DOCSLIB.ORG

Investor Presentation – Pareto Conference

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Investor Presentation – Pareto Conference Investor Presentation – Pareto Conference September 2016 1 Forward Looking Statements Matters discussed in this presentation may constitute forward-looking statements under U.S. federal securities laws, including the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. Forward-looking statements reflect the Company’s current views with respect to future events and financial performance and may include statements concerning plans, objectives, goals, strategies, future events or performance, and underlying assumptions and other statements, which are other than statements of historical facts. All statements, other than statements of historical facts, that address activities, events or developments that the Company expects, projects, believes or anticipates will or may occur in the future, including, without limitation, the delivery of vessels, the outlook for tanker shipping rates, general industry conditions future operating results of the Company’s vessels, capital expenditures, expansion and growth opportunities, bank borrowings, financing activities and other such matters, are forward-looking statements. Although the Company believes that its expectations stated in this presentation are based on reasonable assumptions, actual results may differ from those projected in the forward-looking statements. Important factors that, in our view, could cause actual results to differ materially from those discussed in the forward-looking statements include the failure of counterparties to fully perform their obligations to us, the strength of the world economies and currencies, general market conditions, including changes in tanker vessel charter hire rates and vessel values, changes in demand for tankers, changes in our vessel operating expenses, including dry-docking, crewing and insurance costs, or actions taken by regulatory authorities, ability of customers of our pools to perform their obligations under charter contracts on a timely basis, potential liability from future litigation, domestic and international political conditions, potential disruption of shipping routes due to accidents and political events or acts by terrorists. We undertake no obligation to publicly update or revise any forward looking statement contained in this presentation, whether as a result of new information, future events or otherwise, except as required by law. In light of the risks, uncertainties and assumptions, the forward looking events discussed in this presentation might not occur, and our actual results could differ materially from those anticipated in these forward-looking statements. 2 Section 1 Euronav at a Glance 2 3 Euronav – Largest Tanker Company in the World CURRENT FLEET – TOTAL 55 VESSELS – 13.7 MM DWT WHO WE ARE 1 V – PLUS (1) 2 FSO 20 SUEZMAX 30 VLCC (+2 TBD) Over 441,000 DWT 380k barrels Leading pure-play tanker company Up to 330,000 DWT with best-in-class operating platform 150,000 – 165,000 DWT Only 4 in world fleet Stripped water capacity Strong balance sheet Committed to shareholder 1MM barrels 2MM barrels 3 MM barrels 2.8 MM barrels long-term value creation… Avg. age 10 years Avg. age 6 years Avg. age 13 years Avg. age 14 years … with significant direct return to shareholders Notes: 1. Only 4 V-Plus vessels in world fleet Most liquid big tanker player in the world WELL POSITIONED FOR STRONG CASH FLOW GENERATION Breakeven (including debt service)(1): Spot Income - High Leverage to Upside 1 ~ USD 27,300 / day for VLCC – OpEx / day USD 8,165 3 Each USD 5,000 uplift (above break-even) in both VLCC and Suezmax rates improves net revenue and EBITDA ~ USD 24,000 / day for Suezmax – OpEx / day USD 7,520 by USD 72 million Yield or Growth – Why not both? Fixed Income 25 VLCC acquired in last 30 months 2 > USD 100 million of EBITDA (2) generated annually from 4 fixed income contracts (FSO + TC contracts) 80% of annualized P&L returned to shareholders since January 2015 (3) 1. Before TC-in/fixed income 2. Proportionate consolidation method & FSO contribution current contract runs to Q3 2017 3. Details of Company distribution policy at www.euronav.com 4 Shipping– access to finance is key in the “new normal” Tanker