Animal Welfare Involves the Some of This Ground Has Already Been Broken by Griffin Subjective Feelings of Animals
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BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (1990) 13, 1-61 Printed in the United States of America Marian Stamp Dawkins University of Oxford, Animal Behaviour Research Group, Department of Zoology, Oxford 0X1 3PS, England Electronic mail: [email protected] Abstracts To study animal welfare empirically we need an objective basis for deciding when an animal is suffering. Suffering includes a wide range of unpleasant emotional states such as fear, boredom, pain, and hunger. Suffering has evolved as a mechanism for avoiding sources of danger and threats to fitness. Captive animals often suffer in situations in which they are prevented from doing something that they are highly motivated to do. The "price" an animal is prepared to pay to attain or to escape a situation is an index of how the animal "feels" about that situation. Withholding conditions or commodities for which an animal shows "inelastic demand" (i.e., for which it continues to work despite increasing costs) is very likely to cause suffering. In designing environments for animals in zoos, farms, and laboratories, priority should be given to features for which animals show inelastic demand. The care of animals can thereby be based on an objective, animal-centered assessment of their needs. Keywords; animal care; animal welfare; behavioural ecology; consumer demand theory; emotion; ethics; experimental analysis of behaviour; mental states; motivation; operant conditioning 1. introduction animals but because the study of subjective feelings is properly part of biology. Let us not mince words: Animal welfare involves the Some of this ground has already been broken by Griffin subjective feelings of animals. The growing concern for (1981). It has recently become permissible to talk about animals in laboratories, farms, and zoos is not just concern animals having "thoughts" or forming concepts (Terrace about their physical health, important though that is. Nor 1987; Walker 1983). What we need now is to come to is it just to ensure that animals function properly, like grips with the wide range of unpleasant emotional states well-maintained machines, desirable though that may be. we call "suffering" (fear, loneliness, thirst) and the more Rather, it is a concern that some of the ways in which pleasant ones we call contentment or well-being. The humans treat other animals cause mental suffering and reason is that almost all arguments about the treatment of that these animals may experience "pain," "boredom," animals focus on the issue of suffering and the experience "frustration," "hunger," and other unpleasant states per- of pain. [See also Rachlin: "Pain and Behavior" BBS 811, haps not totally unlike those we experience. 1985.] Singer (1976; see accompanying Precommentary), This would appear to put scientists in a dilemma. If we for example, argues that the capacity to suffer and to feel insist that such subjective language has no place in sci- pain is central to the question of what is moral and what is ence and that the mental states of nonhuman animals not. He believes that this capacity is shared by humans cannot be studied empirically, then we opt out of all and nonhuman animals and that consequently "spe- debates about animal welfare, leaving the formulation of ciesism" (discrimination against other species, Ryder laws and regulations concerning the treatment of animals 1975) is as reprehensible as sexism or racism. The idea to those (often nonscientists) who may have no such that animals are morally the equals of humans and have scruples. On the other hand, if we feel that laws and "rights" comparable to those of humans is based on a regulations should be based on scientific knowledge belief in an equal capacity to suffer as well as on a belief about the animals (Dawkins 1980), we may feel we have a that both have other similar attributes that influence duty to step into these muddy waters and say what we subjective experience (Rollin 1981). Regan (1984; 1985) can, even if we then risk being called unscientific. The advocates the total abolition of the use of animals in purpose of this target article is to argue that we do not, in research, commercial agriculture, and hunting for sport fact, have to choose between scientific respectability and (see further discussions by Clark 1977; M. W. Fox 1986; practical considerations. A middle way is possible. We Frey 1980; Midgley 1983). can acknowledge the genuine difficulty of ascertaining Even those whose views are less extreme and who see what a nonhuman animal feels and yet attempt to attain a humans as more important than nonhuman animals scientific understanding of its feelings. Indeed, we should nevertheless think that animals deserve care and consid- do so not only because we will thus promote the welfare of eration. It is not essential to believe that animals have © 1990 Cambridge University Press 0140-525X190 $5.00+.00 Dawkins: Animal welfare