The Reputational Imperative and Territorial Disputes in South Asia, 1947-1965
Total Page：16
File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb
INSURING THE FUTURE: THE REPUTATIONAL IMPERATIVE AND TERRITORIAL DISPUTES IN SOUTH ASIA, 1947-1965 MAHESH SHANKAR DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE MCGILL UNIVERSITY, MONTREAL OCTOBER, 2012 A thesis submitted to McGill University in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.) © Mahesh Shankar, 2012 Abstract State policies of pursuing compromise or conflict, and the extent of each, have been subject to wide variation in territorial disputes in South Asia, both across cases and within disputes over time. Existing works on the subject, however, which focus on the salience - strategic, economic, or symbolic – of the disputed territory, often prove inadequate in accounting for such variations. They fail moreover to explain some puzzling state behaviour – why, for instance, states choose to sometimes make large concessions on territories of great value, and adopt intransigent attitudes towards territories of little salience; or why stronger states sometimes make concessions larger than they need to, and weaker states bargain harder than their capabilities would justify. This dissertation argues that decisions by state leaders to pursue compromise or conflict on their territorial claims are influenced to a significant extent by a concern for the expected reputational implications of their actions. The theoretical framework offered suggests why we should expect reputational concerns to be independently important in the calculus of state leaders, and how they manifest themselves in decision making. In particular, it makes a novel case that states care not only for reputations for resolve, but also for that of reasonableness, and how contextual factors – bargaining strength and adversary tactics in particular – influence the assessments of what kind of reputation policy decisions are likely to engender. The study demonstrates the utility of the argument in explaining the policy variations and puzzles that characterized territorial disputes in the South Asian neighbourhood during the period from 1947-1965. Through in depth historical research of policy making in not only the more prominent disputes in the region, the Kashmir and Sino-Indian ones, but also territorial disagreements involving the smaller states such as Nepal, Bhutan, and Burma, this dissertation illustrates how reputational concerns often drive state behaviour. i Résumé Les politiques de l'État poursuivant les compromis ou conflits, et l’étendue de chacune de ces politiques, varient de façon importante en territoires en disputes en Asie du Sud pour cas variés et parmi disputes au fil du temps. Cependant, les travaux existants sur le sujet qui mettent l'accent sur la prédominance - stratégique, économique ou symbolique – du territoire en dispute, s'avèrent souvent inadéquats pour expliquer ces variations. De plus, ils n'arrivent pas à expliquer certains comportements curieux de l’État – pourquoi, par exemple, les États choisissent-ils parfois de faire de grandes concessions de territoires de grande valeur, et d'adopter des attitudes inflexibles par rapport aux territoires de petite importance, ou pourquoi les États plus puissants font parfois de plus grandes concessions, et les États moins puissants négocient plus sévèrement sans avoir les capacités apparentes pour justifier la sévérité. Cette thèse soutient que les décisions prises par les dirigeants d’États, par rapport aux compromis ou aux conflits portant sur disputes territoriales, sont influencées de façon importante par un souci des implications à leurs réputations suite à leurs actions. La théorie proposée suggère pourquoi nous devrions nous attendre à des préoccupations étant indépendamment importantes et impliquant la réputation parmi le raisonnement des chefs d'état, et comment celles-ci se manifestent dans la prise de décisions. Cela crée particulièrement un nouveau cas démontrant que les États ne sont pas uniquement préoccupés par leur réputation vis-à-vis les solutions, mais aussi à l’aspect raisonnable, et comment certains facteurs contextuels, tels que le pouvoir de négociation et tactiques d’adversaires, influenceront les genres de décisions politiques impliquant la réputation susceptibles à être prises. L'étude démontre l'utilité de l'argument en expliquant les variations en politiques et aspects inexplicables qui ont caractérisés les disputes territoriales en Asie du Sud entre 1947 et 1965. À travers une recherche historique approfondie sur l’élaboration de politiques non seulement parmi les disputes les plus importantes, notamment celles de Kashmir et des sino- indiens, mais aussi autres disputes territoriales impliquant de plus petits États tels que le Népal, le Bhoutan et la Birmanie, cette thèse démontre comment la préoccupation de réputation influence souvent le comportement des États. ii Table of Contents Acknowledgments…………………………………………………………………… vi Maps and Tables………………………………………………………………....... viii PART I: THEORY Chapter 1: Introduction………………………………………………………….... 