sector remain CYCLICAL but……………… Financing becoming STRUCTURALLY restricted 14% Mid to long term outlook positive 100 12% 95 m barrels consumedbarrels 10% 90 8% 85 per day per % growth %YOY fleet VLCC 6% 80 4% • “New Normal” financing restricts amount of newbuilding orders – less cyclical extremes 75 • Oil demand NOT cyclical – 1.1m average demand 2% growth last 20 years • Industrial players (more disciplined) will retain capital access leading to higher & more sustainable returns 0% 70 Source IEA, BLoomberg 5 Oil Tankers 2015 – All Green 2016-2017 – Mixed Five Key Drivers Long Term – All Green Demand for Oil Supply of Oil Ton Miles Supply of Vessels Financing ROBUST BALANCED REDUCED S/TERM NEW BARRIER HEADWINDS TO ENTRY • Oil demand growing • Atlantic sourced • New regulations last 25 years with Yearly • OPEC supply growth = L/TERM barrels been replaced by (Basel 3 & 4) restricting average 1.1 mbpd Non OPEC reduction primarily Middle East MANAGEABLE lending supply reducing ton • IEA forecast 1.4mbpd • USA production shale miles • Seasonal trends • Distress in shipping for 2016 and 1.2mbpd New Swing Producer impacted by factors very resilient & loans has reduced risk EVERY year to 2020 • USA crude exports to increasing tonnage responsive appetite increase ton miles from • Contracting rate fallen • Only 2 negative years 2017 substantially & shipyards • Equity in retreat of growth since 1990 for • Iran increase to pre under reform pressure PE & ship owners global crude demand sanction output forecast late 2016 1 2 3 4 5 6 Section 2 Current trading 5 7 REMEMBER – Tankers remains a Seasonal Business SEASONALITY BUILT IN – EVERY Q2 DEMAND RETREATS AS REFINERY TANKER RATES SEASONAL BY NATURE – VLCC EARNINGS 2009-2016 MAINTENANCE & NORTHERN HEMISPHERE INTO SUMMER 120,000 97 96 $ USD/ Day 100,000 2011 Million Million barrels per day 95 2012 80,000 94 2013 2014 93 60,000 2015 92 40,000 2016 91 Average 2011-2015 20,000 90 89 0 Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 88 Minimum 2009-2014 Maximum 2009-2014 2015 2016 Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Source IEA Source Clarksons 8 Ton Mile Dislocation DISLOCATION IN VLCC EQUIVALENT TERMS = LOSS OF APPROX 20 VLCCS (ANNUALISED) 1 mbpd x 365 days = 365m barrels Arabian Gulf to China 21 days 365m barrels / 2m capacity per VLCC = 183 cargoes 5,500 miles 183 cargoes / 9 annual journeys for VLCC MEG – F East = 20 VLCCs West Africa to China 33 days 9,650 miles LatAm to China 44 days 11,500 miles Asia Pacific Middle East China 29 – 32 West Africa VLCCs LatAm / Caribs 52 – 54 1 mbpd x 365 days = 365m barrels VLCCs 365m barrels / 2m capacity per VLCC = 183 cargoes 183 cargoes / 4.5 annual journeys for VLCC Atlantic – F East = 40 VLCCs Source Euronav, Morgan Stanley 9 Q4 BEYOND Q3 IMPACTS AND RESPONSE • Reduction of delays in key ports Q2 Q3 • Weather impact less prevalent than previous CONGESTION summers (Mid East / Caribs) • One time negative impact on supply • Seasonality built into tanker sector SEASONALITY • Cargo count all times high during 2016 • Q4 rates +70% on average in 14 out of last 16 years • Loss of Atlantic barrels - Nigeria (600-800k bpd) & SUBSTITUTION – Venezuela (200k) has dislocated ton miles LOSS TON MILES • Nigeria force majeure ending; Far East retains focus on diversifying crude sourcing • 29 VLCC & Suezmax delivered to global fleet April – INCREASED August 2016 v 14 in same 2015 period CAPACITY/VESSELS • New vessels not vetted so first voyage at discount WITHOUT VETTINGS • Tanker delivery rate peaks mid 2017 • Speeds important as can alter tonnage capacity SPEED • Operational flexibility – affirmative action taken by ship owners reducing average VLCC speeds by c 10% since weaker rates 10 Section 3 Industry Dynamics 5 11 Oil Price – Impact on Demand 1 Demand for Oil OIL PRICE OUTLOOK 90 Lack of disruption/market share game Demand Destructive Iran and other supply remain high Shale - as swing producer increases 2009 - 2014 proved in this oil 80 output price range that demand was destroyed USD perbarrel 70 Neutral 60 50 Demand Stimulating proven over time that the cheaper 40 the commodity price the greater it is used 30 Demand Disruptive 20 Current structure of global markets mean energy/capex/sovereign wealth Capex cuts in E&P effects > consumer stimulus