly obvious requirements that unit organizations know their specific objectives and be technically competent to pursue them and that the com‐ plex task be properly broken down into its parts and effectively coordinated. Nearly everyone agrees with Taylor to this extent. A Barnardian organization, however, requires more than technical or cognitive under‐ standing. Beneath understanding lie motives which enable an individual—an individual fitted for cooperation, it must be stressed—to make an organizational, or better, unit objectives his or her own. Motives, thus inculcated, undergird both intellectual and non‐logical elements of Barnardian understanding. They are not, however, a proper central concern of management, except as they are related to an understanding of the general goals of an already effective or‐ ganization. A worker's motives for making his contribution to the organization are his own. In other words, the worker’s motives for allowing organizational goals to be inculcated in him or her are and must remain personal. His or her reasons for participating in the process of organ‐ izational cooperation are personal; the cooperation is impersonal. The psychology of this pro‐ cess may be dubious. For Barnard this ability to separate the personal and the organizational was central to his liberalism. Moreover, “understanding” seems to do its best work when it operates as knowledge of specific objectives aligned with acceptance and coupled with tech‐ nical competence. More generalized knowledge may be beneficial as may be a more wide‐

47 Barnard, op.cit., p.276 48 Barnard, op.cit., p.166

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spread commitment to the organization as a "cause," but neither general understanding nor non‐logical commitment is without drawbacks. And neither is worth the expenditure of exec‐ utive resources, insofar as they are not already associated with the communication and coor‐ dination process entailed in managing a complex organization. All of this leaves aside the very real and serious moral shortcomings of intrusive psychological techniques for the pur‐ pose of increasing profit or any non‐therapeutic aim. If motivation has any meaning for a Barnardian executive, it is derived from organiza‐ tional effectiveness, an effect more than a cause, a dependent more than an independent vari‐ able. Motivation is not something that is done to a member of an organization. It is a sign ra‐ ther that an individual for his or her own reasons has inculcated organizational values under certain Barnardian conditions, the chief of which is the loyalty that only a competent execu‐ tive can expect. This is why even rote management techniques like MBO can have positive ef‐ fects, if they lend credence to executive competence, credence which must be buttressed by effectiveness. The more competent the managers are, the greater is the motivation of the em‐ ployee. Employees are more likely to be willing to cooperate with an effective organization than a futile one. Recall Barnard’s repeated references to military organizations. In combat the irreducible interest of the soldier is to survive. Yet successful leaders are able to inculcate or‐ ganizational objectives or motives which at least partially transcend the desire to live at all costs. Few military analysts believe that this process results from inspirational speech. Al‐ most all believe it is a consequence of the faith in a leader who knows what he is doing. My favorite example is General Patton, whose casualty rates exceeded the norm but in whom his soldiers had the conviction that “George knew how to fight.” This meant that lives would be spent, but not wasted. A person fitted for cooperation can, in Barnard’s view, be appealed to on this basis, even when his or her life is at stake. As an independent variable of effectiveness or as a proper object of the expenditure of managerial resources, motivation has little efficacy. If executives desire increased productivi‐ ty without recourse to incentives or coercion, Barnard's suggestion is plain: Become more competent. Realize that competence is a moral quality and that employees respond to it by becoming moral themselves, that is, more willing to cooperate, to restrict their desires to pur‐ sue organizational goals. The morality that is inherent in competence becomes a moral attrib‐ ute of the organization. Better executives create better employees, or perhaps in a formulation more in keeping with Barnard’s liberalism, better executives release the moral or cooperative potential that exists in anyone who is suited for cooperation. Of course, better employees pro‐ duce more and therefore make managers look good. The path to better results from good em‐ ployees lies through the executive suite, not through motivational consultants or any other external efforts. Better employees are effects of executives more competently fulfilling their functions, which do not include the application of motivational theories or techniques. Any beneficial effect inspirational speech or persuasion the only proper expressions of executive concern with worker‐motives can have is marginal at best and limited to situations of al‐ ready high levels of organizational effectiveness. The last thing motivational theories or moti‐ vationists can do is make bad managers good. They are much more likely to make an ineffec‐ tive organization worse by provoking competent employees to negative organizational action. The more non‐logical or metaphysical the goals of an organization are, the more inspi‐ ration may intensify commitment to it by its members. Inspiration must surely play a more limited role in organizations with less subjective and more tangible goals, a fortiori, in com‐ mercial enterprises. So much is clear and explicit in Barnard. What needs emphasis is the in‐

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spirational effects of managerial competence or in a larger sense, of organizational effective‐ ness—conceived as a summation of technical and managerial competence. This may create a greater commitment to general goals than all the speeches, propaganda, advertising, indoctri‐ nation or the like that any management team can dispense. Competence is not only a moral quality. It is also—and for related reasons—a motivational one, perhaps the only one worth any managerial effort at all. If we can take a wider perspective, the implications of executive competence and its in‐ trinsic morality may enable business to sustain its respectability. Barnard seemed to set the character bar very high, perhaps too high for everyday executives to reach. It is important to remember that Barnard was not expecting sainthood from executives or from any other member of an organization. He was describing what he saw as essential to successful organi‐ zations. Successful organizations exist, therefore, competent executives must exist. Recall Pla‐ to’s captain. So, too, must exist a crew that is fitted for cooperation that can inculcate organi‐ zational goals, at least partly as a result of their faith in the captain’s competence. The locus of decision for Barnard remained and should remain at the level of the individual and his inter‐ ests. But these interests, in Barnard’s view, could not be advanced absent strong character. Only on the basis of a profound sense of personal integrity could a member of an organization be expected to make the material and moral decisions necessary to sustain cooperative enter‐ prise. Barnard did not discuss the impact of such organizations on the larger society. It may be assumed, however, that given the importance of the private sector in free societies, that he expected successful organizations to make more than material contributions to the social or‐ der. Barnardian organizations sit in the context of liberal societies. Liberal societies, is they are to sustain their cooperative basis, must have faith that those who direct business enter‐ prise know what they are doing and know what they are doing it for. One can only hope that this faith can be warranted in those who shape and direct public policy.

20 ISSN:2241‐5106 Πάπυροι - Επιστημονικό Περιοδικό Δέλτοι τόμος 4, 2015

Papyri - Scientific Journal Delti volume 4, 2015

The Natural Rights Basis of Aristotelian Education

Θεσσαλονίκη 2015 – Thessaloniki 2015 ISSN:2241‐5106

Πάπυροι - Επιστημονικό Περιοδικό Papyri - Scientific Journal Δέλτοι Delti τόμος 4, 2015 volume 4, 2015 www.academy.edu.gr [email protected] The Natural Rights Basis of Aristotelian Education

The Natural Rights Basis of Aristotelian Education

CHRISTOPHER VASILLOPOULOS

Περίληψη Είναι κοινή παραδοχή να μιλάμε για την εκπαίδευση ως δικαίωμα. Ωστόσο, αυτή έχει σπάνια υπερασπιστεί ως φυσικό δικαίωμα. Τα φυσικά δικαιώματα είναι προ‐κοινωνικά, ενώ η εκπαίδευση είναι εγγενώς κοινωνική. Αυτή η ανάλυση επιχειρεί να δείξει πώς η έννοια του Αριστοτέλη περί της εκπαίδευσης μπορεί να θεωρηθεί σαν μια φυσική και αναγκαία διαδικα‐ σία για την εκπλήρωση της ατομικής αυτονομίας. Υπό την έννοια αυτή προσεγγίζει τη σύλ‐ ληψη της έννοιας του Locke περί ενός φυσικού δικαιώματος. Στο βαθμό που το καταφέρνει, καθιερώνεται η μεγαλύτερη δυνατή βάση για την εκπαίδευση στα σύγχρονα συνταγματικά θεμέλια της κοινωνικής τάξης. Θα σταθεί στο ίδιο επίπεδο με τη ζωή, την ελευθερία και την ιδιοκτησία και θα είναι εξίσου ανθεκτική σε τυραννικές επιδρομές των δύο κυβερνήσεων ή της πλειοψηφικής πολιτικής. Επιπλέον, θα επικεντρωθεί στην κοινωνία ως απόλυτο καθήκον του για την αντιμετώπιση των πολιτών της δίκαια, δηλαδή, θα ληφθεί πλήρως υπόψη για τα αναφαίρετα δικαιώματά τους. Για να τεκμηριώσει την πρόταση αυτή, είναι απαραίτητο να εκτιμήσουν πόσο ο Αριστοτέλης θέτει ως βάση τον ατομικό χαρακτήρα των πολιτών, ο ο‐ ποίος με τη σειρά του προϋποθέτει την κατανόηση του λόγου για την ύπαρξη της πόλεως. Τα ανθρώπινα όντα φιλοδοξούν να οδηγήσουν μια ζωή σε ενάρετη δραστηριότητα, στην ευδαι‐ μονία, μια ζωή που μπορεί να υπάρξει μόνο σε μια πόλη, η οποία μια αντίληψη που βρίσκεται σε αντίθεση με την έννοια του Locke ότι ένας άνθρωπος μπορεί να ολοκληρωθεί σε μια κατά‐ σταση της φύσης. Ωστόσο, όταν διαβάζεται στο πλαίσιο του σύγχρονου κράτους, τόσο ο Αρι‐ στοτέλης όσο και ο Locke μπορεί να διαβαστούν σαν να θεωρούν την εκπαίδευση ως φυσικό δικαίωμα. Αυτό σημαίνει ότι κάθε φιλόσοφος της εκπαίδευσης είναι απαραίτητο να ζει τη ζωή όπως τη συνέλαβε. Για τον Locke, χωρίς εκπαίδευση ένα πρόσωπο δε θα ήταν τίποτα άλ‐ λο παρά αφοπλισμένο στο πρόσωπο ενός τυραννικού κράτους και ως εκ τούτου θα αδυνα‐ τούσε να εκφράσει τα φυσικά δικαιώματά του. Για τον Αριστοτέλη, χωρίς εκπαίδευση, ένας πολίτης δεν θα είναι σε θέση να ζήσει μια ζωή ενάρετης δραστηριότητας.

Abstract It is commonplace to speak of education as a right. Yet it has been seldom defended as a natural right. Natural rights are pre‐social, while education is social intrinsically. This analy‐ sis attempts to show how Aristotle’s concept of education can be conceived as a natural and necessary process to fulfill individual autonomy. In this sense it approaches Locke’s concep‐ tion of a natural right. To the degree that it succeeds, the firmest possible basis for education in modern constitutionally premised social order is established. It will stand on a par with life, liberty and property and will be equally resistant to tyrannical inroads of either government or majoritarian politics. Moreover, it will refocus society on its absolute duty to treat its citi‐ zens justly, that is, will full regard for their inalienable rights. To substantiate this proposi‐ tion, it is necessary to appreciate how much of Aristotle is premised on the individual nature

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of citizens, which in turn presupposes an understanding of the reason for being of the polis. Human beings aspire to leading a life of virtuous activity, eudemonia, a life which can only ex‐ ist in a polis, a proposition contrary to Locke’s notion that a human being can be complete in a state of nature. Yet when read in the context of the modern state, both Aristotle and Locke can be read as if they regarded education as a natural right. This means that for each philoso‐ pher education is essential to living lives as they conceived them. For Locke, without educa‐ tion a person would be all but disarmed in the face of a tyrannical state and thereby unable to express his or her natural rights. For Aristotle, without education, a citizen would not be able to live a life of virtuous activity.

More than any other class in society, teachers mold the future in the eyes of the young. They transmit to them the aspirations of great thinkers of which their parents may have only the faintest notions. Loren Eiseley1

I. Introduction: The Persistence of Aristotelian Values Ever since Plato, if not before, the antagonism between philosophers and more practi‐ cal policy‐makers, then called Sophists, has been well documented. Contemporary policy‐ makers and those academics who would influence policy, generally called social scientists, have continued this antagonism, if and when they acknowledge the existence of philosophy at all. As one of the most down to earth and certainly the most fact‐driven philosopher, Aristotle, if anyone, might have been an exception to the charge of unworldliness and impracticality. In a work equally prompted by practical concerns, how to fashion a government that would not threaten the life, liberty and property of ordinary men and women, Locke’s Second Treatise has been all but ignored by professional educators, preferring to deal with Locke’s work on education per se. 2 Few have understood the profound implications of a civil society premised on natural rights for education. If education is to encompass activities broader than skill transfer, if it is to retain humanistic objectives, the antagonism between philosophy and edu‐ cation needs to end. I am not making a claim that the practical must become subordinate to the philosophical. To the contrary, the practical objectives of educators will be more easily achieved and more effectively defended in the public arena if they can be grounded in philos‐ ophy. Much will depend on definitions, of education, of skills, of humanism, and of the self. Much will depend on the requirements of the social, technological, economic and political en‐ vironment. It is possible to train students to fit into a technologically driven social order, to make them fit into the productive mechanisms of society—all without cognizance of philoso‐ phy. It might be well to recall that this approach characterized education in the Third Reich. Many Germans when interviewed after the war blamed their educational system for creating technicians who were ill‐equipped to evaluate the assumptions, values, and policies of the Hit‐ ler Movement. Loren Eiseley makes a similar point more generally:

1 Eiseley, Loren, Night Country, Scribner’s, New York, 1971, p.209 2 Locke, John, John Locke on Education, edited by Peter Gay, Columbia University Press, New York, 1964

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In innumerable small ways, if we teachers are rigid, dogmatic, arrogant, we shall be laying stone upon stone, an ugly thing. We shall, for such is our power, give semblance of necessary reality to a future that need never have been permitted. The educator can be the withholder as well as the giver of life.3 Perhaps societies get the educational systems they deserve. The difficulty with this sort of fa‐ talism is that it ignores the interaction between education and the larger society. Of course practical, technological agents of society want well‐trained technicians, sprinkled here and there with a creative mind, equally devoted to technology. Without a humanistic or philosoph‐ ical perspective, a technically proficient and characterless society is what we will get and per‐ haps wonder like the Germans of the previous century at its consequences. From this perspective allow me to relate a personal experience which I believe indi‐ cates by education informed with philosophical awareness. While preparing for an interna‐ tional education conference at the University of Crete, I took a day cruise in the Mediterrane‐ an. As I was reading Locke’s Second Treatise, the subject of my paper, a young crew member asked me what I was reading that for. She informed me that she had already read that, sug‐ gesting that there was no reason for someone my age to reread it! Annoyed, I said, perhaps I was not as bright as she was, hoping to put her off. Unabashed, she replied in what seemed a non sequitur that she was having a problem with her sister regarding the upbringing of her nephew. Having spent my life with students, I appreciated that very seldom is an apparent non sequitur real. In an effort to find the links, I asked a series of questions. Her sister, she said, was not paying sufficient attention to the boy’s education generally conceived. She be‐ lieved it was her duty to intervene. I replied that if she would recall Locke she might have a way to discuss the issue with her sister to the boy’s benefit. Now, as I could see in her eyes, I was the author of a non sequitur, but I had her attention. As I am sure readers of this journal have anticipated, I remarked that according to Locke everyone is endowed with natural rights, including children, and that their parents and teachers have an obligation to respect these rights as they try to nurture the child through the difficulties of growing up. I also suggested that her sister had the same rights too and her views must be treated with respect, not simply as a parent, but as a human being. I was not sure she was satisfied, as the subject was changed. Later that evening, speaking at midnight to about three hundred educators, after a very long tedious and rancorous session about educational reform, I told the story of the young woman, loosely tying it to my formal paper. My thesis was that if we teach philosophy as something divorced from life, separated from how we should live, we do a disservice to some of the world’s greatest minds and a greater disservice to our students. There is nothing more practical than philosophy, for it can help resolve problems and conditions which plague us all, not excluding family disputes regarding the schooling of the next generation. Three days later, as I was waiting for the bus to the airport, the young woman appeared. She said she just wanted to say good‐by. I do not know how she found out when and where I was leaving. As we embraced, I believed that we had experienced on that boat under the Mediterranean sun a teaching moment. Yet for some Locke scholars, if this sort of education is to be promoted by the state, it is a troubling moment for at least two reasons. The first concerns the political implications of education:

3 Eiseley, op.cit., p.217

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The concepts of education and governance have been interrelated and intertwined and have even become near synonyms, in the political theory of Plato for instance, and John Locke. In a number of discourses and traditions of thought, especially those connected with liberalism and democracy, to educate is to govern and to govern is to educate.4 The political nature of education that transcends skill transfer and information inculcation is why the state should have as little to do with it as possible: But wise old Locke would have none of it. As Tarcov phrases it: ‘If government should not try to form character, except by the example of protecting rights, then the function must be fulfilled privately, by agencies that do not have the destructive power of government…. For Locke, the family was the natural and safest agency for these crucial purposes.’5 It is of course difficult to contest the view that parents should be responsible for their chil‐ dren’s characters. As a natural rights civil libertarian, I am as suspicious of the intrusiveness of the power state as Locke and Tarcov. Yet reserving to the family all notions of education not limited to skill and drill simply fails to recognize the realities of contemporary life. According to Peter Gay, ‘Locke’s education aimed to produce the civic‐minded, well‐mannered, and soundly informed gentleman.’6 The idea of universal, compulsory education in an industrial and post‐industrial society was beyond his powers of imagination. Tarcov’s assumption that Locke’s views would have been unchanged in the face of the realities of the twentieth century seems eccentric, notwithstanding that the power state remains the principal danger to liberty. Perhaps it might remain possible, although it seems doubtful, that a narrow group of gentle‐ men could protect their rights by home‐schooling, capped for some by terms at Oxbridge. Yet, even if successful, leaving aside enormous problems of legitimacy that this elitist and sexist approach entails, it would eviscerate Locke’s notion of natural rights, which must be by defini‐ tion an endowment of all human beings. The second troubling element of teaching moments concerns its suggestion of intima‐ cy. Not only is the school or the university ill‐equipped to manufacture such moments, it might be worse if it could. Nonetheless, Aristotle realizes that education requires a complex relationship of student and teacher: In his own teaching, at the Lyceum and elsewhere, Aristotle approached the ideal of in‐ formal education. As Plato and Socrates, he epitomized the ‘camaraderie’ of pupil and teacher which lends itself best to the fellowship of keen minds and the contemplation of higher order abstractions.7 Few would dispute that ‘camaraderie’ can be generated by a curriculum; and fewer still that education only occurs in a classroom. Yet the difficulties of finding the functional equivalents for teaching moments cannot undermine their desirability and power. For this reason Aristo‐ telian values have seemed relevant for today’s society: The New Curriculum Handbook begins with a four‐page statement of aims and under‐ pinning values…. The first of these values…is ‘a belief in education as a route to the well‐being and development of the individual.’ A quick survey of leading writers re‐ veals that most of the following items appear on list after list: 1 accomplishing things

4 Frazer, 1999, p.12 5 Itzkoff, Seymour, ‘Review of Locke’s Education for Liberty,’ American Journal of Education, Vol. 94, No. 3, 1986, p.386 6 Locke, John, John Locke on Education, P. Gay, editor, Columbia, New York, 1964, p.6 7 Robb, Felix, ‘Aristotle and Education,’ Peabody Journal of Education, Vol. 20, No. 4,1943, p.208

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in one’s life which makes that life meaningful; 2 being self‐directed or autonomous in the conduct of one’s life; 3 knowledge and understanding; 4 the enjoyment of beau‐ ty; 5 deep personal relationships; 6 moral goodness; 7 sensual pleasures.8 Consider a similar statement, made almost a hundred years ago: In 1918 the N.E.A. Commission on the Reorganization of Secondary Education pro‐ duced a document which was intended to set a new goal for high schools in America. In this report the Commission held that ‘education should develop in each individual the knowledge, interests, ideals, habits, and powers whereby he will find his place and use that place to shape both himself and society toward ever nobler goals.’ That statement would hardly be more Aristotelian if Aristotle had written the document himself.9 The persistent relevance of Aristotelian values has not pleased everyone. ‘Even so late as the seventeenth century, John Locke was heard to say with exasperation about the Oxford curriculum, ‘The Aristotle of the Schoolmen still determines the studies of the place.’10 I doubt that Locke was complaining about education for character anymore than he was criticizing Aristotle for naïveté regarding the abusive potential of the polis. When ‘Locke stresses the crucial significance of education for the total physical and psychic economy of the human be‐ ing,’ he echoes Aristotle.11 So does his conviction that his Locke’s ‘education program was not a divine pattern or moral improbability, but a sensible, attainable reality….’12 It is one of the purposes of this essay to show that the great Greek philosopher and the great English ad‐ vocate of natural rights have much in common regarding the nature of education, especially, if by an act of imagination we can adjust their views to the realities of contemporary life. While it may be problematic that Locke would favor compulsory public education, Curren argues compellingly that Aristotle would: The question of fundamental concern in the world of fourth‐century Greece…was how to create order that is both stable and good. Public schooling and an associated moder‐ ation of economic and social inequality were the means to political stability and social unity offered first by Plato and then in a more attractive form by Aristotle….13 Given the conservative implication of this formulation and the almost unlimited coercive po‐ tential of the power state, civil libertarians have a valid concern. Of course, Aristotle assumes the polis, not tyranny. It is precisely here that Aristotle’s informed, choice‐making citizens and Locke’s rights bearing individuals meet. Consider White’s reading of O’Neill:14 He O’Neill holds that an individual’s well‐being is objectively rooted in human nature, ‘in the development of her characteristically human capacities.’ The inspiration for this is Aristotelian. He describes his view as: ‘An Aristotelian conception of well‐being ac‐ cording to which well‐being should be characterized not in terms of having the right subjective states, as the hedonist claims, nor in terms of the satisfaction of preferences as modern welfare economics assumes, but rather in terms of a set of objective goods a

8 White, John, ‘The Market and the Nature of Personal Well‐Being,’ British Journal of Educational Studies, Vol. 50, No. 4, 2002, p.443 9 Robb, op.cit., p.206 10 Robb, op.cit., p.202 11 Locke, 1964, op.cit., p.4 12 Locke, 1964, op.cit., p.6 13 Curren, Randall, Aristotle on the Necessity of Public Education, Rowman & Littlefield, Oxford, 2000, p.221 14 White, op.cit., p.448

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person might possess, for example, friends, the contemplation of what is beautiful and wonderful, the development of one’s capacities, the ability to shape one’s life, and so on’ Their conceptions of personal autonomy and civic virtue are not identical. Nor are they anti‐ thetical. Both Locke and Aristotle appreciate that morally and aesthetically sensitive, well‐ informed and mentally alert individuals are necessary to both the viability of society and its capacity to allow for lives worth living. Education has to play an important role in this project. There is no question that education, conceived as a state system, risks having the fox in the chicken coop, as civil libertarians emphasize. Wilfred Carr sums up the difficulty: Thus, as education was itself transformed from a morally informed species of praxis in‐ to a state‐controlled system of schooling, so educational inquiry was transformed from a form of inquiry in which questions about the role of education in creating the good society could be adequately expressed, into a form of research that was constrained by the liberal and utilitarian assumptions on which the state system of schooling had been erected and confined to the version of the good society that the state officially en‐ dorsed.15 It is a real question whether this powerful historical trend and its entailed structural change can be altered. It seems to me that philosophically grounded educational approach offers the best and perhaps only way to restore the objectives of a good society inhabited by free and virtuous citizens. This approach implies more than a set of Aristotelian values. These values must be grounded in philosophical argument, including the questioning and the justification of the values themselves. Here Locke and Aristotle are in essential agreement with the desire of educators like Carr to moderate the excessive individualism and shallow utilitarianism which define contemporary societies.16 But the greatest of all the means to secure the stability of constitutions is one that at present all people despise: it is a system of education suited to these constitutions. For there is no use in the most valuable of laws, ratified by the unanimous judgment of the whole body of citizens, if these are not trained and educated in the constitution…. Aristotle17

II. Natural Rights and Education Few would question the claim that Plato’s Republic is the most important text on edu‐ cation in the ancient Greek world, if not in the subsequent sweep of Western civilization. His only serious philosophical rival, excepting Socrates, Aristotle, did not write a treatise on edu‐ cation, although he wrote one on nearly everything else. This was no omission, as any reader of the Nicomachean Ethics, the Politics, or for that matter, the Rhetoric or the Poetics, will at‐ test. Education in its many forms suffuses these texts, often appearing as an implicit premise of many Aristotelian arguments, when it does not appear explicitly. So powerful and pervasive is education in the works of the great philosopher and so inseparable is it from Aristotle’s

15 Carr, Wilfred: ‘Educational Research and its Histories,’ The Moral Foundation of Educational Research: Knowledge, Inquiry and Values, edited by Pat Sikes, Jon Nixon and Wilfred Carr, Open University Press, Philadel‐ phia, 2003, p.14 16 The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Education 2003 edited by Nigel Blake, Paul Smeyers, Richard Smith, and Paul Standish, Blackwell Books, Oxford, 2003 17 Aristotle, Politics, VII ii, H. Rackham translation, Harvard. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1944

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conception of a human being that education may be said to be a ‘natural right.’ I chose this modern concept and use its Lockean variant advisedly. Aristotle is not a natural rights or so‐ cial contract philosopher. Nevertheless, with respect to education he can be considered to be close to a ‘natural rights’ position. Education is not one of Locke’s natural rights. It is, at least within the limits of his philosophy, one of Aristotle’s. So Aristotle might be said to go Locke one better when it comes to education. A great deal turns on the concept of ‘natural.’ For Locke, it refers to those qualities of human beings that pre‐exist social order. Natural rights are endowments of human birth. For Locke these qualities are sufficient to provide a theoreti‐ cal bulwark against the inevitable incursions on liberty by social groups, to say nothing of the coercive power of the state. Humans are complete in themselves in nature. Society is not only unnatural or conventional; it is anti‐natural given its propensities to curtail the expression of natural endowments. Aristotle’s concept of nature is much broader. It includes not only quali‐ ties a human being is born with; it also and, equally importantly, includes all that a human might become. The final cause or telos of a human being is as much of what a human being is and is equally organic or natural as physical attributes. In a sense, for Aristotle, a natural en‐ dowment includes his telos as a human being and as an individual. It is not only ‘natural’ for human beings to form societies, it is essential to the fulfillment of human telos. As Aristotle famously said, the polis is natural and is prior to human beings. One simply cannot be human outside the polis. Thus Locke and Aristotle disagree on the fundamental question, what is a human being? Many of their other disagreements stem from this difference of conception. It is important, however, not to push this disagreement too far. Moreover, when this and their oth‐ er differences are put into the context of their times, their views on the freedom and the au‐ tonomy of the individual tend to merge. This essay explores this proposition through the prism of Aristotle’s notions of education. It suggests that Aristotle sees education as indispen‐ sable the development of a free and autonomous human beings. In other words, Aristotle’s human being approaches Locke’s by becoming educated. The telos of a human being thus en‐ ables an individual to have the kind of autonomy that is entailed in Locke’s conception of nat‐ ural rights. Moreover, Locke’s citizen can be free only if he can employ his natural rights to limit the state’s tyrannical propensities. This is the purpose and justification of the Social Con‐ tract. So restrained, the power state might allow for the freedom the Aristotle’s ideal polis implies. In addition to institutional guarantees, largely constitutional, the free expression of natural rights requires political participation. Political participation in any constituted social order, including Locke’s, requires education. In the twenty‐first century, it is difficult to imag‐ ine how an uneducated person can be more than an object of the power state, a position, which, in Aristotle’s terms, is tantamount to slavery and which, in Locke’s terms, is worse than the state of nature. No matter how natural and inalienable natural rights might be, without the capacity to express them and to participate in their enforcement, they are little more than brave words. The expression of natural rights cannot depend on institutional protections, im‐ portant as these are. Institutions, including courts whose principal responsibility is the preservation of natural rights, are all too often subject to the prudential concerns of the state. On this point, the views Aristotle and Locke find agreement. Several questions naturally arise: 1 Why bother to stretch Aristotle’s views on educa‐ tion to approximate a Lockean conception of natural rights? 2 Why dilute Locke’s notion of natural rights to accommodate Aristotle? 3 Why not make an Aristotelian argument for the importance of education? 4 Why not make a Lockean argument for education? 5 Why risk distorting either philosopher that a justification of education may not need? 6 Why risk

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confusing or complicating any of the many contemporary straightforward arguments for the necessity of education to fulfill human potential? 7 Why risk offending both Aristotelian and Lockean scholars by yoking philosophers who have been studied in their own right for centu‐ ries and who have been blessed by scores of remarkably able interpreters? I will address these questions. Here, however, I need to indicate why this attempt is worthwhile and not merely an academic exercise. I believe it is important to establish the concept of education on the most powerful conceptual footing possible. Properly understood, education can perhaps avoid becoming 1 the principal means of socializing citizens for a life of compliant service; or 2 a cultural ornament; or 3 a means to fulfill essentially private attributes. I believe the differences and the similarities of Aristotle and Locke will indicate the centrality of education to a meaningful and fruitful dialectic of public and private concerns and of social and individ‐ ual values. To the degree that these dialectics operate, the tyrannical tendencies that both Locke and Aristotle associated with power states may be constrained. To the degree that the tyrannical tendencies of the power state remain unavoidable, educated individuals may find ways of coming to terms with modern necessities without becoming passive elements of a great social engineering or gardening project.18 Finally, I believe that treating Locke and Aris‐ totle in the same essay may their illuminate their views, at least with respect to the concept of education and its place in their philosophies. The individual excellences or aretai demand conditions: length of life, riches, a proper society to function in. Social organization, the polis, provides the means of training in these individual excellences, and it also furnishes the field in which they can operate; it provides the materials and conditions for training in, and for the exercise of, the good life. Ethics and politics are hence two aspects of the same `architectonic' science. The excellences or aretai of the individual are formed in the polis, in society, and they can function only in the polis. John Ran‐ dall19

III. Aristotle’s Concept of Education Perhaps the most famous saying in all political philosophy is that man is a political an‐ imal, zoon politikon. With this premise Aristotle seems to have made impossible any associa‐ tion with Lockean natural rights. Not only must a person live in a polis to be fully human, the polis is natural and prior to the person: It is clear therefore that the polis is also prior by nature to the individual; for if each in‐ dividual when separate is not self‐sufficient, he must be related to the whole state as other parts are to the whole, while a man who is incapable of entering into partnership, or one who is so self‐sufficing that he has no need to do so, is no part of a polis, so that he must be either a lower animal or a god.20 Aristotle begins with civil society, called the polis, and ends with man who is incomplete, not even human, except in potential, until he interacts over a lifetime with his polis. Although I agree with this interpretation of Aristotle, I do so only insofar as his conception of the polis can be distinguished from the concept of the state. If polis is translated, as it often is, as state

18 Bauman, Zygmunt, Modernity and the Holocaust, Cornell University Press, New York, 1991 19 Randall, John Herman, Aristotle, Columbia University Press, New York, 1960, p.254 20 Aristotle, 1944, op.cit., I i 12

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or even city‐state, Aristotle cannot avoid being turned into a Roman or worse. In Rome, as in most modern states, man is defined by his citizenship and its duties, not by his happiness or any other subjective or personal evaluation. To do this to Aristotle is to misunderstand his thought. The state in modern terms refers to all the objective assets of a given sovereign terri‐ tory, including its rules, regulations, laws and all other formal authority. The state is the site of all rational/legal authority, to use Max Weber’s phrase. The French state since 1789 and the German state since 1871 are examples of this concept. Aristotle’s polis, by contrast, is more akin to a collection of citizens, i.e., a group of people under the same constitution. The individ‐ ual never loses autonomy; he remains identifiable and responsible even when engaged in group action: Nevertheless, the individual’s claim for some sort of primacy is not wholly neglected in the Ethics. We shall see it coming to the fore in that he is the bearer of pleasure and happiness, that he is the center of his own consciousness, that he enters into relations of justice and friendship and is faced with problems of self‐aggrandizement and self‐ love, and perhaps ultimately that the good of contemplation seems to be a lone activity. On the other hand, though the individual’s moral place must always be found within the communal context, never as a prior of antecedent unit outside it, there is no trans‐ cending group consciousness, and the equation of communal well‐being with happi‐ ness points the quality of group life directly to individual well‐being.21 By no means the consensus view, I, nonetheless, share Edel’s appreciation of Aristotle’s ‘indi‐ vidualism’. To distinguish the polis from the state is important, for when Aristotle refers to the happiness or well‐being eudaemonia of the nation ethnikos or the polis, he is referring to the happiness that can only be an attribute of human beings, singly or collectively. The collec‐ tivity is more like spectators of a football match than subjects of a modern state. States cannot have emotion‐based human attributes, except as metaphors. This semantic argument is rein‐ forced when Aristotle’s operational description of a polis is appreciated. A polis is a group of citizens who know each other well enough to make proper and informed public decisions re‐ specting them, either in the assembly or in the courts: The activities of the polis are those of the rulers and those of the persons ruled, and the work of a ruler is to direct the administration and to judge law‐suits; but in order to decide questions of justice and in order to distribute the offices according to merit it is necessary for the citizens to know each other’s personal characters, since where this does not happen to be the case the business of electing officials and trying law‐suits is bound to go badly; haphazard decision is unjust in both matters, and this must neces‐ sarily prevail in an excessively numerous community.22 I will argue that Locke’s differences with Aristotle regarding constitutionalism are not so great as is generally believed. First, however, I need to sketch a little more of Aristotle’s views, be‐ ginning with telos. Telos, End, in the sense of what something will become if an unimpeded natural devel‐ opment is allowed to proceed, is the irrefutable sign of what something really is. A child be‐ comes an adult; the essence of an adult is adulthood, the fully developed human being. The essence of adulthood is the capacity to reason. Such a person actively engaged in the affairs of

21 Edel, Abraham, Aristotle and His Philosophy, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1982, p.256 22 Aristotle, 1944, op. cit., VII iv 7

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his polis can be presumed to be complete. What is an individual’s telos, not considered merely as a reasoning organism in the company of others in a civil society, but as a being capable ful‐ filling inherent potential? Aristotle’s answer is a happy person, for happiness is an end in it‐ self, the only human end that cannot be considered as a means to another end.23 Thus, Eu‐ daemonia is the telos; it is, however, not quite the same as ‘end:’ Aristotle’s for what, to hou heneka, is end, telos, or final cause; it is incorrect and very misleading to translate it as purpose, which in English means foresight and intention …. For Aristotle, there are no purposes in the world outside human actions and ma‐ kings. Final causes, tele, are for him a much broader class than the subclass of purpos‐ es.24 Moreover, the concept of ‘end’ is itself misleading, even without its connotation of purpose. For end suggests a state of being, rather than an activity. Eudaemonia is the activity of living virtuously, that is, in pursuit of the good. It is importantly the property of an individual man, seen as a state of contented well‐being, an awkward but usually more adequate a definition of eudaemonia than happiness. Again, I must caution that ‘property’ and ‘contented well‐being’ must not be seen as static concepts. Aristotle’s concepts are dynamic. Consider for example, ‘understanding.’ According to Randall, ‘We see, we recognize, that it is so. We grasp its truth by nous, by intellectual intuition, by insight: nous, working with and in experienced facts, is more certain than deductive proof, than demonstration.’25 Intelligence or mind nous is not a static attribute that we employ to array the facts according to a rational scheme. Understand‐ ing is a process of interaction of nous with the ‘what is.’ And our idea of ‘what is’ is a product, conceived as a pause in the continuous process of self‐conscious experience, of our mind in‐ teracting with ‘what is.’ In the same manner, ‘contented well‐being’ is a process of virtuous activity. If eudaemonia is not the property of an individual, not a thing that is possessed, even less so can it be the property of the polis, notwithstanding that the telos of the polis is citizens actively living virtuously. It must always be remembered that the polis is the name for the cit‐ izenry, not for an institutional entity separate from them. This obvious, but often insufficiently stressed, point is critical for this analysis, because it indicates how a polis is to be judged. A good person has a harmonious soul, who lives life in accordance with moral virtue, which includes an active public life: If happiness is to be defined as well doing, the active life is the best life for the whole state collectively and for each man individually. But the active life is not necessarily active in relation to other men…nor are only those processes of thought active that are pursued for the sake of the objects that result from action, but far more those specula‐ tions and thoughts that have their end in themselves and are pursued for their own sake; for the end is to do well, and therefore is a certain form of action.26 A good polis is one ordered according to justice: It is clear then that those constitutions that aim at the common advantage are rightly framed in accordance with absolute justice, while those that aim at the rulers’ own ad‐ vantage only are faulty, and are all of them deviations from the right constitutions; for they have an element of despotism, whereas a city is a partnership of free men.27

23 Aristotle, 1926, op.cit., I viii 5 24 Randall, op.cit., p.125 25 Randall, op.cit., pp.45‐6 26 Aristotle, 1944, op.cit.,VII iii 5 27 Aristotle, 1944, op.cit., III iv 7

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The ultimate authority, as well as the locus of eudaemonia, is the free, politically participating individual. A tyrannical polis may wield all power, but it can never secure authority over the individuals that constitute its citizenry: Consider Aristotle on liberty: ‘Now a fundamental principle of the democratic form of constitution is liberty…that is for a man to live as he likes…inasmuch as to live not as one likes is the life of a man that is a slave.’28 It is difficult not to anticipate Locke in the wake of these Aristotelian ideas. Yet the most latitudinarian reading does not make Aristotle a natural rights proponent or a social contract theorist. Nevertheless, Aristotle shared with Locke a powerful sense of constitution‐ alism in at least two critical respects. The first is that in the most significant sense the human individual retains sovereignty over his ultimate objective: eudaemonia. Secondly, this implies that the political order, regardless of how it is constituted, is limited. It may act tyrannically but can never do so legitimately, for tyranny obstructs the natural development of man, and interferes with the life of morally virtuous activity, thereby undermining eudaemonia. With all these ideas in mind, we can now appreciate why education is central to Aristo‐ tle’s polis. Another way of saying that man is a zoon politikon is to say that man is a rational, choice‐making animal. As a student of tragedy, Aristotle appreciates the power and the perva‐ siveness of passion, violence and other forms or irrational and non‐rational behavior. Aristo‐ tle understands that men were driven by ambition, hatred and lust of all kinds. Such drives and activities were not, however, the telos of men. If then the function of man is the active exercise of the soul’s faculties in conformity with a rational principle, or at any events not dissociated from a rational principle… and if we declare that the function of man is a certain form of life, and define that form of life as the exercise of the soul’s faculties and activities in association with a rational principle, and say that the function of a good man is to perform these activities well and rightly, and if a function is well‐performed when it is performed in accordance with its own proper excellence—from these premises it follows that the Good of man is the active exercise of his soul’s faculties in conformity with excellence or virtue, or if there be several human excellences or virtues, in conformity with the best and most perfect among them.29 Such human beings do not exist naturally, they are made into people capable of virtuous activ‐ ity and they make themselves by engaging in it. Both processes can be considered education. The first process suggests the role of the polis. ‘For we stated that the Supreme Good was the end of political science, but the principal care of this science is to produce a certain character in the citizens, namely to make them virtuous, and capable of performing noble actions.’30 The second suggests the workings of liberal education: It is therefore not difficult to see that the young must be taught these useful arts that are indispensably necessary; but it is clear that they should not be taught all the useful arts, those pursuits that are liberal being kept distinct from those that are illiberal, ant that they must participate in such among the useful arts as will not render the person who participates in them vulgar. A task and also an art or a science must be deemed

28 Aristotle, 1944 op.cit., VI i 6‐7 29 Aristotle, 1926, op.cit, I viii 14‐6 30 Aristotle, 1926, op.cit., I ix 8

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vulgar if it renders the body or soul or mind of free men useless for the employments and actions of virtue.31 Moreover, the polis should not be considered, as it so often has been as anti‐liberal or anti‐ individual. Aristotle differs profoundly from Locke’s assumption that humans can be fully de‐ veloped without social, to say nothing of political, organization. But his ideas of the telos of man and of the polis are profoundly individual: The excellences he describes on the basis of his observation are the rather individualis‐ tic ideals and values the Athenians actually cherished not the more socialized and func‐ tional ideals and values they sometimes, with an eye on Sparta, thought they ought to cherish.32 The individual is the locus of happiness eudaemonia. Noble actions and virtuous activities are individual. So is friendship, including the ‘camaraderie’ that exists in teaching moments. Individuals can and do act collectively, but these activities should not be taken to suggest that individuals merge into a mass or even a benign community. Individuals never lose their au‐ tonomy. To do so would not only deny their responsibility for their actions. It would deny their capacity to make rational choices, the basis of human autonomy. Humans without au‐ tonomy are slaves. To understand political power aright, and derive it from its original, we must consider, what state all men are naturally in, and that is, as state of perfect free‐ dom to order their actions, and dispose of their possessions and persons as they see fit, within the bounds of the law of nature, without asking leave, or depend‐ ing on the will of any other man. John Locke33

IV. Locke: the Sovereignty of the Individual Let me begin with a radical statement. If natural rights are to be taken seriously, the concept must mean that the sovereignty of the individual can never be properly given up, del‐ egated, modified or otherwise compromised by the social contract or any other form of agreement, voluntary or coerced. In principle, an individual cannot give up the right to per‐ sonal sovereignty, for this right inheres in status conferred on a created organic being. Even Hobbes agrees that the individual never gives up the right to life. Only by ceasing to be a hu‐ man being can an individual cease to have natural rights. Any statement that suggests that civ‐ il society means that an individual surrenders natural rights in order to attain the benefits of social life is false. One enters civil society in order to preserve natural rights from, in the fa‐ mous words of Locke, ‘the inconveniences of the state of nature.’ Any suggestion that society has natural rights that need to be balanced against the natural rights of the individual is simp‐ ly false, a contradiction in terms. Society has no natural rights and cannot have them. Only in‐ dividuals have natural rights. And these are, as the United States Constitution states, ‘inalien‐ able,’ that is, they cannot be separated from its locus in the human body. Civil society does have powers, however, they must be exercised in the context of the inalienability of natural rights. Civil rights must be distinguished from natural rights. Civil rights presume the exist‐ ence of civil society. Civil rights derive from a political organization, from a sovereign unit.

31 Aristotle, 1944, op.cit., VIII ii 1 32 Randall, op. cit., p.249 33 Barker, E., Social Contract, Oxford University Press, London, 1944, p.4

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These rights can confer obligations and status on individuals and groups as it sees fit, so long as natural rights of individuals are not violated. The most serious implication of this set of ideas is that if the rights of one citizen are violated by any social policy, no matter how popu‐ lar or wise, the policy must give way. Most U.S. citizens, I believe, do not appreciate this un‐ derstanding of natural rights, despite the fact that the U.S. Constitutional system actualizes it to a remarkable degree. The reason is plain. It violates ordinary notions of democracy. A con‐ stitutional polity, the term Aristotle would have used, is not a majoritarian democracy, alt‐ hough it may have many democratic characteristics. It must be said emphasized that education cannot, according to this view, be a Lockean natural right. It is not among the famous rights of ‘life, liberty, and property.’ Sometimes Locke lists health in these terms, but never education. The reason is plain. A person, in Locke’s con‐ ception, is fully human before the social contract, even before the individual cooperates in the most primal fashion: sexual reproduction. This is the essence of Locke’s radical individualism. Human beings were created by God whole, complete unto themselves, however unsatisfactory, ephemeral, or ‘inconvenient’ this state of affairs has been. Education entails at least one other, a teacher. Therefore, it, if it were taken as a natural right, would contradict Locke’s conception of the individual and subvert the autonomy of rights possessed by virtue of existence. One might almost say that to compromise an individual’s autonomy in any way would be for Locke to question God’s power to create a whole human being, independent of society. Education is unavoidably and undeniably social and therefore not a natural right. The reader will realize that this view of Locke is relatively extreme. It pushes the concept of ‘nature’ so that its associa‐ tion with ‘rights’ is fundamentally, even artificially, independent of the social order. Many crit‐ ics of Locke and ‘state of nature’ or ‘contract’ theorists have made this point to great effect. Many Lockeans have been constrained in consequence to offer softer interpretations of both the state of nature and the social contract, some suggesting that these concepts should be un‐ derstood metaphorically. The perspicacious reader may wonder why I have not endorsed ‘soft’ interpretations of Locke. Then, my conflation of Locke and Aristotle would be less strained. The first response is simply that I believe Locke should be read as a strict natural rights theorist. He was terrified of the power state and its inevitable claims to absolute authority. His First Trea‐ tise is a book length attack on Filmer’s notion of the Divine Right of Kings. Locke was also wary of social organization, for he believed that man’s social impulses would be used against his need to exercise his natural rights. By indicating how suspicious Locke is of the social and political order, I have substanti‐ ated my ‘hard’ reading of his work, but have I not made thereby impossible any relation to Ar‐ istotle? No philosopher emphasizes the value of the polis his social order more than Aristotle. No other philosopher writes more extensively or more powerfully on friendship than he. And no philosopher has embedded more profoundly his concept of education in the polis than he. I emphasize these points to alert the reader to how different Locke is on this point from Aristo‐ tle. But only provisionally, for I will claim that as a practical matter, notwithstanding the logical requirements of natural rights theory, education can be considered, if not a natural right in Locke’s strict sense, a natural human necessity and a natural human development, if not quite a telos in Aristotle’s sense. In the twenty‐first century, given the virtually ubiquitous coercive power of the state and ever‐increasing knowledge requirements of middle class life, the auton‐ omous human beings that both Locke and Aristotle presume must more than ever be able to engage in life‐long learning and, equally important, life‐long inquiry into what makes life worth

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living. For both, despite differences in content, this inquiry entails the pursuit of the good and a life of virtuous activity. To counter Hobbes’s bleak picture of bestial and aggressive human nature and its de‐ rivative authoritarian police state, John Locke wrote his Second Treatise on Civil Government. Locke’s agreements with Hobbes are, however, as important as are his many points of differ‐ ence. Locke concurs with Hobbes that political authority endowed in a modern state with its monopoly of the use of legitimate force to use Max Weber’s formulation tends toward tyr‐ anny. Locke’s civil authority could become Locke’s ‘leviathan’, having perhaps a greater reach than Hobbes’s for seeming more consensual. A totalitarian prison needs no walls or guards. This proposition is an inference from Locke’s structure of authority, which requires a short exposition. Like Hobbes, Locke realizes that the state of nature has to be transcended: Though in the state of nature he hath such a right to be absolute lord of his own per‐ son and possessions, yet the enjoyment of it is very uncertain and constantly exposed to the invasion of others; for all being kings as much as he, every man his equal, the greater part no strict observers of equity and justice, the enjoyment of the property he has in this state is very unsafe, very insecure. This makes him willing to quit this condi‐ tion which, however free, is full of fears and continual dangers; and it is not without reason that he seeks out and is willing to join in society with others who are already united, or have a mind to unite for the mutual preservation of their lives, liberties, and estates, which I call by the general name, property.34 Unlike Hobbes, the driving force is not fear of the war of all against all. Instead, Locke be‐ lieves that individuals, once they achieve minimal levels of cooperation and division of labor, would realize the `inconveniences’ of the state of nature: ‘I easily grant that civil government is the proper remedy for the inconveniences of the state of nature, which must certainly be great where men be judges in their own case….35 Put more positively, individuals, already co‐ operating in a benign, if inconvenient, pre‐civil society, will perceive advantages resulting from structuring their activities. Locke believes that individual human beings would see the wisdom of providing themselves with formal authority which would serve to guarantee their individual rights, while allowing for ever more complex human cooperation and more elabo‐ rate enterprise. Government, or legitimate coercive authority, thus comes into being at the behest of a sovereign people to secure their individual rights and to allow their expression the fullest sort of elaboration. All restrictions of individual liberty entailed by government have to be measured by their capacity to enhance the benefits attendant upon the exercise of natural rights: Their legislative power in the utmost bounds of it is limited to the public good of the society. It is a power that hath no other end but preservation, and therefore can never have a right to destroy, enslave, or designedly to impoverish the subjects; the obliga‐ tions of the law of nature cease not in society, but only in many cases are drawn closer, and have, by human laws, known penalties annexed to them to enforce their observa‐ tion. Thus the law of nature stands as an external rule to all men, legislators as well as others. The rules they make for other men’s actions must, as well as their own and oth‐ er men’s actions be conformable to the law of nature, i.e., to the will of God, of which

34 Barker, op.cit., p.73 35 Barker, op.cit., p.10

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that is a declaration, and the fundamental law of nature being the preservation of man‐ kind, no human sanction can prevail against it.36 Think of traffic laws. No one is allowed to drive ninety‐five miles per hour in order to allow everyone else to drive at sixty‐five in relative safety. This is a clear restriction of liberty, but it is not only justified on utilitarian grounds. More than the greatest good for the greatest num‐ ber is implied. The individual’s freedom to travel is enhanced. Notice also that the justifica‐ tion does not rest on considerations of good policy by government or by the people. Another criterion must be taken into account, the effect of the policy on liberty. Few people would doubt, for example, that laws restricting access to unhealthy foods, especially in a society where obesity is reaching epidemic, would avoid many thousands of deaths. Few would doubt that targeted lobotomies or castrations would limit violent crime. Few would doubt that re‐ stricting childbirth to the responsible would avoid much child abuse and neglect. Yet these proposals, assuming their effectiveness, are not seriously proposed, because they would trav‐ erse constitutionally protected rights. For Locke these rights require special and powerful protection in precise proportion to the temptation to compromise them in the name of the public good. This proposition can be clearly inferred from Locke’s hierarchy of authority. A believ‐ ing Christian, Locke places the God‐created universe at the apex: For men being all the workmanship of one omnipotent, and infinitely wise maker; all the servants of one sovereign master, sent to the world by his order, and about his business; they are his property, whose workmanship they are, made to last during his, not one another’s pleasure….37 Below this is the natural world, including humanity. It is this group which enters into rudi‐ mentary social groups, each of which chooses to enter into a social contract with the members of its group. The purpose of the contracting parties is to establish among them an authorita‐ tive structure, a constitutionally ordered government whose purpose is to secure the rights and blessings attendant upon the exercise of those rights. The constitution is a set of rules which allocates and limits the coercive power of the society and its most dangerous instru‐ mentality, the state. The sovereign authority of the parties, who can now be properly called the people, remains intact. Sovereignty is not delegated to either the constitution or the state; the constitution is amendable; the state is derivative. The state serves at the pleasure of the sovereign people under the terms of its constitution. Locke thus places barriers between what he believed to be the essentially tyrannical nature of government and the people it would try to rule instead of serve. Notice the profound difference from Hobbes, who believes the most dangerous threat to the security of the indi‐ vidual is the behavior of other individuals. For Locke, the most serious danger to the security of the individual is the agent of the people themselves, the state, as Hobbes’s Leviathan demonstrates. Locke’s notion of security is much broader than Hobbes’s physical security. Locke’s human being is not a terrified humanoid willing to sacrifice all expression of God‐ given rights for a security largely illusory. How can one defend one’s life against an authori‐ tarian state? Locke’s humans are autonomous beings in Kant’s sense who through the use of reason can fashion a government to meet their needs as human beings endowed with rights which cannot be abrogated by any legitimate: ‘The freedom then of man and liberty acting ac‐

36 Barker, op.cit., p.79 37 Barker, op.cit., pp.5-6

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cording to his own will, is grounded on his having reason, which is able to instruct him in that law he is to govern himself by, and make him known how far he is left to the freedom of his own will.’38 The government and coercive authority in general exist only to guarantee the widest possible arena for the free expression of these rights, the benefits of which will provide the means for the physical, emotional, and economic independence from the state. For Hobbes, the question is, how could the coercive state be endured? In Locke, the question is, how could the necessary evil of the state be contained? Alternatively, the question is, how can the people individually or collectively be kept from succumbing to a fear which will thrust them into the willing arms of a tyrannical state? Locke’s answer centered on the very rights the state is sworn to serve. In Locke’s view ‘leviathan’ does not derive from the in‐ herent and pervasive fear of the people. Locke’s ‘leviathan’ would develop, if the people lose their faith in their own ability to secure through reasoned evaluation of their experience the blessings of liberty. The temptation to tyranny occurs when the people no longer believe that their freedoms can create real independence from coercive authority as much as from fear of the predations of criminals. Fearing chaos and physical insecurity, despairing of their own ef‐ forts to protect themselves, they would leap into tyranny believing that only a charismatic leader and his storm troopers could save them. Life, liberty and property are not only natural rights for Locke. They are the means by which a coercive state—tyrannical in principle—can be controlled. For this basic reason all governmental proposals which limit the expression of individual rights must be justified by much more than their effectiveness or responsiveness to public need. Public policies must enhance the effectiveness of the rights in fact, even while it restricts them in principle. No policies conceived in fear can meet this criterion. Fear is the mortal enemy of reasoned judgment and therefore the most profound ally of tyranny. When rights are threatened, when freedom is made to justify itself to the terrified, the state of nature, as Hobbes conceives it, is already at hand. Chaos and criminal anarchy are not the effects of the war of all against all, but of the war of the agent coercive government against its sovereign, the people. ‘This freedom from absolute, arbitrary power is so necessary to, and closely joined with, a man’s preservation, that he cannot part with it but by what for‐ feits his preservation and life together.’39 From the perspective of freedom, the worst sort of anarchy is one masked by the security‐driven state. Paraphrasing Tacitus, the coercive state drowns individual rights in the terrors of panicked people, creating chaos, and calls it security. Predictably, the demise of freedom would be justified in the name of the right to life, just as Hobbes’s Leviathan is justified. But what sort of life? An existence with no motive but fear, with no ambition but physical security, with no hope but a painless death scarcely distin‐ guishable from living? This portrait of Locke’s Second Treatise reflects the individualist school of Locke inter‐ preters like Tarcov. This understanding of Locke implies that the emotional needs of individu‐ als are a weapon that the modern state will use against him to lure him into a degree of obedi‐ ence otherwise impossible. Even the rudimentary society which exists before civil society is formed by the social contract is measured by its utility. Men and women cooperate to achieve tasks impossible to complete alone, with sexual reproduction as the archetypal case. Any ac‐ tivity which might compromise the expression of individual rights is suspect in Locke and can only be justified by necessity. And this justification must come from the individual concerned,

38 Barker, op.cit., p.36 39 Barker, op.cit., p.15

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not any outside person or agency. Sovereignty in Locke begins with and remains with the in‐ dividual. Here we come to Locke profound difference with Aristotle. For the Greek philosopher one cannot be a complete human without political participation. This is why the polis is prior to the human. For Locke the participant in the social contract is already a complete human. The very source of meaning, virtue, and, therefore, identity Aristotle finds in the polis, Locke sees as a threat. An individual needs civil society to better express the possession of rights, not to complete or inform them. However, once in civil society the differences between Locke’s citizen and Aristotle’s shrink. This odd assertion can be made less so, if we see man, not in a polis or in a Lockean civil society, but in a modern nation‐state. Its nationalistic ele‐ ments attempt to provide transcendent meaning for its citizens, to a great extent replacing the traditional function of religion. Nationalism is a tribal emotion the state employs to make sac‐ rifices, including the destruction of their and other people’s lives. Locke’s defense against this sort of tribal violence and its cousins in sectarian strife is to assert the full humanity of the in‐ dividual independent and prior to the state and civil society. This theoretical difference with Aristotle must be seen in the context of his times. Locke has good reason to fear the state more than Aristotle fears the polis. Remember Locke’s Second Treatise follows his First, which is a point‐by‐point refutation of the doctrine of the divine right of kings. Remember also that Locke is attempting to establish a form of govern‐ ment which would not provoke the civil wars that England had experienced for over a centu‐ ry. He believes sectarian controversy, which in Lockean terms can be seen as the power of groups to get humans to kill each other, denying others their rights and risking one’s own, for no proper purpose. War fought for group values is the ultimate denial of the individual’s rights. Locke is concerned that ‘leviathan’ will use man’s decent regard for his fellows against his liberties. Locke’s willingness to have an emotion free public existence marks a major dif‐ ference from Aristotle. In the context of his times, however, and given his main purpose to keep government at bay, this difference may not seem so great. In his love of free expression of the human personality and in his hatred of tyranny, Locke is as Greek as Aristotle. He is, however, much more concerned than the great Greek with the tyrant that lies within our own breasts, the tyrant who will sacrifice his or her freedom not to be alone in the dark. A man should be capable of engaging in business and war, but still more capable of living in peace and leisure; and he should do what is necessary and useful, but still more should he do what is noble. These then are the aims that ought to be kept in view in the education of the citizens both while still children and at the later ages that require education. Aristotle40

V. Education as an Aristotelian Natural Right So far I have tried to minimize as a practical matter the differences between Aristotle’s and Locke’s conception of man. And this from two directions: the first stresses the inevitabil‐ ity of Lockean man’s move into civil society; the second stresses the individualism of Aristote‐ lian man. Moreover, when one considers the nature of the polis and the nature of the leviathan state, the differences between the two conceptions of man shrink even further. If Locke were thinking of a polis instead of a state premised on the divine right of kings, he would be consid‐

40 Aristotle, 1944, op.cit., VII viii 9‐10

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erably less nervous about the abuse of political power and less concerned to set up absolute theoretical barriers between the individual and society. If Aristotle were thinking only of tyr‐ anny, which is what he would call any modern state, he would be more concerned to set up theoretical barriers between the good man and the citizen of a bad state. My understanding of Aristotle does establish such barriers, insofar as the locus of so much Aristotelian virtue lies in the individual, despite its social and political expression, and the necessities of the conception of zoon politikon. Here it remains to make explicit these views with respect to education. Aristotle has none of Locke’s reservations about social or political goods or benefits which might seduce, if not extort or coerce an individual away from a jealous protection of his individual sovereign‐ ty—at least not when Aristotle considers his ideal polity. The inevitably social character of education for Aristotle is no more problematic than the inevitably social character of life in a polis. Far from being a danger, these social benefits are essential, not merely for social order, but for the development of a fully human being. There has been scholarly discussion ever since Aristotle’s view became public whether it is possible to be a complete human being by living a life of contemplation or reflection without political activity, if a human were in a bad state. There is no such disagreement concerning education. The Aristotelian human cannot exist without civic education. It would be pedantic to count the references to education, ex‐ plicit and implied, in his works. Let me refer to only a few of the most pertinent to this essay. As we have already stressed, the purpose of the polis is not fulfilled by the mere survival of its citizens. The polis exists to complete its citizens, to allow them to fulfill their entire na‐ tures to the limit of their attributes, dispositions and characters. For Aristotle, zoon politikon is justified by creating space not only for political activity but also for the other moral and in‐ tellectual virtues, also conceived as activities. Not only must individuals engage in these activi‐ ties to be fully human, they must also know why they are proper. An individual is a choice‐ making creature, because reason, the attribute and capacity that defines the human essence, enables a person to make judgments about actions and their consequences and thereby to en‐ gage in responsible and not merely voluntary actions. But, like so many other Aristotelian dis‐ positions and attributes, it implies only a set of possibilities. For these to become actual, and therefore for man to become fully human, they need to function properly in a polis. It must be emphasized that whatever the mix of formal or intellectual education and practical experi‐ ence, whether a cobbler or a philosopher is in question, all learning should enable a human to act with nobility, that is, in a generally praiseworthy manner. The ultimate test of education, as so much else in Aristotle, is virtuous activity: It is therefore not difficult to see that the young must be taught these useful arts that are indispensably necessary; but it is clear that they should not be taught all the useful arts, those pursuits that are liberal being kept distinct from those that are illiberal, and that they must participate in such among the useful arts as will not render the person who participates in them vulgar. A task and also an art or a science must be deemed vulgar if it renders the body or soul or mind of free men useless for the employments and actions of virtue.41 Despite its undoubted centrality to the polis, a liberal education appropriate to free indi‐ viduals contains a troublesome implication for natural rights philosophers. Aristotle makes it plain that education is too important to be left to private hands. ‘Now nobody would dispute

41 Aristotle, 1944, op.cit., VIII ii

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that the education of the young requires the special attention of the lawgiver.’42 And further, even more ominously: ‘It will be important for the legislator to study how and by what cours‐ es of training good men are to be produced, and what is the end of the best life.’43 The polis has the proper and almost exclusive responsibility of educating its citizens, not only in skills and methods of inquiry, but also in content. This statement by itself is sufficient reason for a thinker like Locke to see education, for all its other merits, as a danger to the natural rights of man.44 Impregnated with the social and the political, it is subject to the abuse of power. Locke prefers ignorant free humans, wandering in a state of nature, to educated subjects. For Aristotle, the dangers to liberty are much less likely to manifest themselves, in an ideal polis than in a tyranny, to say nothing of a modern power state, suffused with irrational nationalism. For Aristotle, the liberty of a free human requires political activity and moral ac‐ tivity, both of which are virtually impossible in a state of nature. For Aristotle, ignorance is slavery. One simply cannot be a slave and a man, except in unusual circumstance. To persist in natural ignorance is to certify natural slavery. To overcome ignorance requires education, as well as, the gift of reason. Education is therefore as essential to adulthood as reason. In this understanding, education enables an individual to make intelligent moral and intellectual choices. It is as essential to free citizens as food and water, for it enables a person to know and to be able to apply the principles of virtuous action. Humans then become fully responsible for their virtue and therefore fully human. Individuals require the polis to provide them with an arena for their virtuous activities, for only then can they lead lives of contented well being eudaemonia. For its part, the polis requires these kinds of individuals so that it may be justi‐ fied. A principal interface of this dialectical relationship between the individual and the collec‐ tivity is education. It indicates the requirements of citizenship. It provides an arena in which the virtuous activities of citizens can flourish. Moreover, it helps the family raise its children to become virtuous citizens by providing them with an appropriate education. Education is as important as friendship and often coincides with it. In teaching moments, teacher and student become friends. Education can be conceived as an essentially social activity which finds its expression in the public and private activities of virtuous citizens. Friendship is essentially a personal activity which finds its public expression in the virtuous activities of citizens in a just polis. For Aristotle a life of contented well‐being Eudaemonia is inconceivable without friendship and impossible without education. In the Introduction I related a self‐serving incident which suggested that I am a better teacher than I am. In closing I will quote Loren Eiseley to the show that teaching is self‐serving in even a more profound way: It is not only for the future the teacher fights, it is for the justification of himself, his profession, and the state of his own soul. He, too, amid contingencies and weariness, without mental antennae, and with tests that fail him, is the savior of souls.45

42 Aristotle, 1944, op.cit. VII ii 43 Aristotle, 1944, op.cit., VII xiii 44 Tarcov, op.cit. 45 Eiseley, op.cit., p.198

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Πάπυροι - Επιστημονικό Περιοδικό Δέλτοι τόμος 4, 2015

Papyri - Scientific Journal Delti volume 4, 2015

Inquiries and Confession before the Cross: An Interpretation of -Wang Guilin’s My Jerusalem ELiu- Yan, China, Institute for Trans cultural Studies, Beijing International Studies University, Peking, China mail: [email protected]

5 – 5 ISSN:2241-5106 Θεσσαλονίκη 201 Thessaloniki 201

Πάπυροι - Επιστημονικό Περιοδικό Papyri - Scientific Journal Δέλτοι Delti τόμος 4, 2015 volume 4, 2015 www.academy.edu.gr [email protected] Inquiries and Confession before the Cross: An Interpretation of Wang Guilin’s My Jerusalem

Inquiries and Confession before the Cross: An Interpretation of Wang Guilin’s My Jerusalem1

LIU YAN

Περίληψη Η εργασία αυτή χρησιμοποιεί την προσέγγιση της προσεκτικής ανάγνωσης για να ερ‐ μηνεύσει το έργο του σύγχρονου Κινέζου ποιητή Wang Guilin, Ιερουσαλήμ, από τη διαλογική προοπτική των «Εγώ και Εσύ». Το βιβλίο της ποίησης καταγράφει τα συναισθήματα του Wang κατά την επίσκεψή του στην Ιερουσαλήμ, με την ευκαιρία της συμμετοχής του στο 32ο Παγκόσμιο Συνέδριο Ποιητών που πραγματοποιήθηκε στο Τελ Αβίβ, στο Ισραήλ, από το ταξί‐ δι στις 3 ‐ 8 Σεπ 2012. Το ταξίδι του Wang στην Ιερουσαλήμ ήταν επίσης ένα προσκύνημα προς την αυτο‐επίτευξη , την ειρήνη και την αγάπη, και την πνευματική πατρίδα. Από τη σκοπιά της πίστης που πηγαίνει πέρα από την καθημερινή ζωή, ο Wang σχετί‐ ζει πώς ένα άτομο που αντιμετωπίζει μοναδικές ιστορικές, πολιτιστικές, θρησκευτικές, γεω‐ γραφικές, φυσικές και ιερές σκηνές στην Ιερουσαλήμ, στη συνέχεια καταυθάνει σε ένα νεο‐ γέννητο. Η Ιερουσαλήμ απεικονίζει μια αντιπαράθεση και ένα διάλογο μεταξύ του «Εγώ» και της «Ιερουσαλήμ» στους Αγίους Τόπους. Αυτό σημαίνει ότι βιώσουν και αισθάνονται μέσα από τα μάτια του "εγώ" προσκυνητής ή ταξιδιώτης σε μια άλλη πολιτιστική παράδοση. Η γερμανική εβραϊκή θεολόγος Martin Buber υποδεικνύει ότι η εκ νέου συγχώνευση της λαϊκό‐ τητας και ιερότητας δείχνει μια σχέση και όχι μια οντότητα. Υπάρχει σε μια σύγκρουση, ένα διάλογο και μια διαπροσωπική υπέρβαση και όχι σε μια μοναχική εμπειρία της αυτο‐εξέτασης και της κερδοσκοπίας. Για παράδειγμα, στη Γεσθημανή ο Wang εμφανίζει μια στενή σχέση μεταξύ του ανθρώπου και του Θεού στο διάλογο «του Εγώ‐και‐Εσύ». Λέει ότι ως άτομο που επιδιώκει την αλήθεια, ο ποιητής ανοίγει θαρραλέα την εσωτερικότητα του και πλησίασε το Θεό με τρόπο ελκυστικό και κοιτώντας ψηλά αντί της λογικής ή των εικασιών. Εάν η Αθήνα αντιπροσωπεύει ένα δρόμο της επιστήμης και της λογικής στρωμένης με τη γνώση, της σοφίας και της αυτο‐παρουσίασης, τότε η Ιερουσαλήμ αντιπροσωπεύει ένα δρόμο του πνεύματος και της πίστεως που χτίστηκε με αυταπάρνηση, θυσία, συμπάθεια, τα‐ πεινοφροσύνη και φιλανθρωπία. Ο θεολόγος Lev Shestov πιστεύει ότι η ανθρώπινη γνώση δεν ελευθερώνει, αλλά περιορίζει τον άνθρωπο, ότι οι αλήθειες που προβλέπονται από τη γνώση έχουν ηττηθεί από τον ανθρώπινο πόνο. Στη σειρά η Ιερουσαλήμ μου, όλες οι βασικές εικόνες που εμφανίζονται συχνά έχουν σχέσεις με "δάκρυα". Προφανώς, ο Wang ακολουθεί ένα δρόμο κλήσης και δακρύων. Η Μέση Ανατολή σήμερα παραμένει τεταμένη και τυρβώδης. Είναι αυτό το μικρό μέ‐ ρος όπου σκορπίζονται ιστορικές σκηνές, έθνη, βασικές εικόνες, ειδικά αντικείμενα και φυσι‐ κές σκηνές. Εκθέτοντας τον εαυτό του σε ένα τόσο περίπλοκο πλαίσιο, το "εγώ" που μεγάλω‐ σε μέσα στις παραδόσεις του Κομφουκιανισμού, του Ταοϊσμού και του Βουδισμού, παταγω‐

1 My original paper was written in Chinese. The English version has been translated by Lin Zhenhua, who teaches at the Green Oasis School in Shenzhen, China. I want to express my gratitude for his patience, kindness and sup‐ port. It was published in: Frontiers of Literary Studies in China Beijing: Higher Education Press Vol‐ ume9.Number2. 2015. PP.318‐336.

