CEU eTD Collection Explaining NewEurozoneEntryExplaining MemberStates' Strategies In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of ofMasters requirementsforthe ofthe fulfillment In partial Arts in theandPost-Crisis Pre- Landscape in Supervisor: ProfessorCsaba László Supervisor: Department of Political Science ofPolitical Department Intentional Laggards?Intentional Central European University European Central Budapest, Hungary Zsófia Murányi Submitted to 2014 By CEU eTD Collection In this way, the thesis represents an advancement upon the “domestic politics” approach paradigm. the theoretical which ismostin common politics” “domestic the upon advancement an represents thesis the way, this In EMU. of rules the and process accession the view to come states pre-euro-accession how on effects anddirect iscomplex has institutions byinternational played the that role for the claim significant find I case, contrasting a as Slovakia Hungary, with and Poland of cases important the on focused an analysis in-depth comparative is a In outcomes. flexibility, affecting variable intervening and credibility institutional as conceptualized institutions, EU-level the of influence country-specific the variable, independent an as serves country a of actors) political of actions the and necessity economic of (comprised propensity domestic the while that hypothesize I literature, Europeanization the in utilized as institutionalism choice rational of framework theoretical the on Building specifically laggards. the Union, of European behaviour the the targeting of states member euro new in the variation puzzling among the strategies for adoption explanation causal the find to out set I thesis this In Abstract i evidence

CEU eTD Collection different lunacy. periods ofthesis-writing three than fewer no of course the over so do to managed now has but deserve quite never I'll way a in existence my tolerate to continues only not who G, to dedicated is thesis This hour, spirits alwayskept high. andmy outside have friendsofCEU,who myin debater and to eleventh the at talk great a for Brett Dan to thankful also am I Lastly, workshop. thesis the during comments insightful for Kovács Borbála Professor thank I and Fölsz, Professor Attila of courses economy political the without work this prepared have not also could I design. research of questions ponder to learned I where and born, was project the for idea the where Carsten Professor Bruno thank and Schneider to opportunity the take to like also would I courses. instructive and intense his for as well kind as work, his my on comments for and advice Csaba encouragement, patience, László Professor supervisor my to grateful am I foremost, and First de Paula Castanho e Silva for the the for Silva e Castanho Paula de Acknowledgements ii Comparative Political Research class, Research Political Comparative

CEU eTD Collection 4 The Crisis Years 3 The Pre-Crisis Years 2 BackgroundTheoretical 1 Introduction Table Contents of 7 References 6 Appendix 5 Conclusions 4.5 Conclusion 4.4 Slovakia 4.3 Hungary 4.2 Poland 4.1 ofEMUAn and Institutions Policy Overview 3.5 Conclusion 3.4 Slovakia 3.3 Hungary 3.2 Poland 3.1 ofEMUAn and Institutions Policy Overview and Hypothesis CaseSelection Measurement, Conceptualization, 2.4 Conclusion: Institutionalismand Europeanization Choice 2.3 Rational 2.2 Institutionalism Choice New andThe Rational Institutionalisms Overviewof 2.1 General Theoretical Study ofEMU toApproaches the 4.4.2 Political Developments 4.4.2 Political 4.4.1 MacroeconomicFundamentals Developments 4.3.2 Political 4.3.1 MacroeconomicFundamentals Developments 4.2.2 Political 4.2.1 MacroeconomicFundamentals Developments 3.4.2 Political 3.4.1 MacroeconomicFundamentals Developments 3.3.2 Political 3.3.1 MacroeconomicFundamentals Developments 3.2.2 Political 3.2.1 MacroeconomicFundamentals ...... iii ...... 38 37 37 32 31 31 25 24 24 20 20 13 72 68 65 60 58 57 57 53 52 52 48 47 47 45 45 41 11 8 4 4 1 CEU eTD Collection presidents Table centralbank parties,and ministers governing finance 10:ministers, Slovakia:prime presidents Table centralbank parties,and ministers governing finance 9: ministers, Hungary: prime presidents Table andbank central ministers finance parties, prime 8: Poland: governing ministers, oftheforSlovakia.openness economy Table 7: Year-on-year GDP convergence onMaastricht growth,indicators criteria and oftheforHungary.openness economy Table 6: Year-on-year GDP convergence onMaastricht growth,indicators criteria and oftheforPoland.openness economy Table 5: Year-on-year GDP convergence onMaastricht growth,indicators criteria and oftheforSlovakia.openness economy Table 4: Year-on-year GDP convergence onMaastricht growth,indicators criteria and oftheforHungary.openness economy Table 3: Year-on-year GDP convergence onMaastricht growth,indicators criteria and oftheforPoland.openness economy Table 2: Year-on-year GDP convergence onMaastricht growth,indicators criteria and Table 1: Hypothesis Index of Tables ...... iv 70 69 57 52 47 37 31 24 17 71 CEU eTD Collection & Tavlas 2004; Hochreiter 2004; Haiss & Fink Breuss, 2004; Schnabl & Grauwe De (See: adoption. euro by speculative to remedied be would which of all – instability monetary and fluctuations rate exchange attacks, vulnerable are Market Internal the of part are which currencies own their with economies trade-dependent open, small, obvious: as seen widely were costs, adjustment certain without not though members. of joining, new benefitsthe of The goal the was this that assumption underlying the in certain entry, swift for strategies best the of aspects technical overriding an expressed Bloc, adoption. forearlyenthusiasm euro Eastern former the of countries them of most members, new the but EU-15, the of those with up caught states member new the of economies the Union. Monetary and Economic of stage A final and while third the necessary was derogation in participate eventually to commitment a made all rights, opt-out no having states, member 1 prominent following the impact of the global economic and the European sovereign debt sovereign European the and economic global the of impact the following prominent process. in the ahead themselves tendency,This more haveeven become ifseems to anything, found soon capita, per GDP as such indicators of terms in do to up although catching more Baltics, having the while altogether), joining for dates target with dispense eventually to as far so (going behind lagged have which countries the among be to found were Hungary and Poland Republic, Czech the as such period, transition the of pacesetters regional the of several – up match quite the not do facts the by but development, economic explained of levels in differences be could this it, of face the On others. than later much currency single

Introduction However, in the following years it became apparent that some countries would adopt the adopt would countries some that apparent became it years following the However,in and economic on focuses accession of time the around from literature the of Much new the 2004-2007, in Union European the of round enlargement ever largest the After Eickmeier &2005 Breitung Eickmeier ) 1

CEU eTD Collection motn o eaie hw te cags my hv lee h rset f Eurozone of prospects the altered have may changes the how is it examine levels, to national important and supranational the both on EMU to members of eurozone attitudes the present on impact substantial a had has crisis the Since crisis. the of wake the in governance EMU into introduced institutions new and reforms the after changed has situation (2009), the how Haughton examine to done been (2010), has research substantive no However, Johnson etc. (2012) Dandashly & Epstein 2008), (2006; Johnson by contributions entry? Eurozone to delay the in ofthestrategies laggards. but quickly acceded which states those of behaviour the in not lies puzzle real the currency, common the of terms in that us shows This 2001). Schimmelfennig see accession, for pushing in word own their to EU the holding of strategies rhetorical normative states' member the by new (highlighted possible as EU the the into integrated of as become to States willingness Member the about agreement in be to seemed assumptions Initial crises. influenced by two sets of factors: on the one hand, domestic conditions, and on the other,the the on and conditions, domestic hand, one the on factors: of sets two by influenced economies. European and transitionofCentral Eastern broadly understood the of understanding an to contribute also question research the to answers the Furthermore, ( etc. increasing competence and of levels areas, policy by states member continued among differentiation and heterogeneity of prospects the to regard with especially – heading is EU the of study where about puzzle the larger much the of piece a on light for shed to helping integration, European implications broader have research such of findings The enlargement. h an agmn f te tei s ta uooe ety srtge r essentially are strategies entry eurozone that is thesis the of argument main The notable with literature, the in attention received already has puzzle outlined above The States Member new cause factors what following: the therefore is question research The efe t al. et Leuffen 02, ad hw ti fet h vrl oein o h Union. the of cohesion overall the affects this how and 2012), 2

CEU eTD Collection concluding remarks.concluding some provides chapter final The well. as accession to prior events to references necessary, where including, period, the over developments political relevant the of analysis detailed a and fundamentals macroeconomic of examination brief a includes case Each studies. case the to proceeding scrutiny, then under frame time the 2009), during process entry the to salient EMU of (since crisis the during and 2008) respectively. ofsome features description general with opens a including chapters Eachanalytical ofthe and to (up before cases chosen the exploring each analysis, empirical the of body main the constitute chapters two following The hypothesis. the of articulation and conceptualization the inform which considerations chapter. second the in detail varying more in formulated is about mechanism The case. particular bringing each in outcomes two the of interaction the with environment, actor domestic the through mediated as EMU of constraints and settings institutional the of influence external h hss i tutrd a olw. Te scn hpe oes te theoretical the covers chapter second The follows. as structured is thesis The 3

CEU eTD Collection fEU–wienofntoaitapoce iwview approaches neo-functionalist while – EMU of formation and origins the explain to employed been have integration of theories mainstream All Union. the of development overall the on impacts significant had which milestone a was 2.1 sources. and data discussion ofthe chosencases a as well as considerations, theoretical these by informed hypothesis and concepts the with conclude I Europeanization. of subfield studies EU the within literature choice rational the situating upwith an following overview general, in aofrational discussion choice move onto then I institutionalism. choice rational of framework the in analysis the base to choice my for justification initial the particular,sketching in Union Monetary & Economic of questions and studies EU of field the characterize which approaches theoretical of variety the examining 2 view, two overarching categories can be discerned: the first being studies of a primarily models economic of terms in currency single the about questions theorizing a nature, economic of studies being first the discerned: be can categories overarching two view, eye bird's a Taking noted. be to ought characteristics unique some but lines same the along 1998) bargaininginterstate largest ofthe and the prevalence 1999; (Jabko Moravcsik states. member of primacy the stress intergovernmentalists EMU, of creation the facilitating and initiating in Commission the as such actors supranational of importance the highlighting union, political full to way the on step logical next the and market common the from spill-over irreversible

Theoretical Background Theoretical T EMU of creation the that integration European of students by acknowledged widely is It briefly by begin I study. the of underpinnings theoretical the outline I chapter this In GeneralOverview of Theoretical to Approaches the of EMU Study he literature on the enlargement of an already established eurozone proceeds broadly proceeds eurozone established already an of enlargement the on literature he 4 monetary integration as inevitable and inevitable as integration monetary

CEU eTD Collection into account not only the technical details but also the effects of factors such as institutional as such factors of effects the also but details technical the only not account into that motivations political the account criteria. theofsuch to levels actorschange and how strive influence whether into take not do approaches these Furthermore, real 2009) (Kostadinova of states. member new the indicators in accession euro of thrust various the and convergence between correlation any hardly is there – evidence empirical etc. accession EMU with up match not do theories these on based However,predictions and propositions noted, as of criteria convergence real presumed or rates) exchange and rates interest inflation, deficit, debt, (i.e. nominal prescribed officially the to adherence properties, OCA of presence like factors economic of divergence straightforward to patterns adoption euro possible in differences the attribute to tend theories economic These etc.) 2011 Najman 2004; Tavlas 2005; & Breitung Hochreiter & 2004; Eickmeier Haiss & Fink Breuss, 2004; Schnabl & Grauwe De theories, regime 2009; Ben (See: rate factors. measurable quantitatively other and exchange synchronization cycle business theory, Area Currency Optimum as such concepts and currency union is doubtful. In post-communist transition countries, it is typically the political the typically is it countries, transition post-communist In doubtful. is the union currency to acceding countries European Eastern and Central of case the in factor explanatory an as applicability its information, evidence important us empirical gives works the such of basis While the on 2011) gathered Goerres & Allam 2008; Goerres & (Allam itself. union currency the to and economies market to attitudes elite and mass varying in causes the locate that theories are there First, explanation. of frameworks theoretical main following present study. iswhat isrelevantforthe oftheories category second This outcomes. shaping in perceptions and interests actor conditionality, structure, o fr h ieaue o ifrn taeis o M ceso a mhszd the emphasized has accession EMU of strategies different on literature the far, So take which economy political comparative in studies entails category broad second The ogli 20; 20; RnliLrie 20; Rzae & Rozmahel 2008; Rinaldi-Larribe 2008; 2005; Mongelli 5

CEU eTD Collection according some sort of mystical salience to the concept of Europeanization, but it is a is it but Europeanization, of concept the to salience mystical a of sort not some according is of wary accession be should we general EMU in and 2.3), 2011) section in elaboration (see (Sedelmeier case straightforward states. acceded of Europeanization newly and the on candidates focused has field this within offshoot burgeoning a states, member old on impact with mostly dealing especially works initial is after since, It study this institutions. to relevant and policies processes, domestic upon EU the of influence the to refers Europeanization put, Simply literature. Europeanization so-called the is CEECs instead.them on focus to promising more is it EU, the about discourse national the thematize to on go then which governments mainly is it Since 1998) (Moravcsik actors. subnational and international vis- to position strategic tended domestic own their have improve to as which so these governments, instrumentalize of domain the remained typically have processes integration post-accession and EU the joining of procedures insular often The versa. vice not and opinion public for agenda the sets turn in which discourse, public shape which elites basis in rational choice institutionalism, locating the causes in material incentives, rational incentives, material in causes the locating institutionalism, choice rational in basis a from developed has strain other the contrast, In 2012) Pechova 2009; III Hempson 2007; Dyson 2003; (Risse paradigms. ideational on focus a and identity European and national for implications with appropriateness, of logic the on founded process socialization complex a institutionalist of sociological because so do adoption euro to committing countries that advances the which lens, theoretical is first The foundations. ontological different markedly particular phenomenon. about this toolkit theorizing forfruitful apt an has and enlargement eurozone of features key some emphasizes which framework Within the Europeanization literature, two main strands are commonly delineated, with delineated, commonly are strands main two literature, Europeanization the Within the in accession euro of questions the situate may we which in subfield large Another 6 à- vis both vis

CEU eTD Collection initial setup of EMU institutions, especially the European Central Bank. He locates the locates He Bank. Central European the especially institutions, EMU of setup initial successfully the in enshrined properties the in paradigm) monetarist the to adhering (2000) ministers finance and Dyson understanding: overall bankers (notably,central communities epistemic transnational of influence an the demonstrates to superfluous not are currency certainly common the of issue the of problematizations institutionalist Sociological juncture. this at operationalize systematically to difficult are marker identity an as currency common the of bonus added the also but membership EU only not use to keenness a state's behind factors the and 830), 2008: (Johnson inconsistent is work theory this some why already addressing is there However, 2007) (Dyson past. Soviet their from away move to eager be would states Baltic the e.g. position, past its from itself distance to state a for marker identity an as adoption euro of use the include literature institutionalist sociological the by proposed causes The understanding. nuanced a for outlook promising most the has Dyson 2006; in studies (country states. member the of part the on action strategic and analysis cost-benefit oiy aoto n hne truh te srtn f mtra ead n domestic and rewards material of scrutiny the through change and adoption policy in states member between variation the for explaining apt remarkably being as noted been has institutionalism choice rational contrast, In paradigms. ideational to dedication similar a share The which states the among differencesoutcome in for difficultyaccounting has notably approach ideas. these for backing significant provide not does evidence the CEECs, to comes it When 653) 2000: (Dyson legacies. historical and identities of terms aforementioned the in framed often discourses, legitimizing of absence or presence the and governance, of modes technocratic for support domestic paradigm, money” “sound the with fits state certain a in quo status the which to extent the in EMU to responses state member different behind factors In my research I pursue the latter approach as it lends itself best to empirical testing and testing empirical to best itself lends it as approach latter the pursue I research my In Johnson 2008; Dandashly2012) Johnson 7

CEU eTD Collection integration theory is that “institutions matter” and are therefore worthy subjects for analysis. for subjects worthy therefore are and matter” “institutions that is theory integration other with approaches. the it contrasting particular, in institutionalism choice rational of characteristics methodological and tenets 2.2 thechapter. endoutlined at ofthe is thesis the in used conceptualization The outcomes. these of causes the discern to is aim the so, do to not choose they or degrees) varying (to entry Eurozone prioritize either countries – known are outcomes the Since conditions. institutional existing of constraints the among and to as so making interests their of considerations on based benefit political as well as economic their maximize decision actors' the emphasizing institutionalism, choice rational in is (Sedelmeier 2011:preferences. 7) iey ue n a e sbue ne oilgcl isiuinls. (uil aoao 19: 436) 1999: Caporaso & (Jupille legal, considers also institutionalism. general, in ideas. as (2003: a“amorphous”set48) three of parts thevague, epistemic strands above and of political beside sociological institutionalism new under of disparaging rather subsumed seems who be Schmitter, Meanwhile can and used widely Institutionalism. and Sociological Institutionalism Historical Institutionalism, Choice Rational are these 1980s: late the since emerged have that thought institutionalist new of strains three recognized commonly most the on focus only I Here 432) (1999: subfields. four charting theory, the to endogenous or exogenous are preferences actor second, and institutions, firrst, whether, dimensions: two on answers. different give label this under grouped schools diverse the matter, they circumstances what under and how to As 1 of) outside indeed, (and, within institutionalists new of manifesto and claim central The basic examinethe then ofinstitutionalist theories, field at sectionthe look Ibriefly In this grounding theoretical the explain, to out set have I that variation this precisely is it Since Jupille & Caporaso’s& Jupille not is preferences, and institutionsboth endogenizes which Structurationism, fourth, The Institutionalism New and Choice Institutionalisms Rational

Jupille & Caporaso differentiate between institutionalisms based institutionalisms between differentiate Caporaso & Jupille 1 (Hall & (Hall Taylor 1996) 8

CEU eTD Collection hs fRI hl itrclisiuinls nlsshwisiuin eeo develop institutions how analyses institutionalism historical while RCI, of those operation. institutional to problem 2008: (Pollack 2) principal-agent the of application political the cycling and unstable, systems, previously in equilibrium create helps structure institutional how on studies included has work Scholarly institutionalism. choice rational in elaboration and attention more received has which element third the is It 32) 2007: Pollack 31; 2006: constraints strategic of existence the third, and behaviour; utility-maximizing of assumption the second, constructivists); of collectivism methodological the with contrast (in individualism methodological first, assumptions: main following the is RC theory. second-order a by characterized as is and economics, neoclassical of world the from wholesale lifted essentially choice rational of summary brief very a provide thus shall I 32) 2007: :16; 2008 (Pollack choice. rational of meta-theory the as such paradigms broad unlike itself, integration of theories first-order are they that means scope smaller their Schneider 2000: 12) In terms of methodology, sociological and historical institutionalists historical and sociological methodology, of terms In 12) 2000: instead. Schneider preferences actor fixed from starting outcomes, influence variables which intervening the as institutions regards institutionalism In choice ways. different rational in contrast, actors of groups empower and socialize they how show to aiming 17) (Aspinwall 2000: & Schneider strain sociological the with accordance in meaning-making and culture on weight greater placewho those as well as drift, and intentionality actor emphasizing camp, rationalism the to closer scholars includes it as inasmuch two other the between ground middle a occupies and Sociological institutionalism usually looks at institutions as the independent variables, independent the as institutions at looks usually institutionalism Sociological with contrast stark in stand institutionalism sociological of assumptions fundamental The however, – ones mid-range rather but theories grand not typically are Institutionalisms . 9 on individual choice. (Shepsle choice. individual on Apnal & (Aspinwall over time over ,

