Vol. 148, No. 2-3 · Research article

Brazil’s Belo Monte Dam: Lessons of an Amazonian resource DIE ERDE struggle Journal of the Geographical Society of Berlin

Philip M. Fearnside National Institute for Research in Amazonia (INPA), Av. André Araújo, 2936, Manaus, Amazonas, CEP 69067-375, Brazil, [email protected]

Manuscript submitted: 6 April 2016 / Accepted for publication: 24 March 2017 / Published online: 27 September 2017

Abstract The struggle to stop Brazil’s Belo Monte Dam, whose reservoir was filled in December 2015, has lessons for other resource struggles in Amazonia and beyond. Among the impediments that failed to halt the dam were the resistance efforts of both indigenous and non-indigenous victims of the dam’s impacts, as well as the non- governmental organizations and other actors supporting their cause. The pro-dam side had massive political and financial support from the top levels of the Brazilian government, including vigorous involvement of the country’s president. At the same time, achievements of the anti-dam side, particularly the local grassroots organizations, have provided inspiration for resource struggles elsewhere (although the victories of the resis- tance are significantly less definitive than was thought by many at the time).

Zusammenfassung Die Auseinandersetzungen um einen Stopp des Belo Monte Staudamms in Brasilien, dessen Stausee im Dezem- ber 2015 geflutet wurde, beinhalten Lehren für andere Ressourcenkonflikte in Amazonien und darüber hinaus. Zu den Kräften, denen es letztendlich nicht gelungen war, den Staudammbau aufzuhalten, gehörten vor allem- die Widerstandbemühungen der indigenen und nicht-indigenen direkt vom Staudammbau Betroffenen, die von- Nicht-Regierungsorganisationen und anderen Akteuren in ihrer Sache unterstützt worden waren. Die Befür worter des Staudammbaus konnten ihrerseits auf die massive politische und finanzielle Unterstützung höchs- ter Kreise der brasilianischen Regierung zählen, inklusive der energischen Einmischung der Präsidentin des Landes. Allerdings wirkten die Errungenschaften der Staudammgegner, insbesondere der lokalen Basisbewe gungen, durchaus inspirierend für andernorts stattfindende Ressourcenkonflikte (auch wenn die Erfolge des KeywordsWiderstandes deutlich weniger klar ausfallen als zunächst von Vielen gedacht).

Hydropower, indigenous peoples, hydroelectric dams, Amazonia, social movements, development impacts

Philip M. Fearnside 148

2017: Brazil’s Belo Monte Dam: Lessons of an Amazonian resource struggle. – DIE ERDE (2-3): 167-184

DOI: 10.12854/erde-148-46 DIE ERDE · Vol. 148 · 2-3/2017 167 Brazil’s Belo Monte Dam: Lessons of an Amazonian resource struggle

1. Introduction - Fig. 1 will also be great.Fearnside Logical, legal and ethical arguments were cast aside as the Belo Monte construction pro Brazil’s 11,233-MW Belo Monte Dam ( ) now- ject advanced ( 2017). blocks the Xingu River, displacingribeirinhos approximately 25,000 people in the city of Altamira and 18,000 tra Local actors and a wide range of outside support ditional riversideVillas-Bôas dwellers ( ) along the groups struggled against the Belo Monte plans but stretch of this Amazon tributary that is flooded by the were unable to convince the Brazilian government to reservoir ( et al. 2015: 12-13). When all of- change course. Amazonia and other developing areas- the turbines are installed in 2019 a 100-kmribeirinho stretch face many resource struggles, of which hydroelectric of river below the main dam will lose 80% of its wa dams represent one important example. Such strug ter flow, destroying the livelihoods of the gles are likely to become even more common with population that depends on fishing in this area as well continued expansion of society’s appetite for resources as indigenous people in two “indigenous lands” in this- and of its capacity to extract them. Learning lessons- “reduced-flow” stretch and one on the Bacajá River, a from the Belo Monte struggle is therefore relevant to tributary of the Xingu. Officially denied plans for ad a wide variety of development issues. The present pa ditional dams upstream of Belo Monte would flood 55°perW examines the Belo Monte struggle50°W and its lessons. vast areas of indigenous land. Environmental impacts

´ *#Belo Monte Dam Babaquara (Altamira) Dam*#

Iriri Dam *# S S 5° 5°

*# Ipixuna Dam

*#Kakraimoro Dam

*# Jarina Dam 10° S 10° S

Fig. 1 Dams and outlines of reservoirs originally planned for the Xingu River basin. Indig- enous areas are crosshatched. The ques- tion of whether dams upstream of Belo Monte will later be built, which Brazilian government authorities currently deny, is Indigenous land km a critical part of the debate. Source: Own 0175 50 300 elaboration 55°W 50°W

DIE ERDE · Vol. 148 · 2-3/2017

168 Brazil’s Belo Monte Dam: Lessons of an Amazonian resource struggle

2. A brief history of the Belo Monte struggle A Fig. 2 - n inventorySevá of the Filho Xingu River Basin proposed six - large damsCNEC ( ), including “Kararaô” (now Belo Planning for a series of dams on the Xingu River be Monte)Brazil, ELETRONORTE (e.g. 1990). Viability studies were gan in 1975 during Brazil’s 1964-1985 military dicta prepared ( 1980), and environmental studiesCon- torship. InFearnside 1975 this author was living in one of the sórcio( Nacional de Engenheiros nd [2002]) Consultores were done by the Transamazon Highway colonization areas 50 km from National Consortium of Consulting Engineers ( Altamira ( 1986). In a visit to the Altamira = CNEC), office of the National Institute for Colonization and- a consulting firm in São Paulo that, during the. course Agrarian Reform (INCRA) I was given a map showing of the study, was bought by Camargo Corrêa, the main the areas to be flooded by the Babaquara (later re construction firm preparing to build the dams named “Altamira”) Dam, the first planned upstream of Belo Monte. That someagrovila of the colonization area Field studies on environmental impactsSaracura began in 1985,- would be flooded provoked understandable dismay for which the CNEC consulting firm that had done the- among colonists in the (planned agricultural viability study was contracted ( 2015). Aca village) where I lived, but during the dictatorship any demics from various universities and research insti sort of objection70°W or protest was out60°W of the question. 50°Wtutions were hired as consultants to collect data for

´ 10°N 10°N

Uatumã River Pará 0° 0° *# Santarém .! 2 .! Belém Manaus .! *#.!*#1 r Altamira *#3 Amazon River *# 7 *# 9 y 10 pajós*# River MadeiraTa Rive8 Porto Velho *#.! ansamazon Highwa *# BR-364 TrHighwa 5 Xingu Rive r *# 4 10°S 6 10°S Fig. 2 Rondônia Locations mentioned in the text. cantins River

y To Dams: River o 1.) Belo Monte .!Cuiabá c 2.) Balbina 3.) Tucuruí 4.) Jirau São Francis

20°S 20°S 5.) Santo Antônio 6.) Cachoeira Riberão (Guajará-Mirim) *# Planned dam *# 7.) Babaquara (Altamira) Existing dam 8.) Chacorão .! Cities 9.) São Luiz do Tapajós Rivers km 10.) Jatobá Highways 05250 00 1000

30°S 30°S Source: Fearnside 2017: 15 70°W 60°W 50°W DIE ERDE · Vol. 148 · 2-3/2017

169 Brazil’s Belo Monte Dam: Lessons of an Amazonian resource struggle

- use by CNEC in drafting the report. The consultants- The year 1989Instituto saw the Brasileiro creation do of Meio the Brazilian Ambiente In e signed contracts committingFearnside themselves 2001; Pinto to secrecy, 2002: dosstitute Recursos for the Naturais Environment Renováveis and Renewable Natural which has been a serious limitation since the begin Resources ( ning of such reports (see Assis and = IBAMA), giving 56).Forline Problems also included pressuring researchers moreEstudo institutional de Impacto capacity Ambiental for the licensing process, regarding the content of their submissions ( including vetting the Environmental Impact Study- 2004). Centrais Elé- ( = EIA) that had been a tricas Brasileiras - requirement for projects like dams since 1986. How In 1987 Brazilian Electrical Centers ( ever, proponents of Amazonian development projects = ELETROBRÁS), a Brazilian gov were still testing the limits as to how little they could ernment holding company, produced the “2010 Plan” get away with considering Fearnsidein these reports, and some listing dams expected toBrazil be built, ELETROBRÁS by the year 2010 major development projects were even going forward as well as other dams without a limit on the date of without the required EIA ( 1989a). - planned construction ( 1987). The report was released only after it had leaked to the The year 1989 also saw the release of the Portu- public. The complete Fearnsidelist indicates 79 large dams in guese-language version of a book edited by Cultural Brazil’s Legal Amazonia region, with a total area of 10 Survival and the Pro-Indian Commission ofSantos São Pau and million hectares (see 1995).Brazil ,Kararaô ELETROBRÁS (Belo lode showingAndrade the disastrous impacts that the Xingu Monte) was indicated for construction by 2000 and dams would have on indigenous peoples ( - Babaquara (Altamira) by 2005 ( 1990). In February of the same year the 1987: 153–154). Brazil’s finances have not permitted “Altamira demonstration” (officially the “First En dam construction at anything like the rate expected counter of the Indigenous Peoples of the Xingu”) was in the 2010 Plan. The 2010 Plan sparked a storm of- held, led by the Kaiapó, with significant national and criticism, and the Brazilian government never again- international press coverage. The event was marked- released its complete plans for Amazonianplanos decenais dams inde by Tuíra, a Kaiapó woman, brandishing a macheteCentrais in pendent of the expected year of construction, releas Elétricasthe face of do the Norte head do of Brasilthe government electrical com ing instead only “ten-year plans” ( ) for pany Electrical Centers Tenotã-mõ!” of Northern BrazilSevá-Filho ( and the dams to be built in the subsequent 10 years, and Switk = ELETRONORTE) while- occasional medium term plans such as the 2015, 2020 shouting the war cry “ ( and 2030 plans. - es 2005). Following the Altamira demonstra tion, ELETRONORTE changed the name of “Kararaô” Brazil’s October 1988 constitution included provi- to “Belo Monte” and made an announcement that sions that development projects affecting indigenous was interpreted by many as cancelling the plans for peoples required approval by both houses of the Na the upstream dams. In reality, this was not the case: tional Congress (Article 231, Paragraph 3) and that- ELETRONORTE was only promising to remove these “Removal of indigenous groups from their lands is- dams from the 2010 Plan and to conduct a “resurvey- prohibited, except (….) in cases of catastrophe or epi of the fall” of the Xingu River, meaning that additional demic that put the population at risk, or in the inter studies would modify the plans to place dams in dif est of the sovereignty of the country (….), [but,] in any ferent locations along the river, which does not imply- event, an immediate return is guaranteed as soon as that the same indigenous lands would not be flooded. the risk ceases” (Article 231, Paragraph 5). This did The notion that the upstream dams had been defini not result in any immediate change of plans for the tively cancelled was widespread. As late as 1994 one- Xingu dams, including both the plan at the time for of the Kaiapó leaders gave a speech at a conference Kararaô (now Belo Monte) that would have directly- claiming a conclusive victory over these dams (per- flooded indigenous land and the upstream dams that- sonal observation). However, as the Kaiapó are now would flood much larger indigenous areas. In prac well aware, this was not (and is still not) the case. Nev tice, there is a two-step process, where behavior re ertheless, the impact of the Altamira demonstration- mains unchanged while actors wait to see whatRosenn new may have served as inspiration for non-governmental requirements will actually be enforced. This is a long organizations (NGOs) and development victims else tradition in Brazil dating from colonial times ( where (both in Brazil and abroad) to take action in 1971). opposing major construction projects that otherwise 170 would have been consideredDIE unstoppable. ERDE · Vol. 148 · 2-3/2017 Brazil’s Belo Monte Dam: Lessons of an Amazonian resource struggle

