National Park Service Monocacy U.S. Department of the Interior National Battlefield Maryland From every point of view it was heroism. —Union Gen. Lew Wallace on the defense of the Monocacy River bridges Burning the wooden bridge over the Monocacy. NPS / KEITH ROCCO The Battle that Saved Washington, DC Monocacy National Battlefield preserves the site of a Civil War battle fought on July 9, 1864, south of Frederick, Maryland, during the third and final Confederate invasion of the North. The Battle of Monocacy is less famous and smaller than the battles of Antietam and Gettysburg—during the first and second invasions—but it also proved crucial. The Battle of Monocacy delayed Confederate forces sent to cap- ture the Nation’s Capital and ultimately forced them to withdraw to Virginia. Third Confederate Invasion of the North Lt. Gen. Jubal Early Maj. Gen. Lew Wallace By mid-1864 the tide of war had turned headed east toward Frederick and the road Early, one of Lee’s most Ulysses S. Grant said against the Confederacy. In the West its to Washington. Seeing their movements, experienced command- that Wallace’s defeat at army was being beaten back toward Atlanta, railroad agents alerted Baltimore and Ohio ers, was ending his Monocacy contributed invasion of Maryland, “a greater benefit to the Georgia. In the East, Gen. Robert E. Lee’s Railroad President John W. Garrett, who no- when he said, “Major, cause than often falls to Army of Northern Virginia was forced to tified Maj. Gen. Lew Wallace, the Union we haven’t taken Wash- the lot of a commander establish battle lines around Richmond and commander in Balti more. Wallace quickly ington, but we scared of equal force to render Peters burg, Virginia. To bolster Union forces assembled 3,200 troops, mostly new or Abe Lincoln like hell!” by means of a victory.” be sieging the cities, Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant short-term recruits without experience. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS removed thousands of troops from the defen- sive ring of forts around Wash ington, DC, Unsure of Early’s strength or whether the leaving the city lightly defended and a Confederates were headed to Baltimore or tempting target. Washington, Wallace rushed his troops by railroad to Monocacy Junction, an impor- To relieve pressure on his beleaguered tant trade and transportation center. There, army, Lee sent 15,000 troops under Lt. Gen. the George town Pike to Washington and Jubal Early to secure the Shenandoah Valley the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad crossed the and then invade Maryland. Lee hoped to Monocacy, as did the nearby National Road force Grant to divert troops to protect the to Balti more. Guarding the three bridges North by threatening—and possibly captur- and several fords, Wallace hoped to delay ing—Washington. Early headed west to the Early until Washington could be reinforced. Shenandoah Valley, then swept north into Maryland. His goal was to threaten or cap- By dawn on July 9, the last of the 3,400 ture the Nation’s Capital. Lee also hoped Union veterans that Grant had sent reached that this third invasion of the war-weary Monocacy Junction, more than doubling North would further erode public support Wallace’s force to 6,600. Early’s army—in for the war there. Frederick now—still outnumbered Wallace more than two to one, although Early had Early’s army reached Harpers Ferry, West sent some cavalry to raid the Union prison Virginia, on July 4. Crossing the Potomac at Point Lookout and free the thousands River near Sharps burg, Maryland, they of Confederates held there. The Armies Clash at Monocacy Confederate artillery on the Best Farm f­­­ires Wallace determined that Early was headed on Union troops at the toward Washington. He concentrated his Battle of Monocacy, July 9, 1864. veterans on the east side of the river at NPS / KEITH ROCCO Monocacy Junction, where the road to Washington crossed. He also placed a line of skirmishers along the railroad tracks on the west side. On the morning of July 9, advancing Confederates attacked Union troops defending the Monocacy River bridges. The Confederates brought up artillery and heavy fighting ensued around the Best Farm as they tested the Union defense. Early decided a direct frontal assault would be too costly. Instead, his cavalry found a place downstream to ford the river and attack the Union left flank. Alerted to the movement, Wallace shifted troops onto the Thomas Farm to meet the assault. Early’s cavalry crossed the river at the Worthington Ford, dismounted, formed ranks, and advanced across the Worthing- MONOCACY AND THE MedaL OF HonoR ton Farm fields. Instead of springing a surprise attack, they marched into a line division forded the river in late afternoon of