CEU eTD Collection chosen cases and not shying away from inductive theorizing where the state of the field does field the of state the where theorizing inductive from away shying not and cases chosen my of description rich a pursuing by research RCI “stereotypical” of characteristics stark 32) 2006: (Shepsle endeavours. future constrain boundaries „protective set to need theories developing newly that out pointing by RCI of limitations standard-issue early, the defends only.Shepsle 25) illustrative 2000: and “thin” Schneider & remaining (Aspinwall evidence of description the with cursory, often is testing empirical their models, of creation the upon expended is energy much while field: the in studies many of typical been has which Wendtfeaturenot, however, 44) is is another 2007: RCI. Neither in Pollack of inevitability an & 2000: & 12) Schneider approach (Fearon “problem-driven” than rather This “method-driven” (Aspinwall adequately. modelled be cannot issues whatever ignoring simply of pitfall the to succumbed often have and models elaborate on focused instead have approach, the of legacy game-theoretic the befits as institutionalists, choice Rational 22) 2000: & Schneider (Aspinwall phenomenon. observed the for explanations inductive with coupled they study, what of description “thick” rich, a on emphasis great place to tended typically have deeper and less conscious effects which may develop thanks to instances of cognitive and cognitive of instances to thanks develop may which effects conscious less the and deeper omitting mechanism, first the at under apt occurs only which is adaptation behavioural RCI protraying that concludes he suasion; normative and playing, role calculation, strategic EU: the in socialization of mechanisms different three sketches Checkel 46) 2007: (Pollack EU. the of impact socializing the ignore to appears it that in approach) sociological the to sympathetic those by (especially problematic be to found is RCI first, ways: main two next thisin section.) (Ireturnproblem the model. to the of elements certain in included be to variables for ideas established clear, provide not Further criticism of RCI in light of its application to EU integration has been advanced in advanced been has EU integration to application of its light RCI in of criticism Further in order to permit normal science to progress” but this need not need this but progress” to science normal permit to order in 10 In the current study I aim to alleviate these alleviate to aim I study current the In

CEU eTD Collection marked difference as well. Much of the literature on Europeanization grew from the study of study the from grew Europeanization on literature the of Much well. as difference marked a is there However, submit. must states member which to rules new of number a includes 2011: and informaltools. offormal (Sedelmeier through a set 5) level domestic the on pressure exert to institutions EU of part the on efforts deliberate the with concerned mainly is understood commonly most Europeanization of However,study the candidate through states EU. the by created externalities negative to due adapt voluntarily which outsiders to countries member old from actors of variety a upon EU the of influence 2.3 47-48) well. studyas the present toin be acknowledged These have limitations 2007: (Pollack factors. material in alterations exogenous to due occur which outcomes and settings institutional preferences, in changes the modelling to limited is RCI change: of issue the is mentioned be must which criticism second The 815) 809; (2005: lock-in. institutional (Sedelmeier 2011:(Sedelmeier 23) retain governments strategy. that implementation their of nature means and timing the over This power discretionary significant prepared. adequately not are which countries of of interest the in not accession is the force to eurozone the of it members extant or institutions monetary supranational and EMU joining for deadline set no is for there penalties them, and missing deadlines fixed entails usually requirements these of transposition the while But issues. opportunity equal and environmental areas to policy competition in from ranging regulations) (directives, legislation Community implement states member how Europeanization (and the rational choice strand within it) is also of particular interest due interest particular of also is it) within strand choice rational the (and Europeanization unification monetary clear: is EMU of study the for relevant is this why reason The the denotes simply it surface its on as concept, elusive an be can Europeanization Rational Choice Institutionalism andEuropeanizationChoice Rational Institutionalism 11

CEU eTD Collection factors are conceptualized differently in the RCI and sociological strands of the literature, the of strands sociological and RCI the in differently conceptualized are factors These level. domestic the on factors facilitating of presence the the is for adaptation of occurrence condition sufficient The be. to likely is process adaptation the problematic more the isabetween misfit where there occur only will change and impact discernible have only will EU the that being assumption 2011:(Sedelmeier well. 29) as limitations these explain in to studies well-suited being RCI for effective), noted also less are far Europeanization (notably: different is post- EU the the while of and influence context, accession integration the within CEECs of of particularities the prize about the with compliance much revealed has angle particular rewarding This 2004) Sedelmeier & of (Schimmelfennig membership. of instrument prospect the the through promising countries conditionality, candidate post-communist on pressure applied in states European Eastern and Central EU the how of subject the on on arisen has literature accomplished most the of focusing particular.Some of legacy a has it that fact the to from a number of weaknesses. First of all, empirical results show that a misfit is not in fact a fact in not is misfit a that show results empirical all, of First weaknesses. of number a from 5-7) & 2000: setup.Risse institutional (Börzel EU the by available made structures opportunity and resources the utilize to actors domestic enables level state the on capacity institutional better.of the existence players the Meanwhile, the which at veto stages fewer the Europeanization, of purposes the for so more fail, or falter might process adaptation means which find, we points veto more the system, political domestic in a is power institutions. dispersed formal more ofThe existence and the dispersion power players, veto of question the being RCI by proposed elements prominent most the with Mastenbroek & Kaeding point out, however, that the “goodness of fit” hypothesis suffershypothesis fit” of however, “goodness out, the point that Kaeding & Mastenbroek the – fit” of “goodness the is studies Europeanization early of hypothesis main The acquis and domestic legislation. legislation. domestic and the misfit, the greater The 12

CEU eTD Collection rsn td ih te floig tertcl pit f dprue is, w ae the have we First, departure. domestic various by of informed governments, domestic of actions consequent points and preferences theoretical following the with study present theories. RCI (2006: 339-344) of on characteristics core (bordering the deterministic to closer overly it brings an and of hypothesis functionalist) problem the resolves This forefront. the to brought be should these and preferences, domestic upon dependent fact in are both spurious: is outcomes and fit” of “goodness the between connection the as inasmuch hypothesis the in flaw logical inherent an is there that suggest authors The best. at shaky is process, adaptation the problematic more the misfit, Furthermore, the greater the 339) that assumption the 2006: on evidence Kaeding empirical & (Mastenbroek overcompliance. in resulting EU), the on blamed be then can home, at problematic if (which, required is what above and over reform for push to regulations instrumentalize might they legislation, Community with fit good a exhibit already they if even and quo, not status domestic the changing to averse inherently are states Member level. European the by influenced change for condition necessary domestic preferences of a member state, on the basis of which the chief agents influencing agents chief the which of basis the on state, member a of preferences domestic and conditions economic broad the mean here factors Internal ones. external and internal 2.4 strategies. euro adoption this case, in – outcomes policy the have we Finally, factors. mediating domestic through transmitted institutions, EU the of influence intervening the have we Second, considerations. material aig tee fcos it osdrto, i mre ht Erpaiain otis the outfits Europeanization that emerges it consideration, into factors these Taking I distinguish between two main sets of causal factors, named, for convenience reasons, convenience for named, factors, causal of sets main two between distinguish I Taking forthe thestudy. above, hypothesis Igoonto ofthe formulate all account into Conclusion: Conceptualization, Conceptualization, Conclusion: Measurement, and HypothesisCase Selection 13

CEU eTD Collection examine the yearly figures for overall foreign trade dependence as well as dependence on dependence as well as dependence trade foreign overall for figures yearly the examine regime. rate exchange and dependence trade foreign measures: following the through preferences to shaping factors domestic the measure to choose I explanation but causal parsimonious a maintain 2005), Mongelli (see convergence theories Area real Currency of Optimum by variety stipulated a as measures include may factors Such adoption. euro for) readiness toward the which point actual economic fundamentals include I importantly, More follow. that sections the in elaborated be can development their influencing factors political that so illustration as showcased are These Treaty. Maastricht the in enshrined criteria convergence nominal the as well as growth GDP year-on-year to strictly literal. not is “internal” name the so circumstances, external to relate they as manifested are factors domestic course, Of adoption. euro to way their negotiate then policy domestic is a vastly simplified measure compared to the number of possible causal factors out there, out factors causal possible of number the to compared measure simplified vastly a is timeframe. over cases the in regimes the rate present exchange of variety the at look a take also therefore I fluctuate. the currency its let affordto cannot country that signal could regime peg hard a end, other the at while instrument, rate exchange is the to resorting without goals its handle to able is bank central national the that enough robust economy the that signaling end one at rates exchange floating with – policy monetary overunder theinvestigation. period case particular eurozoneforeach with in the trade The figures on these two related measures give us a summary account of necessity. of account it summary As a us give measures related two these on figures The independent an conduct to afford can country a much how signal regimes rate Exchange GDP. I of share a as imports and exports as measured be can dependence trade Foreign relating indicators present will I state, member each in conditions economic To describe 14 necessity of (rather thanofficial simply of(rather

CEU eTD Collection h rcs f er nr n vros wy. Hr eiet w set: institutional aspects: two delineate I Here credibility. andflexibility institutional ways. various in entry euro of process the enhancing or constraining by agents the of analysis cost-benefit informed domestically initial the affect can They circumstances. domestic by mediated as institutions supranational the mechanisms. propositions about concrete to as guidance coherent little provides be literature theoretical may extant the as studies necessary case the from following discernment inductive an actors, these between propensity.domestic as label I which variable, independent Tointerplay the for criteria obtain the timeperiod. over andbanks central parties parliamentary governments, need forparsimony, the restrictions, indicators. onthe data availability ofreliable and the resource and time considering acceptable be may trade-off the but best, at fragile is validity institutional architecture may present constraints in specific ways, based on the domestic the on based ways, specific in constraints present EMU may the architecture of institutional aspects specific following: the be to stipulated is aspect this of mechanism The actors. domestic of considerations the with interacted have 2012) of Compact Fiscal not treaties intergovernmental the as (such as governance EMU to related closely but framework community the well in embedded as EMU, and on primary legislation of community requirements the secondary how of analysis an through qualitatively assessed be will This institution. the of governance the in available is that discretion policy of amount the differently, it put or,to states, member individual of needs the suit to framework institutional Institutional flexibility denotes the level of possibility of adapting the existing EMU existing the adapting of possibility of level the denotes flexibility Institutional of conditions the as defined are and variable intervening the constitute factors External the as fashion streamlined a in regard may we what constitute combined, factors, These of interactions and activities goals, the highlight I policy, domestic of agents the As 15

CEU eTD Collection early adoption will persist. If credibility is low, however, the approach will be more cautious, more be will low, approach is however, the credibility If persist. will adoption early for incentive the high, is credibility but low is flexibility institutional if differentiate, further behaviour. laggard Toof opposite complete the – adoption early for incentive straightforward a create flexibility & credibility institutional high way: following the in outcome effectthe on swift entry. isotherwise notto propensity conducive domestic instrumentalization: of one own if their to justify stance in enforcement occur that inconsistencies use statesmember may is here mechanism The review. under states member the of outlookthe upon impacted have practices management crisis interval) time second (in the and enforcement way the at looking qualitatively,by also EMU, on legislation the of application these to adapt to not or whether constraints. choose then agents The case. each in circumstances planned entry dates. If either of the institutional factors is in doubt, the member state will state member the doubt, in is factors indicating institutional the roadmap of either changeable If dates. entry a planned with commitment its maintain will country the high, are credibility and flexibility institutional If Sweden). state member old of case the currently is (as opt-out facto de a possibly de-prioritization, and entry delayed of case straightforward a is low,it are flexibility and credibility both if way: following the in outcome the on effect decreased to changes. of result a as observed be may low, factors institutional score commitment. Ifboth maybe vulnerable again attempt the entry changes pursued, be will entry while and If domestic propensity is low, institutional credibility & flexibility have an interaction an have flexibility & credibility institutional low, is propensity domestic If interaction an have flexibility & credibility institutional high, is propensity domestic If In my hypothesis Iargue the following: practical EU's the of consistency the assess to measure a is credibility Institutional 16

CEU eTD Collection Table Table 1below: official date. entry no likely most and this of indications practical meagre only with but commitment a maintain changes which occurred as a result of the sovereign debt crisis. sovereign debt ofthe a as result changes which occurred the highlight to me allows also This constant. a as it treating than rather ways varied and specific in considerations domestic with interacts which factor a as setup institutional EMU the including explicitly by etc.) 2008 Zubek 2006; Greskovits (see developments domestic entry.commitment to the and clear high a pursue not is does state member necessity the yet and internal high, scores also where component institutional findings e.g. outcomes, predicted the to up ih ti ocpulzto dac pn peiu ok fcsn rmrl on primarily focusing work previous upon advance I conceptualization this With match not do Z and X on values where evidence through falsified be can hypotheses The in way simplified a in illustrated be can claim causal basic the understanding, easier For propensity (X) 1 : Hypothesis Domestic

High Low External/Institutional credibility & flexibility (Z) flexibility & credibility External/Institutional If credibility lowand If credibility entrystrives forearly country high: credibility lowbutIf flexibility some features concrete with low: entry delayed is theIf one ishighother but indefinitely entry practically delayed aspects low:If both external attempt entry If both low: delayed attempt entry fragile high: flexibility 17 Low

early entry early strives for Country attempt entry changeable Fragile, High

CEU eTD Collection states to be studied. The three states share many commonalities in their economic and economic their in commonalities many share states three The studied. be to states member three the as Slovakia and Hungary Republic. Poland, Thus, Czech the omit to choose I thesis the of limitations the to due Visegrádbut Four, the leaves essentially This accession. immediate of notions initial entertain not did they and circumstances, their to due normal as seen is entry euro for horizon time distant their puzzle: the of part as regarded commonly not are they as 2007 in acceded which states two the out rule further I 2009) Alouini 830; 828; 2008: (Johnson states. EU member among range middle the in belong but terms absolute in small still are which Europe, Eastern different and Central of economies the to compared vastly incentives by governed are they that mean states these of economies minuscule the that suggest to evidence is there size: of grounds the on states Baltic the and Slovenia Malta, Cyprus, out rule I crisis. the during and before periods: two over a separated study, for small-n opt to me prompts which examples, of level the on remain cases the let than rather analysis in-depth provide to research the of aim the is It countries. member new 12 the to 2009-2013, yielding six observations in total. While the global financial crisis already made already crisis financial global the While total. in observations six yielding 2009-2013, be instructive. nevertheless crisis will during the which currency, common flux in EMU to attitudes the and developments economic Slovak at look a of but 2009, in occurred adoption the following strategy” “entry an longer no is there Slovakia of case the Clearly,in argument. my of test proper a for allowing variable, dependent the on variation provides Slovakia of inclusion The literature. the in other each against compared often are which cases similar on variation studying of chance a provide systems parliamentary predominantly and legacies post-communist their structures: political Regarding case selection, the main unit of analysis is the state, so the universe is limited is universe the so state, the is analysis of unit main the selection, case Regarding Each of the cases is examined once before the crisis, up until 2008, and again between again and 2008, until up crisis, the before once examined is cases the of Each 18

CEU eTD Collection press. the and academia from countries three the of developments political domestic the of accounts narrative as well as Bank, Central European the and Commission European the by jointly may findings states, those as ofthe such Western EU. the Balkans join any European of Eastern similar generalization roughly other and when and as implications only possible – become hypothetically cases of set small very a to earnest. in appear to began crisis the of implications policy and effects macroeconomic the when is that because periods two the between point cut-off the as 2009 choose I 2008, in felt itself For the analysis I use statistical data from Eurostat, the convergence reports published reports convergence the Eurostat, from data statistical use I analysis the For A major limitation of the research is that its scope conditions are necessarily restricted necessarily are conditions scope its that is research Athe of limitation major 19

CEU eTD Collection states in termsstability.states ofprice in member EU best-performing three the of points percentage two within be must which bonds, rates. lowest inflation with the states of theEUmember three thestates, following: are member between convergence nominal targeting criteria, The thereto. annexed 13 Protocol in elaborated further (TFEU), Union European the of Functioning the Treatythe on of 140(1) andpolicy. monetary coordination, economicpolicy criteria, the accession broad areas: issue three with deal I discussion. under period the during experience accession the for relevance 3.1 3 tensions” or bilateral devaluation against the currency of any other member state. The state. failing but target, member serious more a itself sets country the other if narrower be can margin fluctuation any of currency the against devaluation bilateral or tensions” “severe without years two least at for parity central agreed-upon an on based euro the against of margins set the within currencies national their keep and II, ERM enter 1999,the ERMII. after Mechanism, Rate and, Exchange ofGDP. 60per towards cent decreasing rapidly or below are levels GDP debt of sovereign cent and per three exceed not must deficits All EU members with a perspective on joining EMU must fulfil the convergencecriteria, the fulfil must EMU joining on perspective a with members EU All – – – – Article in found is EMU of stage third the into entry for criteria the for basis treaty The

The Pre-Crisis Years ei ih a sre f te isiuinl stig n oiy patc hc have which practice policy and settings institutional the of survey a with begin I An InstitutionsOverview of EMU and Policy Fourthly, convergence of exchange rates demonstrated through participation in the in participation through demonstrated rates exchange of convergence Fourthly, budget yearly that meaning position, budgetary government sustainable a Thirdly, government on rates interest long-term via manifested as stability price Secondly, points percentage 1.5 within is inflation nominal that meaning stability, price Firstly, 20 ± 15 per cent per 15

CEU eTD Collection proved to be a thorny issue. In the case of the 12 original member states, the rules were not were rules the states, member original 12 the of case the In issue. thorny a be to proved has criteria the of enforcement practical the all, at problematic be not may this While 60) 59- 2007: al. et (Kowalski theory. economic coherent any in roots no having of accusations states. (2010: 1250) fora number inconsistency ofmember present an may which practice, best represents targeting inflation that wisdom widespread the and peg a demanding policy the between discrepancy notable is there note, Epstein risks. & Johnson As its without not is it well), as state member a by commitment prior explicit without achieve to possible is it (as retrospectively assessed be may requirement rate exchange the of fulfilment the While markets. the by also but EU, the by only not punished is criteria the with comply to failure made, been has decision the once so II, ERM enter to commitment public a makes it when manages country a well how closely scrutinize Markets euro. the to currencies their breached. limitcent isnot per 15 the as long as punishment of risk no carries criterion stricter self-imposed this meet to 2 over. be to seemed concessions political for time the 66-67), 2013: Indruchová also see 2006a; (ECB breadth illustrated hair's a by missed it which criterion inflation the over rejection 2006 Lithuania's of case oft-bemoaned the As enforcement. strict on the intent case were ECB their the in and Commission that out find soon would states member new the this, to contrast sharp In 63) 2007: al. et (Kowalski room. training peg rate exchange the in years two than less spend a to able were by Italy and criterion Finland as debt such states other the while margin, missed wide spectacularly having for notable was Greece – strictly very enforced In retrospect, this was the right decision to make, considering the country's dismal performance on price onprice considering dismal retrospect, this thedecisionmake, the right country's In to performance was exacerbated its already present its further. even boom-busttendencies already exacerbated lowinterestwouldhave rates EMU joined Lithuania then, the theyears.Had stability following over The rest of the Maastricht criteria have also received their share of criticism, with criticism, of share their received also have criteria Maastricht the of rest The pegging irrevocably for states preparing room” “training a as act to supposed is II ERM 2 However, while this was supposed to help uphold the principle of equal of principle the uphold help to supposed was this while However, 21

