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Instituto Juan March Juan March Institute Instituto Juan March Centro de Estudios Avanzados en Ciencias Sociales (CEACS) Juan March Institute Center for Advanced Study in the Social Sciences (CEACS) Crisis of parties and change of party system in Italy Author(s): Morlino, Leonardo, 1947- Date 1996 Type Working Paper Series Estudios = Working papers / Instituto Juan March de Estudios e Investigaciones, Centro de Estudios Avanzados en Ciencias Sociales 1996/77 City: Madrid Publisher: Centro de Estudios Avanzados en Ciencias Sociales Your use of the CEACS Repository indicates your acceptance of individual author and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any document(s) only for academic research and teaching purposes. CRISIS OF PARTIES AND CHANGE OF PARTY SYSTEM IN ITALY Leonardo Morlino Estudio/Working Paper 1996/77 March 1996 Leonardo Morlino is professor of Political Science of the Facoltà di Scienze Politiche, University of Florence (Italy). He was Visiting Professor (Fall Semester 1995) at the Center for Advanced Study in the Social Sciences of the Juan March Institute. This paper is based partly on a seminar entitled "Is There a Crisis of Democracy in Southern Europe?" presented at the Center on November 16, 1995. Abstract In the early 1990s, Italian democracy has entered a phase of far-reaching changes, particularly of parties and party system. This article proposes an assessment of what has changed, and why, with specific reference to the most basic features of parties (electoral performance, name, symbol, splits, alliances) from a systemic perspective. In addition, it analyses the depth of change, the party organization, the emergence of new models of parties and the turnover of parliamentary leadership. Finally, the impact of party crisis and change on the party system is evaluated and the degree of change of the same party system assessed. The concluding remarks will suggest how the change of the party system is related to the wider crisis of Italian democracy over the recent period, and the possible choices of the leaders as regards the future party system. - ¡Error!Marcador no definido. - Half a century after its reestablishment (1945-7), Italian democracy has entered a phase of far-reaching changes. To date, the most radical of these concerns its parties and party system. This phenomenon in one of the five largest European countries may be an important test of the ongoing theoretical debate on party change. If until now the main contributions (see recently, for example, Harmel and Janda 1994 and Harmel, Heo, Tan, Janda 1995) have essentially focused on more limited forms of change, the interest of the Italian case lies in the fact that it compels us to analyze more profound transformations involving the disappearance of one or more parties and the change of the very party system itself. In this analysis, the two key notions which seem most useful are crisis and change. By crisis of a party, as an intermediary and representative structure, I mean the process by which one or more factors of a social, cultural or even economic kind produce a detectable inconsistency1 between the existing party, characterized by a well defined identity, organization, policy positions, and a broadly established electorate, and also supporting interest groups. The main empirical expressions of party crisis are a poorer electoral performance to analyze in a systemic perspective, the change of one or more organizational dimensions, the turnover of leadership, also at middle and local levels. The crisis of a party and, even more likely, of more than one party causes or is caused by the change of features within the existing party system. That is, although the causality may be unclear and work in both directions at once, it is important to identify the systemic aspects involved which provide us with the evidence of what has changed in the system. The outcomes of the process, characterized by the unavoidable interweaving of crisis of party/ies and change of the party system, may be: i) 1 Inconsistency is a catchword meaning the incongruence between the party as "supply" and the "demand" of sectors of civil society, those who previously supported the party and the new ones - that is, an inability of meeting them through the party and, therefore, a growing gap and detachment between the two sides of political society and civil society. - ¡Error!Marcador no definido. - simply, the overcoming of the inconsistency and crisis without any change; ii) the change-adaptation of the party in one or more dimensions, and to different degrees; iii) the split of the party with the concomitant creation of a new formation; iv) the disappearance of the party; v) the emergence of a new party or parties. These two definitions, here briefly sketched out, provide the guidelines of the following analysis. I begin by referring to the crisis