from 10 Potential coordinated cuts in production lower oil prices QE returns/$ loss of value/oil as financial asset 0 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 12 Demand – steady, robust and diversified 1 Demand for Oil GLOBAL OIL DEMAND 1990-2016 (MB/D) CHINA CRUDE OIL IMPORT DIVERSIFICATION CONTINUES Average oil demand growth 1990-2015 =1.1 mbpd Russia 14% Other 20% 3.5 3.1 3.1 Source IEA 3 Est. Libya 1% 2.5 Saudi Arabia 14% Kzakhstan 1% 2 Brazil 3% 1.9 1.8 2 1.7 1.6 Kuwait 4% 1.5 1.5 Est. 1.4 1.5 1.3 1.3 1.1 1 1 1 Million Million barrels per day Venezuela 6% 0.8 0.8 1 0.7 0.7 0.7 Oman 11% 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.3 Iran 6% 0 Iraq 9% Angola 10% Source Bloomberg -0.5 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 -1 -0.7 -0.9 CHINA CRUDE DEMAND – ROBUST INDIA CRUDE DEMAND – INCREASING IN IMPORTANCE 35 5 FORECAST 30 4.5 Q Q Q Q Q Q 25 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 20 2 2 2 2 2 2 Millions metric tonnes metric Millions 3.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 15 1 1 1 1 1 1 5 6 5 6 5 6 3 10 2.5 5 0 2 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Load more

Recommended publications
  • New Economics of Oil Spencer Dale British Petroleum
    Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal Volume 1 | Number 5 January 2016 New Economics of Oil Spencer Dale British Petroleum Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej Part of the Energy and Utilities Law Commons, Natural Resources Law Commons, and the Oil, Gas, and Mineral Law Commons Recommended Citation Spencer Dale, New Economics of Oil, 1 Oil & Gas, Nat. Resources & Energy J. 365 (2016), http://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol1/iss5/3 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal by an authorized administrator of University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. ONE J Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal VOLUME 1 NUMBER 5 NEW ECONOMICS OF OIL * SPENCER DALE Introduction The oil market has been at the centre of economic news over much of the past year: what should we make of the US shale revolution; how will the rebalancing of the Chinese economy affect demand; and most obviously, what are the implications of the dramatic fall in oil prices over the past year or so? The implications of these developments are far reaching. For policymakers, responding to their impact on the prospects for demand and inflation; for financial markets, involved in the trading and financing of oil flows; and most fundamentally of all, for businesses and families across the world that rely on oil to fuel their everyday businesses and lives.
    [Show full text]
  • The Swing Producer, the US Gulf Coast, and the US Benchmarks: the Missing Links
    December 2013 The Swing Producer, the US Gulf Coast, and the US Benchmarks: The Missing links OXFORD ENERGY COMMENT Bassam Fattouh and Amrita Sen* * Chief Oil Analyst, Energy Aspects Introduction Amid rising speculation that OPEC’s oil market clout is threatened by US tight oil growth, the group’s December meeting ended without much of a bang. The 30 million b/d production quota, an artifact of different times as most members currently produce at their maximum capacity, was rolled over. Saudi Arabia the only OPEC member with the ability and the willingness to alter its output to balance the market, put on a carefree face. Saudi Arabia’s Oil Minister Mr Ali al-Naimi dismissed suggestions that the Kingdom might need to reduce production to accommodate growing output elsewhere, telling reporters that ‘Demand is great, economic growth is improving, so what more do you want?’ Indeed, should global oil demand surprise to the upside and some of the current supply disruptions persist, the issue of how to accommodate growing output from within and outside OPEC will not be a pressing one for next year. But should oil market fundamentals weaken, Saudi Arabia’s key challenge is to find a way to accommodate the return of some of the older oil powerhouses like Iran and Iraq while avoiding a sharp fall in the oil price. Indeed, as Naimi calmly batted away journalists’ questions, both Iran and Iraq talked about producing 4 million b/d in 2014 (year-on-year increases of 1.4 million b/d and 1 million b/d respectively).
