Estonia Social Briefing: the Post-Elections Syndrome E-MAP Foundation MTÜ

ISSN: 2560-1601 Vol. 16, No. 3 (EE) March 2019 Estonia social briefing: The post-elections syndrome E-MAP Foundation MTÜ 1052 Budapest Petőfi Sándor utca 11. +36 1 5858 690 Kiadó: Kína-KKE Intézet Nonprofit Kft. [email protected] Szerkesztésért felelős személy: Chen Xin Kiadásért felelős személy: Huang Ping china-cee.eu 2017/01 The post-elections syndrome A number of previous briefings on Estonian society have been outlining a multi- dimensional argument that the Estonian Republic is on its way to become a more cohesive societal unit – to be less ethnicity-concerned, but more policy-focused; less linguistically patchy, but more culturally manifold; less politically antagonistic, but more strategically integral. On the empirical side, this argument has plenty of back-ups and is academically valid. In political terms, however (since the immortal Aristotle-framed quote on “a political animal” should always be kept in mind), Estonian society is in a higher imagery ‘league’ if compared to some of the country’s politicians who, after the March 2019 parliamentary elections, have just done their best in spoiling the relatively positive societal ‘scenery’. In Estonia of 2019, a distinctly divisive narrative is featuring the post-elections syndrome. The Estonian Conservative People’s Party (further – EKRE), which received 19 seats in the next Riigikogu, became a ‘golden ticket’-holder after the outgoing Prime Minister Jüri Ratas and his Estonian Centre Party decided to talk to them on a prospective governmental coalition. To a surprise of many, the EKRE have a couple of situative partners now (the aforementioned ‘centrists’ and the Pro Patria) to go all the way up to the Estonian Government, and it was not looking like to be the case before the elections. Objectively, the EKRE-originated glaring rhetoric was, probably, bringing them more prospective-turned-real voters1, but it was also generating plenty of sounding commentaries on the nature of the party’s actions. For example, in September 2018, Eerik-Niiles Kross, an influential member of the Estonian Reform Party2, argued that whatever EKRE had been doing was “closely coincide[d] with the strategic messages of the Kremlin”3. In his article to Postimees, Kross sarcastically used a symbiotic linguistic construct EKRE-МЛЬ that quasi-unified the acronym “EKRE” written in Estonian with the ending of the Russian word “Кремль” (the Kremlin) written in Russian. On the broader societal level, the EKRE’s prospect to enter the country’s next Government was immediately rebuffed by the majority of Estonian citizens. In plain digits, the status quo looks astonishingly different from what it used to be at the beginning of March: 1 In March 2019, EKRE managed to collect 99,671 votes and increased the party’s presence at the Estonian Parliament by 271% (if compared to the 2015 results), adding 12 more seats to their parliamentary faction. 2 The Estonian Reform Party is the winner of the March 2019 parliamentary elections in the country, having received 34 seats in the next Riigikogu. 3 Eerik-Niiles Kross, ‘EKRE-МЛЬ’ in Postimees. 27 September 2019. Available from [https://rus.postimees.ee/6415613/eerik-niyles-kross-ekre-ml]. 1 having together collected 52.3% of the total votes on 3 March 2019, the ‘centrists’, EKRE and Pro Patria as a prospective governmental coalition were positively welcomed only by 24% of voting age citizens who were approached less than two weeks after the elections4. Intriguingly, as noted by Aivar Voog, the pollster’s Head of Marketing Strategies, “[a] coalition between Center, EKRE and [Pro Patria] is clearly supported only by EKRE voters”5, underscoring the undisputed fact that both the ‘centrists’ and Pro Patria are losing big time in popular support. The ‘ethnic card’, which was seemingly being substituted by policies-focused debates, is in play again – as confirmed by the poll, the Estonian Centre Party’s “biggest risk in working with the two conservative parties lies in the reaction of their Russian-speaking voters who have so far made up the foundation of Center’s supporter base”6. Without going in-depth of the issues, the same type of a change was confirmed by PollofPolls.eu7 (aggregation trend line Kalman Smooth) – Table 1 compared both the pre- and post-elections aggregated polling data with the official record on the elections outcome8, and the results of such a simple exercise did not ‘tell’ a positive story for the Centre-EKRE-Pro Patria prospective coalition. Had the parliamentary elections been held 18 days after the real event, with the knowledge of the current development, the aforementioned prospective coalitional trio would not have been in a position to enjoy the new Riigikogu’s parliamentary majority (they would have been, at least, 3% short to break it even and 5% out from what they had actually achieved together on the elections day). This is not to mention that the popularity of the Estonian Reform Party, the winner of the elections, is rising at the reputational expense of both the ‘centrists’ and Pro Patria. 