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Irrationality and the DSM-III-R Definition of Mental Disorder

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Irrationality and the DSM-III-R Definition of Mental Disorder Bernard Gert Irrationality and the DSM-III-R Definition of Mental Disorder Abstract: I provide an account of irrationality that takes the concept of an irrational action as more basic than that of an irrational belief. Whil e ex­ plaining the various elements of the OSM- 111-R definition of mental dis­ orders1 I show that even though ( x) not all mental disorders involve irrational beliefs or delusions1 (z) not all irrational actions are due to mental disorders, and (3) not all mental disorders Iead to irrational actions 1 there is a close conceptual connection between irrationality and mental disorders because both involve suffering or an increased risk of suffering an evil or harm, independent of the circumstances one is in. lrrationality and mental disorders are obviously related to each other, but before the exact nature of that relationship can be provided it is necessary to have a clear account of each of the concepts involved. Many philo­ sophers hold that the relationship between mental disorders and irrationa­ lity is Straightforward; mental disorders always involve irrational beliefs. But this is false1 not all mental disorders involve irrational beliefs, some involve irrational actions or desires without any irrational beliefs, e.g. 1 1 volitional disabilities such as compulsions and phobias. Further 1 many mental disorders do not involve any kind of irrationality at all but simply inappropriate suffering of anxiety or sadness or irritability, e.g. dys­ phoric moods (0, 401). However, this does not mean that there is not a close relationship between irrationality and mental disorders1 for irrationa­ lity and mental disorders are related at a deeper Ievel, both of them must be defined by means of the same Iist of evils or harms. Before beginning the generat discussion it is relevant to point out that delusions are equivalent to what I call irrational beliefs. The OSM- 111-R Glossary defines a delusion as "A personal false belief based on incorrect inference about external reality and firmly sustained in spite of what almost everyone eise believes and in spite of what constitutes incontrovertible and obvious proof or evidence to the contrary. The belief is not one ordinarily accepted by other members of the person•s culture or subculture (i.e., it is not an article of religious 10 faith) • ( 0 I 395) Analyse & Kritik 12 (1990), S. 34-46 Q Westdeutscher Verlag, Opladen lrrationality and the DSM- 11 1-R Definition of Mental Disorder 35 I define an irrational belief as follows: " (I) it is held by a person with sufficient knowledge and intelligence to know that it is false, (2) it is in confl ict, either logically o r empirically, with a great number of beliefs t hat one knows to be true, and (3) this conflict is apparent to almost all people with similar knowledge and intelligence." (Gert 1988, 2 1 ) lt is quite clear that t hese two definit io ns are attempts to. pick out the same beliefs, and that if they result in different beliefs being regarded as ir rational or as delusions , this would be taken as an indication that one or the ot her of t he definitions is inadequate. The Concept of lr rationality The concept of irrationality is one of the most fundamental concepts in philosophy. ln philosophy, as weil as in ordinary life, to show t hat an action, desire, or belief, is irrational is taken as showing that it should be avoided or given up. Whether it is explicitly acknowledged or not, most philosophers who put torward a descriptive account of an irrational action do so in order to condemn that way of acting. When they or anyone for whom they are concerned are considering acting in a certain way, showing that the action is ir rational is sufficient to r ule it out. That is wh y it is so important to have an accurate acoount of irrational actions . If one accepts an inadequate account of an irrational action, then one may rule out a certain way of acting t hat should not be ruled out or fail to rule out a wa y of acting t hat should be ruled out. lt is because of its normative implications that the concepts of rationality and irrationalit y are fu ndamental to morality and to any general theor y of value. I shall not deal with these matters here , but shall concentrate on providing an ad­ equate account of rational and irrational actions and showing how these are related to mental disorder s. •\1 ssc :II e •• p er ssse:mu ef u*ina' sud · ,. I reacare utae · ~ never actenaea, otz ., tll5 t Eile Biste aeli:aus::s at al- 1 5 ;rv ?Qd jssae;e p • )")) Jbbb h0 gi: 0 j 1 f d j , i.e., in some ....._.. way that mentions r p 'f'e e ::ss::a. Almost all economist s, political scientists, sociologists and contemporary Anglo­ American philosophers as diverse as .a...