NASA's Space Shuttle Columbia

Order Code RS21408 Updated April 17, 2003 CRS Report for Congress Received through the CRS Web NASA’s Space Shuttle Columbia: Quick Facts and Issues for Congress Marcia S. Smith Specialist in Aerospace and Telecommunications Policy Resources, Science, and Industry Division Summary On February 1, 2003, NASA’s Space Shuttle Columbia broke apart while returning to Earth from a 16-day science mission in orbit. All seven astronauts — six Americans and one Israeli — were killed. An investigation is underway. This report provides quick facts about Columbia, her crew, the STS-107 mission, the status of the investigation, and a brief discussion of issues for Congress. Additional information on the space shuttle program is available in CRS Issue Brief IB93062, CRS Report RS21411, and CRS Report RS21419. This report will be updated often. The Loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia The space shuttle Columbia was launched on its STS-107 mission on January 16, 2003. After completing a 16-day scientific research mission, Columbia started its descent to Earth on the morning of February 1, 2003. As it descended from orbit, approximately 16 minutes before its scheduled landing at Kennedy Space Center, FL, Columbia broke apart over northeastern Texas. All seven astronauts aboard were killed. They were Commander Rick Husband; Pilot William McCool; Mission Specialists Michael P. Anderson, David M. Brown, Kalpana Chawla, and Laurel Clark; and payload specialist Ilan Ramon, an Israeli. The last communication with Columbia was at about 09:00 EST. The shuttle was at an altitude of 207,135 feet, traveling at a speed of Mach 18.3 (about 13,000 miles per hour). Accident Investigation NASA Administrator Sean O’Keefe immediately appointed an internal “Mishap Investigation Board,” (MIB) and also an external group, the “Columbia Accident Investigation Board” (CAIB), to investigate the accident. MIB was replaced by the NASA Accident Investigation Team (NAIT) on March 21, 2003. NASA has a Web site where many of the materials it is releasing to the public can be obtained [http://www.nasa.gov/Columbia]. Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress CRS-2 The CAIB is chaired by Adm. (Ret.) Harold Gehman, former NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic, and has its own Web site [http://www.caib.us]. Biographical information on Adm. Gehman and the other members of the Board are available at that site. NASA revised the Board’s charter three times to clarify its independence from NASA, primarily in response to congressional concerns. However, the CAIB was created by NASA, includes NASA representatives, and new Board members must be appointed by the NASA Administrator, so concerns about its independence continue. NASA transitioned responsibility for the investigation to the CAIB on February 6. There is no time limit on the Board’s investigation. NASA and the CAIB are working through a “fault tree” of possibilities of what may have happened to Columbia, and no conclusion has been reached. The Board initially focused on data from sensors in Columbia’s left wing in the minutes prior to the orbiter’s break up. The first indications of trouble were the loss of data from sensors in that wing, and other sensors registering rising temperatures. NASA analysis indicates that the superheated gas surrounding the shuttle as it descended through the atmosphere must have reached the interior of the wing to account for those readings. Some theorize that reinforced carbon-carbon (RCC) panels along the front (leading edge) of the wing may have been breached. On March 21, debris searchers in Texas found a flight data recorder (the Orbiter Experiment Support System, or OEX) from the shuttle in remarkably good condition. Data are now being recovered from the OEX, which was recording readings during launch and reentry from sensors located throughout Columbia, including on the left wing. The sensor readings are in addition to those originally available, which were transmitted to the ground during reentry. These were stored on magnetic tape for analysis after the shuttle landed. Initial analysis of the OEX data supports the theory that a breach occurred in the left wing leading edge area. How and precisely where the breach occurred still is unclear. One theory is that the left wing may have been damaged by objects that fell off the shuttle’s External Tank1 82 seconds after launch and struck the orbiter in that area. The day after the launch, NASA experts reviewing footage of the launch discerned something hitting the orbiter. Analysis by the Boeing Company initially focused on one object, believed to be foam insulation, but by January 24, Boeing’s presentation slides indicated that three objects were involved. The Boeing analysis concluded the debris created no safety of flight issue. The concern was that the objects might have damaged protective tiles that form part of the shuttle’s thermal protection system. It does not appear that the analysis assessed