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δώς έγινε μάρτυρας αυτού του ιερού τόπου όπου αναδείχθηκαν οι τρεις μεγάλες θρησκείες του κόσμου του Ιουδαϊσμού, του Χριστιανισμςού και του Ισλαμισμού που υποφέρουν από ατελείωτους πολέμους. Για τον Wang, η πορεία προς την Ιερουσαλήμ είναι μια διαδικασία της αναγέννησης κατά τη διάρκεια της οποίας ο ίδιος τάσσεται υπέρ της ειρήνης και της αγάπης, και ξανά αναγνώρισε τον εαυτό του και έψαξε για το πνευματικό σπίτι του. Η έννοια του να ξαναμπεί στην Ιερουσαλήμ είναι ότι αυτό το ταξίδι ανοίγει μια θεϊκή διάσταση που συνεχίζεται πέρα από τον ορίζοντα τον κοσμικό κόσμο ουσιαστικά, ώστε να εμβαθύνει και να διευρύνει την ποίησή του σε μια επέκταση η οποία ποτέ δεν επιτεύχθηκε. Ως ποιητής με θρησκευτικά συναισθήματα, ο Wang λαμβάνει ένα βαθύ αίσθημα πίστεως προς την ανάμειξη με την προσωπική του εμπειρία με την άθλια ιστορία της Ιερουσαλήμ και την τραγική ζωή του Ιησού. Γνωρίζοντας ότι το πνεύμα του ήταν ελλιπές, ανεπαρκές και ένοχο, ο Wang ξεκίνησε ένα διάλογο με τον Θεό στη σχέση του «Εγώ και Εσύ», έτσι ώστε η νοοτροπία να μπορούσε να αναβιώσει και το πνεύμα να μεταλλαχθεί. Πρόκειται για μια ευγενή ποιότητα σπάνια στη σύγχρονη Κίνα, στην οποία λείπει η πίστη και η αυτο‐αντανάκλαση. Η Ιερουσα‐ λήμ μου επισημαίνει μια ειρηνική πορεία της λύτρωσης που οδηγεί στην πνευματική πατρίδα. Ίσως όλοι μας θα πρέπει να ηρεμήσουμε, κοιτώντας ψηλά στον πανύψηλο βωμό του σκοτα‐ διού και να αναρωτηθούμε: «Πού είναι η Ιερουσαλήμ μου;"

Abstract This paper employs the approach of close reading to interpret a contemporary Chinese poet Wang Guilin’s My Jerusalem from the dialogic perspective of “I and Thou”. The book of poetry records Wang’s feelings and emotions during his visit to Jerusalem on the occasion of attending the 32nd World Congress of Poets held in Tel Aviv, Israel from 3‐8 September 2012. Wang’s journey of Jerusalem was also a pilgrimage toward self‐achievement, peace and love, and the spiritual homeland. From a perspective of faith which goes beyond daily life, Wang relates how an individu‐ al encountered unique historical, cultural, religious, geographical, natural and sacred scenes in Jerusalem, and then obtained a newborn. My Jerusalem depicts a confrontation and a dialogue between “I” and “Jerusalem” the Holy Land. That means to experience and feel through the eyes of the “I” pilgrim or traveller in another cultural tradition. The German Jewish theologi‐ an Martin Buber indicates that the re‐fusion of secularity and sacredness demonstrates a rela‐ tionship rather than an entity. It exists in an encounter, a dialogue and an interpersonal tran‐ scendence rather than in a solitary experience of self‐examination and speculation. For exam‐ ple, Wang’s Gethsēmani displays an intimate relationship between human and God in the “I‐ and‐Thou” dialogue. It tells that as an individual pursuing truth, the poet opened bravely his inwardness and approached God with a way of appealing and looking up instead of reasoning or speculating. If Athens stands for a road of science and reason paved with knowledge, wisdom and self‐presentation, then Jerusalem for a road of spirit and faith built with abnegation, sacrifice, sympathy, humbleness and philanthropy. The theologian Lev Shestov believes that human knowledge does not free but restrain human, that the truths provided by knowledge are van‐ quished by human suffering. In the series of My Jerusalem, all core images appeared frequent‐ ly have relations with “tears”. Obviously, Wang is pursuing a path of calling and tears. The Middle East today remains tense and turbulent. It is in this small place where scat‐ ter historical scenes , nations , core images, special objects and natural scenes. Exposing him‐

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self in such a complicated context, the “I” who grew up within the traditions of Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism miserably witnessed this sacred place where emerged three major reli‐ gions in the world Judaism, Christianity and Islamism suffering from endless wars. For Wang, the route to Jerusalem is a process of revival during which he advocates peace and love, re‐recognized himself and searched for his spiritual home. The meaning of reentering Jerusalem is that this journey opens a divine dimension which goes beyond the horizon the secular world vertically, that it deepens and broadens his poetry to an extension which was never achieved. As a poet with religious sentiments, Wang obtained a deep feeling toward faith through blending his personal experience with the miser‐ able history of Jerusalem and the tragic life of Jesus. Having acknowledged that his spirit was incomplete, deficient and guilty, Wang started a dialogue with God in the relationship of “I and Thou” so that the mentality might be revived and the spirit converted. This is a noble quality rare in contemporary China where lacks faith and self‐reflection. My Jerusalem points out a peaceful path of redemption leading to the spiritual homeland. Perhaps all of us should be calm down, looking up at the towering altar in the dark and asking ourselves: “where is my Jerusalem?”

He is a poet starting for Jerusalem from afar, a pious pilgrim and a spiritual interlocutor of “I and Thou.” Having arrived at the Holy Land, full of history and significance, he she lin‐ gers around the Gethsēmani where Jesus was imprisoned, silently facing the huge cross on the Calvary, bursting into tears at the Wailing Wall. Even reentering Jerusalem was imbued with surprise, shock, compassion, melancholy, reflection, penitence… Inner trembling, spiritual in‐ quiries, reminiscence, meditation and confession—all this constitutes the theme of Wang Gui‐ lin’s book of poetry, My Jerusalem Wode Yelusaleng 我的耶路撒冷.2 In the epilogue, “Every‐ one Should Have an Inward Jerusalem” 每个人心里都要有一个耶路撒冷, Wang points out that “the purpose of this trip was to visit Jerusalem, to be a genuine pilgrim. I used to regard writing poems as my own religion; the way of writing, then being the pilgrimage. However, it was not until being baptized in Jerusalem that I experienced an unprecedentedly astonish‐ ment. It just felt like being hit by a thunderbolt and burned from inside.”3 The book of poetry records Wang’s feelings and emotions during his visit to Jerusalem on the occasion of attending the 32nd World Congress of Poets held in Tel Aviv, Israel, from the 3rd to the 8th of September 2012. “We had been attracted by the atmosphere there insomuch that we paid another visit two days later, retracing the route on which Jesus trudged with the

2 Wang Guilin王桂林 1952– , a.k.a. Du Heng杜衡, a poet from Shandong province. He is the denominator and initiator of the “poet tribe from the mouth of the Yellow River” 黄河口诗人部落 and editor of the journal the Poet Tribe from the Mouth of the Yellow River Huanghekou Shiren Buluo 黄河口诗人部落 . He has published some anthologies such as the Sea on the Grass Caoye shangde hai 草叶上的海 , Introspection and Expectation Neixing yu yuanwu 内省与远骛 and My Jerusalem Wode Yelusaleng 我的耶路撒冷 as well as a collection of essays, My Pool Wode chitang 自己的池塘 . 3 Wang Guilin, Wode Yelusaleng, 62.

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cross on his back. On that day, every visitor was double shocked and baptized both physically and mentally.”4 As a tourist from China visiting an occidental country with a long tradition of pilgrimage, and as a contemporary poet striving to write poems even after the many vicissi‐ tudes of life, Wang could not help but burst into tears and compose twelve religious poems dedicated to Jerusalem. These include Jerusalem 耶路撒冷, Israel 以色列, Pray 祷告, The Mediterranean Sunshine 地中海的阳光, Gethsēmani 客西马尼园, I Am 我是, Reentering Jerusalem 重返耶路撒冷, Harp 竖琴, Wailing Wall 哭墙, Tonight 今夜, Salt of the Dead Sea 死海之盐, and You are Right There 你就在那里. From a perspective of faith that trans‐ cends daily life, he illustrates how an individual encounters unique historical, cultural, reli‐ gious, geographical, natural and sacred scenes in Jerusalem, and then is reborn. For Wang, the route to Jerusalem is a process of revival during which he advocates peace and love, re‐ recognizes himself, and searches for his spiritual home.

I. Meditations in Jerusalem: Light and Shade Just as its title implies, My Jerusalem depicts a confrontation and a dialogue between “I” and “Jerusalem,” the Holy Land—that is, an experience of Jerusalem through the eyes of the “I” the pilgrim or traveller in another cultural tradition. It is here that our story takes place, in the scattered historical scenes the Holy City, the Wailing Wall, the Temple Mount, Jerusa‐ lem, Gethsēmani, nations Israelite and Arabian, core images God, Moses, Mohammed, John, Jesus, special objects stones, bullet holes, crosses, moon, crews and natural scenes the Sea of Galilee, the Mediterranean, the Dead Sea, the Mount of Olives. Exposing himself in such a complicated context, the “I” who grew up within the traditions of Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism miserably witnessed this sacred place in which three major religions of the world emerged Judaism, Christianity and Islamism, suffering from endless wars. Throughout histo‐ ry those that believed in God differently could not get along with each other. Eventually, they had to face catastrophic consequences—blood, hatred, hurt, bullet holes, tears, terror and death. Wang feels confused and helpless before this situation:

死去他们仍怀抱仇恨山坡上埋着不一样的信仰

Dead, yet they still hold hatred On the slope there buried another belief —Jerusalem trans. Bei Ta5

这座哭泣的墙上时间的眼睛依旧流血上帝未醒他的儿子们仍在仇恨

On this Wailing Wall

4 Wang Guilin, Wode Yelusaleng, 63. 5 Wang Guilin, Wode Yelusaleng, 5.

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The eyes of time keep running blood God has not woken up His offspring are still in hatred —Wailing Wall trans. Lin Zhenhua6

He laments that from ancient times Israel the nation chosen by God has been:

是世界喉咙里的钻石阿拉伯肋骨中的钉子

Diamond in the throat of the world Nail in the rib of Arabia —Israel trans. Bei Ta7

With the same fountainhead, Israel and Arabia should have a brotherly relationship; unfortunately they have continued fighting against each other in the name of “God” or “Allah” for hundreds of years. Adorno’s 1949 dictum—“To write poetry after Auschwitz is barbar‐ ic”8—posed the question of poet every just, philanthropic and merciful poet has to consider after Auschwitz. Furthermore, what role can poetry play in an age of danger, violation and faithlessness? Of course, the poet is neither a provident statesman or diplomat, nor a detached be‐ liever. Though unable to put forward some concrete strategies or solutions, he prefers a poetic way of thinking, making his own voice and writing down stanzas, which advocate peace and universal love. He exerts himself in a struggle for human’s dignity and kindness. Likewise, Se‐ amus Heaney describes the value of poetry in the modern world as “The power to persuade that vulnerable part of our consciousness of its rightness in spite of the evidence of wrongness all around it, the power to remind us that we are hunters and gatherers of values, that our very solitudes and distresses are creditable, in so far as they, too, are an earnest of our verita‐ ble human being. ”9 In this context, Wang unfolds a natural scene beyond death from a bystander’s perspec‐ tive, which contrasts the heavily damaged Wailing Wall with the graveyard of innocent vic‐ tims:

太阳将我和大海同时照亮偌大的地中海没有阴影

The Sun enlightens the sea and me simultaneously Mediterranean, so big, yet has no shadows —The Mediterranean Sunshine trans. Bei Ta10

6 Wang Guilin, Wode Yelusaleng, 25. 7 Wang Guilin, Wode Yelusaleng, 7. 8 Adorno, Theodore. Notes to literature, 87. 9 Heaney, “Crediting Poetry,” 467. 10 Wang Guilin, Wode Yelusaleng, 11.

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There is an obvious tension between “sunshine” and “shadows,” implying a possibility of relieving a complicated history or a cruel reality. The sunshine, the sea, the sky and life it‐ self—all of these transcend territories, nations, ages, religions and cultures. Are they not the homeland common to all humans, bestowed by God? If everyone who still stays “in his own shadow” see Wailing Wall while praying could lift his head and gaze at the azure Mediterra‐ nean afar, he may feel:

风中一阵密语肯纳瑞特的湖水清澈又沁凉

Whispers in the breeze How clear and cool the Kinneret —Lyre trans. Lin Zhenhua11

A heart warmed by sunshine could expel national hatred or narrowness, and as a result the “shadows” of history and of self might fade away. The poet expects that all people from dif‐ ferent beliefs and nations

在天空深处接吻

are kissing each other deep in the sky —Jerusalem trans. Bei Ta12

...that all offspring of God could listen to Jesus’ instruction—“love your enemies” and “love thy neighbor” Matthew 5: 43–44—and soldiers, having put down their weapons, “shall beat their swords into plowshares, and their spears into pruning hooks: nation shall not lift up a sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more” Micah 4: 3. Such a ray of “light” piercing shadow, darkness and confusion, predicts the light of eternity, belief or love, which dispels estrangement, hostility and prejudice:

更高的光雪亮我的眼睛

The higher light enlightens my eyes —I Am trans. Bei Ta13

密密的十字架在山顶发光

Dense crosses are glimmering on the summit —Reentering Jerusalem trans. Bei Ta14

挂在圣殿山的左边的大脸庞的明月

11 Wang Guilin, Wode Yelusaleng, 24. 12 Wang Guilin, Wode Yelusaleng, 25. 13 Wang Guilin, Wode Yelusaleng, 18. 14 Wang Guilin, Wode Yelusaleng, 23.

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The bright big moon hanging on the left of the Temple Mount —Tonight trans. Lin Zhenhua15

白昼用它的光刺穿所有谎言和错觉

The Daylight pierced all lies and illusions With its brightness —There You Are trans. Lin Zhenhua16

It is only the divine “light” of redemption that could eliminate all the misery and dark‐ ness hanging about the human realm, and resolve historical contradictions. In regard to the complicated conflicts of history, a poet does not propose any ultimate solution or criticize the other side; instead, he makes his own voice heard among disputations in pursuit of a balance between linguistic aesthetic self‐sufficiency and sociological responsi‐ bility. We should treat My Jerusalem not as a poem in which the foreign poet depicts a misera‐ ble and violent history of a distant ancient city but, instead, as a reflection from the perspec‐ tive of “the other” and an indirect expression made for a generation with memories of political violence and harsh lives. The poet goes beyond the boundary of language and nation, sharing the same feeling with his brothers and sisters in misery as well as praying for the possibility of redemption through self‐examination—only natural sunlight or divine light can dispel the darkness and bright forth the eternal “light” of life, “love,” and “peace.”

II. Inquiries in Gethsēmani: I and Thou Since the Chinese Union Version Heheben of the Bible was published in 1919, reli‐ gious sentiment and discourse of Christianity have permeated Chinese culture, providing a spiritual source for modern Chinese literature, which would be universalized and religionized. In the first half of twentieth century, some Chinese poets had begun to read the Bible and re‐ search Christianity and Hebrew culture. As a result, Jesus’ crucified image, self‐sacrificial spirit and divine personality became one of the subjects of modern Chinese poetry. For instance, Xu Zhimo徐志摩wrote a long poem entitled Calvary that is, the Latinized name of Golgotha, the place where Jesus was crucified, Lu Xun 鲁迅 composed two prose poems entitled Revenge Fuchou on the basis of Jesus’ Passion, and Ai Qing 艾青 wrote The Death of a Lazarus Yige Lasaren de si, a long poem with 109 lines that accord with the four Gospels. Mu Dan’s 穆旦 Revelation Yinxian, 1947 also is a religious poem that discusses the possibility of believing in Christianity in the form of a dialogue. It ends with a moving stanza of prayer:

主呵，因为我们看见了，在我们聪明的愚昧里，我们已经有太多的战争，朝向别人和自己，太多的不满，太多的生中之死，死中之生，

15 Wang Guilin, Wode Yelusaleng, 26. 16 Wang Guilin, Wode Yelusaleng, 30.

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我们有太多的利害，分裂，阴谋，报复，这一切把我们推到相反的极端，我们应该忽然转身，看见你

Lord, for we have seen, we have already seen too many wars, Too many discontents, life‐in‐death and death‐in‐life, Too many interests, disruptions, intrigues and vengeances, All these have pushed us to an opposite end, it is time We turn round, and see you.

这是时候了，这里是我们被曲解的生命请你舒平，这里是我们枯竭的众心请你糅合，主啊，生命的源泉，让我们听见你流动的声音

It is time now. And this is our twisted being For you to straighten. This is our split hearts For you to knead into a whole, O Lord, the fountainhead of being, let us hear the gushing sound of you flowing. —Revelation trans. Mu Dan17

Different from their predecessors who accessed Christianity solely through reading the Bible, contemporary Chinese poets have more resources with regard to Christianity, such as Wang Guilin’s opportunity to visit Jerusalem. Having stood on the ground of this Holy City, Wang was no more a bystander, a hunter of knowledge or an explorer of curiosity. Instead, he put himself into the divine dimension where Christianity was born and confronted Jesus with a special Chinese identity. In Gethsēmani, the poet starts a conversation between “I” and “Thou”:

你回到你主的身边，我没有主，只能徒生艳羡。你满脸祥和，静穆，一如橄榄山正听见圣谕。

You went back to your lord, I have no lord. I can only admire you vainly. Your face solemn and quiet, Just like the Olive Hill hearing the holy decree.

多么羞愧！我，来到此处，甚至算不上异教徒！从前的悲苦无处哭诉，

17 Mu Dan, Mu Dan shiwenji, 253Chinese, 262 English .

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只能借诗行铺展灵魂的出路。

What a shame! I, come here, Yet I am even not a pagan! No way to explain tearfully the past sorrows, Poetry is the only way for my soul to be spread.

此刻闭上双眼向内心张望—— 主啊，我看见血液翻飞，在你的穹窿里轰然炸响。

This moment I close my eyes to look into my heart— O, Lord, I see blood flying up and down With a loud crash in your vault.

怀疑的尘灰纷纷掉落阶前。我忍住泪水，和你跪倒在客西马尼园。

Dusts of doubts falling onto steps In succession. I hold back my tears, Kneeling down at Gethsēmani with you. —Gethsēmani trans. Bei Ta18

This is one of the most moving and excellent poems in My Jerusalem. It could be com‐ pared with Bing Xin’s 冰心 1900–1999 poem of the same name issued on the journal Life Shengming 生命 in May 1921:

漆黑的天空，冰冷的山石，有谁和他一同儆醒呢？睡着的只管睡着，图谋的只管图谋。然而——他伤痛着，血汗流着， “父啊，只照着你的意思行。” 上帝啊！因你爱我们—— “父啊，只照着你的意思行。”阿们。

Under the dark sky, Among frozen mountain stones, Is there anyone awake alertly like him?

18 Wang Guilin, Wode Yelusaleng, 12‐15.

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Those who are sleeping are only concerned with sleeping; Those who are conspiring, conspiring. But—look at him whose wounds and injuries are hurting, blood and sweat running, “Oh Father, only with your instruction I proceed. Oh God! For you love us— Oh Father, only with your instruction I proceed.” Amen. —Gethsēmani trans. Lin Zhenhua19

With this poem, Bing Xin became the first Chinese poet to employ the form of free verse to describe Jesus on the eve of his Passion. Despite the fact that it was impossible to witness the scene at that time, on the basis of the Gospels and her personal experience, Bing Xin still succeeds in revealing Jesus’ anguish and mentality when he was sold by Judas and learned of his destiny as a redemption for all of humanity. Bing Xin faithfully adopts the part of New Tes‐ tament where Jesus meditates in the Gethsēmani. She chooses the third person, “He,” as the listener and the form of prayer to express her Christian faith. This expression constitutes the theme of “love” in Bing Xin’s early poems. Wang Guilin’s Gethsēmani is the inner voice of a contemporary poet who “paves a spir‐ itual path with stanzas.” Facing the Holy Son, the poet, who feels minute, ashamed and sorrow‐ ful and “even not a pagan,” has no way to hide and exhibits himself—“O, Lord, I see blood fly‐ ing up and down/ With a loud crash in your vault./ Dusts of doubts falling onto steps/ In suc‐ cession.” In the encounter with Jesus, his religious passion is ignited so much that he cannot help being embraced by and indulged in the omnipresent love of God. It is a kind of self‐ transcendence realized via the projection of human finiteness into God’s infiniteness. This spiritual transcendence means the human protest against absolute contingency and ridicu‐ lousness of being, as well as a reflection of that the ontological meaning, equals to that of hu‐ man’s existence. The definite, minute self becomes fragmentary, but its inner world is purified and consoled while conversing with the infinite God. Wang’s Gethsēmani displays an intimate relationship between humanity and God in the “I‐and‐Thou” dialogue. It reveals that, as an individual pursuing truth, the poet bravely opens his inwardness and approaches God with reverence instead of reasoning or speculation. Here God is not a void concept, but some ultimate support for human existence. The German Jewish theologian Martin Buber indicates that the re‐fusion of secularity and sacredness demon‐ strates a relationship rather than an entity. It exists in an encounter, a dialogue and an inter‐ personal transcendence, rather than in a solitary experience of self‐examination and specula‐ tion. “The primary word I‐Thou can be spoken only with the whole being. Concentration and fusion into the whole being can never take place through my agency, nor can it ever take place without me. I become through my relation to the Thou; as I become I, and I say Thou. All real living is meeting.”20 Different from an objectified and empirical “I‐It” relationship, in Wang’s Gethsēmani, the individual “I” lies in relation to the supreme “Thou,” where they meet, con‐ verse and speak face to face. While Bing Xin’s hero or heroine is simply praying to Jesus, Wang’s offers an intimate “I‐Thou” communication that concerns the modern—a present two‐ way dialogue between humanity and God which brings humanity upward to the sublime di‐ vine world.

19 Bing Xin, Bing Xin shi quanbian,113. 20 Buber, I and Thou, 11.

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Buber insists that human must ponder over God, but this God is not beyond and de‐ tached from our world, but omnipresent, even in present and sensational objects with whom we converse every day. That is also what Wang feels about God or the power of faith— mental stimulation, expression, and confession, rather than written creeds, rational specula‐ tion, or the accumulation of knowledge. In the meeting of “I and Thou,” “I” become transcend‐ ent. The poet is willing to put aside all doubts and self‐opinions, bowing his head for confes‐ sion—“The cross in my heart/ Collapses and breaks suddenly” 心中原有的十字架/突然歪倒，破碎.21 As Jesus once said, “If any man will come after me, let he deny himself, and take up his cross, and follow me. For whosoever will save his life shall lose it: and whosoever will lose his life for my sake shall find it” Matthew 16: 24–25. Through the sacrifice and love on the Cross, humanity acquires the key to the divine world. When Jesus announces to his disci‐ ples “love God, love your neighbor and love your enemy,” we realize that Jesus’ love is neither a quality of the beloved nor an overwhelming sensation of the “I.” It exists in the “I‐Thou” rela‐ tionship. It exhibits and purifies itself in the relationship between God, my neighbor, my ene‐ my and “I.” At this moment of the sacred encounter, the poet replies firmly—“I murmur: I love/ Even though I will never come again” 我低声说：我爱/即使此生再不回来.22 In another poem, I Am, the poet retells the significance of the Passion via the first per‐ son “I”:

更高的空中有更高的律令更高的光雪亮我眼睛当众人心甘情愿地瞎掉 ——我是

Higher decrees in higher sky The higher light enlightens my eyes When the masses are willing to be blind —I am

我是说出真相之人是我显圣迹以上帝之名即使刽子手不问我我也会主动回答 ——我是

I am he who tells the truth It is I who shows miracles in the name of God Though executioners do not ask me, I answer by myself —I am

不要责备将我出卖之人是我给他勇气让他自己吊死他做的事他自己也不明白

21 Wang Guilin, Wode Yelusaleng, 22. 22 Wang Guilin, Wode Yelusaleng, 23.

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——我是

Don’t blame he who sells me It is I who grants him courage to hang himself He cannot understand what he does —I am

橄榄山的石头背对着我善良的妇女为我流泪我生下来就是为了承担这一切 ——我是

The Stone on the Olive Hill turns its back to me The kind women are bursting into tears to me I was born to bear all these things —I am

十字架一定要我来背耶路撒冷不能永远哀哭我流着血走向高处，高处的死 ——我是

It is fixed for me to carry the Cross Jerusalem cannot be wailing forever I am bleeding and walking upward to die at height —I am —I Am trans. Bei Ta23

Here according to the Gospels, Wang describes how Jesus confronted the whole world the masses, the executioners, those who sell him so vividly that it succeeds in narrating the significance of the Passion and the Cross telling the truth, bearing the miserable, carrying the Cross and bleeding for humanity’s sin. It is by no means a coincidence that he repeats, “I am,” four times, as in all Gospels the Son preaches God’s evangel in the first person. Buber exclaims, “how powerful, even to being overpowering, and how legitimate, even to being self‐evident, is the saying of I by Jesus! For it is the I of unconditional relation in which the man calls his Thou Father in such a way that he himself is simply Son, and nothing else but Son. Whenever he says I he can only mean the I of the holy primary word that has been raised for him into uncondi‐ tional being.”24 As the mediator between human and God, Jesus spared no effort to amend their relationship. In Wang’s poem, every witness is brought into an authentic divine scene by Jesus’ “I am.” Thus we all enter the infinite existence and listen to God’s evangel.

23 Wang Guilin, Wode Yelusaleng, 16‐19. 24 Buber, I and Thou, 66–67.

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III. Reentering Jerusalem: Redemption in Tears Athens is an ancient city lying across the Mediterranean from Jerusalem. While consti‐ tuting two directions and two spirits of the Mediterranean civilization, the two cities respec‐ tively begot the two essences of Western culture—reason and faith. Nevertheless, the journey of faith toward Jerusalem is quite different from the journey of reason toward Athens. The lat‐ ter is characteristic of brightness or leisureliness, of tragic intoxication and ecstasy, whereas the former is replete with heartrending sorrow, sob, shudder and pressure, with confessions and redemptions. If the path to Athens represents a road to science and reason paved with knowledge, wisdom and self‐presentation, then the path to Jerusalem is a road of spirit and faith built with abnegation, sacrifice, sympathy, humbleness and philanthropy. The theologian Lev Shestov believes that human knowledge does not free, but restrains, humanity, that the truths provided by knowledge are vanquished by human suffering. Therefore, it is only faith that can expunge man’s unrestrained arrogance and sin—“the path to the principles, sources, and roots of life leads through the tears with which one calls upon the Creator, and not through a reason which interrogates the ‘given.’”25 The real truth is the tears that fall while calling rather than what reason expresses. In the series of My Jerusalem, all core images that appear frequently relate to “tears,” such as “the kind women are bursting into tears to me” see I Am, “the eyes of time” which shed tears in front of the Wailing Wall see The Wailing Wall, the “I” that has “no way to explain tearfully the past sorrows” but “hold back tears, kneeling down at Gethsēmani with you” see Gethsēmani and Jesus who is willing to carry the Cross for “Jerusalem cannot be wailing forever” see I Am.26 Obviously, Wang is pursuing a path of calling and tears. This is why the poet has reentered Jerusalem, which is not only an attractive tourist city, but also a sacred place for pilgrims. In Reentering Jerusalem, he narrates that

是什么让我再一次回到这里久久地，久久地不愿离去我用泪水擦拭哭墙上的泪水一把刀深深地插进心里

What makes me come here once again Unwilling to leave for a long, long time I wipe the tears on the Wailing Wall with my tears A knife is deeply inserted into my heart

没有缘由的苦痛降临体内当我重返朝圣之路心中原有的十字架突然歪倒，破碎——

Pains without causes have descended into my body

25 Shestov, “In Memory of a Great Philosopher: Edmund Husserl,” in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 22 4: 471. 26 Wang Guilin, Wode Yelusaleng, 19; 25; 14; 19.

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When I reenter the pilgrim road The cross in my heart Collapses and breaks suddenly—

贪婪地吮吸一切，将橄榄山的石头抱进怀里再一次，再一次抬起谦卑的头密密的十字架在山顶发光

Sucking everything greedily, taking the stone Of the Olive Hill into arms Again and again, I raise my humble head Dense crosses are glimmering on the summit

我低声说：我爱即使此生再不回来

I murmur: I love Even though I will never come again —Reentering Jerusalem trans. Bei Ta27

For Wang, the journey of reentering Jerusalem is to go on a pilgrimage, to purify the mind and to pray for redemption. Before Jesus, everyone should carry his own cross, forget‐ ting himself, “taking the stone of the Olive Hill into arms,” so as to throw himself into the em‐ brace of God where he humbly moves toward eternal redemption. In My Jerusalem, interwoven, conflicted and contrasted are opposite discourses or im‐ ages such as light and shadow, the divine ego and the individual self, arrogance and humble‐ ness, stones and tears, history and nature, the Cross shining on the hilltop and the cross of one’s own. These paradoxical discourses in turn reflect Wang’s confusion and exploration of truth. In Jerusalem the common birthplace of three great religions, “God did not wake/ His sons are still in hatred” see The Wailing Wall; “Jerusalem/ There are still fresh bullet holes on walls” see Jerusalem.28 Meanwhile, God’s “hiding” and “absence” make the modern man’s exploration and calling both possible and necessary. Approaching God and reaching faith in whichever way, the pilgrim might possibly be redeemed. After reentering Jerusalem where he had made reflections, Wang obtains redemptive power and is mentally baptized. The last poem in the series, You are Right There, was written for another accomplished modern Chinese poet, Yi Dian伊甸 1953–. It falls on the contemporary Chinese context, lead‐ ing to a virgin land where Chinese poets share their spiritual language and psychological world. The name Yi Dian is transliteration of Eden in the book of Genesis. Born in the 1950s, Yi Dian is also a poet in pursuit of a spiritual homeland like Wang Guilin. Here is one of his fa‐ mous poems, Heian zhongde heliu The River in the Dark:

27 Wang Guilin, Wode Yelusaleng, 20‐23. 28 Wang Guilin, Wode Yelusaleng, 25; 5.

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我们看不见河流但是它在流我们听不见水声但是它在流

We cannot see the river But it is flowing We cannot hear its sound But it is flowing

我们爱它，我们给它写一千首赞美诗但是它在流我们恨它，我们发誓忘记它但是它在流

We love it so much that we write for it one thousand psalms But it is flowing We hate it so much that we swear to forget it But it is flowing

我们远远逃开，一去不复返但是它在流我们寻找它，像寻找圣地一样虔诚但是它在流

We run away far from it forever But it is flowing We search for it piously like exploring the Holy Land But it is flowing

我们气急败坏地吼叫，咒骂，威胁但是它在流我们取消它，删除它，否认它的存在但是它在流

We roar, curse and warn it in a rage But it is flowing We cancel it, delete it and negate its existence But it is flowing

黑暗越来越黑，愈来愈暗但是它在流天塌下来，堵塞了它以外的所有河流但是它在流

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The dark turns deeper and deeper, stronger and stronger But it is flowing The sky falls, blocking all rivers except it But it is flowing —The River in the Dark trans. Lin Zhenhua29

Contrasting this poem with Wang’s You Are Right There, one might notice some an in‐ tertextual dialogue between the two authors:

我燃烧还是冰冷你就在那里

I am burning But still frozen You are right there

写五十首赞美诗或者紧紧地抱着自己你就在那里

I write fifty psalms Or embrace myself tightly You are right there

穿过长江，黄河向北，再向北直到滩涂荒芜，海水寒凉你就在那里

I cross the Yangtze River and the Yellow River Travel northward, again northward Till where the shallows are arid and the deeps frigid You are right there

白昼用它的光刺穿所有谎言和错觉你就在那里

The day uses its light To pierce all lies and illusions You are right there

29 Yi Dian, Heian zhongde heliu,1‐2.

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黄昏拉起幕布只露出背影，沙粒，挽歌声你就在那里

The night draws its falls Leaving only shadows, sands and dirges You are right there

你就在那里不愠，不怒，不喜，不悲黑暗中高高的祭坛竖起又不为人所见你，就在那里

You are right there With no irritation, no infuriation, no happiness and no sadness An altar stands towering in the dark But invisible to anyone You, are right there —You Are Right There trans. Lin Zhenhua30

Through these two poems of a similar theme, we observe that contemporary Chinese poets share an idealistic spirit and strive for the invisible “sacred land.” The “You” in You Are Right There and the “It” in The River in the Dark actually refer to the same inexpressible and formless transcendental object. The last stanzas of both poems relate the same faith, the same pursuit. Both Yi Dian and Wang Guilin employ “the dark” as a metaphor for the real world and the present situation. However, while Yi Dian’s poem focuses on rhythm, Wang’s stresses visu‐ al effect. Moreover, the style of the latter seems simpler, clearer and touchable, its phrasing ex‐ quisite, its images meaningful. Let’s take two lines as an example—“The day uses its light/ To pierce all lies and illusions” and “The night draws its falls/ Leaving only shadows, sands and dirges.”Here “pierce” and “draw” are two personified verbs. “Burning” and “frozen”, “day” and “night” could arouse opposite physical feelings and visual effects. A potential meeting and convergence may take place between the Chinese civilization represented by two geographical terms “the Yangtze River, the Yellow River” and the Hebrew civilization by the Euphrates and the Tigris, which foretells the possibility of a dialogue between East and West. Wang himself does not choose Christianity as an ingrained faith but, rather, he ab‐ sorbed it merely as an intellectual and cultural resource, and used it to gain a broader per‐ spective for examining and criticizing the fragmentation, digression and complexity of modern society. The meaning of reentering Jerusalem is that, for him, this journey opens a divine di‐ mension which goes beyond the horizon the secular world vertically, that it deepens and broadens his poetry to an extension which was never achieved. Now he has gained an insight into darkness, lies, illusions and vanity. Now he has an aspiration, a belief and a passion to car‐

30 Wang Guilin, Wode Yelusaleng, 29‐30.

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ry his own cross. With passionate calling and contemplative focus, we may be freed from nihil‐ istic and atheistic pessimism in this time of crisis. Commendable is the fact that Wang thinks over humanity’s history and living predicament through the relationship between I and He, individual and God. He penetrates into sufferings and chaos, violence and evil, despotism and distortion, as experienced by humanity of all ages. Thus arise self‐reflection and conscious‐ ness of confession. He demolishes the myth of enlightened reason and technological worship and breaks the shackles of mass consumption. This is how he maintains the divinity of indi‐ vidual life. According to Stanley R. Hopper’s idea, poetry is not the Savior, but it can expose human inadequacy in a world plagued with evil and misery, and direct mankind toward God and his salvation.31 Wang is neither a Christian nor a pagan. As a poet with religious senti‐ ments, he obtains a deep feeling toward faith through blending his personal experience with the miserable history of Jerusalem, as well as the tragic life of Jesus. Having acknowledged that his spirit was incomplete, deficient and guilty, Wang starts a dialogue with God in the relation‐ ship of “I and Thou” so that the mentality might be revived and the spirit converted. This is a noble quality rare in contemporary China, which lacks faith and self‐reflection to some extent. For a long time, the contemporary Chinese poetry was overwhelmed with decadent el‐ ements like physical desires, trifles and hedonistic descriptions. The masses were indulged in mechanical technology and commercial capital. As a result, their lives have sunk rapidly into emptiness, meanness, mendacity, corruption and disappointment. Nevertheless, for a nation with no faith or spirit, it will be void in ethos and jeopardized by this. My Jerusalem points out a peaceful path of redemption leading to the spiritual homeland. Perhaps all of us should calm down, looking up at the towering altar in the dark and asking ourselves: “where is my Jerusa‐ lem?”

31 Hopper, Xinyan de weiji, 145.

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REFERENCES

Adorno, Theodore. Notes to literature. Trans. Shierry Weber Nicholsen. New York: Co‐ lumbia University Press, 1992. Buber, Martin. I and Thou. Translated by Ronald Gregor Smith. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1958. Bing Xin. Bing Xin shi quanbian The Complete Poetry of Bing Xin, Hangzhou: Zhejiang wenyi chubanshe, 1994. Gàlik, Mariàn. Influence, Translation and Parallels: Selected Studies on the Bible in Chi‐ na. Sankt Augustin: Institut Monumenta Serica, 2004. Heaney, Seamus. “Crediting Poetry.” In Opened Ground: Selected Poems, 1966–1996, 413–30. New York, NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1998. Hopper, Stanley Romaine. The Crisis of Faith. New York, NY: Abingdon‐Cokesbury, 1944. ———. Xinyande weiji The Crisis of Faith. Translated by Qu Xutong. Beijing: Religion and Culture Press, 2006. Mu Dan. Mu Dan shiwenji. Beijing: Renmin wenxue chubanshe, 2006. Ryken, Leland. How to Read the Bible as Literature. Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1984. ———. Renshi Shengjing wenxue How to Read the Bible as Literature. Translated by Li Yiwei. Nanchang: Jiangxi renmin chubanshe, 2007. Shestov, Lev. Shesituofu wenji The Anthology of Lev Shestov. Edited by Fang Shan. Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 2004. ———. “In Memory of a Great Philosopher: Edmund Husserl.” In Speculation and Reve‐ lation. Translated by Bernard Martin. Columbus, OH: Ohio University Press, 1982. Wang Guilin. Wode Yelusaleng My Jerusalem. Hong Kong: Qingtong International Pub‐ lishing Company, 2013. Yi Dian: Heian zhongde heliu The River in the Dark. Shanghai: Shanghai wenyi chu‐ banshe, 2012.

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Papyri - Scientific Journal Delti volume 4, 2015

Zeno of Citium and Zhuangzi on Virtue and Eudaimonia

PANOS ELIOPOULOS, Ph.D. Adjunct Lecturer in the University of Peloponnese, Hellas ΠΑΝΟΣ ΗΛΙΟΠΟΥΛΟΣ, Διδάκτωρ Φιλοσοφίας του Εθνικού Καποδιστριακού Πανεπιστημίου Αθηνών, Διδάσκων Πανεπιστημίου Πελοποννήσου, Ελλάς E‐mail: [email protected]

Θεσσαλονίκη 2015 – Thessaloniki 2015 ISSN:2241‐5106

Πάπυροι - Επιστημονικό Περιοδικό Papyri - Scientific Journal Δέλτοι Delti τόμος 4, 2015 volume 4, 2015 www.academy.edu.gr [email protected]

Zeno of Citium and Zhuangzi on Virtue and Eudaimonia

PANOS ELIOPOULOS ΠΑΝΟΣ ΗΛΙΟΠΟΥΛΟΣ

Περίληψη: Αμφότεροι ο Ζήνων ο Κιτιεύς και ο Κινέζος Ταοϊστής Τσουάνγκ Τσου ζουν τον 4ο αιώ‐ να π.Χ. Ως φιλοσοφικός απόγονος της σωκρατικής διανόησης, ο Ζήνων υπερθεματίζει τον ρό‐ λο της αρετής στην ανθρώπινη ζωή και υποστηρίζει μια πρακτική ανάλυση της ανθρώπινης πραγματικότητας από μια λογική και ηθική σκοπιά, η οποία σε ουδεμία περίπτωση δεν απο‐ συνδέεται από τη γενικότερη αρχαιοελληνική έμφαση στην τελεολογική στόχευση της ευδαι‐ μονίας. Κατά τη σχετική θεώρηση του Ζήνωνος, είναι αναγκαίο για τον άνθρωπο να απελευ‐ θερώσει τον εαυτό του από την τυραννία των παθών που τον αποπροσανατολίζει από την αυθεντική μορφή ύπαρξής του και από την αυτοκατανόησή του, την αυτογνωσία του. Το ζην κατά φύσιν σημαίνει πως το ανθρώπινο ον αποκτά συνείδηση των περιορισμών που επιβάλ‐ λει επί αυτού η Ανάγκη αλλά, συγχρόνως, ενώ παραμένει εντός του πλαισίου τούτων των πε‐ ριορισμών αποκτά μια σαφή αίσθηση της έννοιας της ελευθερίας, μιας ελευθερίας που προέρχεται από την έλλογη και ώριμη αποδοχή του πραγματικού κόσμου. Ο σοφός του Τσουάνγκ Τσου πραγματοποιεί μια συγκρίσιμη μορφή ύπαρξης. Η αρετή του είναι εντελής και ολοκληρωμένη, δεν απαιτεί την παρουσία άλλων αγαθών πλην του εαυτού της. Για τον Ταοϊστή διανοητή, το ανθρώπινο ον είναι ικανό προς το ευδαιμονείν αν δεν παρεμποδίζεται από μια ισχυρότερη αντίληψη της φυσικής φαινομενολογίας. Τα πάθη δεν του ανήκουν, ενώ αυτός δεν προσκολλάται σε καμία μορφή αποχής από τα πράγματα. Το να είναι, με τον τρόπο του Τάο, ο οποίος είναι ο τρόπος της αρετής, επαρκεί για τη βίωση της ευδαιμονικής κατά‐ στασης. Για τον Ζήνωνα και τον Τσουάνγκ Τσου, οι έννοιες της αρετής και της ευδαιμονίας είναι άμεσα παραγόμενες από μια υποκειμενική αντίληψη της πραγματικότητας. Και στις δυο θεωρήσεις, η Φύση αποτελεί μια διακριτή αναφορά. Σύμφωνα με τα δόγματα του Στωικού Ζήνωνος, η Φύση ενσωματώνει τις ποιότητες του Λόγου έτσι ώστε τα δύο, Φύση και Λόγος, να είναι ταυτόσημα. Κατά την άποψη του Τσουάνγκ Τσου, το αιώνιο Τάο δεν ενεργοποιεί τη λογική ικανότητα του ανθρώπου. Αντιθέτως, ο άνθρωπος εκπληρώνει το πεπρωμένο του α‐ πλώς με το να είναι, να υπάρχει, όχι μέσω του να προβαίνει σε λογικές διακρίσεις.

Abstract: Both the Stoic Zeno of Citium and the Chinese Taoist Zhuangzi live around the 4th cen‐ tury BC. As a philosophical descendant of the Socratic thought, Zeno highlights the role of vir‐ tue in human life and he supports a practical analysis of the human world from a rational and ethical point of view, which at no point disconnects from the general Greek emphasis on the teleological target of eudaimonia. For Zeno, man has to release himself from the tyranny of passions, which disorientate him from an authentic form of living and self understanding. Liv‐ ing in accordance with nature means that man becomes aware of the restraints of necessity, but at the same time, within these restraints, he acquires a clear perception of freedom; free‐ dom deriving from a reasonable and mature acceptance of the real world. The sage of Zhuang‐

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Zeno of Citium and Zhuangzi on Virtue and Eudaimonia

zi realizes a comparable form of existence. His virtue is self complete; also, it does not need the presence of other goods than itself. For the Taoist thinker, man is naturally able for well being in the case that he is not impeded from a stronger awareness of natural phenomenolo‐ gy. Passions do not belong to him, whereas he does not cling on any form of abstinence either. Being in the manner of Tao, which is the manner of virtue, suffices for his experience of eu‐ daimonia. For Zeno and Zhuangzi, the concepts of virtue and eudaimonia are direct deriva‐ tives of a subjective perception of reality. In both theorizations, nature is a constant reference. In the doctrines of the Stoic Zeno, nature embodies the qualities of Logos so that the two are eventually tautological. In Zhuangzi’s view, the eternal Tao does not energize man’s logical ability; on the contrary, man fulfils his destiny by being, not by making logical distinctions.

Both the Stoic Zeno of Citium and the Chinese Taoist Zhuangzi live around the 4th cen‐ tury BC. Other than the fact of the coincidence of their time they seem to share a multitude of characteristics which principally concentrate either around the basis of their common diagno‐ sis that nature is a key reference term in human life or on the spirituality and moral action which are originated from that initial and so influential recognition. The Greek and the Chi‐ nese philosopher show noteworthy and almost parallel concern to concepts such as subjectiv‐ ism, the divine element of Dao or Logos, determinism, freedom, virtue as self completion, the impact of logical distinctions, criteria of truth, harmony and an easy flow of life euroia biou, approval and disapproval as restrictive categorizations although to different extents, the classification of certain things as indifferents, the utilization of the model of a sage as an ex‐ emplar for ordinary people, the systematic insistence that the human being who has reached wisdom shall not be affected by the frivolous changes of fortune or by destiny, their emphasis on tranquillity, on the abstinence from desire and certain emotions, on the idea that the cos‐ mos is actually one thing, that knowledge is futile if it does not lead to a practical awareness of the world and of how is to live, in a vast plethora of other things. These similarities are no conclusive and not inclusive of all the issues. There are quite some more. Nonetheless it has to be clarified that similarities in the thought of these two phi‐ losophers are not the only thing that abounds. There are equally many dissimilarities, perhaps even more significant ones, whose origin is mainly the fact that the basis of their metaphysics and ontology is quite different, along with their totally distinct apprehension of man’s rational faculty. Furthermore, a number of the dissimilarities may be owing to the cultural context around them that determines at least their terminology if not all in all the aims of their philo‐ sophical theorizations. In this paper I will argue, although not exhaustively at all, due to the restrictions of time, that in both thinkers there is a concrete realization of the psychological reference of our perception of the world and of the phenomena of human action, thus leading them both to uphold that the practice of virtue and the state of perfect happiness, or eudai‐ monia, primarily spring from our inner place, a place eventually so closely connected with the eternal and the true. Zhuangzi’s path of thought is simultaneously a path of life. His primary message re‐ flects the need for a constant preoccupation with the Dao and with the way to attain spirited emancipation and an independent personality. The Dao actually is the way and equals a situa‐ tion of absolute freedom. Human freedom through the eternal Dao facilitates human fulfil‐

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Zeno of Citium and Zhuangzi on Virtue and Eudaimonia

ment, which is the ultimate telos of life1. In the hidden schemes of his fables polysemous phil‐ osophical notions about the Dao and the way of the sage are revealed, often in a poetic man‐ ner, which exploits what remains unuttered. Zhuangzi wishes to educate, not to proceed to elaborate dialectics about the nature of man and the universe. At the same time his work is imbued by a noticeably aesthetic appreciation of nature. For the Taoist philosopher2, beings are different in their nature, as in the story of Xiao Yao You. Moreover, they move and live in different ways because they simply follow their na‐ ture, and live according to their inner abilities and functions. Both creatures of this fable, the big and the small, receive the same satisfaction, unless there is a distinction between them as the superior and the inferior. Zhuangzi emphasizes the principle of Qui Wu, the equalization of all things, as a fundamental principle of his philosophical theory. This principle directly conduces to a theory of knowledge and of its utility in the course of human action. The Chi‐ nese philosopher makes it manifest that to judge by means of the customary things that are not made customarily distracts us far from the truth3. As a matter of fact he lays particular stress to the fact that in our consideration of things from the point of view of their similarities, all living things indeed seem to share a unity. At that point, we become persons that not only don't evaluate things empirically through their senses, but let their hearts and minds experi‐ ence the harmony of their own nature and concentrate on achieving virtue. In such a case we consider the unity of things, and we don't look for what they're lacking4. This is the perspec‐ tive that the human being who strives for completion and happiness needs and this is also a type of knowledge that is not supported by typical logical‐gnoseological traits. Rather its meaning is condensed in the affirmation of basic facts, that life and death are linked on a sin‐ gle branch, that approval and disapproval are linked on a single thread5. In the same context of the experience of knowledge, he examines the feasibility of per‐ fect happiness. For Zhuangzi, there is a seeming paradox: perfect happiness has no happiness in it. This paradox is based on Zhuangzi’s distinction between the absolute state of happiness zhile and mere happiness le. In order to become able to understand “zhile”, we must first compromise with “le”. This form of simpler happiness springs from things such as wealth, honor, a long life, kindness, good food, etc. Zeno would not have disagreed on that, because he would have classified them as indifferents but preferable indifferents to others. The Chinese philosopher realises that the things which comprise the basis for this form of “everyday” hap‐ piness, as I would call it, are actually no more than a weight, a burden for the man who seeks fulfilment. His sceptical stance6 towards these material goods, or rather emotional products of a material happiness, extends to the degree where all these are seen as pure vanity, empty possessions, due to the fact that they exceed the actual needs that are derived from our pres‐ ence in life. Becoming a possession of these possessions, that is to say, a slave to objects, signi‐ fies an elusive form of happiness, one that cannot endure. Thus, the perfect happiness of “zhile” prevails as the one which does not allow man to surrender to the tempting influence and to the idolatry of material things and treasures. In fact, absolute happiness is present

1 Keping Wang, Chinese Way of Thinking, Brilliant Publishing House, Shanghai 2009, pp. 50‐51. 2 Keping Wang, Eisagogi stin Kineziki Dianoisi, translated in Greek by Kalliopi Tarasi, OCPC, Athens 2009, p. 45. 3 Chuang Tzu, Texts, translated in Greek by Andreas Tsakalis, Pyrinos Kosmos, Athens 1989, p. 58. 4 Chuang Tzu, Ibid, fourth chapter, p. 62. 5 Chuang Tzu, Ibid, p. 64. 6 Cf. Steve Coutinho, Zhuangzi and Early Chinese Philosophy: Vagueness, Transformation and Paradox, Ashgate, Burlington VT 2004, chapter 4.

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Zeno of Citium and Zhuangzi on Virtue and Eudaimonia

when relative or mere happiness is absent. The two cannot coexist. The common values of the unwise, of the everyday people, are no fitting values in the condition of “zhile”. Absolute hap‐ piness is a state of mind, purified from all desire, free from every restriction. Its essence lies in the core, in taking no action wu wei which practically means spiritual independence. Perfect happiness is a state of mind at which the human being is incapable of distinction; there is no life and death, no prosperity or misery7, as according to the principle of “Qui Wu”. The distinc‐ tions are nothing else than consequences of having overlooked the fact that everything is part and participant in the ceaseless flow of change. The eternal Dao is the solution to this problem of the absence of constancy due to its emphasis on the way of making no distinction8. Since there's no way to base personal harmony on something as unpredictable as life circumstanc‐ es, one should have the ability at least to affect his own spiritual powers and to participate in what really causes harmony. The way of the Dao, of making no distinction, is a synonym for the Supreme One tai yi. For Zhuangzi everything is succumbed to the principle of relativity. All things enjoy naturally their individual abilities; to compare them is the act of a fool. The worthy man dis‐ cards all social norms and lives a life of peace, free from disturbance and ambition, as those would not consist a natural life. The connection between the Heaven Dao tian dao and the human Dao ren dao intends to moralize the connection between heaven and man9. This oneness of the two, abolishing all distinction ennobles the human effort. At the same time it connotes that there is an objective necessity for virtue as well as unalterable and diachronic characteristics in the moral system. Although there is a visible metaphysical basis, the empha‐ sis is given to the practical art of living, the way the sage10 can opt for while aiming at perfect virtue and happiness. The sage of Zhuangzi realizes a comparable form of existence with that of the sage of the Stoic Zeno. His virtue is self‐complete; it does not need the presence of other goods than itself. For the Taoist thinker, man is naturally able for well‐being, in the case that he is not prevented, due to an inner awareness of natural phenomenology. Passions do not belong to his psychological and spiritual sphere, whereas he does not cling on any form of abstinence either. Being in the manner of the Dao, which is the manner of virtue, suffices for his experi‐ ence of eudaimonia as good fortune and well‐being which are born where there is tranquility, i.e. where there is psychological and spiritual relief from the agonies of the existential strife11. This becomes so important in the texts of Zhuangi that he considers it imperative for the hu‐ man being to be able to serve his heart by not allowing joy or grief in it and by cultivating the abandonment to the inevitable which is the culmination of virtue12. The occurrence of the term “heart” is quite frequent in Zhuangzi. He empathically returns to the term when he as‐

7 Keping Wang, Eisagogi stin Kineziki Dianoisi, p. 46. 8 Keping Wang, Chinese Way of Thinking, p. 55. 9 Chuang Tzu, Ibid, sixth chapter, p. 70. It has to be noted that here Zhuangzi describes how one who has knowledge about what actions are of the heavens and what actions are of people has reached attainment. One who knows the actions of the heavens merges his life with the heavens. One who knows the actions of people accepts that knowledge is a part of his intellect and increases that knowledge because he accepts his own igno‐ rance. One has to become a true person before he can have true knowledge. According to Zhuangzi a true person is the one whose whole knowledge is targeted to the Dao. 10 Cf. Lee Yearley, “The Perfected Person in the Radical Chuang Tzu”. In Experimental Essays on the Chuang Tzu, ed. Victor Mair, Three Pines Press, Dunedin FL 2010, pp. 126‐136. 11 Chuang Tzu, Ibid, fourth chapter, p. 52. 12 Chuang Tzu, Ibid, p. 54.

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Zeno of Citium and Zhuangzi on Virtue and Eudaimonia

serts that only a person with a clear heart that is, a virtuous person has the ability to realize that certain things can't be changed and quietly accept destiny13. Virtue, as depicted above, will not lead the sage to an external depiction of his superi‐ ority. He acts in such a conduct so as to remain safe from envy but also to be able to guide oth‐ ers by doing things, seemingly, in their way if such need be14. He does so in order to avoid grief for himself, since he would not resort to resisting against social norms in a futile manner. However, like in the case of the ugly Ai Ta Ta15, the virtuous person gains everybody’s ac‐ ceptance and his abilities, although not demonstrated, as no outer form16 is of any concern to him, are never doubted. This persistent focus on acceptance, in my estimation, among other things, denotes the didactic orientation of Zhuangzi’s fables as a practical orientation that ex‐ ceeds its purely theoretical basis. A parallel discussion is developed in the texts of Zhuangzi with reference to sentimen‐ tality and judgment. The Taoist philosopher insists that the person who follows the Dao is without sentimentality, therefore judgments about right and wrong can't affect him. His single accomplishment is with the heavens17. Hui Zi doubts that and asks Zhuangzi if there are in‐ deed humans without any sentimentality, that is without passions at all, and if there are any how can they be called humans. Zhuangzi’s brilliant answer is that there are persons like that and the Dao gives them their demeanor and their physical shape, so how could they not be called humans. For Zhuangzi the nucleus of the response lies in an interpretation of the con‐ ceptualization of sentimentality as a primary sense of right and wrong. Someone without that sense is a being without sentimentality and he is the kind of person that wouldn’t allow his likes and dislikes to cause physical harm to his body. He would only follow what naturally oc‐ curs without looking to gain profit from life. In Zeno’s stoicism there are some remarkable theoretical convergences with Zhuang‐ zi’s beliefs. As a philosophical descendant of the Socratic thought, Zeno highlights the role of virtue in human life and he supports a practical analysis of the human world from a rational and ethical point of view, which at no point disconnects from the general Greek emphasis on the teleological target of eudaimonia. For Zeno, man has to release himself from the tyranny of desires and passions, which disorientate him from an authentic form of living and from self‐ understanding. Living in accordance with nature means that man becomes aware of the re‐ straints of necessity, but at the same time, within these restraints, he acquires a clear percep‐ tion of freedom. Zeno is conclusive in his logical schema that the cosmos is a souled being pre‐ cisely because our human soul is extracted from it apospasma18. As a part of the cosmos, man acknowledges freedom as deriving from a mature acceptance of the real world. Hence, and through this awareness, the stoic sage is perceived as the perfect man whose capability for free action remains unimpeded under any obstructive circumstance19.

13 Chuang Tzu, Ibid, p. 63. 14 Chuang Tzu, Ibid, p. 56. 15 Chuang Tzu, Ibid, p. 64. 16 Chuang Tzu, Ibid, pp. 66‐67. 17 Chuang Tzu, Ibid, pp. 66‐67. 18 Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, VII. 143. Cf. Theodore Scaltsas ed., The Philosophy of Ze‐ no: Zeno of Citium and his Legacy, Municipality of Larnaca, 2002, pp. 155‐184. 19 Diogenes Laertius, Ibid, VII. 121‐122.