    [Show full text]
  • Geopolitical Effects and Policy Implications of Structural Changes in the Global Crude Oil Trade
    Basic Research Report 18-20 Geopolitical Effects and Policy Implications of Structural Changes in the Global Crude Oil Trade Dalseok Lee Research Participants Head Researcher: Dalseok Lee, Senior Research Fellow, KEEI Research Associates: Sangyun Shin, Research Fellow, KEEI Donguk Park, Postdoctoral Researcher Jaeseung Lee, Professor, Korea University ABSTRACT 1. Research purpose The United States, which was the world’s largest crude oil importer, showed a significant decline in its crude oil imports, resulting from the increase in its domestic shale oil production, and this trend is expected to continue in the future. Meanwhile, since China became a net importer of crude oil in 1996, its dependence on imported crude oil has been increasing steadily with its growing domestic oil demand and stagnant domestic crude oil production. The world’s two biggest crude oil importers are bringing about a huge change in the global crude oil trading structure. With the decrease in the United States’ crude oil imports from major oil producers in the Middle East, Africa, South America, and Europe, a new crude oil trading structure centered around China, and Asia in general, has emerged, and competition among oil producers to secure market share is intensifying. The change in the trading structure for crude oil, which is widely known as a “strategic product,” is expected to have geopolitical impacts, including changes in international relations. This raises several questions: While the decrease in the United States’ crude oil imports from Saudi Arabia
    [Show full text]
  • Russian and European Gas Interdependence Can Market Forces Balance out Geopolitics?
    Laboratoire d'Economie de la Production et de l'Intégration Internationale Département Energie et Politiques de l'Environnement (EPE) FRE 2664 CNRS-UPMF CAHIER DE RECHERCHE LEPII Série EPE N° 41 bis Russian and European gas interdependence Can market forces balance out geopolitics? Dominique FINON Catherine LOCATELLI janvier 2007 LEPII - EPE BP 47 - 38040 Grenoble CEDEX 9 - France 1221 rue des Résidences - 2e étage - 38400 Saint Martin d'Hères Tél.: + 33 (0)4 56 52 85 70 - Télécopie : + 33 (0)4 56 52 85 71 [email protected] - http://www.upmf-grenoble.fr/lepii-epe/ 1 Russian and European gas interdependence. Can market forces balance out geopolitics? Dominique FINON, CIRED, CNRS and EHESS, Paris Catherine LOCATELLI, LEPII-EPE, Université de Grenoble Summary This article analyses the economic risk associated with the dominant position of the Russian vendor in the European market, with a view to assessing the relevance of possible responses by European nations or the EU. It considers various aspects of the Russian vendor's dependence on the European market, before turning to the risks that Gazprom exerts market power on the European market. It concludes by considering the relevance of the possible responses open to the EU and member states to limit any risks by creating a gas single buyer or more simply by encouraging the development of a denser pan-European network, with additional sources of supply and increased market integration. 2 1. Introduction A great deal has been written recently on relations between European Union countries and Russia with respect to gas. Alarmed by the fears stirred up by the supply cuts following the gas dispute between Russia and Ukraine in January 2006, European states are increasingly concerned about their growing dependence on Russian gas (40% of imports) and the strategy of the quasi-public company Gazprom, which aims to take control of some major gas companies in certain countries without offering anything very substantial in return.