-k, in " ·u , id · tlr, ....,._, and ~. do not even consider the possibility that the basic definitions of rationality and irrationality must be given in terms of a specific content, e.g., a Iist, and that there is no formal way to generate that Iist. The failu re to even consider t hat the basic definitions of rationality and ir­ rationality must be given in terms of a Iist has resulted in all of the Standard accounts of rationality being seriously inadequate. Further, - Nt tl a saatrat ol'ows ;e 2 f alit; es bt t Ei!ltEU td ffi@hdii GISOl dCl S 111 tlie appup r f. Bernard Gert Definition of an Irrational Action People act irrationally when they act in ways that they lcnow (justifiably believe) or should lcnow, will significantly increase the probability that they, or those for whom they are concerned, will suffer any of the items on the following Iist: death, pain (including mental suffering), disability, loss of freedom, or loss of pleasure, and they do not have an adequate reason for so acting. A reason for acting is a conscious belief that one's action (or the rule or policy that requires the action) will significantly increase the probability either that someone will avoid suffering any of the items on the previous Iist or that they will gain greater ability, freedom or pleasure. This belief must not be irrational (a delusion). A reason (in this paper I use the term "reason" to mean a reason for acting) is adequate if any !arge group of otherwise rational persons (persons who do not signi­ ficantly increase their chances of suffering death, pain, etc., with no reason) regard what will be a voided or gained as at least as important as what will be suffered. All intentional actions that are not irrational count as rational (Gert 1988, eh . 2). This account of rational and irrational actions conflicts with much that economists, political scientists, philosophers and others have traditionally said about them, but it is the only account that allows us to use "ir­ rational" as the basic normative term, i.e., allows us to hold that no one should ever act irrationally. This use of "irrational" explains why irratio­ nality is such an important concept, fo r if we did not hold that no one ever ought to act irrationally, it wou ld malce sense to aslc "Why should one act rationally?". lj h ep ·a ••igl:t S:j EI: t s h I I t :af lly , and even be tempted *o o'hr 1 1:; c::e sl:cald acc Ii iitlbiially. This shows the confusion that arises once one gives up the view that irratio­ nality is the basic or fundamental normative concept. Chsu•rriaiA8 ~ro­ pose d 2' tios 18 itt&liöii&l iLLOClues a8oisiug tliöSC föt Nl:öiil c.>are c-gcecg•d not • I tl at äCtiöll. Contrary to what philosophers often main­ tain, characterizing an action as rational does not necessarily involve ad­ vising those for whom we are concerned to act in that way, for there are often two or more incompatible but rational ways of acting, e.g., vacation­ ing in the mountains versus at the sea shore. An action is rationally required only if not acting in that way is irrational, e.g., jumping out of the way of a speeding car. Most rational actions are merely rationally allowed, e.g., going to a play. We are often in Situations where all of the proposed alternatives are rational, e. g., choosing between alternative places to vacation. Rejectin g a rational way of acting does not mean one is choosing an irrational way of acting. That incompatible ways of acting can all be rational proves that a proposed Course of action can be rational and yet not everyone would advise their friends to do it. This shows that not all rational actions are lrrationality and the DSM-111-R Definition of Mental Disorder 37 rationally required, some are merely rationally allowed. We cannot be in a Situation where all of the alternatives are irrational. lt may have been irrational to get oneself into a situation where any alternative one chooses results in one's suffering death or pain, etc., but once one is in that situation, at least one of the alternatives has to be a rational one. For even if that alternative involves suffer ing death or pain, etc., it enables one to avoid suffering at least comparable evils, and so since one has an adequate reason for choosing that alternative, one's action is not ir­ rational.
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