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Zeno of Citium and Zhuangzi on Virtue and Eudaimonia

It is precisely this real world that, as Cicero upholds in De Finibus20, makes Zeno dis‐ cern an element of difference among the things that are of no importance for happiness or misery. Although virtue alone is good, there are certain things that can still receive a positive value such as health, freedom from pain, fame, wealth and the like. Zeno calls these “proeg‐ mena” as opposed to “apoproegmena”, things such as pain, disease, poverty etc. Stobaeus in the Eclogai, clarifies that for the founder of the Stoic school, the “proegmena” are not condu‐ cive to eudaimonia, however it is necessary to choose those against their opposites who are of an undeniably negative value21. Zeno is inclined to accepting the idea of unity among all be‐ ings. Despite certain differences among species, there is an advancement of logos in the hu‐ man being which brings him closer to the divine principle. Nature itself does not discriminate between animals and plants. They all seek what is appropriate for them, like the big and small animal of Zhuangzi’s story, but for man it is reason which is the appropriate and distinct fea‐ ture that allows him to live in a protected way. Living according to reason for human beings signifies their adherence to living according to their own “physis” nature. It is common knowledge that there is a tripartite axiom in the stoic philosophy: living in accordance with reason is living in accordance with nature which is living in accordance with virtue. Virtue22 in Zeno retains much of its Homeric conceptual virility: it is the inner ability of the human being to fulfil itself, much like in Zhuangzi’s conception of virtue. In Diogenes Laertius this is clari‐ fied in book seven, 86 to 88. In parts 127‐128 it is added that virtue is self sufficient, it needs nothing more for the mental state of eudaimonia and thus it contempts anything else23. To live according to these three principles is the telos of the human life, i.e. for man to live, as for eve‐ ry other being, is to live according to his proper nature, which is no other than his rational na‐ ture. This is his own peculiar authenticity but apart from that, apart from the symbolic signifi‐ cance that authenticity attributes to human living, there is the recognition of this living as one which is characterized by its easy flow, its uninterrupted continuation, without any spiritual or psychological turmoil. The life of “ataraxia” tranquillity is the aim of the human being, which is found trapped in controversy, strife, subjected to existential trauma, due to the fick‐ leness of fortune. The harmonization of one’s inner will and terms of living with the will of the governing principle, which is the divine Logos, a divinity that man and every being shares, but particularly man due to his greater participation in it as a rational being, is not only a prudent decision but also a natural as well as deliberate choice. The Stoic philosopher elucidates that virtue as harmonious accordance with Logos is chosen for itself, and does not originate from emotions of fear, hope or other external to the human soul factors. The stoic sage is without passions, in constancy24. He is not occupied with tasks, and he has rejected any form of hypocrisy or false exterior appearance. His self belongs to him, being beyond grief and joy25. Eudaimonia exists in the area of this virtue not as a con‐ ceptual pair but as a state of mind within its circle. The perfect man does not pretend happi‐ ness either, nor does he pretend kindness and mercy for his fellow human beings; his exist‐

20 Cicero, De Finibus, III. 50‐51. 21 Stobaeus, Eclogai, II. 84, 18. 22 Cf. Theodore Scaltsas ed., The Philosophy of Zeno: Zeno of Citium and his Legacy, Municipality of Larnaca, 2002, pp. 259‐290. 23 Diogenes Laertius, Ibid, VII. 127‐128. 24 Diogenes Laertius, Ibid, VII. 117, 25 Diogenes Laertius, Ibid, VII. 118.

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Zeno of Citium and Zhuangzi on Virtue and Eudaimonia

ence is natural, hence his virtue is stable anypovlitos and he always uses his perfect soul26. Zeno further clarifies that virtue is “teleiosis”, completion, and a noetic elaboration, which he calls prudence, “phronesis”27. Virtues are, simultaneously, means and ends. They are means as far as their aim is the human eudaimonia, and they are ends in themselves as far as they com‐ plete eudaimonia and become its constituents. The human being who possesses virtue has conquered the natural perfection of the rational being as a rational being, Zeno characteristi‐ cally remarks28. To synopsize, unlike the perfect man of Zhuangzi, the perfect man of the Stoic Zeno has a self; moreover, the initiation of his action is his rational faculty which allows him to provide his assent synkatathesis, his ability for rational decisions which he calls “kathekonta”, du‐ ties and for right reason. Yet, I am afraid that Xunzi’s observation that Zhuangzi is more ob‐ sessed with the law of nature than with the knowledge of mankind29, apparently could hold true for Zeno as well. However, in order to be fair to their thought, it has to be admitted that in their doctrines there is an evident soteriological pursuit, and nature seems to hold the place where from their approaches begin. Not only that but the affirmation of the fact that the trans‐ formation of things proves that the differences among things are not absolute points to the direction of an elementary metaphysical concurrence30. For Zeno and Zhuangzi, the concepts of virtue and eudaimonia are direct derivatives of a subjective perception of reality. In both theorizations, nature as we discerned so far remains as a constant reference. In the doctrines of the Stoic Zeno, nature embodies the qualities of Logos so that the two are eventually tauto‐ logical. In Zhuangzi’s view, the eternal Dao does not energize man’s logical ability; on the con‐ trary, man fulfils his destiny by being, not by making logical distinctions, or by resorting to the approval of certain actions. The “that” and the “this” cease to be opposites, that is the essence of the Dao. Even right and wrong are on endless change, hence Zhuangzi suggests that the human being should use the light of reason yi ming31. Freedom as independence from the tyranny of the incoherence of the phenomena of the human life tends to this, common be‐ tween the two, liberating end: man is superior to the setting of his life’s drama. He is superior because he has the psychological ability to live an authentic, complete and natural life, in full symmetry with the eternal element, thus a life of perfection, unimpeded virtue and happiness.

26 Diogenes Laertius, Ibid, VII. 128. 27 Diogenes Laertius, Ibid, VII. 90. 28 Diogenes Laertius, Ibid, VII. 94. 29 Keping Wang, Ethos of Chinese culture, Foreign Language Press, Beijing 2007, p. 175. 30 Keping Wang, Ethos of Chinese culture, p. 181. 31 Chuang Tzu, Ibid, Nei pian, inner chapters.

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Zeno of Citium and Zhuangzi on Virtue and Eudaimonia

Bibliography

Chuang Tzu, Texts, translated in Greek by Andreas Tsakalis, Pyrinos Kosmos, Athens 1989. Cicero, De Finibus, translated by H. Rackham, Harvard University Press, Loeb London 1914. Coutinho Steve, Zhuangzi and Early Chinese Philosophy: Vagueness, Transformation and Paradox, Ashgate, Burlington VT 2004. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, translated by R. D. Hicks, Vol. I‐II, Harvard University Press, Loeb London 1925. Scaltsas Theodore ed., The Philosophy of Zeno: Zeno of Citium and his Legacy, Munic‐ ipality of Larnaca, 2002. Stobaeus, Eclogai, edited by Thomas Gaisford, Parker, Oxford 1850. Wang Keping, Ethos of Chinese Culture, Foreign Language Press, Beijing 2007. Wang Keping, Eisagogi stin Kineziki Dianoisi, translated in Greek by Kalliopi Tarasi, OCPC, Athens 2009. Wang Keping, Chinese Way of Thinking, Brilliant Publishing House, Shanghai 2009. Watson Burton, The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu, Columbia University Press, New York 1968. Yearley Lee, “The Perfected Person in the Radical Chuang Tzu”. In Experimental Essays on the Chuang Tzu, ed. Victor Mair, Three Pines Press, Dunedin FL 2010. ORIGINAL PUBLICATION: Translated in Chinese “Zeno of Citium and Zhuangzi on Virtue and Eudaimonia” 基提翁的芝诺和庄子的德性与幸福 . In the JOURNAL OF SHANGQIU NORMAL UNIVERSI‐ TY 商丘师范大学学报, Shangqiu‐ China, vol. 31, no. 1, January 2015, pp. 49‐52.

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Papyri - Scientific Journal Delti volume 4, 2015

Intercultural Philosophy and Constructive Dialogue on Cross‐Cultural Norms

RICHARD EVANOFF, School of International Politics, Economics, and Communication, Aoyama Gakuin University, Tokyo, Japan E‐mail: [email protected]

Θεσσαλονίκη 2015 – Thessaloniki 2015 ISSN:2241‐5106

Πάπυροι - Επιστημονικό Περιοδικό Papyri - Scientific Journal Δέλτοι Delti τόμος 4, 2015 volume 4, 2015 www.academy.edu.gr [email protected] Intercultural Philosophy and Constructive Dialogue on Cross-Cultural Norms

Intercultural Philosophy and Constructive Dialogue on Cross‐Cultural Norms

RICHARD EVANOFF

Περίληψη Η παρούσα εργασία εξετάζει τη συμβολή που η φιλοσοφία εν γένει, και η διαπολιτι‐ σμική φιλοσοφία ειδικότερα, μπορεί να είναι σε θέση να έχει με τον τομέα των διαπολιτισμι‐ κών σχέσεων. Σε ένα όλο και πιο παγκοσμιοποιημένο κόσμο, καθώς οι άνθρωποι από διαφο‐ ρετικούς πολιτισμούς έρχονται σε μεγαλύτερη επαφή μεταξύ τους, γρήγορα συνειδητοποιούν ότι μπορεί να έχουν εντελώς διαφορετικά σύνολα πεποιθήσεων για το πώς οι άνθρωποι θα πρέπει να σκεφτούν και να δράσουν. Κάθε πολιτισμός έχει ορισμένους κανόνες σχετικά με το τι θεωρείται ότι είναι ο «κατάλληλος» και «ακατάλληλος» τρόπος σκέψης και συμπεριφοράς, οι οποίοι λειτουργούν για να διέπουν τις αλληλεπιδράσεις που οι άνθρωποι έχουν μεταξύ τους στο πλαίσιο αυτής της κουλτούρας. Οι πεποιθήσεις αυτές ονομάζεται νόρμες. Όταν οι συγκρούσεις προκύπτουν λόγω των διαφορών στις πολιτισμικές νόρμες, πρέπει να είμαστε σε θέση να διαπραγματευτούμε τις διαφορές αυτές με τρόπους που επιτρέπουν στους αν‐ θρώπους από διαφορετικούς πολιτισμούς να αλληλεπιδρούν με επιτυχία ο ένας με τον άλλον και να αντιμετωπίζουν αμοιβαία τα κοινά προβλήματα. Ο κονστρουκτιβισμός προσεγγίζει τον διαπολιτισμικό διάλογο από μια διαλεκτική άποψη, η οποία επιχειρεί να αξιολογήσει κρι‐ τικά και να ενσωματώσει στοιχεία που προέκυψαν από μια ποικιλία των πολιτισμών για τη χρήση σε συγκεκριμένες διαπολιτισμικές αλληλεπιδράσεις. Οι εμπειρικές προσεγγίσεις ασχο‐ λούνται κατά κύριο λόγο με την παρουσίαση των υφιστάμενων προτύπων πεποιθήσεων, αξιών και συμπεριφορών σε συγκεκριμένους πολιτισμούς και κάνουν γενικεύσεις σχετικά με το πώς οι άνθρωποι από διαφορετικούς πολιτισμούς είναι πιθανό να σκέφτονται και να ενεργούν σε διαπολιτισμικές καταστάσεις. Οι θεωρητικές προσεγγίσεις προσπαθούν να προ‐ σφέρουν εξηγήσεις σχετικά με το γιατί οι άνθρωποι από διαφορετικούς πολιτισμούς σκέφτο‐ νται και δρουν με τον τρόπο που το κάνουν. Αυτή η εργασία προτείνει ότι οι νέες μορφές δια‐ πολιτισμικής αλληλεπίδρασης απαιτούν την κατασκευή εξ ολοκλήρου νέων διαπολιτισμικών νορμών που θα διέπουν τις σχέσεις μεταξύ των ανθρώπων από διαφορετικές κουλτούρες. Το κεντρικό ζήτημα για τη διαπολιτισμική φιλοσοφία, λοιπόν, είναι πώς ο διάλογος για τους εν λόγω κανόνες θα πρέπει να διενεργείται, με δεδομένο το γεγονός ότι διαφορετικοί πολιτισμοί έχουν διαφορετικές μορφές του ορθολογισμού, γνώσεων, αξιών, ηθικής, και ούτω καθεξής, που συχνά φαίνονται ασύμβατα μεταξύ τους. Θα πρέπει επίσης να σημειωθεί ότι οι άνθρωποι από διαφορετικούς πολιτισμούς συχνά χρησιμοποιούν διαφορετικά το επικοινωνιακό στυλ όταν συμμετέχουν στο διαπολιτισμικό διάλογο, σε διαπραγματεύσεις και στην επίλυση των συγκρούσεων. Η επιτυχία των όποιων προτεινόμενων λύσεων μπορεί να εξεταστεί με βάση τα κριτήρια του αν είναι πράγματι σε θέση να λύσουν τα προβλήματα άμεσα ή όχι. Ο διαπολι‐ τισμικός διάλογος μπορεί να λειτουργήσει προς την κατεύθυνση της αποτελεσματικής ενσω‐ μάτωσης των ιδεών που στην επιφάνεια εμφανίζονται ως ασύμμετρες και, επιπλέον, προς τη δημιουργία εντελώς νέων νορμών καταλλήλων για τα ανερχόμενα προβλήματα. Η διαπολιτι‐ σμική φιλοσοφία μπορεί να ξεκινήσει με μια ανάλυση του ιστορικού των υποθέσεων που οι

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διάφορες πλευρές φέρνουν μαζί τους στη διαδικασία του διαλόγου. Μπορεί στη συνέχεια να συμμετάσχουν στο κανονιστικό έργο της και να προτείνει κριτήρια για την αξιολόγηση των πεποιθήσεων και των αξιών στην ερώτηση, καθώς και πιθανές λύσεις για τις συγκρούσεις που προκύπτουν μεταξύ των ανθρώπων που αντιμετωπίζουν ένα αμοιβαίο πρόβλημα μόνοι τους. Η διαπολιτισμική φιλοσοφία έχει τη δυνατότητα να εγείρει νέα ζητήματα και να ανοίξει νέα πεδία τη; έρευνας στον τομέα των διαπολιτισμικών σχέσεων.

Abstract This paper considers the contribution that philosophy in general, and intercultural phi‐ losophy in particular, might be able to make to the field of intercultural relations. In an in‐ creasingly globalized world, as people from different cultures come into greater contact with each other, they quickly realize that they may have completely different sets of beliefs about how people should think and act. Every culture has certain norms regarding what are consid‐ ered to be "appropriate" and "inappropriate" ways of thinking and behaving, which function to govern the interactions people have with each other in the context of that culture. The Such beliefs are called norms. When conflicts arise due to differences in cultural norms, we need to be able to negotiate these differences in ways that allow people from different cultures to suc‐ cessfully interact with each other and address mutually shared problems. Constructivism ap‐ proaches intercultural dialogue from a dialectical perspective, which attempts to critically evaluate and integrate insights from a variety of cultures for use in specific cross‐cultural in‐ teractions. Empirical approaches concern themselves primarily with describing existing pat‐ terns of beliefs, values, and behavior in particular cultures and making generalizations about how people from different cultures are likely to think and act in intercultural situations. The‐ oretical approaches attempt to offer explanations about why people from different cultures think and act the way they do. This paper suggests that new forms of cross‐cultural interac‐ tion require the construction of entirely new intercultural norms to govern relationships be‐ tween people from different cultures. The central question for intercultural philosophy, then, is how dialogue on such norms can be effectively conducted, given the fact that different cul‐ tures have differing forms of rationality, knowledge, values, ethics, and so forth which often seem incommensurable with each other. It should also be noted that people from different cultures often employ different communicative styles when engaging in intercultural dia‐ logue, negotiations, and conflict resolution. The success of any proposed solutions can then be tested against the criteria of whether they are actually able to solve the problems at hand or not. Intercultural dialogue can work towards the effective integration of ideas that on the surface appear incommensurable and, moreover, towards the generation of entirely new norms appropriate to newly emergent problems. Intercultural philosophy may begin with an analysis of the background assumptions that the various parties bring with them to the dia‐ logue process. It can then engage itself in the normative task of proposing criteria for evalu‐ ating the beliefs and values in question, as well as possible solutions for conflicts arising among people facing a mutual problem. Intercultural philosophy has the potential to raise new questions and open up new areas of research in the field of intercultural relations.

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Globalization and intercultural norms Globalization is bringing people from different cultures closer together than they have ever been before, making manifest the various ways in which people are not only similar to each other but also different. As people from different cultures come into greater contact with each other, they quickly realize that while they indeed share many similarities, they may also have completely different sets of beliefs about how people should think and act. Such beliefs are called norms. Even a limited amount of cross‐cultural experience makes one aware that there is a great deal of variety in the norms held by people from different cultures, not only with respect to customs and communication styles, but also with respect to deeper attitudes towards reality, knowledge, values, ethics, politics, and religion. Cultural differences with re‐ spect to norms are frequently a source of conflict, especially when people from one culture adopt the ethnocentric view that their own particular norms are in some way "universal" or "superior" to those of other cultures. Cross‐cultural encounters are by their very nature anomic, which literally means "without law," or in a looser translation "without norms." Every culture has certain norms regarding what are considered to be "appropriate" and "inappropriate" ways of thinking and behaving, which function to govern the interactions people have with each other in the con‐ text of that culture. The norms that we learn in our respective cultures teach us how to inter‐ act successfully with people from our own cultures, but they tell us little or nothing about how to get along with people from other cultures whose norms may be quite different from ours. Nonetheless, in an increasingly globalized world we need to be able to live and work together with people from different cultures, despite the fact that their norms are different from our own. When conflicts arise we need to be able to negotiate these differences in ways that allow people from different cultures to successfully interact with each other and address commonly shared problems. It can be argued that current trends towards globalization are creating entirely new forms of cross‐cultural interaction which require the construction of entirely new intercul‐ tural norms to govern relationships between people from different cultures. The central question which must be asked, then, is how dialogue on such norms can be effectively con‐ ducted, given the fact that different cultures have differing forms of rationality, knowledge, values, ethics, and so forth which often seem incommensurable with each other. A construc‐ tivist approach to this question would suggest that since many of the norms which might be used to govern cross‐cultural interactions do not yet exist, they can only be created—i.e., con‐ structed—through a dialogical process in which the participants attempt to critique existing norms in both their own and other cultures, and to arrive at a more adequate set of norms which are capable of facilitating the relationships they have both with each other and with the world they jointly inhabit. Constructivism acknowledges the historically contingent and so‐ cially situated nature of cultural discourses, but nonetheless contends that globalization has created an entirely new situs in which dialogue on cross‐cultural norms is not only possible but also necessary. Rather than see the different forms of rationality, knowledge, values, ethics, and the like which have been historically developed by different cultures as sources of conflict, it may be better to treat them as conceptual resources which can be used to widen our view of the multifarious ways in which it is possible for people to think about and act in the world. Con‐ structivism approaches intercultural dialogue from a dialectical perspective, which attempts to critically evaluate and integrate insights from a variety of cultures for use in specific cross‐

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cultural interactions. Since all epistemological, moral, and political constructions are based on interactions which take place in specific historical, geographical, and cultural settings, none captures the full range of possibilities for human thought or action. By acknowledging the contingency of all cultural constructions, intercultural dialogue can proceed through a dialec‐ tical communicative process which reflects back on existing cultural constructions, evaluates them in accordance with their adequacy for dealing with shared problems, and constructs new conceptual frameworks which draw on insights from varying cultural sources. Intercul‐ tural dialogue can work towards the effective integration of ideas that on the surface appear incommensurable and, moreover, towards the generation of entirely new concepts and norms appropriate to newly emergent problems. Such dialogue involves both a radical critique of existing social arrangements and the creative imagining of new alternatives that can enable people to effectively work together towards the resolution of mutually shared problems.

A normative approach to intercultural relations Intercultural relations can be studied from a variety of academic disciplines in the so‐ cial sciences, including psychology, linguistics, communication studies, anthropology, sociol‐ ogy, economics, political science, and history, as well as by philosophy. The main difference between the approaches taken by the social sciences and philosophy to intercultural relations is that the social sciences use empirical and theoretical methods to give us a better under‐ standing of the similarities and differences in how people from different cultures think and act, while philosophy adopts a normative approach which considers how cooperation across cultures can be fostered to resolve mutually shared problems. Developing such an approach to intercultural relations can be seen as one of the tasks that can be undertaken by the emerging field of intercultural philosophy.1 Normative approaches to intercultural relations can be distinguished from empirical and theoretical approaches in terms of both method and focus. Empirical approaches concern themselves primarily with describing existing patterns of beliefs, values, and behavior in par‐ ticular cultures and making generalizations about how people from different cultures are likely to think and act in intercultural situations. Theoretical approaches attempt to offer ex‐ planations about why people from different cultures think and act the way they do. Rather than simply empirically observe and theoretically analyze human thought and behavior across cultures, as science does, normative approaches consider how problems that arise as a result of cultural differences in thought and behavior might be resolved. The problems may concern purely practical matters or involve deeper conflicts over beliefs, values, and norms, and may occur at a variety of levels, from the interpersonal to the inter‐organizational to the international. Consider, for example, the types of conflicts that might emerge in an intercultural mar‐ riage, a joint venture between companies from different cultures, or political negotiations be‐ tween two countries. Empirically observing and theoretically analyzing the cultural differ‐ ences which lead to such conflicts is undoubtedly important. Yet, neither an empirical nor a theoretical approach can tell us anything whatsoever about how these conflicts might be re‐ solved. The two sides in an intercultural conflict may be able to see and understand the problems they are facing and what is causing them very clearly. What is needed, however, are

1 Recent works in English include Mall 2000 and Wallner, Schmidsberger, and Wimmer 2010. 80 ISSN:2241‐5106 Πάπυροι - Επιστημονικό Περιοδικό Papyri - Scientific Journal Δέλτοι Delti τόμος 4, 2015 volume 4, 2015 www.academy.edu.gr [email protected] Intercultural Philosophy and Constructive Dialogue on Cross-Cultural Norms

solutions to the conflict, and such solutions cannot be found by simply observing and analyz‐ ing the cultural differences which exist between them. Rather, solutions to such conflicts can only be arrived at through a process of dialogue and negotiation, the aim of which is to reach a normative agreement about how the two sides are to interact with each other. It should be made clear from the very start, however, that the aim of intercultural philosophy is not to tell people or cultural groups what they should believe or do, but rather to look at norms from a philosophical perspective in the same way that the social sciences look at them from a social science perspective. While the methodologies are different, a philo‐ sophical analysis of norms is no different from a social science analysis of norms in this re‐ spect. While the aim of empirical social science is to describe the various norms that exist within different cultures, the aim of intercultural philosophy is to consider how these norms can be talked about, analyzed, and argued for or against in the context of a free and open dia‐ logue. A norm can be defined as any idea, whether implicit or explicit, about how people should think or act. The study of norms can be found in every branch of philosophy: what should be regarded as real or unreal metaphysics, valid or invalid logic, true or false epis‐ temology, good or bad value theory, beautiful or ugly aesthetics, right or wrong ethics? While it is possible to examine cultural differences in each of these areas from the standpoint of "pure philosophy," intercultural philosophy can be regarded as an area of applied philoso‐ phy, which addresses the practical problems that arise in everyday life when people holding different cultural norms interact with each other. As such, intercultural philosophy is some‐ thing that can be engaged in not only by professional philosophers, but by anyone. Whenever people, whether individually or collectively, ask and try to answer questions about what is true or false, good or bad, right and wrong, and all the rest, they are engaging in philosophy. Philosophy can be one tool, among others, that helps us to resolve conflicts across cultures.

Normative judgments in intercultural relations Normative positions are essential to the formulation of social, economic, and political policy, which require judgments to be made not only with respect to "what the problems are," but also with respect to "what should be done about them." Simply defining what constitutes "a problem" requires a normative judgment that a particular issue is important and deserves attention. Although the objective conditions may be the same for all observers, there are a va‐ riety of ways in which those conditions can be interpreted, meaning that what might be seen as a problem by some is not seen as a problem by others. Once a problem has been identified, however, a viable solution must be found which resolves the problem in a way that is satisfac‐ tory to everyone involved. Given the fact that problems are often politicized, there are indeed good reasons for thinking that the role of science should be simply to provide information while decision‐ making power should be left to the public or its representatives. Nonetheless, while it is fre‐ quently contended that normative positions must be bracketed out of social science research in the interest of maintaining scientific objectivity, it is clear that normative positions are an inseparable, if often unacknowledged, part of every social science. Psychologists, sociologists, economists, and political scientists routinely make prescriptions about "what should be done," based on the norms they hold about what constitutes a "healthy" mind, society, econ‐ omy, or political order. Researchers in the field of intercultural relations typically adopt nor‐

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mative stances against ethnocentrism, racism, sexism, and the like. Value judgments perme‐ ate even the most "objective" research, even if it is only to the extent of deciding that one area of research should be focused on rather than another. It is unavoidable that research will ul‐ timately be based on implicit normative stances arising out of the particular interests of the researchers involved and often their funders. Nonetheless, trying to maintain scientific objectivity by looking solely at the "facts," un‐ clouded by a researcher's personal opinions and values, is a commendable methodological stance, and it also prevents scientific research from being dominated by political ideologies and imperatives. While the pursuit of a "value‐free" science2 can still be set forth as an ideal to be aspired to, researchers need to be aware of and to openly state their own value orienta‐ tions more explicitly. The idea of reflexivity in the social sciences3 is that researchers do not occupy a privileged position from which all other positions can be judged. Rather, research‐ ers must acknowledge the biases, interests, and positions they bring with them to the re‐ search process, and be willing to submit these to the same critical reflection that is used when considering and evaluating the positions of others. While it may be impossible to attain complete objectivity, there are still good reasons why researchers in disciplines related to intercultural relations should try, to the extent pos‐ sible, to avoid making value judgments about the norms and practices of the cultures they study. A major concern for any discipline that studies cultural differences is avoiding ethno‐ centrism, the tendency to judge the norms of another culture on the basis of one's own cul‐ tural norms. To avoid making ethnocentric judgments about other cultures, it is entirely le‐ gitimate for researchers to adopt a stance of methodological relativism, which means sus‐ pending one's own beliefs and value judgments in order to give as fair and impartial descrip‐ tion of another culture's beliefs and values as possible. Methodological relativism is not the same as normative relativism, however.4 Whereas the former is a normative stance about how research about cultural beliefs and values should be conducted, the latter is the normative stance that all cultural beliefs and values are equally valid. One implicit value orientation frequently found among those involved in intercultural studies is a form of cultural relativism which holds that people in intercultural situations should simply "understand and respect" other cultures. The idea is that cultural differences should be accepted as they are and, moreover, that any attempt to engage in critical reflection on the validity of different cultural practices should be avoided. This view is frequently sup‐ ported by the philosophical argument that since there is no objective viewpoint outside of one's own culture from which other cultures can judged, no value judgments of other cultures can be made. Such a stance is itself normative, however, because it implies that cultural differences should be understood and respected. While the admonition to understand and respect other cultures has the laudable intention of encouraging us to avoid ethnocentrism and to see other cultures on their own terms, it does not really tell us much about how we can actually work together, or even have dialogue, across cultures on problems of mutual concern. Simply say‐ ing that "you have your way of doing things and we have ours," even when based on mutual

2See Lacey 2005. 3Key texts on reflexivity include Bordieu and Wacquant 1992 and Clifford and Marcus 2010. 4For a general introduction to the various forms of relativism, see Baghramian 2014. Methodological relativ‐ ism as it relates to anthropology is discussed by Hunt 2007.

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understanding and respect, precludes the possibility of actively creating common ground on which cooperation across cultures becomes possible. While understanding and respect may be important starting points in helping us to interact successfully with people from different cultures, they do not go far enough.

Constructive solutions to cross‐cultural problems How exactly might constructive solutions to cross‐cultural problems be arrived at? Whereas empirical and theoretical studies in the field of intercultural relations are primarily concerned with giving an account of the world as it is, normative studies can be characterized as attempting to give an account of the world as it might be. By confining themselves to a sci‐ entific consideration of the world as it is, empirical and theoretical approaches are by their very nature prevented from giving any consideration to solutions that do not already exist. Finding a normative solution to a problem, however, involves relying not only on observation and analysis, but also on the ability to imagine a future state in which the problem has been resolved. By opening up possibilities for a philosophical consideration of the world as it might be, normative approaches are able to offer solutions that may never have existed before or even been thought of. Rather than simply observe and describe how things actually stand in the "real" world, a constructivist approach to problems that may arise when people from different cultures in‐ teract with each other attempts to envision "ideal" situations which provide models for how those problems might be successfully resolved. We need not remain captive to our existing cultural norms, but instead can imaginatively explore new solutions which are outside the framework of those norms. Such a move allows us to employ divergent thinking to brainstorm various possible solutions, and then to use convergent thinking to consider their potential results, choose which of the proposed solutions is best, implement the solution we have decided on, and then evaluate the results. This reliance on the imagination may lead some to dismiss philosophical, normative approaches to intercultural interactions on the ground that they are merely "speculative," "impractical," "unrealistic," and outside the scope of "genuine" science. By sticking to the "cold, hard facts," more scientific approaches can be present themselves as being "grounded in reality" and, hence, more "practical." However, it can easily be seen, on the one hand, that simply sticking to the "cold, hard facts" in itself results in no solutions and, on the other, that attempts to imagine new solutions can lead to very practical results. Certainly normative so‐ lutions to concrete problems cannot be merely utopian; they must be capable of being actually implemented in the real world. The success of any proposed solutions can then be tested against the criteria of whether they are actually able to solve the problems at hand or not. Even if an imagined solution cannot be implemented in its entirety, however, it may still be able to provide a standard by which progress can be measured. In the absence of such a standard, there is no reason why one course of action should be preferred over any other. Every day school children in the United States recite the Pledge of Allegiance, which ends with the words: "with liberty and justice for all." In reality, of course, it is doubtful that liberty and justice are equally distributed in American society, given the deep divisions which remain be‐ tween races, classes, and genders. But even if inequalities continue to exist as a matter of em‐ pirical fact, this does not mean that such inequalities are justified. By adopting "liberty and justice for all" as a normative standard, inequality is no longer something to be simply ac‐

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cepted as an empirical fact. Rather "liberty and justice for all" becomes an ideal which Ameri‐ can society strives to achieve. Whenever reality falls short of this ideal, it does not mean that the ideal itself is worthless and that the situation should be cynically accepted as it is. Rather, it means that more work needs to be done if the ideal is to be realized to the fullest extent possible. Note also that the formation of an "ideal" solution to a problem does not necessarily mean achieving the "best of all possible worlds" but simply the best that can be hoped for un‐ der a given set of actual circumstances. As these circumstances change entirely new ideals may be formulated to deal with them. Arriving at normative solutions in cross‐cultural situa‐ tions is not a matter of clinging to single absolute standards set in stone for all time, nor of simply respecting existing cultural norms, but rather a process of negotiation in which those who are affected by a problem jointly seek to solve it. No attempt need be made to formulate norms which are valid for all people in all places and at all times. Rather the norms are con‐ textualized to resolve conflicts occurring among particular groups of people from either the same or different cultures dealing with particular problems in particular situations. There is no question here of one side simply trying to impose its values on the other; any norms which are constructed emerge out of the dialogical process itself.

Towards intercultural dialogue The goal of a constructivist approach to intercultural philosophy is not to "impose" a particular way of thinking on others, but rather to consider how inclusive dialogue among people having different beliefs, values, and norms might be conducted. Although, as has been argued, good methodological reasons may be offered for attempting to maintain a measure of objectivity and avoiding value judgments in the social sciences, a normative, philosophical ap‐ proach to intercultural relations must explicitly concern itself with how value judgments and norms might be formulated, reasoned about, and justified across cultures. While it is permis‐ sible to offer arguments for why one normative position might be preferable to another, all such arguments can themselves be submitted to the dialogical process. To say that normative positions should be excluded from an intercultural dialogue is to miss the point; the whole purpose of cross‐cultural dialogue is trying to understand each other's positions better or to determine what joint action should be taken to resolve the issue at hand. The normative posi‐ tions themselves are part of the subject matter of the dialogue and there is no reason why they should be proscribed. Intercultural philosophy may begin with an analysis of the background assumptions that the various parties bring with them to the dialogue process. It can then engage itself in the normative task of proposing criteria for evaluating the beliefs and values in question, as well as possible solutions for conflicts arising among people facing a mutual problem. The normative stage includes giving arguments for and against various proposals and subjecting them to public scrutiny and dialogue. It is precisely this willingness to subject our views to an open examination and discussion that, on the one hand, precludes the participants in a dia‐ logue from obstinately clinging to their own views without argument or justification, and, on the other, prevents one side in a dialogue from imposing their views on others. While one side may or may not find the arguments of the other side to be persuasive, the only "force" that can be used in intercultural dialogue is the force of a better argument. Silencing the other side, by definition, means that the two sides are no longer having a dialogue with each other.

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Finally, the inquiry may also consider meta‐normative questions related to the communicative processes which enable people from different cultures to engage in dialogue on such questions. Meta‐normative questions are concerned not with the content of what is being discussed, but rather with the procedures that enable normative claims to be co‐con‐ structed by the participants in an intercultural dialogue. While the people involved a dialogue must ultimately decide for themselves how the dialogue will be conducted, what criteria should be adopted, and how the problems themselves should be resolved, philosophy can at least help to clarify the options that are available. To give a concrete example of this process, consider the kind of dialogue that may take place between an international developer who wants to develop resources in a particular area and the indigenous people who live there the sub‐theme of the movie, Avatar, incidentally. While the situation can be examined from a variety of empirical perspectives, including, eco‐ nomic, political, environmental, and other perspectives, it can also be analyzed from an ethical perspective, which is where a philosophy of intercultural relations makes its entrance as an area of inquiry. The normative question in this case is whether the land should be developed or not, and it is possible that arguments can be offered both for and against the plan not only from the economic, political, environmental perspectives mentioned above, but also from an ethical perspective. Meta‐normative questions related to the problem might be: Who is in‐ cluded or excluded from discussions about the issue? What are the power relations between the participants in the dialogue? Who ultimately decides what should be done? What consti‐ tutes a fair decision? And more broadly: Should the values of economic development take precedence over the preservation of traditional cultures? Should attempts be made to inte‐ grate indigenous people into modern society or should they be free to continue their tradi‐ tional ways of life if they so wish? There are, of course, a variety of approaches that might be taken when engaging in meta‐normative questions about how a dialogue should proceed. A universalist approach takes the view that there are certain absolute truths which should be accepted by everyone regardless of culture. Dialogue can be looked at the mutual search for such truths or simply as a matter of one side trying to convince the other that it already knows these truths. A relativ‐ ist approach contends that there are no universal truths and that conflicting beliefs among different cultures may be incommensurable and thus, irreconcilable. If no ultimate standards can be appealed to help resolve such conflicts, one side must either give in arbitrarily to the other or the two sides separate, either amicably agreeing to disagree or unamicably adopting hostile attitudes towards each other. A constructivist approach is to try to work through the disagreement in a manner that arrives at a solution which is mutually satisfactory to both sides, perhaps by reconfiguring the problem in a way that allows completely new ways of thinking and interacting to emerge. Rather than debate existing beliefs and trying to determine which is "right," it may be possible for new solutions to be constructed as new problems arise, leading to the creation of entirely new cultural norms.

The dialogical process It should be recognized, of course, that a constructivist approach to intercultural dia‐ logue may not be applicable to all situations. In some cases persuasive arguments might be offered which in fact result in one side convincing the other side to change its view. In other cases, a majority view may not be implemented because of social, economic, or political op‐

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pression. In still other cases, the disagreements may run so deep that they are regarded as "intractable," and attention shifts away from conflict resolution towards conflict management, which involves trying to prevent a further escalation of the conflict and maintaining, to the extent possible, "peaceful coexistence," or towards conflict transformation, which involves trying to reframe the dispute in a way that can lead to either compromise or integrative, "win– win" situations, which effectively address the concerns of both sides. In such situations, other preliminary measures might need to be taken before the dialogical process can resume, such as increasing personal contacts between the disputants in non‐threatening situations unre‐ lated to the conflict "people‐to‐people" diplomacy or resolving other underlying political, economic, or security issues that impede dialogue.5 It should also be noted that people from different cultures often employ different communicative styles when engaging in intercultural dialogue, negotiations, and conflict res‐ olution, as is evidenced by the extensive literature on these topics.6 Western cultures, for example, frequently employ an "active" style of dialogue in which views are forcefully pre‐ sented, argued for, and debated on an egalitarian basis in which each participant has equal power with all others ideally at least. Following an Aristotelian either–or logic, it is assumed that one side will be "right" and the other "wrong." If the arguments that are presented fail to persuade all sides, a decision about which alternative to adopt might be made on the basis of majority rule. The minority may be obliged to go along with decisions made by the majority, but the minority also has the opportunity to bolster support for its position by offering arguments that may over time convince others to adopt it. Asian cultures, on the other hand, often employ a "passive" style of dialogue in which views are indirectly presented and more attention is given to maintaining group harmony than to winning an argument; relationships between the participants may also be more hier‐ archical, with some people experts or those in authority being given more power in the communicative process. Following a more dialectical both–and logic the aim is reach an in‐ clusive agreement which incorporates rather than rejects minority views. When successful, the result will be a consensus among all of the participants ideally at least. If a consensus cannot be reached, a decision may be made to "table" the issue until a later date, giving all sides more time for reflection. Highly controversial issues may be avoided from the very start if they are perceived as being potentially disruptive to the functioning of the group. What such considerations suggest is that attention needs to be paid not only to the topic under discussion but also the communicative processes that may be employed by people from different cultures when engaging in dialogue. In the same way that it cannot simply be assumed that everyone will share the same meta‐normative assumptions about "truth," it cannot be assumed that everyone will share the same meta‐normative assumptions about how a dialogue should be conducted. In other words, everything is open for negotiation. In trying to decide which communication processes to follow, should we adopt the universalist view that there is only one proper way of engaging in dialogue, or the relativist view that since

5 Bar‐Tal 2013 analyzes intractable conflicts from a social science perspective, while Crocker, Hampson, and Aall 2005 adopt a more practical, normative approach. Conflict management is thoroughly treated in Pammer and Killian 2003. On conflict transformation, see Dumont, Hastings, and Noma 2013. 6 Of the many books that look at dialogue, negotiations, and conflict resolution from a cross‐cultural perspective, the following are good for starters: Avruch 2013, Chew 2001, European Commission 2004, Faure 2003, Fisher 1998, Grein and Weigand 2007, LeBaron 2003, Ting‐Toomey and Oetzel 2001, UNESCO 2009, Weaver 2013.

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each culture has their own communication style, there is no way for dialogue to proceed? Is the best that can be hoped for a bland recommendation to simply "understand" and "respect" differences in communication styles in the same way that we are advised to "understand" and "respect" the beliefs, values, and norms of other cultures? Ultimately, of course, such a stance offers no basis whatsoever for the two sides to actually engage in dialogue with each other, let alone address the substantive issues which brought them together in the first place. While, indeed, it is possible to propose a priori "ground rules" for improving dialogue across cultures, it is often difficult to come up with a general list that can be agreed to by all sides and applied in all situations. An alternative, constructivist approach would suggest that it may nonetheless be possible for the two sides to construct an integrated communication style, which combines aspects of each of the original styles in a way that both sides find ac‐ ceptable. This constructive process begins not from a general set of normative rules laid out in advance for how communication should be conducted, but rather with the sets of rules that already exist, to see if from them new rules can be formulated which embrace both of the original sets and perhaps generate entirely new rules in the process. Both sides would be ac‐ tively involved in the process of jointly creating the ground rules that they will ultimately agree to and follow. While success cannot always be guaranteed, the process may nonetheless be a possible way of moving forward when there are disagreements not only about the sub‐ stantive issues under consideration but also about the manner in which they should be ad‐ dressed. To illustrate the process, we may return to our previous example. When Westerners and Asians are communicating with each other it may be possible for both sides to agree that stating positions directly and clearly is preferable to stating them indirectly and vaguely, given that an indirect, high context style is only understandable within cultural groups that use the style, whereas a direct, low context style is understandable to all groups. Nonetheless, the dialogue should be conducted in a manner which avoids interpersonal conflict and main‐ tains group harmony, on the grounds that the ultimate goal of the dialogue may be to foster cooperation between the two groups in a way that enables them to work together successfully on problems of mutual concern. While everyone can freely engage in the dialogue on an equal basis, the views of experts should be actively consulted. This proposal preserves the Western norm that ideas should be debated on the basis of their merits rather than on the basis of au‐ thority in some cases novices are "right" and the experts are "wrong", but it also acknowl‐ edges that those having greater knowledge of a situation may in fact be able to contribute more than others to the resolution of a problem experts may be "right" more often than they are "wrong" and "right" more often than novices. Arguments can be vigorously debated, as in the West, but the ultimate goal should be a substantive position that incorporates the views of minorities, as in the East. While it may be impossible to reach perfect consensus, a position may emerge which has greater support than one that could be decided on the basis of major‐ ity rule alone. Moreover, since even in the East there is rarely complete consensus on any given issue, the minority can still attempt to gain support for its view by trying to come up with more persuasive arguments in its favor. Whether any of the above proposals are regarded as acceptable is something that ulti‐ mately needs to be decided by the people actually participating in a dialogue, not by philoso‐ phers. Nonetheless, the example does illustrate the kind of analysis that is possible from a constructivist perspective. In sum, intercultural philosophy has the potential to raise new questions and open up new areas of research in the field of intercultural relations, as well as

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to contribute to the resolution of problems that arise as a result of differences in cross‐cul‐ tural norms.

Bibliography

Avruch, Kevin, Context and Pretext in Conflict Resolution: Culture, Identity, Power, and Practice., Boulder: Paradigm 2013. Baghramian, Maria, ed., The Many Faces of Relativism, London: Routledge, 2014. Bar‐Tal, Daniel, Intractable Conflicts: Socio‐Psychological Foundations and Dynamics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014. Bourdieu, Pierre and Loïc J. D. Wacquant, An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992. Chew, Pat K., ed.,The Conflict and Culture Reader. New York: New York University Press, 2001. Clifford, James and George E. Marcus, Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010. Crocker, Chester A., Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela R. Aall , Taming Intractable Conflicts: Mediation in the Hardest Cases. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2004. Douglas, Heather E., Science, Policy, and the Value‐Free Ideal. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2009. DuMont, Rhea A., Tom H. Hastings, and Emiko Noma, eds., Conflict Transformation: Essays on Methods of Nonviolence, Jefferson: McFarland, 2013. European Commission, Intercultural Dialogue, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2004. Faure, Guy Oliver, ed., How People Negotiate: Resolving Disputes in Different Cultures, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, 2003. Fisher, Glen, The Mindset Factor in Ethnic Conflict: A Cross‐Cultural Agenda, Yarmouth: Intercultural Press,1998. Grein, Marion and Edda Weigand, eds., Dialogue and Culture. Amsterdam: J. Benjamins, 2007. Hunt, Robert C., Beyond Relativism: Comparability in Cultural Anthropology., Lanham: Altamira, 2007. Lacey, Hugh, Is Science Value Free?: Values and Scientific Understanding, 2nd ed. London: Routledge, 2004. LeBaron, Michelle, Bridging Cultural Conflict: A New Approach for a Changing World, San Francisco: Jossey‐Bass, 2003. Mall, Ram Adhar, Intercultural Philosophy, Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000. Pammer, William J., Jr., and Jerri Killian, eds., Handbook of Conflict Management, New York: Marcel Dekker, 2003. Proctor, Robert N., Value‐Free Science?: Purity and Power in Modern Knowledge, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991. Ting‐Toomey, Stella and John G. Oetzel, Managing Intercultural Conflict Effectively, London: Sage, 2001. UNESCO, Investing in Cultural Diversity and Intercultural Dialogue, Paris: UNESCO, 2009.

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Wallner, Friedrich G., Florian Schmidsberger, and Franz Martin Wimmer, eds. Intercultural Philosophy: New Aspects and Methods, Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2010. Weaver, Gary, Intercultural Relations: Communication, Identity, and Conflict, Boston: Pearson Learning Solutions, 2013.

Article citation

Evanoff, Richard 2014. "Intercultural Philosophy and Constructivist Dialogue on Cross‐ Cultural Norms." Aoyama Journal of the School of International Politics, Economics, and Communication 93:25–41. Reprinted with permission.

89 ISSN:2241‐5106

Πάπυροι - Επιστημονικό Περιοδικό Δέλτοι τόμος 4, 2015

Papyri - Scientific Journal Delti volume 4, 2015

Being Human Among Humans: Plurality in The Divided World Το να είσαι άνθρωπος ανάμεσα σε ανθρώπους: η πολλαπλότητα σε έναν διαιρεμένο κόσμο

ÖZLEM DUVA KAYA, Assoc. Prof. Dr. of Philosophy, Faculty of Letters, Dokuz Eylül University, Turkey. ΟΖΛΕΜ ΝΤΟΥΒΑ ΚΑΓΙΑ, Αναπληρώτρια Καθηγήτρια Φιλοσοφίας, Τομέας των Γραμμάτων, Πανεπιστήμιο Ντοκούζ Εϋλούλ, Τουρκία E‐mail: [email protected]

Θεσσαλονίκη 2015 – Thessaloniki 2015 ISSN:2241‐5106

Πάπυροι - Επιστημονικό Περιοδικό Papyri - Scientific Journal Δέλτοι Delti τόμος 4, 2015 volume 4, 2015 www.academy.edu.gr [email protected] Being Human Among Humans: Plurality in The Divided World Το να είσαι άνθρωπος ανάμεσα σε ανθρώπους: η πολλαπλότητα σε έναν διαιρεμένο κόσμο

Being Human Among Humans: Plurality in The Divided World Το να είσαι άνθρωπος ανάμεσα σε ανθρώπους: η πολλαπλότητα σε έναν διαιρεμένο κόσμο

ÖZLEM DUVA KAYA, ΟΖΛΕΜ ΝΤΟΥΒΑ ΚΑΓΙΑ

Περίληψη Η κύρια θέση που δηλώνω σε αυτό το άρθρο είναι ότι η δημοκρατική θεωρία χρειάζε‐ ται μια ανθρωπολογική προοπτική η οποία ορίζει τον άνθρωπο στην πολλαπλότητα και υπο‐ δηλώνει την πιθανότητα επίτευξης μιας χωρίς αποκλεισμούς ορθολογικής συναίνεσης. Υπο‐ στηρίζω ότι ένα μοντέλο της δημοκρατίας όσον αφορά την κοσμοπολίτικη ανθρωπολογίας μπορεί να μας βοηθήσει να οραματιζόμαστε καλύτερα την κύρια πρόκληση που αντιμετωπί‐ ζουν τα παγκόσμια πρότυπα και οι αρχές σήμερα. Πώς να δημιουργήσουμε δημοκρατικές μορφές συμβίωσης σήμερα; Νομίζω ότι μπορούμε να απαντήσουμε στο ερώτημα αυτό από την ερμηνεία της θεωρίας της Hannah Arendt περί πολιτικής δράσης σε μια φιλοσοφική αν‐ θρωπολογική βάση. Είναι κοινή παραδοχή ότι η Hannah Arendt είναι καχύποπτη της ηθικής και προειδοποιεί ότι η ηθική και η συνείδηση από μόνη της δεν μπορεί να παράγει τις προϋ‐ ποθέσεις για την ειρήνη. Στην παρούσα εργασία, θα εξεταστεί η φιλοσοφική εργασία της Ar‐ endt μαζί με τη φιλοσοφική ανθρωπολογία του Kant και θα προσπαθήσω να αποδείξω τη σημασία της για την πολυφωνία και για την ειρηνική ζωή.

Abstract The main thesis I put forward in this article is that democratic theory needs an anthro‐ pological perspective which defines the human in plurality and signifies the possibility of achieving a fully inclusive rational consensus. I argue that a model of democracy in terms of cosmopolitan anthropology can help us to better envision the main challenge facing universal norms and principles today. How to create democratic forms of living together? I think we can answer this question by interpreting Hannah Arendt’s theory of political action on a philo‐ sophical anthropological basis. It is common knowledge that Hannah Arendt is suspicious of ethics and warns that ethics and conscience alone cannot produce the conditions for peace. In the present paper, I examine Arendt’s philosophical project together with Kant’s philosophical anthropology and try to demonstrate its importance for plurality and living together in peace.

 This article is published in Dialogue and Universalism, Issue: 1/2015, page: 216‐221

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The most problematic issue in our age is living together in peace. Probably the greatest challenge facing mankind is the danger of conflict between peoples, cultures and political groups. Thus, the main question can be formulated as: What is the possibility of living peace‐ fully and where is the basis for people living respectfully and considering the other? Can such a way of life be actualized on an ethical basis? In answer to this question, I think that we should turn to the question of human nature and its capabilities in order to rethink all con‐ flicting problems and the disintegration of social and political realms. I will apply Arendt’s thought on what it means to be human, by highlighting her idea that we can establish a peaceful world through ethics. While she does not think that if we act ethically we can be free and peaceful, nevertheless, she maintains her belief to human capacities and establishes the human as political being with these capacities. For Arendt, human nature can be defined by political action. Because she understands the proper nature as inherently political, she thinks man is a political animal, zoon poli‐ tikon. Thus man’s nature is perfected only in the active political life, in the vita activa. It is the vita activa and political life that define human freedom. Human freedom can only be real‐ ized on the basis of the space of appearances which has been idealized in the Greek polis. For this idea, a space for politics is necessary so that human freedom can only be realized in it. But this is only an ideal which we cannot experience in exactly the same way. At this point, Han‐ nah Arendt criticizes Kant’s concept of freedom and categorical imperative for she sees the categorical imperative as concerning only the individual and thus ignoring the plurality of in‐ dividuals in the world. For this reason, she points to Kant’s aesthetics with its emphasis on the individual's subjective decision for example in the idea of taste as potentially undermining an eventual group judgment. Therefore she turns to commonsense as sensus communis for making possible being and acting together. Common sense is a basic ability to understand, perceive and judge that can be a possi‐ bility for plurality. If we use common sense in everyday usage, it describes only things/thoughts shared by all people. But common sense has at least two specific meanings: One of that refers to the animal soul Greek psukhē as proposed by Aristotle. This meaning enables us to comprehend the different and unique senses of people to collectively perceive characteristics which are common to all things; behaviors, values or tendencies. It also helps us to distinguish and identify things and other animals in the world, by defining human in so‐ cial life. The second special use of term is Roman influenced and it is used to describe the nat‐ ural human sensitivity for other humans and the community. Although common sense has frequently been used only negatively, and even pejora‐ tively in modern times, sometimes it has been used positively as an appeal to authority. In 18th century the concept of authority was understood in different manner and the term common sense came to be seen more positively as the basis for modern thinking. For example Kant contrasted common sense to metaphysics which was associated with the ancient regime. Hannah Arendt follows Kant and she argues that Kant’s reference to sensus communis should be translated as “community sense” rather than “common sense”. Common sense should be purified emphasizes the “common” here as the key to move to judgment through language. It allows us to go beyond our own limited mode of thinking and the oppression of tradition; the form of government, religion, cultural practices, or all of these and the explanation for the way of living together becomes institutionalized. This is one way to understand what Arendt means by thinking with “an enlarged mentality.” Enlargement mentality places us in commu‐ nity which consists of autonomous citizens. In Arendt’s “detranscendentalization” of Kant,

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human being is defined as communication and interaction with one another rather than a se‐ ries of ethical codes. For this reason, judgment for Kant is only a faculty of the mind but for Arendt it depends on the actual interaction with others. On the question of what it means to be human Kant and Arendt share some similar ideas. In Anthropology From Pragmatic Point of View, Kant focuses on humans as both free agents and of exercising their freedom in community. Kant asserts that when a child begins to speak first of all he/she feels himself/herself, but at the same time he/she becomes ac‐ quainted with others. When we speak about ourselves we have to approve existence of the other. This idea leads to Kant defining the human being in relation to others. A human being cannot imagine himself/herself as a Cartesian subject. Through his criticism of the Cartesian subject, Kant develops the subject of the Enlightenment as one who has to communicate with others to think critically, judge uncommittedly and act freely.1 Kant appeals to the moral aspect of man for defining the human and produces the cat‐ egorical imperative as a possibility for interacting in a free public realm. Since considerations of the physical details of actions are necessarily bound up with a person's subjective prefer‐ ences, culture and experience ‐ they could have been brought about without the action of a rational will; Kant concludes that the consequences of an act are irrelevant to moral deliber‐ ation. For Kant, the only objective basis for moral value would be the rationality of the good will, expressed in recognition of moral duty and leading to a man being human in the public sphere. The categorical imperative cannot contain any moral ingredient or thematic speech but it can be a formula, a heuristic principle to produce moral and political principles. Thus duty for humans becomes a necessity to act out of reverence for the moral law set by the cate‐ gorical imperative, and human actions are conducted according to the categorical imperative. Then, only a categorical imperative can be the supreme principle of morality which has a pub‐ lic character. Because the categorical imperative demands to regard as end itself. This means that people have value in themselves and what we will for others we will for ourselves also. Kant means that rational beings are ends in themselves, so they can act for collectivity in the public realm. Hannah Arendt is suspicious of the role of the categorical imperative in the pub‐ lic domain within which humans are free to act. Under the devastating effect of the Holocaust, Arendt thinks that moral principles are not enough for being together and she gives reasons for this in the Eichmann in Jerusalem. Arendt turns to the conception of man as zoon politikon which is Aristotelian and defines humans as beings with the same capacities. Furthermore, she agrees with the Kantian way of explaining human capacities but she tends to read Kant’s moral philosophy on a political basis. By returning Kant’s concept of transcendental ego, Ar‐ endt wants to constitute the possibility of living together in peace which cannot be realized if the public realm is abolished by violence. For the common life we should keep in mind that all human activities are conditioned by the fact that men live together, but it is only action that cannot even be imagined outside the society of men. First of all, since both Kant and Arendt want to constitute the idea of political freedom they try to articulate common world. This common world can be made possible if and only if, we accept a concept of the human where humans live and act together without oppression and with free will. Arendt thinks that all humans live together in this common world both physically and historically. But the constitution of a space of public freedom appears as a con‐

1 Immanuel Kant, Anthropology From Pragmatic Point of View, Trans: Robert Louden Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006, p:73‐88

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tingent and performative deed executed by persons who decide to act together as equals, au‐ tonomous subjects. Dana Villa points that for Arendt the political judgment of a plurality of diverse citizens expresses what could be called the political aletheia or concrete truth of the city or political association; a judgment is concrete only if it is the product of a particular as‐ semblage of free and equal citizens. For Dana Villa, Arendt follows Kant and describes such judgments as a variety of “enlarged thought” and Arendt’s concept of political freedom refers to modern revolutions that have the same because of the traditional political thought.2 This idea which Dana Villa mentions depends on the assertion that Western metaphysical thoughts has dominant characteristics. But I think that we can acquire a better understanding of Arendt’s concept of political freedom in relation with the concept of human, if we connect it with the Kantian anthropology and with the Aristotelian conception of the citizen. Kant’s critical philosophy is important to think of the human because he defines the free public realm in relation to the ideal of the cosmopolitan citizen. If we can judge and act only in community with communication and dialogue against all oppression then we can imagine universal moral‐political laws that comprise all humans. For Kant, it is these moral laws that lay the groundwork of cosmopolitan ideals. However, Arendt does not think that morality can be a reliable starting point for universal, peaceful practices; she points that human freedom can only be realized by politics, not morality and for this reason political freedom is essential for being human. Arendt explains that freedom, as a regulative principle, has been steering politics for at least two centuries and she identifies political action as the key to redefining the concept of human freedom. The ideal of the polis signifies the realm within which freedom was experienced through history. Therefore, the polis stands for the space of appearance, for that space “where I appear to others as others appear to me, where men exist not merely like other living or inanimate things, but to make their appearance explicitly.”3 The public space of appearance can be always recreated anew wherever individuals gather together politically, that is, “Wherever men are together in the manner of speech and action”4 Thus, the space of appearance becomes the space of human experience. It is highly fragile and exists only when actualized through the performance of deeds or the utterance of words which constitute the world. Arendt explains its peculiarity is that:

“Unlike the spaces which are the work of our hands, it does not survive the actuality of the movement which brought it into being, but disappears not only with the dispersal of men — as in the case of great catastrophes when the body politic of a people is destroyed — but with the disappearance or arrest of the activities themselves. Wherever people gather to‐ gether, it is potentially there, but only potentially, not necessarily and not forever”5

Arendt’s conception of action is intimately related to her conception of freedom and individuation, and her conceptions of temporal transcendence and of the public realm. To un‐ derstand why Arendt turns to Kant, we shall focus our attention upon the central dichotomies in Arendt’s conception of human condition. The main tensions in her political thought are

2 Dana Villa ed, The Cambridge Companion to Hannah Arendt, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000, p: 222 3 Maurizio Passerin D’Entréves, The Political Philosophy of Hannah Arendt, Routledge, London, 1994, p:77 4 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, University of Chicago Press, Chicago,1958, p: 198‐199 5 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, University of Chicago Press, Chicago,1958, p: 199

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freedom and necessity, uniqueness and uniformity, public and private. Both Kant and Arendt want to grasp the particular and universal at the same time without loss of autonomy. To that end, Arendt focuses on Kant’s judgment and its political meaning rather than on morality. Arendt's concern with judgment is related to political tragedies of the twentieth cen‐ tury, namely, Nazism and Stalinism. Faced with the loss of judgment and death of the human, Arendt tries to reformulate new standards of living together; at this point, it is evident that the human is defined in praxis. Thus she synthesizes sensus communis and judgment. For Arendt, therefore, the enormity and unprecedentedness of totalitarianism can be resisted by using capacity to judge for it is precisely this faculty that underlies our conven‐ tional categories of interpretation and assessment, moral or political. And in this situation the only recourse is to appeal to the imagination, which allows us to view things in their proper perspective and to judge them without the benefit of a pre‐given rule or universal. This solu‐ tion places Arendt’s conception of the human between Aristotelian zoon politikon and the Kantian subject. For Arendt, the imagination enables us to create the distance which is neces‐ sary for an impartial judgment, while at the same time allows for the closeness that makes understanding possible; it is a new way for taking moral‐political decisions and principles through action. Therefore the human is defined as a creature that has the capacity to act. Ar‐ endt makes possible both our reconciliation with reality and the ability to act against reality such as the tragic reality of the twentieth century. Political action becomes possible owing to her conception of human. Arendt asserts that there are living humans on earth, humans in the plural, not singular; so we should recognise that the being of human depends on plurality, and plurality can be enabled by political action, namely word, speech and discourse that require the use of judgment. Arendt attempted to connect the activity of thinking to our capacity to judge. To be sure, this connection of thinking and judging seems to operate only in emergencies but today we need judgment and the conception of the human to overcomes disintegration, the monop‐ oly of violence and the loss of value which are together in the divided world. However, the capacity to think representatively with an enlarged mentality is a specifically political ability that enables individuals to orient themselves in the public realm and to judge the phenomenal realm and memorize the importance of speech which is lost within oppression of morality, tradition and violence. If the human is outside the political realm, then we cannot be hopeful for a non‐discriminative, peaceful world.

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Bibliography

H. Arendt, The Human Condition, University of Chicago Press, Chicago,1958. H. Arendt, Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy ed:Ronald Beiner University of Chicago Press, Chicago,1989. D. Carr, The Paradox of Subjectivity, Oxford University Press, New York and Oxford, 1999. M. P. D’Entréves, The Political Philosophy of Hannah Arendt, Routledge, London, 1994. I. Kant, Anthropology From Pragmatic Point of View, Trans: Robert Louden Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006. C. G. Ryn, A Common Human Ground: Universality and Particularity in a Multicultural World. Columbia and London: University of Missouri Press, 2003. D. Villa ed, The Cambridge Companion to Hannah Arendt, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000.