    [Show full text]
  • Investicije I Rizici U 2019
    Bilten # 31 Broj 31 April 2019. SADRŽAJ: Poruka glavnog urednika: Bitka sa žilavim BILTENISSN (Online) 2620-0260 i fleksibilnim protivnikom INTERVJUI Investicije i rizici u 2019. - nafta i gas Ottó Grád: Grey or black side of oil market in Hungary Za godinu dana desetak Aleksandar Djukov Slaviša Petković: puta smanjen broj prekršaja u markiranju Želimo da postanemo orijentir ta tehnološki razvoj i efikasnost ANALIZE EKSPERATA LUKOIL očekuje visoke cene nafte u narednih 10- Tomislav Mićović: Preispitati ceo sistem 15 godina kontrole tržišta nafte I derivata Aleksandar Nedučin: Šverc goriva Vladimir Spasić OSVRT Početak godine ne potvrđuje predviđanja Srećko Đukić I.G. Balčin: Preživljavanje pod sankcijama Nadam se da sa Turskim tokom ne ponavljamo VESTI IZ WPC I NNKS-WPC grešku AKTIVNOSTI NAŠIH ČLANICA Aleksandar Nedučin Trendovi i očekivanja industrije nafte i gasa u NIS 2019. LUKOIL I.G. Balčin Deset najvećih naftnih kompanija u svetu Srbijagas Aktivnosti u kvartalu: SADRŽAJ: NNKS-WPC, NIS, Srbijagas, LUKOIL 3 Poruka čitaocima INTERV JU 1 April 2019. Bilten # 31 . SADRŽAJ 3 Uvodnik: Još jedna godina nemirnog mora ….….………………………..…………………..….…………….……...……. OVDE NAFTA 4 Aleksandar Djukov, Želimo da postanemo orijentir za tehnološki razvoj i efikasnost ............. OVDE 9 Alexander Dyukov, To become a landmark for technological development and efficiency … HERE 14 LUKOIL očekuje visoke cene nafte u narednih 10 -15 godina ………………………………………………..….…… OVDE 17 Vladimir Spasić: Početak godine ne potvrđuje predviđanja ………………………………...…………....….….… OVDE GAS 22 Srećko Đukić: Nadam se da sa Turskim tokom ne ponavljamo grešku ………………………..….….… OVDE STRUČNI TEKSTOVI 34 28 Aleksandar Nedučin: Trendovi i očekivanja industrije nafte i gasa u 2019. ……...………..….….… OVDE 33 I.G. Balčin: Deset najvećih naftnih kompanija u svetu …………................………………….……………….… OVDE 39 I.G.
    [Show full text]
  • OPEC Imposes 'Swing Producer' Role Upon U.S. Shale: Evidence And
    International Association for Energy Economics | 17 OPEC Imposes ‘Swing Producer’ Role upon U.S. Shale: Evidence and Implications By Jim Krane and Mark Agerton* Introduction When OPEC declared in November that it would not cut production to boost oil prices, shock waves cascaded across the global oil sector. Oil prices had been dropping since June 2014, and OPEC’s an- nouncement propelled prices lower. By December, oil prices were half of what they had been in June. Now, emerging data show that those shock waves also disrupted the booming growth in the U.S. shale oil sector. Starting in January, U.S. shale producers reacted to the new price environment by idling rigs and reducing the number of wells drilled. Those actions, in turn, reduced the amount of new oil brought to market. The cutbacks accelerated through February and March. Taken together, it appears that market signals produced a collective “swing” response from shale producers that is helping to balance global markets, but via a new and untested channel. Since the 1970s, most of the market-reactive cuts in crude oil production have been orchestrated by the OPEC cartel. Shale’s unique characteristics are now allowing it to assume a swing role. These include a cost struc- ture that differs from the front-loaded investment required by conventional oil and gas production. Shale allows short lead times and smaller initial investment, along with lower barriers to entry and exit. Since shale wells are characterized by steep production decline curves, companies invest in real time, drilling and producing when prices warrant.