potential damage to the RCC panels. E-mail exchanges among NASA and contractor employees during STS-107’s flight continued discussion of theoretical scenarios stemming from damaged tiles until the day before the landing. Other theories are that ice or a heavier insulating material hit the orbiter during launch, that space debris hit it while it was in orbit, or that the RCC system failed due to aging. Some shuttle engineers reportedly requested that NASA ask the Department of Defense to image the shuttle while it was in orbit with 1 The Space Transportation System (STS)—the space shuttle—consists of an airplane-like orbiter, two Solid Rocket Boosters (SRBs) on either side of the orbiter, and a large cylindrical External Tank that holds the fuel for the orbiter’s main engines. The SRBs detach from the orbiter about 2 ½ minutes after launch when their fuel is spent, fall into the ocean, and are recovered for refurbishment and reuse. The External Tank is not reused. It is jettisoned as the orbiter reaches Earth orbit, and disintegrates as it falls into the Indian Ocean. CRS-3 ground-based telescopes or satellites to gather more data about the extent of damage. NASA officials declined to do so because the Boeing analysis indicated there was no safety of flight issue, and such images taken on earlier flights were unhelpful. NASA reached agreement with the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA, see CRS Report RL31369) on March 25 that NIMA will image the shuttle on a routine “targets of opportunity” basis, and upon specific request from NASA in an emergency. If tiles had been damaged, the astronauts could not have repaired them in orbit. Astronauts can make emergency spacewalks into the shuttle’s cargo bay, but cannot maneuver around to the belly of the orbiter where the tiles are located, and there is no method to repair a damaged tile on orbit, according to NASA. It is not clear what, if anything, the crew could have done to repair an RCC panel. NASA Administrator O’Keefe emphasizes that if they had known of any safety of flight issue, NASA would have done everything possible to save Columbia. Because of the threat of terrorism, and the presence of an Israeli astronaut on the mission, questions arose as to whether the loss of Columbia could be attributed to terrorism. Government officials stress that there is no evidence that the tragedy could have been caused by terrorists. CAIB Recommendations On April 17, 2003, the CAIB issued two preliminary recommendations. The Board found that current inspection techniques are not adequate to assess the structural integrity of the RCC panels, supporting structure, and attaching hardware. Therefore, it recommended that NASA develop and implement a comprehensive inspection plan prior to the shuttle’s return to flight. Second, the Board found that the full capabilities of the United States to image Columbia during its flight were not utilized. It recommended that NASA modify the arrangement it recently reached with NIMA (discussed above) to make on-orbit imaging of each shuttle flight a standard requirement. Space Shuttle Columbia Columbia was one of four flightworthy reusable space shuttle orbiters in NASA’s fleet. The others are Discovery, Atlantis, and Endeavour. A fifth orbiter, Challenger, was lost in a 1986 accident. Another orbiter, Enterprise, was used for approach and landing tests in the 1970s and was not designed to travel in space. Enterprise now belongs to the Smithsonian’s National Air and Space Museum. Columbia was the first spaceflight-worthy orbiter built for NASA by Rockwell International (the space division of Rockwell, which built the orbiters, was later bought by Boeing ). It was used for the very first shuttle flight on April 12, 1981. The STS-107 mission that ended tragically on February 1, 2003 was Columbia’s 28th flight. Although Columbia is the oldest orbiter, Discovery has been used for more flights (30). Orbiters are periodically taken out of service for maintenance and overhaul. Columbia underwent an inspection and retrofit program from August 1991-February 1992, was in an “orbiter maintenance down period” in 1994-1995, and an “orbiter major modification” (OMM) period in 1999-2001. STS-107 was its second flight after the OMM. CRS-4 Columbia’s STS-107 Crew2 Commander: Air Force Colonel Rick D. Husband, b. July 12, 1957, Amarillo, TX. Married, two children. This was his second flight into space, having piloted STS-96 in 1999. Received a BS in mechanical engineering from Texas Tech University in 1980 and a MS in mechanical engineering from California State University-Fresno in 1990. Pilot: Navy Commander William “Willie” McCool, b. September 23, 1961, San Diego, CA. Married, three children. This was his first spaceflight. Received a BS in applied science from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1983, an MS in Computer Science from the University of Maryland in 1985, and an MS in aeronautical engineering from the U.S.

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