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Papyri - Scientific Journal Delti volume 4, 2015

Γνωσιολογία της Δημοκρατίας και Νεωτερικότητα. Το Διακύβευμα της Υπέρβασης του Δυτικοευρωπαϊκού Διαφωτισμού

ΓΙΩΡΓΟΣ ΚΟΝΤΟΓΙΩΡΓΗΣ, Καθηγητής Πολιτικής Επιστήμης, πρ. Πρύτανις του Παντείου Πανεπιστημίου. Ελλάς Email: [email protected]

Θεσσαλονίκη 2015 – Thessaloniki 2015 ISSN:2241‐5106

Πάπυροι - Επιστημονικό Περιοδικό Papyri - Scientific Journal Δέλτοι Delti τόμος 4, 2015 volume 4, 2015 www.academy.edu.gr [email protected] Γνωσιολογία της Δημοκρατίας και Νεωτερικότητα. Το Διακύβευμα της Υπέρβασης του Δυτικοευρωπαϊκού Διαφωτισμού

Γνωσιολογία της Δημοκρατίας και Νεωτερικότητα. Το Διακύβευμα της Υπέρβασης του Δυτικοευρωπαϊκού Διαφωτισμού1

ΓΙΩΡΓΟΣ ΚΟΝΤΟΓΙΩΡΓΗΣ

Η μετάβαση της Εσπερίας από το δεσποτικό στο ανθρωποκεντρικό κοσμοσύστημα σε συνδυασμό με τη μετάλλαξη αυτού από τη μικρή στη μεγάλη κλίμακα έφερε το ζήτημα της δημοκρατίας επιτακτικά στο προσκήνιο. Συγχρόνως όμως η δημοκρατία ως έννοια απέκτησε μία πρωτοφανή αμφισημία ως αποτέλεσμα της ιδεολογικής της προσημείωσης και του γνω‐ σιολογικού ελλείμματος της νεότερης επιστήμης. Στις σελίδες που ακολουθούν θα επιχειρήσω να αποκωδικοποιήσω την περιπέτεια αυ‐ τή της δημοκρατίας και να προσεγγίσω την έννοια υπό το πρίσμα της κοσμοσυστημικής γνωσιολογίας: πρώτον θα διαπιστώσω την προβληματική σχέση της νεωτερικότητας με τη γνωσιολογία της δημοκρατίας. Δεύτερον θα αναδείξω τον σκοπό της. Τρίτον θα σκιαγραφή‐ σω το σύστημά της, το οποίο προόρισται να εμπραγματώσει το σκοπό της. Τέταρτον θα κα‐ ταγράψω την αντίστιξη της δημοκρατίας προς τις λοιπές πολιτείες που προσήκουν στο αν‐ θρωποκεντρικό κοσμοσύστημα και τέλος θα επισημάνω τον χρόνο και τον τόπο το πότε και το πού της δημοκρατίας στην ανθρωποκεντρική «βιολογία».2

1. Το γνωσιολογικό αβαθές και η πρωτο‐ανθρωποκεντρική φύση της νεωτερικότητας Το θεμελιώδες ερώτημα με το οποίο βρίσκεται κατά την κρίση μου αντιμέτωπη η επο‐ χή μας είναι πώς θα συγκροτηθεί ένα σύστημα γνώσης που δεν θα λειτουργεί απλώς διαπι‐ στωτικά, αποτυπώνοντας τα κατά παρατήρηση φαινόμενα ή μάλιστα προτάσσοντας το πα‐ ρόν ως καθολική αξία και τις πραγματικότητές του ως μέτρο, δηλαδή ως πρότυπο για την κα‐ τανόηση ή την ερμηνεία του παρελθόντος, και περαιτέρω δεν θα παραμένει δέσμιο της άπο‐ ψης ότι το μέλλον θα είναι συναρτημένο με τη βιούμενη κοσμοσυστημική τάξη. Η γνωσιολογία οφείλει να προτείνει ένα καθολικό σύστημα γνώσης, που να αντλεί το υλικό του από το σύνολο της κοσμοϊστορίας, να αποδίδει τα φαινόμενα με έννοιες γένους, την τυπολογία τους και το εξελικτικό τους γίγνεσθαι με γνώμονα την κοσμοσυστημική βιολογία του κοινωνικού ανθρώπου. Στο εγχείρημα αυτό φιλοδοξεί να απαντήσει η κοσμοσυστημική γνωσιολογία.3

1 Στο περιοδικό Διάλογος, 4/2014, σελ. 227‐247. 2 Η εργασία αυτή βασίστηκε στα Γ. Κοντογιώργης, Ελληνικό κοσμοσύστημα, Σιδέρης, Αθήνα 2006· Η δημοκρα‐ τία ως ελευθερία. Δημοκρατία και αντιπροσώπευση, Πατάκης, Αθήνα 2007· και Οικονομικά συστήματα και ε‐ λευθερία, Σιδέρης, Αθήνα 2010. 3 Η κοσμοσυστημική γνωσιολογία εισάγει τη διάκριση μεταξύ κοσμοϊστορίας και κοσμοσυστημικής ιστορίας, προκειμένου να προσεγγίσει το κοινωνικό φαινόμενο κατά την τάξη της συγκρότησής του, δηλαδή της ιδιοσυ‐ στασίας του, και της εξελικτικής του σημειολογίας. Η έννοια του κοσμοσυστήματος ορίζει ένα σύνολο κοινω‐ νιών με κοινές θεμέλιες παραμέτρους, θεσμικές, ιδεολογικές και αξιακές ορίζουσες, που συνθέτουν ένα όλον το οποίο κινείται στον ιστορικό χρόνο με όρους εσωτερικής αυτάρκειας και εξελικτικής συνοχής. Διακρίνουμε την

101 ISSN:2241‐5106 Πάπυροι - Επιστημονικό Περιοδικό Papyri - Scientific Journal Δέλτοι Delti τόμος 4, 2015 volume 4, 2015 www.academy.edu.gr [email protected] Γνωσιολογία της Δημοκρατίας και Νεωτερικότητα. Το Διακύβευμα της Υπέρβασης του Δυτικοευρωπαϊκού Διαφωτισμού

Στο εν λόγω πλαίσιο θα επικεντρωθούμε ειδικότερα στο γνωσιολογικό ζήτημα που ανάγεται στην έννοια της δημοκρατίας, προκειμένου σε πρώτο βαθμό να διαπιστώσουμε εάν το πολιτειακό πρόταγμα και συνακόλουθα το πολιτικό σύστημα που επεξεργάσθηκε η νεω‐ τερικότητα από τη δυτικοευρωπαϊκή Αναγέννηση και τον Διαφωτισμό και αποτελεί τη θεμέ‐ λια παραδοχή στις ημέρες μας εγγράφεται στη δημοκρατία. Εάν συμφωνήσουμε ότι αυτό τα‐ ξινομείται όντως στις δημοκρατικές πολιτείες, όπως δέχονται ουσιαστικά όλοι οι στοχαστές της σύγχρονης επιστήμης και η άρχουσα τάξη, σημαίνει ότι δεν χρειάζεται να συνεχίσουμε τον διάλογο παρά να πράξουμε ό,τι η τρέχουσα διδασκαλία: να λάβουμε ως δεδομένο ότι το σημερινό σύστημα είναι δημοκρατία και να συνεχίσουμε περιγράφοντας τους θεσμούς του. Το κοινοβούλιο, την κυβέρνηση, τα κόμματα, τις ομάδες συμφερόντων, το δικαίωμα ψήφου και λόγου και τους διάφορους άλλους θεσμούς, αξίες και πρακτικές που βιώνουμε στην κα‐ θημερινότητά μας. Είναι εντούτοις προφανές ότι η επιλογή αυτή είναι επιστημονικά αδιέξοδη, αφού πα‐ ρακάμπτει το ζητούμενο, τη γνωσιολογία του φαινομένου, προκειμένου να ταξινομήσει εξ αποφάσεως στη δημοκρατία την πολιτεία που βιώνει η νεωτερικότητα και μάλιστα αξιολο‐ γώντας την ως ανώτερη από τη δημοκρατία της πόλης‐κράτους που παρήγαγε την έννοια. Περαιτέρω απόρροια της επιλογής αυτής είναι η απόφανση ότι η όποια εναντίωση στη σημε‐ ρινή πολιτειακή πραγματικότητα είναι υπόλογη συνέργειας στον αυταρχισμό, στο αυταρχικό πολιτικό σύστημα. Ή το ένα θα επιλέξει κανείς ή το άλλο. Η προσέγγιση αυτή δεν συνεκτιμά προφανώς ότι η εποχή μας εγγράφεται τυπολογικά σε μια φάση η οποία εδράζεται στο αξίωμα της ενιαίας σκέψης και πράξης, της μιας και μονα‐ δικής πρότασης πολιτείας, ανεξαρτήτως των μορφολογικών της διαφοροποιήσεων. Αναφέ‐ ρομαι στην πρωτο‐ανθρωποκεντρική περίοδο του νέου κόσμου την οποία έφερε στην επιφά‐ νεια η έξοδός του από τη φεουδαρχία/δεσποτεία. Παρ’ όλ’ αυτά η νεωτερικότητα αφήνει να διαφανεί ότι το παράδειγμά της είναι μοναδικό και ουσιαστικά τελειωτικό με την έννοια της ανθρωποκεντρικής ολοκλήρωσης, ότι δεν συντρέχει επομένως η προοπτική της εξέλιξης, της μετάλλαξης του παρόντος προς μια τυπολογικά διαφορετική πολιτεία. Είναι έτοιμη να απο‐ δεχθεί το ενδεχόμενο κάποιων μορφολογικών προσαρμογών, που όμως δεν θα αλλάζουν την ουσία της σύγχρονης δημοκρατίας. Η στάση αυτή είναι ιδεολογικά συντηρητική και γνωσιολογικά ανυπόστατη καθώς αρνείται την εξελικτική φύση του κοινωνικού ανθρώπου και συγκεκριμένα της ανθρωποκε‐ ντρικής κοινωνίας. Η προσέγγιση αυτή του εξελικτικού γίγνεσθαι του κοινωνικού ανθρώπου συνδυάζεται ωστόσο με το γεγονός ότι η νεωτερικότητα δεν κατάφερε έως σήμερα να οικο‐ δομήσει μια κάποια αξιόπιστη προβληματική για την εξέλιξη που να υπερβαίνει τα καταστα‐ τικά θεμέλια του παρόντος. Τούτο γίνεται εμφανές όταν προσεγγίζουμε τις έννοιες που συνέ‐ χονται με τον κοινωνικό άνθρωπο και εν προκειμένω αυτές που είναι συνοδοί της έννοιας δημοκρατία, όπως η ελευθερία, η ισότητα, η δικαιοσύνη, το δικαίωμα, η πολιτειότης κ.ά. Όλες αυτές οι έννοιες όπως ακριβώς και η έννοια της δημοκρατίας έχουν δεσμευτικά συγκεκριμένο

ύπαρξη δύο κοσμοσυστημικών παραδειγμάτων: του δεσποτικού και του ανθρωποκεντρικού. Το δεσποτικό πα‐ ράγει κοινωνίες «υποκειμένων» στην ιδιοκτησία τρίτου τινός, το ανθρωποκεντρικό κοινωνίες με πρόσημο την ελευθερία. Το ανθρωποκεντρικό κοσμοσύστημα διακρίνεται σε δύο μείζονες περιόδους: σε εκείνη της μικρής κλίμακας που ενσαρκώνει κατά το ουσιώδες ο ελληνισμός και σε εκείνη της μεγάλης κλίμακας, την οποία αποδί‐ δει η νεότερη εποχή. Το ανθρωποκεντρικό κοσμοσύστημα μικρής κλίμακας έχει να επιδείξει μια ολοκληρωμένη εξελικτική διαδρομή, πράγμα θεμελιώδες για τη σπουδή του κοινωνικού φαινομένου, ενώ η εποχή της μεγάλης κοσμοσυστημικής κλίμακας τυπολογείται ως απλώς πρωτο‐ανθρωποκεντρική. Περισσότερα για το ζήτημα αυτό στα έργα του γράφοντος, ιδίως στο Κοντογιώργης 2006.

102 ISSN:2241‐5106 Πάπυροι - Επιστημονικό Περιοδικό Papyri - Scientific Journal Δέλτοι Delti τόμος 4, 2015 volume 4, 2015 www.academy.edu.gr [email protected] Γνωσιολογία της Δημοκρατίας και Νεωτερικότητα. Το Διακύβευμα της Υπέρβασης του Δυτικοευρωπαϊκού Διαφωτισμού

περιεχόμενο και ουσιαστικά περιγράφουν τις πραγματικότητες που βιώνει ο κόσμος σήμερα, τις οποίες προβάλλουν ως καθολικό γνωσιολογικό διακύβευμα. Για να αντιληφθούμε την αιτία του φαινομένου αυτού πρέπει να επιστρέψουμε στην περίοδο της εισόδου του δυτικοευρωπαϊκού φεουδαλικού κόσμου στη νεότερη εποχή. Η ε‐ παφή την περίοδο εκείνη με την έννοια της δημοκρατίας δεν υπήρξε απόρροια των συνθη‐ κών, δηλαδή της πραγματικότητας, ώστε οι στοχαστές να αντλήσουν από αυτή το περιεχόμε‐ νό της και να οδηγηθούν στη συνέχεια σε έναν ορισμό που να περιγράφει την βιούμενη πολι‐ τεία. Ο νεότερος κόσμος ανακάλυψε τη δημοκρατία, πληροφορήθηκε για την ύπαρξή της καθ’ οδόν προς την ανθρωποκεντρική μετάβαση μέσα από τις αναγνώσεις της ελληνικής γραμμα‐ τείας. Ακριβώς γι’ αυτό οι στοχαστές συνέβη να μη δυνηθούν να αντιληφθούν το διακύβευ‐ μά της, να συλλάβουν το περιεχόμενο του θεσμικού της οπλοστασίου, να μην είναι σε θέση να συνεκτιμήσουν τον χρόνο της. Συγχρόνως όμως με τη μη συνδρομή των διανοητικών προϋ‐ ποθέσεων για την κατανόηση της έννοιας της δημοκρατίας δεν συνέτρεχαν και οι συνθήκες για να γίνει αποδεκτή ως πραγματολογικό διακύβευμα και να εφαρμοστεί. Όντως οι προτε‐ ραιότητες της εποχής της μετάβασης από το δεσποτικό στο ανθρωποκεντρικό κοσμοσύστη‐ μα ήγειραν μονοσήμαντα το ζήτημα της ατομικής ελευθερίας, δηλαδή της απόσεισης των δε‐ σμών της φεουδαλικής ιδιοκτησίας επάνω στο άτομο. Η ελευθερία αυτή εντούτοις δεν αντι‐ λέγει στο ανήκειν της πολιτείας στην ιδιοκτησία τρίτου τινός –όπως στο απολυταρχικό κρά‐ τος ή στο κράτος έθνος– ούτε προφανώς στο ανήκειν του συστήματος της οικονομίας στη διαφοροποιημένη από την κοινωνία ή τους επιμέρους συντελεστές της ιδιοκτησία του επι‐ χειρηματία ή κεφαλαιούχου ή και του κράτους. Η περίπτωση των στοχαστών του Διαφωτισμού είναι εξόχως χαρακτηριστική του γε‐ γονότος ότι μέσα από την αδυναμία τους να προσεγγίσουν την ουσία, δηλαδή τον σκοπό, τους θεσμούς και τον χρόνο της δημοκρατίας καθώς και των συναρτημένων με αυτήν εν‐ νοιών όπως η ελευθερία, προσήλθαν στην οικοδόμηση της ιδεολογίας της νεωτερικότητας, η οποία συνίστατο στην «τεκμηρίωση» της δημοκρατικής ταξινόμησης της πολιτείας που προόριζαν για τη μετά την αποτίναξη της δεσποτείας περίοδο. Στο περιβάλλον αυτό ήταν φυσικό ο στοχαστικός άνθρωπος της εποχής της μετάβασης να απομακρυνθεί από τον αρχι‐ κό θαυμασμό της «αρχαιότητας» και, στο πλαίσιο αυτό, της δημοκρατίας, προκειμένου να δώσει απαντήσεις στα φλέγοντα ζητήματα που είχε να αντιμετωπίσει: πώς θα συγκροτηθεί η νέα πρωτόγνωρη σε αυτόν ανθρωποκεντρική κοινωνία, με μόνο πρόσημο την ατομική ελευ‐ θερία· πώς θα εναρμονισθεί το κοινωνικο‐οικονομικό και πολιτικό σύστημα δυνάμει του α‐ νήκειν στην ιδιοκτησία σε ένα περιβάλλον ανθρωποκεντρικής κοινωνίας· πώς τέλος θα νομι‐ μοποιηθεί η απόρριψη της δημοκρατίας της πόλης –της πόλης κράτους αλλά και της πό‐ λης/κοινού της εποχής–, χωρίς να προσαφθεί στο εκκολαπτόμενο πολιτικό μόρφωμα η μομ‐ φή της ολιγαρχίας· ποιος θα είναι ο σκοπός του και πολλά άλλα. Μέσα από περίπλοκες νοητικές επεξεργασίες και θεσμικές επινοήσεις, οι οποίες κυρι‐ αρχούν ακόμη στις ημέρες μας, επιτεύχθηκε τελικά η ταξινόμηση του οπωσδήποτε αναπό‐ φευκτου πολιτειακού οικονομικού, κοινωνικού και πολιτικού συστήματος της πρώτης με‐ τα‐φεουδαλικής εποχής στις δημοκρατίες. Το οποίο ωστόσο υπό το πρίσμα της κοσμοσυστη‐ μικής γνωσιολογίας προσήκει παραδειγματικά στις αυστηρά ολιγαρχικές με πρόσημο την ε‐ κλόγιμη μοναρχία πολιτείες. Αυτό που εντούτοις προκαλεί ενδιαφέρον στην εποχή μας είναι ότι ο διάλογος για τη δημοκρατία και τις συναφείς με το περιεχόμενό της έννοιες εξακολουθεί να γίνεται με τους όρους του Διαφωτισμού. Όταν μάλιστα διαπιστώνεται δια γυμνού οφθαλμού ότι όσα συντε‐

103 ISSN:2241‐5106 Πάπυροι - Επιστημονικό Περιοδικό Papyri - Scientific Journal Δέλτοι Delti τόμος 4, 2015 volume 4, 2015 www.academy.edu.gr [email protected] Γνωσιολογία της Δημοκρατίας και Νεωτερικότητα. Το Διακύβευμα της Υπέρβασης του Δυτικοευρωπαϊκού Διαφωτισμού

λούνται ενώπιόν μας στις ημέρες μας υποδηλώνουν ότι βιώνουμε όχι μια εσωτερική κρίση της πρωτο‐ανθρωποκεντρικής περιόδου αλλά μια αλλαγή φάσης. Η οποία αναγκαιεί την αλ‐ λαγή του αξιακού και συστημικού παραδείγματος.

2. Ο σκοπός της δημοκρατίας Η δημοκρατία δεν είναι αυτοσκοπός. Είναι η πολιτεία που καλείται να εμπραγματώσει τον σκοπό της ανθρωποκεντρικής κοινωνίας, δηλαδή την ελευθερία. Εν προκειμένω η ελευ‐ θερία της δημοκρατίας καλύπτει το σύνολο του κοινωνικού βίου των ανθρώπων. Σχηματο‐ ποιώντας θα λέγαμε ότι η δημοκρατία καλείται να θεσμίσει έτσι την κοινωνική επικράτεια ώστε να υλοποιηθεί η ελευθερία των μελών της στα πεδία της ατομικής/προσωπικής, της κοινωνικο‐οικονομικής και της πολιτικής ζωής. Η παραδοχή αυτή κάνει αναγκαία τη διευκρίνιση σειράς ζητημάτων: πρώτον η έννοια της ελευθερίας ορίζεται ως αυτονομία, εγγράφει δηλαδή στο περιεχόμενό της την αυτοκαθο‐ ριστική προϋπόθεση του ατόμου σε ό,τι αφορά τόσο στην προσωπική ή ιδιωτική ζωή όσο και στην κοινωνικο‐πολιτική σφαίρα. Η αρχή της αυτονομίας στην δημοκρατική της διατύπωση αποδίδεται με τη ρήτρα του «μη άρχεσθαι υπό μηδενός». Η ατομική ελευθερία εισάγει την υπόθεση της αυτονομίας στον προσωπικό βίο ενός εκάστου εν κοινωνία. Η κοινωνική ελευ‐ θερία αφορά στα πεδία της κοινωνικής ζωής όπου το άτομο συνάπτει συμβάσεις, όπως λόγου χάρη με τα οικονομικά υπο‐ συστήματα. Η πολιτική ελευθερία ανάγεται στη θέση του ατό‐ μου μέλους της κοινωνίας στο όλον, δηλαδή στη σχέση μεταξύ κοινωνίας και πολιτικής. Ώστε η καθολική ατομική, κοινωνική, πολιτική ελευθερία υποδεικνύει ότι η πολιτεία ως όλον –το οικονομικό, κοινωνικό και πολιτικό σύστημα– οφείλει να διασφαλίζει την αυτο‐ νομία, ήτοι τη μη εξάρτηση του ατόμου από τρίτον τινά σε όλα τα πεδία του επιστητού. Για να συμβεί αυτό πρέπει το άτομο είτε να μετέχει ισοτίμως στη διοίκηση του συστήματος είτε να μην υπόκειται στην εξάρτησή του. Η επιλογή της μίας ή της άλλης λύσης συναρτάται ου‐ σιαστικά με τον ανθρωποκεντρικό χρόνο.4 Τούτο σημαίνει ότι στο πεδίο επί παραδείγματι της οικονομίας το σύστημα μεριμνά ώστε να μην εγγράφει τον πολίτη στη σημειολογία της εξάρτησης του φορέα της εργασίας ή σε μια άλλη εκδοχή να τον ορίζει ως εταίρο εντός του συστήματος. Στο πεδίο της πολιτικής η ελευθερία προϋποθέτει την ενσάρκωση της ολότητας του συστήματος από το σώμα της κοινωνίας των πολιτών, αντί του κράτους. Η επισήμανση αυτή εγείρει το ζήτημα της θέσης της ιδιοκτησίας στη δημοκρατία. Ό‐ ντως η δημοκρατία δεν εναντιώνεται στην ιδιοκτησία. Αντιθέτως. Διακρίνει ωστόσο μεταξύ της ατομικής ιδιοκτησίας, εκεί όπου αυτή δεν συνεπάγεται τη δημιουργία συμβάσεων με τρί‐ τον τινά, εν προκειμένω με τον πολίτη, και της ιδιοκτησίας η οποία είναι επιδεκτική να ακυ‐ ρώσει την ελευθερία. Οι πιο χαρακτηριστικές από τις συμβάσεις αυτές αφορούν στα πεδία του οικονομικού και του πολιτικού συστήματος. Μια άλλη καθόλα ιδεολογική παράμετρος την οποία προβάλει η νεωτερικότητα, για να αποδείξει τη βίωση της καθολικής ελευθερίας από αυτήν, αφορά στην έννοια της συναίνεσης. Η συναίνεση προβλήθηκε ως επιχείρημα για να διασκεδασθεί προφανώς το γεγονός ότι η δι‐ ατήρηση, σε συνθήκες ατομικού ανθρωποκεντρισμού, του προγενέστερου ιδιοκτησιακά δια‐ τεταγμένου καθεστώτος στα συστήματά της, λειτουργούσε αναιρετικά στην κοινωνική και πολιτική ελευθερία. Εντούτοις παραβλέπεται ότι η συναίνεση στην προκειμένη περίπτωση είναι χορηγός νομιμοποίησης, όχι όμως και ελευθερίας. Ο συναινών δεν παραμένει ελεύθερος

4 Περισσότερα στο Κοντογιώργης 2007.

104 ISSN:2241‐5106 Πάπυροι - Επιστημονικό Περιοδικό Papyri - Scientific Journal Δέλτοι Delti τόμος 4, 2015 volume 4, 2015 www.academy.edu.gr [email protected] Γνωσιολογία της Δημοκρατίας και Νεωτερικότητα. Το Διακύβευμα της Υπέρβασης του Δυτικοευρωπαϊκού Διαφωτισμού

μόνο και μόνο επειδή αποδέχεται την υποβολή του σε ένα καθεστώς εξάρτησης, δηλαδή ετε‐ ρονομίας. Για να θεραπευθεί πλήρως ο ισχυρισμός αυτός, η ελευθερία στο κοινωνικό και στο πο‐ λιτικό πεδίο θα ορισθεί με γνώμονα την έννοια του δικαιώματος αντί της αυτονομίας. Το γε‐ γονός αυτό δεν αντιφάσκει μόνο προς την προσέγγιση της ατομικής ελευθερίας, η οποία γί‐ νεται υπό το πρίσμα της αυτονομίας. Αναδεικνύει το δικαίωμα ως ανώτερο της ελευθερίας, τη στιγμή που αυτό απλώς οριοθετεί εκτατικά το πεδίο της ατομικής ελευθερίας ή το πλαίσιο της προστασίας της εκεί όπου το άτομο στερείται ελευθερίας. Τυπικά παραδείγματα αποτε‐ λούν ο εργασιακός χώρος στις ημέρες μας ή η σχέση μεταξύ κοινωνίας και πολιτικής. Ώστε η νεωτερικότητα ορίζοντας την κοινωνική και την πολιτική ελευθερία με όρους δικαιώματος αποφεύγει να συνομολογήσει τη μη ύπαρξή τους, προκειμένου να εγγράψει το σύστημά της στις δημοκρατικές πολιτείες. Αναπόφευκτο συμπέρασμα της ιδεολογικής αυτής παλινωδίας είναι ο ισχυρισμός της νεωτερικής επιστήμης ότι η ατομική ελευθερία είναι ασύμβατη με την πολιτική ελευθερία την ομόλογη ισότητα κ.λπ., την οποία όμως ταυτίζουν με τον φερόμενο ως φορέα της συλ‐ λογικότητας, δηλαδή το κράτος/σύστημα. Στον αντίποδα η κοσμοσυστημική γνωσιολογία υποδεικνύει ότι η ελευθερία είναι ενιαία, τα δε πεδία της εμπραγμάτωσής της προστίθενται σωρευτικά και μάλιστα κατά τον λόγο της σειράς: ατομική, κοινωνική, πολιτική ελευθερία. Με διαφορετική διατύπωση δεν είναι νοητό να επιδιώξει κανείς πρώτα την πολιτική ελευθε‐ ρία και κατόπιν την ατομική ή να είναι πολιτικά ελεύθερος χωρίς να είναι ατομικά αυτεξού‐ σιος. Η βιολογία των κοινωνιών έχει κοινή ως προς αυτό πραγματολογική και εξελικτική λο‐ γική, όπως ακριβώς και η βιολογία ενός εκάστου ανθρώπου. Η διαφορά έγκειται στο ότι η μεν εξελικτική βιολογία ενός εκάστου ατόμου γίνεται εύκολα αντιληπτή, ενώ η κοινωνική βι‐ ολογία προϋποθέτει άλλες διεργασίες πρόσληψης τις οποίες η νεωτερική επιστήμη πόρρω απέχει από το να αποκωδικοποιήσει. Η αδυναμία της νεότερης επιστήμης να προσεγγίσει τη δημοκρατία και κατ' επέκταση τον σκοπό της την οδήγησε να διακηρύξει τον ολοκληρωτικό της χαρακτήρα. Η ισχυρισμός αυτός δεν συνεκτιμά εντούτοις το γεγονός ότι ο ολοκληρωτισμός, όπως και η απολυταρχία και ο αυταρχισμός, αξιώνει την ύπαρξη μιας σαφούς διαφοροποίησης μεταξύ του κατόχου της καθολικής πολιτικής αρμοδιότητας και του κοινωνικού της υποκειμένου, δηλαδή τη με‐ τάλλαξη της πρώτης σε πολιτικά κυρίαρχη εξουσία. Στη δημοκρατία ελλείπει το υποκείμενο της πολιτικής κυριαρχίας –η κοινωνία των πολιτών–, διότι η πολιτική ελευθερία εξαλείφει την σχέση εξουσιαστή‐εξουσιαζόμενου αφού το πολιτικό σύστημα περιέρχεται εξ ολοκλήρου στην κοινωνία των πολιτών. Εν συμπεράσματι ο σκοπός της δημοκρατίας αφορά στην καθολική ελευθερία, δηλαδή σωρευτικά στην ατομική, κοινωνική και πολιτική ελευθερία. Η οποία καθολική ελευθερία ο‐ ριοθετείται υπό το πρίσμα της αυτονομίας των μελών του κοινωνικού σώματος στο προσω‐ πικό, κοινωνικο‐οικονομικό και πολιτικό πεδίο.

3. Η πολιτεία ή αλλιώς το κοινωνικο‐οικονομικό και πολιτικό σύστημα της δημοκρατίας Ο σκοπός της καθολικής ελευθερίας μπορεί να επιτευχθεί μόνο με τη δημοκρατική πο‐ λιτεία. Η πολιτεία αυτή καλείται να εμπραγματώσει το πεδίο της ελευθερίας πέραν του ατο‐ μικού, σε εκείνα του οικονομικο‐κοινωνικού και του πολιτικού συστήματος. Η ατομική υπο‐ στασιοποίηση του ανθρώπου δύναται να εξοικονομηθεί και σε ένα πολιτειακό περιβάλλον που αποδέχεται το ανήκειν του συστήματος στη διαφοροποιημένη ιδιοκτησία και κατά

105 ISSN:2241‐5106 Πάπυροι - Επιστημονικό Περιοδικό Papyri - Scientific Journal Δέλτοι Delti τόμος 4, 2015 volume 4, 2015 www.academy.edu.gr [email protected] Γνωσιολογία της Δημοκρατίας και Νεωτερικότητα. Το Διακύβευμα της Υπέρβασης του Δυτικοευρωπαϊκού Διαφωτισμού

τούτο διαφεύγει από την κοινωνία των πολιτών. Αρκεί ο κάτοχος του συστήματος να συνε‐ κτιμά στις πολιτικές του το κεκτημένο της ατομικής ελευθερίας, δηλαδή τις θεσμικές, αξιακές κ.λπ. πρόνοιες που τη διασφαλίζουν και μια αναδιανομή του πλούτου ικανή να την υποστηρί‐ ξει. Στην πραγματικότητα όμως το διακύβευμα αυτό τελεί υπό τον όρο της διατήρησης μιας ευαίσθητης ισορροπίας μεταξύ της κοινωνίας των πολιτών και των φορέων του συστή‐ ματος, καθόσον οι πολιτικές των τελευταίων διέρχονται από συσχετισμούς ισχύος που ανα‐ πτύσσονται στο πλαίσιο της κοινωνικής δυναμικής. Η κοινωνία παραμένει ιδιώτης και συνα‐ ντάται ή διαλέγεται με τους φορείς του συστήματος πέραν αυτού, σε μια εξωθεσμική βάση. Για να γίνει εφικτή η κοινωνική ελευθερία πρέπει να επινοηθεί ένα σύστημα που δεν θα θέτει σε εξουσιαστική συμβατική ή μη εξάρτηση το άτομο μέλος της κοινωνίας. Πώς θα συμβεί αυτό; Σε ό,τι αφορά λόγου χάρη στην οικονομία μπορούμε να υποθέσουμε δύο ενδε‐ χόμενα: το ένα να αποσυνδεθεί το άτομο από τη διαδικασία της παραγωγής ή να αποκτήσει ιδίαν ιδιοκτησιακή επιφάνεια· το άλλο να εισέλθει στο σύστημα ως συντελεστής του. Παρέλ‐ κει η διεξοδικότερη ενασχόληση με το ζήτημα αυτό, καθόσον παραπέμπει σε έναν διάλογο για τον οποίον η νεωτερική επιστήμη δεν είναι προετοιμασμένη. Αρκεί εν προκειμένω να επικα‐ λεστούμε το ελληνικό ανθρωποκεντρικό παράδειγμα της πόλης‐κράτους μόνο και μόνο για έναν απλώς προϊδεασμό: στην κρατοκεντρική εποχή της δημοκρατίας η επίλυση του ζητήμα‐ τος της κοινωνικής ελευθερίας έγινε με την απόρριψη του πολίτη από την οικονομική διαδι‐ κασία η περίπτωση της κοινωνίας της σχόλης. Στην οικουμενική φάση του ανθρωποκε‐ ντρικού κοσμοσυστήματος η κοινωνική ελευθερία επιτεύχθηκε με την εταιρική οργάνωση του οικονομικού συστήματος.5 Η πολιτική ελευθερία από την πλευρά της δύναται να επιτευχθεί με έναν και μοναδικό τρόπο: με την ενσάρκωση του πολιτικού συστήματος από το σώμα της κοινωνίας των πολι‐ τών. Για να συμβεί αυτό απαιτούνται δύο τινά. Η συγκρότηση της κοινωνίας σε δήμο, δηλαδή σε οργανική συνιστώσα του πολιτικού συστήματος, και συγχρόνως η περιέλευση σε αυτόν της καθολικής πολιτικής αρμοδιότητας. Διότι μόνο με την ολική ενσάρκωση της πολιτείας από την κοινωνία, το άτομο/πολίτης απαλλάσσεται από την πολιτική κηδεμονία και σε κάθε περίπτωση από τις όποιες «συμβάσεις» εξάρτησης. Με τον τρόπο αυτόν συντελείται η μετάβαση από το κράτος της πολιτικά κυρίαρχης εξουσίας στη μη εξουσιαστικά διατεταγμένη καθολική πολιτική αρμοδιότητα της κοινωνίας‐ δήμου. Από την κοινωνική συλλογικότητα που ενσαρκώνει και διαχειρίζεται το κράτος οι νομείς του, ήτοι το έθνος του κράτους στην κοινωνική συλλογικότητα που ορίζεται ως το ταυτολογικό ισοδύναμο της κοινωνίας δήμου το έθνος της κοινωνίας. Η απόσειση του καταμερισμού των πολιτικών –και προφανώς σε ό,τι αφορά στην κοι‐ νωνική ελευθερία, των κοινωνικών– έργων αποτελεί την προϋπόθεση για την κατάργηση της εξουσιαστικής ετερονομίας. Πράγμα που υποδηλώνει ότι η επίκληση και μάλιστα η εφαρμογή της αρχής αυτής δεν υπόκειται στη νομοτέλεια της άλλης αρχής, που επικαλείται η ολιγαρχι‐ κή ιδεολογία, της λεγόμενης πολυπλοκότητας, αλλά συναρτάται από τον βαθμό της ανθρω‐ ποκεντρικής ολοκλήρωσης του κοινωνικού ανθρώπου. Το σύνολο του θεσμικού περιβάλλο‐ ντος της δημοκρατίας περιέρχεται αυτούσιο στην κοινωνία‐δήμο. Οι όποιες εκτελεστικές αρ‐ χές καλούνται απλώς να διαχειρισθούν περιοριστικά δίκην θεραπαινίδων τις πολιτικές του δήμου.

5 Περισσότερα στο Κοντογιώργης 2010.

106 ISSN:2241‐5106 Πάπυροι - Επιστημονικό Περιοδικό Papyri - Scientific Journal Δέλτοι Delti τόμος 4, 2015 volume 4, 2015 www.academy.edu.gr [email protected] Γνωσιολογία της Δημοκρατίας και Νεωτερικότητα. Το Διακύβευμα της Υπέρβασης του Δυτικοευρωπαϊκού Διαφωτισμού

Διευκρινίζεται τέλος ότι το αξίωμα της δημοκρατίας –«το μη άρχεσθαι υπό μηδενός»– δεν εξομοιώνει την πολιτεία αυτή με την αναρχία, καθόσον η τελευταία δεν συνιστά πολιτεία. Άλλωστε αυτή καθεαυτή η ύπαρξή της συναρτάται ευθέως με την προ‐ ή πρωτο‐ ανθρωποκεντρική εποχή του κράτους της πολιτικής κυριαρχίας.

4. Η δημοκρατία και οι μη δημοκρατικές πολιτείες Οι ολίγες αυτές επισημάνσεις σχετικά με τη δημοκρατική πολιτεία οροθετούν το θε‐ σμικό και αξιακό περιβάλλον της έναντι των άλλων ανθρωποκεντρικών πολιτειών. Αναφέρο‐ μαι συγκεκριμένα στην αντιπροσώπευση και όλως δευτερευόντως στην προ‐ αντιπροσωπευτική πολιτεία. Η δημοκρατία διακρίνεται ρητώς από την αντιπροσώπευση. Συναντώνται στο γεγονός ότι και οι δύο προϋποθέτουν τη συγκρότηση της κοινωνίας των πολιτών σε οργανικό θεσμό της πολιτείας, δηλαδή σε δήμο. Διαφέρουν όμως στο ότι η μεν δημοκρατία αποδίδει στην κοι‐ νωνία την καθολική πολιτική αρμοδιότητα, η δε αντιπροσώπευση μόνον την ιδιότητα του ε‐ ντολέα. Στη δημοκρατία οι αντιπροσωπευτικοί θεσμοί συγκροτούνται και λειτουργούν υπό το πρίσμα του θεράποντος υποκειμένου της πολιτείας, εν αντιθέσει προς την αντιπροσωπευ‐ τική πολιτεία, που την χαρακτηρίζει ο επιμερισμός της πολιτικής αρμοδιότητας μεταξύ εντο‐ λέα και εντολοδόχου. Η διαφορά δεν είναι απλώς μορφολογική, περιέχει τα στοιχεία μιας ση‐ μαίνουσας τυπολογικής αντίστιξης. Σε ό,τι αφορά στο προ‐αντιπροσωπευτικό πολιτικό σύστημα, εν προκειμένω εκείνο της νεωτερικότητας, διαπιστώνουμε πως δεν περιέχει κανένα από τα στοιχεία της αντιπρο‐ σώπευσης και καταφανώς ούτε της δημοκρατίας. Η κοινωνία προσλαμβάνεται ως ιδιώτης, δεν συγκροτεί θεσμική πολιτική κατηγορία δήμο ούτε και κατέχει την παραμικρή πολιτική αρμοδιότητα. Το κράτος δεν ενσαρκώνει απλώς την ολότητα του πολιτικού συστήματος. Οι‐ κειοποιείται επίσης την έννοια της κοινωνικής συλλογικότητας που αποδίδει εν προκειμένω το πρόσημο του έθνους, καθώς μόνο με τον τρόπο αυτόν νομιμοποιείται να ασκεί την πολι‐ τική κυριαρχία έναντι της κοινωνίας των πολιτών, δηλαδή συγχρόνως τις ιδιότητες του εντο‐ λοδόχου και του εντολέα. Από τα ανωτέρω συνάγεται ότι ο σκοπός της δημοκρατίας, η εμπραγμάτωση της κα‐ θολικής ιδίως δε της πολιτικής ελευθερίας δεν μπορεί να ικανοποιηθεί μέσω των δύο άλλων πολιτικών συστημάτων. Η μεν αντιπροσώπευση εμφανίζεται ως μια μεταβατική πολιτεία που γεφυρώνει την πρωτο‐ανθρωποκεντρική εποχή με εκείνη της ανθρωποκεντρικής ολο‐ κλήρωσης. Η δε προ‐αντιπροσώπευση καλείται να θεραπεύσει την απλώς ατομική ελευθερία και κατά μικρόν με την πάροδο του πρωτο‐αντιπροσωπευτικού χρόνου ορισμένα κοινωνικά και πολιτικά δικαιώματα τα οποία οριοθετούν εκτατικά το περιεχόμενό της. Κατά τούτο η νεότερη επιστήμη, εμμένοντας να ταξινομεί την πολιτεία της το κοινωνικο‐οικονομικό και το πολιτικό της σύστημα στις δημοκρατίες και μάλιστα να ισχυρίζεται ότι είναι συνάμα δημο‐ κρατικό και αντιπροσωπευτικό, τη στιγμή που αντιπροσώπευση και δημοκρατία αποτελούν δύο τυπολογικά διαφορετικές πολιτείες, συλλαμβάνεται απλώς ως γνωσιολογικά ελλιπής και οπωσδήποτε επιρρεπής σε ιδεολογικές προσημειώσεις της επιστήμης.

107 ISSN:2241‐5106 Πάπυροι - Επιστημονικό Περιοδικό Papyri - Scientific Journal Δέλτοι Delti τόμος 4, 2015 volume 4, 2015 www.academy.edu.gr [email protected] Γνωσιολογία της Δημοκρατίας και Νεωτερικότητα. Το Διακύβευμα της Υπέρβασης του Δυτικοευρωπαϊκού Διαφωτισμού

5. Ο χρόνος της δημοκρατίας Διαπιστώσαμε ήδη ότι η καθολική και ειδικότερα στο πλαίσιο αυτό η πολιτική ελευθε‐ ρία ανάγονται στην εποχή της ανθρωποκεντρικής ωριμότητας του κοινωνικού ανθρώπου. Παρατηρήσαμε επίσης ότι η τάξη της προσέλευσης του κοινωνικού ανθρώπου στην ελευθε‐ ρία είναι προδιαγεγραμμένη, υπό την έννοια ότι προηγείται εξ ορισμού η ατομική ελευθερία και ακολουθούν η κοινωνική και η πολιτική.6 Στο μέτρο που η τάξη των πολιτειών ακολουθεί όπως είδαμε το διατακτικό της ανά‐ πτυξης του σκοπού τους, εν προκειμένω της ελευθερίας, είναι προφανές ότι ο χρόνος της δη‐ μοκρατίας συμπίπτει με εκείνον της ανθρωποκεντρικής ωριμότητας, δηλαδή της καθολικής ελευθερίας. Δεν νοείται για παράδειγμα μια κοινωνία, προσερχόμενη για πρώτη φορά στον ανθρωποκεντρισμό, να υποστασιοποιηθεί κατά τον τρόπο της φάσης της ολοκλήρωσης, ό‐ πως ακριβώς και ένας έκαστος άνθρωπος δεν γίνεται να γεννηθεί ώριμος στην ηλικία των εξήντα και στη συνέχεια να οπισθοδρομεί στη βρεφική του ηλικία. Το αδιαμφισβήτητο αυτό γεγονός που συλλαμβάνεται δια γυμνού οφθαλμού σε ό,τι αφορά στο άτομο, είναι αντικειμε‐ νικά δύσκολο να γίνει αντιληπτό όταν πρόκειται για το κοινωνικό φαινόμενο, ιδίως στο περι‐ βάλλον του ανθρωποκεντρικού κοσμοσυστήματος, καθόσον το τελευταίο είναι μοναδικό, βι‐ ολογείται εφάπαξ ως τυπολογία, όχι κατ’ επανάληψη. Ώστε η αντικειμενική αδυναμία της σύγχρονης επιστήμης να συλλάβει τη βιολογία του κοινωνικού φαινομένου δεν υποδηλώνει ότι αυτή δεν συντρέχει ως φαινόμενο και ως εξελι‐ κτική συνιστώσα. Δεν είναι του παρόντος η κατάδυση στο μείζον αυτό διακύβευμα. Αρκεί ε‐ ντούτοις ως προς αυτό να επισημάνουμε ορισμένες από τις εκδηλώσεις του. Ο χρόνος μιας πολιτείας και, κατ'επέκταση, της δημοκρατίας, δεν συνδέεται με τις νοητικές ή γνωστικές λειτουργίες του ανθρώπου. Δεν αρκεί να συλλάβει κανείς την έννοια μιας συγκεκριμένης πο‐ λιτείας για να γίνει στη συνέχεια αντικείμενο εφαρμογής. Θα έλεγα ότι δεν γίνεται να συλ‐ ληφθεί η έννοια χωρίς να συντρέχουν οι προϋποθέσεις της ή έστω οι νοητικές συνθήκες που θα οδηγήσουν στην κεφαλαιοποίηση της ιστορικής εμπειρίας. Εάν για παράδειγμα επιχειρη‐ θεί η εφαρμογή της δημοκρατίας στις ημέρες μας, θα προκύψει ένα διαφορετικό αποτέλεσμα, όπως ακριβώς και στην περίπτωση της εξόδου της δυτικής Ευρώπης από το δεσποτικό κο‐ σμοσύστημα. Αυτό συνέβη επίσης με τη μετακένωση του φαινομένου των κοινών/πόλεων στην Εσπερία, κατά τη φάση της Αναγέννησης, όπου οι συνοδές πολιτείες τους προσαρμό‐ σθηκαν στην πρωτόλεια ανθρωποκεντρική τους συναγωγή. Ήταν η εποχή που οι ανθρωπο‐ κεντρικοί θύλακες της αναγεννώμενης Ευρώπης ήσαν πεπεισμένοι ότι θα ανασυνέστηναν την ανυπέρβλητη κατ’ αυτούς «Αρχαιότητα». Μέσα από το εγχείρημα αυτό παρήχθη το προσήκον στις νέες συνθήκες ανθρωποκεντρικό φαινόμενο: ο κλασικισμός στην αρχιτεκτονική, στη μουσική, στο θέατρο κ.λπ. Ανάλογα φαινόμενα απαντώνται στην οικονομία, στην πολιτική, στην κοινωνία εν γένει, όπου ωστόσο συνέτρεχε επίσης η διαφορά φάσης, που αντέτεινε τη νεωτερική Εσπερία σε εκείνη της προ‐σολώνειας πρωτο‐ανθρωποκεντρικής εποχής του ελ‐ ληνικού κόσμου. Έτσι εξηγείται γιατί όχι μόνο δεν απαντάται στις ημέρες μας η δημοκρατική πολιτεία, αλλά και η νεότερη επιστήμη αδυνατεί να τη συλλάβει. Με διαφορετική διατύπωση το διακύ‐ βευμα στις ημέρες μας κυμαίνεται ανάμεσα στην προ‐αντιπροσωπευτική πολιτεία και στην

6 Οίκοθεν νοείται ότι η τάξη αυτή της ανθρωποκεντρικής εξέλιξης αφορά στη δυναμική της εξελικτικής πρωτο‐ γένεσης του κοινωνικού ανθρώπου. Διότι, όταν η διαδικασία αυτή ολοκληρωθεί, η εναλλαγή πολιτειών υπακού‐ ει σε διαφορετικές αιτίες όπως και στις περιπτώσεις που περιθωριακές κοινωνικές οντότητες δεσποτικού τύ‐ που προσέρχονται στο ανθρωποκεντρικό γίγνεσθαι.

108 ISSN:2241‐5106 Πάπυροι - Επιστημονικό Περιοδικό Papyri - Scientific Journal Δέλτοι Delti τόμος 4, 2015 volume 4, 2015 www.academy.edu.gr [email protected] Γνωσιολογία της Δημοκρατίας και Νεωτερικότητα. Το Διακύβευμα της Υπέρβασης του Δυτικοευρωπαϊκού Διαφωτισμού

αυταρχική της παρέκκλιση. Δεν συντρέχει η δημοκρατία, όχι επειδή κάποιος τη στερεί από τις κοινωνίες, αλλά διότι δεν συντρέχει το αίτημα, δεν έχει καν εγγραφεί ως διακύβευμα στο αξι‐ ακό σύστημα του σύγχρονου ανθρώπου ούτε συντρέχουν οι πραγματολογικές προϋποθέσεις της. Ώστε σύμφωνα με τα ανωτέρω η τάξη της ωριμότητας και κατ’ επέκταση της εξέλιξης των πολιτειών στο ανθρωποκεντρικό κοσμοσύστημα είναι η ακόλουθη: προαντιπροσωπευ‐ τική, αντιπροσωπευτική, δημοκρατική. Η προ‐αντιπροσωπευτική, προόρισται να εξοικονο‐ μήσει την απλή ατομική ελευθερία, χωρίς να αγγίξει τη θεμέλια ιδιοκτησιακή βάση του οικο‐ νομικού και πολιτικού συστήματος. Το προσαρμόζει απλώς στις προδιαγραφές της πρωτο‐ ανθρωποκεντρικής αναγκαιότητας, περιορίζοντας επομένως την ιδιοκτησία στα πράγματα στα μέσα παραγωγής κ.λπ. όχι όμως και στον κοινωνικό άνθρωπο. Κατά τούτο η αποστέ‐ ρηση της κοινωνικής και της πολιτικής ελευθερίας καλείται να επιβεβαιωθεί στη βάση της σύμβασης, δηλαδή της συναίνεσης και κυριολεκτικά της ρητής παραίτησης από αυτή, όχι α‐ ναγκαστικώς. Η πρωτο‐ανθρωποκεντρική φάση θέτει τις θεμέλιες βάσεις της νέας εποχής, με την έννοια ότι σε αυτήν οικοδομούνται οι παράμετροι του οικείου κοσμοσυστήματος. Οπωσδήποτε η προ‐αντιπροσωπευτική πολιτεία είναι σαφώς μη αντιπροσωπευτική. Το προσωνύμιο που την ορίζει δηλώνει απλώς ότι εγγράφεται σε μια δυναμική που στο βά‐ θος του χρόνου θα οδηγήσει στην αντιπροσωπευτική πολιτεία. Όσο οι παράμετροι που κι‐ νούν την ανθρωποκεντρική εξέλιξη αναπτύσσονται, τόσο θα μορφοποιείται η αξίωση του κοινωνικού ανθρώπου να αποσυνδεθεί από τις δουλείες/εξαρτήσεις που συνάδουν με την ιδιοκτησία επί του συστήματος ή και να εισέλθει σε αυτό προκειμένου να το ελέγξει και να απελευθερωθεί από την εξάρτηση. Η αντιπροσωπευτική πολιτεία τοποθετείται στο μεταίχμιο μεταξύ της πρωτο‐ανθρωποκεντρικής και της ολοκληρωμένης ανθρωποκεντρικής εποχής. Ο κοινωνικός άνθρωπος μετέχει της κοινωνικής και της πολιτικής ελευθερίας, αλλά κατά μι‐ κρόν, έως ότου μεταβεί στην τελική φάση της ανθρωποκεντρικής ολοκλήρωσης, την καθολι‐ κή ελευθερία και συνακόλουθα τη δημοκρατία.7 Παρέλκει από τον σκοπό της προσέγγισης αυτής η ενασχόληση με την αιτιολογική βά‐ ση της δημοκρατίας. Αρκεί να υποσημειώσουμε ότι η σταδιακή είσοδος της κοινωνίας των πολιτών στην πολιτεία αντιστοιχεί αναλογικά στην αυτονόμηση της οικονομικής παραμέ‐ τρου από την κοινωνική επικράτεια και την ανάπτυξή της σε επίπεδο κοσμοσυστήματος. Ώ‐ στε η αρχική πολιτειακή αξίωση της κοινωνίας των πολιτών γεννάται ως αποτέλεσμα της ανάγκης να αντισταθμισθεί η αυξανόμενη πολιτική ισχύς της οικονομικής ιδιοκτησίας. Η ο‐ ποία ανάγκη συν τω χρόνω μεταλλάσσεται σε υπόθεση ελευθερίας, σε πρόταγμα βίου καθε‐ αυτό. Ανάλογα ισχύουν και για την κοινωνική ελευθερία, αν και η διαδρομή της θα συναρτη‐ θεί από τις ειδικότερες εκφάνσεις της σχέσης που δημιουργείται ανάμεσα στον φορέα της εργασίας και στον φορέα του συστήματος της οικονομίας. Και οι δύο όμως, η κοινωνική και η πολιτική ελευθερία, η ίδια η ανθρωποκεντρική πραγματικότητα στο σύνολό της, υπακούουν στην παράμετρο του επικοινωνιακού συστήματος. Στον γνωστό ανθρωποκεντρικό κόσμο το επικοινωνιακό σύστημα συναρτήθηκε θεμελιωδώς από την κοσμοσυστημική κλίμακα. Τη μι‐ κρή σε ό,τι αφορά ειδικότερα στο ελληνικό/ανθρωποκεντρικό κοσμοσύστημα, τη μεγάλη ό‐ σον αφορά στη μεγάλη κοσμοσυστημική κλίμακα του κράτους έθνους. Η εστίαση στην κλί‐ μακα συνομολογεί όντως ότι αυτή είναι σημαίνουσα μεν στο μέτρο που αποτελεί την προϋ‐

7 Στο παρόν πόνημα η γνωσιολογία της δημοκρατίας εξετάζεται αποκλειστικά στο περιβάλλον της κρατοκεντρι‐ κής φάσης. Παραλείπεται επομένως η φάση της μετα‐κρατοκεντρικής οικουμένης και συνακόλουθα η δημοκρα‐ τία στο πλαίσιο της κοσμόπολης/κοσμοκράτους.

109 ISSN:2241‐5106 Πάπυροι - Επιστημονικό Περιοδικό Papyri - Scientific Journal Δέλτοι Delti τόμος 4, 2015 volume 4, 2015 www.academy.edu.gr [email protected] Γνωσιολογία της Δημοκρατίας και Νεωτερικότητα. Το Διακύβευμα της Υπέρβασης του Δυτικοευρωπαϊκού Διαφωτισμού

πόθεση για να εγγραφεί το κοινωνικό γεγονός στο ανθρωποκεντρικό γίγνεσθαι, όχι όμως αποκλειστική. Χωρίς να υπεισέλθω στην τεκμηρίωση της επισήμανσης, θα επικαλεσθώ το ελληνικό παράδειγμα. Η κλίμακα ήταν σταθερά η ίδια από τους κρητομυκηναϊκούς χρόνους έως την κλασική εποχή. Όμως η δημοκρατία εισήλθε στην ανθρωποκεντρική τροχιά της πό‐ λης μόλις τον 5ο αιώνα, όταν δηλαδή οι παράμετροι που υποστασιοποιούν και κινούν το αν‐ θρωποκεντρικό γίγνεσθαι στην ιστορία, είχαν ωριμάσει.8 Κατά τον ίδιο λόγο η απουσία της δημοκρατίας όσο και της αντιπροσώπευσης στην εποχή μας δεν οφείλεται στην μεγάλη κο‐ σμοσυστημική κλίμακα, αλλά στο πρωτο‐ανθρωποκεντρικό στάδιο που διέρχεται κατ’ αυτάς ο κοινωνικός άνθρωπος.

5. Η εποχή της νεωτερικότητας και η προοπτική της δημοκρατίας Από τα ανωτέρω ολίγα προκύπτει ως κατάδηλον ότι η εποχή μας διάγει την πρωτο‐ ανθρωποκεντρική φάση του ανθρωποκεντρικού κοσμοσυστήματος και ως εκ τούτου τις συνθήκες της προ‐αντιπροσωπευτικής πολιτείας. Εξ ου και ο ισχυρισμός της νεότερης επι‐ στήμης ότι ο κόσμος της εποχής μας μετέβη απευθείας από τη δεσποτική περίοδο σε εκείνη της ανθρωποκεντρικής ωριμότητας, δηλαδή της δημοκρατίας, καταρρίπτεται ως ανυπόστα‐ τος. Υπό το πρίσμα αυτό η εμμονή της νεότερης επιστήμης να τυπολογεί μια παραδειγματικά πρωτο‐ανθρωποκεντρική πολιτεία, όπως το πολιτικό της σύστημα, στη δημοκρατία, εγγρά‐ φεται κατ’ αρχήν στη γενικότερη αδυναμία της να διακρίνει μεταξύ της κοσμοσυστημικής κλίμακας, η οποία είναι προφανώς ανώτερη και γι’ αυτό δημιουργός παραμέτρων της επι‐ κοινωνιακής και της οικονομικής μεταξύ άλλων που ξεπερνούν εξ αποστάσεως εκείνες της μικρής κλίμακας, και του ανθρωποκεντρικού σταδίου το οποίο διέρχεται. Έτσι εξηγείται ότι η έννοια της νεωτερικότητας, η οποία όφειλε να ορίζει τη νεότερη ανθρωποκεντρική εποχή, απέληξε να δηλώνει μια καθαρά ιδεολογική επιλογή, η οποία τοποθετεί τον νεότερο κόσμο στην κλίμακα της ανθρωποκεντρικής ολοκλήρωσης και επέκεινα σε μέτρο αξιολόγησης του παρελθόντος και στο εξελικτικό «τέλος» του ανθρωποκεντρικού γίγνεσθαι. Ο συνδυασμός ακριβώς αυτός της ιδεολογικής προσημείωσης της εποχής μας με το γνωσιολογικό έλλειμμα που είναι καταφανές εξηγεί επίσης γιατί από τη σύγχρονη επιστήμη απουσιάζει πλήρως η προοπτική της εξέλιξης. Όχι μόνο ως φάση του εν γένει ανθρωποκεντρικού γίγνεσθαι, αλλά και ως προβληματική για την επίλυση των προβλημάτων που επισυμβαίνουν στις ημέρες μας. Εξ ου και διδάσκει ότι οι λύσεις στα προβλήματα που ανακύπτουν πρέπει να αναζητηθούν «νομοτελειακά» εντός του παρόντος συστήματος και όχι πέραν αυτού. Το γεγονός αυτό γίνε‐ ται εμφανές, εάν συνεκτιμήσει κανείς την εμμονή της νεωτερικότητας να αγνοεί τον χαρα‐ κτήρα των εξελίξεων που προέκυψαν κατά μικρόν και έκαμαν εμφανή την παρουσία τους από τη δεκαετία του 1980, με την πλανητική ανάπτυξη των θεμελίων παραμέτρων του αν‐ θρωποκεντρικού κοσμοσυστήματος και συνακόλουθα τη ριζική ανατροπή της ισορροπίας μεταξύ της κοινωνίας, της οικονομίας και της πολιτικής. Το ερώτημα επομένως επανέρχεται στην πηγή της προβληματικής μας. Πρέπει άραγε να συνομολογήσουμε ότι η μετάβαση στην μεγάλη κοσμοσυστημική κλίμακα προσημειώνει αρνητικά την προοπτική της μετάβασης στη δημοκρατία; Η απάντηση σύμφωνα με τη νεω‐

8 Και οι Προέλληνες όπως και ορισμένοι ασιατικοί λαοί διέθεταν πόλεις, όμως η ανθρωποκεντρική τους εξέλιξη και περαιτέρω η δημοκρατία εγγράφεται ως φαινόμενο στην τροχιά του ελληνικού κόσμου, στο μέτρο δηλαδή που οι κοινωνίες των πόλεων ενεγράφησαν σε μια καθαρά κοσμοσυστημική τροχιά. Το ζήτημα της κλίμακας το διαπραγματεύεται διεξοδικά ο Αριστοτέλης. Όπως όμως προκύπτει οι Έλληνες είχαν πλήρη συνείδηση της ση‐ μασίας της για την ανθρωποκεντρική υποστασιοποίηση και εξέλιξη των κοινωνικού ανθρώπου.

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τερική επιστήμη είναι «ναι», πολλώ μάλλον αφού για την τεκμηρίωσή της προβάλλει το επι‐ χείρημα όχι μόνο της κλίμακας και της πολυπλοκότητας αλλά και του προ‐νεωτερικού χαρα‐ κτήρα της «ελληνικής» δημοκρατίας. Στον αντίποδα η κοσμοσυστημική γνωσιολογία διδάσκει ότι η εποχή μας έχει εισέλθει σε μια κοσμοσυστημικά διατεταγμένη ανθρωποκεντρική τροχιά η οποία αυτή καθεαυτή προδικάζει την εξελικτική της σημειολογία. Η διαφορά κλίμακας σε σχέση με την ανθρωπο‐ κεντρική της μήτρα, το ελληνικό κοσμοσύστημα, δεν ακυρώνει το διακύβευμά της. Δηλώνει απλώς ότι στην πορεία προς την ολοκλήρωση θα κληθεί να επιζητήσει διαφορετικές λύσεις, δηλαδή μέσα τελολογικής εμπραγμάτωσης. Υπό το πρίσμα αυτό το γεγονός ότι η εποχή μας ταξινομείται στην πρωτοανθρωποκε‐ ντρική φάση του κοινωνικού γίγνεσθαι, αιτιολογεί προδήλως τον προ‐αντιπροσωπευτικό χαρακτήρα του πολιτεύματος καθώς και τη μη εδρασμένη στην αρχή της κοινωνικής ελευθε‐ ρίας συγκρότηση του οικονομικού συστήματος, δηλαδή της σχέσης του φορέα της εργασίας με αυτό. Η πραγματικότητα αυτή, ιδίως όμως οι εξελίξεις που καταγράφονται από τη δεκαε‐ τία του 1980, προϊδεάζουν για την αρχή μιας νέας περιόδου κατά την οποία οι θεμέλιες αν‐ θρωποκεντρικές παράμετροι η οικονομία, η επικοινωνία κ.λπ. έχουν ήδη προσημειωθεί στο μέλλον, με την ανάπτυξή τους πέραν του κράτους, στο επίπεδο του συνόλου, πλανητικού ε‐ φεξής κοσμοσυστήματος. Το γεγονός ότι το οικονομικό, κοινωνικό και πολιτικό σύστημα εξακολουθεί να παραμένει δέσμιο στο παρελθόν της εποχής του Διαφωτισμού δεν αναιρεί τη δυναμική του φαινομένου. Απλώς επιβεβαιώνει την ακολουθία της μεθάρμοσης του ανθρω‐ ποκεντρικού περιβάλλοντος καθ’ οδόν προς την ολοκλήρωσή του με γνώμονα τους συσχετι‐ σμούς. Τη γνωστική μαρτυρία της εξέλιξης αυτής μπορούμε να την αντλήσουμε από το ήδη συντελεσθέν ελληνικό ανθρωποκεντρικό παράδειγμα. Η αναλογία στη σύγκριση στην οποία μας καλεί η διαφορά κοσμοσυστημικής κλίμακας, μας οδηγεί εντέλει στη διαπίστωση ότι η προϊούσα ανάπτυξη των ανθρωποκεντρικών παραμέτρων οδηγεί τις κοινωνίες να αξιώσουν την είσοδό τους στην πολιτεία προκειμένου να αντισταθμίσουν την κοινωνικο‐οικονομική και πολιτική τους αδυναμία. Συγχρόνως όμως αναδεικνύεται η βάση της αναλογίας. Για πα‐ ράδειγμα η σύγκριση της οικονομικής παραμέτρου της μεγάλης έναντι της μικρής κοσμοσυ‐ στημικής κλίμακας, οφείλει να γίνει όχι με ποσοτικούς όρους, όπως πράττει η νεωτερική επι‐ στήμη λόγου χάρη διακρίνοντας μεταξύ «βιομηχανικής» και «βιοτεχνικής» οικονομίας, αλλά υπό το πρίσμα του αποτελέσματος που αυτή παράγει στο οικείο κοινωνικό περιβάλλον. Θα διαπιστώσουμε τότε ότι η οικονομία της εποχής μας παράγει ένα κοινωνικο‐οικονομικό και πολιτικό αποτέλεσμα αντίστοιχο με εκείνο της εγγύς στον Σόλωνα εποχής. Δεν αγγίζει όμως ούτε τη σολώνεια αντιπροσωπευτική πολιτεία ούτε προφανώς τη δημοκρατία. Όμοιες επι‐ σημάνσεις θα είχε να αναφέρει κανείς σε ό,τι αφορά στην επικοινωνιακή παράμετρο. Από τα ανωτέρω προκύπτει ότι διατυπώσεις όπως άμεση και έμμεση δημοκρατία, α‐ ντιπροσωπευτική δημοκρατία, συμμετοχική δημοκρατία και άλλες, περιέχουν έντονο το ιδεο‐ λογικό ζητούμενο και το γνωσιολογικό έλλειμμα της νεωτερικότητας, δεν αποδίδουν όμως από μόνες τους την πραγματική φύση της πολιτείας της εποχής μας. Ομοίως και η ρητή απο‐ σιώπηση του γεγονότος ότι η κοινωνική και η πολιτική πτυχή της ελευθερίας ορίζεται υπό το πρίσμα του ετερονομικού δικαιώματος και όχι της αυτονομίας. Από την άποψη αυτή η ανάγκη να απαλλαγεί η νεότερη επιστήμη από τις ιδεολογικές αγκυλώσεις της εποχής της μετάβασης και εν προκειμένω του Διαφωτισμού, ώστε να απο‐ σείσει τις βεβαιότητές της και να εισέλθει στο στάδιο της συγκρότησης μιας νέας γνωσιολο‐ γίας με κοσμοσυστημική αξίωση, αποδεικνύεται επείγουσα. Το ζήτημα αυτό αφορά τόσο στις

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έννοιες, στην τυπολογία και στον χρόνο του κοινωνικού γεγονότος όσο και στον αναστοχα‐ σμό της κοσμοϊστορίας. Άλλωστε ο αναστοχασμός αυτός της κοσμοϊστορίας μέσα από την κοσμοσυστημική είδωση του κοινωνικού ανθρώπου εκτιμούμε ότι θα οδηγήσει στην ανά‐ κτηση του παρελθόντος εν είδει παραδείγματος, έτσι ώστε η αποτίμησή του να αποφέρει στην επιστήμη ανεκτίμητες πληροφορίες στο εγχείρημα της συγκρότησης μιας νέας καθολι‐ κής, δηλαδή κοσμοσυστημικής ως προς το διακύβευμά της, γνωσιολογίας.

