Reprinted from October 1992 - Security Affairs with additional illustrations added 1 Golan Crucial for Israeli Security by Mark Langfan Upon completion of the latest round of Israel-Syrian bilateral peace talks, the Syrian foreign minister emphasized that no “grain of sand of our land” will be “lost.” For the Israelis, Prime Minister Rabin reiterated his election pledge of “never coming down from the Golan Heights.” While the two sides continue to talk, there still appears to be a wide gap between them on substantive issues. From the Israeli point of view, resolution of the Golan MARJAYOUN MOUNT HERMON 2:00 PM, Oct 6th, 1973 To Damascus Heights issue depends on a calculus LEBANON Syrian attack begins 14 km of the Golan’s security value as a BEIT JINN buffer against Arab attack and the SASSA 3 Armd Div METULLA MAJDAL precarious position Israel will find SHAMS KANAKIR itself in if it does not have this crucial BANIYAS MASADA buffer zone (see Fig. 1) . TEL DAN JUBBATA EL KASHAB KIRYAT Topographically, the Golan Heights SHEMONA ZAOURA KEFAR EL is a mountain ridge which runs a SZOLD ROM 1 length of approximately 50 kilometers KALA on a north-south axis and is EL QUNETRA approximately15 kilometers wide RAWIYE MANSURAH GONEN SYRIA KAFR SHAMS with plateaus on either side of the NOTERA GOLAN 1 Armd Div crest (see Fig. 2 and 3A) . Since the 1967 Six Day war, Israel has controlled ISRAEL KAFR NAFAKH EL HARRA the crest running north-south and the GADOT western side of the Golan plateau EL KHUSHNIYE which overlooks Israel’s densely BNOT YAAKOV populated Hula Valley and the BRIDGE JASIM ROSH PINNA N 2 A D R RAFID O J HEIGHTS BUTMIYE ALMAGOR Figure 1. The Golan as Israel's Strategic "Breathing Space." UYUN HADI The Golan mountains topographically channel KAFR AQIB RAMAT attacking Syrian tanks through two key MAGSHIMIM bottleneck areas (1) and (2). These natural SEA OF GALILEE terrain bottlenecks allow the defending Israeli SYRIA'S 1973 ADVANCE IN THE GOLAN general to maximize the defensive value of TIBERIAS EL AL D 1967 Cease-fire Line A Q Israel's small standing army by focusing his EIN GEV Q U FIQ R Syrian Armored Attacks limited troops on only those two relatively Natural terrain small spots. 1 2 HAON bottlenecks In the 1973 Yom Kippur War (as depicted on TEL UK QAZIR RM DEGANYA YA Approximate Limit of the map), the Golan's strategic terrain enabled Syrian Advance N A Midnight 7 Oct. '73 Israel's standing force of 150 defending tanks D R O MILES to stop the Syrian standing force of 1500 J O510 JORDAN N attacking tanks. This "Breathing Space" gave O51015 KILOMETERS the IDF the critical 48 hours to call up and deploy Israel's reserve soldiers. Reprinted from October 1992 - Security Affairs with additional illustrations added 2 2,300 ft. Figure 2. The Golan Heights as Israel's E N I 700 m. L Strategic "Watershed" and "Perch." West East E R I F The topographical slope and commanding E E N S I A L position of the Golan Heights is key to E E C R 8 I 4 understanding their supreme strategic value F 9 E 1 S S " T GOLAN A E as Israel's "Watershed" (see also Fig. 3) and H E N G I I C L E HEIGHTS 4 as the strategic "Perch" overlooking the upper H N 7 F E 9 E O 1 GALILEE / R Galilee and the entire North of Israel. E 7 G M " 6 C 9 A 1 Sea of Galilee Tiberias Ein Gev T N – 695 ft. E R – 212 m. R U C northern shore of the Sea of Galilee. Large areas of the Golan, currently controlled by Israel, hold the critical head-waters of the Jordan River which supply at least one third of Israel’s fresh water needs (see Fig. 3B) . These waters flow into the Sea of Galilee which, in turn, supplies most of Israel via the National Water Carrier. In 1964, Syria attempted to divert these headwaters and cripple Israel’s fresh water system (see Fig. 3C) . Israel’s then Labor government ordered a RAIN WATER COLLECTION military operation to destroy the Syrian damming project. This operation was successfully carried out by then IDF Chief of Staff Yizhak Rabin. Before the 1967 war, Syria continuously fired a artillery shells and sniper bullets at Israeli civilians and planted RAIN A A mines on Israeli territory from advantageous perches high in the c Golan hills. Militarily, Israel’s authority extends just over the crest-line of MOUNTAIN the range allowing observation of Syrian military movements and build-ups in peacetime. During war-time, the Golan crest acts as a defensive wall channeling a Syrian attack through two c relatively small approaches. This is exactly what occurred in the TER RESH WA B F a B 1973 Yom Kippur War, when Syrians attacked through the MOUNTAIN “Valley of Tears” gap in the north and over the apex of the VALLEY shoulder of the volcanic hills in the south (see Fig. 1) . Using every centimeter of the Golan terrain. 