CEU eTD Collection intergovernmental body, it was in fact relegated to the status of “soft law.” Enforcement was law.”Enforcement “soft of status the to relegated fact in was body,it intergovernmental a But with deficits. states for excessive place in sanctions possible with states, member the among convergence continued and diligence fiscal ensure to meant was SGP The Pact. Growth and Stability the (Johnson 2008: 836) option. an just rather but country their of required fact, in not, is EMU joining that states believes member new European Central in instruments. populations of policy percentage monetary high their a Consequently, of all retaining also while economically fine doing be to seem countries these as seeing well, as EMU of allure and legitimacy the weakened justified being Dulkys 2008;2010;& 2012) Darvas Czaja al (see Kropienė et despite incident, credibility. EMU Lithuanian in crack another representing The as up brought be often others. would economically, than equal more been had states member past some the in that showing examples difficultwas the to it ignore treatment, ntrso anann rc tblt.stability. price maintaining of terms in 2005: 434) (Eichengreen introduced. were which loopholes and exemptions numerous only the to due further measures enforceability weakened the deficits, over sustainability debt long-term prioritizing by thing right the on focusing and well-intentioned 2005. Germany, While in and followed attempt reform a France than other none by rules the with non-compliance of drama 2002-03 the After 2004) errant an off let al et Haan (de that. to came it if “favour” the return would they that hopes in country member would Council the in ministers – self-interest to due stringent from far In contrast, the core structure of EMU, the European Central Bank performed very well very performed Bank Central European the EMU, of structure core the contrast, In mechanism, coordination economic EMU's of application the was problematic less No has Eurozone the outside permanently remaining states of evidence the Additionally, acinn oe etd wt h cfn Cucl an Council, Ecofin the with rested power sanctioning s Caa21a 77)77-78) 2012a: (Csaba 22 However, many old member old many However,

CEU eTD Collection to be one ofstraightforwardto compliance. be one experience EMU own their find not may question in states member new three the that believe institution.coherent less-than- a as EMU of picture a painted again, once episodes, danger, such real in never was ECB the of independence the While 2007) Economist (The growth. boost help to influence political greater for called famously and states, member of needs individual the accommodate to inflexible too were they saying policies, ECB’s the with frustration expressed Sarkozy president French 2007 In bank. central independent an of realities day-to-day the to adapt to hard it found Bundesbank the to thanks had Germany which legacy of kind the without states Depending on the domestic political context, all of the above provides plenty ofreasonto plenty above provides ofthe all context, political domestic Depending onthe 23

CEU eTD Collection openness of the economy forPoland. ofopenness the Table Totaltrade (exports imports) GDP)& (%of goodsImportsof andGDP) (%of services goodsof Exports andGDP) (%of services GDP)(%of Totaltrade (exports imports) & withmembers theEUof europeanunion GDP)(%of goodsImportsof and frommembers services theof europeanunion GDP)(%of goodsof Exports andmembers to services theof Generalgovernment GDP)deficit/surplusof (% Generalgovernment debt GDP)(%of yields* Referencevalue forEMU convergence criterion bond EMUconvergence criterion bond yields ratechangeof (%)* Referencevalue forHICP -inflation rate –annual average HICP-inflation rate –annual average rate changeof (%) previousyear RealGDP growth rate –volume –percentage change over indicator\time 3.2.1 3.2 3 common the to acceding of necessity the this, on Based states. European Eastern and Central other most of those as open as not is economy its EU, the in are partners trading important general deficit.government the is exception obvious glaringly The value. reference the under remained debt government general and period, remained the over stabilized and rates interest long-term low,accession its generally EU to prior just lows historic at were rates inflation its criteria: admittedly imprecise proxy. imprecise admittedly an the fromuse EU with eurozone as with available trade Eurostat, trade is I onPoland's the As nodata Source: Eurostat. Source: availabledata: no givena calendar year. to notbased 12-month on period correspondinga 2008,2012, ECB 2004,and of 2006, * theConvergence From Reports Regarding the indicators for economic openness, while it is clear that Poland's most Poland's that clear is it while openness, economic for indicators the Regarding Maastricht of number a on well reasonably performed Poland above, Table 2 in seen As 2 Poland : Year-on-year GDP growth, onMaastricht convergence indicators and criteria Macroeconomic Fundamentals 3 24 2002 42.2 -5.0 1.9 1.4 : : : : : : : : : 2003 47.1 -6.2 0.7 3.9 : : : : : : : : : 2004 39.8 37.5 60.4 30.6 29.8 45.7 6.40 6.90 2.40 77.3 -5.4 3.6 5.3 2005 37.8 37.1 57.4 28.5 28.9 47.1 5.22 74.9 -4.1 2.2 3.6 : : 2006 42.2 40.4 62.5 30.9 31.6 47.7 6.20 5.23 2.80 82.6 -3.6 1.3 6.2 2007 43.6 40.8 63.9 32.1 31.8 6.50 5.48 3.20 84.4 -1.9 2.6 6.8 45 2008 43.9 39.9 62.5 31.8 30.7 47.1 6.07 83.8 -3.7 4.2 5.1 : :

CEU eTD Collection midst of political turmoil. The Democratic Left Alliance (SLD), at the centre of the coalition the of centre the at (SLD), Left Alliance Democratic The turmoil. political of midst 3.2.2 a rolewhich play here. considerations political domestic of number a are there see, shall we as although, high, not markets. the financial global exposedto instrumentand whilst rate being exchange the without even policy monetary its over influence enough exercise can bank central whose country a of impression an us gives This 17) 2013: (Petreski all. at strictly very patrolled not was rate exchange the followed, was band crawling a featuring approach eclectic an when period, previous the in even that suggest to evidence is 2011: There Kostyleva 24) & (Darvas the letting and entirely target rate exchange immediately obvious. not forcesdoes seem against zone tomarket currency guard targeting as best practice, the strenuous efforts of the transnational epistemic community of community epistemic transnational the of efforts strenuous the practice, best as targeting first governor, HannaGronkiewicz-Waltz ofthe ofinflation merits not persuaded initially was the While programmes. training and guidance international copious from benefited matters, monetary in take to path correct the about unsure then leadership, bank's central the 1990s, the eurozone. of member prospective a as and economy transitional catching-up a as concerns competing country's the targeted which attempts policy of variety a through gone had it power, in time its During government. caretaker a to way giving disintegrating, was 2001, since government The NBP had been the main driving force behind plans for speedy euro adoption. In the In adoption. euro speedy for plans behind force driving main the been had NBP The the in was government its 2004, May 1 on Union European the entered Poland When is period this in adoption euro of necessity economic the that suggests data the Overall, (NBP) officially Polishbank central The in a float switched to an 2000,abandoning April Political Developments Political 25 złoty float freely according to market forces. market to according freely float

CEU eTD Collection Kwlk t a. 20: 6) Frhroe h uo wud eiiae aant fluctuating against eliminate would euro the Furthermore, 68) 2007: al. et out. drawn (Kowalski more were process of the if costs diminished the significantly that be argued not would also convergence was it and last, would ramifications negative the shorter the procedure, entry the faster The market. labour the and policy fiscal in reforms structural painful but much-needed for impetus the provide would accession euro that was this behind rationale primary The 198-9) 2006: (Zubek well. as statements policy its monetary in prioritized convergence bank the and 2006-7, as early as area currency the join Poland that recommended he 2002 In adoption. euro speedy of proponent ardent an and hawk, inflation an also was Balcerowicz Leszek successor, Gronkiewicz-Waltz's 248) 2012: (ECB country. the of constitution 1997 the in enshrined was NBP the of independence the that successful so were efforts The 1243-4) 2010: Johnson & (Epstein elites. and public Polish the among independence bank central normalize to helping actors, transnational of campaign an effective by rebuffed was bank the with interfere to 1994 in coalition SLD-PSL the by attempt teaching. monetarist of basis the on acting bank central independent early An to an alternative no was there that her convinced eventually officials EU and OECD IMF, bankers, central fiscal situation led the NBP to pursue a tight monetary policy, which was likely to stifle to likely was which policy, monetary tight a pursue to NBP the led situation fiscal However,the it. tackled finally which one the be to eager to none was cabinet the but Poland in problem chronic a was deficit The government. the of stance the into fed which something is This 200) 2006: Zubek 1249; 2010: Johnson entry.& hasty (Epstein against states member and slow so waslaborious, matter. this nosmall been had transition of wake the in process disinflation the where country a low,In 200) if while 2006: investments, (Zubek pressures. money” inflationary to contributed “hot speculative of danger the themselves with carried high, if which, rates, interest domestic However, the EU itself was not keen on this idea, and in fact tried to warn the larger the warn to tried fact in and idea, this on keen not was itself EU the However, 26

CEU eTD Collection ECB, this plan ultimately failed as well. Deputy Prime Minister Jerzy Hausner had an had Hausner Jerzy Minister Prime Deputy well. as failed ultimately plan this ECB, the of position discouraging the and revenues, extraordinary through finances un shoring for plans the to due NBP from itself doubts cabinet, the in enmity with However, mind. faced in date target entry 2007 the with plan consolidation fiscal ambitious an devised adoption, euro of supporter avowed an was who Kolodko, Grzegorz sucessor, Belka's 204-6) 2006: (Zubek ways. spendthrift their in continue to content were who cabinets, the of rest the over win not could he Miller, Leszek Minister Prime of support the won Belka while However, conduct. monetary favourable more for exchange in caps spending introduced have would which bank central the and government the between agreement an initiated Belka Marek coalition. ruling the of minister finance then the Instead, 202-3) 2006: (Zubek Commission. European the and ECB the from threats by down shut successfully was meddling Further bank. central the for embeddedness institutional of importance the demonstrating thereby a through independence NBP's the unconstitutional, ruled later was but passed act 2002. The of spring the in proposal legislative compromise to tried (PSL) Party People's Polish agrarian the and (UP) Workers' the Party partners, coalition The term. medium the in growth were taken. Poland is at an advantage regarding general government finances in the sense thatsense in the finances government general regarding advantage an is at Poland were taken. convergencefiscal towards steps credible unless funds withdraw to threatening by this to stop a put to quick was Commission European the However, 294) 2008: (Zubek states. member from contributions matching required which funds, structural EU the to appeals by justified 2006: 211) (Zubek place first the in position wassecure his todeficit mounting be able The to plans adjustment fiscal ambitious any sacrifice to needed he Minister,but Prime as over took only, (Dandashly & proved,infeasible. once again, implementation but Verdun 2011: 32) cuts reasonable promised and 2009 to entry prospective moved which proposal, alternative This is how Poland arrived at membership. Amid the effective collapse of SLD, Belka SLD, of collapse effective the Amid membership. at arrived Poland how is This 27

CEU eTD Collection new parties at the 2001 elections was already a sign of a previously unrepresented eurosceptic unrepresented a signofa already previously 2001electionswas at the parties new the SGP.renegotiated of 301) (Zubek 2008: framework the in considered as deficit the toward count not did which exceptions many the among included be to expenses these for lobbied successfully However, Poland 74) 2007: al. et (Kowalski balance. the of part as schemes pension capital-based of costs the treat to decision the of wake the in deteriorated situation Poland's balance. government general the of part being as treats Eurostat what on extent, large a to depends, deficit government general The 2004. in SGPintensified the of reform impending the over debates as position budgetary is term. over the long be itsubstantivelymodified way isthe can expenditures only deficit its However, 7) 2003: al. state other and provisions et welfare affecting reform structural and inflexible characteristically (Borowski mark. 60% the over debt the raise would which struck be may deals government no and GDP, surplus, in be to needs budget the of 55% exceeds debt government general the if rule: debt enshrined constitutionally a has it osiuinl cut dcso ucsfly dfne h eta ak ad te personal the and bank central the defended successfully decision a court that notes constitutional Balcerowicz. ECB the president, reports convergence its its of on one In attack 32) 2011: Verdun veiled & (Dandashly a purposes, practical all for was, which launched, was matters privatization certain in role NBP's the into committee investigative an Meanwhile, agenda. the off were eurozone the joining for roadmap precise a currency, fore. Partysawto voices (SRP), the come Families (LPR) and Polishthese Self-Defense Polish of Leagure eurosceptic decidedly the with coalition a forming (PiS) party Justice and electorate. Although PiS, unlike its coalition partners, was not completely against the common the against completely not was partners, coalition its unlike PiS, Although of results signficiant The shift. significant a about brought 2005 in elections general The the in improvement cosmetic a achieve to arose level EU the at opportunity an Still (Markowski & Tucker 2010) In 2005, with the euro-pragmatist, conservative Law conservative euro-pragmatist, the with 2005, In 2010) Tucker & (Markowski 28

CEU eTD Collection shocks could only be dealth with through internal devaluation or decreased output. ordecreased devaluation with dealth throughshocks internal only be could external any and speculation, currency to vulnerable notoriously are parity central the around bands with pegs limbo: in spent period two-year minimum preceding the than problem a of European uponbythe Commission. (Polanskifrowned 2004:euroization 285),a practice unilateral advocated even had economists some why is which effects, detrimental have could peg the contrast, In float. free the via mechanism absorption shock a providing asset, great Polish the decade, a half previous the Over time. some “training for room” the of nature problematic the considering been had elsewhere and bank central the from analysts Polish fact, In not. was II ERM over concerns of voicing contemporaneous ofEMU third the stage joining isoptional. implies that falsely it since move disingenuous particularly a is This “experiment.” an it calling euro, newly the 2006 in Lech Furthermore, Poland, of President 227-8) inaugurated 2006: (ECB president. the of independence involvement in the currency union. (Borowski13) currencyal. in union. 2003: the et involvement risking from deterrent further a as acts which bands, fluctuation the of application precise the about “enigmatic” been have Commission the and ECB the Furthermore, 17) 2005: al. et (Borowski itself. rate exchange the of maintenance the sabotage could tensions attendant the however, overvalued, were currency national the If criteria. Maastricht nominal the of fulfillment the compromise could which atmosphere, inflationary an to lead would gap output positive and pressure demand resulting the rate, undervalued an at II ERM into entered złoty the if – parity central the setting of question the is there Firstly, II. ERM entering to averse Other technical issues are also present which make Polish policy-makers in particular in policy-makers Polish make which present also are issues technical Other less is freely) floats also (which currency common the here that stress to important is It Kaczy Jaroslaw Minister Prime unprecedented, were steps above the While Kaczyński floated the idea of a referendum on the on referendum a of idea the floated Kaczyński 29 (Epstein & 1252) (Epstein Johnson 2010: złoty had proved to be a be to proved had złoty ń ski's

CEU eTD Collection rumours began to gather about yet another gatheryet delay.rumours began about to & (Dandashly Verdun 2011: 25) Trichet, Jean-Claude head ECB with meetings Tusk's Donald Minister Prime after month, next the but plan, detailed a of announcement the with along floated was 2012 by joining of idea the 2008 In October 1252) Johnson 2010: & spending. (Epstein deficit the discontinue not did PO tow, in Rostowski Jacek minister, finance pro-EMU strongly a with in and words euro the to commitment maintaining While 304) 2008: (Zubek PSL. with coalition in victory, to (PO) Platform Civic euro-friendly decidedly and liberal-conservative the bringing again, turned tide the 2007, November in called elections early in and scene, international into Poland's doubtsregarding ERMII. expressed foray PiS and its even more outlandish coalition partners did not make many friends on the on friends many make not did partners coalition outlandish more even its and PiS President, NBP new the even coalition, PiS the of era the During 30 Sławomir Skrzypek Sławomir

CEU eTD Collection openness of the economy forHungary. ofopenness the Table Totaltrade (exports imports) & GDP)(%of goodsImportsof and GDP)(%of services goodsExportsof and GDP)(%of services Totaltrade (exports imports) & with euro area GDP)(%of monetaryunion GDP)(%of goodsImportsof and from membersservices theof monetaryunion GDP)(%of goodsExportsof and membersto services theof Generalgovernment deficit/surplusGDP) (%of Generalgovernment debt GDP)(%of yields* Referencevalue forEMU convergence criterion bond EMUconvergence criterion bond yields ratechangeof (%)* Referencevalue forHICP -inflation rate –annual average HICP-inflation rate –annual average rate changeof (%) previousyear RealGDP growth rate –volume –percentage change over indicator\time 3.3.1 3.3 Hungary is very likely to be affected by the comings and going in the euro area. and area. A small euro the in going and comings the by affected be to likely very is that Hungary suggesting states, member eurozone with occurs this of half around times, all at and activity, import and export increasing toward trend clear a is there economy: Hungarian the worldeconomy. year unambiguous ofthe the boom last to during a halt slowed already growth that fact the is values. notable Also reference the overshooting clearly better, little fared rates interest Long-term fluctuating. and high relatively remained inflation while threshold, cent per 60 the over debt sovereign pushed deficits budget high Staggeringly Source: Eurostat Source: availabledata: no given calendar year. periodcorrespondinga a 2008,to not andbased 12-month on ECB 2004,of 2006, * theConvergence From Reports The above is especially puzzling once we take a look at the indicators for the openness of openness the for indicators the at look a take we once puzzling especially is above The As Table 3 shows, Hungary did not satisfy any of the nominal criteria during the period. the during criteria nominal the of any satisfy not did TableHungary As shows, 3 3 Hungary : Year-on-year GDP growth, onMaastricht convergence indicators and criteria Macroeconomic Fundamentals 31 2002 55.9 -9.0 5.2 4.5 : : : : : : : : : 2003 58.6 -7.3 4.7 3.9 : : : : : : : : : 130.2 2004 35.6 38.5 59.5 6.40 8.19 2.40 66.9 63.3 74.1 -6.5 6.8 4.8 2005 36.6 38.0 61.7 6.60 68.1 65.9 74.6 -7.9 134 3.5 4 : : 156.4 2006 40.7 42.1 65.9 6.20 7.12 2.80 78.7 77.7 82.8 -9.4 3.9 4 161.7 2007 41.4 43.8 6.50 6.74 3.20 80.4 81.3 85.2 -5.1 7.9 0.1 67 162.9 2008 41.1 42.7 8.24 81.2 81.7 83.8 -3.7 0.9 73 6 : :

