Crown Policies and Purchases in Muriwhenua 1840-1850
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EMPIRE ON THE CHEAP: CROWN POLICIES AND PURCHASES IN MURIWHENUA 1840-1850 A Historical Report commissioned by the waitanqi Tribunal Barry Rigby 6 March 1992 / EMPIRE ON THE CHEAP: CROWN POLICIES AND PURCHASES IN MURIWHENUA 1840-1850 TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE I INTRODUCTION 4 (a) Purpose 4 (b) Thesis statement 5 (c) Outline 5 II ORIGINS OF THE TREATY 1837-1840 8 (a) Historiography 8 (b) Imperial Illusions 9 (c) Maori depopulation 16 (d) Vested interests 18 III HOBSON'S CHOICE 1840-1842 21 (a) strict economy 21 (b) Land in Treaty transactions 23 (c) Crown Mangonui Purchases 1840-1841 36 (d) Crown conceptions of Maori land rights 43 (e) The Crown/CMS Alliance 48 IV COLONIAL CRISIS 1842-1845 54 (a) Inadequate administration 54 (b) Land claims policy 57 (c) The Oruru conflict 62 (d) FitzRoy's choice 67 V COLONIAL AND IMPERIAL CONFLICT 1845-1847 71 (a) Disestablishment of the CMS 71 (b) Land and conflict 73 (c) Grey's Maori allies 76 (d) The Wasteland debate 78 (e) Grey, Panakareao and the CMS 80 VI CROWN CONTROL 1848-1850 85 (a) The Resident Magistrate system 85 (b) White and Maori 86 (c) The Mixed Economy 88 (d) Crown Autocracy 92 - 3 - PAGE VII CONCLUSION 95 (a) Issues arising from the evidence 95 (b) How cheap was justice? 96 VIII MAP 1840-1841 Crown Mangonui Purchases 41 - 4 - I INTRODUCTION (a) Purpose This report presents an overview of Crown policies and purchases in Muriwhenua during the 1840s. It treats this subject more exhaustively than the "Preliminary Report on the Historical Report" filed in December 1989, or the subsequent Mangonui, Muriwhenua North and Oruru reports. This report examines not only the Crown's actions in Muriwhenua, but the imperial and colonial policies governing those actions. Likewise, it examines not just the 1840 and 1841 Crown Mangonui purchases, but also the Crown's changing conception of Maori land rights both before and after the Treaty transactions at the beginning of the decade. The purpose of including imperial and colonial policies wi thin the investigation is to locate Muriwhenua history within a larger context than was possible in previous reports. without consideration of the larger imperial and colonial context, Crown actions in Muriwhenua cannot be fully understood. Since Margaret Mutu and Anne Salmond will examine the Maori context of those actions, this report deals largely with things Pakeha. Nonetheless, the history of the 1840s was one of dynamic interaction between Maori and Pakeha. Consequently, this report cannot ignore situations where Maor i clearly influenced, and were influenced by, Crown actions. Although I've also avoided detailed examination of the Crown Land Claims commissions, the subject of Richard Boast's and other claimant research reports, I've not been able to avoid them entirely. Since the Godfrey commission reveals a great deal about the Crown's conception of Maori land rights in Muriwhenua, as does the debate about missionary land claims, both receive proper attention. - 5 - (b) Thesis statement The central thesis of this report is that the Crown's policies and purchases in both Muriwhenua and New Zealand during the 1840s attempted to get "empire on the cheap". Though historians such as McLintock, Wards and Adams detected this theme in Crown policies towards New Zealand, they haven't 1 considered the consequences of this for Maori • In this report, I argue that to uphold Treaty obligations incurred in 1840, the Crown had to commit considerable resources. To protect Maori land rights effectively, it had to conduct a thorough investigation of Maori customs, for example. I argue that not only did the Crown fail to commit sufficient resources to uphold its Treaty obligations, its policies invariably sacrificed justice in the interests of strict economy. By seeking "empire on the cheap", the Crown tried to buy justice cheaply. In this process, I maintain, the Crown short-changed Maori. (c) Outline In developing this thesis, I've organised the report into five main chapters, in addition to the introduction and conclusion. In Chapter II, Imperial origins of the Treaty, I'll begin by reviewing how historians have explained annexation by Treaty. I then examine some imperial illusions, and Maori depopulation, which preceded the Treaty. This leads me to further identify the vested interests of the Pakeha architects of the Treaty. A H McLintock, Crown Colony Government in New Zealand (Wellington 1858); Ian Wards, The Shadow of the Land: A Study of British Policy and Racial Conflict in New Zealand 1832-1852 (Wellington 1968); Peter Adams, Fatal Necessity: British Intervention in New Zealand 1830-1847 (Auckland 1977). - 6 - Chapter III, entitled Hobson's Choice, points out how the Crown's first executive officer in New Zealand had very few options left open to him by his superiors in London and Sydney. Hobson's superiors insisted that he operate on a shoe-string budget, while upholding Treaty obligations. The