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Papyri - Scientific Journal Delti volume 4, 2015

Gnoseology of Democracy and Modernity. The Issue at Sake of the Transcendence of the Western European Enlightenment

GΕORGΕ CONTOGΕORGIS, Professor of Pοlitical Science, former Rector of Panteion University. Hellas Email: [email protected]

Θεσσαλονίκη 2015 – Thessaloniki 2015 ISSN:2241‐5106

Πάπυροι - Επιστημονικό Περιοδικό Papyri - Scientific Journal Δέλτοι Delti τόμος 4, 2015 volume 4, 2015 www.academy.edu.gr [email protected] Gnoseology of Democracy and Modernity. The Issue at Sake of the Transcendence of the Western European Enlightenment

Gnoseology of Democracy and Modernity. The Issue at Sake of the Transcendence of the Western European Enlightenment1

GEORGE CONTOGEORGIS

The transition of the Western World from the despotic to the anthropocentric cos‐ mosystem, combined with the mutation of the aforementioned, from the small to the large scale, brought the issue of democracy imperatively at the foreground. But, at the same time, democracy, as a concept, acquired an unprecedented ambiguity, as a result of its ideological prenotation and of the gnoseological deficit of modern science. In the following pages I shall try to decode this adventure of democracy, and to verge on this concept in the light of the cosmosystemic gnoseology: firstly, I shall ascertain the prob‐ lematic relation between modernity and the gnoseology of democracy. Secondly, I shall em‐ phasize its aim. Thirdly, I shall outline its system, which is intended to realize its aim. Fourth‐ ly, I shall record the the counterpoint of democracy, as opposed to the other states pertaining to the anthropocentric cosmosystem, and finally I shall point out the time and the space the when and the where of democracy in the anthropocentric “biology”.2

1. The gnoseological shallowness and the proto‐anthropocentric nature of modernity The fundamental question, which has to be confronted by our age according to my opinion, is how to constitute a system of knowledge which shall not plainly function for stat‐ ing the obvious, just capturing the phenomena under observation, or even preciding the pre‐ sent as a global value, and its realities as measure, that is as a standard for the understanding or the interpretation of the past, and furthermore, it shall not remain bound to the view that the future shall be related to the experienced cosmosystemic order. Gnoseology has to propose a universal system of knowledge, which derives its material from the totality of cosmohistory, drills its material from the whole corpus of cosmohistory, ascribes the phenomena in terms of genera, of their typology, and of their evolutionary be‐ coming, according to the cosmosystemic biology of the social man. Cosmosystemic gnoseology aspires to asnwer to this undertaking.3

1 “Διάλογος”, 4/2014, pp. 227‐247. 2 This paper is based on the G. Contogeorgis, Greek cosmosystem, Sideris Publications, Athens 2006 in Greek· Democracy as freedom. Democracy and representation, Patakis Publications, Athens 2007 in Greek· and Eco‐ nomic systems and freedom, Sideris Publications, Athens, 2010 in Greek. 3 The cosmosystemic gnoseology introduces the distinction between cosmohistory and cosmosystemic history, in order to approach the social phenomenon according to the class of its constitution, that is of its individuality, and of its evolutionary semiology. The concept of the cosmosystem defines a set of societies with common fundamental parameters, institutional, ideological, and value defining concepts, which comprise a whole moving within historical time under the terms of inner self-sufficiency and of evolutionary coherence. We distinguish between the existences of two cosmosystemic paradigms: the despotic and the anthropocentric. The

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Within the mentioned framework we shall concentrate specifically on the gnoseologi‐ cal issue, which is reduced to the concept of democracy, in order, firstly to ascertain if this civ‐ il imperative, and concomitantly the politic system processed by modernity, by the western european Renaissance and by Enlightenment, and constitutes the fundamental acceptance in our days, is recorded within democracy. If we agree that this is indeed taxinomized under the democratic states, something essentially accepted by all the thinkers of modern science and by the leading class, this means that there is no need to continue the dialog, but to act accord‐ ing to the current teaching: to take as a fact that the current system is democracy, and to con‐ tinue by describing its constitutions. The parliament, the government, the parties, the groups of interest, the voiting rights, the freedom of speech, and all the other various institutions, values and practices we experience in our everyday life. On the other hand, it is evident that this choice is a scientific deadlock, since it bypasses the desideratum, the gnoseology of the phenomenon, in order to taxinomize by decision into democracy the state experienced by modernity, and even to evaluate it as superior to the de‐ mocracy of the City‐State, which produced this concept. A further result of this choice is the assertion that any objection to the current civil reality is subject to collabotation to authoritar‐ ianism, to the authoritative political system. One has to choose among the one or the other. This approach obviously does not consider that our age is recorded typologically in a phase, which is based on the axiom of uniform thought and action, of the one and unique pro‐ posal for a state, independently of its morphological diferentiations. I refer to the proto‐ anthropocentric period of the new world, which was brought to the surface by its exit from feudalism/despotism. However, modernity allows to reveal that its paradigm is unique and essentially irrevocable, according to the concept of the anthropocentric integration, therefore the perspective of evolution does not concur, of the mutation of the present towards a typo‐ logically different state. It is ready to accept the possibility of some morphological adapta‐ tions, which, on the other hand, shall not change the essence of modern democracy. This attitude is ideologically conservative and gnoseologically unsustainable, since it denies the evolutionary nature of the social man, and specifically of the anthropocentric socie‐ ty. This approach of the evolutionary becoming of the social man is yet combined with the fact that modernity has not succeeded up to our age to develop any reliable problematics about the evolution for exceeding the statutory foundations of the present. This becomes evident when we approach the concepts concordant with the social man, and hereto to these escorting the concept of democracy, such as freedom, equality, justice, the civil rights, the right of partic‐ ipation in the state, etc. All these concepts, as exactly the concept of democracy, have a bind‐ ing, concrete content and essentially describe the realities experienced by the world in our days, which are projected as a global gnoseological issue at stake. In order to understand the cause of this phenomenon we have to return to the period of the entrance of the western european feudal world into modernity. The contact of this peri‐ od with the concept of democracy did not originate from the condition that is of reality, in or‐

despotic produces societies of “subjects” under the property of someone else, the anthropocentric societies signed by freedom. The anthropocentric cosmosystem is distinguished into two major periods: the one of the small scale, when the hellenism is being embodied, and to the other of the large scale, which is rendered by mod‐ ern age. The anthropocentric cosmosystem of small scale has to demonstrate an integrated evolutionary course, something essential for the study of the social phenomenon, whereas the age of the large cosmosystemic scale is typologised simply as proto‐anthropocentric. More about this issue in the works of the author, especially in Con‐ togeorgis 2006.

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der for the thinkers to draw from reality its content, and to be led sequentially to a definition describing the experienced state. The modern world discovered democracy, was informed about its existence, along the way towards the anthropocentric transition, through the read‐ ings of the hellenic literature. Precisely because of this, the thinkers could not understand the issue at stake, conceive the content of its institutional armory, or being capable to taking into account its time of ap‐ pearance. On the other hand, simultaneously with the non‐occurring assistance of the intellec‐ tual prerequisites for the understanding the concept of democracy, the conditions for its ac‐ ceptance as a pragmatological issue at stake, and for its implementation, did also not concur. Indeed, the priorities of the epoch of transition from the despotic to the anthropocentric sys‐ tem raised unequivocally the issue of the freedom of the individual that is of the abdication of the bonds of the feudal society upon the individual. However, this freedom does not object to the belonging of the state on the property of someone else‐ such as in the authoritative state, or the nation state, ‐ obviously not to the belonging of the system of economy to the property, differentiated by society or its partial factors of the entrepreneur, or of the investor, or of the state. The case of the thinkers of Enlightenment is superbly characteristic of the fact that through their weakness to approach the essence, the institutions and the time of democracy, as well as of the related concepts, such as freedom, arrived to the construction of the ideology of modernity, which was comprised by the “substantiation» of the democratic taxinomy of the state they intended, for the period after the overthrow of despotism. In their environment it was natural for the thinking man of the age of transition to depart from the initial admiration of “antiquity” and, within this context, of democracy, in order to provide answers to the burn‐ ing issues he had to confront: how to constitute, the new to him, anthropocentric society, with only sign the individual freedom· how to harmonize the socio‐economic and political system in virtue of belonging to property within the environment of the anthropocentric society· last‐ ly, how to legitimate the rejection of democracy of the state, that is of the city‐state, but also of the city/public of that age‐, without ascribing to the incubating political morphome the accu‐ sation of oligarchy· being its aim, and many other issues. Through complicated noetic processes and institutional inventions, which dominate even in our days the, anyway inevitable, civil economic, social and political system of the first post‐feudal age of the democracies was finally achieved. On the other hand, and in the light of the cosmosystemic gnoseology, this pertains paradigmatically to the strict oligarchical states, having as its sign the elected monarchy. However, what is very interesting in our days is that the dialog about democracy, and about the relevant concepts, is still pursued according to the terms of Enlightenment. Indeed, when we realize by naked eye that everything occurring in our days connote that we experi‐ ence not an internal crisis of the proto‐anthropocentric period, but a phase change. This ne‐ cessitates the change of the value paradigm and of the systemic paradigm.

2. The aim of democracy Democracy is not an objective in itself. It is the state which is called to realize the scope of the anthropocentric society, which is of freedom. Hereto, the freedom of democracy covers the whole of the social life of man. Stating this schematically, we would say that democracy is called to institutionalize the social domain in such a manner, so that the freedom of its mem‐

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bers, in the fields of the atomic/personal, socio‐economic and political life, is being material‐ ized. This assumption necessitates the clarification of a series of issues: firstly, the concept of freedom is defined as autonomy, that is, it enrolls in its content the self‐defining premise of the individual as referring to its personal or private life, as well as within the socio‐political sphere. The principle of autonomy is being ascribed with the provision «μη άρχεσθαι υπό μη‐ δενός» do not be governed by anybody. The individual freedom introduces the issue of au‐ tonomy into the personal life of each and every member in society. Social freedom refers to the fields of social life, where the individual enters into contracts, such as with the economic sub‐ systems. Political freedom is deduced to the place of the individual member of the soci‐ ety to the whole that is to the relation between society and politics. So, the general individual, social, political freedom suggests that the state as a whole ‐ the economic, social and political system‐ is obliged to ensure autonomy, that is the non‐ dependence of the individual by anyone, regarding all the fields of the sphere of knowledge. In order for this to be achieved, the individual has either to participate alike to the administra‐ tion of the system, or not to be subject to their dependence. The choice of the one or of the other solution depends essentially on the anthropocentric time4 . This means, for example in the field of economy that the system fends so that it does not enroll the citizen into the semi‐ ology of the dependence of the body of labor, or, in another version, to determine him as a partner within the system. In the field of politics freedom presupposes the embodiment of the whole of the system by the body of the society of citizens, instead of the state. This detection raises the issue of the place of property in democracy. Indeed, democra‐ cy does not oppose property. On the contrary. However, it distinguishes between individual properties; in the cases this does not imply the creation of contracts with someone else, here‐ to with the citizen, and the property, which is amenable to cancel freedom. The most charac‐ teristic of these contracts refer to the fields of the economic and political system. Another entirely ideological parameter featured by modernity, in order to prove by it the experience of the global freedom, concerns the concept of consent. Consent was featured as argument, obviously in order to dispel the fact that the preservation, within the conditions of the individual anthropocentrism, of the earlier proprietorially ordered status in their sys‐ tems, it functioned abjuratory to the social and political freedom. However, it is being ne‐ glected that consent, in this case, is the contributor of legalization, but not of freedom. The consenting person does not remain free just because he accepts its submission to a status of dependence that is of heteronomy. In order to cure completely this assertion, freedom within the social and the political field shall be defined in accordance with the concept of right instead of autonomy. This fact is not only inconsistent with the approach of the individual freedom, which is conducted in the light of autonomy. It raises the right as superior to freedom, just as it delimits extensively the field of the individual freedom or the frame of its protection, where the individual lacks of freedom. Typical examples are, in our times, the work area, or the relation between society and politics. So, modernity, by defining the social and the political freedom in terms of right, avoids stipulating their non‐existence, in order to enroll in its system the democratic states. An inevitable conclusion of this ideological palinode is the assertion of the science of modernity, that the individual freedom is incompatible with political freedom the homolo‐

4 More in Contogeorgis 2007.

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gous equality, etc., which on the other hand is identified with the alleged body of collegiality, that is of the state/system. On the very opposite, the cosmosystemic gnoseology suggests that freedom is undivided, and its fields of realization are added cumulatively, according to the fol‐ lowing series: individual, social, political freedom. Stating this alternatively, it is not conceiva‐ ble that someone pursuits firstly the political freedom and then the individual freedom, or to be politically free without being individually sovereign. The biology of the societies follows in respect to this a pramatological and evolutionary logic, as exactly the biology of each and eve‐ ry person. The difference lies in the fact that, on the one hand the evolutionary biology of each man can be easily perceived, and on the other hand that social biology presupposes other pro‐ cesses of comprehension, which modern science stays away of their decoding by far. The inability of modern science to approach democracy, and in extension, its aim, led to the declaration of its totalitarian character. On the other hand, this assertion does not con‐ sider the fact that totalitarianism, as well as absolutism and authoritarianism, asserts the ex‐ istence of a concrete differentiation between the holder of a global political responsibility and its social subject that is the mutation of the former into a politically dominant power. In de‐ mocracy the subject of political dominance ‐the society of the citizens‐ is absent, because the political freedom eliminates the relationship between the ordinate and the subordinate, since the political system is included entirely within the society of the citizens. In conclusion, the aim of democracy refers to global freedom that is cumulatively to the individual social and political freedom. The global freedom of any form is being delimited in the light of the autonomy of the members of the social body within the individual, socio‐ economic and political field.

3. The state or the social‐economic and political system of democracy The aim of the general freedom can be achieved only within a democratic state. This state is called to realize the field of freedom beyond the field of the individual, within the fields of the economo‐social and of the political system. The individual existentialization of man can be complemented also within an institutional system that accepts the belonging of the system in the differentiated property, and thus escapes from the society of the citizens. It is enough for the holder of the system to take into account to its polices the established right of the individual freedom, that is of the constitutional, of the value, and of other welfares, ensuring it, and a redistribution of wealth capable of supporting it. In reality, this issue at stake is under the condition of the preservation of a sensitive equilibrium between the society of the citizens and the body of the system, whereas the poli‐ cies of the latter are being embodied by relationships of power, which are developed within the frame of social dynamics. Society remains a private, and encounters, or is in discourse, with the body of the system, exceeding it, on a extra‐institutional basis. In order for this social freedom to be achievable, a system has to be invented, which shall not place in an authoritarian conventional or not dependence the individual‐member of society. How can this be accomplished? As regards, for instance, the economic field, we can suppose two possibilities: according to the first, the individual disconnects from the process of production, or acquires its own proprietorial surface· according to the second; it can enter into the system as its component. The more comprehensive pursuit with this issue is unneces‐ sary, since it refers to a dialogue, for which modern science is not prepared. In that case, it is enough to recall the Greek anthropocentric paradigm of the City‐State, just to make a predis‐

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position: in the state‐centered epoch of democracy the resolution of the issue of social free‐ dom was accomplished by the disposal of the citizen from the economic process the case of the leisure society. In the ecumenical phase of the anthropocentric cosmosystem social free‐ dom was accomplished by the corporate organization of the economic system.5 The political freedom, from its side, can be achieved by one and only way: by the em‐ bodiment of the political system by the body of the society of the citizens. In order for this to happen two things are required. The constitution of the society to demos, that is to the organic component of the political system, and, at the same time, the receipt of the global political ju‐ risdiction to demos. Because only by the global embodiment of the state by society, the indi‐ vidual/citizen is being released from the political custody, and, in every case, from the any “contracts” of dependence. By this way the transition from the state of the politically dominant power to the non‐ authoritative ordered global political responsibility of the society‐demos is being realized. From this social collegiality, which incorporates and operates the state its holders that is the nation of the state to the social collegiality, which is defined as the tautological equivalent of the society of demos the nation of society. The disclaim of the division of the politicians‐and, obviously, as regards the social free‐ dom, of the social projects‐ is the prerequisite for the abolishment of authoritarian heterono‐ my. This indicates that the invocation, and indeed the application of this principle, is not sub‐ ject to the principle of the other authority, which is invoked by the oligarchic ideology, of the so called complexity, but is related to the degree of the anthropocentric integration of the so‐ cial man. The whole of the institutional environment of democracy is contained unaltered within the society‐demos. The any executive authorities are just called to operate restrictive‐ ly, as if they were the handmaids, the polices of demos. Lastly, it is clarified that the axiom of democracy –«το μη άρχεσθαι υπό μηδενός» do not be governed by anybody– does not equates this state with anarchy, since the latter does not comprise a state. Besides, its very existence is immediately related to the pre‐ or proto‐ anthropocentric age of the state of political dominance.

4. Democracy and the non‐democratic states These few notes regarding the democratic state establish the conditions of its institu‐ tional and of its value system versus the other anthropocentric states. I refer particularly to the representation, and fully incidentally to the pre‐representional state. Democracy is distinguished explicitly by representation. They both meet because of the fact that both of them presuppose the constitution of the society of citizens into an organic in‐ stitution of the state that is to demos. But they differ, since on the one hand this attributes to society the global political responsibility, and on the other hand, representation attributes on‐ ly the property of the contractor. In democracy the representative institutions function in the light of the treating subject of the state, in contrary to the representative state, which is char‐ acterized by the epimerization of the political responsibility between the agent and the inter‐ mediary. This difference is not just morphological, it contains the elements of a signifying ty‐ pological conterpoint.

5 More, in Contogeorgis 2010.

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As regards the pre‐representative political system, hereto this of modernity, we ascer‐ tain that it does not contain any of the elements of representation, and evidently any of de‐ mocracy. Society is being conceived as a private citizen, it does not constute an institutional political category demos, nor does it possess the slightest political responsibility. The state does not embody just the whole of the political system. It also annexes the concept of social collegiality which is, in this case, attributed to the sign of the nation, since, only in this way it can sanction for exercising the political dominance on the society of the citizens, that is, simul‐ taneously, the properties of the agent and of the principal. By the abovementioned it can be inferred that the aim of democracy, the embodiment of the global, and especially of the political freedom, cannot be satisfied by the other two polit‐ ical systems. On the one hand, the representation appears as a transitory state which bridges the proto‐anthropocentric age with the age of the anthropocentric integration. In particular, the proto‐representation is just called to cure the individual freedom, and by small steps, with the passage of the proto‐representational time, some social and political rights which delimit extensionally its content. Because of this, modern science, by persisting to taxinomize its state its socio‐economic and political system to the democracies, and indeed, to ascertain that it is at the same time democratic and representative, where the representation and democracy constitute simultaneously two typologically different states, is being conceived just as gnoseo‐ logically deficient, and, by all means, prone to ideological prenotations of science.

5. The time of democracy We have already ascertained that the global, and especially within this frame, the polit‐ ical freedom are being deduced to the age of the anthropocentric maturity of the social man. We have also noted that the order of the attendance of the social man at freedom is prede‐ scribed, that is, it precedes, by definition, the individual freedom, and then the social freedom and the political freedom follow.6 As we have seen, insofar as the order of the states follows the operative part of the growth of their aim, hereto of freedom, it is obvious that the time of democracy coincides with the one of anthropocentric maturity, that is of global freedom. For instance, it is inconceivable that a society, entering for the first time into anthropocentrism, existentializes towards its way to the phase of integration, as exactly each and every man cannot be born as a mature man in the age of sixty, and regressing to its infant age. This indisputable fact, seen with the naked eye, as refers to the individual, is generally difficult to be perceived when it comes about the social phenomenon, especially within the environment of the anthropocentric cos‐ mosystem, since the latter is unique; it is biologized once as a typology, and not serially. So, the objective weakness of modern science for conceiving the biology of the social phenomenon, does not suggest that this process does not concur as a phenomen and as an evolutionary component. For the time being, we can overlook the submergence into this ma‐ jor issue at stake. However, it is enough to point out some related manifestations. The time of a state, and by extension, of democracy, is not connected to the noetic or gnoseologic func‐

6 However, it is conceived that the order of this anthropocentric evolution refers to the dynamics of the evolu‐ tionary protogenesis of the social man. Since, when this process shall be integrated, the interchange of states obeys on different causes, as well as in the cases where social entities of despotic type enter into the anthropo‐ centric becoming.

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tions of man. It is not enough for someone to grasp the concept of a particular state, in order for this to be implemented subsequently. I would say that the concept cannot be grasped without the concurrence of the necessary conditions, or, at least, of the noetic conditions lead‐ ing to the capitalization of the historical experience. For instance, if the implementation of democracy is being attempted in our epoch, a different result shall emerge, as this exactly oc‐ curred in the case of the exit of Western Europe from the despotic cosmosystem. This also oc‐ curred during the transfer of the phenomenon of the commons/cities in Western Europe dur‐ ing the phase of Renaissance, where the escorting states adapted to their unprocessed an‐ thropocentric synagoge. Those were the days when the anthropocentric enclaves of the fledg‐ gling Europe were convinced that they would reconstitute the incomparable to them “Antiqui‐ ty”. Through this attempt the appropriate to the new conditions anthropocentric phenomenon was produced: the classicism in architecture, in music, in theater, etc. Analogous phenomena are met in economy, in politics, and generally in society, but because of lag in phase, the mod‐ ern Western World was confronted to the pre‐solonic proto‐anthropocentric age of the hel‐ lenic world. In such a way, we can explain not only the non‐appearance of the democratic state in our days, but also the reason of why modern science cannot conceive it. Stating it differently, the issue at stake in our days ranges between the pre‐representative state and its authoritari‐ an deviation. Democracy does not concur, not because somebody deprives it from the socie‐ ties, but because the demand does not concur, it is not even recorded as an issue at stake within the value system of the modern man, and even its pragmatological prerequisites also do not concur. So that, by the abovementioned, the order of maturity, and in extension of the evolu‐ tion of the states in the anthropocentric cosmosystem is the following: pre‐representative, representative, democratic. The pre‐representative is intended to conserve the simple indi‐ vidual freedom, without affecting the fundamental proprietorial basis of the economic and political system. It just adapts it to the prescriptions of the proto‐anthropocentric necessity, thus confining the property to things the means of production, etc., but not to the social man. Thus, the debarment of social and political freedom is called to be confirmed on the basis of contract that is of consent, and literally, not necessarily, of the explicit resignation from it. The proto‐anthropocentric phase establishes the fundamental foundations of the new epoch, in the sense that, within this phase the parameters of the familiar cosmosystem are being de‐ veloped. In any case, the pre‐representative state is clearly non representative. The alias which defines it just declares that this is recorded in a dynamics, which, in depth of time, shall lead to the representative state. As much as the parameters driving the anthropocentric evolution are being developed, the claim of the social man, in order to become disconnected from the slav‐ eries/dependences staying in concord with the property over the system, is shaped, or even the entrance into it, in order to control it and to be liberated by the dependence. The repre‐ sentative state is being placed on the threshold between the proto‐anthropocentric and the integrated anthropocentric age. The social man participates in the social and the political

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freedom, but only in a small amount, until it transits to the final phase of the anthropocentric integration, the global freedom and concomitantly to democracy.7 It is not necessary for the purpose of this approach to pursuit the etiological basis of democracy. It is enough to note that the gradual entrance of the society of the citizens into the state corresponds analogously to the autonomy of the economic parameter from the social dominance and its development at the level of the cosmosystem. Thus, the initial civil claim of the society of the citizens is born as the result of the need for counterbalancing the increasing political power of the economic property. Which need, in the course of time, is mutated into an issue of freedom, into an imperative of life in itself. The same analogues hold also for social freedom, while its route shall be related to the more special aspects of the relation created be‐ tween the body of labor and the body of the system of economy. But, both of them, social and political freedom, the very anthropocentric reality in its whole, obey to the parameter of the communicative system. In the known anthropocentric world the communicative system was fundamentally related to the cosmosystemic scale. The small scale, as it refers especially to the hellenic/anthropocentric cosmosystem, and the large scale, as it refers to the large cos‐ mosystemic scale of the nation state. The focus on the scale indeed covenants that, on the hand, this is significant in the extent it is the prerequisite for enrolling the social event into the anthropocentric becoming, and that, on the other hand, this is not exclusive. Without enlarg‐ ing upon the documentation of this detection, I shall invoke the hellenic paradigm. The scale remained unaltered, from the cretan minoan age up to the classical age. But, democracy en‐ tered into the anthropocentric trajectory of the city only in the 5th century, that is, when the parameters of existentializing and of moving the anthropocentric becoming in history, had matured.8 For the same reason, the absence of democracy, as well as of representation in our age, does not result from the large cosmosystemic scale, but because of the proto‐ anthropocentric phase experienced by the social man.

6. The age of modernism and the perspective of democracy By the few abovementioned, it evidently results that our age experiences the proto‐ anthropocentric phase of the anthropocentric cosmosystem, hereto the conditions of the pre‐ representative state. Hereto, the claim of modern science, that the world of our age proceeded directly from the despotic period to the period of anthropocentric maturity, is confuted as un‐ sustainable. Under this perspective, the persistence of modern science to typologize a para‐ digmatically proto‐anthropocentric state, such as its political system, into democracy, is rec‐ orded in principle in its general weakness to distinguish between the cosmosystemic scale, which is obviously superior, and therefore generator of parameters among them, the com‐ municative and the economic surpassing by far these of the small scale, and of the anthropo‐ centric phase, which it undergoes. Thus, the concept of modernity is explained, which should

7 In the present paper, the gnoseology of democracy is being examined exclusively within the environment of the state‐centered phase. Therefore, the phase of the meta‐state‐centered phase is omitted, and therefore democracy in the frame of the cosmopolis/cosmostate. 8 Also the Pre‐hellenes, as well as some asiatic people, had cities, but their anthropocentric evolution, and fur‐ thermore democracy, is being recorded as a phenomenon in the rajectory of the hellenic world, insofar as the societies of the cities were recorded in a purely cosmosystemic trajectory. The issue of scale is being examined thoroughly by Aristotle. But, as far as it results, the Greeks were completely conscious about its meaning for the anthropocentric existenitaliation of the social man.

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define the modern anthropocentric age, declaring at the end a purely ideological choice, which places the modern world in the scale of the anthropocentric integration and beyond, as a measure of evaluation of the past, and to the evolutionary “end” of the anthropocentric be‐ coming. This exact combination between the ideological signature of our age with the gnoseo‐ logical deficit, which is evident, also explains the reason of why the perspective of evolution is absolutely absent from modern science. Not just as a phase of the overall anthropocentric be‐ coming, but also as a problematics for the solution of problems occurring in our days. Thus, it instructs that the solutions to the emerging problems have to be “deterministically” sought within the present system, and not beyond it. This fact becomes evident, if we take into ac‐ count the obsession of modernity for neglecting the character of the developments taking place progressively from the decade of 1980s, with the planetary development of the funda‐ mental parameters of the anthropocentric cosmosystem and concomitantly, the radical over‐ turn of the balance between society, economy and politics. Thus, the question returns to the source of our problematics. And yet, do we have to conclude that the transition into the late cosmosystemic scale signs negatively the perspective of the transition into democracy? The answer, according to modern science, is all the more positive, since it contests for its documentation not only the argument of scale and of com‐ plexity, but also of the pre‐modern character of “hellenic” democracy. On the very opposite, cosmosystemic gnoseology instructs that our age has entered in‐ to a cosmosystematically ordered anthropocentric trajectory, which in itself prejudges its evo‐ lutionary semiology. The difference in scale, in relation to its anthropocentric uterus, the hel‐ lenic cosmosystem, does not cancel its issue at stake. It just states that during the course for its integration it shall be called to pursue different solutions, that is, throught the teleological embodiment. In the light of this fact, that is, that our age is taxinomized in the proto‐anthropocentric phase of the social becoming, justifies patently the pre‐representational character of the polit‐ ical system, as well as the non‐based on the principle of social freedom constitution of the economic system, that is the relation of the body of labour with it. This reality, and especially the developments recorded from the decade of the 1980s, incline the begin of a new period, during which the fundamental anthropocentric parameters economy, communication, etc. have been already signed into the future, with their development beyond the state, on the lev‐ el of the whole, henceforth planetary cosmosystem. The fact that the economic, social and political system continues remaining captive to the past of the age of Enlightenment does not cancel the dynamic of the phenomenon. It just confirms the succesion of the shift of the an‐ thropocentric environment along its way towards integration, in line with the interrelation‐ ships. The gnoseological testimony of this evolution can be drawn from the already occured hellenic anthropocentric paradigm. The analogy in the comparison, which is urged by the dif‐ ference of the cosmosystemic scale, leads us after all into the ascertainment that the progres‐ sive development of the anthropocentric parameters leads societies to claim their entrance into the state, in order to counterbalance their socio‐economic and political weakness. At the same time, the basis of the analogy is being designated. For instance, the comparison between the economic parameter of the large to the small cosmosystemic scale, has to be accomplished not in quantitative terms, as the modern science accomplishes such as by distinguishing be‐ tween the “industrial” economy and the economy of “craft production”, but in the light of the producing result on the familiar social environment. We shall ascertain that the economy of

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our age produces a socio‐economic and political result corresponding to that close to the epoch of Solon. But, it does not touch the representative state introduced by Solon, and obvi‐ ously, not of democracy. Similar identifications can be mentioned regarding the communica‐ tive parameter. By the abovementioned it results that formulations such as direct and indirect democ‐ racy, representative democracy, participatory democracy, and other, contain profoundly the ideological request and the gnoseological deficit of modernity, but do not attribute by them‐ selves the true nature of the state of our age. Similarly, the explicit suppression of the fact that the social and political aspect of freedom is defined in the light of the eteronomic right, and not of autonomy. From this point of view, the need for modern science for being relieved of the ideologi‐ cal ankyloses of the transitory age, and hereto of Enlightenment, in order to disclaim its cer‐ tainties, and to enter into the phase of the constitution of a novel gnoseology with cosmosys‐ temic assertion, is proved to be urgent. This issue refers to the concepts, the typology and the time of the social event, as well as to the self‐reflection of cosmohistory. Besides, we estimate that this self‐reflection of cosmohistory through the cosmosystemic point of view of the social man, shall lead to the recovery of the past in the form of a paradigm, so that its evaluation shall yield to science invaluable information for the attempt of the constitution of a novel, global, that is a cosmosystemic, regarding its issue at stake, gnoseology.

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Πάπυροι - Επιστημονικό Περιοδικό Δέλτοι τόμος 4, 2015

Papyri - Scientific Journal Delti volume 4, 2015

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The Future Human Being What is it like? TETIANA MATUSEVYCH, National Pedagogical Dragomanov University Email: [email protected]

5 – 5 ISSN:2241-5106 Θεσσαλονίκη 201 Thessaloniki 201

Πάπυροι - Επιστημονικό Περιοδικό Papyri - Scientific Journal Δέλτοι Delti τόμος 4, 2015 volume 4, 2015 www.academy.edu.gr [email protected] The Future Human Being – What is it like?

The Future Human Being – What is it like?

TETIANA MATUSEVYCH

Περίληψη Η Υλοποίηση των μόνιμων μετασχηματιστικών μεταβάσεων έχει δημιουργήσει την ανάγκη να συλλάβουμε πολύπλοκα οντολογικά προβλήματα μιας νέας πραγματικότητας για την ανάπτυξη μιας στρατηγικής για την επαρκή αντίθεση με τις προκλήσεις που αντιμετωπί‐ ζει η ανθρωπότητα. Η κατανόηση του ρόλου της εκπαίδευσης στη διαμόρφωση και την ανά‐ πτυξη ενός μελλοντικού ανθρώπινου ον κατέχει την πρώτη θέση ανάμεσα σε αυτά τα θέματα. Στις μέρες μας στη δύσκολη περίοδο των αλλαγών και των μετασχηματισμών, η εικόνα του μελλοντικού ανθρώπινου όντος θέλει ιδιαίτερη προσοχή. Ορισμένοι μελλοντολόγοι όπως ο Κ. Venter και ο R. Freitas έχουν την πεποίθηση ότι η γενετική μηχανική θα γίνει μια προωθητική δύναμη στο δρόμο για ένα μετάνθρωπο. Στην εκπαιδευτική θεωρία και την πρακτική, η θεω‐ ρία του ανδρόγυνου πραγματοποιείται στην εστίαση σχετικά με το σχηματισμό της προσω‐ πικότητας του ανδρόγυνου. Υπάρχουν πολυάριθμες προγνώσεις ανάπης της ανθρωπότητας και του μελλοντικού ανθρώπινου όντος. Ένα βασικό στοιχείο της πνευματικής εικόνας του μελλοντικού ανθρώπου είναι ο ταυτόχρονος νους, δηλαδή η ικανότητα να σχηματίζει ταυτό‐ χρονα μια ιδέα, να αναλύσει ένα φαινόμενο, το αντικείμενο, το πρόβλημα από όλες τις πλευ‐ ρές, να χτίσει παράλληλα λογικές αλυσίδες, τη διαδικασία της σκέψης, σε αντίθεση με τις πληροφορίες που φαίνονται να είναι διαφορετικές σε πρώτη ματιά. Σε αυτό το άρθρο έχω αναλύσει τις τρέχουσες τάσεις στη σκέψη για την προσπάθεια αλλαγών μετασχηματισμού στην ανθρωπότητα διανθρωπισμό, η θεωρία του ανδρόγυνου, κλπ για να εκπροσωπήσει το βασικό ρόλο που διαδραματίζει η φιλοσοφία της εκπαίδευσης στην ανάπτυξη μιας εικόνας των μελλοντικών ανθρώπινων όντων, και έχουμε καθορίσει τα βασικά χαρακτηριστικά της προσωπικότητας του πλανητικού‐ κοσμικού τύπου και του συστήματος των προσωπικών, των τοπικών και παγκόσμιων αλληλεπιδράσεων του. H ανάπτυξη της έννοιας της «οικολογι‐ κής επιτακτικής ανάγκης» απαιτεί μια σειρά από χαρακτηριστικά που κατευθύνουν το περι‐ βάλλον, που πρέπει να περιλαμβάνονται στην εικόνα του μελλοντικού ανθρώπινου όντος. Αυτά είναι τα χαρακτηριστικά της οικολογικής πρόβλεψης βιοηθικής: η ικανότητα να προ‐ βλέψει επιπτώσεις της δικής μας δραστηριότητας στο περιβάλλον, της σταθερής συσχέτισης μεταξύ των συνεπειών της δραστηριότητάς μας και τις ανάγκες του οικοσυστήματος, την ευ‐ αισθητοποίηση της θέσης και του ρόλου μας στην ενοποιημένη κατάσταση του σύμπαντος, το σχηματισμό της βιοηθικής συνειδητοποίησης, την προσωπική οικολογική ευθύνη, την προσαρμογή των δικών της συμφερόντων, των αναγκών των νόμων της φύσης και ούτω κα‐ θεξής. H Φιλοσοφία της εκπαίδευσης ως μια ενοποιητική ανθρωπολογική γνώση, λαμβάνει υπόψη όλες τις διαδικασίες του πολιτισμού και τις προοπτικές εξέλιξης της ανθρωπότητας.

Abstract Realization of permanent transformational transitions has brought to necessity to ap‐ prehend complex ontological issues of a new reality for development of a strategy for ade‐ 129 ISSN:2241‐5106

quate opposition to challenges faced by the humanity. Understanding the role of education in the formation and development of a future human being ranks first among these issues. In our days, in the difficult period of changes and transformations, the image of the future human be‐ ing draws particular attention. Some futurologists like K. Venter, R. Freitas are convinced that genetic engineering will become a propelling power on the way to a posthuman. In education‐ al theory and practice the theory of androgyny is realized in focusing on the formation of an‐ drogynous personality. There are numerous prognoses of development of the humanity and future human being. A main component of intellectual image of the future human being is simultaneous mind, i.e. ability to simultaneously form an idea, analyze a phenomenon, object, problem from all sides, build parallel logical chains, thought processes, contrast information which seems to be different at first sight. In this article I have analyzed current trends in thinking about transformational changes in humankind transhumanism, theory of androgyny etc. to represent the key role played by the philosophy of education in the development of an image of the future human being. We have determined the main characteristics of a personali‐ ty of the planetary‐cosmic type and the system of his personal, local and global interactions. The development of the concept of “ecological imperative” requires a number of environment directed characteristics to be included into the image of future human being. These are eco‐ prediction bioethical characteristics: ability to predict impact of our own activity on envi‐ ronment, constant correlation between consequences of our activity and needs of eco‐system, awareness of our place and role in the unified being of the Universe, formation of bioethical awareness, personal ecological responsibility, adjustment of own interests, needs to laws of nature so on. Philosophy of education as an integrative anthropological knowledge, is taking into account all civilization processes and prospects of humanity evolution.

1. Introduction The beginning of the 21st century is a new phase in the history of humanity evolution. Development and formation of such social phenomena and tendencies like information revo‐ lution, humanization, democratization of society, intensification of cross‐cultural communica‐ tion, globalization etc. have made a colossal impact on fundamentals of social system, risen profound changes in the essence of social institutions and practices, everyday life of people, their ideas, values, interpersonal communications, moral norms, life goals and strategies. Re‐ alization of permanent transformational transitions has brought to necessity to apprehend complex ontological issues of a new reality for development of a complex strategy for ade‐ quate opposition to challenges faced by the humanity. Understanding the role of education in the formation and development of a future human being ranks first among these issues. Understanding the future of the humanity has always had a special place in philosophi‐ cal discourse. Nowadays in the troubling period of changes and transformations the image of the future human being draws particular attention. Not only does mere interest lie in the basis of such attention, but objective people’s needs, hopes for the future as well as the people’s fear of expected changes. Motivated activity and constant adjustment of their directions to imme‐ diate result and remote consequences of their activity are common to humans. Modern pro‐ cesses and tendencies will be developed during numerous decades further on and will signifi‐ cantly influence not only our lives, but future generations as well. Hence there comes necessi‐

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ty of nurturing responsibility of a special kind in the socium – responsibility before future generations, which has to become a core of all and every decision of a personality, society, state ensuring its deliberateness. Futurologists, scientists, philosophers are interested not only in future transforma‐ tional changes in the world, but also how these changes will influence a person, what the fu‐ ture human being will be like. There are numerous prognoses of development of the humanity and future human being. Let us consider the most well‐known and controversial ones.

2. The future human being. Transhumanism Philosophical ideas of transhumanism have become rather popular in recent decades. Transhumanism is a rational philosophical movement grounded on apprehension of pro‐ spects and achievements of science, which determines desirability and possibility of funda‐ mental changes in social state of a human by means of different sophisticated technologies, which are to eliminate ageing, suffering and even human’s death, strengthen mental, physical and psychological abilities of a person. Main goal and task of transhumanism is endless per‐ fection of a human applying all available means and techniques. In order to achieve this goal transhumanism suggests the following: support and facilitate technical progress in any way; expand freedoms of every person applying scientific achievements; predict and prevent all possible moral problems and dangers, which may hinder implementation of scientific achievements; postpone humans’ ageing and death as far as possible and give humans the right to decide when to die and even to die or not to die. Transhumanists adhere to a cross‐ disciplinary approach analyzing dynamic interrelation of the humanity and growing technolo‐ gies. Transhumanists focus on both existing biotechnologies and information technologies and those which are under development yet – molecular nanotechnology and artificial general intelligence. Transhumanism aims at ethical usage of technologies for expansion of humans’ abilities1. One of the most influential hearths of transhumanism ideas in the world is the Fu‐ ture of Humanity Institute, University of Oxford. The Future of Humanity Institute is a leading multi field research and development center which investigates a large range of issues ex‐ tremely important for human civilization. The task of the institute is to analyze with applica‐ tion of mathematical tools, scientific theories and data, methods of analytical philosophy risks and possibilities which will be connected with future technological changes, studying topical ethical dilemma, estimation of global priorities in order to make a decision which way of development to follow to ensure a long‐term future of the humanity. Research work of the institute covers four programme areas: global estimation of irretrievable risks; improvement of human’s life; applied theory of cognition and rationality; technologies of future2. In 2005 the Future of Humanity Institute was headed by N. Bostrom, co‐founder of World Transhu‐ manist Association nowadays Humanity, which covers such areas of theoretical interests as singularity, risks of civilization extinction, “mind uploading” Humanity, 2013. In 2003 The Philosophical Quarterly published N. Bostrom’s article with an almost fantastic title: “Are

1 See: Humanity . Philosophy. Available at: http://humanityplus.org/philosophy/philosophy‐2 2 See: Future of Humanity Institute. Available at: http://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk

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we living in computer simulation?3, which caused controversial discussions in academic communities all over the world. In his work N. Bostrom thoroughly analyzes computation ca‐ pacity necessary for simulation of human mind or even whole civilizations, he also assumes that there is a high possibility of the fact that we all live inside a huge computer model launched by posthumans for studying their own past. Bostrom is sure that future people will transcend modern human being: they will possess mental abilities transcending all abilities of present geniuses, perfect memory, artificial body which will be able to withstand any disease and age. Substantiating simulation hypothesis N. Bostrom contends that at least one of the fol‐ lowing statements is likely to be true so called Bostrom’s trilemma: 1 The human species is very likely to go extinct before reaching a posthuman stage; 2 Any posthuman civilization is unlikely to run a significant number of simulations of their evolutionary history, for any of a number of reasons; 3 We are almost certainly living in a computer simulation. In his work Bostrom follows a concept of being independent of a carrier, according to which consciousness does not depend on the carrier, i.e. biological tissue – human brain. It means that consciousness can be actualized in a way of a number of electric impulses of some computing machine. Taking into account that the work describes simulations created by posthumans, people modeled inside the simulation have consciousness. They will understand the model as reality. Bostrom thinks that if simulations take place, there will be a lot of them. It is logically to assume that the number of modeled people will be next larger than the num‐ ber of ancestors of the base civilization. Thus probability of the fact that a randomly selected person is an object of experiment is very close to one Bostrom, 20034. Bostrom’s simulation hypothesis was actively criticized by scientists, yet it has realized the function of a “different opinion” in full. Many futurologists share the idea of “uploading mind”. According to this hypothesis it will be possible to read mind and transfer it to electronic format. Famous American researcher and futurologist R. Kurzweil5 is sure that by 2020 per‐ sonal computers will have achieved computing capacity of a human brain. In 2020s na‐ nomachines will be used with medical purposes. Moreover nanorobots will supply nutrition to people’s cells and extract waste products. They will also carry out detailed scanning of peo‐ ple’s brain and by 2029 brain computer simulation will have become possible. In 2040 human body will be able to take any shape formed by a large number of nanorobots. Inner organs will be substituted by cybernetic gadgets. Kurzweil predicts the boost of technological singularity in 2045. At this time Earth will start turning into one giant computer and gradually this pro‐ cess will expand to the whole Universe. Some futurologists like K. Venter, R. Freitas are con‐ vinced that genetic engineering will become a propelling power on the way to a posthuman. Onset of cosmic era will facilitate research in the area of genetic engineering aiming at adapta‐ tion of the human’s body to a long‐term staying in cosmic space.

3 Bostrom, N. Are you living in a computer simulation? Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 53, no. 211, pp. 243‐255. 4 Ibid. 5 Kurzweil, R. The Singularity Is Near — selected chapters. Available at: http://www.kurzweilai.net/ebooks/the‐ singularity‐is‐near accessed 13 September 2013 132 ISSN:2241‐5106

3. The future human being. Theory of androgyny Theory of androgyny is actively used in mass culture nowadays although in a primitive way. This theory has ancestral roots. Bisexual or asexual creatures can be found in the mytho‐ logical works of nearly all cultures. Plato in his dialogue “The Banquet” tells us a myth about androgens, ancestors of people, who combined masculine and feminine characteristics. Later on this theory was considered in mystical anthropology by J. Böhme and the works of Russian philosophers M. Berdiaiev and V. Soloviov. C. Jung, saw an archetypical figure in the unity of two opposites – masculine and feminine. He considered the expression of a feminine origin in the masculine unconsciousness anima and masculine in the feminine animus, i.e. psycho‐ logical bisexuality, as the most important archetypes, as regulators of behavior that manifests itself by appearing in some dreams and fantasies or the irrationality of men’s feelings and women’s reasoning. S. Bem, the author of the theory of psychological androgyny believed that androgyny provides big opportunities for social adaptation. The relation between androgyny and situational flexibility6, motivation to achievements7, self‐esteem8 and decent fulfillment of parental duty9 has been postulated. Theory of androgyny has acquired popularity in feminist discourse as well. In educational theory and practice the theory of androgyny is realized in focusing on the formation of androgynous personality through some directions of gender mainstream‐ ing.

4. Philosophy of education in search for an ideal image of the future human being What is a posthuman like: cyborg, mutant, androgen – nobody knows. But the obvious thing is that at present, when humanity is on the edge of massive transformations the issues on education have become more topical than ever, in particular changes of its philosophical paradigm, which would allow to prepare further generations not only to radical global trans‐ formational changes, but also become their immediate creators. One of possible image of a future human being is the planetary‐cosmic personality10. There is a number of characteristics that differ a contemporary human from personali‐ ty of planetary and cosmic type: knowledge of its past, including not only historical one, con‐ nected with development of society, but cosmic as well, connected with stages of formation and evolution of the Universe structure; level of thinking; consistent activity; motivation of activity realization of a global goal of life. Мain clusters of characteristics of a planetary and

6 Bem, S. L. Androgyny vs. The tight little lives of fluffy women and chesty men. Psychology Today, 1975, September, p. 59‐62. 7 Spence, J., Helmrich, R. Masculinity and femininity: Their psychological dimensions, correlates, and antecedents. Austin, TX, Texas University Press. 8 Orlofsky, J. L. Sex‐role orientation, identity formation, and self‐esteem in college men and women . Sex Roles, v. 3, p. 561‐575. 9 Baumrind, D. Are androgynous individuals more effective persons and parents? Child Development, 1982, v. 53, p. 44‐75. 10 Bazaluk, O. Philosophy of education. Formation of the planetary‐cosmic type of personality. 2010. Available at: http://www.bazaluk.com/scientific‐library/book/68.html accessed 17 September 2013

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cosmic personality include: cognitive informative, creative imaginative, organizational methodological, communicative, world perceptive characteristics. Modern word tendencies, development of concept of “ecological imperative” require a number of environment directed characteristics to be included into the image of future hu‐ man being. These are eco‐prediction bioethical characteristics: ability to predict impact of our own activity on environment, constant correlation between consequences of our activity and needs of eco‐system, awareness of our place and role in the unified being of the Universe, formation of bioethical awareness, personal ecological responsibility, adjustment of own in‐ terests, needs to laws of nature so on. The necessity to include eco‐prediction bioethical characteristics to the image of fu‐ ture human being has been caused by the following main factors: firstly – colossal impact of environmental conditions on development of human society and civilization in general; sec‐ ondly – intensification of anthropological load on biosphere, present ecology conditions; thirdly – necessity of constant ethic control over interrelations in the system “human‐nature” due to rapid development of engineering, emergence of new sophisticated technologies. The system of interrelations of a planetary and cosmic personality is shown in Picture 1.

STATE UNIVERSE

PLANETARY AND COSMIC MACRO- PERSONALITY SOCIAL EN- VIRONMENT PLANET

MICRO- SOCIAL EN- VIRONMENT

Picture1. The system of interrelations of a planetary and cosmic personality

A main component of intellectual image of the future human being is simultaneous mind, i.e. ability to simultaneously form an idea, analyze a phenomenon, object, problem from all sides, build parallel logical chains, thought processes, contrast information which seems to be different at first sight. Development of such personal characteristic would allow an indi‐ vidual to have “wider world view”, avoid closed mind, narrow mind, and help prevent mind manipulation, which is in the beginning of the formation process. Furthermore, when considering the image of future human being one should pay atten‐ tion to gender characteristics of personality, develop gender tolerance in the younger genera‐ tions alongside with racial, cross‐national, religious and political ones, which will ensure peaceful coexistence and equal cooperation of individuals, recognition, understanding and re‐ spect of alternatives, freedom of personality, multidimensionality of surrounding, variability

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of points of view, exclusion of domination and pressure, aprioristic ascription of gender stere‐ otypes. So far as gender equality in all spheres of social life is one of the most important at‐ tributes of a just civil society, society of equal rights and opportunities, which excludes any involuntary segregation and discrimination. The topicality of gender problematic is deter‐ mined by necessity to study specific peculiarities of women’s and men’s personal develop‐ ment as a basis for differentiation and individualization of upbringing and education aiming at formation of new gender awareness and creation of a society, which ensures conditions for self‐actualization of every individual and exclude any forms of violence and pressure to per‐ sonality. Activity motivation of a personality of planetary and cosmic type, conformity of own ontogenesis with prospects and restrictions at all levels of interrelation system is reflected in the algorithm of making strategic decisions by an individual, which must have imperative, in‐ variant character Picture 2.

Hypothesis

ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF CONSEQUENCES FROM MADE DECISION ON ALL LEVELS OF INTERRELATION SYSTEM (GLOBAL, LOCAL, PERSONAL)

POSITIVE IMPACT NEGATIVE IM- PACT

MAKING DECI- CONSIDERATION AND ESTI- SION MATION OF ALTERNATIVES

Picture 2. The algorithm of making strategic decisions by a planetary and cosmic individual

5. Conclusion Summarizing everything above‐mentioned we can make a conclusion that there are numerous prognoses of development of the humanity and future human being and nobody knows what is a posthuman like: cyborg, mutant, androgen, etc. But the obvious thing is that at present the issues on education have become more topical than ever. The strategic objec‐ tive of philosophy of education is to shape the planetary and cosmic type of person ‐ an intel‐ lectually developed, balanced, tolerant, simultaneously thinking personality, who arranges its activity and development within personal, local and global interrelations. Philosophy of edu‐ cation as an integrative anthropological knowledge, taking into account all civilization pro‐ cesses, prospects of humanity evolution, cultural time dominator, shall not only facilitate the choice of the variants of educational systems, programs, methods which would correspond to

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progressive tendencies of social development as complete as possible, needs of individual in self‐actualization, but also perform prognostic and axiological function forming a prospect of world outlook genesis of personality ensuring theoretical and methodological grounds for in‐ novation processes in education.

Bibliography

Baumrind, D. Are androgynous individuals more effective persons and parents? Child Development, 1982, v. 53, p. 44‐75. Bazaluk, O. 2010 Philosophy of education. Formation of the planetary‐cosmic type of personality. Available at: http://www.bazaluk.com/scientific‐library/book/68.html accessed 17 September 2013 Bem, S. L. Androgyny vs. The tight little lives of fluffy women and chesty men. Psychol‐ ogy Today, 1975, September, p. 59‐62. Bostrom, N. Are you living in a computer simulation? Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 53, no. 211, pp. 243‐255. Kurzweil, R. The Singularity Is Near — selected chapters. Available at: http://www.kurzweilai.net/ebooks/the‐singularity‐is‐near accessed 13 September 2013 Orlofsky, J. L. Sex‐role orientation, identity formation, and self‐esteem in college men and women . Sex Roles, v. 3, p. 561‐575. Spence, J., Helmrich, R. Masculinity and femininity: Their psychological dimensions, correlates, and antecedents. Austin, TX, Texas University Press.

Article Citation

Matusevych T. The future human being – What is it like? / Философия и космология/ Philosophy & Cosmology 2012 – Kyiv: ISPC, 2013. – P.161–170.

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Πάπυροι - Επιστημονικό Περιοδικό Δέλτοι τόμος 4, 2015

Papyri - Scientific Journal Delti volume 4, 2015

Moral and social values from Ancient Greek Tragedy Ηθικές και κοινωνικές αξίες από την Αρχαία Ελληνική Τραγωδία - GEORGIA XANTHAKI- KARAMANOU, Professor of Ancient Greek Philology at the School of Philosophy, Faculty of Philology of the National and Kapodistrian University of Athens. Hellas ΓΕΩΡΓΙΑ- ΞΑΝΘΑΚΗ- ΚΑΡΑΜΑΝΟΥ, Καθηγήτρια της Αρχαίας Ελληνικής Φιλολογίας του Τμήματος Φιλοσοφίας της Σχολής Φιλολογίας του Εθνικού και Καποδιστριακού Πανεπιστημίου Αθηνών. Ελλάς E mail: gxanth@g xanthaki.gr

5 – 5 ISSN:2241-5106 Θεσσαλονίκη 201 Thessaloniki 201

Πάπυροι - Επιστημονικό Περιοδικό Papyri - Scientific Journal Δέλτοι Delti τόμος 4, 2015 volume 4, 2015 www.academy.edu.gr [email protected] Moral and social values from Ancient Greek Tragedy Ηθικές και κοινωνικές αξίες από την Αρχαία Ελληνική Τραγωδία

Moral and social values from Ancient Greek Tragedy Ηθικές και κοινωνικές αξίες από την Αρχαία Ελληνική Τραγωδία

GEORGIA XANTHAKI‐KARAMANOU ΓΕΩΡΓΙΑ ΞΑΝΘΑΚΗ‐ΚΑΡΑΜΑΝΟΥ

Περίληψη Η παρουσίαση για τις «ηθικές και κοινωνικές αξίες από την Αρχαία Ελληνική Τραγω‐ δία» ασχολείται παγκοσμίως με την ιστορία των ανθρώπινων και κοινωνικών αξιών από τον Όμηρο και τον Ησίοδο ως στο τέλος του πέμπτου αιώνα. Ιδιαίτερη έμφαση δίνεται στις ηθι‐ κές και κοινωνικές αντιλήψεις που εκφράζονται σε ορισμένα βασικά κείμενα των τριών με‐ γάλων τραγικών ποιητών Αισχύλου, Σοφοκλή και του Ευριπίδη. Στην αρχαϊκή Ελλάδα, ένα άτομο επαινείται για την παρουσία του στον πόλεμο και στη δημόσια ζωή. Η σύνεση και η μετριοπάθεια είναι προαπαιτούμενα της αρετής. Η σύγκρουση της βίας και της πειθούς ήταν συνεχής στην ελληνική σκέψη. Στα έργα του Σοφοκλή, ο ηρωικός χαρακτήρας έρχεται αντι‐ μέτωπος με την ευπάθεια του ανθρώπου με το χρόνο. Ο Ευριπίδης, «ο πιο τραγικός των ποιη‐ τών», σύμφωνα με τον Αριστοτέλη, απεικόνιζε τη σκληρότητα και τη βία του πολέμου. Οι σοφιστές απέρριψε τις διακρίσεις στην κοινωνία. Οι ηθικές αρετές και όχι ο πλούτος ή η ευ‐ γενική καταγωγή προσδιορίζουν της ανθρώπινη προσωπικότητα. Κατά συνέπεια, ήταν υψί‐ στης σημασίας ότι οι πολίτες πρέπει να τιμούν τη δικαιοσύνη στις σχέσεις τους ο ένας με τον άλλο. Η εργασία αυτή επικεντρώνεται ιδιαίτερα στη σημαντική διάκριση μεταξύ των αντα‐ γωνιστικών αξιών, όπως ο πλούτος και η ευγενής καταγωγής, και τις συνεργατικές, όπως εκ‐ φράζονται στις έννοιες της δικαιοσύνης, της σοφίας, της εγκράτειας, της σεμνότητας και της ευγένειας του χαρακτήρα, καθώς και το σεβασμό για τα νόμιμα και τα ανθρώπινα και πολιτι‐ κά δικαιώματα, που διαμόρφωσαν την ανάπτυξη της δημοκρατίας.

Abstract The presentation on the “Moral and social values from Ancient Greek Tragedy” deals globally with the history of human and social values from Homer and Hesiod to the end of the fifth century. Special emphasis is given on the moral and social concepts expressed in some fundamental texts of the three major tragic poets Aeschylus, Sophocles and Euripides. In ar‐ chaic Greece, an individual is praised for his presence in war and in public life. Prudence and moderation are prerequisites of aretē. The conflict of violence and persuasion was constant in Greek thought. In the works of Sophocles, the heroic status is confronted with man’s vulnera‐ bility to time. Euripides, “the most tragic of the poets” according to Aristotle, depicted the cru‐ elty and the violence of war. The sophists had rejected the distinctions in society. Moral vir‐ tues and not wealth or noble origin determine human personality. Consequently, it was of the

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utmost importance that the citizens should esteem justice in their relationships with each other. The paper is particularly focused on the significant discrimination between the com‐ petitive values, such as wealth and noble origin, and the cooperative ones, expressed in the concepts of justice, wisdom, temperance, modesty, and nobility of character, as well as the re‐ spect for the law and the human and political rights, which shaped the development of de‐ mocracy.

The most powerful words to commend an individual from the Homeric society to the fifth century B.C., the era of the Greek tragedy, are the adjectives agathos and esthlos, and the excellence of aretē, ‘virtue’. In Homer, agathos in particular commends a man who is of high birth, rich, brave and handsome. Achilles, the most effective and successful fighter, provides a model for such a character‐portrayal. The Homeric agathos‐character, the morally ideal char‐ acter comprises the main competitive values: bravery and courage, strength, wealth and high birth1. The Homeric epic poetry focuses on the agathos hero; the opposite, kakoi, bad charac‐ ters hardly exist and are very rarely mentioned. Agamemnon and Achilles, behaving in the way they behaved to Achilles and Hector respectively, are typical agathoi. Co‐operative excel‐ lences and behaviour as they are known from tragedy and particularly Greek moral philoso‐ phy, such as temperance sophrosynē, prudence phronesēs and justice dikaiosynē were much less esteemed. The agathos in Homer primarily posseses timē, ‘honour’, and powerfully defends it, as Achilles did. The agathos also possesses friendship, philia, particularly guest friendship and care for another who needs help, a foreigner or a suppliant hiketēs. If friendship, philia and philotēs provide a fundamental co‐operative excellence in Homeric society2, aidōs, ‘decency’, expresses failing to do something of which society approves and which secures the moral co‐ herence of the Homeric world3. Homeric gods have similar values to those of the Homeric heroes: timē honour, since they demand to be honoured with temples and offerings, and hence, close relationship, philotēs between man and gods is assured. Such a concept lasted for long until the period of tragedy cf. Hippolytus’ honour for Artemis. On the other hand, if a god is not honoured by an individual, his punishment is powerful and violent cf. Aphrodite’s punishment on Hippoly‐ tus and that of Dionysus on Pentheus. The jealousy of the gods, the pthonos theōn, is thus in‐ evitably fulfilled. The most powerful values of the Homeric society commend success in peace and war, and prosperity and stability in family oikos and community. Gods pay little atten‐

1 See, more extensively: A. W. H. Adkins. 1970. From the Many to the One. A Study of Personality and Views on Human Nature in the Context of Ancient Greek Society, Values and Beliefs. London: Constable and Co. Ltd., 30ff, and A. W. H. Adkins. 1972. Moral Values and Political Behaviour in Ancient Greece from Homer to the End of the Fifth Century. London: Chatto & Windus, 13ff. 2 Cf. Adkins 1972, 18. 3 Adkins 1972, 18. 140 ISSN:2241‐5106

tion to acts of injustice between men and they don’t commend just behaviour. The coherence of the Homeric world is thus mainly based on competitive values. From Hesiod to the end of the sixth century, a new world arises. Though the wealthy possessors of land prevail in society and wealth is still a prerequisite for agathos, two new value‐terms predominate in the Works and Days of Hesiod: dikē justice and ergasia work‐ ing; ‘work is no disgrace, it is idleness that is a disgrace’ v. 3114. ‘The immortal gods’, Hesi‐ od says to Perses, his brother Works and Days 289ff., ‘have set sweat in the way of attaining aretē ’; and a path leads to it that is long and steep, and rough too at first, but when one reach‐ es the summit, then aretē is easy to possess, though before, it was difficult’. Without effort and work, aretē cannot be achieved. ‘By working, men become dearer to the gods’ v. 309. Aretē and fame kūdos accompany wealth v. 314. Wealth, a traditionally competitive value‐term, still prevails in Hesiod, associated with aretē. Such a co‐existence will predominate in Ancient Greek ethics, until its total disruption by Socrates and Plato. Justice, ‘Dikē’, seated by Zeus, her father, secures prosperity, since the unjust men do not prosper. The more beneficial to oneself’s road is to go towards justice, for Justice beats hubris, ‘arrogance’, when she comes to the end of the course vv. 213 ff.. The gods reward the just and punish the unjust. Zeus punishes hubris, a concept which after Hesiod predominates in Aeschylus, espe‐ cially in the Persae. Hesiod for the first time suggests that violence and cruelty are unsuited to civilized human beings. Such a belief is vividly expressed in the story of the hawk and the nightingale5. Dikē, ‘justice’, distinguishes human beings from animals. The eye of Zeus sees and observes everything and nothing escapes him 267 ff.6. Justice is a clear co‐operative moral value in Hesiod. The co‐operative excellence of bravery and courage commends the agathos as the man successful in battle in Tyrtaeus. Aretē leads a warrior to be ready to die fighting bravely for his city. In archaic Greece, an individual is praised for his remarkable presence in war and in public life. Wealth secures effectiveness in society while poverty deprives him of prestige. On the other hand, prudence phronēsis and moderation metron and temperance are prereq‐ uisites of aretē. A conjuction, thus, of competitive and co‐operative value‐terms form the su‐ perior excellence aretē in lyric poetry and in the archaic era. In Theognis’ poems a remarkable advice for the age’s morality is expressed 145 ff.: “Be willing to be a pious man and dwell with little wealth rather than be wealthy with posses‐ sions unjustly acquired. The whole of aretē is summed up in dikaiosynē ‘justice’. Every man is agathos if he is dikaios ‘just’7. The Platonic concept of justice in the Republic is foreshad‐ owed almost three centuries before.