1 State of the Literature: History and Theory…………………………………. 3 State of the Literature: The Importance of Salience…………………………. 6 The Limitations of Salience…………………………………………………. 12 An Alternative: Reputation in Territorial Disputes………………………….. 16 The Argument………………………………………………………………. 19 Cases and Methodology……………………………………………………... 24 Coming Up………………………………………………………………….. 31 Chapter 2: Theorizing State Behaviour in Territorial Disputes…………………... 34 Underlying Assumptions and Concepts……………………………………….. 36 Reputation in International Relations…………………………………………. 40 States and Territorial Disputes: Insuring the Future…………………………… 47 Commitment Problems and Territorial Disputes……………………………… 49 The Reputational Calculus…………………………………………………….. 53 Bargaining Strength…………………………………………………………… 58 Bargaining Tactics……………………………………………………………... 65 The Reputational Dimensions of Salience……………………………………... 69 Domestic Politics, Reputation and Territorial Disputes………………………... 70 Conclusion……………………………………………………………………... 74 PART II: KASHMIR, 1947-1965 Chapter 3: India and Kashmir: The Nehru Years…………………………………. 77 Kashmir’s Salience for India and its Explanatory Limitations…………………. 79 Approaching Independence and the Tribal Invasion…………………………... 84 Indian Commitment to the Plebiscite Option…………………………………. 94 India and the Failure of the Plebiscite Option…………………………………. 100 Commitment Problem in the Kashmir Theatre………………………………... 103 The Strategic Calculus…………………………………………………………. 106 The Reputational Imperative in Indian Decision Making……………………… 111 Taking the Plebiscite Option off the Table: India and Kashmir 1954-1964……... 116 The Strategic Logic……………………………………………………………... 120 The US-Pakistan Military Pact and Reputational Considerations……………….. 125 iii Into the 1960s………………………………………………………………….. 130 Conclusion……………………………………………………………………… 133 Chapter 4: Pakistan and the Dispute over Kashmir……………………………….. 135 Introduction…………………………………………………………………... 135 Approaching Independence…………………………………………………... 139 The Tribal Invasion……………………………………………………………. 146 The UN and the Plebiscite Option……………………………………………… 152 Strategic and Reputational Concerns Underlying the Prerequisites to Plebiscite.. 157 Entering the Military Pact and Alternatives to Plebiscite……………………… 166 The Decision to War in 1965…………………………………………………... 172 Conclusion……………………………………………………………………... 178 PART III: SINO-INDIAN FRONTIER DISPUTE, 1947-1962 Chapter 5: India and the Frontier Dispute with China……………………………. 181 The Territory under Dispute………………………………………………….... 183 Treatment of India’s Role in Existing Literature………………………………. 188 India and the Sino-Indian Frontier, 1949-55………………………………….. 192 Explaining Delay and Avoidance, 1949-1955………………………………….. 200 Commitment Problems, Reputation and Indian Firmness, 1949-1955………… 204 Opening the Territorial Breach, 1956-1962……………………………………... 208 The Aksai Chin Puzzle………………………………………………………….. 217 Reputation and Indian Intransigence, 1956-1962……………………………….. 220 Domestic Politics and Indian Policy…………………………………………….. 230 Conclusion……………………………………………………………………… 235 Chapter 6: China and the Sino-Indian Dispute…………………………………… 238 The Early Years of Delay, 1949-1957…………………………………………. 241 Opening the Breach: Staking Chinese Claims and Compromise 1958-1962…… 246 Tibet, the Frontier, and India: Abandoning Delay……………………………... 250 Explaining the Choice and Extent of Compromise……………………………. 255 The Descent to War and Unilateral Withdrawal, 1962…………………………. 260 Conclusion……………………………………………………………………… 268 PART IV: ASYMMETRIC DISPUTES Chapter 7: Explaining State Behaviour in Asymmetric Disputes………………… 271 China and the Smaller Neighbours: Disputed Claims………………………….. 273 Early Approaches: Small State Activism and Chinese Deferral………………… 278 Chinese Compromise and Small State Firmness……………………………….. 283 China-Burma…………………………………………………………….. 284 iv China-Nepal……………………………………………………………. 288 China-Pakistan………………………………………………………….. 291 China-Bhutan…………………………………………………………… 294 Explaining Chinese Compromise and Small State Firmness…………………… 297 The Reputational Imperative and Chinese Behaviour………………………….. 299 Reputational Concerns and Small State Firmness……………………………… 304 Reputational Considerations in Indo-Bhutanese Relations…………………….. 308 Conclusion……………………………………………………………………... 313 Chapter 8: Conclusion................................................................................................................. 315 Summary……………………………………………………………………….. 315 Limits of Nationalism and Domestic Politics…………………………………... 320 The Importance of Reputation………………………………………………… 322 Reputations