    [Show full text]
  • The Death of OPEC? the Displacement of Saudi Arabia As the World's Swing Producer and the Futility of an Output Freeze
    Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies Volume 24 Issue 1 Article 12 2-15-2017 The Death of OPEC? The Displacement of Saudi Arabia as the World's Swing Producer and the Futility of an Output Freeze Christopher Hanewald Indiana University Maurer School of Law, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ijgls Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, International Trade Law Commons, Natural Resource Economics Commons, and the Oil, Gas, and Energy Commons Recommended Citation Hanewald, Christopher (2017) "The Death of OPEC? The Displacement of Saudi Arabia as the World's Swing Producer and the Futility of an Output Freeze," Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies: Vol. 24 : Iss. 1 , Article 12. Available at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ijgls/vol24/iss1/12 This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies by an authorized editor of Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact [email protected]. The Death of OPEC? The Displacement of Saudi Arabia as the World's Swing Producer and the Futility of an Output Freeze CHRISTOPHER HANEWALD* ABSTRACT On November 27, 2014, the Organizationof Petroleum Exporting Countries met in Vienna and adopted a bold stance against increasing supply from beyond the reach of the cartel. Rather than reduce their own production, the cartel decided to allow market forces to dictate the price of a barrel of oil.
    [Show full text]
  • TURKEY 2005 Review INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY
    INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY Energy Policies of IEA Countries TURKEY 2005 Review INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY The International Energy Agency (IEA) is an autonomous body which was established in November 1974 within the framework of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) to implement an international energy programme. It carries out a comprehensive programme of energy co-operation among twenty-six of the OECD’s thirty member countries. The basic aims of the IEA are: • to maintain and improve systems for coping with oil supply disruptions; • to promote rational energy policies in a global context through co-operative relations with non-member countries, industry and international organisations; • to operate a permanent information system on the international oil market; • to improve the world’s energy supply and demand structure by developing alternative energy sources and increasing the efficiency of energy use; • to assist in the integration of environmental and energy policies. The IEA member countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States. The European Commission takes part in the work of the IEA. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT The OECD is a unique forum where the governments of thirty democracies work together to address the economic, social and environmental challenges of globalisation. The OECD is also at the forefront of efforts to understand and to help governments respond to new developments and concerns, such as corporate governance, the information economy and the challenges of an ageing population.
    [Show full text]
  • Shale, the New Oil Swing Producer?
    View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by RERO DOC Digital Library Shale, the new oil swing producer? Bachelor Project submitted for the obtention of the Bachelor of Science HES in International Business Management by Gregory HUTIN Bachelor Project Advisor: Benoit LIOUD Geneva, the 21st September 2017 Haute école de gestion de Genève (HEG-GE) International Business Management Declaration This Bachelor Project is submitted as part of the final examination requirements of the Haute école de gestion de Genève, for the Bachelor of Science HES-SO in International Business Management. The student accepts the terms of the confidentiality agreement if one has been signed. The use of any conclusions or recommendations made in the Bachelor Project, with no prejudice to their value, engages neither the responsibility of the author, nor the adviser to the Bachelor Project, nor the jury members nor the HEG. “I attest that I have personally accomplished this work without using any sources other than those cited in the bibliography. Furthermore, I have sent the final version of this document for analysis by the plagiarism detection software URKUND using the address supplied by my adviser”. Geneva, 21 September 2017 Gregory HUTIN Shale, the new oil swing producer? Gregory HUTIN i Acknowledgements I would particularly like to express my gratitude to my Advisor, Mr Benoit Lioud, for his support during this research. I would also like to thank my Commodity Trading Major Program teacher Mr. Robert Piller who, by sharing his passion for the commodities sector, made me discover this captivating domain.