One of the effects of the Altamira demonstration is flow through canals to a powerhouse below the Big believed to have been its influence on international Bend of the Xingu, rather than following the normal- lenders. The WorldChernela Bank had been expected to fund pattern of generating all power at the foot of the dam Belo Monte, either directly or indirectly as part of itself. This new design significantly increased the ver a sector loan ( 1988). However, the World tical drop that could be used for power generation, but- Bank pulled out while the first (2002) EIA was under it would leave the Big Bend with greatly reduced flow, preparation, and the lack of internationalHochstetler finance is thus creating a different kind of impact on the indig believed to have motivated the Brazilian government enous people downstream of the new dam location.Brazil, to place Belo Monte on hold ( 2011: 358). ELETRONORTE - The loss of the World Bank as a focus of the anti-dam The EIA that was prepared in 2002 ( campaign changedCarvalho the political context, diminishing nd [2002]) was never formally sub- the campaign’s leverage in pressuring the Brazilian mitted toAção IBAMA. Civil PúblicaLegal decisions in 2001 and 2002,- government (e.g. 2006: 260). This change which accepted some of the arguments in a Civil Pub eliminated the “boomerang” strategy, where a local lic Suit ( Sevá= ACP) Filho brought by the Fed group in a place like Amazonia has its greatest effect eral Public Ministry (MPF), resulted in suspension- on the national government by inducing changes in- of the licensing process ( 2014). Upstream- projects and policies of international institutionsKeck andlike dams were entirely omitted from this first EIA, al theSikkink World Bank, which, in turn, have a strong influ though the viability study for the one-dam plan ex ence on the national government’s actions ( plains that considering only Belo Monte is the resultBrazil, of 1998). - ELETRONORTEpolitical considerations, and that Belo Monte’s output Apagão, - would be much greater with upstream dams ( A windfall for dam proponents was provided by Bra Brazil, 2002: ELETROBRÁS 6-82). Despite this disclaimer, zil’s 2001 “ ” a major energy crisis with uncon- studies for the upstream dams were continuing. The trolled blackouts in almost all of Brazil followed by a- second EIA ( 2009) would also series of controlledRosa blackouts and electricity ration omit consideration of upstream dams. - ing measures. The crisis was mainly caused by mis - management ( 2001). Public discontent made it- The 1988 constitutional requirement that the Nation- easy to argue that Amazonian dams were needed to al Congress approve any projects with impacts on in save the country from future blackouts.Apagão The same op digenous peoples was seen as an almost unsurmount portunity was presented byConselho the 2014-2015 Nacional São de PolítiPaulo- able barrier to proposing dams that would flood cadrought. Energética As a result of the 2001 , the National- indigenous lands. This was the reason for the 2002 Council on Energy Policy ( revision of the Belo Monte design to avoid flooding = CNPE) was created. This body is most indigenous land. Then everything changed in 2005, ly composed of ministers in the federal government. when the National Congress approved Belo Monte Representatives of civil society and of the scientific in record time under a special “urgent” regime rela that- community were supposed to be included, but these- tor”limits debate. Former president José Sarney was the members have never been appointed. The CNPE would person in charge of modifications to the bill (the “ later play a key role in facilitating Belo Monte by fore ) in the Senate, facilitating Senate approval only stalling any criticism of the upstream dam plans. three days Calheirosafter the House of Deputies approved the measure, producing Legislative Decree No. 788 of 13- In March 2002, a new plan for the design of the Belo July 2005 ( 2005). This decree, authorizing- Monte reservoir was announced in order to avoid initiation of the Belo Monte licensing process, was ap flooding any indigenous land. Throughout the almost proved by both houses in only 15 days, providing a re 14 years that had elapsed since the 1988 constitution vealing contrast with the 17 years that the indigenous had created a barrier to flooding indigenous land, the people had been waitingGraeff for the National Congress companies had been investing in a design that called- to enact laws for their protection as specified in the for indigenous lands to be flooded. This illustrates 1988 constitution ( 2012: 273). The indigenous the impunity that the dam proponents were expect peoples were not consulted prior to approval of the ing and the gradual process of adjustment. The dam measure by the National Congress, as required by the was moved upstream from its former position, thus constitution.Fearnside This legislative event sent a signal for decreasing the area and volume of the reservoir. The the subsequent surge in Amazonian dam proposals designDIE ERDE was · Vol. also 148 changed · 2-3/2017 to divert most of the river’s (see 2012). 171 Brazil’s Belo Monte Dam: Lessons of an Amazonian resource struggle

- Brazil, ELETROBRÁS On 31 October 2007, ELETROBRÁS released a Power- some future date and allowing the construction of point presentationBrazil, ( ELETROBRÁS 2007a) of a- upstream dams. The logic of this change is apparent new inventory of the Xingu River (although not the in from data on the flow of the Xingu River: the average ventory itself: 2007b). Three al flows in the months of August, September, October, ternatives were considered, two with four dams (but minus the amounts that the consortium is required to with differing water levels in the three that would be- pass through the Big Bend in these months according upstream of Belo Monte) and the third alternative to the “hydrogram of consensus” to which it agreed, with only Belo Monte. The inventory and presenta mean that the amount of water that can bypass the tion assert that the third alternative, with only Belo Big Bend throughTable the 1 adduction canal in these months Monte, was selected. The inventory indicates that the is insufficient for even a single turbine in the main upstream dams would be financially attractive based powerhouse ( ). In a fourth month (November) on the unitary reference cost of dams to be built in only one turbine would have adequate water, and the- the ELETROBRÁS ten-year plan at the time, butBrazil, that full 20 turbines would only be used at the peak of the ELETROBRÁSweighting by factors for environmental impact made flood season. Turbines can function at partial capac the one-dam choice more attractive overall ( - Tableity, but 1 Xingu with River reduced flow atoutput. Belo Monte in critical months 2007b, Vol. 1, Tome 2: 5-115).2 The two - Monthly mean flow (m³/s) alternatives with upstream dams would flood, in ad - August September October Source dition to Belo Monte, 2283 and 3004 km , respective ly, including Altamira/Babaquara. The 2007 invento Total – Xingu River 1,557 1,066 1,115 (a) ry calls for fewer dams and about one-sixth the total Bra- Big Bend 900 750 700 (b) area to be flooded, as compared to the inventory in (“hydrogram of zil, ELETROBRÁS consensus”) the 1980s that is represented by the 2010 Plan ( - 1987). However, substantial areas of Available for the 657 316 415 (c) main power house indigenous land would still be flooded. The assump tion that the option announced as “selected” (i.e., Consumption of 695 695 695 (d) - each turbine only Belo Monte) is what would take place in practice- is central to the entire discussion and struggle sur (a) Brazil, ELETROBRÁS 2009: Vol. 1: 59. rounding Belo Monte. Subsequent developments up (b) Norte Energia SA 2014: 6. stream could follow the two other alternatives given (c) Difference between total Xingu River flow and Big Bend flow. in the 2007 inventory, or they could (as has occurred (d) Brazil, ELETROBRÁS 2009: Vol. 1: 48. elsewhere) evolve with water levels being raised (and flooded areas consequently being expanded) beyond - what is initially announced. - The economic unviability of Belo Monte without up One of the indications suggesting that an option with stream dams to store water for use during the dry sea upstream dams might be the real one is that the son has been interpreted as implying that there will- 11,000-MW installed capacity of the main powerhouse- be a “plannedde Sousa crisis” Júnior after and Belo Reid Monte 2010; is de complete Sousa Júnior and at Belo Monte remains unchanged in the scenarios it is suddenlyLúcio discovered Flávio Pinto that the water flow is insuf with and without upstream dams. The electrical au ficient ( thoritiesPinto had earlier floated plans for Belo Monte with et al. 2006). (2002: 25, 69) dubs Belo the total capacity reduced to 5500, 5900 or 7500 MW Monte a “Trojan horse of concrete” and points out that ( 2003), which would have been more consistent “On the Tocantins, for example, ELETRONORTE was with an unregulated flow of the Xingu River. able to sell its controversial project for the Tucuruí Dam to public opinion based on the assumption that it The one-dam plan became the official scenario on 3 would be the only dam on the Tocantins River in Pará”- July 2008 when the National Council on Energy Policy (an obvious falsehood, given thatJunk plans and decalled Mello for all of (CNPE) issued its Resolution No. 6, stating that Belo the river above Tucuruí being converted into a contin- Monte would be the only dam on the Xingu River. The uous chain of reservoirs; see 1990). claim that only one damNader would beSalm built on the Xingu- A strong indication that public opinion is being pre River is what is known as the “institutionalized lie” pared for the Altamira/Babaquara Dam was provided by dam opponents ( 2008; 2009a). Noth by a speech by President Dilma Vana Rousseff (known ing172 prevents the CNPE from changing its mind at simply as “Dilma”) in JuneDIE 2013 ERDE asserting · Vol. 148 a · need2-3/2017 for Brazil’s Belo Monte Dam: Lessons of an Amazonian resource struggle

