Lessons Learned from 9/11: DNA Identification in Mass Fatality Incidents

SEPTEMBER 2006 Lessons Learned From 9/11: DNA Identiﬁcation in Mass Fatality Incidents PRESIDENT’S DNA I N I T IA T I VE www.DNA.gov U.S. Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs 810 Seventh Street N.W. Washington, DC 20531 Alberto R. Gonzales Attorney General Regina B. Schofield Assistant Attorney General Glenn R. Schmitt Acting Director, National Institute of Justice Office of Justice Programs Partnerships for Safer Communities www.ojp.usdoj.gov Lessons Learned From 9/11: DNA Identification in Mass Fatality Incidents SEPTEMBER 2006 National Institute of Justice This document is not intended to create, and may not be relied upon to create, any rights, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by any party in any matter civil or criminal. The opinions, factual and other findings, conclusions, or recommendations in this publication represent the points of view of a majority of the KADAP members and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. NCJ 214781 Preface n September 11, 2001, 2,792 people This report discusses the incorporation of DNA were killed in terrorist attacks on the identification into a mass fatality disaster plan, O World Trade Center (WTC) in New York including how to: City. The number of victims, the condition of their ■ Establish laboratory policies and procedures, remains, and the duration of the recovery effort including the creation of sample collection made the identification of the victims the most documents. difficult ever undertaken by the forensic commu nity in this country. ■ Assess the magnitude of an identification effort, and identify and acquire resources to In response to this need, the National Institute of respond. Justice (NIJ), the research, development, and ■ Identify reference and kinship samples. evaluation agency of the U.S. Department of Justice, brought together a group of experts to ■ Create a comprehensive laboratory manage provide advice and support throughout the ment plan, including technology management identification effort. Called the Kinship and Data and quality assurance. Analysis Panel (KADAP), the group made recom ■ Establish lines of communication between mendations on new forensic technologies, tools, agencies, departments, victims’ families, and policies, and procedures to help identify those the press. who perished in the WTC attack. Although this report does not address every This report contains the KADAP’s “lessons aspect of a mass fatality DNA identification effort, learned,” particularly regarding DNA protocols, it does stress intentional testing redundancy as a laboratory techniques, and statistical approaches, way to monitor a system’s effectiveness. The in the DNA identification of WTC victims. It is report also discusses how decisions made in the written primarily for the Nation’s forensic labora first 48 hours after a mass fatality event shape tory directors and other officials who may be the scope of the identification effort. responsible for organizing and managing the DNA identification response to a mass fatality incident. Designed to augment another NIJ publication, Mass Fatality Incidents: A Guide for Human Although New York City’s mass disaster plan on Forensic Identification (http://www.ojp.usdoj. 9/11 contained lessons learned from the 1993 gov/nij/pubs-sum/199758.htm), this guide will terrorist bombing of the WTC, it did not contain help the Nation’s forensic laboratories—whether policies or procedures for identifying mass disas called upon to identify victims of a major natural ter victims through DNA analysis. Had this been disaster, transportation accident, or terrorist part of the city’s plan in 2001, many of the issues attack—prepare for a mass fatality incident. that arose after the attacks could have been more quickly resolved. PRESIDENT’S iii DNA INITIATIVE Message From the Director othing in the history of mass fatality and assessment of the capabilities of our public events prepared America’s forensic forensic laboratories that laboratory directors— N community for the task of identifying and the policymakers who support them—can those who perished when terrorists attacked the prepare for a mass fatality event. But such prepa World Trade Center (WTC) in New York City on ration is essential to ensure that our public September 11, 2001. For the Nation’s forensic lab resources are used as efficiently as possible. oratories, the primary lesson of this monumental identification effort is clear: every jurisdiction— The importance of such preparedness was again large and small, urban and rural—should have a demonstrated only 2 months after the 9/11 plan for identifying mass disaster victims through attacks when, on November 12, 2001, American DNA analysis. Airlines flight 587 crashed in Queens, New York, killing 265 people. Because of the administrative This report was prepared by the Kinship and Data and analytical processes that were in place for the Analysis Panel (KADAP), a multidisciplinary group WTC identification effort, New York City’s Office of outstanding scientists that the National Insti of the Chief Medical Examiner (OCME) did not tute of Justice (NIJ) assembled to offer advice in have to restructure its laboratory to handle the the identification of those who died in the WTC. identifications of the airline crash victims. The report contains guidance for forensic labora Historically, such a major identification response tory directors on developing a mass fatality DNA would have taken at least 3 months and even that identification plan. It should become an essential would have been considered rapid. But because resource used by forensic laboratory directors the OCME was prepared, all of the victims of the and senior public safety officials at all levels of American Airlines crash—the second largest government. single-event transportation mass fatality in U.S. history—were identified within 1 month. Even before this report was published, NIJ used the work of the KADAP to assist officials involved The challenges that accompany any large-scale in identifying the victims of the Southeast Asia DNA identification effort are substantial. There tsunami (December 2004) and of Hurricane Katri fore, I encourage every jurisdiction to carefully na (August 2005), a disaster that revealed how consider the guidance in this report. The families any State or municipality can be overwhelmed by of the victims of the next mass fatality disaster— the operational requirements of responding to a indeed, the entire Nation—will need their public mass fatality event. All of these events demon officials to be prepared. This guide will help us strate that it is only through planning, training, accomplish that mission. Glenn R. Schmitt Acting Director, National Institute of Justice PRESIDENT’S v DNA INITIATIVE Acknowledgments he National Institute of Justice (NIJ) is Health Science Center, and Yale University School grateful for the support of the many of Medicine for supporting the investment of time T people who were involved in this project, and energy by their Panel representatives. We from the creation and empanelment of the appreciate, too, that colleagues of KADAP mem Kinship and Data Analysis Panel (KADAP) through bers in those institutions often took on the the development of this report. responsibility of additional work so that the KADAP members could provide guidance on the The idea of a panel of experts to advise New York identification of WTC victims. City officials in the identification of victims of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the Early in the process, the Panel’s understanding World Trade Center (WTC) originated with Inspec about collection procedures and specific “Ground tor W. Mark Dale, Director of Forensic Services Zero” issues was greatly aided by then-Deputy for the New York State Police Department. Realiz Commissioner of the New York City Police ing that the number of victims and the condition Department, Maureen Casey, who attended of their remains would require his laboratory to KADAP meetings on behalf of Commissioner enter uncharted territory, Inspector Dale asked Howard Safir. NIJ to create a “brain trust” of independent scientists to offer guidance in this monumental The New York State Police Forensic Services Divi effort. sion made the initial KADAP meetings a priority, despite many new responsibilities that the Divi NIJ thanks the organizations that supported their sion had for organizing victim reference samples. designee’s participation on the KADAP. The National Institutes of Health’s (NIH’s) Human Many people—from the private and public Genome Research Institute and the National Cen sectors—provided testimony to the Panel that ter for Biotechnology Informatics provided several resulted in the KADAP recommendations. Early KADAP members whose expertise became the demonstrations of matching software, developed bedrock of the Panel’s deliberations. We especial for other mass fatality situations, were an impor ly thank Dr. Francis Collins and Dr. David Lipman tant contribution. We thank, in particular, Ed for identifying potential KADAP members, and Huffine, Fuad Suljetovic, and Adnan Rizvic, with for their steadfast support throughout the victim the International Commission on Missing Persons identification process. We also thank Dr. Celia in Bosnia; Jodi Irwin, with AFDIL; and Benoît Hooper Kozlowski, from NIH’s Office of the Leclair, with Myriad Genetics, who received per Director, for her guidance on NIH programs that mission

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