rights comparable to those of humans to conclude that ment (Archer 1979; Broom 1986; Cabanac 1979). Only animals should not suffer unnecessarily (Cohen 1986; M. when they are prolonged or acute should these states be A. Fox 1986). Countries in many parts of the world have termed "suffering." A mild itch may be unpleasant, but it established, or are currently revising, legislation relating can hardly be said to cause suffering; itching so severe to the way animals should be treated in farms, zoos, and that it prevents someone from sleeping or working research institutions. Academic bodies have published amounts to suffering. guidelines for the use of animals in research (e.g., Animal Why coping mechanisms are accompanied by subjec- Behavior Society/Association for the Study of Animal tive feelings (in other words, why pain hurts, why hunger Behaviour 1986) and ethical issues regarding the use of is unpleasant) is not understood (Humphrey 1983; Wall animals have been openly debated in academic journals 1974). Nor is it clear whether subjective feelings play a (Bowd 1980; Burghardt & Herzog 1980; Gallup & Suarez causal role in these mechanisms or are epiphenomenal 1980; Huntingford 1984). Experiments on animals have (see discussions by Churchland 1986; Libet 1985). How- recently been defended (Miller 1985; Paton 1984) and ever, subjective feelings can be assumed to have evolved attacked (Sharpe 1987) with renewed vehemence. The because they help animals (or are inseparably linked to moral basis of experimenting on animals is now being something that helps animals) to avoid death or failure to questioned and analysed (Bateson 1986) and where possi- reproduce. ble, alternatives to the use of animals are being sought This means that both captive and wild animals can (Gallup & Suarez 1985). suffer (Dawkins 1980). Shortages of food and water occur None of this would be happening if many people did even in the wild, with the result that normal foraging not believe that animals are in an important way different behaviour fails to yield enough to eat or drink. Some from inanimate objects such as national monuments or animals are captured by predators despite their efforts to religious relics, entities that also receive protection. They escape and they probably suffer in the process. But in are different because of their assumed capacity to feel, to captivity, which is a restricted environment, there is experience subjectively. Many now agree that when an more likelihood that the animal will be prevented from animal "suffers," it experiences unpleasant states and that taking the usual steps to remove itself from danger or they matter to it (Baxter 1983a; 1983b; Dawkins 1987; van correct other aversive conditions. Rooijen 1984; Zayan & Duncan 1987). Suffering occurs when unpleasant subjective feelings The growing interest in the ethical issues surrounding are acute or continue for a long time because the animal is animal welfare thus forces us to consider the subjective unable to carry out the actions that would normally feelings of animals and how we might best study them. reduce risks to life and reproduction in those circum- Many attempts have already been made to define the stances. signs of well-being and suffering in animals (Banks 1982; McNamara and Houston (1986) (see also Houston & Barnett et al. 1985; Broom 1986; Brown 1981; Craig & McNamara 1988; Mangel & Clark 1986) put forward a Adams 1984; Dantzer et al. 1983; Duncan 1974; Ewbank framework relating an animal's behaviour to risks to its 1985; Hill 1983; Kilgour 1985; McBride & Craig 1985; fittiess. They argue that, at any given time, an animal Morton & Griffiths 1985; Smidt 1983; van Putten 1981; should perform that behaviour which, if not performed, Tschanz 1982), using the criteria of the animal's physical would lead to the greatest risk to survival and reproduc- health or changes in its physiology and behaviour. In this tion, behaviour they refer to as having the highest "can- article I will concentrate on behavioural measures of onical cost." They argue that animals are sensitive to the ensuring welfare and will draw together work from ap- canonical costs of different courses of action and choose plied ethology, psychology, and behavioural ecology. the one that most minimizes cost. The aim throughout will be to attempt to understand how The assumption that suffering occurs when animals are much of what happens to animals actually matters to the- prevented from performing behaviour with high can- animals themselves. The animals' point of view cannot be onical costs might lead to the conclusion that canonical considered in isolation from long-term health interests costs (risks to fitness) are directly related to suffering. In (any more than a child's view about going to the dentist one respect this conclusion is correct. A clear sign that an can be). However, I shall argue that the animals' view- animal's fitness is threatened is that its physical or psycho- point should be an essential ingredient in all animal logical health or its ability to reproduce are diminished.