Borges dams with “large reservoirs” rather than continuing FUNAI released a public note also claimed that these to build run-of-river dams like Belo Monte ( presentationsXingu representedVivo a “consultation” and that- 2013). audiência públi- FUNAI had thereby fulfilled its duties in the licensing ca process ( 2011a). The deception these inci In September 2009 a publicBrazil, hearing ELETROBRÁS ( dents revealed has been a particularly sensitive issue ) was held in Altamira, as required for discussion- in increasing distrust of FUNAI and other government of the second EIA (i.e., 2009). The agencies. hearing was held to discuss the EIA only two days af- - ter this massive document hadSalm been released to the- Indigenous people are aware that they need to take public, contributing to the hearing’s lack of verisimili- care not to have their participation in meetings in tude as an informed debate ( 2009b). These hear terpreted as a “consultation.” Required consultations- ings have limited real public participation, partly be- with indigenous peoples represent one of the only cause they are held in venues with inadequate space- tools these people have to prevent a project from go- to accommodate many of the affected people and be ing forward. Their option is not to participate in the- cause the first several hours of the hearings are occu consultation, as this would only result in the box be pied by engineers from the dam consortium making ing checked off that the consultation had been con- long technical presentations, while statements from ducted, thereby allowing the project to move forward.- the public are only allowed at the end, usually in the- Refusal to participate is their only real option. Obvi dead of night. The hearings were also accompanied by ously, deep reform of the system is needed for this re an overpowering police and military presence. Indig- ality to change. enous participants were present at the beginning of the session, but then left so as not to allow their pres “Consultation,” as the term is used in ILO Convention ence to be interpreted as agreeing with the dams, and 169, implies a voice in the decision on whether to build especially as having been “consulted.” - or not to build the infrastructure in question (that is, Fundação Nacional do Índio not just to modify the compensation or mitigation- In 2009 a representative of the National Indian Foun- measures), and theILO consulted population must have, dation ( = FUNAI)oitivas made at the least, a “realistic” chance of affecting the deci presentations in indigenous villages in which he ex sion that is made ( Esteves2005). Some interpretations go plicitly stated that the gatherings were not “ ” further, holding that audiências the consulted públicas population has a (consultations as required by International Labor clear right to say “no” ( et al. 2012). By contrast, Organization (ILO) Convention 169 and by Brazilian- the public hearings ( ) required in- Constitution Article Medialivre231), as shown in a video of the the licensing process for all major projects, whether presentation in one of the villages made by theparecer indig or not they affect indigenous peoples, provides a plat- enous participants ( 2011). On 14 October form for affected people to voice their concerns, but- 2009 FUNAI Brazil, submitted FUNAI a formal opinion ( ) their influence is limited to suggestions for adjust to IBAMA on the indigenous component of licensing ments in mitigation programs rather than question Belo Monte ( novas oitivas 2009). The opinion states ing the existence of the project as a whole. (p. 14) that FUNAI would be willing to “accompany … - new consultations [ ],” implying that the Formation of the Belo Monte “Panel of Specialists” presentations they had made in the villages were, in in 2009 was a step that provided alternative infor fact, consultations. The coverletter from the head of mation in the discussion of the EIA. This group of 40 FUNAI states that the agency considers the dam to be- academics (of which this author was one) was brought “viable” so long as a list of conditionsoitivas is met, indígenasand states], together to read the approximately 20,000 pages of explicitly that “With regard to the carrying out of con- the 2009 EIA and prepare commentary in record time- sultations with indigenous peoples [ in order to have Magalhães input to the and approval Hernández deliberations this Foundation considersGuapindaia that it has fulfilled [its du- within the timetables required in the licensing pro- ties under] Legislative decree 788/05, in the course of cess. The report ( 2009) was the licensing process” ( 2009). When indig delivered to IBAMA in September 2009. The damHernán pro- enous people invaded the FUNAI office in Altamira oiin- dezponents and wentSantos to considerable lengths in attempts to tivas2010 indígenasthey discoveredXingu a Vivo collection of DVDs recording disqualify the report and some of its authors ( the 2009 presentations in the villages, labeled as “ 2011). However, when the IBAMA DIE ERDE · Vol. 148” ( · 2-3/2017 2011a). In February 2011 technical staff issued their 345-page formal opinion

173 Brazil’s Belo Monte Dam: Lessons of an Amazonian resource struggle

parecer Brazil, IBAMA - ( ) on 23 November 2009 ( 2009) nalistic tone has been identified as a “strategically recommending against approval of a Preliminary Li- crafted” turning pointBratman in the government discourse cense for Belo Monte without an extensive revision of on Belo Monte by minimizing the opponents as naïve the EIA, some of the information they used to substan and uninformed ( 2014: 274; 2015: 72). The tiate their conclusion was derived from the Panel of discourse had longentraves been aggressive: in 2006Glass President Specialists report. Lula listed indigenous peoples and environmentalists as “obstacles” (“ ”) to growth ( 2006: 1),- The year 2009McCully ended with a setback for the anti-dam and in 2009 Brazil’sforças ministerdemoníacas of minesLima and energy struggle in the loss of Glenn Switkes to cancer on 21- declared that Belo Monte was being impeded by “de December ( 2009). He headed the Brazilian monic forces” (“ ”) ( 2009: 1). branch of International Rivers and was tireless oppo- - nent of Belo Monte; his ashes were committed to the A key tactic of the pro-dam side has always been to waters of the Big Bend of the Xingu River. Another im portray the dam as inevitable, and, therefore, at portant opponent of the dam would later succumb to- tempts to change the decision to build it as completely- the same disease: Arsenio Oswaldo Sevá Filho of the delusionary. As the licensing process progressed this State University of Campinas (UNICAMP) on 28 Feb argument naturally gained ever more force. The per ruary 2015. ception of opposing Belo Monte as a “losing battle” Brazil, IBAMA - was an important factor in various local opponents,- On 26 January 2010 the IBAMA technical staff issued- including indigenousBratman groups, dropping opposition to- another technical opinion ( 2010) op the dam in favor of pressing for more generous mitiga posing approval of a preliminary license. Neverthe tion programs ( 2015: 74). Creating a percep less, the full preliminary license (No. 342/2010) was tion that a dam project is inevitable was effectively- issued on 1 February 2010 with 40 preconditions that- used by proponents in Belo Monte just as this strategy- were supposed to be met before an installation license has been used by the governmentFearnside in previous Ama would be granted to actually build the dam.Agência The direcBrasil zonian struggles, such as that surrounding the “ir tor of IBAMA’s licensing sector was replaced before reversible” Balbina Dam ( 1989b). However, the preliminary license was granted ( the outcome is never foreordained. 2011). - Consórcio Construtor BeloNESA Monte contracted a consortium of ten construction- In April 2010, bidding to own and operate Belo Mon companies to build the dam: the - te was won by Norte Energia, Sociedade Anônima,- (CCBM) (https://www.consorciobelomon or NESA (http://norteenergiasa.com.br/site/). This te.com.br/). The arrival of this consortium in Altami group was made up of 10 companies, mostly govern- ra at the beginning of 2011 was a key factor in local ment entities. The close ties between NESA and the perceptions regarding the inevitability of the dam. government are illustrated by the head of the ad ministrative council of NESA being a formerLava-Jato head of- Dilma became president of Brazil on 1 January 2011. ELETROBRÁS, andSassine by many and de of Souzathe companies included On 12 January, the Hurwitz head of IBAMA resigned rather in NESA now being investigated by the cor than sign an installation license for the Belo Monte ruption probe ( 2016). - construction site ( 2011). On 26 January Leite 2010; 2011, the new head of IBAMA issued an installation Mediasee replies: attacks Medeiros on dam 2010; opponents Fearnside escalated as the li- license for the construction site and for access roads- censing process progressed in 2010 (e.g. and other infrastructure, but excepting the dam itself 2010). ELETRO (No. 770/211). Partial licenses do not exist in Brazil BRÁS and NESA increased their advertising of Belo ian legislation. Issuing the license was summarized Monte in print media and television, and ELETROBRÁS succinctly by the Federal Public Ministry (Ministério- mounted an advertising campaign in all of Brazil’s Público FederalMiotto – MPF, 2011). a public prosecutor’s office for major airports. In his June 2010 speech in Altamira, defending the interests of the people) in Belém as “to President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (known simply as tally illegal” ( Avaaz “Lula”) called those who question Belo Monte “a half- - dozen well-intentionedInternational young Rivers people who, if they had- In January 2011, (2011) launched an internet- the patience to listen, would learn what I have already petition against Belo Monte that received 760,000 sig learned…” ( 2010: 1). This pater natures internationally andDIE in ERDE Brazil. · Vol. Another 148 · 2-3/2017 cam