CEU eTD Collection existing problems such as the oversized state sector or the persistent fiscal deficit, we only we deficit, fiscal persistent the or sector state oversized the as such problems existing address to activity policy any of instead Yet,successfully. completed been just had EU the with alignment of process strenuous the and favourable, were conditions economic External 239) 2011: (Csaba place. taken had policy economic in reforms or adjustments structural 3.3.2 security the where one and isa necessity. currency common provided bythe pressures, international disregard simply not ought which bya free was float. the EUR band replaced of band crawling a of system earlier the supplanting 2001, from euro off isbetter sucha state that economic wisdomsuggests stability club. outside inside a than conventional and markets, financial international the on risks numerous faces economy open socialist-era changes and the experienceoftransformation. and the socialist-era changes of effects long-term the of understanding an period, time this during Hungary characterized cycle business political infamous spending. government through election-year phenomenon the for evidence statistical is next there the Indeed, in votes election. their buy to trying thus and groups, societal various to handouts more ever give to promises of on piling the the and considerations short-term with concerned only were Fidesz, conservative the by led opposition, the and coalition governing Democrat Free Socialist- centre-left The imbalances. such of prevalence greater ever and persistence the see The relatively recent abandonment of exchange rate management also points to a country a to points also management rate exchange of abandonment recent relatively The a with peg soft a operated Hungary of Bank National The How did this state of affairs come about? In order to understand the policy drift which drift policy the understand to order In about? come affairs of state this did How significant no which in one was Union European the to accession surrounding era The Political Developments Political 32 (Lami & Imami 2013) (Lami & Imami ± 15 per cent band around the around band cent per 15 ±2.25 per cent. In 2008, In cent. per ±2.25

CEU eTD Collection not occur, of course. When the threat of impending bankruptcy loomed up in front of a of front in up loomed bankruptcy impending of threat the When course. of occur, not the of price the did changes that mean at not does 2011)This (Benczes state. the of came constraint budget softening sector private the in constraint budget hardening The course. reform challenging fundamentally a on embarking of instead afloat keep to spending deficit on rely to continuing governments successive with shake, to habit difficult a It be to state. proved welfare the through groups hard-hit compensating of course familiar the pursue to 1990s the in governments elected democratically the led turn, in This, standards. living attained previously on compromise to reluctant were who people from resistance immediate elicited they and severe, nevertheless were costs economic inevitable The terms. political in of process transformation areas negotiated smooth, a various for way in the paved liberalization This activity. economic of degree some necessitated also which imbalances macroeconomic of number a in resulted this system, the of inefficiencies the With transfers. social through populace the of acquiescence the purchased leadership authoritarian The bloc. the of countries the among freedoms and benefits social generous most the of some enjoyed steps would not be necessary. The benefits of EU accession were seen to accrue almost accrue to seen were accession EU of benefits The necessary. be not would steps further and done been had work the that considered process, the in involved elites political themany, accession, including EU of completion the with coincided this reaped. As be could reward the and end, finally would constraints various to conforming constant seemingly the that expectation general a was there transition of decade first the of end Toward the 159-60) 2009: (Győrffy changes. structural than rather spending on freezes and cuts of comprised these However, were them of danger. most and backtracked, soon the Socialists ruling the as short-lived averted were measures package, Bokros the as collectively known steps, liberalizing and cuts radical of collection a 1995, in crises currency external of background In the socialist period, following the bitter defeat of the 1956 revolution, Hungary revolution, 1956 the of defeat bitter the following period, socialist the In 33

CEU eTD Collection h eta akr f CE wud hv ecmd sm lxblt n ciei uh as such criteria on flexibility some welcomed have would CEE of bankers central the while Furthermore, convergence. of sustainability the instead promoting quickly, join states member European Eastern and Central the letting to averse was ECB the directions: both from foiled were banker central the of aspirations the again, once However, 370-1) (Johnson 2006: 2007. by EMU of the completion and foresaw 2005 by later criteria Maastricht year the a of fulfilment published program pre-accession The 2006. in date, possible earliest the at eurozone the joining for advocated millennium, the of turn the at government Fidesz-FKgP-MDF centre-right the in minister finance of post the fulfilling after MNB the of presidency the to acceded who In Járai, policies. Zsigmond optimal 2001 regarding August government. with the in bitterconflict embroiled alike, afterbefore accession and was, MNB The facts? the of account sober more much a had surely which accession, euro (Csaba2011:deal.” 243) done “a as viewed currency,was which common the of adoption the automatically, including even through the budget deficit had already started to widen under the previous government. previous the under widen to started already had deficit budget the through even election, their after immediately rates interest raised he when government the of side wrong the on himself put already had Járai 184-5) 2006: (Greskovits easing. monetary for condition a as this set and first, deficit the tackling to commitment credible demanded turn, in MNB, The restraint. fiscal pledge would they which for exchange in growth, boost to rate interest of concept new their the of decrease a was propagating MNB the from for hoped they What welfare.” through with “transformation concerned more were 2002, Spring in elected and Medgyessy Péter minister prime by led Socialists, the home, At 373) 2006: (Johnson letter. the to them enforcing in resolute remained ECB the entry, faster facilitate to inflation s ws te cs ih Pln, te laesi f te MB sae iia concerns similar shared MNB the of leadership the Poland, with case the was As and stability price of champion the bank, central the about what ask: then might One 34

CEU eTD Collection the oftentimes confusing communication towards the public caused a major disturbance. major towards caused a public confusingthe communication the oftentimes as well as institutions, two the between coordination of lack The 189-90) 2006: (Greskovits well. as executive the of approval the needed have would however, which, bands, flotation the change to MNB the push could they that believed wrongly speculators – markets financial victory. minimal it ahis predecessors, rather was 2006: (Greskovits 1987) of that to compared bolstered definitely was position his while but Bank, Central European the of backing the secure to tried Járai bank. the over board supervisory a placing through influence exercise to attempted policy, and rate exchange the in say a demanded government the executive. centralbank and sour the to between especially relations which led opponent, political a as regarded and partisanship of accused was He 139) 2008: (Várhegyi interests. industrial hurting appreciate, forint Hungarian the made which result, a as policy tight a enforcing was and 2001, in targeting inflation to switch the made had head MNB The the Monetary Council himself – now the prime minister introduced a bench-packing scheme, bench-packing a introduced minister prime the now – himself Council Monetary the of members eight all choose to empowered legally been had veto) a to subject (though Járai Previously, MNB. the on yet attack invasive most the launched Gyurcsány Ferenc successor, the target 2010.(Johnson was 2006: date 376) Union, European the entered Hungary when 2004, May in and followed, soon delay another 2004, early in replaced was minister finance pro-euro the after However, 2008. to date entry eurozone the postponing included 2003, July in bank central the of head the and prime minister the minister, finance the by together made announcement, The side. government's A minor political crisis in the summer of 2004 saw the prime minister step down, and his and down, step minister prime the saw 2004 of summer the A in crisis political minor the from followed reforms comprehensive no although struck, was deal a end, the In the on attacks several endure to had forint the 2003 during rate, interest high the to Due the as question into called was MNB the of independence the 2002, summer In 35

CEU eTD Collection Gekvt 08 8-) rvsd er ovrec ln ws as umte o the to submitted also was plan convergence announced. euro soon revised were A measures 288-9) austerity 2008: drastic (Greskovits so longer, any off put be not could adjustment that clear became it re-election, a secured Socialists the after immediately but welfare increasing ever of promises usual the by preceded been had elections general 2006 147) The 2008: (Várhegyi government. the with up caught had policies irresponsible of years the time this by 2008, February in forint floating freely the introducing by speculators under from out rug the pulled finally he While Simor. András choice, preferred government's the (Csaba forthe2007: 418-9) MNB. proactiverole facilitate a properly not did membership EU freedoms. and powers institution's the upon encroach could it which to limit the test to room more much had government the provisions, constitutional entry. ofeurozone the benefits 2005: (Carroll 71) political Hungarian first the was Gyurcsány 193) 2006: (Greskovits members. additional four appointing personally 151) In 2008, as the subprime crisis gave way to the global credit crunch, Hungary was cut was Hungary crunch, credit global the to way gave crisis subprime the as 2008, In 151) 2008: (Várhegyi Simor. and government the against both attacks launched president, MNB missing. was elections the during welfare as term his during Járai of supportive been had which opposition, 289) The 2008: (Greskovits more with campaigning after cuts of severe leaking the after legitimacy lost introducing for mandate their that, barring even but and speech” “lie much-maligned Gyurcsány's disgraced was government The 150) 2008: (Várhegyi scale. global a on rates interest raise and unfold to began which crisis subprime the by hampered were adjustment of Unfortunately, efforts 2006) (EurActiv dates. likely as seen were 2012 or 2011 Unofficially, date. entry an specifying without Commission, European The conflict only abated as Járai's term came to an end in 2007, and he was replaced by replaced was he and 2007, in end an to came term Járai's as abated only conflict The by anchored not was independence bank central since that observe can we general In leader, who, in a statement made in October 2005, openly questioned openly 2005, October in leader, made statement a in who, 36

CEU eTD Collection openness of the economy forSlovakia. ofopenness the Table Totaltrade (exports imports) & GDP)of (% goodsImportsof andGDP) (%of services goodsof Exports andGDP) of (% services Totaltrade (exports imports) & with euro area GDP)(%of monetaryunion GDP)of (% goodsImportsof and frommembers services theof monetaryunion GDP)of (% goodsof Exports andmembers to services the of Generalgovernment GDP)deficit/surplusof (% Generalgovernment debt GDP)(%of yields* Referencevalue forEMU convergence criterion bond EMUconvergence criterion bond yields HICP-inflation rate –annual average rate changeof (%) ratechange of (%)* Referencevalue forHICP -inflation rate –annual average previousyear RealGDP growth rate –volume –percentage change over indicator\time 3.4.1 3.4 a by introduced policies bad of hope ofconvergence and withsuccession ofgovernments, nolegitimate sight. in fruits the by saddled enmities, partisan among adrift on international trade. This shows a clear sign as to why Slovakia saw it as necessary to necessary as it saw Slovakia why to as sign clear a shows This trade. international on reliance significant overall an Hungary,and of those to similar quite are which eurozone the growth rates. impressive coupled was reduction with deficit currency. Effective common the of introduction successful the preceding immediately Source: Eurostat Source: availabledata: no given calendar year. periodcorrespondinga a 2008,to not andbased 12-month on ECB 2004,of 2006, * theConvergence From Reports Surveying indicators for the openness of the economy, we find export and import rates to rates import economy,and the export of find openness we the for indicators Surveying one the was case their in which period the during standing Slovakia's displays 4 Table 4 Slovakia : Year-on-year GDP growth, indicatorsconvergence onMaastricht and criteria Macroeconomic Fundamentals 37 2002 43.4 -8.2 3.5 4.6 : : : : : : : : : 2003 42.4 -2.8 8.4 4.8 : : : : : : : : : 151.8 2004 41.5 6.40 5.03 2.40 77.3 74.5 80.9 39.2 41.7 -2.4 7.5 5.1 157.2 2005 34.2 3.52 80.9 76.3 74.7 38.2 36.5 -2.8 2.8 6.7 : : 2006 30.5 6.20 4.41 2.80 88.5 84.5 75.1 33.1 42.0 -3.2 173 4.3 8.3 174.9 2007 29.6 6.50 4.49 3.20 10.5 88.0 86.9 74.1 30.7 43.4 -1.8 1.9 169.4 2008 27.9 4.72 85.9 83.5 71.8 32.3 39.5 -2.1 3.9 5.8 : :

CEU eTD Collection a o rmi oua ih te eetrt hogot te 19s oiiig along sovereign debt. with noinherited mobilizing 1990s, the throughout position, favourable a in was Slovakia policy, electorate economic to came it When lines. nationalistic the with popular remain to was HZDS 278) 2008: (Greskovits Prague. in government central the with of system socialist-era Slovakia Democratic a (HZDS), for Movement the of leader the that out turned “velvet it the after divoerce” through independence seek to pushed was country the entity, Czechoslovak the in partner junior the independence. Always country's the to way the all back stretch entry 3.4.2 fairly 2006 January in II ERM to transition the rate exchange regimes. to compared other when straightforward made which euro, the to pegged common the introduce currency. international pressures. (Epstein & 1246) (Epstein Johnson pressures. 2010: international other and loans IMF on dependent was country the that reminders Masár's president Vladimír bank central by foiled was NBS the of status legal the amend to attempt His easily. rather interference undue from dissuaded be could Mečiar reason, this For 281) 2008: (Greskovits NBS. the of goals the to helpful was which value, important an as regarded was stability significantly, its – sovereignty national of emblem important an became koruna currency, the national new The 1246) 2010: Johnson & (Epstein independence. its secure and credibility its establish help to assistance international received staff Slovak inexperienced Hungary, the During the period, the Slovak central bank (NBS) initially maintained a managed float managed a maintained initially (NBS) bank central Slovak the period, the During Monetary policy was in the hands of the newly established NBS. As with Poland and Poland with As NBS. established newly the of hands the in was policy Monetary eurozone fast-track to Slovakia piloted eventually which coalition the of origins The Political Developments Political ldmr Me Vladimír ir cud nt boe aorbe da con utv Husák's Gustáv echoing deal favourable a broker not could čiar 38

CEU eTD Collection eain ih te E n AO n nrdcn hne o mk h onr more country the make to changes introducing and NATO, and EU the with relations restoringover, took successfully party ethnic Hungarian the and reform-socialists Democrats, 2010: &1255) (Epstein Johnson “uncoalitionable.” seen as was and forces political other the among pariah a became party the elections, general 1998 the Westernthe at votes the of plurality of HZDS. a gaining demise still While the to led Club Four. Visegrád from exclusion the of threat of the and credibility states international of loss three The 279) 2008: (Greskovits other the for so did it that time same the at Slovakia to membership offer to refused NATOsimilarly democracy. regarding criteria Copenhagen the of violations to due Six) Luxembourg the as known became collectively (which accession EU for frontrunners the among Slovakia include to refusal EU's the by compounded was This Mečiar.Western to visit diplomatic single 2011:a (Carroll paying never 73) leaders European several with scene, international the on unacceptable it made HZDS of partners coalition unsavoury and tendencies authoritarian The problematic. more far was situation political earned a second term for Dzurinda, this time with a more ideologically cohesive coalition. cohesive ideologically more a with time this Dzurinda, elections for term second 2002 a earned The 789) 2012: (Pechova implementation. successful ensuring minister, finance as role his in spirit reformist a exhibited Mikloš Ivan member party changes, the of partner,coalition neoliberal (SDL')thrust with Left the ofthedisagreed the Democratic Party numbers the period. preceding a While the during account “creative” and cheating rampant through hidden exposing as well as costs, adjustment painful incurred 1998-2002 between ofthe structure economy. sectoral outmoded (Győrffy 2009: 165) ofthe coalition The reforms the by compounded problems, microeconomic serious were Mečiar, there under bad been not had situation macroeconomic the While 166) 2009: (Győrffy investors. foreign to appealing Therefore, a loose coalition headed by Mikulás Dzurinda and including his Christian his including and Dzurinda Mikulás by headed coalition loose a Therefore, general the cooperative, be to itself proved government the front this on while But 39

CEU eTD Collection election, so it relied on making the commitment to ERM II final in November 2005, thereby 2005, November in final II ERM to commitment the making on relied it so election, next the for prospects good face not did massive government The to populace. the led among disaffection and society, in vulnerable most the harmed severely also they economy, the stability.kickstart of helped However,favour reforms in 280) 2008: the while (Greskovits welfare in decreases towards tolerant fairly general, in were, Slovaks rate. 167-8) 2009: (Győrffy tax flat a as well as reform, care health and pension policy, social and state welfare the of restructuring radical a convergence included facilitate to introduced measures 786) The 2012: (Pechova backsliding. and policies short-termist against safeguard a as acting as well as inflation, and rate interest low the to thanks growth to integral as it country, seeing the for adoption euro of benefits prospective the about agreement in were government the and SNB Smer-SD. 2012: 790) (Pechova unit, democratic social inexperienced and new a as well as (SNS), Party National Slovak right-wing radical the and HZDS disgraced the of consisted opposition the – programme to had the ability this timeensuredthat government at landscape the The political Slovakia as a new member chose to focus on the completion of integration to drive home its home drive to integration of completion the on focus to chose member new a as Slovakia advantage. present, was CEECs the by adoption euro of terms in their EU the of attitude ambiguous the While to this use to chose instead leaders Slovak conform, to but choice other no With 15.) 2010: (Haughton ignored. went mostly contributions and suggestions their that found politicians Slovak Treaty, Lisbon the high-level become eventually 2004 would a what at about meeting Already constraints. to adhere to but choice no had it that showed achievements. the 2012: &791) 1255;(Epstein Johnson Pechova 2010: on backtracking against pressure market and international increasing Slovakia's relationship to the EU was formed to a large extent by experiences which experiences by extent large a to formed was EU the to relationship Slovakia's The radical. and extensive were cabinet Dzurinda second the by undertaken reforms The 40 carry out itscarry

CEU eTD Collection political forces made sure that Slovakia stuck to its goal of adopting the euro in 2009. in euro the adopting 794) (Pechova 2012: a proactiverole. exercise President ofthewasable NBS to Šramko also of goal its to stuck Slovakia that sure and made interests forces business political of constraints combined The HZDS. and SNS partners, coalition tax oppose to of choice its to continuing due pressure political 11-12) faced Smer-SD 2010: (Haughton harmonization. well, as level EU the on stance predecessor's his maintaining up Fico 2012: ended 792; wouldstayKirk2006)Indeed, theoncourse.(Pechova that country reassurance provide to trying statements, previous the on backtracked minister finance his and minister prime the so danger, in koruna the putting immediately, commitment of breach potential this to reacted Markets advantageous. genuinely was it if introduced be only should euro the that claimed Fico election, the after Immediately controversy. without not was SD most Smer- Fico's Robert of Rybár victory & 552-4) The (Haughton 2009: it. achieve to competent was who around centered competition party necessity, its about agreement in were 17) (Haughton required2010: what was byaccession. into its preferences dissolving essentially through approval obtaining strategically European,” “good a as position made in the hypothesis. in the made 3.5 impending and 2008) (EurActiv accession wereunfolding. eurozone membership II ERM was Slovakia's he way that the expressed with Počiatek comfortable” Jan “maximally minister finance set, was parity central the which Poland, the largest of the newly acceded EU members, was in no obvious need of joining of need obvious no in was members, EU acceded newly the largestthe of Poland, assumptions the confirm period this in studies case the whether analyzing to turn now I at level rate exchange the of appropriateness the about doubts some were there While all while i.e. issue, valence a as emerge adoption euro saw election general 2006 The Conclusion 41