key Treaty transactions in Northern New Zealand focused on Maori land rights. I examine those transaction in considerable detail. The Kaitaia transaction, in particular, prepared the way for the 1840-1841 Mangonui purchases. In each of these transactions, CMS missionaries played a crucial role. I therefore examine what I refer to as the Crown/CMS alliance. The strains of an under-resourced colonial administration plunged New Zealand into crisis between 1842 and 1845. This is the subject of Chapter III. The Crown Land Claims commissions, hampered by lack of funds and erratic policy shifts, reflected and contributed to a deepening of the crisis. In Muriwhenua the crisis contributed to the 1843 Oruru conflict. The crisis also produced a series of drastic measures by Governor FitzRoy which contributed to his recall during the Northern war of 1845. In Chapter V, Colonial and Imperial conflict, I argue that Grey's arrived to replace FitzRoy signalled a major shift in Crown policy. Grey dissolved the Crown's alliance with the CMS while recruiting Maori allies (including Panakareao) during the Northern War. Imperial authorities contributed an added dimension to the conflict with the "waste-land" doctrine enunciated in 1846. The colonial and imperial conflict came to Muriwhenua in late 1847 with Nugent and Symonds' visit to Mangonui, Oruru and Kaitaia. Although Grey refrained from implementing the imperial "waste land" doctrine, he established direct Crown control in predominantly Maori areas such as Muriwhenua through his Resident Magistrate system. I examine this system briefly in - 7 - Chapter VI, entitled Crown Control 1848-1850. Since Grey maintained that a thriving mixed economy underlay the extens ion of Crown control, I examine this phenomenon in Muriwhenua. Finally, I assess the impact on Maori rights of what Grey's biographer describes as Crown autocracy. In conclusion, I suggest issues arising from the evidence and interpretation presented in this report. I also conclude on what can be learned of the consequences of "empire on the cheap" . - 8 - II IMPERIAL ORIGINS OF THE TREATY (a) Historiography Historians explaining the origins of the Treaty of Waitangi normally fall into one of two schools. These may be described as the consensus school, and the conflict school. Consensus historians normally emphasis the humanitarian ideals embodied in the Treaty. The younger Sinclair wrote in 1959 that the Treaty inaugurated a "new and noble experiment" in colonial history. Recently, Orange has continued this theme. Despite her criticism of the Crown for failing to honour the Treaty, she generally sees it as originating in humanitarian idealism and bicultural consensus2 • Historians emphasising conflict between the humanitarian architects of the Treaty, and its detractors; and between Maori and Pakeha settler interests, include two former Official Historians, McLintock and Wards. In 1958 McLintock argued that misguided idealism embodied in the Treaty led the Crown to protect Maori interests at the expense of Pakeha interests3 • A decade later Wards argued that the Crown sought control over both Maori and Pakeha settler interests, and stumbled upon the Treaty as the most expedient way to achieve such control4. In assessing the imperial origins of the Treaty, Adams came to a similar conclusion in 1977. He argued that the "Treaty was intended to protect the Maoris only insofar as their rights were compatible with British dominance .•• " 5 • 2 Keith Sinclair, Historv of New Zealand (Harmondsworth 1959) p71; Claudia Orange, The Treaty of Waitangi (Auckland 1987) pp38, 59. 3 McLintock, Crown Colony Government, pp70-1 4 Wards, Shadow of the Land, ppix-x, 28 5 Adams, Fatal Necessity, pp14-15. I' - 9 - Neither consensus nor conflict historians have probed the imperial origins of the Treaty very deeply. In embracing a view of imperial idealism, consensus historians have failed to consider that this idealism may have been .. based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of Maori society during the 1830s. On the other hand, conflict historians oversimplify the divisions between Crown, humanitarian and vested interests. They also pay insufficient attention to how Maori actions could influence imperial and colonial outcomes. (b) Imperial Illusions During the late 1830s, Crown actions were influenced by four major illusions which historians usually ignore. Although the illusory nature of these assumptions may not be potently obvious, they were that: 1 Maori had alienated most of their land; 2 Land in Maori hands was virtually valueless; 3 Maori were almost all under missionary control; and; 4 Maori would meekly accept annexation to Britain. The first illusion, that during the 1830s Maori alienated most of their land, arose partly from Busby and missionary reports, and partly from testimony before the House of Lords Select Committee on New Zealand in 1838. In mid 1837, James Busby, the British Resident in the Bay of Islands informed London that Maori had alienated most of Northern New Zealand to British settlers.