160 Israeli tanks barely TER RESH WA F a c managed to contain the more than 1,400 attacking Syrian tanks b for 48 hours until the reserves began to arrive. Of the 119 Israeli C C GUTTER MOUNTAIN soldiers that the Syrians captured in the first two days of fighting, 42 were later found murdered, their bodies mutilated. SIDE VIEW OF MOUNTAIN AREA Today, as in 1973, the IDF maintains a relatively small standing force on the Golan to balance the much larger Syrian Figure 3. Water issues - Roof/Gutter force (see Fig. 4B) . The topography of the Israeli-held Golan analogy: Applicable to the Golan Heights limits Syrian armored forces, in an attack on Israel, to a total of and Judea & Samaria 10-15 kilometers of front at those two gaps. Without the Golan, A. Rain falls on mountains (roof). Israel would be forced to field a much larger standing force as it B. Rainwater flows down mountain range would then be forced to defend a 60 kilometer front against an into fertile valley (as off roof without a gutter). enemy that would now be attacking downhill (see Fig. 4C) . This C. Rainwater can be held back by Arab dams situation would require more funding for a larger army, a functioning as a gutter, preventing the lengthening of civilian reserve duty, or reliance on a “hair- water from irrigating the agricultural trigger” mobilization threshold. All these options would be areas. severely injurious to Israel both economically and strategically. Reprinted from October 1992 - Security Affairs with additional illustrations added 3 PLEXI PIECES SCHEMATIC REPRESENTATION Schematic clarifications have been added to the reprint of this article, originally published in "Security Affairs." a b The simplified elements used here have been produced in plexiglass, well suited for demonstration of the principles of the system to a limited audience. The c scale of the Plexi Pieces is such that the pieces can be used on a standard 1:250,000 map of Israel. The pieces, with instructions, can be obtained from the author, or from the organizations listed on the back page. GOLAN BALANCE OF FORCES The Golan’s terrain does not make for a perfect defense but it ISRAELI FORCES gives a small breathing space for Israel to mobilize civilian JUST OVER CREST (CURRENT CEASE- b reserves to meet an attack before Syrian forces could reach the FIRE LINE) c Hula Valley. But, in order for Israel’s forces to have the A A maximum defensive effect, they must be able to engage enemy MOUNTAIN forces at the two small approaches at the very onset of the attack AREA with tanks. If the Syrian forces break through either gap, thus MUCH LARGER breaching the crestline, and make it to the road networks to the STANDING STANDING ISRAELI b SYRIAN west - which supply Israeli defenders in the northern Golan - FORCES FORCES c Israel’s Golan defense would unravel. If this were to occur, B B Israeli civilian population centers in the Hula Valley would be a MOUNTAIN few kilometers from Syrian occupation. AREA a Under the current ceasefire line, Israeli control extends just east of the north-south crestline, terminating in the north at the STANDING ISRAELI STANDING “valley of Tears” gap and at the apex of the shoulder of the FORCES a SYRIAN volcanic hills in the south. Any “interim” disengagement, c FORCES demilitarization or pullback over the crestline will render C b C MOUNTAIN impotent the defensive effect of the Golan terrain. AREA - ) T Correspondingly, an Israeli pullback would make a Syrian first- D " E " S N E S E R O N A I N I strike far more attractive because the severely outnumbered I C E F L L T " E ( C S T T S T E " E R R Israeli forces will not have the defensive advantages afforded by N N R A A S I ' E P C L P N R I M M the natural terrain. E R B A A R A I U R R F R The Syrian missile threat greatly magnifies the importance of C the mobilization breathing space afforded by the Golan’s SIDE VIEW OF MOUNTAIN AREA natural defensive terrain. The real threat posed by the Syrian surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs) is that they will impair Figure 4. Golan - Balance of Standing Israel’s crucial mobilization process. The 2,500 lb. war heads on Forces - Israeli Small Force holds back Syria’s Scud-B SSMs are approximately six times as powerful as Big Syrian Force.