4 Adkins’ translation 1972, 25. For the concept, generally, see M. L. West. 1978. Hesiod Works and Days, edited with prolegomena and commentary. Oxford: Clarendon Press ad loc. N. Bezantakos et al. 2006. Μουσάων αρχό‐ μεθα. Hesiod and the Archaic Epic Poetry. Athens: Patakis in Greek, 349ff. 5 Adkins 1972, 30. 6 See West 1978 ad loc. Cf. also Bezantakos et al 2007, 342ff. 7 See also 315ff.: “many kakoi are rich and many agathoi are poor; but we will not take wealth in exchange for our aretē “, transl. Adkins 1970, 76. 141 ISSN:2241‐5106

The value term of justice leads to Solon’s Eunomia, ‘sound government’. Solon by his reforms released the small farmers of sixth‐century Attica from their debts, giving thus a clear image of just and law‐abiding government. Solon’s Eunomia provided a fundamental catch‐ word before the development of the Athenian democracy. The opposite to Eunomia, ‘governing with justice’, is hubris, ‘arrogance’, personified in Xerxes’ attempt to conquer a free country. We enter the area of tragedy with Aeschylus’ Per‐ sians. Justice, ‘dikaiosynē ’, commends what is fair and just for all. Nevertheless, Thra‐ symachus defined Pl. Republic 338d ff. as just ‘what is in my own interest’. Hubris meaning ‘getting above one’s moira, above the limits of what is due to him’, complies with Thra‐ symachus’ definition of justice. Hubris creates atē, ‘infatuation’, caused by blindness sent by the gods as the punishment of guilty rashness. The ghost of Darius exclaims in A. Persae 821 ff. referring to the disaster of the Persians troops at Salamis: “Hubris has flowered and borne a crop of atē whence it is reaping a harvest of woe” 821‐22. “Seeing that such are the penal‐ ties, remember Athens and Greece, and let no‐one…. be struck with desire for more… For Zeus, a heavy chastiser is near as a punisher of minds that boast too much” 827‐828, transl. Adkins, 1972, 85‐86. Hubris means transgressing the limits permitted by gods to men. Hubris opposes to the prevailing ideas of measure, wisdom and self‐knowledge or‐ dered by Apollo, the god of Delphi, foreshadowing the development of Athenian democracy. In the Persae, patriotic exultation takes second place to the religious interpretation of a remark‐ able historic event held at Salamis. Divine retribution, especially the punishment of Persians and Xerxes for their impiety and sacrilege, moves the play. Darius instructs the moral order upheld by Zeus as the chastener of impious minds and foretells the great disaster of the Per‐ sians at Plataea vv. 800‐831. The punishment Nemesis of hubris, the blind insolence, and of atē, infatuation, which form the tripartite expression of the tragic action, provides the kernel of the religious and po‐ litical dimension of the play, as focused on Darius’ presence which is thematically the central feature of the play. Hubris and impious thoughts v. 808 ff. lead the Persians to destroy the temples of the gods in Greece. The Persians “have got above themselves”8. Aeschylus com‐ mends the proud claims of the free law‐abiding Greeks for equal laws isonomia and free speech isigoria, the people who ‘are not slaves or subjects of anyone’ v. 242. There is only one master over them called Law, as Demaratus had said to Xerxes Hrdt. 7.103‐104. The justice of Zeus provides the cornerstone of the Persae reaching its fuller expres‐ sion in the Agamemnon, the first play of the Oresteia. The trilogy reveals a global dramatic ex‐ ploration of the nature of justice, human and divine9. In both cases, justice is a matter of retri‐ bution, of retaliation talio. Agamemnon is punished for the sacrifice of Iphigeneia, Clytem‐ nestra for his murder and the avenger must be her son Orestes acting at the command of Apollo but pursued by Erinyes, the Furies, demanding his due punishment for the matricide. The doer shall suffer ‘pathein ton erxanta’ v. 1564. Experience, knowledge and mo‐ rality is a result of strong misfortunes: ”learning by suffering” are the morals of the hymn to

8 Thus aptly Adkins 1972, 86. 9 R. P. Winnington‐Ingram. 1985. “Aeschylus”. In The Cambridge History of Classical Literature, ed. by P. E. East‐ erling and B. M. W. Knox, 281‐295. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 287. For the development of justice in the Agamemnon, see recently D. Raeburn – O. Thomas. 2011. The Agamemnon of Aeschylus. Oxford: Universi‐ ty Press, xxxff. 142 ISSN:2241‐5106

Zeus in the parodos of the Agamemnon vv.176‐178. Zeus will punish the wrong doer and has the power to lead men to learn by suffering. With Zeus in the Agamemnon came a new couple of cooperative values: synesis and sophrosynē, ‘wisdom’ and ‘temperance’. The com‐ pound mnēsipēmōn ponos in the parodos of the Agamemnon v. 180 denotes the pain from the memory of the sufferings that brings to wisdom. In Aeschylus dikē, justice, is directly as‐ sociated with retributive acts. Guilt produces fresh guilt and such a situation is attributed to an evil spirit for whom the terms daimōn, alastōr and Erinyes, ‘Furies’, are used: Clytemnestra is identified to an alastōr for Agamemnon, and to madness, the beginning of disaster for her family. By treading on purple, Agamemnon provoked the jealousy of the gods, caused hubris and was blinded by atē. “He changed his mind so as to be utterly unscrupulous” v. 22110. From the arbitrary monarchy of the Agamemnon to the law‐ abiding democratic gov‐ erning of the Eumenides, the progress in morality and politics was remarkable. In the Oresteia, the Aeschylean trilogy, the action is progressive, culminating in mur‐ der, a vengeance, and a trial. The Law of Justice penetrates the trilogy. Apollo orders Orestes to avenge his father’s death by killing his mother; the Furies chased him, reviling Apollo for helping a murderer. However, the doctrine of the ’doer shall suffer’ is not applied to Orestes. Athena –this is very important– decides that there must be a trial and an examination into motives and circumstances. The mechanical retribution and punishment is abolished. Erinyes representing the law of blind retribution, the law of nature, a rigid punitive justice, became Eumenides, beneficial spirits protecting the city of Athens. In Aeschylus divine and human causes operate simultaneously, “the divine justice accomplishes itself through human motiva‐ tion”11. In a context of democratic Athens, Athene brings persuasion peithō and reconcilia‐ tion both in gods Apollo and Erinyes and between gods and men Erinyes and Orestes. The conflict of violence and persuasion was constant in Greek thinking. Athene suc‐ ceeded in replacing violence, revenge and brutality by peaceful dialogue and democratic or‐ der. The superior court of Areios Pagos, as Athene proclaims, becomes “the fortress and salva‐ tion of the city” v. 701. The citizens should protect its prestige with the respect and the feel‐ ing of justice deriving from the fear of the Law Eum. v. 700. The fear for the illegal thus en‐ sures that justice is maintained: “Who is safe from sin if he has no fear and reverence for God and Justice?” v. 699. The coherence of democracy is thus achieved, since the respect of the Law and of the law‐court, justice averts both from tyranny despoteia and anarchy anarchia; it secures jus‐ tice among the citizens and the moral governing of the City. “Approve neither a life of anarchy, nor one subject to master. The god gives power to moderation… hubris is in truth the child of impiety… revere the altar of justice dikē. He who of his own free will, without compulsion, is dikaios just shall be prosperous olvios” vv. 526‐551. Athene will echo these admonitions of the chorus vv. 696‐698 and the reconciliation of old and new institutions is achieved. The Furies, the Erinyes, were substituted by Eumenides, beneficent spirits for Athens, and democ‐ racy was powerfully established. The co‐operative values of justice and moderation are com‐ mended in the Aeschylean drama as the cornerstone of democratic institutions.

10 E. R. Dodds. 2007. “Morals and politics in the Oresteia”. In Oxford Readings in Classical Studies. Aeschylus, ed. by M. Lloyd, 245‐264. Oxford: University Press, 261. 11 Thus aptly Winnington‐Ingram 1985, 294. 143 ISSN:2241‐5106

In Sophocles, the heroic status is confronted with man’s vulnerability to time and cir‐ cumstance. Man is brave, clever, with moral qualities and faces suffering with endurance12. The heroic code and the concept of sophrosynē, ‘temperance, wisdom’, characterize many Sophoclean heroes, such as Oedipus and Antigone. The question of crime and punishment is not central to Sophoclean tragedy, as it was in Aeschylus. Action is mainly anthropocentric. Electra and Orestes regard as their own duty to take revenge of their father’s murder. After the matricide, there is no regret, no remorse as in Euripides. In Ajax the Homeric ideal of honour finds its highest expression. The hero’s death to defend his honour timē reveals both the moral value and the fragility of man13. The play is built on the combination of heavy wrong‐doing ‐ Ajax in madness tried to kill the Achaean chieftains – and of ultimate nobility ‐ finally in humiliation, he committed suicide to save his honour. Athene punishes Ajax for his arrogance hubris and wishes him, as we saw also in Aeschylus’ Agamemnon, to learn wisdom by experience through suffering. Sophocles com‐ mends the co‐operative value of modesty and the way of life with respect for the gods that leads to man’s happiness. The mutability of human fortune provides thus a central motif in the dramatic action of Sophoclean plays. Nothing remains as it is, except the gods and their eternal laws. The antith‐ esis between the divine, unwritten laws, commending the reverence for the gods, the parents, the suppliants, and the dead, and the written human laws in the Antigone points to the values of democratic governing as opposed to the arbitrary expression of the ruler’s decision and in‐ tolerance. Antigone makes a noble defense to Creon, states her case against his accusation of breaking the law of the state and justifies herself by appealing to the sacred, unwritten laws, whose life lasts forever and no one knows whence they came vv. 450‐457. She knows that the laws of the gods are the basis of human order and morality. On the other hand, Sophocles depicts Creon as the strict ruler and the kind of man thinking that he knows more than the gods, a man who wrongly accuses others of faults which are his own14 and which lead to his own and his family’s disaster. The inviolable laws of the gods defended by Antigone are broken when Oedipus in Sophocles’ Oedipus Tyrannus kills his father and marries his mother. As Oedipus comes to see the truth, to realize his real destiny and to punish himself for his past actions and especially for his hamartia in Aristotle’s sense Poet. 13, 1453a14‐17, his peace with the gods is achieved and through his suffering the rightful, moral harmony of things is restored. Divine benevolence and human respect for the suppliant finds its fullest expression in the last play of Sophocles, produced post‐mortem by his grandson. In Oedipus at Colonus the poet evokes the powerful feeling of holiness in his descrip‐ tion of the sanctity of Colonus and the grove of the Eumenides. Theseus, the personification of a democratic ruler, offers to the apoptolin, the ‘homeless,’ blind Oedipus home and city ren‐ dering him empolin v. 637, ‘a dweller in the city of Athens’. Sophocles bridges the gap be‐ tween the blind outcast who knows himself to be an incestuous patricide and the potent, ben‐ eficial spirit for Athens, transforming Oedipus into a hero. At the end of his long life Sophocles

12 P. E. Easterling. 1985. “Sophocles”. In The Cambridge History of Classical Literature, ed. by P. E. Easterling and B. M. W. Knox, 295‐316. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 299. 13 Cf., indicatively, Easterling 1985, 302‐303. 14 Thus aptly Bowra 1964, 115. 144 ISSN:2241‐5106

confronted his war‐worn people with his vision of a heroic individual sustaining Attica by his moral presence15. Tragic texts show that Democracy developed according to a new morality that followed the aristocratic morals of the archaic era. The moral approach does not commend and evalu‐ ate human beings on the basis of their own noble origins and wealth but taking into account the fundamental moral, co‐operative excellences of justice, piety and wisdom. This change is clear in the last Sophoclean and Euripidean plays. Neoptolemus in Sophocles’ Philoctetes pro‐ vides the symbol of an ideal young man in a law‐abiding city, founded on the principles of the humanitarian feelings and social justice. From the morality of competition in the Homeric and the archaic period, dramatic poetry and especially Euripides, as we will see, foreshadows the ethics of Socrates. The sophists whose influence on Euripides’ thinking is obvious had rejected the dis‐ tinctions in society. Moral virtues and not wealth and noble origin determine human person‐ ality. In later fifth‐century literature values determining the aretē‐group were redefined to commend human behaviour in accordance with co‐operative excellences or to decry devia‐ tions from such excellences16. If one acts with injustice is not an agathos. The man possessing aretē, the agathos, is the law‐abiding, righteous and pious man. Such a usage of agathos de‐ termined with co‐operative values is frequent in Euripides and the later plays of Sophocles. The change from competitive to co‐operative values has in this period been completed. In E. Orestes, a play of 408 B.C., Orestes has just discovered that the autourgos, the husbandman, the working farmer, has respected Electra given to him as wife by Aegisthus to prevent any usurpation to his throne. Orestes vv. 367ff. identifies the husbandman with a real aristos: he is not a wealthy man, not a man of noble origin, but he is brave, just and self‐ controlled, eugenēs, concludes Euripides via Orestes, namely, a ‘noble man’, determined by his good behaviour and justice. Similarly, another working farmer defends Orestes in his trial in the court of the Argives. He is also an individual endowed with wisdom and nobility of charac‐ ter, a manly man, not a man of noble origin or physically good‐looking, but intelligent, uncor‐ rupted, self‐disciplined to a life above reproach vv. 918‐922. The aretē of a citizen is determined in Euripidean drama by moral values not of social distinctions such as wealth and aristocratic origin, foreshadowing the moral and political thinking of fourth‐century moral philosophy, especially Plato and Aristotle. Orestes adds on the agathos husbandman vv. 386ff: “… such men administer well not only their own households but also their cities. The real value of a man lies in his physis ‘character’ and especially in his eupsychia“ ‘his excellence of spirit’17. Self control and jus‐ tice render a man decent at the administration of his city, what Protagoras called political art. Aretē commends the most highly valued qualities, necessary for the well‐being of the city. “The greatest honour to be given to those able to observe the written pronouncement of their good legislators” says Plato in the Laws 922a. In Plato’s Meno 71 e, the citizen’s contribution to the prosperity of the city is clearly expressed: “a man’s aretē is to be capable of taking an

15 C. M. Bowra. 1964. Sophoclean Tragedy. Oxford: Clarendon Press repr., 1st ed. 1944, 355. 16 Adkins 1972, 99ff, for a thorough analysis with good examples. 17 Indicatively, for Orestes’ speech on the Farmer’s character, see recently H. M. Roisman – C. A. E. Luschnig. 2011. Euripides’ Electra. A Commentary. University of Oklahoma Press: Norman, 146‐148. 145 ISSN:2241‐5106

active part in politics, of helping the City’s friends and harming its enemies”. This is exactly what Thucydides commends as philopragmosynē ‘remain active in the governing of the City’, decrying the abstention from the City’s affairs apragmosynē Th. II 63.3. The well‐being of the city and the law‐abiding government, entailing the moral devel‐ opment of both the citizens and the City as a whole, is most vividly pointed out in two clearly political plays of Euripides: The Heraclidae, ‘the Children of Heracles’, and the Suppliant Women which reveal outstanding dimensions of democratic governing: the protection of the suppliants and the attribution of the traditional respect to the dead. In these two Euripidean plays the values of the Athenian democracy are depicted in the protection of human rights, especially of those oppressed by regimes. Theseus powerfully re‐ plies to the Theban messenger of Creon vv. 524‐25, 534‐40 who refuses the burial of the Seven leaders: “Now let the dead be buried… and let each element return to the place from where it came… allow the burial of the dead, maintaining the custom of all the Greeks. Justice has run its course”. The Argives’ death was just but now they have right to burial18. In the Suppliant Women, man’s existence is secure on the premise that he preserves the cosmos, namely the moral and ethical order which the state ordains19. Democracy, espe‐ cially the values of human freedom and equality in the eye of the law are commended and the oppressive domination of tyranny is decried in the epigrammatic apostrophe of Theseus vv. 429‐32: “There is nothing more hostile to the city than a tyrant… There are no common laws in such a city and one man keeping the law in his own hands rules arbitrarily. This is unjust. When the laws are written, both the powerless and the rich have equal access to justice”. Contrary to this praise of democracy in the plays of Euripides during the second dec‐ ade of the Peloponnesian War, especially in the Troades, human sufferings of war are consid‐ ered to result from man’s insanity. Euripides, “the most tragic of the poets” according to Aris‐ totle Poet. 13, 1453a30, depicted the cruelty and the violence of war from the aspect of the defeated women of Troy: The dedicated virgin, princess Cassandra, taken as a mistress by Ag‐ amemnon, Andromache who is given as a concubine to Neoptolemus, the son of Achilles, her husband’s killer, Andromache whose infant Astyanax is thrown from the walls of Troy, and, above all, Hecuba, the respectable old queen of Troy lamenting the death of her daughter Po‐ lyxena and her grandson Astyanax. Hecuba’s lament for the dead Astyanax, pointing to the powerful victors’ unreasonable fear for the powerless infant, shows the vanity of such crimes at war. Aeschylus in the Persae faced the war as a triumph of a just struggle against injustice, while Euripides, on the contrary, some years after the praise of democracy in the Suppliant Women, in the Troades stressed the disaster caused by human insanity and by arrogant men, trespassing their moral boundaries20.

18 G. Xanthakis‐Karamanos. 1980. Studies in Fourth‐Century Tragedy. Athens: Academy of Athens, 115, and C. Collard. 1975. Euripides’ Supplices, edited with introduction and commentary, 2 vols. Groningen: Buma & Boekhuis Publishers, II 250. 19 Xanthakis‐Karamanos 1980, 115. 20 See G. Xanthaki‐Karamanou. 2010. “The Persae of Aeschylus and the Troades of Euripides. A similar approach to the war on the part of the defeated?”. In Actas del XXII Congreso Espaňol de Estudios Clásicos. Madrid: Socie‐ dad Espaňola de Estudios Clásicos, 735‐741, for an analysis and comparison of the A. Persae and E. Troades. 146 ISSN:2241‐5106

The futility of a war for nothing is also strongly censured in the chorus of Helen, anoth‐ er later play of Euripides vv. 1151‐1154. Nevertheless, the anti‐war atmosphere with the strong emphasis on inhumanity and violence in the Troades associated this play of 415 B.C., namely in the heart of the Peloponnesian War, with the incident of the island of Melos, held at the same year. Euripides’ morality must have been really shocked by the cruelty of the Athe‐ nians towards the inhabitants of Melos wishing their autonomy. Concluding, the change in ethics can be clearly observed in the fifth‐century dramatic poetry, especially tragedy21. It has been shown that for the continued existence and well‐being of the city‐state it was of the utmost importance that the citizens should esteem co‐operative values, and particularly justice in their relationships with each other. After the political upheavals of Athens in the closing years of the Peloponnesian War, it was necessary to strengthen such a belief in social justice and morality. A Plato and an Aristo‐ tle were needed. Nevertheless, even before the flourishing development of fourth‐century philosophy, equal rights of speech isigoria, equality before the law isonomia, observance of the laws and the institutions of democracy, respect for human and political rights and social justice are the everlasting moral and social values that the texts of Ancient Greek tragedy powerfully re‐ veal. These principles which forged the concept of democracy are the heritage of Greek antiq‐ uity to our modern world.

Article Citation

Georgia Xanthaki, “Moral and Social Values from Ancient Greek Tragedy”. In The Hu‐ man Being: Its Nature and Functions, C. Vasillopulos ‐ P. Eliopoulos editors, volume I xxv, Dialogue and Universalism, Warsaw‐ Poland, No. 1/2015, pp. 20‐29.

21 Adkins 1972, 113 cites passages already from A. Supp. 402ff. confined to generalizations and S. Ajax 132f. and underlines the frequency of co‐operative excellences in the later plays of Sophocles and particularly in Eu‐ ripides. 147 ISSN:2241‐5106

Πάπυροι - Επιστημονικό Περιοδικό Δέλτοι τόμος 4, 2015

Papyri - Scientific Journal Delti volume 4, 2015

"Nature” and "Water” in the ancient Greek philosophy Hellas SPYROS PAVLIDES, Professor of Neotectonics and Palaeoseismology, Department of Geology, former Dean of the Faculty of Science, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki. ΣΠΥΡΟΣ ΠΑΥΛΙΔΗΣ, Καθηγητής Νεοτεκτονικής και Παλαιοσεισμολογίας, του Τμήματος Γεωλογίας, Eπρ.- Κοσμήτωρ της Σχολής Θετικών Επιστημών, του Αριστοτελείου Πανεπιστημίου Θεσσαλονίκης. Ελλάς mail: [email protected]

5 – 5 ISSN:2241-5106 Θεσσαλονίκη 201 Thessaloniki 201

Πάπυροι - Επιστημονικό Περιοδικό Papyri - Scientific Journal Δέλτοι Delti τόμος 4, 2015 volume 4, 2015 www.academy.edu.gr [email protected] "Nature” and "Water” in the ancient Greek philosophy

"Nature” and "Water” in the ancient Greek philosophy1

SPYROS PAVLIDES

Abstract ΣΠΥΡΟΣ ΠΑΥΛΙΔΗΣ This talk is divided into two parts. The first part outlines the "genesis" (creation) of the Aegean region (land of Greece), with a poetic, transcendent and lyrical, as well geoscientific language, based mainly on the poetry of the modern Greek Nobel Price (1979) poet Odysseous Elytis, as well it sum- maries the very early emergence of the Greek civilization (Aegean, Cycladic, Classic, Hellenistic). The second part of the speech emphases the ancient Greek philosophy of Nature and especially the role of Water in it. "Nature" in a broader sense, is fundamental in the ancient Greek philosophy; it constitutes the creative basis of the philosophical questioning and the roots of Science. Still, it goes beyond the reality perceived by our senses; it is a comprehensive term; what philosophy and science is trying to "see" beyond the surface.

"Our foundations are in the mountains" The poem «Genesis», an introduction to "AXION ESTI" (is worthy) by the Greek poet Odysseus Elytis (1911-1996), is deeply heretical. It expresses a fundamental experience of (existential) boundaries being drawn, between inner and outer world, a «fundamental distinction», a philosophical logic system. It is extremely difficult to be translated. Its essence and its language are unique.

When . . . "the sea was born, and I saw and admired, the Aegean Islands", the thousand of Greek Islands "emerged". My country "has tall mountains shaped like eagles the vines in ranks on the volcanoes' flanks and the houses more white. ..", that is the geological approach of the creation of the Land of Greece :

“My foundations (are) in the mountains and mountains raise people on their shoulder and over the memory burns unburned bramble. Memory of my people to say... (the poet names the Greek mountains, such as Pindos, Athos etc.)

On this land the emergence of the Greek civilization (Aegean - Cycladic, Minoan, Ar- chaic, Classic, Hellenistic) occurred, that is the roots of the foundation or the foundation of the European - Western Civilization, as the myth of abduction of Europe (Phoenician young lady

1 Speech which was given by the Invited Speaker Prof. S Pavlides at the Yunnan Mingzu University, Kunming City (China) at 7th July 2015 during the Opening Ceremony of the International Conference on the “Water Wisdom and Achievements in the Ancient Civilizations of China and Greece", 7th-9th July, 2015. Co-organazed by the Yunnan Mingzu University (China) and Dept. of Geology, Aristotle University (Greece). 151 ISSN:2241-5106

was taken from the head of the Gods, Zeus and transferred in Greece (Island of Crete), for whom the continent Europe was named). The second part of the speech outlines the ancient Greek philosophy of Nature and especially the role of Water in it. Gaia (Gaea, ), the ancient Greek goddess personifying the Earth (=Mother Nature) in its role as the beginning of life, is self-existent and unborn, the Big Mother, the Almighty Goddess. Gaia actuallyΓαία personifies the general cosmic frame within life is being evolved, or better to say, Gaia itself constitutes an integral system with life. She is called Big Mother, Mother of all, All-powerful, Supreme Goddess. According to Greek mythology, Gaea and Eros (Love) are the first “creatures” after Chaos. Earth and Eros: what a poetic, racy and substantial expression! Gaea (variant spelling Gaia) is etymologically a compound word of "Ge, "meaning “Earth” in modern Greek. In English, the root "Ge" still relates to terms such as geology (Ge/o/logos = words or reason about the Earth) geography (Ge/o/graphos = writing about Earth) and displaying an ancient connection to the term Gaea. Furthermore, Gaia represents a significant, scientific hypothesis (theory) of the last thirty years which views the Earth in its entirety as a hyper- organism. Which are though the facts that geoscientists have nowadays at their disposal in order to adopt a stance towards this conjunction and why do we turn to myths again? From cognitive and psychological view, every myth is catalytic for the human way of thinking, as it simplifies the inexplicit scientific approaches through narration. No matter how many doubts might have been raised concerning the myth, it is still considered to be a primary form of historicity. Carried by the word, it is a quite philosophical and mainly pedagogic way of conveying knowledge; an allegoric attestation. The fundamentals of Nature, Earth and Universe sciences had been established during the first Classic Greek period of Philosophy (=sciences). Modern sciences and the embryonic knowledge about Nature and its functions have their roots in the so called pre-Socratic philosophers: Thales, Heraclitus, Anaximander, Xe- nophanes, Lefkipus and Democritus (6th to 5th centuries BC), as well as later Aristotle, The- ophrastus, Epicurus, (4th c. BC) Strabo, Plinius (1st c. AD) and many other pioneers of human thought. “Nature”, in a broader sense, is fundamental in the ancient Greek philosophy (classical period); it constitutes the creative basis of the philosophical questioning. “Nature is the most dominant ruler of all’ and “nature provides everyone with everything’, points out the physician Hip- pocrates, Father of the Western Medicine. Nature is what we perceive around us “...this vast mass that we call the world’, according to philosopher Plato. Still, it goes beyond the reality perceived by our senses; it is a comprehensive term; it is what philosophy and science is trying to “see” beyond the surface. It is governed by measureless complexity that exceeds the possibilities of human comprehension. The essence of reality remains the central point of the Greek philosophy's questioning. “Nature is the substance of natural things..." and “...substance of some beginning and cause..." according to Aristotle. “Nature is self-sufficient’, according to Democritus (4th c BC). Nature, as a multifarious concept and essence, includes another significant dimension, namely: the motion and change; “...nature is the origin of motion...”, and “..an intrinsic mover ", states Aristotle. “The substance

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embraces all changes" according to the Stoics. It is eternal: "...it was and is and ever shall be ever- living fire..." According to Heraclitus, it has not been created; it was and is and ever shall be “.a world that was not made by any of the gods or men..!’, because nobody created it. Euripides calls the substance “immortal nature”. Epicurus was talking about the “...indestructible and imperishable nature of substances...’’. Finally, nature is a totality. In all Greek philosophy's nuances, all natural things and phenomena are conceived as a total, no matter if they are in accordance or in dia- metrical opposition -even in rivalry- to one another. All beings, facts and phenomena, which govern their relations, are closely tied one to another; they depend one on another and are influenced one by another; they constitute an unbreakable unity, that is today's definition of System. “Everything is one...’’, claimed Heraclitus, who was the first among the natural philosophers to grasp the concepts of Unity and Wholeness. Philosophy in its first steps, which were taken by the Ions, specifically by Thales, hypothesized the fundamental unity of all material things, which lies beyond their apparent disparity. “Nothing exceeds the supreme nature...", claims the contemporary philosopher Kostas Axelos (1924-2010), who keeps up the Greek philosophy. Democritus states that “nature and teaching are similar; for teaching reshapes the man, and in reshaping makes his nature...”. That is to say, teaching (by speech) reshapes the man and alike nature, which constantly reshapes and hence creates a second nature in man. Plato, who has always focused on the man, extends his line of thought and points out that without knowing nature as a whole it is not possible to know the nature of the human soul. “Everything happens by necessity and the cause of all that comes into being is the 'whirl” which is called necessity’ says Democritus. While trying to connect to his primary thoughts the issue of “necessity” and "causality”, Democritus put emphasis on an additional factor, which contributes to the changes that happen in nature, namely: the chance. Of course the term “chance” does not mean here lack of cause, but merely lack of expediency: “..even though he seems to use chance in the creation of the world....”. Chance and Necessity are the two factors which drive the phenomena of this world, according to Democritus. “Chance and Necessity, “An Essay on the Natural Phi- losophy of Modern Biology (1971)” was also the title of the book written by the French biolo- gist and Nobel prize-winner (in Medicine 1965) Jacques L. Monod (19101976); a book, which had such an impact on our undergraduate thought. Democritus and J. Monod, as well as many other contemporary scientists, are talking about a causal chance and necessity which acts without the intervention of any other external power. Aristotle talks also about “reciprocal causality”. That is to say, there is a relation of mutual dependence or influence of cause upon effect. The same does Plato: “nothing can happen without a cause’’, who also accepts that whatever happens in nature should necessarily have a cause, while for him, the cause is automatically interpreted into a creator. The water cycle had been introduced by Xenophanes (6th-5th century BC), as well as by Anaxagoras (5th c. B.C.) and Aristotle (4th c. B.C.) "...The sea is the source of water and of wind. For without the great sea, there would be no wind, nor streams of rivers, nor rainwater from on high, but the great sea is the begetter of clouds, winds and rivers’”, that is a laconic, though very clear formulation of the hydrologic cycle. While Thales of Miletus and Democritus believe that water is the cause of Earthquakes. Aristotle quotes in his text "Meteorologica”: "...Democritussays that the whole Earth is water...". Today, we are talking about the solid crust of the Earth and the solid- semi-fluid mantle, while contemporary calculations refer to such big quantities of water inside the crust that can be compared to the oceans. The stoic philosophers were talking about

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the "water creature". Thales, who acknowledged the significance of water, exalted it to the structural element of the world: "he declared that water is the principle of all things..."

As conclusion We consider the ancient Greek philosophy as the seed of the later philosophic and scientific thought; however, what is amazing is the fact that it also includes some concise conclusions which we reach with the modern sciences. The big, primary and fundamental ideas of Greek philosophy about the perceptibility of nature and the different pervasiveness of knowledge (in Greek "logos") through nature about eternity, mobility, variability, holism as well as the naturalistic view in general keep occupying and puzzling the contemporary thought. The contribution of modern science to the respective problematic is significant and essential. Earth in its entirety is the big piece of nature which is immediate to us and which we will try to approach in the circle of the same questioning about the diachronic and recent scientific conclusions about it. The study and interpretation of nature was done gradually through the myth, the religious views, the philosophy, the dogmatic unified post-aristotelic “science” and the modern fragmented science, which is classified in branches and specializations. This course included conflicts, ruptures, losses but also considerable profits. The magic of the myth disappeared in the paths of the more rational questioning of philosophy; still, this was a necessary rapture for human thought to be released and go ahead. Philosophy's holistic view about nature vanished further in the fragmented science of the 19th century, which was divided into basic sciences to study the nature i.e., cosmography, physics, chemistry, geology and biology, while it almost disappeared in the 20th century's technocratic views about super-specialization.

Aftermath:

Sun of justice, whom we feel and you, myrtle branch of glory, do not, I beg of you do not forget my country ! (Elytis)

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Πάπυροι - Επιστημονικό Περιοδικό Δέλτοι τόμος 4, 2015

Papyri - Scientific Journal Delti volume 4, 2015

The Nature of Logically Simple Objects in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Η Φύση των λογικά απλών αντικειμένων στο Tractatus του Wittgenstein Hellas EMMANUEL PERAKIS, Ph.D, Department of Philosophical and Social Studies, Philosophy School, University of Crete. ΕΜΜΑΝΟΥΗΛ ΠΕΡΑΚΗΣ, Διδάκτωρ Φιλοσοφίας του Τμήματος Φιλοσοφικών και Κοινωνικών Σπουδών της Φιλοσοφικής Σχολής του Πανεπιστημίου Κρήτης. Ελλάς Email: [email protected]

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Πάπυροι - Επιστημονικό Περιοδικό Papyri - Scientific Journal Δέλτοι Delti τόμος 4, 2015 volume 4, 2015 www.academy.edu.gr [email protected] The Nature of Logically Simple Objects in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Η Φύση των λογικά απλών αντικειμένων στο Tractatus του Wittgenstein

The Nature of Logically Simple Objects in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus1

Tractatus Wittgenstein Η Φύση των λογικά απλών αντικειμένων

στο του EMMANUEL PERAKIS

ΕΜΜΑΝΟΥΗΛ ΠΕΡΑΚΗΣ

Tractatus Wittgenstein Περίληψη Στο του , η γλώσσα και ο κόσμος συνδέονται στο επίπεδο των λογικά απλών ονομάτων και των αντίστοιχων απεικονιζόμενων αντικειμένων. Το πρόβλημα είναι ότι δεν μπορούμε να έχουμε εμπειρία των αντικειμένων και για αυτόν το λόγο έχουν προταθεί διαφορετικές ερμηνείες ούτως ώστε να εξηγηθεί η φύση αυτών των οντοτήτων. Τα λογικά απλά αντικείμενα δεν είναι όπως οι οντότητες που συναντούμε στον εμπειρικό κόσμο. Δεν έχουν ουσιαστικές υλικές ιδιότητες. Μόνη τουςTractatus ουσιαστική ιδιότητα είναι η δυνατότητα τους να συνδέονται με άλλα λογικά απλά αντικείμενα. Τίποτε άλλο δε θα μπορούσε να είναι ουσιαστικό για αυτά, σύμφωνα με το κείμενο του . Εφόσον οι στοιχειώδεις προτά- σεις πρέπει να είναι λογικά ανεξάρτητες και οι αντίστοιχες καταστάσεις πραγμάτων δεν πρέ- πει να αλληλοαποκλείονται, έτσι και τα λογικά απλά αντικείμενα θα πρέπει να μπορούν να εμφανίζονται σε όλες τις δυνατές καταστάσεις πραγμάτων. Θα πρέπει να είναι ομοειδή με την έννοια ότι έχουν την ίδια λογική μορφή. Η δυνατότητα σύνδεσής τους με τα άλλα απλά αντι- κείμενα δεν πρέπει να περιορίζεται, αντίθετα από ότι συμβαίνει στα μακροσκοπικά αντικεί- μενα της καθημερινής μας εμπειρικής ζωής που έχουν περιορισμένη γκάμα σύνδεσης με τα άλλα πράγματα. Τα λογικά απλά αντικείμενα μπορούν να διακριθούν μεταξύ τους μόνο με την έννοια ότι δεν ταυτίζονται και συμμετέχουν σε διαφορετικές καταστάσεις πραγμάτων. Θα ήταν καλύτερα να μην αποδίδουμε στα αντικείμενα κάποια θετική εμπειρική ιδιότητα, καθώς μια τέτοια ιδιότητα θα περιόριζε τις δυνατές εμφανίσεις τους σε δυνατές καταστάσεις πραγμάτων και τη δυνατότητά τους να συνδέονται μεταξύ τους. Έτσι θα πρέπει να καταλή- ξουμε στην άποψη ότι τα αντικείμενα είναι κάποιες εμπειρικά άγνωστες γυμνές οντότητες. Abstract Language and the world are connected in the level of logically simple names and o jects in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus and this is one of the reasons why so many different theories have been proposed in order b-to . The Logically problem simple is that objects objects are are not not like empirically any entity observable we have

explain the nature of these entities.

ever1 This metis a slightly in our modified empirical version world. of a Theylecture have given no in theessential Sixth European material Congress properties, of Analytic but Philosophy, only internal 21

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formal properties, which merely consist in their capacity to be connected with other simple is is their only essential property and nothing else could be essential for them, a cording to Wittgenstein’s sayings in the Tractatus objects.pendent Th and corresponding states of affairs must not exclude each other, simple objects mustc- . As elementary propositions must be inde-

objectsbe able tomust appear not bein allrestricted, possible instates contrast of affairs. to macrosco They mustpic beempirical homogeneous things inof theour sense everyday that they all have some common logical form. Their capacity to be connected with the other simple distinguished in that they are numerically different and participate in different states of a life, which can only be connectedt ascribe in limited objects ways any with positive other property, things. Simple as such objects properties can only would be restrict their possible appearances in the possible states of affairs and their capacity to bef- fairs. So, we would better no bare e connected with each other. We should think that objects must be some empirically unknown ntities.

The subject of this paper is the problem of the nature of logically simple objects in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Tractatus problem of simple objects. An is extensivecorrelated bibliography with early Wittgenstein’s has been produced conception on this of controversialmetaphysics, issue. Its significance consists in that it is in the core of the metaphysics of the . The Simple objects, as the products of a complete logical analysis, constitute the substance ofbut the it isworld also 2interesting and simultaneously by itself, as the a kind ontological of metaphysical background exercise. of all possible worlds3 l po

. Al s- sible worlds are products of the various correlations of these logically simple objects. Simple objectsEarly are depicted Wittgenstei by simple names. This pictorial relation is the foundation of the pictorial relation between language and the world. physics and “Socrates’ dream”n’s atomism in Plato’s is quite Theaetetus different4, to from which ancient Wittgenstein materialist himself atomism. is refe His ratomisming in his is Philosophical logical, linguistic. Investigations There is a5 closer connection between early Wittgenstein’s meta- r- Tractatus, only. Socrates composite says entities, that the like world facts, consists can be of minimaldescribed si m-by ple entities, which cannot be described, but only be named. Only composite entities can be described. Similarly in the simultaneouslycomposite propositions, language whereasand the simpleworld, objectsWittgenstein can only ma kes be nameda kind byof ‘linguistic simple names. ontology’, So it seems that there is a gap between naming simples and describing composites. By analyzing

producing simple names and objects. Language and the world are connected in the level of cansimples. be compared to Frege’s objects, Wittgenstein’s immediate philosophical ancestors were Frege and Russell. His objects

2 TLP “The objects form to which his proper simple names refer.” Nevertheless, 3 TLP “Objects contain the possibility of all states of affairs” 4 Plato,, 2.021: Theaetetus , 201d – the substance of the world. Therefore they cannot be compound . 5 , 2.014: . 202d. 158 P.I., 46. ISSN:2241-5106

Frege was not a logical atomist, aiming to a complete logical analysis and consequently his o jects were not really logical simples like Wittgenstein’s6 between Wittgenstein’s and Russell’s logical atomism7 b- . A closer similarity could be found refer to Russell’s individuals, which are very close to simple. For Russell, objects, the as onlyWittgenst genuinelyein himself refer- acknowledgesring entities are in the his demonstrative Philosophical pronounsInvestigations “this”8 and “that”. These demonstrative pronouns

. Such Russell genuinely and simple Wittgenstein, names cannotthe mea be ingdescribed. of their On simple the contrary, names is composite their non names of our language can be analytically described by meansomism ofis descriptionsquite different using in character these simple in that names. it is empiricalFor both and phenomenalistic in contrast n-to early Wittgenstein’s purely - describable reference. Despite this, Russell’s logical at-

logical atomism. Russell’s atoms are our minimal sense data out oft which the objects of our empirical knowledge are composed. Wittgenstein’s pure logical atomism endorsesIn contrast a kind to of ancient pure logical physical entities atomism as a orcandidate Russell’s for empiricist, the role of phenomenalistic simple objects. In ato tha sense Wittgenstein’s logical atomism is more radical than Russell’s. of la m- ism, Wittgenstein’s atomism could be regarded as purely logical or linguistic. The role n- empiricalguage is of entities great significance of our everyday in early life, Wittgenstein. he is leading He us presents to those us minimal a kind of entities, downward logical anal oy- sis of the world and language, which is its depicting medium. Departing from macroscopic b- jects. The world is gradually being analyzed in facts, facts are analyzed in atomic facts and the latter are analyzed in simple objects. Correspondingly, language is being analyzed in propositions, propositionsAs Wittgenstein are says analyzed in the in beginning elementary of his propositions Tractatus, the and world the latter is the aretotality analyzed of facts, in simple names. nt 9, non empirical, metaphysical, strange e not of things or objects. This makes the nature of logically simple objects essentially differe from facts. In contrast to facts, objects are colorless - rld is founded in this leveln- tities. Objects compose the substance of the world and the corresponding logically simple names Manyrefer tointerpretations them. The pictorial have been relation developed of language in order and to the explain wo the nature of the simple objectsof simplicity. of the Tractatus The problem with most of these interpretations is that, although they are based on texts from the Tractatus and other inworks the lastof Wittgenstein, fifty years, but they there ascribe is still to nohis consensussimple objects on this properties subject. of

fersascribable to all these rather kinds to empirical, of simplicity, complex it should entities, be made like facts.clear thatThey his confuse objects the in thevarious Tractatus kinds, as simplicity, like logical, epistemological and semantic. Although Wittgenstein occasionally re-

6 G Function and Concept 21 41, On Concept and Object, 1892a, 55, On Sense and Mea ing, 1892b, 56 78 Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege. Frege,, , 1891, pp. - pp. 42- n- 7 Russell, pp.On - in P., Mind Geach and M. 479 Black93, (eds), Analytic Realism, in , vi, 1980, Third Edition, Blackwell, Oxford, 133 46, The Philosophy of Logical Atomism Logic B. Denoting 1950(1905), George- Allen and Unwin, The Collected 178 Papers of Bertrand Russell George8 Allen and Unwin, London 1983, pp. - , in R.C. Marsh (ed.), and9 TLP Knowledge:“ Essays 1901 - ” London 1956, pp. - 281. P.I., 46. 159 , 2.0232: Roughly speaking: objects are colorless . ISSN:2241-5106

Wittgenstein makes a ‘shifting’, alte

the substance of the world, are logically simple entities. r- nating use of the term ‘object’. 10, simple objectsThere c are various questions concerning the nature of simple objects. One of them is thewhether wide theyinterpretation are particulars11, simple or universals. objects could According be not to only the narrowparticulars, interpretation but also universals ould only be particulars and consequently proper names refer to them.al According names refer to

(propertiesMy interpretation and relations). is In that such logically a case, simple not only objects proper of names, the Tractatus but also must gener be uniform ‘n ked’to them. entities, in the sense that they have a common logical form and that their only difference a hypothesis, we should reject the wide intea- pretation, as for such an interpretation simple objects are both particulars and universals is that they are not the same. If we adopt such r- lso not adequate textual evidence in the Tractatus supporting this (propertiesinterpretation, and which relations). confuses Consequently, the various usesaccording of the to term such ‘object’ an interpretation, made throughout objects Wittge could not be uniform. There is a after the Tractatus n- stein’s texts. Wide interpretation of simple objects is mainly based on some texts before and standing of some texts. The of same Wittgenstein could be andsaid his about ‘shifting’ the narrow use of theinterpretation term “ of simples, according to which objects are only particulars. This interpretation is also based on a misunder- object”. Attributing ofcharacterizations our everyday life like and particulars not to logical or universals to logically simple objects is not the right way to followVarious on this answers matter. haveSuch also characterizations been given to theare questionrather attributable whether simple to the objectscomplex are entities phy ical, phenomenalistic or phenomenologicalsimples. entities12 tation, simple objects are physical and as such they are the causes of s- . According to the physicalistic interpre- our sense data. This in- problemterpretation with is such quite an close interpretation to the narrow is that interpretation it suits to Russell’s and the atoms ancient rather atomic than theories. to Wittge Ac- cording to the classical phenomenalistic interpretation, simple objects are our sense data. The n- stein’s Thesimple views objects. that theThere objects is also of thethe Tractatusphenomenological are physicalistic interpretation, or phenomenalistic according to entities which objects are universals or sensible qualities.

rect(sense evidence data) confusein the text the variousof the Tractatus uses of thesuppo termrting “object” the phenomenological and consequently interpretation, they must be whichabandoned. takes Wittgensteinthe simple objects does notof the give Tractatus us any specific as universals example or sensibleof his objects. qualities There and is it no is edi-

an indirect way at this view, which is also connected with Wittgenstein’s idiosyncratic solis- sentially an improved version of the phenomenalistic interpretation. We could only arrive in p- 10 Objects, Properties and Relations in the Tractatus 145 An Introduction to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, London, 1959 ers, Tractarian Semantics, Oxford, I. M. Copi,108 9, 147 68, The Metaphysics of the Tractatus , Mind 67 (1958) -165, G.E.M. Anscombe, 11 Investigating Wittgenstein, Oxford,, pp. 1986 25-40, P. Carruth 121989, Tejedor, pp. The- Metaphysical- Status of Tractarian Objects, ,Cambridge, Philosophical 1990, Investigations pp. 85-106., 24, 4 285–303, M. B. and J. Hintikka, , Oxford, 1992 77 , pp. Wittgenstein’s 32-3. Metaphysics, Cambridge, 1994, C. 14 27 (2001) R. Bradley, The Nature of All Being , pp. 160-8, J. Cook, pp. - . ISSN:2241-5106

ence of the elementary propositions, simple objects could be neither sense data, nor sensible sismqu based on texts of his middle philosophical period. Due to the doctrine of the independ- There is much contradictory evidence in the Tractatus and Wittgenstein’s other texts alities, as the propositions depicting them would mutually exclude each other. hese Tractatus, Wittgenstein does not give us any description of hisfor simpleand against objects these; he interpretations.does not tell us whatSuch theseevidence objects is not are adequate and does to not establish give any any example of t of interpretations conclusively. In the If we want to stay close to the text of the Tractatus, we should better adopt a kind of an empi icallythem. agnosticHe could viewnot do concerning otherwise the as hisnature objects of Wittgenstein’s are simple entities simple that objects, could notin the be sensedescribed. that they could not be described r- we follow such a view, simple objects should be considered as a kind of entities quite myster in the same way as the empirical entities of our everyday life.ial If i- ous for Theus. According main point to of this this interpretation, paper is that their the only logical essential form could property be seen that as Wittgenstein their potent a i- cribesty to be to connected his logically with simple other objects similar in and the uniform Tractatus simple, taken objects as the without produc tsany of restriction.a complete log cal analysis and as the substance of all possible worlds is their capacity to participate in alls- possible states of affairs connected with other similar logically simple objects13 i- have common internal essential properties, then we could only distinguish them through their external properties, which are their actual occurrences in the various states of affairs,. If they even all if such a distinction does not depict their inner substance14 entities complet . Logically simple objects must be ely different from those we have ever met in our empirical everyday world. Those entities are the common form and substance of all possible worlds. Simple objects do pacitynot have to beany connected material withproperties other similarlyessential simpleto them objects as such15 properties characterize complex howentities. contain Logically the possibility simple objects of all possiblehave only states internal of affairs formal16 properties consisting in their ca- . In this way, simple objects some- . As it is essential and necessary for thea visual Tractatus spot to does have not some give color us any (any other color), information similarly concerningit is essential what and is necessary essential forfor ahis simple si object to have the capacity to be connected with other similar simple objects. Wittgenstein in The nature of simple objects of the Tractatus m- Logicallyple objects. simple objects should be uniform in the sense that they all have some common log cal form and their capacity to be combined with eachis indeterminateother should not and be mysterious restricted forin theus. i- ssible worlds could be r same way as the macroscopic unanalyzed objects of our everyday life could only have limited connections to each other. Even the most different entities of all po e- duced to the logically simple objects in this way. Given such a view, logically simple objects 13 TLP it’s

, 2.01231: “In order to know an object, I must know not external but all its internal qualities”. 2.0124: “If14 TLP all objects are given, then thereby are all possible atomic facts also given”. 2.0141: “Objects contain the possi- bilityare first of allpresented states of by affairs”. the propositions 15 TLP, 2.0231: “The substance of the world can only determine a form and not any material properties. For these 16 TLP - first formed by the configurations of the objects”. , 2.0141, 2.033: “The form is the possibility of the161 structure”, 2.121. , 2.014. ISSN:2241-5106

could appear in all possible states of affairs and even be indistinguishable in respect to their logical form and only be distinguished by the fact that they are different numerically and pa ticipate in different states of affairs17 r- Such a view is based on the .requirement As a visual point of the could logical have independence any color, in theof elementary same way, a logically simple object should have the capacity to appear in any possible state of affairs. in all possible states of affairs, then the logical independence of elementary propositions wouldpropositions. not be Ifpossible, there were as they restrictions would exclude in the capacityand contradict of logically each simpleother, inobjects the same to participate way as in

positive property as essential to logically simple objects, except their capacity to combine with the level of complex propositions. This is a good reason why we should rather not ascribe any

each other.Another Positive problem properties is whether are restrictionsWittgenstein’s to theobjects range could of the be viewedpossible in combinations a realistic way, of thatobjects. is, whether they should be considered as having an existence independent of us and our language18

the existence. According of objects to to a that“nominalistic” of the existence interpretation, of the objects objects of couldour everyday not be considered empirical life, independently of our language. Such an interpretation gives a completely different meaning in ple objects depend on our language as references of logically simple names, we should not forgettaking thatthem Wittgenstein as postulates was, of a at theory least programmatically,of meaning. Nevertheless, a realist even concerning if we suppose the existence that sim- of logically simple objects19 way to secure the meaning of our language20, that is, its propositions must have the possibility . He demanded the existence of his objects, as he saw it as the only cally simple objects in the world and the necessary existence of simple names in language toconstitute be true orthe false crucial in a logically necessary way. He thought that the necessary existence of logi- In other words, the existence of both logically simple names and objects is a necessary cond points in which language and the world are connected with each other. In this paper, I maintained the view that simple objects are non empirical, met i- tion of the picture theory of meaning of language. should better adopt a kind of an agnostic view according to which logically simple- objects area- mysteriousphysical entities, non empirwhich necessarily exist and they cannot be described by propositions. So we

17 TLP ical entities, without any – positiveapart from or their material external properties. properties only All different possible

then one, 2.0233: can distinguish “Two objects it straig of the same logical form, are - i- thereated from are severalone another things in which that they have are the different”, totality of 2.02331: their properties “Either a in thing common, has properties and then whichit is quite no other impossible has, and to ht away from the others dby by a descriptionanything, I cannotand refer distinguish to it. Or, iton – forthe otherwiseother hand, it

point to any one of them. For if a thing is not distinguishe , therewith are all objects also would be distinguished”, 4.023: “As the description of an object describes it by its external properties so propos i- tions18 describe realityUse and by Reference its internal of properties”,Names 5.524: “If the objectsStudies are given in the philosophy of Wittgenstein, given.Routle If the elementary propositions are given, 20 then therewith The all Falseelementary Prison propositions are also 99 given”. 19 TLPH. Ishiguro, , in Peter Winch (ed.), –a form dge and Kegan Paul, London 1969, pp. “This-50, fixedD. Pears, form consists of , Oxford 1987, pp.Substance -114. is what exists ,independently 2.022: “It is clear of what however is the different case”, from a real one an imagined world may be, it must have something 20 TLP- in common with the real world”, 2.023: the objects”., 2.024: “

, 3.23: “The postulate of the possibility of the simple162 signs is the postulate of the determinateness of the sense”. ISSN:2241-5106

states of affairs are composed of them and they can occur in all possible states of affairs co mater m- bined with all other logically simple objects without any restriction. Objects cannot be i- al entities having certain positive properties in the real empiricalities seem world. to be quiteThey strange,must be almostpurely logical entities. Not only our real empirical world, but all possible worlds are made of these objects. Such distant from our everyday empirical life ent asabsurd. a complete As Wittgenstein logical analysis ascribes w such a character to his objects, this makes our attempts to find out their nature hard. Such an attempt would unavoidably have a paradoxical character, ould be practically unattainable. Nevertheless such attempts can be irresistibly attractive.

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Bibliography An Introduction to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus

Anscombe, G.E.M.,Tractarian Semantics, Oxford, 1989 , London, 1959. Bradley, R., The The Nature Metaphysics of All Being of the, Oxford, Tractatus 1992. Carruthers,Wittgenstein’s P., Metaphysics . Carruthers,Objects, P., Properties and Relations in the, Cambridge, Tractatus 1990. Cook,Freg J. W.,Function and Concept , Cambridge, 1994. Translations from theCopi, Philosophical I.M., Writings of Gottlob Frege, , Mind 67 (1958) 145 -165. 21 e, G., , 1891, in P. Geach and M. Black (eds), On Concept and Object, 1980, Third Edition, Blackwell,Translations Oxford, pp. from- 41. the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege, 42 Frege, G., 1892a, in P. Geach and M. Black (eds), On Sense and Meaning, 1980, Third Edition, Blackwell,Translations Oxford, pp. from- 55. the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege, 1980, 56 Frege, G., 1892b, in P. Geach and M. Black (eds), Translations from the PhilosophicalThird Edition, Writings Blackwell, of Gottlob Oxford, Frege pp. , - 78. Geach P., Black M. (eds),Investigating Wittgenstein Third Edition, Blackwell,Use and Oxford, Reference 1980. of Names Studies in the philos phy of WittgensteinHintikka, M. B. and J., , Oxford, 1986. Ishiguro, H.,The False Prison , in Peter Winch (ed.), o- Plato, Theaetetus, Routledge, in the and Kegan Paul, London 1969, pp. 20 -50. RussellPears, D.,, On , Mind, Oxford 1987. Analytic RealismDialogues, in of Plato, vol. IV, tr. B. Jowett, Oxford 1871., vi, George A B., Denoting (1905), 479 -93. Russell, B., The Philosophy of LogicalThe Collected Atomism Papers of Bertrand RussellLogic and l- len and Unwin, London 1983,1950 pp., George 133 -46. Allen and Unwin, 178 Russell, B., The Metaphysical Status of Tractarian, in R.C.Objects Marsh, Philosophical (ed.), Investigations, 24,Knowledge: 4 Essays 285 303 1901 - London 1956, pp. -281. Tejedor, C., Tractatus Logico Philosophicus London 1973 TLP (2001) - . Philosophical Investigations PI Wittgenstein, L., - , tr. C.K. Ogden, . ( ). Wittgenstein, L., , tr. G.E.M. Anscombe, Oxford 1986. ( ).

Article Citation This article was first published in Ariadni

15 (2009) 155-163.

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Πάπυροι - Επιστημονικό Περιοδικό Δέλτοι τόμος 4, 2015

Papyri - Scientific Journal Delti volume 4, 2015

Sartre and the Problem of Universal Human Nature Revisited DAVID EDWARD ROSE, Senior Lecturer in Philosophy, Newcastle University, U.K. Email: [email protected]

5 – 5 ISSN:2241-5106 Θεσσαλονίκη 201 Thessaloniki 201

Πάπυροι - Επιστημονικό Περιοδικό Papyri - Scientific Journal Δέλτοι Delti τόμος 4, 2015 volume 4, 2015 www.academy.edu.gr [email protected] Sartre and the Problem of Universal Human Nature Revisited

Sartre and the Problem of Universal Human Nature Revisited

DAVID EDWARD ROSE

Περίληψη Στην εργασία αυτή,Heidegger προτείνω να εξετάσουμε αποκλειστικά τη φιλοσοφική σκέψη του Σαρτρ και να τη τοποθετήσουμε σε σχέση με την ευρύτερη ευρωπαϊκή παράδοση και άλλων στοχαστών, κυρίως του . Ο σκοπός προκύπτει από τη γενική αποδοχή της φιλοσο- φίας του Σαρτρ στο βρετανικό ακαδημαϊκό περιβάλλον ως παράδειγμα ενός αντιφατικού υπολογισμού της ελευθερίας και της ανθρώπινης φύσης. Μια τέτοια ανάγνωση, θα υποστηρί- ξω, βασίζεται στην εσφαλμένη πεποίθηση για την έννοια της ύπαρξης στον Σαρτρ, που έχει αποκοπεί από τις ρίζες της στη σύγχρονη ευρωπαϊκή παράδοση και στον υπερ-προσδιορισμό της έννοιας της ελευθερίας ως αναίτιο αυθορμητισμό. Ο σκοπός αυτής της εργασίας είναι να μην αρνηθεί το ελευθεριακό στοιχείο στον Σαρτρ, αλλά να υποστηρίξει ότι είναι το πιο βασι- κό επίπεδο στο οποίο έχει ανεγερθεί ένας πιο εξελιγμένος υπολογισμός της ελεύθερης βούλη- σης. Ο Σαρτρ έχει δημιουργήσει μια απαράδεκτη ένταση μεταξύ, αφενός, της ελευθερίας ως απρόκλητο αυθορμητισμό και, από την άλλη, ενός καθολικού υπολογισμού της ανθρώπινης φύσης. Ανεξάρτητα με το πόσο λεπτή αυτή η γενική θεωρία του ανθρώπου είναι, σύμφωνα με αυτή, ο Σαρτρ είναι ένοχος για την επανεισαγωγή μιας ουσίας στην ύπαρξη του ανθρώπου, σε αντίθεση με τη δική του κατάσταση ελευθερίας. Οποιαδήποτε άλλη ερμηνεία του υπολογι- σμού του Σαρτρ περί της υποκειμενικότητας πρέπει να επιστρέψει στη σχέση μεταξύ αυτών των εννοιών και της αντι-καρτεσιανής καταγωγής τους. Η υποτιθέμενη ένταση στο κείμενο του Σαρτρ ανάμεσα σε ένα καθολικό υπολογισμό της ανθρώπινηςSartre φύσης και του υπολογι- σμού της απρόκλητης ελευθερίας στηρίζεται σε αυτό το οντολογικό σφάλμα. Είναι για να πε- ριγράψει το θέμα από την άποψη του πράγματος, όταν ο ισχυρίζεται κατ 'επανάληψη ότι δεν είναι τίποτα. Το αρχικό σχέδιο πρέπει να γίνει κατανοητό ως μια πληρέστερη ανάπτυ- ξη της γνώσης της αυτο-συνείδησης για τον εαυτό της. Ως εκ τούτου, το αρχικό σχέδιο που περιγράφεται στο Είναι και το Μηδέν δεν είναι μια γενική θεωρία της ανθρώπινης συμπερι- φοράς, είναι η περιγραφή της ανθρώπινης ύπαρξης. Η ιδέα της ελευθερίας και της αυτοδι ά- θεσης θεωρεί ζωτικής σημασίας το ότι ο χαρακτηρισμός της πράξης παραμένει ότι εγώ, ως άτομο, είμαι υπεύθυνος για το τι εγώ (και το τι εμείς) κάνω για τον εαυτό μου (εαυτό μας). Το να δούμε τον Σαρτρ χωρίς αναφορά στις επιρροές του, όπως ο Καντ, ο Χέγκελ και ο Χάιντεγκερ και χωρίς να λαμβάνονται υπόψη τα μεταγενέστερα έργα του, είναι ο λόγος που αυτή η επικρατέστερη, εσφαλμένη ανάγνωση εξακολουθεί να είναι αποδεκτή από πολλές πλευρές.