174 Brazil’s Belo Monte Dam: Lessons of an Amazonian resource struggle

- paign in December 2011 received 68,000 signatures, The head (“president”) of IBAMA had supported the while subsequent campaigns in 2012 received 47,000 technical staff in insisting on fulfilling the precon and 34,000 signatures, respectively. There were also ditions prior to approving an installation license telephone and e-mail campaigns, as well as street for Belo Monte. He was removed and replaced by an demonstrations. IBAMA employee who was on the verge of retirement, and who promptly signed the license (No. 795/2011). In March 2011 President Dilma was enraged by the Soon afterwards, he gave an interview to Australian finding by the Inter-American Commission on Human television in which he invoked theXingu history Vivo of Australia’s Rights (IACHR) of the Organization of American States- aborigines as an apology for contemporary killing of (OAS) that the downstream indigenous groups were Amazonian indigenous people ( 2011b). indeed directlyFolha impacted de São by Paulo Belo 2011; Monte Siciliano and were en - titled to free, prior and informed consent thorough a Construction of Belo Monte began on 23 June 2011. consultation ( 2011). Some local academics opposing the dam fell silent af- She ordered the withdrawal of Brazil’s ambassador ter construction started in 2011, given the significant- from the OAS and suspended Brazil’s payments of potential personal cost of continuing to speak out. Lo dues to the organization, creating a diplomatic crisis. cal opponents continued to be harassed as construc In 2012 the ILO would also find that ConventionJustiça Global 169, tion progressed. Brasilwhich 2012;had been see signedalso Puentes and ratified and Vieira by Brazil, required - consulting the downstream groups ( In June 2012 the main Belo Monte construction site 2015). - was invaded by various indigenous groups, with par ticularly active participation of a group of about 20 As the Belo Monte licensing process progressedAma to- MundurukuBratman warriors who had come from the Tapajós zonwards Watch a full and installation International license, Rivers international groups River, where their land is threatened by planned dams made renewed appeals to President Dilma ( (see Sitio 2015: Pimental 74). The Munduruku vandalized Hance 2011). A petition- the company offices at the construction site of the- signed by 500,000 people was delivered to authorities- main dam (“ ”), but the Xingu indigenous in FebruaryGota d’Água 2011 ( 2011) and a Brazilian peti groups and the non-indigenous individuals and or- tion with 1.3 million signatures from theRapoza “Drop of Wa ganizations that were present did not participate (I ter” ( ) initiative by television soap-opera have been told this by both indigenousBratman and non-indig 2015: stars was delivered in December 2011 ( 2011).- enous participants). Nevertheless, 11 non-indigenous activists were charged with crimes ( The IBAMA technical staff opposed issuing theBrazil, in 74). On the strength of this incident, in March 2013- IBAMAstallation license for the dam itself on the grounds the consortium obtained a legal order from a Pará that most of the conditions had not been met ( state magistrate in Altamira that would automati 2011). Nevertheless, the license was granted callyMAB fine two non-indigenous NGOs each R$50,000 by IBAMA on 1 June 2011 (No. 795/2011) with only (~US$25,000) per day if any other invasions occurred- 5 of the 40 preconditions having been met according- ( 2013). The organizations were the Xingu Alive- to the NGOs and 16 according to IBAMA. Note that Forever MovementMovimento (Movimento dos Atingidos Xingu por Vivo Barragens para Sem = granting preliminary licenses with preconditions rep pre = Xingu Vivo) and the Movement of Dam-Affect resents a relativelyPartido recent dos practice, Trabalhadores having begun only ed People ( Sitio Belo Monte in 2003 – that is, coincident with the beginning of the MAB). Indigenous people invaded the construction- Workers’ Party ( = PT) presi- site of the main powerhouse (“ Agência Públi”) in- dential administration under Bratman Lula and Dilma – and caJune 2013, after which the site was physically forti the use of this expedient to speed license approval has fied with formidable walls and fencing ( steadily increased ever since ( 2015: 69). The 2014). Construction continued through 2014 and precedent of granting an installation license without 2015, with the exception of brief interruptions from fulfilling all preconditions was a legacy of licensing disturbances, strikes and court orders. the Madeira River dams in 2008, an event thatFearnside raises the question of what value a precondition has if licenses Harassment of local opponents continued. In February can be obtained without fulfilling them ( 2013 an employee of the dam consortium infiltrated a 2014a). meeting of Xingu Vivo and was caught recording the DIE ERDE · Vol. 148 · 2-3/2017 proceedings with an apparatus disguised as a large175 Brazil’s Belo Monte Dam: Lessons of an Amazonian resource struggle

- ballpointXingu Vivo pen. When confronted by the others at the evance to discussions of the theoretical or philosophi meeting, his confession was filmed and posted online cal underpinnings of their actions or to the very real ( 2013). - connections of local events to such general concerns - as social justice, environmental sustainability and a On 10 September 2015 the IBAMA technical staff is democratic political system functioning under a state sued a 242-page formal opinion listing a series of con of law. ditions that Brazil, were stillIBAMA pending that the proponents - would have to fulfill before an operating license could Xingu Vivo in particular has, in addition to its own be granted ( 2015). Nevertheless, on 24 grassroots membership, been able to enlist the sup NovemberVillas-Bôas 2015 IBAMA issued the operating license- port and collaboration of a wide range of other actors, despite most of the conditions not having been met such as national and international NGOs, academics,- (see et al. 2015). Filling the reservoir be- journalists and celebrities. The various supporting gan on 12 December 2015. On 21 December 2015 the- groups and individuals should have a measure of hu Inter-American Commission on HumanAIDA Rights (IA mility with respect to their overall importance in the- CHR) opened case against Brazil for human rights vi struggle at Belo Monte and in other resource conflicts. olations related to the Belo Monte Dam ( 2016). While outside groups tend to move on to the next cri 3. Lessons sis now that the Belo Monte Dam has actually been built and filled, it should be remembered that Belo - Monte is only the beginning of the “Altamira Complex” and the damming of the rest of the Xingu River. Both The Belo Monte struggle brought together an impres- local and distant groups are sure to have important sive coalition of actors in questioning and resisting roles as these developments play out. - the dam project. Noticeably more domestic and inter national attention was focused on this case than, for- While the struggle at the local level is naturally fo- example, the dams on the Madeira and Tapajós Rivers. cused on the dam proposed at the place in question, The Panel of Specialists, repeated major demonstra the struggle at more distant venues also tends to fo tions, over 60 legal suits and many other events and cus on the urgent demands of the environmental and- campaigns surpass what has been seen elsewhere. Yet human-rights crisis represented by each dam project. in the end, these efforts and the facts they revealed- The visibility and concreteness of these projects is es about the unviability and illegality of the project and sential to understanding what they imply. However, it the magnitude of its impacts did not impede the jug is not enough to fight each dam: the question must be gernaut from reaching its planned goal in the form of addressedBaitelo as to whether BrazilMoreira needs a massive dam- the dam that blocks the Xingu River today. building program in Amazonia. The answer to this is no (e.g. et al. 2013; 2012). The struggle at the local level is necessarily the key to - events at all other levels. This struggle, carried out by- Along with reforming how electricity is produced and local indigenous and non-indigenous groups, has been used, institutional changes are needed in how deci- the focus of a longAndrade series of2015; studies Bingham applying 2010; sociologi Castro sions are made on dam projects. The environmental 2012;cal methods da Silva to 2011; analyzing Fleury theirand Almeida discourse andGuzmán use of studies, public hearings and consultations with tra the media (e.g.Jouberte and de Mello MacLeod nd ditional peoples need to take place before the initial McCormick 2013; decision on dam construction is made. Today these nd [C. 2011]; 2014; decisions are made behind closed doors by a handful- [C. 2014]; 2006, 2007, 2011). However, of technocrats and political appointees, long before- what really distinguishes these local groups is that- any information on the environmental and social im they do not just represent or support the victims of pacts of the project have been gatheredFearnside let alone 2007, pub Belo Monte – they are the victims. They are neces lically debated. WhatFearnside is needed and is Graça a reform of decision- sarily focused on the impacts of this particular dam,- making, not just a reform of licensing ( rather than migrating from one issue to the next as 2014a,b, 2015a,b; 2006). - can sometimes happen with environmental and hu Fearnside man-rights groups located in distant urban centers.- Another essential battlefield is to repeal security sus When the activists themselves have their homes and pension laws in Brazil ( 2015a). These laws 176livelihoods under immediate threat there is less rel allow any judicial decisionDIE to ERDEbe reversed · Vol. 148 if · it2-3/2017 would Brazil’s Belo Monte Dam: Lessons of an Amazonian resource struggle