CEU eTD Collection Polish political leaders to legitimize their preference for putting off adjustments and treating and adjustments off putting for preference their legitimize to leaders by political Polish utilized was inconsistency This position. inconsistent hopelessly a nominal to amounted enforcing entry towards Poland speedy from discouragement of expression spur continued its had, it tools to the with convergence and independence bank central defend to ready and keen liability.was EU major a the While be have to proved institutions EU by signals not may alone this but mixed of sending continued concern, the However, accession. rapid seeking from Poland prime discouraged a was economy Polish the affect could it which in way specific the and II ERM rigid The sure. for expected, be to was enforcement their and criteria the of inflexibility The matters. facilitate to little did institutions EU-level a not was by played there role the However, hand. so of out euro tendencies, the reject to Poland spending for case straightforward deficit of curbing the and rates interest low through growth to contribution potential a to thanks prospects favourable held still currency liquid highly large a the sacrifice lightly with not West,would the it with catch-up rapid country of hopes and market domestic a As standing. macroeconomic its by judging union, currency the faced with low flexibility and credibility onthehypothesis vindicated. Ifind EU's the part, with and lowflexibility credibility faced competing concernswell. as faced embedded its to thanks agency bank central the exercise as euro, the for support unwavering to amount not did this but independence, to able their was to NBP The due positions. governments ideological different through differently the transmitted course, Of effect pleased. they institutional as do to rein free had they where area an as adoption euro Hungary during the period exhibited paradoxical features. While the economic case for case economic the While features. paradoxical exhibited period the during Hungary propensity domestic middling to low with country a Poland, of case the in Therefore, złoty or the focus on growth instead of stability. However, the common the However, stability. of instead growth on focus the or złoty 42

CEU eTD Collection arn si, n ed f rsle t mak o aia eom pt ol ae root. the take to could conducive not path was period reform the radical characterizing partisanship a extreme the on Furthermore, embark to resolve of seeds no soil, barren this In proces. transition the of frontrunner and gradualist a as reputation continued Hungary's to thanks complacency of degree large a for allowed and inertia past, socialist by the from burdened inherited was actors political of context intermediary domestic The stability. of favour in voices the stifled further bank central the of position fragile definitely still but strengthening point. gradually any The at process accession euro the with engagement serious no was there because mainly was however, This, leaders. Hungarian to concern for cause specific little gave EU the this, from aside But 187) 2006: (Greskovits illustration. pertinent a an as SGP the about is anyway itself eurozone the assertion by abandoned be to likely was which straightjacket unnecesary Surányi's György chief bank were central structure Former less-than-credible a present. of signs overall the and accession and convergence superficial) presumably (and quick toward ambiguity familiar the part, EU's the On plans. feasible by up backed hardly were they discarded, then and adopted serially were dates target While strategies. entry credible any into translate not did this clear, quite was adoption euro hypothesis. facto de to similar more be to as so feeble so were entry at attempts their words, in accession euro to a committed were be governments successive while propensity,and domestic equal automatically to seems entry delaying then and necessity that not does reveals the look ancase ofthein-depth at hypothesis,confirmation but dates optimistic setting kept EU dismissed either. adoption, a towards consensustransmission oneuro ofincentives The fact that a country with high necessity and faced with an inflexible and easily and inflexible an with faced and necessity high with country a that fact The indefinite postponement. Therefore, the findings in Hungary's case do not confirm not do case Hungary's in findings the Therefore, postponement. indefinite 43

CEU eTD Collection process included, for granted. In contrast, Slovakia's leaders were acutely aware of the stain the of aware acutely were leaders Slovakia's contrast, In granted. for included, adoption process euro the integration, EU taken had it there, observe to able been have we as so, EU, the to relationship its to regard with situation crisis serious a experienced never Hungary transformation. the before since organizations international of darling the been had latter the that is find we what Hungary, with this contrast we If EU. the into followed eventually it path ambitious and committed the to contributed experience traumatic this and Slovakia, secured. successfully was accession reform, serious for impetus provided isolation international of memory the and factions political all by respected was independence bank's central the where context mediating domestic favourable a with Combined credible. relatively be to continued they meant development Slovak of hope only and anchor external the as politicians Slovak of the eyes to the in status their problems, their had objections institutions EU the While criteria. entry possible inflexible lessened and concern important an bloc currency the joining and relatively high credibility of the EU as external anchor were transmitted through the isconfirmed. the so hypothesis adoption, in toearly context domestic result through transmitted were anchor external as EU the of credibility high relatively and afford could not reputationthey country's and thusfelt on their blunders. any more As Slovakia is a case of a country with high necessity, the combination of low flexibility low of necessity, combination high the with country a of case a is Slovakia As needed EU the than more EU the needed it that on early learn to had had Slovakia made openness economic Its adoption. euro from benefit to stood clearly Slovakia 44

CEU eTD Collection formidably capitalized ECB. (Lane 2008) ECB. (Lane formidably capitalized the of umbrella protective the under member, Eurozone a been Iceland had happened, have bank, central wouldnot thing the suggested Itthat same was panicmarkets. to distrustonthe which led and small comparably its to part large in due country’s were the sector of financial collapse humongous and situation dangerous the that suggested was it 2008, in out broke crisis banking Icelandic the commendably.When quite 2007-08 of crisis financial the handle to seemed initially economies eurozone currency.that significant also reserve is It a 1-2) 2009: (Tilford as prominence more and more acquiring and dollar the against own its holding easily stable, and strong be to proved euro The themselves. presented critics early by anticipated disasters major the of none and successful, essentially seemed EMU were: measures. importantcrisis-management includingtheEMU-related most debt crises, 4.1 4 countries with large debts in a currency they could not control with higher bond yields and yields bond higher with control not could they currency a in debts punishing large with started countries and awoke suddenly agencies rating and Markets crunch. credit the of wake the in evaporated security of sense this states, member lax fiscally even protected that haven safe a as seen further. was levels currency debt single public the crisis the before While as2010: (Hrebenciuc 57) area whole. euro the for cumulatively GDP of 60% below went never and rising kept levels debt public states, member all nearly by rules SGP the against trespassing continuous the and decade The financial crisis necessitated state bailouts of private sector institutions, escalating institutions, sector private of bailouts state necessitated crisis financial The previous the over credit cheap to Due union. currency the within well not was all But they unremarkable how for remarkable were currency common the of years ten first The sovereign and financial the of aspects relevant some recapitulate briefly very I Below

The Crisis Years An InstitutionsOverview of EMU and Policy 45

CEU eTD Collection market, taxation and structural reform structural policies. taxationmarket, and labour in coordination intergovernmental foster to tool a was agreement The members. EU non-eurozone four but all include to expanded was but Pact Competitiveness the called and states. member bythe guaranteed eurozone from theand billion raised markets euros) 750 of total a ESM: of case the (in capital of amounts substantial of basis the on operated have funds Both (ESM). Mechanism Stabilization European permanent the by succeeded the EU. the takenfollowing: steps were most significant The within rules deficit and debt the of enforcement stricter for need the as well as fund, rescue and buffer permanent a of idea the to birth 2011,giving during others several by up followed be to had 2010 May in agreement bailout eurozone-IMF first The eurozone. the of periphery severe downgrades. member state’smember debt-to-GDP 3%mark. deficitbelow stays the 60%while its isabove ratio a if also but deficits excessive of case the in only not launched EDPis an Furthermore, them. against vote to decides actively majority qualified a unless automatically triggered are they Council: the of discretion the at longer no are sanctions that RQMV Procedure. means Deficit Excessive an of launch the for threshold lower a and Council, ECOFIN the in sanctions on significant following: most the were elements Its directive. a and regulations further three as well as legislation, SGP 1997 original the amend to regulations two SGP.included It the of enforceability the bolster – – southern the on economies other by followed Greece, was casualty greatest The – – The Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the EU (TSCG), also called also (TSCG), EU the in Governance and Stability,Coordination on Treaty The to effort legislative a was 2011, September in adopted “Six-Pack,” so-called The members eurozone for meant only originally was 2011 March of Pact Plus Euro The later fund bailout temporary a (EFSF), Facility Stability Financial European The the introduction of reverse qualified majority voting (RQMV) voting majority qualified reverse of introduction the 46

CEU eTD Collection 4.2.1 4.2 under scrutiny. ofthecountries three therole politics in states. in budget signatory rule ofa aimbalanced adoption Itschief UK isthe veto. a after one intergovernmental an became but treaty EU an as out started Compact, Fiscal the This in itself renders the figures dubious, as the numbers do not seem to add up; a definite a up; add to seem not do numbers the as dubious, figures the renders itself in This avoid to soared. managed still deficits budget threshold, critical growth, the below remained debts its in While recession. drop significant nevertheless a notwithstanding which, Poland stands out among the members of the EU as it was one of the few countries few the of one was it as EU the of members the among out stands Poland signficant a play would itself, crisis the of effects the as well as measures, these of All and openness of the economy forPoland. ofand openness the Table Totaltrade (exports imports) & GDP)(%of goodsImportsof and GDP)(%of services goodsExportsof and GDP)(%of services GDP)(%of Totaltrade (exports imports) & with members theofEU europeanunion GDP)(%of Importsgoodsof and from services members theof europeanunion GDP)(%of goodsExportsof and membersto services theof Generalgovernment deficit/surplusGDP) (%of Generalgovernment debt GDP)(%of yields* Referencevalue for EMUconvergence criterion bond EMUconvergence criterion bond yields ratechangeof (%)* Referencevalue for HICP -inflation rate –annual average HICP-inflation rate –annual average rate changeof (%) previousyear RealGDP growth rate –volume –percentage change over indicator\time Poland Macroeconomic Fundamentals Source: Eurostat Source: availabledata: no year. calendar not 12-month givenon periodcorrespondinga to ECB 2012,of based * theConvergence From Report 5 : Year-on-year GDP growth, onMaastricht convergence indicators criteria 47 2009 78.8 39.4 39.4 59.8 28.8 31.0 50.9 6.12 -7.5 1.6 4 : : 2010 85.6 43.4 42.2 64.2 31.4 32.8 54.9 5.78 -7.8 2.7 3.9 : : 2011 91.3 46.2 45.1 67.4 32.8 34.6 56.2 5.80 5.96 -5.1 3.1 3.9 4.5 2012 93.1 46.4 46.7 67.1 32.1 35.0 55.6 5.00 -3.9 3.7 2 : : 2013 93.2 45.4 47.8 67.2 31.7 35.5 4.03 -4.3 0.8 1.6 57 : :

CEU eTD Collection many other things at the time, the plan fell by the wayside as bythecrisis escalated. fell thewayside the plan the things time, many at other so with as But 2009) (Rettman year. that May in II ERM join to Poland for intended they that maintained still officials Polish 2009, strong.” February of end the as late the as Even 2008) (Runner of decisions the on influence have to and strong the among strong, the with be to safer “It's clear: motive the made Tusk Minister Prime mid-2009. in II ERM into entry planned surprising truly a stipulated it 2012, in currency the of introduction the for Shooting 2008. late in adopted was that plan entry euro ambitious highly the by exemplified as leaders, 4.2.2 vital. entry more enougheuro to make wouldhavevulnerable the become that country conclusion immediate an to lead not does and rate exchange floating the with do to lot a had debt. hiddento the maycomponents and there be seems it as is all not that sign a be may years of couple past the during growth in slowdown was no accident, as the country was weathering the storm far better than the currency union. currency the than better far storm the weathering was country the as accident, no was 2010a) (EurActiv stance stabilized. This convincingly been had EMU once earnest pursued in be to only but Poland, for interest strategic long-term a as seen still was euro The unfolded. goal. a remained still criteria Maastricht 2012:(Markiewicz 3) the of fulfillment the toward convergence but it, miss and date entry the an set to to not credibility country's According the for better 2010a) was it document, (EurActiv since. ever set officially not has country the which The government's rhetoric changed markedly in 2011-2012 as the sovereign debt crises debt sovereign the as 2011-2012 in markedly changed rhetoric government's The date, target formal a without but 2010, early in formulated was plan convergence Anew Polish on lost not was crisis the of start the at area euro the of resilience apparent The however, This, growth. of driver main the was and strongly increased trade International Political Developments Political 48

CEU eTD Collection rivals. On the other,rivals. the On and services products domestic more expensive, much became imports as tradecountry's balance. the altering significantly by beneficial be to proved it case Poland's in peg, a by guaranteed stability the to contrast in regime floating a of disadvantage main the pose can what precisely Visegrád fellow by experienced 2012: 147) (Bandasz andRepublic. Hungary the Czech floaters change is a such severe While that than drop steeper much a euro, the to comparison the 2009, February and 2008 September Between currency. 2011. September after disappeared 5) 2012: (Markiewicz these – meetings council monetary monthly after published statements its in possible as soon as adoption euro pursue to need the about line a included previously had bank 70) central The 2012: (Belka cautious. remaining for reason primary a was crisis the during country the of of lives the claimed had tragedy Smolensk the after 2010 in over took (who Belka president NBP As benefits of the euro may pale in comparison. in comparison. ofthe pale eurobenefits may the Polish and absorber, shock optimal an with country a the provide can currency own its maintaining so Europe, Eastern and Central that proved it Nevertheless, of 151-3) 2012: (Bandasz unique. quite inevitably was phenomenon economies smaller far the in degree equal an to present not are features same these that note to important is It shocks. specific sector- to vulnerable highly being of risk smaller a had also it and goods foreign replace to capacity the had it production, diversified and market internal large its with economy: thePolish of specificities the to due possible made was This market. domestic the for produced who those for and exporters for both opportunities creating thereby them, displace to came On the one hand, the depreciation made Polish exports more competitive than those of its of those than competitive exports more Polish made depreciation the one hand, the On its of flexibility the was success relative country's the behind features key the of One

Sławomir Sławomir Skrzypek and other state dignitaries state other and Skrzypek 49 ) himself stated, the good performance good the stated, himself ) złoty lost 48% of its value in value its of 48% lost złoty

CEU eTD Collection aware of the fact that remaining outside a strengthened bloc would cause major difficulties in difficulties major cause would bloc strengthened a outside remaining that fact the of aware acutely were politicians Polish 6-7) 2012: (Markiewicz insistence. Polish at largely states only.area euro the of ministers finance of council a – Eurogroup the of meetings the at decided being was policy monetary and economic EU-level of future the that clear became increasingly it and eurozone, the of countries core few a by spearheaded was management Crisis events. of EU's part. onthe flexibility hard-won of instance rare such a represents it any but basis, case-by-case a that on made be and only would one-off concession a was it that maintained deficit. Commission its The of 2010c) calculation (EurActiv the from fund pension its of costs the of exemption a definitive secured it 2010 late in when Commission hawkish more ever the against victory small a score to managed even country The deficit. government general chronic the down bringing 2011) (Rettman meetings. the of some in participate to allowed eventually was Rostowski Minister Finance well. as states non-euro for ramifications have to bound was EMU of fate the that was reasoning Polish The time. the at plans Six-Pack the on intensely focusing were they as especially too, proceedings Eurogroup other into admittance for strongly advocate to began this.step against important but small another was occasion this on table the at Staying level. supranational the at preferences Polish of expression the hinder would and EU the of aspects all with dealing When Poland held the rotating presidency of the Council in the second half of 2011, it 2011, of half second the in Council the of presidency rotating the held Poland When area euro as well as non-adopters welcome to expanded was Pact Competitiveness The heart the to close keep to Poland for incentive new a arose there proceeded, crisis the As of task the neglect to leaders Polish allow again once could however, phenomenon, This 50

CEU eTD Collection bank chief Belka has once again raised the riskiness of ERM II as a problem, highlighting problem, a as II ERM of riskiness the raised again once has Belka chief bank forconvergence. exchange 5-6) be in sacrificed 2010a;2012: (EurActiv Markiewicz to have would which welfare the for fearing well, as times 2011, at in wavering reelected was being after partnership coalition its continued had PO the which with party the PSL, stance. belligerent its maintained PiS sympathetic, generally were Movement Palikot popular newly the and SLD the While Sejm. the in parties other all by echoed not course, of was, adoption debt. 2011b) (Pop ofthe default) Greek “orderly” (i.e. an restructuring the especially methods, management crisis criticizing openly to came it when back hold not did also Rostowski 2012) (Rettman upon. acted not end the in although floated blow, was political significant a been have would which TSCG, the sign to refusing of threat the even words, the to weight give To integration. the of dynamic the to harms long-term cause would countries non-euro and euro of tiers separate into Union the dividing that plea a question of “when” rather than a question of “if”, if peace with the Commission is to be to Secondly,maintained. the as legal złoty country's names the the to Polish thisconstitution day is Commission the with peace if “if”, of question a than rather “when” of question a be only natually could vote a Such it. consider seriously to have to government the for clout enough carries now referendum Firstly, own. a its on insistence of PiS-led roadblocks few the a with country the leave would scenario unlikely utterly this even but well, as adoption euro before II ERM in participating from exemption bargaining an of for idea the up brought again once has advisers Tusk's of One elections. 2015 the after taken be only likely most will euro 2013: 55) (Belka of“severe tensions.” the over how criterion EUwouldapply uncertainty the In the meantime, the prime minister has announced that a decision on when to adopt the adopt to when on decision a that announced has minister prime the meantime, the In Central well. as issues familiar old, some evokes players political of attitude recent The euro towards edging cautiously and close keeping of position party's PO governing The entered and out left be to not wish country's the about vocal be to continued minister The 51

CEU eTD Collection 4.3.1 4.3 currency. 2014) EurActiv (ECB 2012;2013; EurActiv common the introducing facilitate to it amend to needed be would Sejm the in supermajority lacking) (currently a money,and issue to right the with body sole the as NBP the and tender even inflation is below the reference value. reference isbelow the even inflation recently Most decade. a over in figures lowest the showing also is deficit the and somewhat, tempered been even has and increasing stopped are level debt indicators the favourable: Maastricht more somewhat the of tendencies The tenuous. been has recovery and region, In 2009 Hungary suffered the most severe recession in the Central and Eastern European Eastern and Central the in recession severe most sufferedthe Hungary 2009 In and openness of the economy forHungary. ofand openness the Table Totaltrade (exports imports) & GDP)(%of goodsImportsof and GDP)(%of services goodsofExports and GDP)(%of services Totaltrade (exports imports) & with euro area GDP)(%of monetaryunion GDP)(%of Importsgoodsof and from membersservices theof monetaryunion GDP)(%of goodsExportsof and membersto services theof Generalgovernment deficit/surplusGDP) (%of Generalgovernment debt GDP)(%of yields* Referencevalue forEMU convergence criterion bond EMUconvergence criterion bond yields ratechangeof (%)* Referencevalue for HICP -inflation rate –annual average HICP-inflation rate –annual average rate changeof (%) previousyear RealGDP growth rate –volume –percentage change over indicator\time Hungary Macroeconomic Fundamentals Source: Eurostat Source: availabledata: no year. calendar not 12-month givenon periodcorrespondinga to ECB 2012,of based * theConvergence From Report 6 : Year-on-year GDP growth, indicatorsconvergence onMaastricht criteria 52 150.3 2009 9.12 72.7 77.6 84.7 40.1 44.6 79.8 -6.8 -4.6 4 : : 164.5 2010 7.28 79.4 85.1 90.2 42.1 48.1 82.2 -4.3 4.7 1.1 : : 176.8 2011 5.80 7.64 85.2 91.6 97.4 46.3 51.1 82.1 3.1 3.9 1.6 4.3 100.4 2012 7.89 87.3 94.7 48.4 52.0 79.8 -1.7 -2.1 182 5.7 : : 101.8 2013 5.92 88.0 96.0 49.0 52.8 79.2 -2.2 184 1.7 1.1 : :