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Abstract In this paper I propose to look exclusively at the philosophical thought of Sartre and to

The purpose arises from the general acceptance of Sartre’s philosophy in the British academic environmentsituate it in relation as an example to the wider of a contradictoryEuropean tradition account and of other freedom thinkers, and human especially nature. Heidegger. Such a

which has been divorced from its origins in the modern European tradition and the over dreading,etermination I shall ofcontend, the meaning is based of onfreedom a mistaken as uncaused appropriation spontaneity. of Sartre’s The conceptaim of this of existence paper is - on which a more sophisticated account of free will is erected. Sartre has created an una not to deny the libertarianism element in Sartre, but to argue that it is but the most basic level - c- ceptable tension between, on the one hand, freedoman essenceas uncaused into spontaneityman’s being and,and contradicon the oth- inger, ahis universal own condition account of of freedom. human nature. Any alternative No matter reading how thin of Sartre’s this general account theory of subjectivity of man is, hasaccording to return to her, to the Sartre relationship is guilty ofbetween reintroducing these concepts and their anti Cartesian origin. Thet- supposed tension in Sartre’s text between a universal account of human nature and his a count of uncaused freedom rests on this ontological error. It is to describe- the subject in terms of a thing when Sartre repeatedly asserts that it is nothing. The original project needsc- to be understood as a fuller elaboration of self the original project described in Being and Nothingness is not a general theory of human b -consciousness’s knowledges self of itself.determination Therefore, is e- haviour, it is a description of human existence. the idea of freedom a - crucial in that the characterisation of praxis remains that I, as individual, am responsible for Heideggwhat I (and what we) make of myself (ourselves). readingTo is stilllook accepted at Sartre in without many quarters.reference to his influences such as Kant, Hegel and er and without considering his later works is the reason that this prevalent, mistaken

1. Introduction1 Sartre’s account of freedom is still widely understood as a version of metaphysical li doctrine which asserts that the human being is completely and unconditionally free. This prevalent reading is largely due to the influence still held by Mary Warnock’s inteb- pretationertarianism, of hisa early texts and her privilege of the role of anguish in his thought.2 The true r-

1 This paper was originally published in 2003 in Sartre Studies International 20. Reprinted by kind pe

2 The Philosophy of Sartre , 9(1), 1- r- missioncomprehensively of the publishers, argued accountBerghahn of Books.Sartre’s libertarianism and this “traditional” Sartrean freedom can also be M. Warnock, The Tragic Finale , London: Hutchinson and Co., 1965 (Hereafter PS) Her bookFree is Willthe mostEn Sartrean scholars – found in W. Desan, New York: Harper, 1960 andReview S. Morgenbesser of Metaphysics and J. Walsh, 101. It alsog- lewood Clifts: Prentice-Hall, 1962. It is appropriated unreflectively by non-The Cambridge Companionsee, for toexample, Sartre J. Neu, “Divided Minds: Sartre’s “Bad Faith” critique and forcesof Freud” P. Caws in to completely separate1988, the freedom42, 79- of spont causesneity and confusion freedom in of Sartrean action as scholars, though they see wereJ. Simont, distinct “Sartrean phenomena Ethics” in inch. 8 of Sartre Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, 168 a- London: Routledge, 1979. ISSN:2241-5106

and unconditionally free and that determinism is false. This leads to a tension in Being and Nothingnessdoctrine of Sartrean philosophy is, according to this position,n uncaused the andidea ultimately that man ismeaningless absolutely

accuses Sartrebetween, of resolving on the this one tension hand, the in selfhis aslater a works by betraying freedom and re introducingspontaneity; determinism and, on the other, into his an acco account of human nature as the original project. Warnock - the Marxist. unt of human nature, namely Marxist historical materi- alism. Her book makes it possible to speakdetermines of an earlythe meaning and a late of Sartre;freedom the in existentialist, Sartre’s texts and as uncaused spontaneity when it is possible to offer an alternative interpretation by returning to the anachronisticHowever, this idea approach of human over nature.- Sartre openly states that “there is no human nature” f human freedom and not just in relation to his rejection of determinism.3 The aim of this paper is not to deny (EH 29), but this is to be understood in terms of his whole presentation o on which a more sophisticated account of free will is erected. An examination of the influence ofthe the libertarianism German idealist inherent t in Sartre’s account, but to argue that it is but the most basic level demonstrate the importance of the notion of freedom- as self determination. radition and, especially, Heidegger on Sartre’s ideas, will hopefully - 2. Sartre’s libertarianism Most interpretations of Sartre’s work begin from his contribution to the freedom d – patibilist and the libertarian – Sartre offers his readers the most extreme and consistent a - counteterminism of the libertarian debate: of position.the three Thecharacters determinist in the holds debate that thethat huma is, then beingdeterminist, is a physical the co om- c- b- jecthaviour like as all a others,billiard subjectball. Free to will the physicalis merely lawsan illusion. of the universeThe compatibilist and, once agrees all the that laws man are is known and the initial conditions revealed, the human being is as predictable in his or her be- - thesubject human to causal being law is free since because he is motivated he can choose by desires, his own but valuesthat freedom and projects. is the power Human to beingssatisfy anddesire objects and so are one just ought different to understand types of things; freedom humans as freedom are able from to restraint.determine For their the own libertarian, actions through an act of volition which is uncaused. Sartre is the proper name most commonly a sociated with the position of the libertarian 4as he rejects any deterministic theory of action s-

Freedom as a Value

For3 a good overview of the whole problem of defining Sartrean The freedom,Transcendence refer to of D. the Detmar, Ego Chicago: Open Court, 1986. Nausea Abbreviations Being to and the Nothingnessworks of Sartre are as follows: TE - – (1936)Anti trans. F. Wil- liams, and R. Kirkpatrick, New York: Octagon Books, 1972; N - Existentialism(1938) trans. and R.Humanism Baldick, London: Penguin, 1965; BN - (1943)trans. H. Barnes, London: Routledge, 1989 AJ -Semite trans.and Jew A. (1944) trans. G. Becker, New York: Schoken– Notebooks Books, 1948; for an EH Ethics - (1945) trans. P. Mairet, London: Methuen, 1987;– CFThe - Search“Cartesian for aFreedom” Method (1947) in Literary and Philosophical Essays Michelson,– The Critique London: of Dialectical Hutchinson, Reason 1968; vol. NE 1 (1947-8) trans. D. Pellauer, London: Univer- sity of Chicago Press, 1992; SM (1960) trans. H. Barnes,Free London: Will Methuen, 1963;nive CDR 4 (1960) trans. A. Sheridan-Smith, London: Verso, 1991. For a comprehensive overview of all these positions, refer to G. Watson, (ed.) Oxford: Oxford U r- sity Press, 1982. ISSN:2241-5106 169

dom as acting on one’s desires without impediment is to say one’s action is caused by a desire and, equally, he does not accept compatibilism: if freedom means uncaused, to describe free-

or a personalityThe above trait. account (BN of433 freedom-442) To can be be free found is to mos rejectt clearly all possible in The explanationsTranscendence of knoof thew- Egoing, doing or being which refer to something prior and external to consciousness. Being and Nothingness that the moraland, consequences at that stage, of Sartre his extreme was concerned libertarianism with capturing, begin to be not felt defining, with regard the nature to responsibi of metaphysical freedom, that is the essence of consciousness. It is in world which can I claim as “mine.” A very unsophisticated determinist would answer abs l- ity. In asking for what things am I responsible, the agent asks himself of all the events in the o- lutely nothing: the agent is nothing more thancause a itcomplicated seems to negate billiard far ball. too much The compatibilistof our actual would answer: all those acts which are motivated by my own desires. Both accounts, of freecourse, action. have their problems: the former be experience, the latter because it cannot explain why we conceive of coercion as a case of un-

Sartre, though, would respond by saying that the agent is responsible for every act one’s(and onepersonal must responsibility remember that for knowing, what one too, has is done. a species Any attempt of acting to for avoid Sartre). responsib One cannot claim that “I couldn’t help it”, “That’s just the way I am” or “It’s my duty” in orderBeing to negate and Nothingness ility, to denydignity one’s of humanity. freedom, isThe bad realisation faith and thatthis theis the agent morality is solely that responsible lies at the forheart his ofacts leads to . Bad faith is a denial of freedom, a denial of who we are, it is to deny the very

knowinganguish, thethat dread he must of being decide free, and and choose it is andthis thatrevelation these choices which Warnock are his and takes his alone.to be so significant in Sartre’s work. Anguish captures the nature of the human being condemned to be free, sponsibility was defined as those events which originate from “me” and a compatibilist is able to describeYet, itan is em this extreme libertarianism which gives rise to the paradox of freedom. Re-

an empirical self andpirical action. self, a When personality the libertarian or storehouse says thatof desires, “I chose and to restructure x” what is the object which“me” which can stand is in inthe for world. the “I”? The libertarian, of course, rejects any causal relationship between

from reasonsOne could, rather perhaps, than w henfollow he theis motivated libertarianism by empirical of Kant causesand equate such asthe desires. unity of “I”Howe with the rational self as opposed to the phenomenal self: the agent is responsible when5 he acts v- er, the extreme nature of Sartre’s libertarianism can be heard in these words: “… the root of all Reason is to be sought in the depths of the free act.” (CF 183; see also BN 570) Kant, after all, predicted.talks of two This different is to replace orders the of causality,free agent one with of reason reason and and it one is not of thethe agentphenomenal who chooses world. but If one were capable of understanding the principles of reason, then the right action could be

thenreason that itself. consciousness For Sartre, is this prior is akin to positing a law of consciousness which is absurd. A law of consciousness would be known by a consciousness and, if it is known by a consciousness, to it. (BN xxvi-xxxii) The5 Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals This is a very unsatisfactory account of Kant’s picture,170 but it serves its purpose here. For the full account, see trans. M. Gregor, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. ISSN:2241-5106

Sartre, then, absolutely rejects all forms of causality, including the differentiation of the self into rational and phenomenal, à la Kant. It is the spontaneous nature of consciousness which makes room for a coherent notion of choice: for a choice to be mine and mine alone, it negatemust not these arise constraints from a prior and character, consciousness from a given desire, form the way the world is or was, or, finally, from the dictates of reason. For a choice to be authentic and free the agent must is nothingness and not identical with the empiricalhas to beego spontaneous. which is “me”? And What here is is the the difference problem: betweenif the choice this is uncaused spontaneous, event is and it not choosing better understoodan ice as an event since the “I” which chooses a bucket of tickets with flavours written on them and picking one?6 Perhaps one can say in an -cream by lottery, that is placing enonmy hand of a in

whoabsurd feels universe, anguish? there Who is isno the difference, self which but connects then Sartre all the has acts to explainas mine? the Freedom phenom understoodn- inguish this differently, manner seems for if to the lose “me” its relationshipof “my” choice to responsibiis nothingness,lity which then iswho crucial is responsible for the exper and ence of anguish. Being and Nothingness is Sartre’s attempt to offer a resolution to this problem becausei- the subject is no longer a metaphysical abstraction employed to reveal the structures of being

human (as it was in the earlier works), but it is characterisedBeing as and a particular Nothingness personits living intr in the world. (BN 3) And what defines a person as opposed to an isolated consciousness is simply continuity over time: this series of acts is “me.” Thus, , in o- duction and first two parts, revises and elaborates the account of metaphysical freedom Sartre beinghad already human. described The original in the project earlier dictates works. thatIn parts each three act has and a four,meaning he begins in relation to offer to ana co answer to the problem of continuity: the original project is a universal, fundamental forstructure of Warnock describes the original project as man’s desire to possess others and then- sciousness which is constructing itself in the face of other consciousnesses (being- -others). seeks to possess other consciousnesses and the world? In order to be something and not nothing;world, but in theseorder areto only manifestations of a deeper structure. Why is it that consciousness

The goal in shortbe fixed, is to overtakeessential that and beingfree of which anguish; flees in itself order while to be being what what it is it not. is in Sa ther- modetre’s own of not descriptionbeing and bears which this flows out: on while being own fingers; the goal is to make of it a given is what it is; the problem is to gather together- in a unity of one this unachieved totalityits own which flow, iswhich unachieved escapes only between because its it is to itself its own non , a given which finally – precisely because it has escaped from the chains of this reference to itself – to make-achievement, it be as a toseen escape reference from the– sphere of perpetual referenceis what which it is. has to be a reference to itself, and Continuity or personality is postulated in an accountthat ofis, humana reference nature which which Sartre b (BN 153) is recognisably free through a series of acts that demonstrate this undeniably to the other.e- Thelieves metaphysical is consistent freedom with his ofdescription The Transcendence of consciousness: of the Egoto found becomes oneself a practical as that being freedom which of

6 dles it somewhat with compatibilism. Sartre himself is well aware of this. He criticises libertarianism171 as gratuitous on pp. 436-437 of BN, but mud- ISSN:2241-5106

thecalled person inner in “nature”. situation: It chooses them and by this very choice confers upon them a transcen ent existenceHuman as reality the external cannot limitsreceive of its its ends, projects. as we From have thisseen, point either of fromview outside– and if orit is from unde so- stood that the existence of Dasein precedes and commands its essence – human reality in andd- through its very upsurge decides to define its own being by its ends. It is therefore the posir- ing of my ultimate ends which characterizes my being and which is identical with the sudden 7 t- It is at this point in the description of being human that Warnock poses her famous thrust of freedom which is mine. (BN 443) w challenge: Sartre has created an unacceptable tension between, on the one hand, freedom as intouncaused man’s spontaneity being and contradicting and, on the other, his own a universal condition account of freedom. of human nature. No matter ho thin this general theory of man is, according to her, Sartre is guilty of reintroducing an essence in our patternWhat of behaviour can be meant such asby Sartresaying hasthat described? we choose ourselves,Sartre accuses or that Freud we chooseof denying how human to live freedompeculiar by basing circumstances his method and of analysis situation, of if human we are behaviour committed, on by the being suppositio human,n tothat a general we are

formdetermined the projects by our we past do experiences because of toour behave commitment as we do. to But his method of analysis, in so far as it has any definite basis at all, must rest on the equally deterministic assumption that we And how was this tension to be resolved? The standardpossess interpretation others and states the world. that Sa (PS tre126) negated the freedom of the particular individual for his account of human nature which was to eventually embody Marxist doctrine. Sartre betrayed his existentialist roots in orderr- early Sartre – the existentialist and the exponent of – and a late Sartre who reveals the problems with thatto make position his account and opts consistent: for Marxism there instead. is an an extreme (if contradictory) libertarianism

dom whichThe retains alternative the concept’s reading: centralia Heideggerean Sartre the psychologicalIt is possible and to offersociological an alternative, levels of equally meaning. plausible The interpretationestablished schism of Sartrean in Sartre’s free- thought is most comprehensively championedty in his in work, Warnock’s but also book proposes and acontinuity couple of between general statements made there are ex tre’s anti tremely revealing. First, for all her continued references to Sar- D -Cartesianism, her book often works against this overall interpretation, relying too heavily on a parallel between the two thinkers: “Sartre, like all French philosophers, treats escartes as the father of the subject, and “Cogito ergo sum”, Descartes”ood supposedly as “We must indubit begina- ble foundation for his whole Itsystem, is only as to somehowassert that containing the explanation the germ of any of phenomenonall truth within must itself.” (PS 13) This is true, but, for Sartre, “Cogito ergo sum” is underst 7from the subjective.” (EH 26) property of a being which would be engendered conjointly with an idea.” This distinction between existence and being willThis become passage significant continues: as “Andthe reader this thrust will soon is an see. existence; it has nothing to do with an essence or with a 172 ISSN:2241-5106

include and be grounded in the consciousness of that phenomenon. For there to be pheno

m- existena, onea pre must be experiencing and if one is experiencing, one exists. This is a familiar tran- ofscendental Descartes’ argument mind that, for Sartre, proves that if there is consciousness, then there must -reflective cogito, which is consciousness of being conscious of x. This falls far short or thinking substance and, yet, Warnock manages to mistakenly allow ar latent dualism to corrupt her presentation of Sartre’s theory of mind: “The duality of mindin itself. and body, of physical thing and mentalfor thing,itself. is essentialAnd together to human these twobeings modes and ofdetermines being combine thei tobehaviour define the in thirdmany modeways. – ForBeing otherfor people I am, at first and immediately,tation contains a Being obvious- - e For myself I am, naturally, a Being- - in itself for others. Others are immediately and pre reflectively -different-others.” from (PS being 66-7)in This quo r- thererors: one,is no it dualismis not clear in Sartre’sthat first thought and immediately between thinkingI am a being substance- - and physical substance. There is only Being and- consciousness and the two do- not-itself form for a dualitySartre. becauseMore significantly, consciou ness is nothingness. It is a strange duality indeed which holds that there are two types of things in the s- constituted by being for itself and being in world, onefor whichothers? is being Warnock and the does other not which explicitly is nothing. call Sartre Also, a ifdual the dualism is - - - -itself, how then is one supposed to comprehend theand thirdbeing mode:for itself being and- being- in itself were conveniently mapped on to mind and body.ist, but the implicationAny alternativeis latent in readingher interpretation. of Sartre’s account Unfortunately, of subjectivity the interpretation has to return became to the standardrelatio ship between- - these concepts- and- their anti Cartesian origin. A parenthetical comment by n- - or theirWarnock history reveals in Hegelian why her and reading German may idealist be inadequate: philosophy in general. Sartre owes a very great (I shall not, incidentally, say anything at all about the origins of these expressions obscure that more would be lost than gained in trying to trace the deal to Hegel, and also to Heidegger. But these philosophers are themselves so exceedingly 8 debts and the corruptions, the likenessesWarnock’s and mistakethe differences, resides whichin refusing are, however, to think certainlythrough thesethere toconnections be traced bysince anyone it is easywho hasto framethe patience Sartre toas undertake a dualist ifit.) one (PS thinks 42) of these concepts as entities rather than as modes of being. Consciousness comports itself – – towards being and this is crucial to understanding his anti Cartesianism which – in Being and Nothingness – is derived that is, behavesCartesianism explains why he a sumes that he can offer an account- of freedom which is compatible with a universal structure oflargely human from being. Heidegger. More significantly, Sartre’s anti- s- The first departure for an existe

ntialism is to hold existence precedes essence: any byknowledge the fact atthat all moments (any relationship of consciousness with being) must is onlyhave possiblean a priori if there unity is otherwise a subject. synthesis This is a familiar transcendental argument which one finds in Kant: the unity of apperception is proven

8 intelligible and unattra

She is even more revealing when she states: “I confess173 to finding Heidegger both un c- tive…” p. 71. ISSN:2241-5106

would not be possible. 9 10 If there exists an a priori un It is in Heidegger’s thought that the unity of apperception, which for Kant is derived from knowledge, becomes ontologically prior. i- itty, is surely characterised the way indifferently which this due exists to thedetermines subject’s the be objectshaviour of towards experience it. Althoughand any ontology I say “I or metaphysics must begin with this: each different entity has a different way of being known,– and knowing is a type of doing – is different in each case. The modes of being Sartre describes knoware derived myself”, from “I know this app Paul”roach. and “I know that is a table” with the same verb, what I am doing Dasein – Heidegger’s substitution for the Cartesian Cogito and the Kantian unity of a perception – concerned about jects or desires. This is p-to know things asis either constituted ready byto three knowing relationships. (1) Dasein isat things,way in they which matter Dasein because exists they – can either fulfill or frustrate its pro – are prior to - -hand or, in a more reified sense, as present- -hand.in Thus, the rather being in itselfs.11 its projects,others aspirations in a relationship and motivations of solicitude knowledge of these entities. This, of course, loosely corresponds to Sartre’s being- -itself, or for themselves.- - This loosely(2) correspondsDasein is with to- Sartre’s being for : we– in share Being a worldand Nothingness with other –consciousnesses pessimistic about who the also possibility exist as projects,of authentic structuring recognition the worldby others as a and matrix r - - -others, but Sartres substituted is by cares about itself. It is immediately related to itself as that whiche- places Heidegger’s picture with a more antagonistic one, hence solicitude i shame.understand (3) Sartre’sFinally, Daseinbeing for itself and agai caresanguish. who12 it is, what it does, and who it becomes. This is the immediate way in which one can - - n his emotional characterisation is more prosaic: to Sartre’s account are concern and care. Heidegger says that it is pertinent and useful to a ply theOf verb these “to three be” to modes being ofin consciousness,itself and the verbof knowing, “to exist” the to two being whichfor most closely map on mer answers the question “What is it?” and the latter answers the question “Who is it?p-13 - - - -itself, since the fochr-

Common to both is Dasein, without Dasein there would be no knowing, yet knowing in ea case is a different type of behaviour. One commits an ontological error, for Heidegger, when Critique of Pure Re 9son the synth For Kant’s full argument, see his “Transcendental Deduction” in part two of the Analytic in a- trans. J. Meiklejohn, (revised by V. Politis) London: Everyman, 1993. Basically, for knowledge as e- sis of assertions to be possible, was it mustmortal. be presupposedThe I has to be that identical these moments through allall thesebelong moments. to the same If Bill knowing knows self e - consciousness (the unity of apperception): (I know) that all men are mortal; (I know) Socrates was a man; theTherefore, conclusion (I know) of the Socrates syllogism on their own. x- clusively10 Dasein thatis ont all men are mortal and Bob knows exclusively Socrates was a man, neither woulditself bein ableontologically to reach in itself ologically prior to entities, but not Being itself. Sartre denies that the forin- itself and beings in prior to the in itself (BN, p. 619) but thisin actuallyitselfs.” underlines a confusion in his work. Sartre uses being- - in11 Seean equivocal footnote 10.way: The to referreason to why Being nausea and to is entities, my way heof knowingshould perhaps is because talk itabout refers Being to Being- - in itself. The nea- - themselves,est emotional though comportment he often touses being “beingin itself- - would be the coefficient of adversity. 12 r- towards death. See Being and Time - - For Heidegger, of course, anguish/anxiety is an ontic form of care, just as care is an ontic form of being- 13 - trans. J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson, Oxford: Blackwell, 1992 ¶¶39-42; 51- 53. (Hereafter BT.) Sartre’s own equivalent can be found in BN 25 and 123. ISSN:2241-5106 174

one attempts to know consciousness as a “what” rather than a “who” Cartesianism commits this error as does any account of human nature given in terms apt to14 a “what” rather than a

sent at “who”, that is attempts to describe the human subject in terms of properties or as a thing pre- consciousnes- -hand swith in ordera fixed, to eternal synthesise essence. it and when we wish to characterise this synthesis it amountsWho, to nothingthen, is Dasein?more than Dasein a totalised is that system which enduresof moments through of consciousness. the fleeting moments It is self of chara - determination as a structure of existence: I exist as my possibilities, reflectiveor as Heidegger consciousness c- terises it: “I myself am mine.” (BT ¶13) Whereas, entities are determined from without by the projection of Dasein, Dasein projects itself. The structure of the pre- makes itself an object but can never grasp itself. (BT ¶25) This entails that it is impossible to ingunderstandfor it as an objectn becomes or as an hisessence equivalent (a what), for onethe Kantianhas to comprehend unity of apperception. it as an existence, There hasas a toway exist of beingan a priori (a who). unity Sartre of consciousness appropriates otherwise Heidegger’s this insights particular in hismoment presentation of consciou of be- - -itself, which the ty which is me consciousnesss- ness would be impossible and this a priori unity makes possible the empirical, synthetic uni in the world. (BN 103) The original project is the attempt by self- on the Therepart of is itself an in to make itself identical with its– unifyingdefinitely process not a substancewhich is impossible, supporting but its necessary since it is its essential structure: divisible, indissoluble being qualities like particles of being,essentia but a being which is existence through and through… This is what Heidegger expressed very well when heexistentia wrote (though speaking of Dasein, not of con- producedsciousness): as “Thea particular “how” ( instance) of of an this abstract being, sopossibil far asity it is but possible that in to rising speak to of the it generally, center of must be conceived in terms of its existence– ( ).” This means that consciousness is not

being,15 itWarnock creates andunderstands supports Sartre’s its essence for itselfthat as is, an the essence synthetic order of its possibilities. (BN xxxi)should most properly be understood as an existence. She commits an ontological error when she assumes that the original project is an- account of human naturelike the as Cartesian a “what”. cogito, If the when human it at o it

waybeing in is which a “what”, human a thing present- -hand, then one can apply the category of causality t andthe fortheitself paradox is being of freedom applied arises. to the situation.However, Warnock’sSartre is describing reading is the dependent “who”, the on fundamental the account of The Transcendence-being of the exists Ego and in the the world. first third In other of Being words, and theNothingness metaphysical being account extrap of - entity exists in a social situation. He is moving his description from the abstract level to theo- concretelated into level. a social situation, whereas Sartre is offering an account of how such a metaphysical

It is an equal error to try to know a table as a “who”. One way to crystallise Heidegger’s point is when one uses 14scientific concepts to Using Sartre

the roots of this in existentialism.explain a work of art. They are just not apt. In G. McCulloch, London: Routledge, Sartre also 1994 offers p. 57,a the author feels compelled to distinguish “to BE” from “to be”, but makes no mention of 15 n aesthetic way to understand this unity, see N 252 and TE 73-74. ISSN:2241-5106 175

The supposed tension in Sartre’s text between a universal account of human nature and his account of uncaused freedom rests on this ontological error. It is to describe the su ject in terms of a thing when Sartre repeatedly asserts that it is nothing. The original project needs to be understood as a fuller elaboration of self consciousness’s knowledge of itself.b- Things are consciousness exists - want to negate, that my is, have,possibilities essences: and a become table is ax, thing y, z. Selfwhich- is free. The original, that project is, is isfree. an elaborationHow do I know of who myself we areas freedom?and a desc riptionI know ofI am the inway anguish, we know that ourselves this anguish and revealsdeal with that our I

self. freedom.To Freedomdescribe Sartreis, after as all, a thelibertarian futile pursuit is misleading of essence, because of a negation the spontaneous trying to negatenature ioft- consciousness condition of choice. The freedom of consciousness is indeterminism and this indeterminism guarantees the notion of choice.16 In is not the essence of freedom, but the pre- elf

theorder pure for nihilating choice to movement be meaningful, of reflection this freedom makes itself has to personal be elaborated; for what more confers fully personal as s - existencedetermination on a beingor the is idea not ofthe personal possession freedom: of an Ego“Thus – which from itsis onlyfirst thearising, sign ofconsciousness a personality by –

am free when I am the one w notbut thoseit is the imposed fact that on the me being from exists without. for itselfThe original as presence project to itself.”cannot (BN be understood 103; see also in EH terms 29) of I ho chooses the content of my will, when I act on my volitions and if freedom as self freedom if this means only uncaused, but it is a good characterisation of the human condition -determination is a fundamental structure of the self, especially if the one whosible exists,for this exists fact. inSartre’s an absurd conception universe. of self Eachdetermination of my acts fills is uniqueme with and being original for which because I am it responsible, yet this “me” can always be negated, always be overcome and “I”, too, am respon- termination is contingent since it has no ult - meembodies and this the is the“necessity impossible of contingency”: burden of responsibility it is necessary that that gives I determinerise to anguish. myself but any de- Sartre’s account of the original projectimate is notmeaning. exactly (BN an 327)account My ofbeing human refers nature only asto

the original project as having a causal relationship with the particular acts of the individual is Warnock supposes, it is a characterisation of the human condition, of being human.at hand To read are

toof beingapply fora category which is mistaken.determined. Acts are not determined, things present- - determined (this is, at least, one of their possible ways to be) whereas acts are an expression - -itself, they are self- . Whose reading? Given the length and style of Being and Nothingness pass 4 , it would be possible to identify ages which supported one or other of the readings elaborated above. It is, therefore, 16 Such an assertion can once more be traced back to German Idealism and Hegel. See Elements of the Philos phy of Right 7. There is another story to o- part than histrans. appropriation H. Nisbet, of Cambridge: Heidegger’s Cambridge approach. University It is thus aPress, story 1991 which §§5 requires and a more general investig betion told than about a brief Hegel’s article influence can offer. on Sartre, but it is a much more subtle and reflective engagement on the latter’s 176 a- ISSN:2241-5106

more pertinent to point to general ways in which the Heideggerean reading might offer a be ter understanding of Sartre’s philosophical canon. I shall do this in two way strating that the paradox of freedom and the supposed tension within Being and Nothingnesst- is resolved without ceding either the notion of consciousness as spontaneitys: or first, the fundameby demon- hall question Warnock’s explicit accus n- tal structure of the project. (4.1 and 4.2) Second, I s a- tion that the sociological concepts of Sartre’s later works do not grow out of, but rather negate, his earlier psychological concepts. (5)

Sartre’s extreme libertarianism committed him to describing consciousness as u 4.1 Warnock’s charge of determinism n- ofcaused anguish spontaneity, and resp but to describe an act as “mine” means nothing unless there exists “me” ateswhich by can creating be identified a unity ofas self.the cause Acts areof that not act.gratuitous Therefore, but are in orderto be understoodto justify his in own terms account of an ongoing project to beonsibility, in itself Sartrefor itself. offered This aclearly universal brings account in the of second being sensehuman of which freedom ope asr- self made to be at the heart of man and which forces human- -reality- to make itself instead of to be -determination: “Freedom is precisely the nothingnessaccount which of the ishuman -condition- to partic lar cases and it is in doing this- that he sees the possibility of an existentialist.” (BN 440; psycho see alsoanalysis. 23, 34- 5) Sartre then sets himself the task of applying his u- - explainThis is supposedly human behaviour where Warnock’sin terms other criticism than bitessuperficial deepest: or common in the lightOf course, of some it may general truly theory. be said thatThis absolutelyis what such any an m ethodexplanation of analysis, consists if it in.is designed And there to cannot be a general theory of human nature which does not commit its-sense holder terms, to some must general do so

degreeviews about of det how human beings necessarily behave. And so from the very outset Sartre, as well as Freud and anyone else who undertakes the task of analysis, is committed to a certain general humanerminism. desire to (PS be 126 in -itself7) for man” isActs, rather according than exists to Warnock, cannot be absolutely freea thing because like athey chair are or caused a bottle by with the - - -itself. However, her reading only works if the “hu- Heidegger calls a thing present, whichat is to say, the human is properties and/or tendencies. Only because this is to think of a human in terms of what - -hand is it possible to apply those categories (such as causal- posality) which is useless one applies since it to serves chairs, littlebottles, or no et usecetera. as an explanatory theory. Warnock is aware of If it is true that Sartre is proposing a description of the human as a thing, then his pro- can explain actions whereas Sartrean analysis cannot. Any general theory needs to be able to makethis, citing predictions it as a reasonwhich either why Freud’s support account or falsify of theanalysis theory. is moreFreudian satisfying, analysis since can hisideally theory i vestigate the parti n- cular details of an individual’s life (the initial conditions), add possible. in some geThen- eral desires from its account of human nature (universal laws) and generate a range of predictions. It is obviously far more complicated than this ideal presentation, but it is

177 ISSN:2241-5106

Sartrean analyst can only predict that freedom will be expressed in a general project to be in itself for 17 Sartre was no fool. Warnock’s charge of determinism just does not hold water because- if one- ta -itself; that is, he predicts nothing. eral theory of the in itself for itself has to be serving an alternative role in Sartre’s complete picture. kesWarnock’s Sartre’s challenge account ofonly human applies nature if one as assumesan explanatory consciousness theory, itis isa beinguseless. present The geatn- - - - in itself and not for itself. Sartre begins Being and Nothingness - - nothand, know a thing anything with properties about consciousness and tendencies, without but that is the domain of being- - cedes- essence since one exists as the possibilityby toresisting transcend epistemological the given and primacy: posit oneself one ca asn- being it. In other words, one’s existence pre- ty and it is this rupture with determinism which makes room for a meaningful account of pe what is not Sartre is, on one level, a libertarian because consciousness is uncaused spontanei- non and not Sartrean freedom per se as Warnock seems to suggest. Spontaneous consciour- sonalness is freedom. the conditional Yet, this possibility metaphysical of self freedomdetermination is the most which basic is the description proper characterisation of the phenom ofe- the human condition. s- - Being and Nothingness is not a general e. Given that self conscious Therefore, the original project described in c unity oftheory the ofperson human possible? behaviour, it is a description of human existenc - consciousnessbeings exist as itfreedom, must exist how freely is an througha priori unityth of identity which grounds the syntheti One, through self-determination: for consciousnessconsciousness to is be imm self- diately aware of its being for e moments of consciousness. Two, the existence of other consciousnesses is an immediate structure of my being (self- e- consciousness then desires- to- othersbe a unity or, again, open toit wouldevaluation; be only my consciousness a priori identity without is structured identity) and, as such, I structure “me” as an object for the evaluation of the other. Three, selfB - ing and Nothingness as the attempt to create a synthetic unity (the project). The purpose of the second half of e- is, then, an attempt to answer this question: given dthis in Beinguniversal and condNot i- ingnesstion of being human, how are we to understand this particular, synthetic totality (and here onetween could self substituteconsciousness a proper as it name: exists Pierre, for Laura)? Sartre is concerne h- consciousnessto descend as it fromexists the in levelthe world.of abstraction The original to concreteness: project characterises to show the the relationship way in which be- self consciousness- exists -itself as isolated, metaphysicalway freedom in which and we self are-

- in the world and not, as Warnock supposes, a (as, say, the table is brown or a lion is dangerous).

Bad faith is a possible way in which the for itself can exist. It is an attempt to deny the contingency4.2 The of three actions forms due of to bad some faith source of meaning prior to choice. The for itself denies responsibility for who it is and what it has made of- itself. In Being and Nothingness - , bad faith takes17 It has three been forms:suggested (1) to theme thatbelief Sartre’s that longI am biographies determined demonstrate by my facticity: the explanatory the agent power assumes of his theory. that on;

The problem is, I feel, that we are running together the178 ideas of strong, causal explanation and comprehensi that is, rendering intelligible. For Warnock’s charge to stand, she has to assume the stronger explanatory case. ISSN:2241-5106

essential, fixed properties limit his possibilities and explain his actions. (2) The beliefcitly denies that I existmy being mostfor authentically as transcendence, that no matter what you describe as “me”, I can negate it. I can negate all my facticity, because I am free. This form of bad faith impli a Christian- and-others my role which dictates is an certainessential obligati structureons whichof freedom; derive that from is, something existing in externalthe world. to me.(3) Finally,This is describedthe “spirit as of anotherseriousness” way to or try binding and fulfil oneself my projectto a purpose: without I am the a anguish communist, of choo I am

of that movement. s- ing for Itmyself is commonly because, assupposed a part of athat general Sartre’s movement, authentic my choicesself consciousness are limited byand the the dictates self consciousness of bad faith map snugly on to Heidegger’s own authentic and inauthentic - s-

Dasein. Dasein, like Sartre’s for-itself, has always made some choice about being the way it i (it is responsible for its own facticity) and this choice is authentic when it chooses for itself and inauthentic when it is chosen for. (BT ¶¶9, 27 and 38) Yet, if Sartre’s own distinction is supposed to map neatly on this, a problem immediately arises. The first form of bad faith, whichwhere areI consider simply myselfnot apt a and thing any with co properties, is not a case of inauthenticity in Heidegger’s sense. Rather, it is to commit an ontological– perhaps error: because one is Beingusing categoriesand Nothingness and descriptions is anthr pology and not a preparatory work fornclusion ontology which – because is generated he recognises will be inapplicable.that this ontological Sartre, errorthough, is isa waymore in astute which than self consciousnessHeidegger often exists. Warnock accuses Sartre of this veryo-

bad faith would not be possible.- Bad faith is to think of oneself as a thing with properties and iterror would in hisbe strangedescription if Sartre of the contradicted original project, himself but so if brazenly.the human18 did not exist as a project, then

distinction in mind. It is also an ontological error because it is to deny who one is – an exis ence inSimilarly, the world the – second form of bad faith is puzzling if it is considered with Heidegger’s t- is the very freedom whichand to Warnock misdescribe celebrates? human being.Self det If ermination Sartre is solely is the a acceptance libertarian, of what my sense is one supposed to make of the idea of revelling in transcendence as bad faith, when this - own facticityThe final and form the situationof bad faith within does which neatly I find map myself on to inHeidegger’s order to work distinction it over, andto make Sartre it trulymakes mine. it (BN 489; SM 12-13) in Being and Nothingness self determiningexplicitly being moral: and one it oughtallows not us toto livediscover in bad those faith, structures one ought whichto be authentic. constitute His a selfaim is not to tell us how to live, though. Bad faith is only possible for as - - determiningare equally erroneous being. However, attitudes. within an absurd universe devoid of meaning and value, how i it possible to be authentic? The opposite of bad faith is neithercs good of authenticity faith nor sincerity, in Being these and Nothingness The opposite is, and here one hears an echo of Heidegger, authenticity. (BN 70fn) However, there is little hope of an ethi because Sartre sees social being as wholly alienated, or any political project or 18 Oddly enough this is Heidegger’s own criticism of Sartre – and any humanism – because it describes a human as a what rather than a who. Basic Writings

See his “Letter on Humanism” in D. Krell (ed.), London: Routledge, 1993. ISSN:2241-5106 179

collective movement as impossible. he is attempting to extrapolate the ps19ychological concepts into the sphere of sociology. In the bridge between Being andYet, Nothingness these are theand very the Critique themes of the later works when

mission to an abstra , Sartre defines the spirit of seriousness in these words: “The spirit of seriousnessvoluntary is voluntary alienation, that is, sub- ction thatauthentic justifies. Where one: the the thought spirit of that seriousness man is the fails inessential is in the rejectionand the a b-of stract the essential.” (NE 60) The alienation is , that is free in the sense of self- Thisdetermined, is the very and premisetherefore which Sartre will begin the Critique existentialistthe particular subjectivism and the individual with Marxist in favour historicism. of the duties Being of andsome Nothingness impersonal, abstract entity. from, that is the need to marry is not a failure, it calis incomplete level of some as Sartrecommon himself acknowledges: “… what is impossible Beingat the andlevel Nothingness of the For- itself and the Project (the ontological organisation of a We) becomes real on the anthropologi- bad faith points explicitly work.”towards (NE the 130) need Thefor aincomplete sociological nature and politicalof understanding of man.resides Ignoring in its consideration the continuity of betweenan isolated the individual early psychological existing in conceptsthe world, and but the the later third sociolo form of ical ones only serves to exaggerate Warnock’s supposed contradiction between the idea of freedom and the project. g-

. Is there continuity or rupture in Sartre’s thought? By placing a privilege on Sartre’s early works and especially on the metaphysical fre 5 supposed indeterminism and e- ducesdom of a consciousness,contradiction betweenWarnock, her firstly, interpretation sees an inconsistency of freedom inand Sartre’s Sartre’s thought own discussion between his of a deterministic account of human nature; and, secondly, pro- made possible by the metaphysical reality of a spontaneous consciousness but not identical to bad faith. However, if one understands personal freedom as self-determination, a freedom rstanding of theit, then earlier these and two the problemslater Sartre. dissipate. Warnock This treats advantage them as in two itself entities is arguably diametrically reason opposed enough to accept this interpretation, but there is another20 aspect to it which affects our unde post Being and Nothingness rests on the very idea of freedom against which I have sought to argue.one another, By ignoring and she the is notidea the of onlyfreedom one. asHowever, self determination the supposed and ruptureany serious between engagement pre and perpetuating. - with the later philosophical works, this reading becomes self- physicalUncaused account spontaneity,of freedom as or indeterminism consciousness, to is an not anthropological identical with account personal of freedom freedom (asas selfWarnock supposes), but is a precondition ofhis it. anthropological This reading allows account one ofto freedomclimb from must a met sima-

- determination. If this is the case, then t i-

1920 See PS ch. 6. In BN Sartre hints at some authentic attitudes, viz. shame and arrogance (not pride), see 290 and also AJ 90. In her camp one also needs to mention: G. Kline, “The Existentialist Rediscovery Freedomof Hegel asand a Marx”Value opin N. Lee and M. SartreMandelbaum and Marxist (eds), Existentialism Phenomenology and Existentialism Baltimore: John Hopkins Universi- tySartre Press, 1967. Amongst those who think Sartre’s thought constitutes a continuity, see D. Detmar, -cit., T. Flynn, 180London: University of Chicago Press, 1984 and M. Grene, New York: New Viewpoints, 1973. ISSN:2241-5106

larly be a pre condition of a sociological account of freedom found in the pages of The Critique of Dialectical Freedom. It would be unreasonable to adequately interrogate this hypothesis without beginning- a tre’s political and sociological works are both dependent on and an extrapolation of freedom as self determinationnew in the article, same but way I merelythat that wish idea to is show both thatdependent the concepts on and in an play extrapol in Sar- tion of an account of metaphysical indeterminism. -Being and Nothingness does not fulfil the task of offering a complete set of methoda- logical tools for comprehending the synthetic totality of the person – Sartre’s attempt at a fundamental psycho analytic theory is incomplete and he only hints at the possibility of ano-

sarily requires a sociology- and an ethics. In The Transcendence of the Ego and the beginning ofethics. Being This and deficiency Nothingness is not, however, a failure because a full description of the person neces-

derstood as uncaused spontaneity, freedom issince described this is from consistent the metaphysical with the phenpointomenological of view. Sartre a is concernedproach adopted. with revealing This description the structures is a conditional of freedom possibility in isolation, for thusa person freedom to exist is primarily as a project un- and the idea of freedom as self Being andp- Nothingness where Sartre turns his analysis to the significance of the situation and the su Critique-determination begins to take hold in parts 3 and 4 of The progressive regressive method is Sartre’s first attempt to truly complete his ab- countject’s facticity. of being Later, human. in theIt remains a, historytheory tooof human will play natur a part.e based upon the free transcen - c- d- essentiallyence of one’s the situation for itself (progressive), existing as being yet simultaneouslyfor realises that a particular project has to be understood as the negation of a particular situation, facticity or history. As freedom is - - -others, then the way in which it will be free de- thepends pa on its particular others and notmeaning some abstract, universal other. With the progressive- regressive method, Sartre is trying to make his general account of being human applicable to rticular case: “The project has a , it is not the simple negativitystructures of offlight; being by forit a man aims at the production of himself in the world as a certain objective totality.” (SM 147; see alsoThe SM progressive 150-1) Onlyregressive within a method social context,can only thatbe applicable is the actual to persons if the more fu- - others, can freedom be meaningful rather than absurd. (CDR 334) ial reality - n- damental description of humanimmanence” existence is of projection. its members Similarly, creates freedom the possibility within socof the group is to be understood as praxis: in favour of a hyper… theorganism. “transcendence - as common action. Pure immanence, indeed, would eliminate the practical organism positing itself- as a regulatoryOr, quite action simply and, if the it were group possible would nofor longer everyone conceive to effect itself his in own its praxis inte- througration,gh everyinnumerable action, inrefractions so far as ofit wasthe same common, would lose any possibility of or reason for

community into molecules related only by bondsoperation. of exteriority In other and words, no one the wouldaction rwouldecognise be himselfblind, or in wouldthe action become or signal inertia. of some Pure atomised transcendence, however, would shatter the practical

ing without falling into the spirit of seriousness.individual. Sartre sets (CDR out 409)the conditions of social fre This is the possibility of an ethics, the way inHumean which one can commit oneself to a mean- e- dom: it is not wholly immanent, for that would181 be : to reason to one’s ends, but not to ISSN:2241-5106

possibility.choose one’s These ends mirror(they would the first be two chosen forms by of the bad group). faith. Neither is it wholly transcendental like(metaphysical absolute freedom; freedom), for that would be ineffectual: to negate everything, is to negate even the third form of bad fa Yet, social freedom is precarious un- the Critique it must ward off the ever present possibility of inertia, that is becoming ith, viz. the spirit of seriousness (or seriality). In fact, the badhrough faith anof ontological errormaps in neatly that theon toself the is authentic/inauthenticassumed to be substance distinction and this that myth was is describedperpetuated earl byi- er: when historical necessity is able to furnish a complete explanation it does so t to my freedom. The agent is in bad faith because he has not chosen himself; he is not his own product.other freedoms (oppressing classes, the system solidified, etc.): freedom is still the only limit co Critique that authenticIt is this praxis very may contradiction become the between pratico howinert I exist arises (praxis) from Sartre’sand what assertion I am (the that pract fori- freedom-inert) towhich be meaningful fuels the movementit has to occur towards in objective the future. or historical The constant structures. worry Freedom in the as self - Without his psychological - determination remains at the heart of Sartre’s enterprise. (CDR 339-431) determina tion is crucial in that the characterisationconcepts, the basis of praxis as a sociological theory of action blewould be woefully incomplete. More than any other, the idea of freedom as self- - of praxis remains that I, as individual, am responsi- thatfor there what is Ino (and better what society we) make or way of myself of things” (ourselves): provides it theis because motor ofman change can negate as an whatimplicit is, because he is free to choose himself, that the negative conception of the world “it is determinaimpossible tion not only solves certain inconsistencies which arise if one shares Warnock’s belief that “the world ought to be thus” in the future.he (CDRidea that330) he The undergoes idea of freedom a radical as conversion self- from- existentialism to Marxism. If one understands freedom as self seeSartre how is thea libertarian, sociological it conceptsalso dissolves of Sartre’s t later texts are dependent upon his existentialist n if such a claim requires much more argument in order-determination, to be fully convincing. it is possible to

origins, eve

182 ISSN:2241-5106

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The Tragic Finale Caws, P., Sartre,FreedomLondon: as a Routledge,Value 1979. Desan, W., , New York: Harper, 1960 Detmar, D., , Chicago: Open Court, 1986. Flynn, T., SartreElements and of Marxist the Philosophy Existentialism, of RightLondon: University of Chicago Press, 1984. Grene, M., Sartre, New York: New Viewpoints, 1973. Hegel,Heid G., , trans. Nisbet, H., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991. egger, M., Being and Time, trans. Macquarrie,Basic Writings J. and Robinson, E., Oxford: Black- well, 1992. Heidegger,, M., “Letter on Humanism”, , Krell, D. (ed.) London: Routledge, 1993. refers toKant Being I., Critique in itself. of The Pure nearest Reason, emotionaltrans. Meiklejohn, comportment J., (revised to being byin Politis,itself wouldV.) London: be the Everyman,coefficient of1993. adversity. See footnote 10. The reason why nausea is my way of knowing is because it The Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals - -

Kant, I., , trans. Gregor, M., Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPhenomenology Press, 1998. and Existentialism Kline, G., “The Existentialist Rediscovery of Hegel and Marx” in Lee, N. and Mandel- baum, M. (eds) , Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1967. Free Will McCulloch, G., Using Sartre, London: Routledge, 1994. Review of Metaphysics Morgenbesser,101. S. and Walsh, J., , Englewood Clifts: Prentice-Hall, 1962. Neu, J., “Divided Minds: Sartre’s “Bad Faith” critique of Freud”, , 1988, 42, 79- Sartre, J-P., Anti “Cartesian Freedom” (1947), Literary and Philosophical Essays, trans. Mi- chelson, A., London: Hutchinson, 1968. Sartre, J-P., Being-Semite and Nothingness and Jew (1944), trans. Becker, G., New York: Schoken Books, 1948. Existentialism and Humanism Sartre, J-P., (1943), trans. Barnes, H., London: Routledge, 1989. Sartre, J-P., Nausea (1945), trans. Mairet, P., London: Methuen, 1987. Notebooks for an Ethics Sartre, J-P., (1938), trans. Baldick, R., London: Penguin, 1965. Sartre, J-P., The Critique of Dialectical(1947 Reason-8), vol. trans. 1 Pellauer, D., London: University of Chicago Press, 1992. Sartre, J-P., The Search for a Method (1960), trans. Sheridan-Smith, A., London: Verso, 1991.The Transcendence of the Ego Sartre, J-P., (1960), trans. Barnes, H., London: Methuen, 1963. Sartre, J-P., The Cambridge(1936), Companion trans. toWilliams, Sartre F. and Kirkpatrick, R., New York: Octagon Books, 1972. Simont, J., “SartreanThe Philosophy Ethics”, of Sartre , Cambridge: Cam- bridge University Press, 1992. Warnock, M., , London: Hutchinson and Co., 1965. Watson, G., (ed.) Free Will, Oxford: Oxford183 University Press, 1982. ISSN:2241-5106

Πάπυροι - Επιστημονικό Περιοδικό Δέλτοι τόμος 4, 2015

Papyri - Scientific Journal Delti volume 4, 2015

- Music Evolution in Ancient Greece and the Value of Music Education in- Pseudo Plutarch’s De Musica - ATHENA- SALAPPA ELIOPOULOU, PhD candidate, Department of Philosophy Pedagogy and Psychology, Faculty of Philosophy, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens. Hellas E mail: [email protected]

5 – 5 ISSN:2241-5106 Θεσσαλονίκη 201 Thessaloniki 201

Πάπυροι - Επιστημονικό Περιοδικό Papyri - Scientific Journal Δέλτοι Delti τόμος 4, 2015 volume 4, 2015 www.academy.edu.gr [email protected] Music Evolution in Ancient Greece and the Value of Music Education in Pseudo-Plutarch’s De Musica

Music Evolution in Ancient Greece and the Value of Music Education in Pseudo-Plutarch’s De Musica1

ATHENA SALAPPA-ELIOPOULOU -

ΑΘΗΝΑ ΣΑΛΑΠΠΑ ΗΛΙΟΠΟΥΛΟΥ Abstract The debate between the good old music and the bad new one of the ancient Greeks is widely discussed in the dialogue of this book and we are going to present it in our article, in order to investigate the reasons for the decline of music in education after centuries of dominance in the spiritual and the every day life of the ancient Greeks. The book reflects the music evolution since the beginning of this art in archaic Greece until the early Hellenistic period in which it is written. Initially, within the spiritual life and the education of the citizens the importance of music education was extremely high. Gradual- ly, during the years, and even since the last part of the 5th c. BC, music, after centuries of dominance, appeared in the spiritual life of the Greeks not as a prevailing feature anymore but as a subsiding one. It was even difficult to maintain its position in the educational system. During a symposium three men have gathered to discuss, investigate and highlight the reasons why this decadence happened to music, by citing musicians and the innovations they brought since the beginning of its history. The discussion takes place between the rich host Onesicrates, the musician Lysias and the educated Soterichus. In the book, apart from the list of musicians and the technical developments they invented, we derive information about the views of Pythagoras, Plato, Aristotle and others about the value that music used to have in ancient Greece. The paideutic moral value of music was the reason why it played a very important role in the education and the three men conclude that the technical improvements made it lost ground in favor of the literary studies.

Περίληψη Η διαμάχη μεταξύ της παλιάς καλής μουσικής και το κακιάς νέας από τους αρχαίους Έλληνες έχει ευρέως συζητηθεί στο πλαίσιο του διαλόγου αυτού του βιβλίου και πρόκειται να το παρουσιάσει στο άρθρο μας, προκειμένου να διερευνηθούν οι λόγοι για τη μείωση της μουσικής στην εκπαίδευση μετά από αιώνες της κυριαρχίας της στην πνευματική και την κα- θημερινή ζωή των αρχαίων Ελλήνων.

1 ORIGINAL PUBLICATION: “Music Evolution in Ancient Greece and the Value of Music Education in Pseudo- Plutarch’s De Musica”. In the Russian Journal of Philosophy , vol. 6, issue 1, 2012, dedicated to ancient music, published by the Centre for Ancient Philosophy and the Classical Tradition, Novosibirsk State University and Institute of Philosophy and Law, Russia 2012, pp. 76-86. ISSNΣΧΟΛΗ 1995-4328 (Print), ISSN 1995-4336 (Online). The Journal is included in the SCOPUS database.

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Το βιβλίο αντανακλά την εξέλιξη της μουσικής από την αρχή αυτής της τέχνης στην Αρχαϊκή Ελλάδα μέχρι την Πρώιμη Ελληνιστική περίοδο στην οποία είναι γραμμένο. Αρχικά, μέσα στην πνευματική ζωή και την εκπαίδευση των πολιτών, η σημασία της μουσικής εκπαί- δευσης ήταν εξαιρετικά υψηλή. Σταδιακά, κατά τη διάρκεια των ετών, αλλά και από το τε- λευταίο μέρος του 5ου αι. π.Χ., η μουσική, μετά από αιώνες κυριαρχίας, εμφανίστηκε στην πνευματική ζωή των Έλληνες όχι ως επικρατές χαρακτηριστικό πια, αλλά ως αυτό που υπο- χωρεί. Ήταν δύσκολο ακόμη και να διατηρήσει τη θέση της στο εκπαιδευτικό σύστημα. Κατά τη διάρκεια ενός συμποσίου τρεις άνδρες συναντήθηκαν για να συζητήσουν, να διερευνήσουν και να τονίσουν τους λόγους για τους οποίους αυτή η παρακμή συνέβη με τη μουσική, παραθέτοντας τους μουσικούς και τις καινοτομίες που αυτοί έφεραν από την αρχή της ιστορίας της. Η συζήτηση διεξάγεται μεταξύ του πλούσιου οικοδεσπότη Ονησικράτη, του μουσικού Λυσία και του εκπαιδευόμενου Σωτήριχου. Στο βιβλίο, εκτός από τη λίστα των μουσικών και των τεχνικών εξελίξεων που ανακάλυψαν, αντλούμε πληροφορίες σχετικά με τις απόψεις του Πυθαγόρα, του Πλάτωνα, του Αριστοτέλη και άλλων για την αξία που η μου- σική συνήθιζε να έχει στην αρχαία Ελλάδα. Η παιδευτική ηθική αξία της μουσικής ήταν ο λό- γος για τον οποίο διαδραμάτισε πολύ σημαντικό ρόλο στην εκπαίδευση και οι τρεις άνδρες καταλήγουν στο συμπέρασμα ότι οι τεχνικές βελτιώσεις έχασαν έδαφος υπέρ των λογοτεχνι- κών σπουδών.

The authorship of the book De Musica is an unsolved, until now, problem; it is believed, however, that it is a compilation of texts by different ancient sources. The unknown author of the compilation is alleged to have used texts by Dionysius of Halicarnassus the younger who has compiled it after Plutarch’s death in the times of the Roman Emperor Hadrian (117-138 AD). Consequently, it can be safely concluded that Plutarch is not the author of it. The debate between the good music of the archaic period and the bad new one is widely discussed in the dialogue of this book. We are going to present it in our article, in order to investigate the reasons for the decline of music in education after centuries of dominance in the spiritual and the every day life of the ancient Greeks. The book reflects the music evolution since the beginning of this art in ancient Greece not until the early Hellenistic period in which it was written, but until around the 5th c. BC. For the spiritual life of the citizens the importance of music education was extremely high. In the books of the philosophers Plato, Aristotle, and others, we read that male children used to go to school where they were taught grammar, drawing, music, and they used to train their bodies, so they could be healthy and strong. They were taking care not only of their mind and soul but of their body too. Gradually, during the years, and even since the last part of the 5th c. BC, music, after centuries of dominance, appeared in the spiritual life of the Greeks not as a prevailing feature anymore but as a subsiding one. It was even difficult to maintain its position in the educational system. Music and gymnastics lost ground in favour of the grammatical studies and this phenomenon occurred on a large scale round the 2nd c. BC. The decline of music education and the gradual loss of the moral paideutic role it used to play mainly happened because of the technical innovations that took music away from its initial goal, which were the

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spiritual lift of the citizens and therefore their eudemonia and the eudemonia of the State as a whole2. In the brief and plain preamble of the De Musica the importance of the issue of education and especially music education that the speakers of the symposium are going to develop are emphasized and the usefulness of education is compared with that of the martial arts. The martial arts, the author claims, become savior to a few soldiers, a city or a nation, that means to a limited number of people, while education, as a necessary substance of eudemonia, is useful for all mankind3. The discussion takes place in the house of a rich man, Onesicrates, on the second day of the celebration of Kronia4. He has invited to his place, in order to discuss the issue of music, the musician Lysias who works for him and a wise man from Alexandria, Soter- ichus5. Music and religion were very closely connected, so it is Onesicrates6 who opens the discussion expressing the view that it is fundamental and customary for men to praise the gods with hymns, as the Homeric and then the Platonic tradition set, and this is valid until the days of the book. He, then, defines the topic of the discussion and divides it into sub- questions: who are the first inventors of music, what progress the music has succeeded over the years, what the most important musicians and inventors of music are, and, finally, what is the benefit people gained from their involvement with music. Despite the fact that half of the dialogue highlights the musicians and the articular innovations that they have brought to it, the purpose of the author, even without having been mentioned, is to investigate and to bring into the limelight the reasons for the decline of music in education, although this has not been one of the sub-questions set in the preamble and although, in our opinion, it is exactly the reason why the book has been written. The other purpose of the writer is also to remind the public of the value and the importance of music. Although at the time the book was compiled music had lost much of its influence which it used to exert on a person’s soul and character, as it is reflected in Plato and Aristotle’s works the men in the symposium share the same ideas about the issue and the unknown author of the compilation demonstrates his ideas about the ‘good old music of the old Greeks’ against the ‘bad music’ of their contemporaries. At the period of time the speakers discuss, music was abandoned to the hands of the professional musicians who work for rich people, like Lysias who works for the rich One- sicrates. As it has always been customary for the rich people even if not educated themselves,

2 Aristotle, Politics VIII, 1-10. 3 Plutarch, De Musica 1131C. In the preamble also, the author of the compilation tries for the first time to connect it with Plutarch; and specifically, with the demonstrably authentic Plutarch’s work, Phocion. From this book, he copies the start, where Phocion’s wife proudly says that her husband, who had been an Athenian general for twenty years, has always been her only ornament. The narrator opposes to her words, saying that his own jewel is the love that his teacher nourished for study and science. 4 The symposium takes place on the second day of the Kronia, a festival in honour of Kronos, beginning at the 17th December. See Walter Burkert, John Raffan, Greek Religion: archaic and classical, Wiley-Blackwell, Publish- ing Ltd. and Harvard University Press, 1985, p.231: “At this festival the fixed order of society is suspended, but the reversal is of different kind…; the slaves, otherwise without rights, oppressed and ill-treated, are now invited by their masters to join in a luxurious banquet; they are also permitted to run riot through the city, shouting and making a noise”. 5 At this point, the author of the compilation tried to connect it with Plutarch and this is how: in Plutarch’s book, Table Talks, the philosopher from Haeroneia refers to a doctor called Onesicrates, who has invited a few famous men for a symposium at his house in honour of Plutarch, who had just returned from Egypt. 6 Thomas J. Mathiesen, Apollo's lyre: Greek music and music theory in antiquity and the Middle Ages, University of Nebraska Press, 1999, pp. 32-33: “Onesicrates, the preceptor of the dialogue, echoes Plato’s Republic 10 (607a) when he observes that it is a principal occupation of men to sing hymns to the gods ( )…”.

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they used to seek the company of educated persons, that gave them glamour and prestige. Ar- istotle confirms that the professional musicians were admired for their charismas and abilities but on the other hand they were ‘silently’ distinguished from the other educated people and they were not respected in the same way7. Although Lysias was not treated with scorn by the diners in the symposium he was not treated with respect either. His role was merely to speak about the lower and technical issues of music, such as the chronological order of the musicians and their innovations. The higher spiritual matters were left to the educated man, Soterichus, who at the beginning of his speech does not hesitate to correct quite rudely some of Lysias’ words, although not in technical matters. Lysias, in order to make his speech “scientific”, following the Aristotelian format, argues that music creation followed the theory of evolution that Aristotle and the ambulatory had taught8. The musician applies information for the ‘citharodia’ (art of the guitar-playing accompanied with song)9 and the ‘aulodia’ (art of the aulos-playing accompanied with song). He also mentions many great and famous musicians from the start of the history of music, such as Amphion10 who invented citharodia, Terpander11 the establisher of the formal names of the ‘citharodic nomoi’12 (nomos=musical law, nomos=law in Greek), Klonas of Tegea who was considered to be the inventor of the ‘auloedic nomoi’, Hyagnis13 who invented the instrument aulos (it is referred as a kind of flute but this is not correct-it was more a kind of oboe) and Olympus, the first man who brought to Athens the solo aulos-playing from Phryg-

7 Aristotle, Politics VIII. 8 See Longman Study Edition, Aristotle Poetics, with introduction, annotations and critical essays, Penguin Books Ltd. and Dorling Kindersley (India) Pvt. Ltd. 2007, p. xlv: “As we have seen before, Aristotle is assuming some kind of evolutionary pattern in the evolution of literary forms”. 9 For more details on aulodia and citharodia see: http://www.psaradelli.gr/education/epim/letters/let_alfa.htm. According to Heraclides Ponticus (Plutarch, De musica, 1131F, 3), “Amphion, the son of Zeus and Andiope, was the inventor of citharodia and of the citharodic poetry”. 10 Martin West, Ancient Greek Music, Oxford University Press Inc., New York 1992, pp. 33, 347, 351. 11 Thomas J. Mathiesen, Apollo's lyre: Greek music and music theory in antiquity and the Middle Ages, University of Nebraska Press, 1999, pp. 59-60: footnote 61: “Terpander (born ca. 710 BC) flourished in the first third of the seventh century B.C. Athenaeus in Deipnosophistae 14.37 (635e) attests that he won the Carnean musical contests in 676 and 673, and the De musica states that he won four successive victories at the Pythian games (1132e [Ziegler 4.23-24]) and was responsible for the organization of music at Sparta (1134b [Ziegler 8,9-11]). Ter- pander is rumoured to have died by choking on a fig when the fruit was thrown to him in appreciation of one of his performances by a spectator. 12 Nomoi (music laws) were extended compositions, organized in several sections. See John Gray Landels, Music in ancient Greece and Rome, Routledge, London, New York 1999, p. 5, about citharodic nomoi and auloedic nomoi: “The compositions they wrote and performed were called ‘kithara-singers’ nomoi’; this was the genre in which the most famous innovators made their mark, and to excel in it was their ultimate ambition”. “The wood- wind players were not left out either; they performed solos which were known as ‘Aulis-players’nomoi’- extended instrumental pieces with a number of ‘movements’, some of which seem to have been in the nature of programmatic music. One famous example told, in five sections, the story of the victory of Apollo over the mythi- cal monster called the Python at Delphi-a very suitable subject for the venue”. See also Thomas J. Mathiesen, Apollo's lyre: Greek music and music theory in antiquity and the Middle Ages, University of Nebraska Press, 1999, pp. 58-71. 13 John Gray Landels, Music in ancient Greece and Rome, Routledge, London, New York 1999, p.153: “The first strand involves three characters on the borderline between myth and dimly remembered history-Hyagnis, Marsyas and Olympos. Hyagnis is a very shadowy figure - a Phrygian, in some version the father of Marsyas, the inventor of the aulos and the composer of the oldest known piece for that instrument, the ‘Great Mother’s aulos tune’ (Metroon aulema). He lived in Celaenae, a town in Phrygia where there was a cult of the Great Mother (Cybele) whose worship was of an orgiastic character, accompanied by aulos music”.