Fearnside cause “grave damage” to the public economy. Since pajósFearnside River (see 2015a, b). This dam would any hydroelectric dam is important for the economy,- Brazil,flood 11,700 PR 2015; ha CNEC of the Worley Munduruku Parsons Indigenous Engenharia Land S.A. security suspensions can be invoked to overridePrudente any (see 2015a). It appears in various plans (e.g. decision based on violation of environmental regula- CNEC Worley Parsons Engenharia S.A. tions and protections of human rights (e.g. 2014a), but is not mentioned in the EIA for the first 2013, 2014). Security suspensions were created dur Brazil,Tapajós MME/EPE Dam ( ing Brazil’s 1964-1985 military dictatorship (Law 2014b) nor in the ELETROBRÁS ten-year plans (e.g. 4348 of 26 June 1964) but are still in force today (laws Brazil, 2015:MT 393). However, it would be 8437 of 30 June 1992 and 12,016 of 7 August 2009). needed to make the river navigable for the Tapajós By 2014Palmquist they had been used at eightGarzón times in the case Waterway ( 2010), which is a top priority of Belo Monte and 12 times in the case of the Tapajós in the “transportation axis” of the PAC. The parallel Dams ( 2014; see also et al. 2015). - with Babaquara (Altamira) and other planned dams- upstream of Belo Monte is clear: omitting discussion Important as academic studies are as providers of in of associated dams with major impacts facilitates ap formation in struggles such as this, one Fischeris reminded proval of the first dams on a river, and, when the time of Gandhi’s statement that the freedom of India would comes, the approval of the subsequent dams can be not be won by a few lawyers in Bombay ( 1964 expected to be facilitated by the existence of the dams [2010]). It is a country’s people who bring about- that have already been built. In the case of Babaquara change. In the case of improving decision making on (Altamira), whenBrazil, this ELETROBRÁS was openly included in the plans Amazonian dams, any change requires that the im it was to come on line seven years after completion of pacts of dams and the deficiencies of the system that Belo Monte ( 1998: 145). leads to them be understood beyond the rural people in the Amazonian interior who are the main victims of Now that Belo Monte exists as a physical reality on- these dams. In Brazil 85% of the population is urban.- the Xingu River, it is important to remember that the - struggle there is far from over. Holding the dam con The Belo Monte case has similarities with dam contro- sortium to account for the many unfulfilled promises versies elsewhere in Brazilian Amazonia. At Belo Mon for resettlement and for a wide variety of measures to te, the proponents succeeded in keeping the “institu- mitigateISA the dam’sVillas-Bôas environmental and social impacts tionalized lie” concerning plans for upstream dams is a major effort on which very little progress has been out of the discussion inside Brazil. It is virtually com made ( 2014; et al. 2015). Of course, pletely absent from the Brazilian mainstream press. the likely unveiling of plans for disastrous upstream The 2008 resolution by CNPE was useful in further dams is an ever-present factor now that Belo Monte is deflecting attention from impacts of upstream dams physically present. - and insuring that these would not delay approval of the licenses for Belo Monte itself. Similar scenarios- Lessons of history are evident for the case of the up are playing out in other cases. While licensing process stream Xingu River dams. Building of dams in series- for the Madeira River Dams was underway, this au- to regulate streamflow and increase the output of- thor asked the head engineer of Odebrecht (the main downstream dams is well known in hydropower de construction firm planning to build the dams) in Por- velopment worldwide; it is illustrated by the dam to Velho about plans for the Guajará Mirim Dam (also ming of Brazil’s Tocantins River beginning with the known as “Cachoeira Riberão”), plannedPCE for construc TucuruíFearnside Dam, with parallels to the upstream Xingu tion upstream of the two dams that have now been- dams that were evident from Tucuruí’s inception- built – Santo Antônio and Jirau ( et al. 2004). The ( 1999). This author has long contested the reply was that discussing the upstream dam was for- Belo Monte proponents’Fearnside portrayal of the dam’s ben biddenhidrovia until after the first two dams were approved.Fearnside efits without considering the impacts of the planned The third dam would be necessary for a major water upstream dams ( 1996). Denying these plans way ( ) for transporting soybeans ( fits into a pattern shown by past the history of Brazil’s 2014a). Construction of the third dam is now under Amazonian dams. Fearn- negotiation with Bolivia, which shares this stretch of side the Madeira River. - One parallel is the filling of the Balbina Dam ( 1989b), where an official statement released ADIE similar ERDE ·case Vol. 148is the · 2-3/2017 planned Chacorão Dam on the Ta just two weeks before the dam was closed promised177 Brazil’s Belo Monte Dam: Lessons of an Amazonian resource struggle

Brazil, Pública, ELETRONORTE - - to fill it only to a level 46 m above sea level ( 5 September 2014. – Online available at: http:// terradedireitos.org.br/2014/09/05/agencia-publica-ca 1987a), but instead it was filled direct- AIDA (Interamerican Association for Environmental Defense) la-boca-em-belo-monte/ – accessed 03/03/2016 ly to a level 50 m above sea level – a plan thatBrazil, was, ELETRONORTEin fact, in place the entire time as shown by docu- 2016: IACHR opens case against Brazil for human rights ments obtained while the reservoir was filling ( http://amazon- violations related to Belo Monte Dam. – Amazon Watch, 1987b). The second case is the Tucu watch.org/news/2016/0107-iachr-opens-case-against-bra- 7 January 2016. – Online available at: ruí-II project, which was built without an EIA on the zil-for-human-rights-violations-related-to-belo-monte-dam basis of a promise notIndriunas to raise the water level in the reservoir beyond the 70 m-above-sea-level mark in Amazon Watch and International Rivers 2011: Brazilian – accessed 03/03/2016 the Turucuí-I project ( 1998), but instead the- level was quietlyFearnside raised to 74 m, as originally planned,- 17 May 2011. – On- government pressured over human rights resolution on when the water was needed to run the Tucuruí-II tur- www.internationalrivers.org/resources/ Amazon dam. – International Rivers, bines (see 2006). There is no reason to be brazilian-government-pressured-over-human-rights-resolu- line available at: lieve that these were isolated incidents by rogue em tion-on-amazon-dam-3716 ployees – instead they are best explained as part of Andrade, R - – accessed 03/03/2016 an institutional culture that systematically employs - “disinformation.” Both the indigenous people whose . 2015: The political ecology of large dams in Bra zil and China: Power to the people? A comparative analy land would be flooded by dams on the Xingu River - upstream of Belo Monte and those whose land would sis of public participation in Belo Monte and Three Gorges be flooded by the Chacorão Dam on the Tapajós River Dam. – Master’s thesis in public management, Univer are well aware of how history is likely to play out as a sity of Potsdam, Potsdam, Germany. – Online available at: www.talktoricardo.com/15/images/pdf/Andrade_ result of the initial downstream dams (Belo Monte on Assis, E. and L. Forline - MPM_2014-15_Thesis.pdf – accessed 03/03/2016 the Xingu River and São Luiz do Tapajós and Jatobá on- - 2004: Dams and social move the Tapajós River), despite official silence on plans for 26 upstream dams. Never has the century-old observa ments in Brazil: Quiet victories on the Xingu. – Prac ticing Anthropology (3): 21-25, – doi: 10.17730/ tionSantayana of George Santayana been more relevant “Those Avaaz praa.26.3.j0212654302007m6 who cannot remember the past are doomed to repeat - it” ( 1905: 95). 2011: Stop Belo Monte – No mega-dam in the Amazon. – Avaaz. – Online available at: www.avaaz.org/en/ama Acknowledgements Baitelo, R., M. Yamaoka, R. Nitta and R Batista zon_under_threat/?rc=fb – accessed 03/03/2016 . 2013: [R] Online avail- evolução energética: A caminho do desenvolvimento. – able at: - The author’s research is supported exclusively by academic Greenpeace Brasil, São Paulo, SP, Brazil. – sources: Conselho Nacional do Desenvolvimento Científico www.greenpeace.org/brasil/Global/brasil/im e Tecnológico (CNPq: Proc. 305880/2007-1; 304020/2010- age/2013/Agosto/Revolucao_Energetica.pdf – accessed Bingham, B 9; 573810/2008-7; 575853/2008-5), Fundação de Amparo à 08/03/2016 - Pesquisa do Estado do Amazonas (FAPEAM: Proc. 708565) . 2010: Discourse of the dammed: A study of the and Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas da Amazônia (INPA: impacts of sustainable development discourse on indig PRJ15.125). Marcelo Augusto dos Santos Júnior prepared enous peoples in the Brazilian Amazon in the context 4 - the figures. I thank Paulo Maurício Lima de Alencastro of the proposed Belo Monte hydroelectric dam. – POLIS Graça for comments. Journal (Winter 2010). – Online available at: www.po lis.leeds.ac.uk/assets/files/students/student-journal/ References Borges, A ma-winter-10/bingham-e.pdf – accessed 03/03/2016 . 2013: Dilma defende usinas hidrelétricas com Agência Brasil grandes reservatórios. – Valor Econômico, 6 June 2013. – - - 2011: Ibama concede licença ambiental para Online available at: www.valor.com.br/brasil/3151684/ Hidrelétrica de Belo Monte. – Gazeta do Povo, 1 Febru dilma-defende-usinas-hidreletricas-com-grandes-res - Bratman, E.Z ary 2010. – Online available at: www.gazetadopovo.com. ervatorios – accessed 03/03/2016 br/economia/ibama-concede-licenca-ambiental-para-hi . 2014: Contradictions of green development: - dreletrica-de-belo-monte-dhifis54m89b4jf13oy3l2dse Human rights and environmental norms in light of Belo Agência Pública Agência ies 46 – accessed 03/03/2016 Monte dam activism. – Journal of Latin American Stud 2014: Cala-boca em Belo Monte. – (2): 261–289, – doi: 10.1017/S0022216X14000042 DIE ERDE · Vol. 148 · 2-3/2017

178 Brazil’s Belo Monte Dam: Lessons of an Amazonian resource struggle

Bratman, E.Z -

. 2015: Passive revolution in the green econ philip.inpa.gov.br/publ_livres/Dossie/BM/BELO%20 Brazil, FUNAI (Fundação Nacional do Índio) omy: activism and the Belo Monte dam. – International MONTE.htm – accessed 03/03/2016 15 Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics 2009: UHE Belo Brazil, ELETROBRÁS (Centrais Elétricas Brasileiras) : 61-77, – doi: 10.1007/s10784-014-9268-z Monte – Componente Indígena, Parecer técnico nº 21/ - CMAM/CGPIMA-FUNAI, Parecer Técnico nº 21 – Análise