soldiers concealed along a fence on the and launched a three-pronged assault Thomas Farm. Union rifle fire raked the against the Union line. Confederates, forcing them to fall back. The day’s heaviest fighting raged across Meanwhile, Wallace ordered his men to the wheat and corn fields of the Thomas burn the wooden covered bridge on the Farm, as the Confederates again pushed Georgetown Pike to keep Confederates on the Union soldiers back. At the junction his right from storming across the river. By they also dislodged the Union skirmishers NPS NPS doing so, he also cut off the best route of and forced them to flee under fire across Lt. George E. Davis Corp. Alexander Scott retreat for his skirmishers, still stubbornly the railroad bridge. The Medal of Honor is the highest holding their ground near the junction. decoration for valor awarded by Wallace bolstered his left flank and shifted Wallace could hold his position no longer. the US government. It was award- more troops to the Thomas Farm, prepar- He ordered what was left of his small army ed twice at the Battle of Monocacy, ing for a second Confederate assault. to fall back past Gambrill Mill and retreat both times to members of the 10th toward Baltimore. He left behind some Regi ment of Vermont Volunteers: A mid-afternoon Confederate cavalry 1,300 men—dead, wounded, missing, or Lt. George E. Davis, for defending attack pushed the Union soldiers back and captured. the two bridge approaches at captured the Thomas House. Then a Union Monocacy Junction against the counterattack recaptured the house. On repeated assaults by a larger force; the Worthington Farm, a full Confederate and Corp. Alexander Scott, for saving the regiment’s national flag from capture. NPS Significance of the Battle The exhausted Confederates encamped on from Petersburg were moving into Fort of darkness, Early started to withdraw his the battlefield that night before resuming Stevens and other city defenses. army back into Virginia, ending the last their march toward Washington. The battle Con federate invasion of the North. had cost them as many as 900 men killed, Early’s and Grant’s troops battled on July wounded, missing, or captured, as well as a 12, with President Lincoln watching the At Monocacy, Wallace’s small improvised precious day of time. On July 11, two days action, but any opportunity to capture the army had held its ground against repeated after the Battle of Monocacy, Early’s army city had been lost. The Confederate cavalry assaults by a much larger, battle-hardened reached Fort Stevens in northwest Wash- sent to liberate prisoners at Point Lookout Confederate force, delaying their advance ington. By the time his army arrived, the was recalled before they could reach their for one critical day. His troops had lost the two divisions Grant rushed to Washington destination, and on July 12, under the cover battle, but they had saved Washington. Frederick Monocacy River Best Farm Wooden bridge Worthington Farm Railroad bridge Gambrill Mill Thomas Farm NPS / RICHARD SCHLECHT Monocacy Battlefield Then and Now Two Other Significant Civil War Events took place on the Monocacy battlefield before and after the battle: On September 13, 1862, Union soldiers systematically lay waste to this “breadbas- made a surprising find—they discovered ket of the Confederacy,” therefore deny- an envelope containing two cigars and a ing Lee’s army a de pend able source of copy of Confederate Gen. Robert E. Lee’s food and forage. The next day he placed Special Orders No. 191. The orders, detail- Gen. Philip Sheridan in command of the ing movements of the Confederate army Union army in the Valley. Sheridan’s September 10–12, were written a few assign ment: destroy Early’s forces and days before as the army was camped at render the Valley so desolate that “even the Best Farm. This information enabled a crow flying over the place would have Union Gen. George B. McClellan to deter- to take his rations with him.” mine Lee’s movements and intentions, and to move his army quicker and with more confidence. His clash with Lee at Antietam on September 17, the bloodiest day of the war, ended in a draw—a CLELLAN PAPERS, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS LIBRARY CLELLAN PAPERS, C M missed opportunity to destroy the Con- federate army. A his tor i cal marker on the NPS Lee’s Lost Orders Monocacy battlefield identifies Lee’s When General McClellan paper with which, if I headquarters site where Special Orders re­­ceived this copy of Lee’s cannot whip Bobby No. 191 was prepared. Soldier Encampments on the Battlefield Special Orders No. 191, he Lee, I will be willing to Both Union and Lt. Ambrose B. Hart Confederate armies of the 128th New York exclaimed, “Here is a go home.” On August 5, 1864, Union Lt.