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ia14. Apart from the list of the musicians, a reference is made about the types of measures that the citharodic and auloedic nomoi consisted of. A special reference is made on Polykephalos nomos (many-headed nomos)15, a nomos that was in honor of Apollo16, and on the Harma- teios nomos (‘chariot’)17, a nomos that was the invention of the first Olympus, the younger. Lysias praises Sacadas18 of Argos who, apart from being a famous and very skilled aulos- player, was also a composer who brought many innovations to music while he won at the Phythian Games in Delphi, with his Pythic Nomos19 that he himself created. The Pythic nomos has been the first known species of programme music (music that describes-descriptive music) in antiquity and its purpose was to describe the struggle of Apollo with the dragon Py- thon20. Lysias brings into the limelight of the discussion the ‘old music’ and he refers to the two music schools of Sparta, the ‘first and the second situation”, as they were called. The ‘first situation’ was connected with the establishment of the Festival of Carnea21, that was held in Sparta and it was dedicated to the god Apollo. In the first celebration of the Carnea the winner

14 John Gray Landels, Music in ancient Greece and Rome, Routledge, London, New York 1999, p. 153: “And though Orpheus, despite his birthplace, was entirely Greek, Marsyas hailed from a ‘barbarian’ land (meaning one where Greek was not spoken) - namely central Asia Minor, now Turkey but then called Phrygia”. 15 Martin West, Ancient Greek Music, Oxford University Press Inc., New York 1992, p. 214: “Another auletic rep- ertory item was the ‘Polykephalos nomos’ (many-headed nome). This again involved imitation of hissing ser- pents, the ones that grew from the scalp of the Gorgon Euryale; the hissing was a lament over the killing of her sister Medusa by Perseus. Midas of Acragas played this piece when he won the Pythian contest in 490”. See also Thomas J. Mathiesen, Apollo's lyre: Greek music and music theory in antiquity and the Middle Ages, University of Nebraska Press, 1999, pp. 64, 178. 16 The Polykephalos nomos was attributed to either the goddess Athena or to Olympus, to Crates, or to the first Olympus (see Thomas J. Mathiesen, Apollo's lyre: Greek music and music theory in antiquity and the Middle Ag- es, University of Nebraska Press, 1999, pp. 64,178). 17 The Harmateios nomos (Chariot nomos) used to be played in battles with chariots or in chariot races, in order to inspire enthusiasm to those who took part in them. It is said that it was established by the first Olympus whose teacher was Marsyas. 18 Thomas J. Mathiesen, Apollo's lyre: Greek music and music theory in antiquity and the Middle Ages, University of Nebraska Press, 1999, pp. 59-60, footnote 62: “The Phythian Festival had been held every eight years at Delphi until it was transformed into a Panhellenic festival as part of the Olympiad. Echembrotus won the contest for singing to the aulos, while Sacadas won for solo aulos playing. Sacadas also won victories at the next two festivals (cf. Plutarch, De musica 1134a [Ziegler 7.23-26]. Sacadas is credited with the composition of the Pythic Nomos in Pollux Onomastikon 4.78 (but cf. Strabo Geographica 9.3.10). Auloedic nomoi were apparently dropped from the Pythian Games beginning with the second festival. Some of the figures named by Lysias are also named by other writers, and some fragments of their poetry survive”. 19 Thomas J. Mathiesen, Apollo's lyre: Greek music and music theory in antiquity and the Middle Ages, University of Nebraska Press, 1999, p. 59: “Nomoi for solo instruments were a later development, undoubtedly reflecting the rising prominence of a professional class of artists. The Pythic Nomos … is an example of the third type, the auletic nomos, an extended composition for solo aulos in which the music itself is highly descriptive or evocative. Auletic nomoi and a forth type, the kitharistic nomos, were introduced at the Pythian Games in 586 and 558 B.C.E.”. Also in p. 63: “Strabo’s Geographica, …names five parts in the Pythic Nomos”. 20 Thomas J. Mathiesen, Apollo's lyre: Greek music and music theory in antiquity and the Middle Ages, University of Nebraska Press, 1999, pp. 24-25, there is an extended description of the Nomos: “To those who sang with the kithara…with its final whistlings”. 21 Perry L. Westmoreland, Ancient Greek Beliefs, Perry L. Westmoreland 2006, p. 138: “When the Peloponnesians denounced Apollo seer Carnus as being a spy, Hippotes killed him. However this idea was not unanimously shared. Crius was a seer from Sparta, and in his home Carnus was even worshipped. As a result of the murder, the Spartans suffered a pestilence that only ended after the national festival of carnea was founded in honor of Apollo to commemorate the death of Carnus”.

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was Terpander. The ‘second situation’ was associated with the gynmnopaedies22 in honor of Apollo, too, during which a musical contest was held23. Lysias within the framework of his role as a professional musician becomes much more technical as regards the tonal scales (harmonics) and the way they have been developed historically and he also does a less extensive report ‘on rhythms’24. The poets and composers who are presented in the De Musica were from the 8th to the 5th century BC. This fact implies that the history of the Greek music has been completed around 400 BC; something that is not historically proved to be correct25. There are many documents found that are dated from the 5th c. BC to the 3rd c. AD. This fact also comes to strengthen our argument that the collocutors of the symposium and hence the author of the book does not consider the contemporary musicians or the music they produced as worth mentioning or having any artistic or moral value at all; plus the fact that the author probably was not a musician himself so he had already lost his connection with music, its technical improvement and development that all the cultivated men in the archaic period used to have. At the time that Pseudo-Plutarch formed his compilation, the writers of the im- perial period were used to making frequent references and comparisons between the old good music and the contemporary bad and they used to praise the music of ‘the old Greeks’ as they called them. In his whole monologue the professional musician Lysias emphasizes and praises the lack of large changes in the harmonics26 and the rhythms of the old Greeks27. Re- flecting “the whole body of doctrines” that were strongly believed during the archaic period “about the different emotional and moral values, the ethos, of the various modes28” he considers that the inviolable rules, in which melodies-harmonics29 and rhythms were structured, renders them suitable for celebrations in honor of the gods and for the shaping of the young men’s soul and character. Despite the fact that he strictly criticizes the innovations of various musicians as responsible for the imbalance between music evolution and cultural life, he does not condemn them. He criticizes them only in the case when they do not expel ‘the good type’, that is the good ethos of music, as he states30. The criticism of the music innovations of the

22 Revista “Stinta Sportului” 2005, webpage: http://www.sportscience.ro/html/reviste_2005_46-1.html of the 16th December 2011: “Gymnopaedies was the annual ten-day ceremony or festival held in Sparta to honor Apol- lo. It was originally dedicated to the memory of the Spartans who died in the battle of Thyrea. During the ceremony, naked adolescents and boys performed physical exercises and dances around the statues of Apollo, Arte- mis and Leto; their movements imitated wrestling and ‘pankratio’ (pankratio=pancratium, which includes wrestling and boxing). The music and lyrics were written by famous writers of that time like Thalitas and Alkmanas. The nature of the dances and festival was particularly solemn, dignified and glorious. ‘Gymnopaedies’ was of such significance in Sparta that men who were not married could not attend it, as a kind of punishment”. 23 Richard Balthazar, Gymnopedie, Author House, 2004. 24 1135 . 25 Only until today almost 60 musical documents have been found and saved, so music history does not end at the 5th c.Β BC. The music evolution was continued until the Greek music was transformed to Greek-Roman through the transitive period of the later Greek period which both the two Delphic hymns by Athenaeus and Limenius belong in. See Martin West, Ancient Greek Music, Oxford University Press Inc., New York 1992, p. 375. 26 Martin West, Ancient Greek Music, Oxford University Press Inc., New York 1992, p. 5: “'Harmonics', in ancient terminology, is the science dealing with the ordered arrangement of notes in scales and the relationships between scales. It was not concerned like modern harmonic theory with chords and chord-successions”. 27 1133BC 28 Henri Irénée Marrou, A history of education in antiquity, University of Wisconsin Press, 1956, p. 140. 29 Warren D. Anderson, Ethos and education in Greek music: the evidence of poetry and philosophy, Harvard University Press, 1966, passim. 30 1135C

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new era, and that is from the middle of the 5th c. BC, that altered its character, leads him to speak extensively of Crexus, Timotheus of Miletus and Philoxenus31, all of them dithyrambists and great musicians; their bold musical innovations provoked intense and contradictory re- views32 and he accuses them that they had preferred ‘the style of now called popular and prof- itable’33. Until the middle of the 5th c., music had rather poor expressive elements and it was plain and grave but with Melanippides, Cinesias, Phrynis and Timotheus music was technically developed as they brought to it many complicated rhythms, harmony and therefore complicated instruments. So, music became complex and object of specialists, while the common people could not follow the changes in technical and moral developments34. In order to prove the abuse that music suffered by the innovative musicians of the 5th c. BC (i.e. Melanippides35 of Melos, Cinesias, Phrynis and Timotheus of Milesia) the compiler of the De musica cites an interesting excerpt from the comedy Chiron written by Pherecrates, whom, his contemporary Aristophanes, involves among the ‘vicious’ ones, that means one of the modern writers and composers. In the passage from the comedy, Music appeared on stage as an abused woman while Justice, another woman, was interested to know what happened to her. Music, then, being in pain and suffering, gradually indicated her four rapists and torturers plus the injuries that these brought to her body with their innovations, of course with a dose of profanity and wicked insinuations, as accustomed in the Attic Comedy: Melanippides loosed and humiliated her with his twelve chords, the malicious Cinesias “‘making exharmonic bends in his strophes’ so that his dithyrambs appear the wrong way round36” ruined her order and balance, Phrynis, with the tuner that he invented brought about changes in the tones, and the worst of all, Timotheus of Miletus, put such many notes coming and going like ants37. Of course, the purpose of the comedy was not to provide an objective historical source, but to ridicule and criticize the wrongs of society; therefore, we cannot be sure for all the things that

31 Martin West, Ancient Greek Music, Oxford University Press Inc., New York 1992, pp. 349-350: “In the second half of the fifth century there were, among others, Melanippides of Melos, Timotheus of Miletus, Telestes of Seli- nus, and Philoxenus of Cythera, while the only native Athenian dithyrambist of note is Cinesias. These, together with the Lesbian citharode Phrynis, stand out as the principal representatives of the so-called new Music that we find unfavourably contrasted with the old by comedians and philosophers”. 32 Martin West, Ancient Greek Music, Oxford University Press Inc., New York 1992, p. 359: “Crexus is credited with introducing into dithyramb a form of combination of singing with instrumentally accompanied spoken de- livery ( ...and with the invention of heterophonic accompaniment of vocal music”. Timo- theus of Miletus added the eleventh and twelfth string to kithara and made a lot of changes in modes and genus. When heκρο tookῦσιν part ὑπὸ toτ ὴtheν ᾡ Carneaδήν) one of the Spartans cut the strings of his kithara that were more than seven. But, in Aristotle's opinion (Metaph. 993B 15): “If Timotheus had not been born, there is a lot of music that we would not have, yet if Phrynis had not existed, there would not have been a Timotheus”. As far as Philoxenus is concerned he has been judged for his harmonic variety, change of mode and genus, and for his bold compositions. See Martin West, pp. 364-366. 33 1135D. 34 Henri Irénée Marrou, A history of education in antiquity, University of Wisconsin Press, 1956, pp. 138-139. 35 Martin West, Ancient Greek Music, Oxford University Press Inc., New York 1992, p. 358: “What Pherecrates says of him is that he undid Music and slackened her with his dozen chordai. We can infer at last that he used extra notes besides those of the plain old scales, and probably that he favoured a mode or modes of the category called ‘slack’”. 36 Martin West, Ancient Greek Music, Oxford University Press Inc., New York 1992, p. 359. 37 Martin West, Ancient Greek Music, Oxford University Press Inc., New York 1992, p. 362: “He leads her through amazing ant-hills, and if he catches her on her own-does this mean when the instrument plays solo?-he pulls her clothes off and untunes her with his dozen strings”

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Pherecrates claimed; still, they remain indicative of the tendency of the prevailing views in his time. The important part of the well-educated Soterichus’ reflects the views of Plato on music and with the criticism that the Philosopher did on the rhythms and the harmonics, in his third book of the Republic. For the preparation of the guardians for their role in the State, Pla- to suggested a complete system of education which allowed poetic texts and myths that only described justice, beauty, morality, valor, and all virtues that teach the proper control of emotions. By following them practically in our life the development of virtues is achieved. As regards the harmonics (modes) Plato expressed the widely believed ancient Greek theory of the ‘ethos of the modes’ by characterizing them one by one and by giving one basic characteriza- tion to each one of them by the way they influenced the soul. For instance, the Mixolydian38 and the Tense Lydian mode were characterized as plaintive and they did not have any place in the music education39. The modes Ionian and Lydian were loose, soft and matched to the symposia; hence, they were inappropriate for the training of the warriors. Only two modes (harmonics) were allowed, the Dorian and the Phrygian. By allowing only two of them, Plato concluded that the multi chord (with many strings) instruments were not necessary, especially the ‘multi-chord’40 (as he named it) aulos. Music, according to Plato, influenced and shaped the soul and ordered it in a harmonious way while supreme music, clarity and purity were identical to philosophy itself. Plato, as Soterichus claims, rejected the other music styles neither out of ignorance nor out of inexperience; he did it because they did not match with the State he had in mind41. Plato did not only have a wide knowledge of music theory and practice (as all free men at his time) but also a profound knowledge of the music harmony and even of the mathematical theory of music, as shown in the excerpt of Timaeus42, mentioned and discussed by Soterichus, which refers to the generation of the soul43 contrast to Aristoxenus, who lived after him, used to disapprove of hearing as a means of perception of music and taught that music should be perceived by the(ψυχογονία). mind and through Pythagoras, the pr o-in portional harmony. However, the contemporaries of Soterichus had abandoned this teaching and they were using the unreasonable musical intervals (those that cannot be expressed as integers or as fractions (the traditional ancient Greek musical intervals of the eighth, the fourth and the fifth are expressed as fractions, therefore they are not characterized as unreasonable) and this practice resulted to the distortion and the misuse of the musical innovations, as they were accused of moving music away from the correct moral ethos. Soterichus, also, mentions Aristotle, the other Greek philosopher who was occupied with ‘mesotis’, the numerical and the harmonious ratio. Aristotle, he concludes, was aware of the relevant text of

38 Martin West, Ancient Greek Music, Oxford University Press Inc., New York 1992, pp. 174, 175, 333, 352. 39 Martin West, Ancient Greek Music, Oxford University Press Inc., New York 1992, p. 179. 40 Plato, Republic 399d. 41 1138C. 42 Plato, Timaeus 35c-36a. 43 Plutarch is particularly interested in the generation of the soul, and he devotes an entire treatise to discussing one short passage, Timaeus 35b–36b (On the Generation of Soul in the Timaeus-De animae procreatione in Ti- maeo, see Hershbell 1987). Plutarch endorses the idea suggested in the Timaeus that the universe is a unified whole with the human being an integral part of this unity, which means that both the physical world and natural phenomena as well as human beings and human society should be approached from a cosmic/metaphysical point of view. See Stanford Encyclopedia: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/plutarch/ 18th June 2011.

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Plato’s Timaeus: “Harmony is celestial and its nature is divine…it has also two kinds of middle ratio: the numerical and the harmonious one…44”. After Aristotle, his student Aristoxenus moved the music theory further than his teacher and spread the view that the ultimate judge for music was the ear and the ear only, a very radical idea that moved the theories of the ethos of the modes even more further away, as then, it was not the influence that music had on the soul that judged and distinguished music into ‘good’ or ‘bad’, anymore. Soterichus insightfully observes that hearing, along with sight, are the senses that bring us into contact and union with the divine, implying that music itself is divine as invented by the god Apollo. An extended part of the discussion is dedicated to the gravity and importance that music had in the education of the old Greeks. In the Greek education music played a significant role: the young Athenians used to play both lyre and aulos but later aulos was abandoned as not suitable and only the five-chord lyre of Terpander was suitable for the young people, as Aristotle taught. Aristotle devoted a whole book of Politics (VIII) trying to give answers to the problem that had emerged from the technical progress of music: should music continue to be taught to the young people within the framework of their basic education in order for them to form their character and ethos and to make them active persons in the Greek cultural life and if yes, what kind of music should this be? He tried to solve this problem by distinguishing the music into: a) music suitable for education (like Plato in the Republic, he followed the old tradition of the paideutic ethos of the harmonics but even more strictly than him) and b) to music for other purposes of the cultural life. The pupils were not supposed to go into great depths of mastery as regards technique (as their aim was not to become professionals) but they were trained to develop their taste yet remaining amateurs45. Soterichus, reflecting Aris- totle’s theory on the subject, speaks about the music education and like the Philosopher focuses on the overall music education, in combination with the hearing and taste training and claimed that the knowledge of the harmonics that were suitable to express a specific moral character were the most important requisite for the musically educated person. In the end, the wise man of Alexandria refers to the usefulness of music not only for educational purposes but also for the intellectual goods that music offers to people such as the spiritual uplift, encouragement to the difficulties, avoidance of evil, and he, then, caps the dialogue with these words: “the first and best service that music offers to men is the reciproca- tion of gratitude to the gods while the second one is that through music the human soul is ordered in purity, musicality and harmony46”, expressing this way once more the Pythagorean realm. In our article we argued that in the whole dialogue of the De Musica, the debate between philosophers concerning music and its position in the educational system of ancient Greece is clearly presented through the citing of the musicians and of the artistic and technical innovations they brought to music from the start of its history until the middle of the 5th c. BC. The collocutors of the symposium gathered to investigate and highlight the reasons why music declined and lost ground in the educational curriculum of the Greeks and they concluded

44 1139B. 45 Henri Irénée Marrou, A history of education in antiquity, University of Wisconsin Press, 1956, p. 139: “This shows considerable insight, and many musicians would readily agree with it today, for the genuine amateur is the person who not only goes to concerts and listens to the radio or the gramophone but actually makes music by playing the piano or the violin- even though he never becomes a virtuoso”. 46 1146D.

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that this happened because of the technical innovations that moved music away from its initial purpose, which was the spiritual elevation of the citizens and therefore their eudemonia and the eudemonia of the State as a whole. The De Musica is also a rich historical source on music, musicians and philosophical aspects, despite the fact that it does not cover the centuries from the 5th c. BC until the 2nd c. AD, when it was written. The reason for that, as already mentioned before, proves that the author, through the three men who discuss, actually upholds that, after the 5th c., music became very complicated and suitable for specialists only- therefore it was not good enough to mention. Another major contribution is that the dialogue reflects the Platonic and Aristotelian views concerning the value and the utility that music had in men’s lives.

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Bibliography

A. Ancient Aristotle, Politics. Plato, Republic. Plato, Timaeus. Plutarch, De musica. Plutarch, Phocion. Plutarch, Table Talks.

B. Contemporary Anderson Warren D., Ethos and education in Greek music: the evidence of poetry and philosophy, Harvard University Press, 1966. Balthazar Richard, Gymnopedie, Author House, 2004. Burkert Walter, Raffan John, Greek Religion: archaic and classical, Wiley-Blackwell, Publishing Ltd. and Harvard University Press, 1985. Gibson Sophie, Aristoxenus of Tarentum and the birth of musicology, Routledge, New York 2005. Kalfas Vasilis, “Aristotle's Language”, in ELETO-7th Conference with title: “Greek Lan- guage and Termination”, Athens 22nd-24th October 2009. From the webpage: http://www.eleto.gr/download/Conferences/7th%20Conference/7th_00a- KalfasVassilis_Aristotle's-Language2_V02.pdf. Landels John Gray, Music in ancient Greece and Rome, Routledge, London, New York 1999. Marrou Henri Irénée, A history of education in antiquity, University of Wisconsin Press, 1956. Mathiesen Thomas J., Apollo's lyre: Greek music and music theory in antiquity and the middle Ages, University of Nebraska Press, 1999. Psaradelli Georgia, in her webpage on the 26th September 2011: http://www.psaradelli.gr/education/epim/letters/let_alfa.htm. Routledge Companion to Philosophy and Music, edited by Theodore Gracyk and An- drew Kania, Routledge, New York 2011. Stanford Encyclopaedia, webpage: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/plutarch/ West Martin, Ancient Greek Music, Oxford University Press Inc., New York 1992. Westmoreland Perry L., Ancient Greek Beliefs, Perry L. Westmoreland ed., 2006.

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Πάπυροι - Επιστημονικό Περιοδικό Δέλτοι τόμος 4, 2015

Papyri - Scientific Journal Delti volume 4, 2015

substance Criticism of the heideggerian interpretation of the aristotelian

CARMEN SEGURA PERAITA, Departamento de Filosofía Teorética, Facultad de Filosofía, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, España Email: [email protected]

5 – 5 ISSN:2241-5106 Θεσσαλονίκη 201 Thessaloniki 201

Πάπυροι - Επιστημονικό Περιοδικό Papyri - Scientific Journal Δέλτοι Delti τόμος 4, 2015 volume 4, 2015 www.academy.edu.gr [email protected] Criticism of the heideggerian interpretation of the aristotelian substance

Criticism of the heideggerian interpretation of the aristotelian substance

CARMEN SEGURA PERAITA

Περίληψηo VIII Αυτή η σύντομη μελέτη επιχειρεί να προχωρήσει βαθύτερα στην κατανόηση που προ- σφέρει Χάιντεγκερ της οὐσίας-ἐνέργειαςPhysis στο κεφάλαιο του Νίτσε του. Η κατανόησηactualitas της οποίας το αντικείμενοWirklichkeit δεν είναι τίποτα άλλο από τον υπολογισμό για την ιστορία της ύπαρ- ξης. Αυτό που είχεHeidegger αρχικά θεωρηθεί ως , αλλά λίγο αργότερα ως οὐσία, και τελικά ως . Πρόκειται για ένα θέμα της αξιολόγησης της καταλληλότητας των Seinsgeschichteαναλύσεων του Heidegger και τα συμπεράσματά του. Με τον τρόπο αυτό, το συγκεκριμένο ζήτημα που εξετάζεται εδώ είναι το κατά πόσον το σχηματικό σχεδιάγραμμα του παρόντος προχωρά με φαινομενολογική ερμηνευτική συνοχή, στον τρόπο του για την εκτέλεση αυτής της ιστορικής έρευνας. Abstract This brief study seeks to go deeper into the understanding that Heidegger offers of Nietzsche other than accounting for the history of being ph sisοὐσία-ἐνέργεια in Chapter VIII of hisactualitas and. An finally understanding as whoseI t object is a question is nothing of . That which he had initially understood as y- , but shortly thereafter as οὐσία, Wirklichkeit. Seinsgeschichte evaluating the pertinence of Heidegger’s analyseshermeneutic and of his coherence conclusions. in his In manner so doing, of carryingthe specific issue that is considered here is whether in his schematic sketch of this Heidegger proceeds with phenomenological- out this historical investigation.

I. Introducción especialistas – Con independencia– de lo que de no la cabe simpatía duda oes animadversión de que el pensador que la de lectura Friburgo heideggeriana se destaca a de Aristóteles despierte entre los no sólo entre lo filósofos sino también entre los filólogos clásicos c- tualmente como uno de los más relevantes intérpretes del estagirita. En particular, porque no sólo ha revitalizado la filosofía aristotélica, sino porque lo ha hechos mediantefundamentos una dedurísima la m crítica, al menos por lo que respecta a la central categoría aristotélica de sustancia, que es la que ahora nos ocupa. Tal crítica, como es bien sabido, ha socavado lo e- tafísica clásica, forzando a la filosofía actual a intentar una comprensión no sustancialista de lo que es. A mi parecer, como ya he señalado en otras ocasiones, todavía está pendiente la tarea de estudiar, de manera sistemática y global, el conjunto de las interpretaciones hedieggeria- nas de Aristóteles. Sin duda ya se ha dado pasos201 muy importantes en esta dirección, pero está ISSN:2241-5106

aunque no absolut todavía pendiente una considerable tarea. Mi investigación actual1 está centrada prioritaria, amente, en este campo de trabajo. Con ella pretendo contribuir modesta- mentesustancia a un constituye propósito un que, aspecto filosóficamente, no me parece relegable . A mi juicio, como ya he apuntado al comienzo, la crítica heidegeriana a la noción de discípulo de Husserl tachar de presencialistafundamental, si no el más fundamental, de toda su interpreta- bien,ción del fundador de la metafísica occidental. Fue en efecto dicha crítica la que le permitió al a toda la tradición metafísica occidental. Pues riana,al que abordar en ocasiones la mencionada es el resultado interpretación de un insuficiente crítica que conocimientoHeidegger realiza de las de filosofía la οὐσία, de pers Ari i- go, entre otros, los siguientes objetivos. 1) Eliminar una lectura tópica de la crítica heidegge- s- tóteles y también de la de Heidegger. 2) Aclarar algunos malentendidos, que en ocasiones provienen de ámbitos muy conservadores por lo que a la interpretación de los textos clásicos se refieren, poco proclive a admitir ningún mérito al heterodoxo intérprete del estagirita. 3) Enbate consonancia establecido con por lo He anterior, situar la interpretación heideggeriana de la aristotélica οὐσία en el adecuado horizonte de comprensión; 4) analizar los rendimientos filosóficos que el de- idegger con Aristóteles tiene para su propio proyecto. Huelga decir quebuc nada de esto significa que suscriba acríticamente las tesis heideggerianas; por el contra- rio, como se podrá advertir en este mismo trabajo, mi propósito es el de realizar una contri- ión realmente crítica, en el sentido más radical y positivo de esta palabra. e Con relación a los dos primeros objetivos, entiendo que es preciso realizar un examen riguroso tanto de la doctrina aristotélica de la sustancia como de la exégesis y crítica heid g- geriana de la misma. En mi trabajo (del que aquí no caben sino unas pinceladas) en seguida, lo trasllevo haber a cabo y, a mi juicio, el resultado de tal investigación es diferente del que habitualmente se acos- tumbra a verter. Formulado brevemente, se trata de lo que expondré realizado una breve aclaración sobre la relación οὐσίαPues -bien,ἐνέργεια. es cierto Que queexiste no una en todo estrechísima mome relación entre ambas nociones centrales resulta evidente. Pero también lo es que Heidegger no lee siempre del mismo modo esta vinculación. n- Sinto Heidegger embargo, realizaren los aspecto una crítica ajustada de la οὐσία aristotélica, porque no en todo momento parece realizar una adecuada interpretación de la misma. Así, especialmente en los años 20’. s nucleares, su análisis es certero. Así ocurre en la vinculaciónen que su comentarioestablece entre a los οὐσία primeros y tiempo. libros Una de vinculaciónla Física a la que nunca se había atendido tan explícita ni fructíferamente. Por otra parte, hay que recordar que el Heidegger de los años treinta, , realiza excelente interpretaciónsulta bastante decontrovertida, la ἐνέργεια en la que destaca su carácter de operación. Que el de Friburgo, entendiera la ἐνέργεια como operación es algo que muchos le niegan, aunque esta cuestión re puesto que en los numerosos textos posteriores a 1930 encontramos interpretaciones tanto en una dirección como en otra. Es decir, hay textos de Heidegger dónde la ἐνέργεια si es en-

1 Entre otras puedo mencionar las siguientes investigaciones: “Heidegger: el Ereignis Daimon “Heidegger en Contrastes desde la reapropiación de la respuesta aristotélica al problema del movimiento”, (aceptado para su publicación) y torno a Aristóteles: una mirada fenomenológico-hermenéutica”,202 (aceptado para su publicación, 2015). ISSN:2241-5106

2 tendida como operación, pero también hay otros texto donde esa dimensión esencial de la ἐνέργεια es ignorada e incluso, a menos de facto, puesta en cuestión . Con relación a los dos últimos objetivosNatorp es necesario Bericht realizar dio forma las al precisiones proyecto de que de siguen. Heidegger no se entendió nunca como un comentador ni como un intérprete ortodoxo de Aristóteles. Pero desde 1922, cuando en elmiento, articulada categorialmente mediante lass- trucción, supo que en el origen de las categorías que conformaron la metafísica clásica se en- contraba la comprensión aristotélica del movi significanociones tantode οὐσία, como δύναμις decir y ἐνέργεια. Ahora bien, hay que tener presente en todo momento que la lectura que Heidegger realiza de Aristóteles es fenomenológico-hermenéutica, lo que tendida more heideggerianoque el discípulo de Husserl fuerza al de Platón a hablar su propio deidioma qu o, mejor dicho, hace rendir los logros “metafísicos” para la causa fenomenológica, en- posible gracias a la copertenencia. La de delHeidegger Dasein es una “ontologíaEreignis fenomenológica”, esto es lo que enen eldefinitiva sentido vertebrae no la se búsqueda pregunta de por un el pensador ente sino quepor nola verdad hacer sinodel ser, girar por entorno su sentido. Un sentido que es y el ser. El a la vieja e insondable sentencia parmenídea que declara la identidad de pensar y ser. Es aquí donde hay que buscar todolos rendimientos lo que debe de ser la pensadosostenida ya discusión sea por quetoda Heidegger la anterior mantuvo filosofía con o por Aristóteles. el pensamiento Así, en “La de tesis de Kant sobre el ser” dice el intérprete de Aristóteles: “Ser y pensar: en ese ‘y’ se esconde 3 hoy” . Éste es el horizonte dentro del que se mueve la confrontación de Heidegger con Aristó- teles y sólo haciéndonos cargo de él, apropiándonoslo, estaremos en condiciones de analizar y valorar adecuadamente su interpretación. De momento, sin embargo, la pretensión de la aportación que sigue es bastante más modesta.Nietzsche De lo que se trata en estas breves páginas es tan sólo de ahondar en la singularAqu com- prensiónlla que lo entiende que de la en οὐσία su origen-ἐνέργεια com o ofrece physis el pensador de Friburgo en el capítulo VIII del teriormente. Una hacia comprensión la actualitas cuyo y finalmenteobjeto no es la otro Wirklichkeit que dar cuenta, de manera de la historia que el ser del pasaser. a sere- entendido como , pero que deriva enseguida hacia la οὐσία y pos- tea es si en s historia del ser Heidegger procede con coherencia mera posición del pensar. Pues bien, la cuestión específica que aquí se plan- u trazado esquemático de esa fenomenológicoen dos te -hermenéutica en su manera de realizar la investigación histórica. Pues bien para toda la interpretación que voy a exponer y criticar, Heidegger se basa Wirklichkeitsis (o hipótesis) nucleares, que se interrelacionan mutuamente y mutuamentetafísica, se tuvo ex- plican. La primera es que, desde sus orígenes, la metafísica entendió el ser como realidad efectiva ( ). La segunda es que, a la largo de la historia de la misma me lugar unaEn transformaciónefecto, en el Nietzsche según la, Heideggercual la οὐσία sostiene-ὑποκείμενον que ya pasó desde a sersus entendida mismos orígenes como suj ene- to apofántico; dicha transformación habría llegado, fue a entendido su cenit con como Kant. realidad efectiva, Wirkl

Aristóteles el ser, en el sentido de la Existenz i- 2 Física deDel Die magnífico Grundprobleme conocimiento der Phänomenologie que de Aristóteles tenía Heidegger da cuenta especialmente, a mi parecer, el texto mientodedicado de al la análisis de la aristotélica de 1939 (Heidegger, 1976), así como lo recogido en la segunda parte relativo a la consideración del tiempo en Aristóteles y a su trata- 3 metabolé (Heidegger, 1975). Heidegger, “La tesis de Kant sobre el ser,, p. 477 (386). ISSN:2241-5106 203

chkeit por el Estagirita entre el es que es . Esta afirmación toma como punto de apoyo, por una parte, la diferencia establecida qué- (la esencia) y el - (la existencia). Por otra parte, se fun- damentaque su crítica en una definitiva interpretación a la idea de de la ser οὐσία como como Wirklicheit ὑποκείμενον,, ya en Kant,pero seen sostieneel sentido sobre de sujeto la s ontológico. Poner el acento en esta identificación le resulta imprescindible a Heidegger puesto – – dee- gunda tesis mencionada y que recuerdo a continuación. Heidegger,Al comienzo lo que yaciendo de la historia desde delsí delante ser, la οὐσίαestaba fue así pensada presente como y, por sujeto lo tanto ὑποκείμενον era acto, actual Ahoratodas susbien, determinaciones; en la Edad Media, es debido decir, antecomo todo sujeto al pensamiento ontológico. Este creacionista, sujeto era, tal siempre actualidad según p actualitas, en el sentido del mero estar puesto, del ser . actualitas a- sómo a Wirklichkeit, ser entendida hay como un corto trecho extra causas. Se advierte enseguida que, de la comprensión de la existencia como a la de ésta co- en la Edad Media, como lo que surge yque permanece recorrer. en la presencia physis Por otra parte, y además, el sujeto ontológico, la οὐσία,a ya por no substantiahabría sido: locomprendida que yace y sub puesto (en el recuerdo deadaequatio la ) sino, de manera patente,–merced como a sujeto;Descartes de– hecho, como certeza,es traducid eso permanece debajo, lo - . Pero, dado que poco después la verdad como pasó a ser concebida sujeto (ὑποκείμενον) ya no po- día continuar siendo prioritariamente– un sujeto ontológico sino uno lógico. De este modo es, por tanto, como se inició la transformación del sujeto ontológico en sujeto lógico; o dicho con Heidegger,to que el yo de pienso, la οὐσία queὑποκείμενον ya no es sustancia, en sujeto se apofánticohabría transformado. plenamente en logos ap A juicio de nuestro pensador, tal transformación sólo llegó a su plenitud en Kant, pues- 4 Nietzsche o- fántico: en sujeto de sus todas sus determinaciones . A mi parecer, la lectura de Aristóteles, realizadaWirklicheit por Heidegger tuvo Suarez en el 5 (aunque no sólo), está hecha desde su peculiar y siempre vigente perspectivapuesto que kantiana lo que yme así propongo también desde la influencia que sobre su comprensión de la . Sin embargo, esta última es una cuestión en la que no me puedo detener aquí, realizar con esta aportación es lo que ya está contenido en el título de la misma: un análisis crítico de la interpretación heideggeriana de la οὐσία aristotélica. Los pasos que siguen se en- caminan en esa dirección.

2. La determinación metafísica del ser como “Wirklichkeit” y la transformación del sujeto ontológico en sujeto lógico Nietzsche Como ya he anunciado, para abordar el asunto de esta contribución comenzaré por atenerme a lo dicho por Heidegger en un breve texto de su . El que lleva por título, «La metafísica como historia del ser». Considero que la elección es atinada en la medida en que en estas páginas se encuentran decantadas las ideas que paulatinamente Heidegger fue elaborando a lo largo de un ya dilatado camino. Dasein Pensamiento 4 5 Cf. mi artículo, “Heidegger: la copertenencia entre y ser. Una confrontación con Kant”, , vol. 67, nº 252, mayo-agosto, 2011, pp. 295-320. A este respecto cf. mi libro Heidegger y la metafísica. Análisis críticos, Madrid, 2007, pp.193-202. ISSN:2241-5106 204

2.1. El ser como Wirklichkeit das WirklicheAl comienzo de las páginas citadas, Heidegger formula una de sus tesis centrales; la primera de6 las dos que he enunciado. Que en metafísica, como “ente” vale lo real efectivo ( ) . Como ya he dicho, se trata de una comprensión que el pensador de Friburgo de- fiende desde el principio y que mantiene como hilo conductor de su análisis crítico hasta el Asífinal. es, a su parecer l es y el que es constituye el comienzo de la met De hecho, sostiene arriesgadamente que esta distinciónessentia, entendidaya es operativa como en posibilidad, Aristóteles. y a distinción entre el qué- - es obviaa- parafísica, toda ya en la metafísica,Aristóteles, aunque y permite en realidad,la diferencia no lo entre sea en absoluto existentia, comprendida como realidad efectiva. A juicio de Heidegger7 esta distinción y esta presencia no mienta otra cosa que lo .que posteriormente, en una En la medida, sin embargo, en que Aristótelesactualitas, piensa en primer lugar la οὐσία (presen-, cia)Dasein como ἐνέργεια, riormenteinterpretación se denomina transformada, se llamará respecto de la essentiarealidad efectiva y existencia (Existenz ), la exposición aristotélica de la distinción muestra una preeminencia de lo que poste- existentia8 (…). Para Aristóteles el ser descansa en la ἐνέργεια del τόδε τι . Estas palabras no dejan de ser sorprendentes, por varios motivos, de los que doy so- recemera mantener cuenta. una op En en primer actualitas lugar, he de hacer notar que en otros pasajes del mismo texto, Heidegger pa- actualitas inión diferente. Así es, en el epígrafe titulado «La transformaciónsegún de la ἐνέργειαla cual en la Edad Media», Heidegger –aunque lassostiene9 traducciones que tras parecieran Aristóteles mantener «la ἐνέργεια el significado se convierte orig en nal– y ésta en realidad efectiva» . En estos momentos, Heidegger es de la opinión i- en realidad lo modificaron. actualitas y la Wirklichket El pensador alemán da la impresión de vacilar en sus valoraciones. Por una parte, en el texto citado antes, dice que en la ἐνέργεια ya está el gérmen de la actualitas que ya no; declara, así, que lo esencial de la ἐνέργεια se mantiene en la posteridad. Por otra parte, poco entiendedespués, sostienela metafísica que haycomo una destino sustantiva acontecido, transformación de manera de sentidoque lo que en lacomparece en el final expresa lo contenido en la ἐνέργεια. A mi parecer esta aparenten esto vacilación su postura no parece es tal. quedar Heidegger d actualitas, la había de estar desde el principio.esse De actu hecho mantiene, y co e- inicialfinitivamente del ser10 clara, que a pesar del abismo que media entre la ἐνέργεια y la transformación del ser como está también preparada desde la esencia metafísica . Esto haceEn estaque latransformación –sistencia la idea de Dios Creador juega, a su parecer, un papel fundamental. Desde el cristianismo, la ἀρχή se transforma en αἰτία y ésta, en definitiva, es el actus, es Diosquo rescreador. sist ex se refiera al mero estar fuera de la causación. Así pues, Heideg- ger puede concluir lo que la tradición medieval rezaba: «la existentia i-

6 Ib 7 IbHeidegger, 1961, 327. 8 Ib., 329. 910 Ib., 334. . 205 ., 339. ISSN:2241-5106

actus es causalitas 11 actualitas, pero eso es, tur, ponitur extradas Wirklichestatum possibilitatis . Este » . En definitiva, ahora lo real existente es lo que es en acto, la a su vez (o al menos puede ser com- prendido así) .

2.2. De la οὐσία al sujeto apofántico En la introducción de este estudio he afirmado que la segunda tesis fuerte en que se apoya la interpretación y crítica heideggerianas de la “comprensión tradicional” del ser, es la siguiente. Que a lo largo de laNietzsche historia de que la metafísicaestoy analizando, hubo una Heidegger transformación se esfuer porza porla cual mo la οὐσία griega pasó a ser entendida como sujeto apofántico. En el mismo texto del s- trar que tal transformación tuvo lugar tal como él la entendió. Para mostrar hacerlo que procede fue Descartes del siguiente modo. En primer lugar, aborda la comprensión aristotélica de la οὐσία, de la que ex- trae las consecuencias pertinentes. Después dedica un apartado a quien realizó la transformación de aquella en sujeto – porlógico; lo que es decir,tiene queapofántico ver con. Alla menci hacerlo, insiste en varias ocasiones– en que tal transformación sólo llegó a su plenitud con Kant. A mi parecer, la interpretación heideggeriana o- desarrollosnada transformación posteriores,resulta no se e sugerente y no está totalmente exenta de sentido. Considero, pasossin embargo principales y como que ya da he el dicho, pensador que desu exégesisFriburgo depara Aristóteles, afianzar susobre propia la que tesis hará respecto pivotar de los la ncuentra libre de algunas dificultades. Paso ya a exponer los

οὐσία yPues sus transformación.bi Einführung in die M taphysik2.2.1. La οὐσία como presencia y su reconducción al ὑποκείμενον miento – en,– es conocida la tesis heideggeriana12 (que se remonta a de- rivando en) según el demorarse la cual en: en el un comienzo mantenerse de la presente historia y del consistente ser, éste enfue el entendido ser, que así como llega surg a seri- φύσις y, en consecuencia, como ἀλήθεια . Ahora bien, esta concepción acabaría e- –así lo entiende Heidegger– como un presenciar que acaba por llegar a la13 pr entendido como οὐσία. Aquí comenzaría la historia propiamente dicha de la metafísica . La οὐσία es pues que al haber logrado estar ahí yaciendo delantee- sencia y se mantiene en ella; la οὐσία, recuerda nuestro pensador, habría sido comprendida por el estagirita como un τόδε τι, pero uno tal (ὑποκείμενον) se encuentra en reposo y, precisamente en ese reposo, es presencia, presente. De esta inicial caracterización de la οὐσία por parte deun Heidegger, llegar a la haypresencia que destacar, y mant a nersemi parecer, en ella dos aspectos. a) Por una parte, con su descripción de la οὐσία como Sophie- tes , el pensador de Friburgo está reiterando su conocida acusación de presencialis- mo a la metafísica (una acusación que se remonta a 1924, cuando en el curso titulado yacers- delante, la formula de manera explícita por vez primera). b) Por otra parte, apoyándose en su caracterización de la οὐσία como un mero (de modo sin duda original), parece hacer coincidir a ésta con el ὑποκείμενον. Que,

además,11 Ib añada que es un τόδε τι reta fuerza al acercamiento entre las nociones de entidad y 12 physis es el ser mismo, merced al cual lo ente se hace y permanece visible por vez primera12 Einführung in die Metaphysik,., 342. “LaNietzsche, . 13 GA 40, pp. 16-17. Cf. p. 330. ISSN:2241-5106 206

sujeto. No parece caber duda, la intención del pensador friburgués es subrayar el caráctercierto que de sujeto (nadie lo discute) tiene la οὐσία. Aunque, a mi juicio, el modo en que lo hace desdi- buja los perfiles nítidos y precisos con los que el estagirita la definió, también es hay elementos en la metafísica y en la lógica aristotélica (como veremos en seguida) que le permiten a Heidegger realizar la lectura buscada. No es mi propósito realizar un estudio filo- lógico-críticoEn el libro con VIIrelación de la Metafísicaa la interpretación que Heidegger hace de Aristóteles. No obstante, me resulta inesquivable la necesidad de apuntar, siquiera, ciertas precisiones. , Aristóteles afirma que lo que primariamente es, es la entidades individual: y algo determinado la οὐσία. y, de otra parte, la calidad, la cantidad o cualquiera otra de las c La expresión “algo que es“ se dice en muchos sentidos (…). De una parte, significa el qué- o- sas que se predican de este modo. Pues bien, si “lo que es“ se dice tal en todos estos sentidos, es evidente que lo que es primero de ellos, es el qué referido a la entidad (…).14 Lo que primda- riamente es, lo que no es en ningún aspecto, sino simplemente,– será la entidad . Ésta es entendida como principio. Es–, decir,que desde no como sí misma una mera se autoconstituye suma de notas y autogeo pre i- cados sino, si se me permite la expresión, como una orden eso es tambiéno desde forma la forma y así lay porde- nomina Aristóteles: forma específica, εἶδος s- tiona. Aunque, en cualquier caso, lo que hay es el individuo constituid ella, también por el resto de sus determinaciones15 categoriales. refiere, su re En el mismo libro, Aristóteles se pregunta a qué se debe llamar entidad, si a la esencia, al universal, al género o al sujeto (ὑποκείμενον) . Por lo que a éste último se s- seguidapuesta es que que, puesto que el sujeto es aquello de lo que16 se predica el resto de las categorías, sin que se diga de ninguna otra, podría parecer οὐσία . Sin embargo, el Estagirita añade en- no basta ser sujeto para ser οὐσία. Así es, «el ser capaz de existencia17 separada y el definitiva,ser algo determinado como es sab parecen pertenecer en grado sumo a la entidad» . Por tanto, sólo será sustanciaEn elel sujetocapítulo que, cuarto además, del reúnalibro VII estos de requisitosla Metafísica (por eso, la materia, ὕλη, no lo es). En ido, la respuesta de Aristóteles es que la οὐσία es el εἶδος. específica son lo mismo, pero contempladas desde dos puntosdice18 de Aristóteles vista diferentes: que «la cuando esencia co de cada cosa es lo que de cada cosa se dice que es por sí misma» . Es decir,esencia la esencia, y la forma en, eso mismo, visto desden- templo desde fuera lo que algo es y lo defino, la definición recoge la la dimensión “ló- gica” de la cosa en cuantoforma que específica ésta es vista desde el λόγος. Ahora bi la naturaleza, en cuanto que principio constitutivo de un individuo, de una οὐσία, es denomi- nado por Aristóteles (εἶδος). Esto se puede explicar también diciendo que la forma específica es la esencia “según la φύσις”, y que la esencia es la forma específica “según el λόγος”. Por eso dice también Aristóteles que «el enunciado de la esencia de cada19 cosa es aquel enunciado que expresa la cosa misma sin que ella misma esté incluida en él» .

Metafísica 1415 1028a 10- 30. 16 Ib., 1028b 33-36. 17 Ib., 37-38-1029a 31. 18 Ib., 1029a 28-30. 19 Ib., 1029b 13. Ib., 20. ISSN:2241-5106 207

, y En las líneas siguientes del capítulo del Nietzsche al que me estoy refiriendo20, Heide 2.2.2. Vinculación entre οὐσία ἐνέργεια ἐντελέχεια , y g- ger va a tratar de la vinculación que existe en el pensamiento de Aristóteles entre οὐσία ἐνέργεια ἐντελέχεια. Para lograrlo, tiene que realizar la tarea previa de mostrar «El la reposo relación se esencial que existe en la filosofía aristotélica entre movimiento y reposo. Después tendrá el camino expedito para que se advierta la conexión que se acaba21 de mencionar: muestraComo como se un aprecia carácter en elde fragmento la presencia. que Pero acabo el dereposo citar, esmovimiento un modo eminente y reposo seríande la movil cara i- teresdad. En fundamentales la quietud el movimientodel ser que se ha no llegado se pue aden su acabamiento»considerar por separado. en la medida en que c- presenciar, puesto que ese presenciar el movimiento se encamina al reposo y éste es el fin de aquél. En opinión de Heidegger, estos caracteres están vinculados de manera esencial con el es uno de los modos de, labien movilidad como y el reposo. sentidos:Siempre como aproducir juicio de y Heidegger,como representar lo movido es llevado al estado y situación del presenciar; bien como φύσις ποίησις. A la vez ésta última puede ser entendida en dos (de esta última interpretación que, sin duda, puede resultar insólita, se irá dando cuenta a lo largo de la exposición que sigue). Recordando el ejemplo de la construcción de una casa (proporcionado por el mismo Aristóteles) se advierten dos cosas. La primera es que algo está en movimiento, está siendo muestraproducido. en Lalo de segunda es que el reposo, tras el movimiento de la producción de la obra (ἔργον), preservaAussehen: el acabamiento. La, la casa, obra, dice Heidegger, reposa en su acabamiento y así se soculto de su apariencia. Está a la vista, exhibida,presenciar expuesta, y así y pa nosradigma muestra de sula aspecto ( εἶδος). El ἔργον es así lo que está expuesto en lo desoculto de su aspecto y se demora ahí; es, por tanto, uno de los modos del das Wirkliche οὐσία. Por eso ésta se denomina también ἐνέργεια, y hay que entender por ἐνέργεια lo que se ha realizado, lo efectuado y actual. De nuevo, lo real efectivo, . , puesto que, Como se puede advertir enseguida, sorprende que para realizar y su explicación sobre la ἐνέργεια, Heidegger recurra exclusivamente el ejemplo de una actividad poiética comoMetafísica es bien, que sabido, conocía Aristóteles, bien22 distingue netamente entre ποίησις πρᾶξις. Resulta extraño además, que este pensador no recurra aquí para su explicación al capítulo 6 del libro IX de la mero estar detenido de l . En cualquier caso, siguiendo a Aristóteles, hay que decir que el acto no consiste en el un acto intensivo o actividadya acabado (lo que supondría entender el acto desde la κίνησις y la ποίησις, que es lo que parece ocurrir en el caso de la interpretacións distingue de Heidegger) entre acto sinoy potencia, que es ; esto es, . movimiento es acto Para empezar, Por otra parte, aunque hayamos visto que Aristótele también hemos de recordar su afirmación según la cual el . 20 Ib 21 Ib 22 ., pp. 331-332. Metafísica, ., p. 330. desde la Enesencial el libro estructura IX de la de potenciaAristóteles y acto continúa su tratamiento de la οὐσία; más aún, es ahí dónde finaliza su deestudio estas acerca “meta de ella. La nota diferencial, pero a la vez imprescindible, es que en él va a abordar la οὐσία . A este respecto, convieneIb señalar que, si resulta evidente la vinculación -categorías” con el movimiento, Aristóteles aclara que «la potencia y el acto van más allá de sus significados vinculados exclusivamente con el movimiento». ., 1, 1046 a 1. ISSN:2241-5106 208

como en tantas ocasiones, Aristóteles toma en consideración las opiniones: «La palabra “acto”, vinculada a la realización plena, se haFísica extendido también a otras cosas, fundamentalmente, dice que: «es a evidentepartir23 de los movimientos. En efecto, parece que el acto es, fundamentalmente, el movimien- to» . De hecho, en el libro III de la , donde Aristóteles trata de la κίνησις 24 que el movimiento es la actualidad de lo potencial en tanto que25 potencial»n: «pue. Ade- más: «El movimiento es, pues, la actualidad de lo potencial, cuando al estar actualizándose opera no en cuanto a lo que es en sí mismo, sino en es tanto una quecierta es actualidad,movible» aunque. Y tambié no tenga s-la to que distinguimos en cada26 género lo actual sin perseguir y lo potencial, el movimiento es la actualidad de ticalo potencial de la en cuanto a tal» . Así pues, la κίνησις perfección de la insistencia en la acción un fin todavía no alcanzado (caracterís- dad propiaπρᾶξις de lo perfecta).potencial Se trata de una actualidad activa, dinámica, vinculada al proceso de actualización, del estar cambiando algo (por ejemplo, construyéndose). Es el tipo de actuali- , pero sólo en tanto que sigue siendo potencial, porque una vez que dejales mantenga de serlo y al es menos acto, el en movimiento un sentido (talκίνησις ) cesa. contramosAhora en bien, la Metafísica aunque el acto (ἐνέργεια) se haya vinculado con el movimiento (y Aristóte- relación), el estagirita, establece (y de nuevo nos en- IX, 6) una distinción que va a conducir a la que podríamos considerar su definición metafísica, en sentido estricto y no lato de “acto”. Para lograr su objeto Aris- tóteles distingue entre distintos tipos de acciones (utilizando ahora la palabrae, enen sentidosentido lato,am- plio): por un lado, están las “acciones“ que tienen término (πέρας), y en las que el movimiento cesa una vez alcanzado ese fin (adelgazar, por ejemplo); entre éstas se incluy también la ποίησις. Como estasmovimiento “acciones” no tienen el fin en sí mismas, no se les puede de- nominar propiamente acciones (al menos, no “acciones perfectas”). Para referirse a ellas Aris- tóteles propone hablar de “ “ (κίνησις). El movimiento es, pues, ἐνέργεια ἀ-τελής. Porun fin otro lado, estánra las –como acciones en el perfectas caso de (laπρᾶξις ἀκινησίας– sino que), aquéllas la plenitud que se tienen da en el la fin misma en sí mismas, en las que se dan a la vez el fin y la acción. En éstas la plenitud no consiste en alcanzar uso de quela palabra está fue “acto κίνησις acción. Pues bien, es para estas acciones perfectas para las que Aristóteles propone reservar el “ (ἐνέργεια). En el libro de las Categorías 2.2.3. La οὐσία como sujeto apofántico , la οὐσία es caracterizada como sujeto, y sujeto eminente, aunque este sujeto desde luego no es la ὕλη. «Entidad, la así llamada con más propiedad, más primariamente y en más alto grado, es aquella que,27 ni se dice de un sujeto, ni está en un sujeto, v.g.: el hombre individual o el caballo individual» . La entidad o primera categoría ni se dice de un sujeto ni está en un sujeto porque ella es sujeto, tanto de predicación como de inhesión. Así pues, no hay duda: la entidad es tanto sujeto lógico como ontológico. Pero esto significa en Aristóteles, ante todo, que de no existir

23 Fisica 2425 Ib., 3, 1047a 30-32. , 201b 5. 26 CategoríasIb., 28. 5, 2a 11 27 Ib., 201a 10. -13. ISSN:2241-5106 209

las entidades primarias,Nietzsche no podría existir nada más. Esto es lo que le sirve a Heidegger para afirmar, con verdad, que la οὐσία aristotélica es, también, sujeto apofántico. En el texto del que está acaparando nuestra atención, Heidegger dedica unas intensas páginas a estudiar lo relativo a la diferencia entre entidad primera y segunda. Para ellasello, comodice el no estagirita: puede ser «se de llaman otro modo, entidades se basa secundarias en los textos las especiesde Aristóteles. a las que Después pertenecen de haber las entidadesanalizado loprimariamente relativo a la entidad así llamadas primera, pasa a estudiar lo que se refiere a las segundas. De 28 , tanto esas especies como sus géneros» . esto determ nado Sólo los predicados, sino un esenciales, los que contienen la esencia de un individuo, la defin i- ción de lo que algo es, constituyen entidades secundarias. Pero éstas no son un “ 29 i- ” (un τόδε τι) concepto universal que designa un conjunto de individuos . Me parece necesarioiste entre subrayar un individuo que hay particular, una diferencia que es que, un al parecer, pasó bastante desapercibida a los pensadores renacentistas y modernos (que también a Heidegger le intere- sa destacar); la que ex τόδε τι, y una esencia, quear expresa lo que Aristóteles nos ha mostrado (ya se trate de una especie o un género). Al pare- precisamentecer, estos pensadores en esos centraronsiglos como toda realidad su atención efectiva, en Wiklichkeitlas esencias,: loque que llegaron es ahora a identific siemprecon la posibilidad o lo posible. Ésta es la razón que explica que la existenciao es entendida fuera entendidacomo una (si no es ). Y esto en el sentido de que la existencia de un individu se“efectuación ha de recordar de la queesencia” hay unaque notablepara nada diferencia le afecta entre y que, la por poten tanto es irrelevante. Aunque tan sólo sea muy brevemente, en este orden de consideraciones, entiendo que –aunque en el modo de que puedecia aristotélica llegar a ser y la, que posibilidad no se ha realizadomoderna. Segúntodavía el deestagirita, manera laacaba potenciada– (δύναμις) pertenece al orden ontológico. Con ella, Aristóteles se refiere a algo que es ; por ese motivo ha de experimentar un proceso (κίνησις). Esto no significa que el pensador griego desconociera la posibilidad, entendida como uno de los modos de ser, pero sí que estableció y mantuvo con nitidez la diferencia existente entre ambas.

3. Conclusiones actualitas Wirklichkeit El objetivo que persigue Heidegger es mostrar cómo aconteció históricamente que la ἐνέργεια se transformara en y que ésta lo hiciera en . Por este motivo parece identificar,Wirklichkeit o al menos querer reducir, la οὐσία el ὑποκείμενον y la ἐνέργεια. En realidad Heidegger no llega a afirmar que Aristóteles entendiera ya con toda rotundidad que la οὐσία esHay q ; pero sí afirmó que esta última tiene su origen en aquélla que, por tanto, de algún modo la prepararía. ue apuntar que, desde luego, en esta comprensión del ser está latente, pero de un modo que le pertenece esencialmente, la correspondiente comprensión del tiempo. A mi pare-

28 Ib., 2a 13-19. Por ejemplo, un ser humano no puede ser más o menos ser humano, ni con respecto a sí mismo ni en29 comparación con otros seres humanos. «Verosímilmente, después de las entidades primarias, sólo las especies y los géneros, de entre las demás cosas, se llaman entidades secundarias; pues sólo ellas entre210 los predicados muestran la entidad primaria», Ib., 2b 30- 32. ISSN:2241-5106

–y como es sabido, la cons – cer, en la interpretación heideggeriana del tiempo en Kant titución tuladosde la subjetividad del pensamiento kantiana empírico, está atravesada el Dasein por, das el Wirklichetiempo , ,tiene l también un peso decisivo. La razón es que, según las categorías de la modalidad, sus correspondientes esquemas y los pos- o que existe, es lo presente; es el objeto construido según principios y esquemas que reúne los requisitos materiales necesarios para que el pensamiento pueda determinar que ahora, en presente, existe. Pero desde luego no es así, a mi parecer, como Aristóteles entendió la οὐσία ni el acto (sea éste entendido como ἐνέργειαSin o embargo,como ἐντελέχεια). hay algo Enimportante cualquier caso, las categorías y el horizonte de comprensión kantiano no puede superponerse sin más sobre la filosofía aristotélica. Categ rías que es preciso reconocer en la interpretación heideggeriana. Ya lo he hecho al recoger la teoría aristotélica contenida en su libro de las o- , respecto al carácter de sujeto lógico que le corresponde a la οὐσία por ser antes sujeto ontológico. Desde luegoMetafísica ella lo es y lo es en sentido principal, tanto en el planootros ontológico “dec cuanto en el lógico que, como sostiene con nitidez el estagirita, depende de aquél. Es el mismo Aristóteles quien en la , por ejemplo, recuerda con insistencia que nos i- mos lo que es”; que “lo que es se dice”. Es decir, predicamos,ger pudo decimos aferrarse algo de para algo; desarrollar y en ese d e-la cir, algo opera como sujeto gramatical, apofántico, en definitiva, y algo opera como predicado. Sin duda, éste es un asidero importante al que Heideg cualtesis elsegún movimiento, la cual el el sujeto “lleva rontológico a la presencia se transformó en lógico. Ahora cabe entender también la afirmación, quizá algo desconcertante, de nuestro pensador que he recogido antes, según la ” es ποίησις y ésta puede ser entendida en dos sen- represtidos: como “producir” y como “representar”. Todo parece indicar que con “representación” Heidegger se está refiriendo al conocimiento, que él califica, siempre de manera negativa, de entacionista. Pero, para hacer honor a la verdad, hay que decir que Aristóteles jamás habría Deadmitido cualquier que manera, la aprehensión y de las esencias inteligibles ni su composición y división mediante la afirmación y la negación fuera producción. dejando esta última consideración atrás, de lo que no cabe du- daen eles Nietzscheque, de no ser por el apoyo que Heidegger creyó encontrar en la teoría aristotélica de las categorías, del juicio y, en concreto, del lόγος ἀποφαντικός el objetivo que se había propuesto tre el es y elle que hubieraes resultado más difícil de alcanzar. dad Para finalizar, si algo ha de quedar claro es lo que sigue. Por una parte, la diferencia en- qué- - , es bien distinta de la que existe entre posibilidad y actualidad o reali- efectiva. Y no parece justo achacar a Aristóteles esta reducción. Además, Por último, no es no cierto se puede que esta diferencia sea “obvia”, como dice Heidegger, para toda la metafísica. Por otra parte,que esel edes- tagirita no piensa de ningún modo la ἐνέργεια como realidad efectiva. hacerque en coincidir el Nietzsche esta ἐνέργεια, entendida como puro acto, con la existencia, con el - noalgo. habitualmente También porque no es que del algogusto sea de no Heidegger, significa aunqueque sea fuerapura elactualidad. mismo Heidegger En definitiva, quien parece lo ll asistimos a un ejercicio de superposición–y esto es de lo categoríasque ofrece y un horizontes, mayor fund que mento para la crítica– e- vara a efecto. Pero no sólo en este central texto, sino , actuala- tas y Wirkichkeit en el conjunto de su crítica a la metafísica occidental. Porque lo ciertoen es que, como el mismo pensador friburgués también señala, los significados de οὐσία i- no son intercambiables. De este modo, resulta dudosa la coherencia f o- 211 ISSN:2241-5106

celadas en el capítulo del Nietzsche consagrado a la Historia del ser menológico -hermenéutica de la investigación histórica llevada a cabo mediante brillantes pin- .

Fuentes

Categoriae Paluello Categorías Aristóteles, Metaphysica, 1956 [1974], Oxford Classical Text, Oxford, Minio- (trad.Metaf esp.: ísica , Gredos, Madrid, 1982, introd., trad., notas, Miguel Candel Sanmartín). Aristóteles, Physica , 1957 [1973], Oxford Classical Text, Oxford, W. Jaeger (trad. Físicaesp.: , Gredos, Madrid, 1994, introd., trad., notas, Tomás Calvo Martínez). Heidegger,Aristóteles, , 1950Nietzsche [1973],, Günter Oxford Neske Classical Verlag, Text, Pfullingen Oxford, Ross,y Vittorio W.D. Kloste (trad. esp.: mann,, FrankfurtGredos, Madrid, am Main, 1995, introd., trad., notas,Nietzsche Guillermo R. De Echandía). M., 1961: r- GAWegmarken 6.2 (trad. esp.: , Destino, Barcelona, 2001, trad. J.L. sikVermal). Hitos,Madrid, Alianza, Heidegger, M., 1976, («Von Wesen und Begrift der Φύσις. Aristóteles. Phy- Β, 1»), Vittorio Klostermann,Die Grundprobleme Frankfurt am Main, der PhänomenologieGA 9 (trad. esp.: , Vittorio Klostermann, 2007). Heidegger, M., 1975, Platon: Sophistes, Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main, GA Frankfurt am Main, GA 24. Heidegger, M., 1992, Einführung in die Metaphysik, Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main19. Heidegger, M., 1983, GA 40 (tra. Esp.: Introducción a la metafísica, Buenos Aires, Nova, 1959).

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Χρώμεθα γ ρ πολιτεί ο ζηλούσ το ς τ ν πέλας νόμους, παράδειγμα δ μ λλον α το ντες τισ ν μιμούμενοι τέρους∙ κα νομα μ ν δι τ μ ς λίγους λλ’ ς πλείονας ο κε ν δημοκρατία κέκληται∙ μέτεστι δ κατ μ ν το ς νόμους πρ ς τ δια διάφορα π σι τ σον, κατ δ τ ν ξίωσιν, ς καστος ν τ ε δοκιμε , ο κ π μέρους τ πλέον ς τ κοιν π’ ρετ ς προτιμ ται, ο δ’ α κατ πενίαν, χων γέ τι γαθ ν δρ σαι τ ν πόλιν, ξιώματος φανεί κεκώλυται. ΘΟΥΚΥΔΙΔΟΥ, Ιστορία του Πελοποννησιακού πολέμου, Επιτάφιος, [2.37.1]

We have a form of government not fetched by imitation from the laws of our neighboring states (nay, we are rather a pattern to others, than they to us) which, because in the administration it hath respect not to a few but to the multitude, is called a democracy. Wherein, though there be an equality amongst all men in point of law for their private controversies, yet in conferring of dignities one man is preferred before another to public charge, and that according to the repu- tation not of his house but of his virtue, and is not put back through poverty for the obscurity of his person as long as he can do good service to the common- wealth. Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War. The English works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury. Thucydides. Thomas Hobbes. translator. London. Bohn. 1843