1987: Plano 2010: Relatório geral, Plano Nacional de do componente indígena dos estudos de impacto ambi Energia Elétrica 1987/2010 (Dezembro de 1987). ental. – FUNAI, Brasília, DF, Brazil. – Online available at: Brazil, ELETROBRÁS (Centrais Elétricas Brasileiras) – ELETROBRÁS, Rio de Janeiro, RJ, Brazil www.ibama.gov.br/licenciamento/index.php – accessed - Brazil, IBAMA (Instituto Brasileiro do Meio Ambiente e dos 1998: 03/03/2016 Recursos Naturais Renováveis) Plano Decenal 1999-2008. – ELETROBRÁS, Rio de Janei Brazil, ELETROBRÁS (Centrais Elétricas Brasileiras) 2007a: ro, RJ, Brazil 2009: Parecer Técnico No. - 114/2009 – COHID/CGENE/DILIC/IBAMA, de 23/11/2009, At ua lizaç ão do Invent ár io Hidrelét r ico da Bac ia do r io X in Assunto: AHE Belo Monte. Ref: Análise técnica do Estudo gu. 31 de outubro de 2007. – Ministério de Minas e Energia, de Impacto Ambiental do Aproveitamento Hidrelétrico - Brasí lia, DF, Brazil. – Online available at: w w w.elet robras. Belo Monte, processo n° 02001.001848/2006-75. IBAMA, com/elb/services/DocumentManagement/FileDown Brasília, DF, Brazil – Online available at: www.ibama.gov. Brazil, IBAMA (Instituto Brasileiro do Meio Ambiente e dos load.EZTSvc.asp?DocumentID=%7B6B67D0FD-76F2- br/licenciamento/index.php – accessed 03/03/2016 Recursos Naturais Renováveis) 4F75-AD53-8FECD90119B7%7D&ServiceInstUID=% - 7B5947E09B-BDF0-4A21-A48F-518B42072401%7D 2010: Parecer Técnico Brazil, ELETROBRÁS (Centrais Elétricas Brasileiras) 2007b: - – accessed 03/03/2016 No. 06/2010-COHID/CGENE/DILIC/IBAMA de 26 de ja - neiro de 2010. Assunto: Análise técnica das complemen A t u a l i z a ç ã o d o I n v e n t á r i o H i d r e l é t r i c o d a B a c i a d o R i o X i n tações solicitadas no Parecer nº 114/2009, referente ao gu Consolidação dos Estudos Realizados. Relatório Geral. Aproveitamento Hidrelétrico Belo Monte, processo n°

Processo Aneel Número: 48500.004313/05-47 8892/00- 02001.001848/2006-75. – IBAMA, Brasília, DF, Brazil. – 10-Rl-0001-0. Outubro/2007. – ELETROBRÁS, Rio de Online available at: www.ibama.gov.br/licenciamento/ Brazil, IBAMA (Instituto Brasileiro do Meio Ambiente e Janeiro, RJ, Brazil. 3 Vols. – Online available at: http:// index.php – accessed 03/03/2016 dos Recursos Naturais Renováveis) philip.inpa.gov.br/publ_livres/Dossie/BM/BELO% Brazil, ELETROBRÁS (Centrais Elétricas Brasileiras) 20MONTE.htm – accessed 03/03/2016 2011: Parecer No - - 2009: 52/2011AHE Belo Monte-COHID/CGENE/DILIC/IBAMA. Aproveitamento hidrelétrico Belo Monte: Estudo de im Ref: Análise da solicitação de Licença de Insta pacto ambiental. Fevereiro de 2009. – ELETROBRÁS, Rio lação da Usina Hidrelétrica Belo Monte, processo No de Janeiro, RJ, Brazil. 36 vols. – Online available at: http:// 02001.001848/2006-75. – IBAMA, Brasília, DF, Brazil. philip.inpa.gov.br/publ_livres/Dossie/BM/BELO%20 Online available at: www.ibama.gov.br/licenciamento/ Brazil, ELETRONORTE (Centrais Elétricas do Norte do Brasil) Brazil, IBAMA (Instituto Brasileiro do Meio Ambiente e MONTE.htm – accessed 03/03/2016 index.php – accessed 03/03/2016 - dos Recursos Naturais Renováveis)

1987a: Esclarecimento público: Usina hidrelétrica Balbi 2015: Parecer No. DF, Brazil na. Modulo 1, Setembro 1987. – ELETRONORTE, Brasília, 02001.003622/2015-08. UHE Belo Monte - COHID/IBAMA. Brazil, ELETRONORTE (Centrais Elétricas do Norte do Brasil) Ref.: Análise da solicitação de Licença de Operação da Usina - Hidrelétrica Belo Monte, processo n° 02001.001848/2006- - 1987b: UHE Balbina: Enchimento do reservatório, consid 75. – IBAMA, Brasília, DF, Brazil – Online available at: erações gerais. BAL-39-2735-RE. – ELETRONORTE, Bra www.ibama.gov.br/licenciamento/index.php – accessed Brazil, ELETRONORTE (Centrais Elétricas do Norte do Bra- Brazil, MME/EPE (Ministério de Minas e Energia, Empresa de sília, DF, Brazil 03/03/2016 sil) Pesquisa Energética) - 2002: Complexo hidrelétrico Belo Monte: Estudos de 2015: Plano decenal de expansão de viabilidade, relatório final. –ELETRONORTE, Brasília, DF, energia 2024. MME/EPE, Brasília, DF, Brazil – Online avail Brazil. 8 vols. – Online available at: http://philip.inpa. able at: www.epe.gov.br/PDEE/Relatório%20Final%20 Brazil, MT (Ministério dos Transportes) 2010: Diretrizes gov.br/publ_livres/Dossie/BM/DocsOf/LP/Licenca%20 do%20PDE%202024.pdf – accessed 03/03/2016 Brazil, ELETRONORTE (Centrais Elétricas do Norte do Brasil) - previa%20Belo%20Monte.pdf – accessed 03/03/2016 da política nacional de transporte hidroviário. – Secre - - nd [2002]: Complexo hidrelétrico Belo Monte: Estudo de taria de Política Nacional de Transportes, MT, Brasília, - impacto ambiental - EIA. Versão preliminar. – ELETRO DF, Brazil. – Online available at: http://bibspi.plane NORTE, Brasília, DF, Brazil. 6 vols. – Online available at: ht t p:// jamento.gov.br/bitstream/handle/iditem/217/Diretriz DIE ERDE · Vol. 148 · 2-3/2017

179 Brazil’s Belo Monte Dam: Lessons of an Amazonian resource struggle

3 de Sousa Júnior, W.C., J. Reid and N.C.S. Leitão es%20da%20Pol%c3%adtica%20Nacional%20de%20 Alternatives (2): 249-268 Transportes%20Hidrovi%c3%a1rios.pdf?sequence=1 2006: Custos Brazil, PR (Presidência da República) - - – accessed 03/03/2016 e benefícios do Complexo Hidrelétrico Belo Monte: Uma - 2015: Empreendimen abordagem econômico-ambiental. – Conservation Strat tos do PAC. – PR, Brasília, DF, Brazil. – Online available egy Fund (CSF), Lagoa Santa, MG, Brazil. – Online avail at: www.pac.gov.br/pub/up/relatorio/73e4de1070842b able at: http://conservation-strategy.org/sites/default/ Calheiros, R. 5d33484d68d6f57544.pdf – accessed 08/03/2016 files/field-file/4_Belo_Monte_Dam_Report_mar2006.pdf 142 Esteves, A.M., D. Franks and F. Vanclay - 2005: Decreto Legislativo Nº 788, de 2005. - – accessed 08/03/2016 - - Diário Oficial da União (134): Section 1, 14 July 2005. 2012: Social im 30 – Online available at: http://legis.senado.gov.br/legis pact assessment: The state of the art. – Impact As lacao/ListaTextoIntegral.action?id=231371 – accessed sessment and Project Appraisal (1): 34-42, – doi: Carvalho, G.O. - Fearnside, P.M. - 08/03/2016 10.1080/14615517.2012.660356 2006: Environmental resistance and the poli 1986: Human carrying capacity of the Brazil 15 Fearnside, P.M. tics of energy development in the Brazilian Amazon. – ian rainforest. – New York, NY, U.S.A. - Journal of Environment and Development : 245-268, 1989a: The charcoal of Carajás: Pig‑iron Castro, G.C. 18 – doi: 10.1177/1070496506291575 smelting threatens the forests of Brazil’s Eastern Ama 2012: “A favor de outro desenvolvimento”: O zon Region. – Ambio (2): 141‑143. – Jstor: www.jstor. 12 Fearnside, P.M. Movimento Xingu Vivo para Sempre, Belo Monte e suas org/stable/4313548 - manifestações na World Wide Web. – Somanlu (2): 1989b: Brazil’s Balbina Dam: Environment - ronmental Management 13 221-242. – Online available at: www.periodicos.ufam. versus the legacy of the pharaohs in Amazonia. – Envi edu.br/index.php/somanlu/article/view/449/280 – ac (4): 401-423, – doi: 10.1007/ Chernela, J.M. - Fearnside, P.M - cessed 08/03/2016 BF01867675 - 1988: Potential impacts of the proposed Al . 1995: Hydroelectric dams in the Brazil 129 - 22 tamira-Xingu hydroelectric complex in Brazil. – Latin ian Amazon as sources of ‘greenhouse’ gases. – Envi American Studies Association Forum (2): 1, 3-6. – On ronmental Conservation (1): 7-19, – doi: 10.1017/ Fearnside, P.M - line available at: http://ufdc.ufl.edu/UF00091288/00010 S0376892900034020 CNEC (Consórcio de Engenheiros Consultores) - – accessed 08/03/2016 . 1996: Hydroelectric dams in Brazilian Ama - 23 1980: Estudo de zonia: Response to Rosa, Schaeffer & dos Santos. – Envi inventário hidrelétrico da bacia hidrográfica do Rio Xin ronmental Conservation (2): 105-108, – doi:10.1017/ Fearnside, P.M gu. – Ministério das Minas e Energia, ELETRONORTE and S0376892900038467 CNEC Worley Parsons Engenharia, S.A. - 24 CNEC, São Paulo, SP, Brazil . 1999: Social impacts of Brazil’s Tucuruí Dam. 2014a: Estudo de via – Environmental Management (4): 483-495, – doi: Fearnside, P.M - bilidade do AHE São Luiz do Tapajós. – CNEC (Consórcio 10.1007/s002679900248 Brazil - Nacional dos Engenheiros Consultores). São Paulo, SP, . 2001: Environmental impacts of Brazil’s Tu CNEC Worley Parsons Engenharia, S.A 27 curuí Dam: Unlearned lessons for hydroelectric develop - . 2014b: EIA: AHE São ment in Amazonia. – Environmental Management (3): Fearnside, P.M Luiz do Tapajós; Estudo de impacto ambiental, aproveita 377-396, – doi: 10.1007/s002670010156 mento hidrelétrico São Luiz do Tapajós. CNEC (Consórcio . 2006: Dams in the Amazon: Belo Monte and 38 Nacional dos Engenheiros Consultores), São Paulo, SP, Brazil’s hydroelectric development of the Xingu River Brazil. – Online available at: http://licenciamento.ibama. Basin. – Environmental Management (1): 16-27, – doi: Fearnside, P.M. gov.br/Hidreletricas/São%20Luiz%20do%20Tapajos/ 10.1007/s00267-005-00113-6 da Silva, J.S EIA_RIMA/ – accessed 08/03/2016 2007: Brazil’s Cuiabá-Santarém (BR-163) - - . 2011: Movimento Xingu Vivo para Sempre e o Highway: The environmental cost of paving a soybean - ment 39 discurso da contestação contra Belo Monte. – Paper pre corridor through the Amazon. – Environmental Manage Fearnside, P.M sented at the II Conferência Sul-Americana e VII Confer (5): 601-614, – doi: 10.1007/s00267-006-0149-2 ência Brasileira de Mídia Cidadã, 20-22 October 2011, . 2010: Belo Monte: Resposta a Rogério Belém, PA, Brazil. – Online available at: www.unicentro. Cezar de Cerqueira Leite. – Globoamazonia, 7 June 2010. - br/redemc/2011/conteudo/mc_artigos/Midia_Cidada_ – Online available at: http://philip.inpa.gov.br/publ_ de Sousa Júnior, W.C. and J. Reid - Silva.pdf – accessed 08/03/2016 livres/2010/Belo%20Monte--GloboAmazonia-Respos - 2010: Uncertainties in Ama ta%20a%20Rogerio%20Cezar%20Cerqueira%20Leite. Fearnside, P.M. zon hydropower development: Risk scenarios and envi pdf – accessed 08/03/2016 ronmental issues around the Belo Monte dam. – Water 2012: Belo Monte Dam: A spearhead for DIE ERDE · Vol. 148 · 2-3/2017