CEU eTD Collection oenet ld b odn Bja, peiul iitr fr te eooy ad local and economy the utterly and for Fidesz, party, opposition vocal more ever minister the from hostility Facing government. previously caretaker a Bajnai, to Gordon way giving by 2009, led of government spring the in turmoil the amid resigned minister prime the and up broke coalition The 55) 2012b: (Csaba bankruptcy. forestall could euros billion 20 of line credit EU-IMF-World Bank assembled hastily a only 2008, of end the near country the in trust lost markets financial when and mark, the off more been have couldn't 2009 year the for rate growth 3% hoped-for) least at (or estimated major initially to The problems. led over was worst the thinking government coalition Democrat Socialist-Free the of optimism unreasonable the but consolidation, relative of period a by followed was 4.3.2 throughoutperiod. floatingforint the withpolicy the monetary own its maintained has It processes. international to exposed highly be to continues and the green-left LMP), the governing faction had a very strong mandate, which was which mandate, strong Europe. ofcrisis-ridden the legislatures among especially atypical very a had faction governing the LMP), green-left the and Jobbik nationalist right-wing the newcomers: two plus Socialists decimated and discredited thecome two-thirds parliament, majority in Fidesz to swept a April 2010. Orbán's Viktor as stone in written practically already was future the but fairly it performed quality this In 2009) (EurActiv conditionality. loan IMF by required consolidation the general until about bring to year attempting than other anything of dream not could therefore and a time, election for power in be would government the legitimacy, popular lacking odn uemjrt n ae ny wt ek ad dvdd opsto (the opposition divided and weak a with only faced and supermajority a Holding elsewhere) years boom last the were (which 2006-07 during slowdown unique Hungary's Hungary that meaning tendentiously, increased has openness trade country's The Political Developments Political 53

CEU eTD Collection not sign the Euro Plus Pact, and later briefly threatening to abandon the abandon the threatening briefly to later Euro Pact,not Plus signthe and TSCG well. as did which countries four the of one being Hungary with feathers, some ruffled also EU the an when relented 38-9) of (Csaba 2012b: emerging governance later presented. The was economic new plan updated though funds, EU withhold to threatened Commission the high, oftwistsand turns. plenty included in itself factor the economic work, this of scope the beyond is period the of controversies political various the recounting while here: end not would Commission European the and government the between Clashes contentious. less no was levels, acceptable to down deficit the bringing and revenue term short- of source good a providing while step, This 2010c) (EurActiv thefunds. pension private nationalize to move sudden a was solution ad-hoc alternative Orbán's 159-60) 2013: (Csaba criteria. SGP & Maastricht the of flouting deliberate and obvious an such of face the in lenient be not would and crisis Greek the of upheaval the handle to having with bristling was which Commission, European the by ruthlessly down shot were These programs. their receiving especially stern charges and demands to aid government policy. Simor resisted, Simor policy. government aid to demands and charges stern especially receiving national oftheinterest. true defender the as pose could Fidesz turn, in and benefit, country's the for than rather against acting and sovereignty Hungary's upon encroaching were actors international the that asserted rhetoric government's The 40) 2012: (Csaba for altogether. Fund deal the reject loan eventually to another only months, negotiating around tiptoed government the 2011, late in markets international the in forint the to blow a either. After government, the of attitude unorthodox The MNB was also accused of acting against the national interest, with president Simor president with interest, national the against acting of accused also was MNB The new, the of advance the escape not did Commission, the with tandem in IMF, The too deemed was Fidesz by submitted value forecast fiscal 2013 a when 2012, early In finance to deficit budget large a up running entailed which plans ambitious had Fidesz 54

CEU eTD Collection the head of that organization. Its most extreme measures were once again foiled by the by foiled again once were measures extreme most Its organization. that of head the under president bank's central the subsume actually to and authority, supervision financial a mergetowith MNB the planned – it oppositethe did which legislation bank central morewas instead happened what but constitution, draft new country's the in independence bank central for guarantees of inclusion the demanded had Simor 162) 2013: (Csaba instead. factor key the being inflation variable, dependent a economy,is Hungarian rate the interest on the where effect substantial a having of record good a with come not do measures stimulus similar and cuts rate that fact the of light in puzzling especially is action latter The 14) 2014: Barnes & (Johnson times. several policy rate interest on decisions his overturned had council monetary the to appointees parliamentary and gesture, symbolic highly a was which salary, his to cut drastic a received Simor 12-3) 2014: Barnes & (Johnson taken. also were measures pressure, further EU to thanks averted eventually was this though and tax, windfall a levied had it which on banks commercial the among MNB the include to wanted had Initially, affairs. it bank's central the in meddle to was response government's the before, times many happened had As climate. economic inflation-prone and uncertain the in high rates interest keeping reasonably well-received in the international credit markets. The fact that it could finance its finance could it that fact The markets. credit international the in well-received reasonably funding forSMEs. and throughprovide markets, them, credit domestic ailing the into life breathe to programme lending a launched and regularly rates interest cut bank central the indeed, and any plans, present government's the to to unlikely opposition highly significant was He 14) 2014: Barnes & (Johnson bank. the of head the at government, the of minister finance & economy the then until up Matolcsy, György instilled Fidesz ahead. go still could independence bank central of dismantling the end, an to came finally term Simor's When action. legal of threat the through only but Commission, ept h nrhdx, te gvrmn eand hgl oua t hm and home at popular highly remained government the unorthodoxy, the Despite 55

CEU eTD Collection aig n ocee ramp n aohr smoi etr, te gvrmn a even had government the gesture, 2011) Constitution. in(EurActiv the forint Hungarian enshrined new the symbolic another In roadmap. concrete no having and 2020 before point any at about come not would de- it that stating completely adoption, euro prioritized had government the been, has ever it as criteria Maastricht the fulfilling party. hated and 2014:(Johnson 18) & Barnes discredited already an to blow final the delivering thereby and policies austerity unpopular highly enact Socialists the making by Fidesz cement helped indirectly favour ofthem. shift attitudesfact investors' in in may Hungary like country a offeredby yields higher slightly another, the as bad as is bond sovereign one when uncertainty, general of climate a in that fact the through explained be can perception positive fairly Hungary's of Part 2013) Gokoluk & members (Gergely bailouts. needed eurozone many so when time a at remarkable quite was market the from debts Through all this, and in spite of the fact that most recently, Hungary came as close to close as came Hungary recently, most that fact the of spite in and this, all Through fact in had IMF and EU critical highly the that is situation the of irony the of Part 56

CEU eTD Collection 4.4.1 4.4 period is not immediately obvious from the numbers alone. the numbers immediately obviousfrom period isnot wasduring the advantageous currency adoption common truly ofthe ofits timing and manner Slovakia 2009 in as figures, these with recession. deepshort-lived although experienced a do to lot a had also crisis the course, Of goal. main its achieved had it after vanished predictably adoption to run-up the in seen diligence of Slovakia's embeddedness in international trade also increased further, but whether the whether but further, increased also trade international in embeddedness Slovakia's kind the and deficit, huge a up ran immediately Slovakia eurozone, the to acceding After and openness of the economy forSlovakia. ofand openness the Table Totaltrade (exports imports) & GDP)(%of goodsImportsof and GDP)(%of services goodsofExports and GDP)(%of services Totaltrade (exports imports) & with euro area GDP)(%of monetaryunion GDP)(%of Importsgoodsof and from membersservices theof monetaryunion GDP)(%of goodsExportsof and membersto services theof Generalgovernment deficit/surplusGDP) (%of Generalgovernment debt GDP)(%of yields* Referencevalue forEMU convergence criterion bond EMUconvergence criterion bond yields HICP-inflation rate –annual average rate changeof (%) ratechangeof (%)* Referencevalue for HICP -inflation rate –annual average previousyear RealGDP growth rate –volume –percentage change over indicator\time Slovakia Macroeconomic Fundamentals Source: Eurostat Source: availabledata: no year. calendar not 12-month givenon periodcorrespondinga to ECB 2012,of based * theConvergence From Report 7 : Year-on-year GDP growth, onMaastricht convergence indicators criteria 57 141.7 2009 71.1 70.6 56.3 22.7 33.6 35.6 4.71 -8.0 -4.9 0.9 : : 2010 80.6 80.4 62.7 25.1 37.6 3.87 -7.5 161 0.7 4.4 41 : : 178.5 2011 89.0 89.5 68.5 27.3 41.2 43.4 5.80 4.45 -4.8 3.1 4.1 3 2012 91.4 96.6 70.9 27.6 43.3 52.4 4.55 -4.5 188 3.7 1.8 : : 188.9 2013 91.3 97.6 70.5 27.4 43.1 55.4 3.19 -2.8 1.5 0.9 : :

CEU eTD Collection imports during the crisis. (Bandasz 2012: 151) Meanwhile, since its neighbours could and did and could neighbours its since Meanwhile, 151) 2012: (Bandasz crisis. the during imports than sharply more much fell exports expected, be can As circumstances. external of changing face the in inflexible it making electronics and automobiles around centered structure in competitive undifferentiated a has rather the Furthermore, country to itsexportcomparison peers. regional less became exports its consequently, and depreciate not could currency the to Slovakia's crisis, the adding During 147) 2012: appreciation, (Bandasz further. even record-high inflation high of of likelihood period a through gone just had koruna the euro, the to switched Slovakia when that clear become also had it However, situation. a such in currency own its with economy open small, a befall can which attacks market financial the of lot from a sheltered Slovakia ECB kept robust by the backed net safety a as function its with in chimes This 2008b) states. European Eastern member position ofthe strict and ECB's onCentral accounts (Kubosova ready. was it that EU the persuade to entrants Šefčovič Maroš 4.4.2 the domestic currency, meant that there was no exchange rate risk. (Bandasz 2012: 154) This 154) 2012: (Bandasz risk. rate exchange no was there that currency, meant domestic the become now had it as which, euros, in denominated exclusively almost were credits private that fact the to and country, the in banks the of policies lending cautious fairly the to part ofthe eurozone. poorestcountry member standards in the this but competitiveness, living improve to little did salvage 63) 2013: Wörgötter & (Fidrmuc recovery” “jobless characteristic to devaluation internal of processes painful rebound to through managed still country The 59) 2013: Wörgötter in & higher (Fidrmuc even case. was Slovakia's rate exchange effective real the devaluation, competitive in engage The financial stability of the country was relatively well-protected, thanks in no small no in thanks well-protected, relatively was country the of stability financial The First, crisis. the in Slovakia to boon a and bane a both was euro the terms, economic In EU the to ambassador Slovakia's 2008, December in accession eurozone of eve the On Political Developments Political claimed that Slovakia had to work “at least twice as hard” as previous as hard” as twice least “at work to had Slovakia that claimed 58

CEU eTD Collection back in government again, after Smer-SD had gained a plurality in the elections but had been had but elections onwards, the in plurality a gained had Smer-SD after again, government in back 2010 spring from package, rescue was year,SDKÚ that of summer country. the the In in Greek crisis political ongoing an precipitated the of question The crisis. euro a as larger extent same to was the rate economyto.flexible exchange Poland able like a of advantage taken have not could certainly it currency, of own its capriciousness with even forces the market from it sheltered have might stability toward predilection general country's the while counterfactual, a pose To were. sacrifices the serious how evaluate to 2014) country.(Bohle the in loans non-performing of proportion the in hike massive a to led forint the against currencies these of strengthening the Instead, currency. Hungary's become soon would euro the that assumption implicit an was there as risks, fluctuation currency of thought no with francs Swiss or euros in denominated loans mortgage cheap out taken had population the of segments large 2000s, early the in especially where, Hungary, to contrast sharp in is divisiveness of the issue, and prime minister Iveta Iveta minister prime and issue, the of divisiveness to the to due had agreement the ratified not had still which country members last the was Slovakia it. approve eurozone all proceed, to loan the for order In necessary. became funds additional year following the when continued Tension 2010) (Rettman unfair. as country Greek the of Minister Finance bailout. critical highly was (SaS), Solidarity and Freedom liberal market-oriented the partners, coalition the of One start. very the from tenure government's coalition SDKÚ the overshadowed it and election, the before Slovakia over large loomed already had loan Greek the to contributing of question The 2010) (Phillips coalition. majority a form to unable The economic sphere was not the only area where Slovakia was deeply affected by the by affected deeply was Slovakia where area only the not was sphere economic The difficult is it but respects, numerous off in paid certainly commitment Slovakia's Overall, Mikloš Mikloš also decried Slovakia's having to pay for the sins of a richer a of sins the for pay to having Slovakia's decried also 59 Radičová eventually offered to tie the vote the tie to offered eventually

CEU eTD Collection 4.5 its to threat greatest current economy, be businessexhausted. itsmay ofthethat old model isa symptom fact and it the is years few last the in growth of slowdown The level. latent the to peddle to 2014: among79-80) voters. (Haughton sentiment eurosceptic trying SNS and part, Union's the on decisions policy economic irresponsible as saw it what against railing SaS only with theme, minor fairly a was EU the campaign, the During partner. coalition a without government majority a form to able being victory,largea secured 2011a; (Pop 2011)Smer Phillips 2012, Spring in held elections the At 2011. October in passed resolution The fund. bailout the support to agreeing for exchange in elections early for promise a secure to managed instead They fail. it letting vote, the from abstained they so this, accept to than position bargaining better a in was polls, but the in leading opposition in Smer-SD, parliament. the in confidence no of vote a to package the on eurozone into a primary concern of the Union as a whole, and as the growing informal growing the as and whole, a as Union the of concern primary a the into of eurozone governance the turned has crisis the As well. as EMU Poland an by partly, be least better at had shaped, it requirement, a still is EMU of completion since – themselves politicians the from heard have we what with do to has this of Part intensified. has game political the membership, eurozone from economically benefit would they why to as reasons new persuasive particularly no saw they haven) safe a as eurozone the of mirage brief initial, states. waysfrom new member demand level ofadaptation supranational the on governance modes and structures new emerging The eurozone. troubled In the case of Poland, we can witness a lot of strategic maneuvering – while (after the (after while – maneuvering strategic of lot a witness can we Poland, of case the In the outside those including states, member EU all for matters complicated crisis The EU the at concern serious of matter a been not has trajectory country's the then, Since Conclusion 60

CEU eTD Collection previously stone-set rules is easily possible. Still, the fact that Poland has been able to able been has Poland that fact the Still, over possible. bargaining easily where is future rules a stone-set to previously lead might this that think to foolish be would It up. toughening was it when time a during precisely Commission European the of out concessions not does euro. the introduce it as long as partner junior a remain to continue will Poland but achieved, have would state member passive thoroughly a what than better certainly is occasionally meetings doing was it that markets show to part EU's the from attempts of series a in week” the of “treaty another just as off came essentially which Pact, Plus Euro the like document non-enforceable practically and voluntary a sign to allowed be to achievement greatest the quite not is it hand, one the On made. being are decisions core the where right stay to managing in successful been have politicians extent what to debatable is It adoption. euro regarding in decision-making factor Polish strong a is within from acting by representation interest effective more of tenet classic the formalized, more ever becoming is leaders eurozone of power decision-making low, and the flexibility of the EU level may just have improved marginally. However, the However, marginally. improved have just may level EU the of flexibility the and low, question kept open. the have certainconstraints with” among be “reasoned can Commission the that showing precedent a and core the of part being of rewards political enticing increasingly the insignificant, is accession of necessity economic the while even So costs. adjustment own their decrease to concessions further for hoping adoption, euro of their possibility the with engagement reserved their up kept have they level, EU the to prefrerences of some upload could they that seen have politicians As euro. the to comes it when times several level EU the at will its exercise Over the crisis period, I find that domestic propensity for accession in Poland remains Poland in accession for propensity domestic that find I period, crisis the Over rare some squeeze to managed has Poland picture: interesting very a paints this Overall, something to battle the crisis the battle to 61 may in fact act as an incentive for trying harder trying for incentive an as act fact in may . Likewise, the ability to elbow into Eurogroup into elbow to ability the Likewise, . ,

CEU eTD Collection currency. International institutions have demonstrated a modicum of influence to stop truly stop to influence of modicum a demonstrated have institutions International currency. single the of advocate an and orthodoxy of stronghold proper a being from prevented still is isnot confirmed. the hypothesis and euro-rejection, of case straightfoward simple, a of speak cannot we that clear is it latter), the from out left being of cost arisen newly the (incorporating institutions of credibility the of and outcome the outcome both of interpretation nuanced an more a take we delay.if However, and indefinite joining, for propensity low a flexibility, low still but higher slightly credibility, low of coexistence the to due confirmed is hypothesis the that find I hypthesis, the in credibility EU of interpretation envisioned originally the utilizing if Thus, Hungary. in outcome identical seemingly the from different clearly is date target specified officially an of lack Poland's same, the all but accurately, very hypothesis the by captured not is facet This Poland. incentivize to dimension new curious a developed has management, crisis inept sometimes of times during greatly suffering while level, suprnanational the of credibility that Hungary may survive despite not having the euro. having the may Hungary not that survive despite international the on claim to unorthodoxaddedthe has frompolicies fuel the many despite expected markets what afloat stay to managed has Hungary recently most that fact The all. at much changed not has currency) single the towards commitment serious of lack (a rhetoric the behind substance the but features, new are euro the toward rhetoric dismissive generally truly to ability the empower actors. domestic to extend not does this but temporarily, least at violations egregious Both Hungary and Poland are now without a specified entry date. However, as stated as However, date. entry specified a without now are Poland and Hungary Both its and Commission European the with clashes spectacular government's Fidesz The domestically, repeated: bank patterns old central some the see to continue we Hungary In 62

CEU eTD Collection the bumps on the road toward convergence could be smoothed by a more flexible EU. The EU. flexible more a by smoothed be could convergence toward road the on bumps the that suppose to reason any supplied not have Commission the with altercations government's day.Secondly,the another for problem a of status the to it relegate to able way,being either stance clear a for need no thus and agenda the on euro the of issue the place even to reason no has sustainable, less or more markets financial international on situation country's the with and alternatives policy viable present to opposition political significant no with government, Fidesz current Firstly,the decision-makers. EU-level with experiences different the by partly and considerations, domestic by partly explained be can countries two the differencebetween This opposition. in still was it when accession swift of favour in expediency) political of reasonsfor least (at been had Fidesz that consider we once curious especially idea. is the This to hospitable more them make would which circumstances any signal to buts or ands ifs no with table, the off question the taken simply have politicians Hungarian contrast, inevitable In option. almsot and viable a as discussed still is joining of possibility the but happens, what out waiting to dedicated and wary remains stance Polish The substance. in different somewhat fact, in are, strategy official from derived outcomes identical seemingly the above, One important consideration might be that while the vulnerability of the Hungarian economy Hungarian the of vulnerability the while that be might consideration important One findings. the match not does therefore hypothesis the that conclude again once must I and delay, indefinite explicit now a with contrasted is part, EU's the on flexibility low and credibility with coupled This, high. is joining for propensity domestic Hungary's that stuggests discussion. from the are euro adoption absent early by averted been have could loans currency foreign nonperforming of problem the that fact delay. an indefinite support for further lends with contend must thesuchas issues Meanwhile, Hungary force hostile a as Commission the of home, at government the by cultivated image, To sum up, the still apparent economic necessity as conceptualized by the hypothesis the by conceptualized as necessity economic apparent still the up, sum To 63