of parties in a systemic perspective with reference to basic features, such as electoral performance, new name and symbol, split, alliances, and to the main explanatory factors of the crisis; then, to assess better the depth of the change, the transformations of party organizations and the emergence of new models of parties will be considered and the turnover of party élite, and more particularly of their main component, the parliamentary élite, will be explored; third, the impact of party crises and change on the party system will be evaluated. In the concluding remarks, the problems of the future of the party system, and the relationships between the changes of parties and party system and the crisis and change of Italian democracy will be addressed. What Has Happened to the Parties? (1985-95) Even prior to the 1994 elections, Italian parties had undergone different but more or less radical transformations. Some parties had undergone a major face- lift; others were in crisis and their transformation had already begun; still others split up or broke down and virtually disappeared; brand new parties were also established. That is, most of the possibilities envisaged above took place. The two key phases of the change occurred in 1991 and 1994, but the apparent beginning of - ¡Error!Marcador no definido. - the change can be traced back to the mid 1980s, when local lists flourished2 as well as environmentalist groups. These were the first still fairly limited manifestations of crisis as a consequence of societal discontent and dissatisfaction. The left was the first segment of the political continuum to undergo crisis 3 and profound transformation. In the case of the Italian Communist Party (PCI), this slow, gradual process came to a head with the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989. But the process of democratic integration of the PCI had at least two previous key moments: in 1973, with the so-called strategy of the _historic compromise_, aiming at the formation of an alliance with Catholic forces and even with a Catholic party, Christian Democracy (DC); and in 1978-9, when the PCI supported Andreotti's cabinet during a difficult period of terrorist attacks. Later, democratic integration advanced and the party held important internal debates which gradually changed its identity. But the objective presence of the USSR on the international scene with its traditional links with the party was still seen by some as a possible anti-democratic point of reference for Communists and a cause for fear. The disintegration of the USSR and subsequent fall of the Berlin Wall heralded the final stage of this break up. As a consequence, on the one hand, anti- Communism no longer had good reason to exist;4 on the other hand, that break up was also the definitive answer to the old internal debate on "real Socialism": the Communist alternative had been made bankrupt. A new party was created in February 1991 with a new name, the Democratic Party of the Left (PDS), and new logos (see Ignazi 1992, Weinberg 1995, Baccetti forthcoming). A segment of the old PCI with more orthodox 2 Both in the national elections of 1983 and the municipal ones of 1985. 3 Of course, one of the main manifestations of the crisis is its declining electoral performance (to 26.6% in 1987 from 34.4% ten years earlier, in 1976). 4 Actually, a new artificial form of anti-communism was rebuilt by Forza Italia in the 1994 electoral campaign - and it also survived later on. - ¡Error!Marcador no definido. - communist views created a splinter party, Rifondazione Comunista (Communist Refoundation), with roughly one-third/one-fourth of the electoral size of the PDS: 5.6 to 16.1 in 1992; 6.1 to 20.4 in 1994 (see Table 1). At the same time, the extreme left-wing party, Democrazia Proletaria (Proletarian Democracy), which under other names had been to the left of the old PCI for almost twenty years, disappeared. The other main aspect of the first phase of change is the formation, growth and success of the Lega Nord (the Northern League), whose first party conference was held in February 1991. The party is the result of an association of various Leagues and other local lists, especially from Veneto, Lombardy, and Piedmont, which all together had won about 6% in the regional and municipal elections of 1990. This new party occupied the space left vacant by the crisis of Catholic culture following the well-known, widespread process of secularization in those regions; it is rooted in precise territorial identities, and has been a successful way of exploiting localist, anti-centralist, anti-party, anti-southerner positions and in supporting the taxpayers' protest. Also the disappearance of the communist- anticommunist Table 1. Electoral Results in 1992 and 1994 (Lower Chamber) 1992 1994 Votes (%) Seats Votes (%) Seats Total seats Plurality PR segment segment n.
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