180 Brazil’s Belo Monte Dam: Lessons of an Amazonian resource struggle

- Carta Maior, 24 November 2006. - - Brazil’s dam building attack on Amazonia? – GWF Dis bre povos tradicionais. – cussion Paper 1210, Global Water Forum, Canberra, Aus – Online available at: www.cartamaior.com.br/?/Edito tralia. – Online available at: www.globalwaterforum. ria/Meio-Ambiente/Entidades-repudiam-declaracao- - org/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/Belo-Monte-Dam-A- de-Lula-sobre-povos-tradicionais/3/12236 – accessed Graeff, B - spearhead-for-Brazils-dam-building-attack-on-Amazo 08/03/2016 Fearnside, P.M nia_-GWF-1210.pdf – accessed 08/03/2016 . 2012: Should we adopt a specific regulation to pro . 2014a: Brazil’s Madeira River dams: A setback tect people that are displaced by hydroelectric projects? 7 7 for environmental policy in Amazonian development. – Reflections based on Brazilian law and the ‘Belo Monte’ Water Alternatives (1): 156-169. – Online available at: case. – Florida A&M University Law Review (2): 261- - www.water-alternatives.org/index.php/alldoc/articles/ 285. – Online available at: http://commons.law.famu. Fearnside, P.M vol7/v7issue1/244-a7-1-15/file – accessed 08/03/2016 edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1064&context=famu Guapindaia, A.A.C . 2014b: Impacts of Brazil’s Madeira River lawreview – accessed 08/03/2016 38 dams: Unlearned lessons for hydroelectric development . 2009: Ofício No. 302/2009/PRES-FUNAI. in Amazonia. – Environmental Science & Policy : 164- Assunto – Parecer Técnico. 14 de outubro de 2009. – Fearnside, P.M. - 172, – doi: 10.1016/j.envsci.2013.11.004. Fundação Nacional do Índio (FUNAI), Brasília, DF, Brazil. 44 2015a: Amazon dams and waterways: Bra – Online available at: www.ibama.gov.br/licenciamento/ Guzmán, T.D. zil’s Tapajós Basin plans. – Ambio (5): 426-439, – doi: index.php – accessed 08/03/2016 Fearnside, P.M. - 10.1007/s13280-015-0642-z nd [C. 2011]: Writing indigenous activism in 2015b: Brazil’s São Luiz do Tapajós Dam: The Brazil: Belo Monte and the Acampamento Indígena Rev 8 art of cosmetic environmental impact assessments. – olucionário. – University of Miami, Miami, FL, U.S.A. – - Water Alternatives (3): 373-396. – Online available at: Online available at: http://acontracorriente.chass.ncsu. www.water-alternatives.org/index.php/alldoc/articles/ edu/index.php/acontracorriente/article/downloadSup Fearnside, P.M Hance, J. vol8/v8issue3/297-a8-3-5/file – accessed 08/03/2016 pFile/99/27 – accessed 08/03/2016 . - . 2017: Belo Monte: Actors and Arguments in 2011: Half a million people sign petition against 148 the Struggle over Brazil’s largest Amazonian Dam – Die Belo Monte, Brazilian mega-dam. – Mongabay, 8 Febru Fearnside, P.M P.M.L.A. Graça Erde (1): 14-26, – doi: 10.12854/erde-147-18 ary 2011. – Online available at: http://news.mongabay. . and 2006: BR-319: Brazil’s com/2011/02/half-a-million-people-sign-petition-against- Hernández, F.M S.B.M Santos - Manaus-Porto Velho Highway and the potential impact belo-monte-brazilian-mega-dam/ – accessed 08/03/2016 38 of linking the arc of deforestation to central Amazonia. . and . 2011: Ciência, cientis 14 - – Environmental Management (5): 705-716, – doi: tas e democracia desfigurada: O caso de Belo Monte. Fischer, L. 10.1007/s00267-005-0295-y – Novos Cadernos NAEA (1): 79-96. – Online avail 1964 [2010]: Gandhi: His Life and Message for the able at: www.periodicos.ufpa.br/index.php/ncn/article/ Fleury, L.C. and J. Almeida Hochstetler, K. - World. – New York, NY, U.S.A. view/599/851 – accessed 08/03/2016 - 2013: The construction of the Belo 2011: The politics of environmental licens - 46 Monte hydroelectric power plant: Environmental con ing: Energy projects of the past and future in Brazil. – dade 16 flict and the development dilemma. – Ambiente & Socie Studies in Comparative International Development Hurwitz, Z. (4): 141-158. – Online available at: www.scielo. (4): 349–371, – doi 10.1007/s12116-011-9092-1 Folha de São Paulo - br/pdf/asoc/v16n4/en_09.pdf – accessed 08/03/2016 2011: IBAMA President resigns over Belo Monte 2011: Dilma retalia OEA por Belo Monte licensing. – International Rivers, 13 January 2011. – On - e suspende recursos. – Folha de São Paulo, 30 April 2011, line available at: https://www.internationalrivers.org/ Garzón, B.R, R.S.T. do Valle and L. Amorim p. B7 blogs/258/ibama-president-resigns-over-belo-monte-li ILO (International Labor Organization) 2015: Por que a lei censing – accessed 08/03/2016 - não se aplica a Belo Monte: A suspensão de segurança. 2005: Contribution of Villas-Bôas, A., B.R. – In: Vozes do Xingu: Coletânea de artigos para o Dossiê the ILO. International Workshop on Free, Prior and In Garzón, C. Reis, L. Amorim and L Leite Belo Monte: Vozes do Xingu. Annex to: formed Consent and Indigenous Peoples (New York, 17- . (eds.): Dossiê Belo 19 January 2005). PFII/2005/WS.2/4. – United Nations - Monte: Não há condições para a licença de operação. – Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Division for Instituto Socioambiental (ISA), Brasília, DF, Brazil: 156- Social Policy and Development, Secretariat of the Perma - 169. – Online available at: www.socioambiental.org/ nent Forum on Indigenous Issues, New York, NY, U.S.A. – sites/blog.socioambiental.org/files/dossie-belo-monte- Online available at: www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/doc Glass, V. 2006: - Indriunas, L. site.pdf – accessed 08/03/2016 uments/workshop_FPIC_ILO.doc – accessed 08/03/2016 Entidades repudiam declaração de Lula so 1998: FHC inaugura obras em viagem ao Pará. DIE ERDE · Vol. 148 · 2-3/2017