4 Urmas Jaagant, ‘Poll: voters prefer other coalitions’ in Postimees. 14 March 2019. Available from [https://news.postimees.ee/6545414/poll-voters-prefer-other-coalitions]. 5 Aivar Voog in Jaagant. 6 Jaagant. 7 ‘All polls for Estonia’ in Pollof•Polls.eu. Available from [https://pollofpolls.eu/EE]. 8 ‘Voting and election result’ in Valimised. Available from [https://rk2019.valimised.ee/en/election- result/election-result.html]. 2 Table 1: Aggregated polling data (February-March 2019) and the elections results (3 March 2019), Estonia9 Date of recording/aggregated % vs. the actual result Political party 3 February 21 March 3 March 2019 2019 2019 The Estonian Centre 27% 23.1% 20% Party The Estonian Reform 26% 28.9% 30% Party The Conservative 17% 17.8% 18% People’s Party of Estonia The Social Democratic 10% 9.8% 10% Party Pro Patria 8% 11.4% 9% Source: Pollof•Polls.eu and Valimised.ee (completed by E-MAP Foundation MTÜ) Some of the country’s key decision-shapers immediately noted the likelihood for the Estonian society to have a prolonged post-elections disintegrational syndrome. Toomas Hendrik Ilves, the fourth President of Estonia (2006-2016), was one of those. From the first glance, his article, which initially appeared in the format of a sizable Facebook post, was generally focused on Estonian security-related matters. However, considering the material’s philosophical underpinning, the high-profile author’s reflection-concern seemed to be about something else – the Estonian society’s degree of cohesiveness, and how to maintain the society-wide unity. The self-imposed question on “how can we defend Estonia without becoming self-absorbed and without pushing aside those who are different?” received the former President’s comprehensive answer, featuring a master-class on ‘Aesopian language’ for the current Estonian politicians to study: [L]et us ask again and clearly, what is the Estonia that we want to defend and are asking others to help us defend? […] We want: Estonia to be a country governed by the rule of law, where the courts and their judgments are just; for Estonia not to go bankrupt 9 ‘All polls for Estonia’. 3 or descend into a fatal tailspin; to resolve mutual disputes without violence; for people to be judged for their values, skills and attitudes, not their origins, religion or native language; to refrain from classifying our people into the right kind and the second-rate kind, and those with different world views into enemies or worthless; for the people in Estonia have the freedom to remain themselves. Everyone here has the right to freedom and the fruits of freedom, to their opinions and beliefs, even if they differ from your opinions and beliefs. Estonia is being defended, advanced and promoted in the world by our own people.10 As reported, Martin Helme, the EKRE’s Deputy Chairman and one of those key politicians who meticulously ‘crafted’ the particular image that his party enjoys at the moment, noted that “the hysteria over their coming into power is malicious and unfounded”, adding that the EKRE “does not want a ‘mass Islamic invasion’ of Estonia” and that “angry feminists and a number of other societal groups do not understand [the EKRE’s] demands”11. In a way, it could arguably be treated as an indirect response to the above-mentioned former President’s advice, and such a response is sending a very clear message of disregarding what Toomas Hendrik Ilves was attempting to deliver. Even though, any of the two influential members of EKRE are in a very different political ‘league’, if compared to the ‘premier league’ where Ilves is comfortably ‘residing’, it is a situation when Mart and Martin Helme, but not Toomas Hendrik Ilves (let alone Jüri Ratas who lost the elections but would like to remain the Prime Minister), are accidently but undeniably found themselves being in charge of a broader political agenda-setting process in the country, for now at least. Before even formalising the coalitional talks, the next step for the EKRE politicians is already visualised – to enter the European Parliament after the May 2019 elections. The party have decided on the list of contenders from their side, and the EKRE Chairman Mart Helme will be leading the roster12. Having collected almost 100,000 votes during the Riigikogu elections, Mart Helme gave a positive prognosis for his party in regards of the prospective contest to reach the EU level: “I think there are people on the list that would do very well in 10 Toomas Hendrik Ilves in ‘Toomas Hendrik Ilves on the Estonia we want and ask others to defend’. ERR. 19 March 2019. Available from [https://news.err.ee/921438/toomas-hendrik-ilves-on-the-estonia-we-want-and-ask- others-to-defend].

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