CEU eTD Collection laggards: while the benefits which accrued to the country thanks to accession were largely were accession to thanks country the to accrued which benefits the the while for laggards: tales cautionary as served also pay to had Slovakia costs economic and politicial the Still, crisis. the of course the over institutions EMU of credibility general the enhancing thus and enforcement strict bolstering EU-15), the for always not but CEECs the for case the been has (which strictly criteria convergence the enforcing of importance the to credence lent has this hand, other the On states. member old all were Cyprus, of exception the with countries, troubled the – crisis euro the during level EU the for area problem a become not did periphery Eastern The unfounded. mostly were states Socialist former the about worries belower. slightly hypothesis) may in variables the bythe (not captured the on tenuously, why reason however the on by, light shed getting may market, been bond international has it that fact the regard, this exposed highly in very country a still is Hungary while And forefront. the to channel financial the brought has crisis the included, variables the in channel trade the through surveyed mostly is goe, te pltcas o o-uooe sae ntuetlzd te hrsis fcd by faced hardships ownforjoining. their ofenthusiasm to justify lack ofthe currency common members the instrumentalized states non-eurozone of politicians the ignored, As for Slovakia, its post-accession story is an instructive one: it shows that the ECB's the that shows it one: instructive an is story post-accession its Slovakia, for As 64 de facto de domestic propensity domestic

CEU eTD Collection complacency. and policies drifting of result a more and choice deliberate a less clearly was outcome the albeit Poland, of that to closer much was outcome Hungarian the similarities, domestic many shared it which with Slovakia, of case the resembling than rather that official revealed of strategies substance the and phenomena political the of description in-depth an well, as mechanisms postulated the fit to seemed Hungary of case the While Slovakia. and Poland of countries. concerns ofthese circumstancesand specific the Secondly, favourably. institutions the with dealing in leaders their and institutions international the international of flexibility and credibility to respond to contexts and actors domestic of propensity the with combined necessity domestic Firstly, be. would outcomes factors main influencing hypothesis onwhat the upa ontheIdrew Union. Building literature, Monetary and Economic of completion the toward paths their pursued have states member 5 independence of the central bank has a significant effects on how the question is negotiated is question the how on effects significant a has bank central the of independence of level the that found have likely.Firstly,I less or more approach favourable a make which thesis stand out. ofthe added value bythe captured chosenvariables. werenot them entirely led to factorswhile which the manner, nuanced more a in regarded best were outcomes the that revealed events of study the cases, both in however, case; Hungarian the for again disconfirmed and case Polish the Conclusions First, the study has made it possible to identify certain elements of domestic contexts domestic of elements certain identify to possible it made has study the First, and findings the regarding observations related of sets two total, in work the Surveying for confirmed be to hypothesis the found I observation, under period second the During cases the in confirmed hypothesis the found I observation, under period first the During EU new which with variability the for explanations find to attempted I study this In 65

CEU eTD Collection how pre-euro-accession states come to view the accession process and the rules ofEMU. and the process the rules accession to states view come how pre-euro-accession on effects direct has and complex is institutions international by played role the that claim present. clearly been has institutions, EU and government between and opposition, and government game between ofthe political two-level strategicrole while the role, a very limited played has the forging in ideology party Meanwhile, adjustments. fundamental necessary the out carrying been for necessary conviction has rejection of experience early the case Slovakia's in foothold, a political the but process retaining forstalling tendencies bolsters existing case it Poland'sin and outcome, uncharacteristic the in large a factor has been this Hungary in While large a degree. to actors domestic of proclivities the organizations,shaped has international to regard with especially experience, transition initial the that found also I Furthermore, process. the for catalyst indispensable an be to seems government and legislature the inside groups euro-optimist possible from separate is which adoption euro to conducive culture stability the for advocate strong a of presence the that means this broadly, more Takendomestically. occur. To add to this, there is a complex interaction between these “external” factors and the and factors “external” these between interaction complex a is there this, to occur. To add does variation that shown have incidents individual as well as crisis the states, member new toward actions and advice their in inconsistencies several exhibiting and inflexible mostly staying institutions has EMU with aspects observation, under two period the the during small on been admittedly variation be that must explanation the It of limitation Europeanization. a of as acknowledged explanations choice rational in exhibited most commonly approach politics” “domestic traditional more the upon advancement thesis an the represents way, this In countries. chosen the between differences the of some explaining The mechanisms labelled credibility and flexibility have proved to be important in important be to proved have flexibility and credibility labelled mechanisms The the for evidence significant find I observations. of set second the to me leads latter The 66

CEU eTD Collection & Monetary Union.& Monetary for avenue promising a Economic of area policy the in states be member among variation behind causes the uncovering to themselves shown have description in-depth of method domestic the with interacts aspect institutional states. ofmember preferences circumstances and external the which in mechanisms precise and detailed more delineating on focus may area this in work Further leadership. area of euro clout political changing andemerged the havecrisis the mechanisms with subtle more and dimensions complex more but observation, under cases the in events pre-crisis the fit forinstance. Slovak incase, credibility the EU-level adding to indirectly actors domestic of eyes the in costs reputational of importance the with – ones “internal” Overall, the chosen theoretical background of rational choice institutionalism and the and institutionalism choice rational of background theoretical chosen the Overall, do mechanisms hypothesized simple rather the that is study the of finding important An 67

CEU eTD Collection Poland, Hungary and Slovakia during the period under thediscussion period Poland, during and Hungary Slovakia in presidents bank central and ministers finance parties, governing ministers, prime of List 6 Appendix 68

CEU eTD Collection Table 14 July 200614 July –13 13August2007 – 8June 2000 –19 22004May –11 31October 2005 31October 2005 19October 2001 31October 1997 November2011 11June 2004 – 2011–present –200614 July –8June 2000 –22004May October2001 18November 16November 16November August2007 June2004 2007–18 Dates 2007 8 : Poland: : Poland: TheFirst Cabinet TheFirst Cabinet TheFirst Cabinet CabinetofMarek CabinetofJerzy Prime MinisterPrime / ofDonald Tusk prime ministers, governing parties, finance ministers and central bank presidents ministers bank governingprime ministers, parties, andcentral finance ofMarek Belka ofJerzy Buzek TheCabinet of TheCabinet of TheCabinet of TheCabinet of Marcinkiewicz LeszekMiller DonaldTusk TheSecond TheSecond TheSecond Kaczyński Kaczyński Cabinetof Kazimierz Jarosław Jarosław Cabinet Buzek Belka PiS, SRP, PiS, AWS, UWAWS, SLD,UP, SLD,UP, PO, PSL PO, PSL PO, SLD,UP Parties SDPL AWS LPR PSL PiS PiS 6 July 2002 6July –16 19October 2001 1811 2011 –27 16June 2003 – 2013–present 69 – 6 July 2002 –6July 27November 11.06.2004- 02.05.2004- 28.08.2001- 08.06.2000- 31.10.1997- 16.11.2007- 10.09.2007- 07.09.2007- 22.09.2006- 14.07.2006- 24.06.2006- 07.01.2006- 31.10.2005- 21.07.2004- 22004May 21.07.2004 11.06.2004 19.10.2001 28.08.2001 08.06.2000 18.11.2011 16.11.2007 10.09.2007 07.09.2007 22.09.2006 14.07.2006 24.06.2006 07.01.2006 31.10.2005 June2003 112013 Dates TeresaLubińska StanisławKluza AndrzejRaczko AndrzejRaczko AndrzejRaczko Wojciechowski JarosławBauc Zyta Gilowska Zyta Gilowska Zyta Gilowska Zyta Wasilewska- MarekBelka Balcerowicz Kaczyński Kaczyński Rostowski Rostowski Szczurek Grzegorz Trenkner Jarosław Mirosław Minister Mateusz Finance Gronicki Kołodko (acting) Leszek Halina Jacek Jacek Jacek Paweł January2007 11June 2010 10January 10January 1992–2001 April2010 2001–10 2007–10 –present Dates CentralBank Gronkiewicz Balcerowicz MarekBelka President Sławomir Skrzypek Leszek -Waltz Hanna CEU eTD Collection presidents Table 2014–present 2010–2014 2009–2010 2006–2009 2004–2006 2002–2004 1998–2002 Dates 9 : Hungary: : Hungary: GordonBajnai Viktor Orbán Viktor Orbán Viktor Orbán Viktor Medgyessy Gyurcsány Gyurcsány Minister Ferenc Ferenc Prime Péter prime ministers, governing parties, finance ministers and central bank ministers bank governingprime ministers, parties,andcentral finance FIDESZ-FKgP- FIDESZ-KDNP FIDESZ-KDNP MSZP-SZDSZ MSZP-SZDSZ MSZP-SZDSZ Parties MSZP MDF 9June 2006 – –9June 2006 7March 2013 8 July 1998 8July – 31December 31December 14April 2009 14April 2009 24April 2005 272002May 292010May –4October May 2014May – –2014May –3March April2005 May 2002May 2000–26 2004–24 4October –29 May 70 present Dates 2004 2000 2013 2010 CsabaLászló MihályVarga MihályVarga MihályVarga PéterOszkó JánosVeres JánosVeres Draskovics Zsigmond Matolcsy Minister Finance György Tibor Járai 3March 2007 1March 2001 3March 2013 1March 1995 –3March –1March –1March –present Dates 2007 2013 2001 AndrásSimor CentralBank President Zsigmond Matolcsy Surányi György György Járai CEU eTD Collection 13December 1994 - 4 July 2006 4July - 8 July presidents Table 16October 2002 – 30October 1998 – 15October 2002 30October 1998 '82010 July –4 4April 2012 – 4 July 2006 4July April2012 present Dates 10 2010 : Slovakia: : Slovakia: Mikuláš DzurindaMikuláš DzurindaMikuláš Prime MinisterPrime VladimírMečiar Iveta Radicová Iveta prime ministers, governing parties, finance ministers and central bank ministers bank governingprime ministers, parties,andcentral finance RobertFico RobertFico SDKÚ–– SMK HZDS–ZRS – SaS –SaSMOST- SDK–SDĽ – SMK –SOP SMK SMER-SD– KDH–ANO SDKÚ-DS– SNS–RSS SMER-SD replaced by HÍD–KDH SNS–ĽS- (SDKlater Parties SDKÚ) HZDS 71 4April2012 – 8 July 2010 8July – 2006 4July – October2002 January2002 2002 –4July October1998 1994–1998 4April 2012 8 July 2010 8July 29January 30October 16October 14January 2002–15 1998–29 1998–30 present Dates 2006 Schmögnero Ivan MiklošIvan Ivan MiklošIvan František Počiatek Hajnovič Minister Miroslav Finance Kažimír Maxon Brigita Kozlík Sergej Peter Ján vá 01.01.2005– 29.07.1999– 29.07.1993– 11.01.2010– 11.01.2010 31.12.2004 28.07.1999 present Dates Ivan SramkoIvan President Vladimír Makúch Central Marián Masár Jusko Jozef Jozef Bank CEU eTD Collection un i oiia cec n h td f Erpa nerto. integration.” European of study the and ResearchPolitical science political in turn institutionalist The tables: seperate menu, “Same (2000). G. Schneider, & D., M. Aspinwall, at: divide.” size 2009-0 N° the travail de Document Po, Sciences of study empirical an zone: the of euro economy political the and performance economic size, “Country (2009). O. Alouini, Studies Europe.” Eastern and Central in states member EU new in euro the for support individual Explaining identities? Goerres, or & (2011).S., politics A. M. “Economics, Allam, « Planck M currency.” single the toward An countries: attitudes post-communist the in of euro analysis the “Adopting (2008). A. Goerres, & S., M. Allam, 7 « change.” central parity: case ofPoland.” The II ERM the towards forward “Looking (2005). A. Czyżewski, & A., Czogała, J., Borowski, Poland’s in ERMII.” participation & M., Szpunar,Borowski, Brzoza-Brzezina, J., P. (2003). banks, Estonia”, Foreignand Hungary finance: in welfare transnational of EconomyInternational Political privatization meets the housing and lending, “Post-socialist mortgage (2014) D. Bohle, countries.” acceding Ben, and Eastern Central some affectingshocks and EMU Europe: “Analysis of (2009). N. A. Börzel, T. A., & Risse, T. (2000). “When Europe hits home: Europeanization and domestic and Europeanization home: hits Europe “When (2000). T. Risse, & T. A., Börzel, ek, M 21) Hw Pln’ U Mmesi epd Tasom is Eooy ,” Economy its Transform Helped Membership EU Poland’s 88,Group Paper No. Occasional of30, Washington C.,pp.1-73. D. “How (2013). M. Belka, 72. Warsaw: ofHigher Education, 2012. Publisher Univerity -Ministry WWZ In EMU,” the Join to Poland for Prospects The Perspectives. Eurozone “The (2012). M. Belka, 165. The 2008–2010: Crisis Economic the ,” Regimes Rate Exchange During Diverse of Influence Slovakia and “Poland (2012). K. Bandasz,

www.mpifg.de/pu/mpifg_dp/dp08-1.pdf http:// European Integration in the New Global and Regional Setting Regional and Global New the in Integration European « http://www.ofce.sciences-po.fr/pdf/dtravail/WP2009-01.pdf References -

eiop.or.at/eiop/pdf/2000-015.pdf , nttt fr Gesellschaftsforschung,Köln. für Institut 63 uoen Itgain oln aes (EIoP) Papers online Integration European (8), 1399-1424. , 38 Panoeconomicus (1), 1-36. , 21(4):913–48. Bank i Kredyt/BankBank andCredit Économie internationale Économie , 56 » (Accessed: 26 (Accessed: April 2014) » (1), 21-38. (Accessed:2014) 2June 1 ,Collection OFCE/ANR, ,Collection 1 72 Society and Economy and Society Centre de recherche en économie de économie en recherche de Centre p -7 vial at: Available 1-27. pp. 4, 1, p. 11. vial at: Available 1-13. pp. 15, (4), , “ IGDsuso ae 81 08/1, Paper Discussion PIfG Exchange rate regimes and regimes rate Exchange , (2),9-31. »

, ed.: E. Latoszek et al., 67- al., et Latoszek E. ed.: , , 34( (Accessed: 30 May 2014) 30May (Accessed: 1) 35 (2013) 2, pp. 141– pp. 2, (2013) 35 uoen Junl of Journal European n°7 , 1-31. 1-31. Available, n°7 , 1-24. Europe-Asia Review of Review Max

-

CEU eTD Collection Csaba, L. (2011). 427. Case ofHungary.” Csaba, L. (2007). 2010, 2010/C 83. the Union(TFEU), European oftheConsolidated versions Treaty Unionand the onEuropean Treaty onthe of Functioning Affairs Monetary toUnion.” ontheEconomicNeighbors and Path J.Carroll, (2011). M. agendas. 791. Union?” the Monetary European De Grauwe, P. & G. Schnabl (2004). “EMU Entry Strategies for the New Member States,” Member New the for Strategies Entry “EMU (2004). Schnabl G. P.& Grauwe, De 32 criteria.” entry area euro reforming for case “The (2010). Z. Darvas, Poland. and Hungary Republic, University of Victoria) Czech the of Cases The Europe: (2012). Dandashly, A. Ekonomika/Economics Czaja, J., & J., Dulkys, Czaja, and Poland: ofLithuania Euroization (2012).“The A. A Comparison.” Bulmer, in Europeanization.” (2007).“Theorizing S. F.Breuss, &P. & Fink, G. Haiss, States for theMember prepared New are well (2004).“How Csaba, L. (2013). “Growth, Crisis Management and the EU: The Hungarian Trilemma,” Hungarian The EU: the and Südosteuropa Mitteilungen Management Crisis “Growth, (2013). L. Csaba, ofEurope East-Central the Institute Errors?” of Comedy A Crisis: Eurozone the and “Hungary (2012b). L. Csaba, 73-90. et al., Warsaw: ofHigher Education, 2012. Publisher -Ministry University WWZ Through?” (2012a). L. Csaba, onre, ree okn ae, N. 21/2 -8 vial at: Available 1-38. 2011/02, No. Paper, 2014) May CESEE Working of countries/file/1402-the-fiscal-and-monetary-institutions-of-cesee-countries/ institutions monetary and Bruegel « fiscal “The (2011). V. countries,” Kostyleva, & Z. Darvas, http://www.bruegel.org/download/parent/494-the-fiscal-and-monetary-institutions-of-cesee- (2), 195-219. – Volume 8,Spring 2011 ,pp.65-82. Eds.: P. M. Graziano & P. Vink, Macmillan. Palgrave pp.46-58.Basingstoke: In European andRegionalSetting New Global in Integration the “ “ And the first shall be the first shalllast.” the be And Zeitschrift fürStaats- undEuropawissenschaftenZeitschrift Constitutionalism, Economic Constitutionalism, Economic Transformation and Europeanisation: The “Perspectives for the Euro-Zone: Consolidation, Collapse or Muddling or Collapse Consolidation, Euro-Zone: the for “Perspectives “ , Slovakia and the Euro: How Slovakia has Out-paced its HowOut-paced has Euro: Slovakia and the Slovakia Visegrad Domestic Politics Comes First—Euro Adoption Strategies in Central in Strategies Adoption First—Euro Comes Politics Domestic 91 (3), pp.27–55. 03-04/2013, 154-169. 03-04/2013, Official Journal of the European Journal of the Official Union Journal of Policy Modeling Journal 10,no.5(2012): 33-44. 73 Hungarian StudiesHungarian Europeanization: research New The Michigan Journal of Public Journal of The Michigan , Elsevier, vol. 26(7),pp.769- 5, no. 3-4 (2007): 408- 5,no.3-4(2007): , v.25.no.2., pp235-248. (Doctoral Dissertation, (Doctoral , Volume 53,30March Society and Economy and Society » , ed.: E. Latoszek , ed.: Acse 30 (Accessed Yearbook of Yearbook ,

CEU eTD Collection 5/2005_06_23_dkp_20.pdf « at: Available Centre. Research Bundesbank, EuropeanDeutsche 2005,20, Studies east Economic Paper 1: Discussion and Series model.” factor central structural a are from Evidence synchronized area? euro “How the with (2005). economies J. Breitung, & S. Eickmeier, ModelingJournal of Policy failure.” Monetaryfiscal ECB: success, euro and the the Eichengreen, B.(2005).“Europe, convergence.”clustered and Europeanization paradoxical Europe: east-central in entry area “Euro (2007). K. Dyson, Failed?” Berger, Haan,J., De and Pact –J.theGrowth has &D. Stability H. Jansen, (2004).“Why Intereconomics 220096 2008. Available at: 9 July .” EurActiv background euroofscandal toagainst (2008).“Slovakia join EurActiv 2014) (Accesssed: 30May « EurActiv, euro plan,” (2006).“Hungaryreleases EurActiv 23 2006. August Available at:

Central and Eastern Europe,” Europe,” andCentral Eastern (2010). J. Johnson, R. & A. Epstein, 2014) (Accesssed: 22May 2007. Economist, 27September Available at: Bank: theCentral (2007)“FranceEuropean and The Economist transformation inEurope East Central (2006). (ed.) K. Dyson, contingency.” and diversity convergence, Europeanization: CommonJCMS: JournalMarket of Studies as “EMU (2000). K. Dyson, vial t « at: Available 2010. July 14 EurActiv ,” fund aid EU on off sign to ready not “Slovakia (2010b). EurActiv « (Accessed: 2014) 30May at: Available 2010. EurActiv,February ,” 3 plan convergence euro adopt to set “Poland (2010a). EurActiv « 22164 at: Available 14 EurActiv ,” crisis 2009. April in nation a over takes PM new “Hungary's (2009). EurActiv http://www.bundesbank.de/Redaktion/EN/Downloads/Publications/Discussion_Paper_1/200 http://www.euractiv.com/enlargement/hungary-releases-euro-plan/article-157190

9 » (Accesssed: 30 May 2014) » (Accesssed:30May » (Accessed:2014) 30May International Finance International , 39(5),September/October, pp.241-247. http://www.euractiv.com/euro-finance/slovakia-ready-sign-eu-aid-fund-news- http://www.euractiv.com/euro/poland-set-to-adopt-euro-convergence-plan « www.euractiv.com/euro-finance/hungarys-new-pm-takes-nation-cri-news- www.euractiv.com/euro-finance/slovakia-join-euro-background-sc-news- West European Politics Enlarging the Euro area: external empowerment and domestic and empowerment external area: Euro the Enlarging

27(2005)427–439. » (Accessed: 2June2014) (Accessed: JCMS: , Vol. 2,pp.235-:260. 7,No. “Uneven Integration: Economic and Monetary Union in Union Monetary and Economic Integration: “Uneven Journal ofStudies Common Market Journal . New York University and Oxford:Oxford Press. , 38 74 « (4), 645-666. http://www.economist.com/node/9867011 30(3): 417–42. Faulty Sarkonomics.” The 48:5: 1235-1258. 48:5: » » »

CEU eTD Collection « Bank Central (ECB) (2008).ConvergenceEuropean 2008. May Report Available at: « Bank Central (ECB) (2006).ConvergenceEuropean 2006. December Report Available at: « Bank Central (ECB) (2004).ConvergenceEuropean 2004. Report Available at: « at: join-euro-wants-entry-own-terms-302112 Available 2014. 14 EurActiv, May terms,” own on entry wants euro, join to rush no in “Poland (2014). EurActiv 27 EurActiv 2015,” setting-ta-news-518082 to decision membership « at: euro Available2013. February postpones “Poland (2013). EurActiv 2014) and-hungary-odds-pension-reform-ahead-eu-summit-news-500565 summit,” « EU at: of Available ahead 2010. reform December pension 14 EurActiv, over odds at Hungary “Poland, (2010c). EurActiv uoen Cnrl Bn EB 21) ovrec eot My 21. Aalbe at: Available 2012. May Report Convergence (2012). « (ECB) Bank Central European « 2011. news-503861 at: April 7 EurActiv opt-out,” eurozone to Available closer moves “Hungary (2011). EurActiv 496289 3 vial nie online: Europe Central East in transformation domestic and empowerment external area: Euro the “ (2006). B. Greskovits, June 2014) 02-12/hungary-registers-dollar-notes-after-21-month-eurobond-gap-1-.html Available at: Available 2013. February 13 Bloomberg, Replacing IMF” Sale Bond in Billion $3.25 Raises “Hungary (2013). S. Gokoluk, & Gergely, A. 2014) group.de/ifoHome/publications/docbase/details.html?docId=19087966 63. before “Slovakia: (2013). Wörgötter, A. & J. Fidrmuc, endogenous of integration.” regional explanation rationalist-institutionalist “A (2005). A. Héritier, & H., Farrell, 2014) https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/convergence/html/index.en.html https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/convergence/html/index.en.html https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/convergence/html/index.en.html https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/convergence/html/index.en.html the the » (Accessed:2014) 30May Crisis » (Accessed: 30 May 2014) 30May » (Accessed: for a a for http://www.euractiv.com/euro-finance/hungary-gets-closer-eurozone-opt- Journal of EuropeanJournal PublicPolicy Small Catching Small » (Accessed:2014) 30May The First Shall Be the Last? Hungary's Road to EMU.” to Road Hungary's Last? the Be Shall First The http://www.euractiv.com/sections/euro-finance/poland-no-rush- http://www.euractiv.com/euro-finance/poland-postpones-2015- - up Economy, up » (Accessed: 30 May 2014) 30May » (Accessed: 75 http://www.euractiv.com/euro-finance/poland- The The « ” CESifo Forum 1/2013 (March) pp. 57- pp. (March) 1/2013 Forum CESifo http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013- Consequences , 12 (2), 273-290. » (Accesssed: 30 May 2014) » (Accesssed:30May » (Accesssed: 30 May 2014) » (Accesssed:30May 2014) » (Accesssed:30May Acssd 0 May 30 (Accesssed: » Acse: 3 May 30 (Accessed: » of of » Joining « Acse June 2 (Accessed https://www.cesifo- »

Acse 9 (Accessed the the In In Enlarging Euro Aea ,

CEU eTD Collection Politics in” Politics Slovakia, Membership onParty Haughton, T. Rybář, & (2009).“A M. Tool in the Toolbox: ofEU Assessing the Impact « at: Europe, Studies and Central Eastern European Working Paper Series 68,pp.1-41. Available Choices forEurope.” EUMemberExplaining States' New Haughton, T. (2010).“ Oxford Press. University Euro Ten. at Europeanization, Power, andConvergence B.(2008).“ Greskovits, Johnson, (2006). J. union,” for monetary way the paved Commission European the how Market: the of name the “In (1999). N. Jabko, 793-816, October 2004. states,” member new the to for path optimal EMU the on essay an again: road the “On (2004). S., G. Tavlas, & E. Hochreiter, lvk Rpbis rgn: Cret Eet n Hsoia esetv. Vl . ise 11. issue 2. Vol. Perspective. Historical in Events Current Origins: and Republics” Czech the Slovak of Paths Diverging The 'European:' “Becoming (2009). A. D. III, Hempson the and EU The Politics: of Market Studies Motors Europe.” the Eastern and Central and in Politics Party of Margins Development “Money, (2014). T. Haughton, Republic's Czech The Necessity? Choices forEurope.” for or Pleasure for Business, “For (2009). T. Haughton, studiesPolitical institutionalisms.” new three the and and science “Political (1996). C. Hungary Taylor,R. & P. A., Hall, in cycles reform trust: without change Slovakia.” “Structural (2009). D. Győrffy, ed.: Dyson, K. 178-196.New York Press. University and Oxford:Oxford Status and Approach Towards Euro.” the Legal Their Euro Area: the Outside States Member Union “European (2013). E. Indruchová, Policy of 53-62. Need the and Eurozone the in Coordination,” Evolution Debt „Public (2010). A. Hrebenciuc, and-slovak-republics online: Available http://aei.pitt.edu/14473/1/CEE_WP_68.pdf , 25:4, 540-563 , 25:4, Acta oeconomicaActa , Theoretical and Applied Economics Applied and Theoretical , 52 44 (1), 71-87. “Two-Track Diffusion Embeddedness: Bank and Central The of Politics « (5), 936-957. » http://origins.osu.edu/article/becoming-european-diverging-paths-czech- Journal of European PublicPolicy Europe-Asia Studies (Accessed: 28 (Accessed: April 2014) Vulnerabilities, Presidency Role: and the Hangovers Accession Hungary and Slovakia: ComplianceDiscontentsHungary andits andSlovakia: , 59 (2), 147-177. Journal of Policy Modeling Policy of Journal The Lawyer Quarterly The Lawyer , 61 Journal ofStudies Communist andTransitionJournal 76 (8), 1371-1392. » (Accesssed: 30 May 2014) 30May » (Accesssed: , Volume XVII (2010), No. 8(549), pp. 8(549), No. (2010), XVII Volume , , ed.: Dyson, K. 274-292.Oxford: 6:3 September 1999: 475–95. 6:3 1999: September Harvard University CenterHarvard University for , 3 , Elsevier, vol. 26(7), pages 26(7), vol. Elsevier, , JCMS: Journal of Common of Journal JCMS: (3), 225–234. .” In .” The

CEU eTD Collection ai . mm, D 21) erhn o oiia icl Cce n Hungary. in Cycles Fiscal Political for Searching (2013). D. Imami, EconomicsContemporary & E., Lami, Enlargement.” & S., Kropienė, Dulkys, R.,Kropas, Problem (2008).“The of A. EuroAsymmetry in Area issues.” monetary P.,Kowalski, Kowalski, T., & Wihlborg, C.(2007).“Poland. strategy the The entry vs. EMU « Science Association, Toronto, 3-6,2009.1-32. September ON, Canada, Available at: States.” Kostadinova, P. (Non) Puzzle Currency (2009).“The ofSingle Adoption New in the Member 2006. EUobserver, goal to to2009euro.” entry stick Kirk, L. pledges (2006).“Slovakia 7 August Economy Euro Republic,” Adoption Czech in and Hungary the parties in Poland.” in Poland.” parties Markowski, R.,& Tucker, J. emergence and the (2010).“Euroscepticism A. ofpolitical 2008. Available « at: December 30 EUobserver ,” 16th on takes eurozone on, years Ten “ (2008b). L. Kubosova, 429-444. politics. comparative and relations international J.,Jupille, Caporaso,J. & Union: beyond European (1999).Institutionalismand the A. euro the of enlargement faltering the zone,” conditionality: of remains “The (2008). J. Johnson, Domestic Politics in the Forefront,” in Politics the Domestic ofFit: Beyond the Goodness &Mastenbroek, Kaeding,(2006).“Europeanization M. E., at: Available 1-26. pp. current Paper, the Discussion on discourse Affairs Public Polish too' « of it Institute eat ,” and crisis cake Eurozone its “'Have (2012). O. Markiewicz, Explaining Variation European in the Union Leuffen, & D. B.Rittberger & F. ( Schimmelfennig at: global-financial-crisis-21st-century-part-ii-june-december-2008 Available Research. Policy Economic II Part Century 21st the of Crisis Financial P. (2008 Lane, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1450198

http:// Available « at: Journal of European PublicPolicy

pasos.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/223031181.pdf Paper prepared for presentation at the 2009 forpresentationat Paper prepared oftheAnnual Meeting PoliticalAmerican 13:3 (2006),361-386. 13:3 ). “Iceland: The future is in the EU.” 6 November 2008. In: In: 2008. November 6 EU.” the in is future The “Iceland: ). Lithuanian Lithuanian 2007 Review Strategic Annual Poznan University of EconomicsPoznan University Review Party Politics http://euobserver.com/economic/22213 http://euobserver.com/economic/27328 , 7 (4), 73-98. , 16 Comparative EuropeanComparative Politics (4), 523-548. 15:6 September 2008: 826–841. 15:6 2008: September . Basingstoke et al: Palgrave Macmillan. Palgrave al: . Basingstoke et . A VoxEU.org Publication. London: Centre for Centre London: VoxEU.org A Publication. . 77 « http://www.voxeu.org/epubs/cepr-reports/first- Annual Review of Science Political Annual Review 2012 Review of International Political of InternationalPolitical Review ). , vol. 6. Differentiated Integration: , » (Accesssed: 30 May 2014) 30May » (Accesssed: » (Accessed:2014) 30May 7 (2), 59-88. » » (Accessed: 30 May 2014) 30May (Accessed: (Accessed: 2June2014) (Accessed: » pp.125-152 (Accessed: 2June2014) (Accessed: , 4 (4), 331-354. The First Global First The , 2 (1),

CEU eTD Collection Politics in politics.” EU and choice “Rational (2007). A. M. Pollack, On Countries PolicyofSeven CESEE Petreski, (2013).“Monetary Conduct M. Road Their at: at: “ Rettman, (2009) A. webpapers on Constitutionalism and Governance beyond the State, pp. 1-25. Available 1-25. pp. State, the beyond Governance and Constitutionalism – conWEB on Integration,” webpapers European and Institutionalisms New “The (2008). M.A. Pollack, polity, in governance? new orexperiment M. (2005). Pollack, A. at: Available other issues.” fund,” bail-out enlargement: EU euro zone Polański, and the Z. (2004).“Poland Monetary policy, ERMII,and on deal reach parties “Slovak « (2011) L. Phillips, 2010. Available « at: June EUobserver,14 Slovakia” in over take to set coalition “Centre-right (2010). L. Phillips, Euro.”to the EconomyPolitical and Republic Slovakia.” the Czech politics ofEuroin adoption Pechova, integration: framework inofEuropean discourses the A. (2012).“Legitimising The Messina to Maastricht Moravcsik, (1998). A. areas?” F.Mongelli, P. currency us ofoptimum the telling properties about isEMU (2005).“What nie 2010. Available at: 12 August EUobserver, u-turn,” Greek over Slovakia rebukes “Brussels (2010). A. Rettman, minister,.” Polish says « response, at: (Accessed: 2014) 30May Available euro-crisis 2011. in December 'mistakes' 20 made EUobserver, “EU (2011b). V. Pop, 2014) at: Available2011. November “ (2011a) V. Pop, (Accessed: 28 April 2014) hamburg.de/fileadmin/sowi/politik/governance/ConWeb_Papers/conweb1-2008.pdf online: http://euobserver.com/economic/113919 « http://euobserver.com/tickers/108836 , eds.: , eds.: JCMS: Journal of CommonJCMS: JournalMarket of Studies Comparative Economic Studies Economic Comparative Jørgensen, al., E. K. et Atlantic Economic Journal Economic Atlantic , lvk gvrmn olpe vr er-alu ud Ubevr 12 EUobserver, fund” euro-bailout over collapses government Slovak « 19 http://euobserver.com/political/30280 http://euobserver.com/economic/30610 Poland to join ERM2 in May,” EUobserver 23 February 2009. 2009. May,” February Availablein 23 ERM2 EUobserver join to Poland (5), 779-807. . Ithaca: Cornell University Press. University . Ithaca:Cornell The Choice ForEurope:The Choice &Power Purpose From State Social “ Theorizing the European Union: international organization, domestic organization, international Union: European the Theorizing « http://euobserver.com/economic/113895 pp. 31-55.New York: Sage , » (Accessed: 30 May 2014) 30May » (Accessed: » (Accessed:2014) 2June ” 32

Annual Review of Science Political Annual Review (4), 280-292. , vol.55 no.1,pp.1-41. , vol.55 78 (2005), Vol 43(3)pp.607-635. http://euobserver.com/economic/114693 » (Accessed:2014) 2June » (Accessed:2014) 2June Handbook of European Union European of Handbook Review of International Review of .

« https://www.wiso.uni- » » (Accessed: 2 June 2 (Accessed: , 8 , 357-398. »

»

CEU eTD Collection « and6/2011.in Economics Business University in Mendel Brno.pp.1-12. Available at: an CandidateCountries: Member and Alternative Approach.” MENDELU Working Papers Rozmahel, P., N. & Najman, (2011). European ReformJanuary2009.pp. 1-8. European Essays, Available at: Tilford, S. Schmitter, P. C. (2003): “Neo-neo-functionalism,” in Wiener & Diez, Diez, & Wiener in “Neo-neo-functionalism,” (2003): P.C. Schmitter, Europe,” rule Eastern and EU policypublic Central conditionality: of countries by candidate “Governance the to (2004). transfer U. Sedelmeier, & F., Schimmelfennig, 47-80. Union.” European the of Enlargement Eastern the and Action, Rhetorical Norms, Liberal Trap: Community “The (2001). F. Schimmelfennig, October 29 EUobserver, 2008. plan,” Available « at: entry euro step-by-step adopts “Poland (2008). P. Runner, Public Policy Identity,” European and National between Euro “The T.(2003). Risse, sufficient Euro?” ofthe for an adoption States Member New in convergence economic “Is (2008). J. M. Rinaldi-Larribe, 2014) 19 EUobserver, summits,” « eurozone-only at: Available 2012. on January attack renews “Poland (2012). A. Rettman, 2014) May « 2011. Availableat: July 3 EUobserver, join,'” to safe it's 'if worry amid meeting eurozone in part takes “Poland (2011). Rettman, A. ed.: Dyson, K. 197-214.New York Press. University and Oxford: Oxford Europe Central East in transformation domestic and empowerment external area: Euro the (2006). R. Zubek, (Accessed: 2014) 2June « pp23–38. University Press, Institutions Political K.A. Shepsle, states,” candidate and member new reviews in European in governance “Europeanisation (2011). U. Sedelmeier, Theory. http://vyzc.pef.mendelu.cz/cz/publ/papers http://www.cer.org.uk/publications/archive/essay/2009/euro-ten-its-future-secure (1 st (2009). “The euro at ten: Is its future secure?” London, UK: For its London, Centre Is future ten: secure?” euro at (2009). “The ed.) Oxford: Oxford University ed.) Oxford:Oxford Press. , , Volume 10,Number4, 2003 August 11 20) “ainl Coc ntttoaim” i in Institutionalism,” Choice “Rational (2006) (4), 661-679. “Poland: unbalanced domestic leadership in negotiating fit.” fit.” negotiating in leadership domestic unbalanced “Poland: . Eds.: Eds.: . http://euobserver.com/economic/27010 R.A.W. Binder,S.A. Rhodes, B.A. and European Comparative Economics Journal of http://euobserver.com/economic/114945 , 6 (1), 5-52. “ Business Cycle Similarity Measuring in the Eurozone Business Measuringin Similarity Cycle http://euobserver.com/pl2011/32581 »

(Accessed: 2014) 2June 79 10(4) International Organization International , pp.487-505 » (Accessed:2014) 30May h xod Hnbo of Handbook Oxford The Rockman. Oxford: Oxford Oxford: Rockman. » (Accessed: 30 May 30 (Accessed: » European Integration European Journal of European of Journal Journal of European of Journal , 5 » (Accessed: 30 (Accessed: » (2), 269–290. 55(1), 2001: 55(1), In In »

Enlarging Living ,

CEU eTD Collection University Press. Convergence and Power, Europeanization, Ten: “ (2008). R. Zubek, oad rmpcste osm-emnn usdr”outsider?” semi-permanent to pacesetter from Poland: 80 , ed.: K. Dyson K. ed.: , 292-306. Oxford: Oxford Oxford: 292-306. nIn The Euro at Euro The