    [Show full text]
  • Swing Production and the Role of Credit
    Swing Production and the Role of Credit: A Synthesis of Best-in-Class Research International Energy Forum and Bank of Canada Roundtable April 25, 2016 Hilary Till, Solich Scholar, J.P. Morgan Center for Commodities, University of Colorado Denver Business School J.P. Morgan Center for Commodities. Swing Production and the Role of Credit: A Synthesis of Best-in-Class Research * I. Strict Definition of Swing Producer II. New Technology: New Financing Options III. Shale as an Imperfect Swing Producer, But But Perhaps Only in the Short-Term Future IV. Ultimately, the Gulf Producers, Though, Could Revert to Being the Key Swing Producers * The opinions expressed during this presentation are the personal opinions of the presenter and do not necessarily reflect those of other organizations with which the presenter is affiliated, including the J.P. Morgan Center for Commodities at the University of Colorado Denver Business School. The information contained in this presentation has been assembled from sources believed to be reliable, but is not guaranteed by the presenter. 2 J.P. Morgan Center for Commodities. I. Strict Definition of Swing Producer A. Definition of Swing Producer Coy (2015): A swing producer “has a large market share, spare capacity, and very low production costs, and it is capable of acting strategically—alone or in a cartel—to raise and lower production to affect the price.” B. Historically, Gulf Producers Fit this Definition Capable of Acting Strategically Source of Data: Bloomberg. 3 J.P. Morgan Center for Commodities. I. Strict Definition of Swing Producer B. Historically, Gulf Producers Fit this Definition (Continued) Spare Capacity EIA (2014): The U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • Annual Report 2004
    Succeeding through cooperation Annual report and accounts 2004 Norway Sweden Estonia Denmark Latvia UK Russia Ireland Lithuania Belgium Poland France Germany Kazakhstan Georgia USA Turkey Azerbaijan Algeria Iran Saudi Arabia Qatar China Mexico Venezuela Nigeria Singapore Angola Brazil Statoil is represented in 29 countries and has its head office in Stavanger. Statoil 2004 The picture on the front cover of this annual report was taken on the helicopter deck of the Statfjord A platform. Agate Langeland, materials coordinator, is welcomed on board for a new shift by production operative Kollfinn Buvik. Along with 630 Statoil colleagues and a similar number of contractor personnel, they staff an oil and gas field which has played an extremely important role in Statoil’s economy and expertise development. Without Statfjord, Statoil would not have been the same company. On 24 November 2004, it was 25 years since production started on Statfjord. The field has produced oil equivalent to 50 times Norway’s annual requirements and has exported substantial volumes of gas to customers in continental Europe. Although output today is a sixth of what it was at maximum, the plan is to uphold profitable production and processing until 2020. A plan for Statfjord late life has been submitted to the authorities. The Statfjord veteran will continue to deliver and contribute to the goal of maintaining today’s level of production on the Norwegian continental shelf (NCS) beyond 2010. Upholding production on the NCS is one of two important ambitions. The other is to strengthen efforts to secure long- term international growth. This report tells of our strategies and goals, shows a cross-section of our business and communicates the results which have made 2004 a record year for Statoil.
    [Show full text]
  • Teck Fort Hills Blend Market Strategy
    Energy Business Unit & Marketing March 31, 2015 Ray Reipas, Senior Vice President, Energy Energy Business Unit & Marketing Forward Looking Information Both these slides and the accompanying oral presentation contain certain forward-looking statements within the meaning of the United States Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 and forward-looking information within the meaning of the Securities Act (Ontario) and comparable legislation in other provinces. Forward-looking statements can be identified by the use of words such as “plans”, “expects” or “does not expect”, “is expected”, “budget”, “scheduled”, “estimates”, “forecasts”, “intends”, “anticipates” or “does not anticipate”, or “believes”, or variation of such words and phrases or state that certain actions, events or results “may”, “could”, “should”, “would”, “might” or “will” be taken, occur or be achieved. Forward-looking statements involve known and unknown risks, uncertainties and other factors which may cause the actual results, performance or achievements of Teck to be materially different from any future results, performance or achievements expressed or implied by the forward-looking statements. These forward-looking statements include statements relating to management’s expectations regarding future oil prices, that PFT bitumen produced at Fort Hills is expected to be equivalent to WCS, other statements regarding our Fort Hills project, including mine life of Fort Hills, projected revenues and economics, cash flow potential, future production targets, our market access options and projected railway and pipeline capacity. These forward-looking statements involve numerous assumptions, risks and uncertainties and actual results may vary materially. Management’s expectations of mine life are based on the current planned production rate and assume that all resources described in this presentation are developed.
    [Show full text]