181 Brazil’s Belo Monte Dam: Lessons of an Amazonian resource struggle

-

– Folha de São Paulo, 14 July 1998, p. 1-17. – Online avail – Painel de Especialistas sobre a Hidrelétrica de Belo able at: www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/brasil/fc14069828. Monte, Belém, Pará, Brazil. – Online available at: https:// International Rivers htm – accessed 08/03/2016 www.socioambiental.org/banco_imagens/pdfs/Belo_ 2010: Speech by Pres. Lula at a rally Monte_Painel_especialistas_EIA.pdf%20%20 – accessed McCormick, S. for the Belo Monte Dam. – International Rivers, 22 June 08/03/2016 2010. – Online available at: www.internationalrivers. 2006: The Brazilian anti-dam movement: 19 doi: org/resources/speech-by-pres-lula-at-a-rally-for-the- Knowledge contestation as communicative action. – ISA (Instituto Socioambiental) 10.1177/1086026606292494 belo-monte-dam-4293 – accessed 08/03/2016 Organization & Environment (3): 321-346, – - McCormick, S. 2014: A dívida de Belo Monte. - 39 – ISA Brasília, DF, Brazil. – Online available at: www.so 2007: The governance of hydro-electric dams cioambiental.org/pt-br/blog/blog-do-xingu/infografi in Brazil. – Journal of Latin American Studies (2): 227- Jouberte, M.L.S. and S.C.B. de Mello McCormick, S. - co-belo-monte – accessed 08/03/2016 261, – doi: 10.1017/S0022216X07002374 - 2014: The meanings of 2011: Damming the Amazon: Local move 11 24 doi: Belo Monte in the discourse of social media. – PPGCOM ments and transnational struggles over water. – So – ESPM, Comunicação Mídia e Consumo (30): 13-38. ciety & Natural Resources (1): 34-48, – McCully, P - – Online available at: http://revistacmc.espm.br/index. 10.1080/08941920903278129 22 December 2009. php/revistacmc/article/viewFile/649/pdf_1 – accessed . 2009: Glenn Ross Switkes (1951-2009). – Inter Junk, W.J. and J.A.S.N de Mello 08/03/2016 national Rivers, – Online available - . 1990: Impactos ecológicos das at: www.internationalrivers.org/resources/glenn-ross- 4 represas hidrelétricas na bacia amazônica brasileira. – switkes-1951-2009-3503 - accessed 08/03/2016 – ac Medeiros, H.F. Estudos Avançados (8): 126-143, – doi: 10.1590/S0103- cessed 08/03/2016 Justiça Global Brasil - 40141990000100010 2010: Fatos sobre Belo Monte. – Folha de São - 2012: OIT diz que governo violou Con Paulo, 1 June 2010. – Online available at: www1.folha.uol.com. 2012. Medialivre venção 169 no caso de Belo Monte. – Justiça Global Bra br/fsp/opiniao/fz0106201008.htm – accessed 08/03/2016 - sil, 5 March – Online available at: http://global.org. 2011: FUNAI afirma que não fez oitivas indigenas br/programas/oit-diz-que-governo-violou-convencao- sobre Belo Monte. – YouTube, 17 February 2011. – Online avail Keck, M.E K Sikkink. 169-no-caso-de-belo-monte/ – accessed 08/03/2016 able at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zdLboQmTAGE Miotto, K. 2011: . and 1998: Activists beyond borders: – accessed 08/03/2016 9 March 2011. Advocacy networks in international politics. – Ithaca, NY, Norte Energia inicia obras de Belo Monte. Leite, R.C.C U.S.A. – (O) Eco Notícias, – Online available at: . 2010: Belo Monte, a floresta e a árvore. – Folha www.oeco.com.br/salada-verde/24867-norte-energia- Moreira, P.F. - de São Paulo, 19 May 2010, p. A-3. – Online available at: inicia-obras-de-belo-monte – accessed 08/03/2016 www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/opiniao/fz1905201009.htm (ed.) 2012: Setor elétrico brasileiro e a sus Lima, K. 2a – accessed 08/03/2016 tentabilidade no século 21: Oportunidades e desafios.

2009: Lobão vê ‘forças demoníacas’ que impedem ed. – Rios Internacionais, Brasília, DF. Brazil. – Online http://economia.estadao.com. hidrelétricas. – O Estado de São Paulo, 29 September available at: www.internationalrivers.org/node/7525 br/noticias/geral,lobao-ve-forcas-demoniacas-que-impedem- Nader, V. - 2009. – Online available at: – accessed 08/03/2016 hidreletricas,442767 2008: Mentira institucionalizada justifica hidrelé MAB (Movimento dos Atingidos por Barragens) - - – accessed 08/03/2016 trica de Belo Monte. – Correio Cidadania, 17 June 2008. 2013: Consór – Online available at: www.correiocidadania.com.br/in - cio de Belo Monte proíbe atingidos de se manifestarem. dex.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1955&Ite Norte Energia SA. – MAB, 18 March 2013. – Online available at: www.ma mid=79 – accessed 08/03/2016 bnacional.org.br/noticia/cons-rcio-belo-monte-pro-be- 2014: Plano de gerenciamento integrado MacLeod, J. - atingidos-se-manifestarem-0 – accessed 08/03/2016 da Volta Grande do Xingu UHE Belo Monte. Empresa - nd [C. 2014]: The Belo Monte Dam: Social move Norte Energia SA, Número/código do documento PL_ - ments, law and state repression. – Online available at: SFB_Nº001_PGIVG_ 25-02-20-LEME, Empresas Partici https://www.jasondmacleod.com/the-belo-monte-dam- pantes: LEME Engenharia. Fevereiro/2014. – Norte En social-movements-law-and-state-repression/ – accessed ergia SA, Rio de Janeiro, RJ, Brazil. – Online available at: Magalhães, S.B. and F.D.M. Hernandez 08/03/2016 www.ibama.gov.br/licenciamento/index.php – accessed - Palmquist, H. (eds.) 2009: Painel de 08/03/2016 Especialistas: Análise crítica do estudo de impacto am 2014: Usina Teles Pires: Justiça ordena parar e biental do aproveitamento hidrelétrico de Belo Monte. governo federal libera operação, com base em suspensão DIE ERDE · Vol. 148 · 2-3/2017

182 Brazil’s Belo Monte Dam: Lessons of an Amazonian resource struggle

- - - 19 de segurança. – Ponte, 27 November 2014. – Online avail of the formal legal system and its development implica Salm, R able at: http://ponte.org/usina-teles-pires-justica-orde tions. – American Journal of Comparative Law : 14-49 - na-parar-e-governo-federal-libera-operacao-com-base- . 2009a: Belo Monte: Mentira institucionalizada. – PCE (Projetos e Consultorias de Engenharia, Ltda.), FURNAS em-suspensao-de-seguranca/ – accessed 08/03/2016 Correio da Cidadania, No. 682, 4 December 2009. – On (Furnas Centrais Elétricas, S.A.) and CNO (Construtora line available at: www.correiocidadania.com.br/index. Noberto Odebrecht, S.A.) php?option=com_content&task=view&id=4029&Itemid Salm, R. 2004: Complexo hidrelétrico =79 – accessed 08/03/2016 - do Rio Madeira: Estudos de viabilidade do AHE Jirau, 2009b: Belo Monte: A farsa das audiências públicas. Processo N8 PJ-0519-V1-00-RL-0001. – PCE, FURNAS – Correio da Cidadania, No. 674, 5 October 2009. – On - and CNO, Rio de Janeiro, RJ, Brazil. – Online available at: line available at: www.correiocidadania.com.br/index. http://philip.inpa.gov.br/publ_livres/Dossie/Mad/BAR php?option=com_content&task=view&id=3827&Itemid Santayana, G. Reason in common sense. In: RAGENS%20DO%20RIO%20MADEIRA.htm – accessed =79 – accessed 08/03/2016 Pinto, L.F. 08/03/2016 1905: – The life of Vol. 1 https://www.gutenberg. 2002: Hidrelétricas na Amazônia: Predestinação, reason: The phases of human progress. – New York, NY, org/files/15000/15000-h/vol1.html accessed 08/03/2016 fatalidade ou engodo? – Edição Jornal Pessoal, Belém, U.S.A.: – Online available at: Pinto, L.F. - Santos, L.A.O. and de Andrade, L.M.M. - Pará, Brazil – - 2003: Corrigida, começa a terceira versão da usi (eds.) 1990: Hydroelec 30 - na de Belo Monte. – Jornal Pessoal [Belém], 28 Novem tric dams on Brazil’s Xingu River and Indigenous peoples. ber 2003. – Online available at: http://philip.inpa.gov.br/ – Cultural Survival Report . – Cultural Survival, Cam Saracura, V.F. - publ_livres/Dossie/BM/Outros/Lúcio_Flávio_Pinto-Belo_ bridge, Massachusetts, U.S.A. Prudente, A.S. - - Monte-terceira_versao.pdf – accessed 08/03/2016 2015: History of studies on Belo Monte hy ogy 75 2013: O terror jurídico-ditatorial da suspen droelectric power station. – Brazilian Journal of Biol são de segurança e a proibição do retrocesso no estado (3) Supplement 1: S5-S9, – doi: 10.1590/1519- 10 Sassine, V. and A. de Souza 2016: Belo Monte: Obras da usina democrático de direito. – Revista Magister de Direito 6984.7503BM - - Civil e Processual Civil : 108-120. – Online available

at: www.icjp.pt/sites/default/files/papers/o_terror_ju foram tratadas na casa de empreiteiro. – O Globo, 6 Feb Prudente, A.S - - ridico_completo.pdf – accessed 08/03/2016 ruary 2016. – Online available at: http://oglobo.globo. . 2014: A suspensão de segurança como instru com/brasil/cardeal-admite-reuniao-em-casa-de-empre mento agressor dos tratados internacionais. – Revista iteiro-para-tratar-de-belo-monte-18609859 – accessed - Sevá Filho, A.O Justiça e Cidadania, No. 165. – Online available at: www. 08/03/2016 Santos, L.A.O L.M.M. de An- editorajc.com.br/2014/05/suspensao-seguranca-instru . 1990: Works on the great bend of the Xingu drade mento-agressor-tratados-internacionais/ – accessed – A historic trauma? – In: . and Puentes, A A.V. Vieira 30 08/03/2016 (eds.): Hydroelectric Dams on Brazil’s Xingu River - . and 2015: Brasil não cumpre: Belo and Indigenous Peoples. – Cultural Survival Report . Monte na Comissão Interamericana de Direitos Hu – Cultural Survival, Cambridge, Massachusetts, U.S.A.: Villas- Sevá Filho, A.O. manos. – In: Vozes do Xingu: Coletânea de artigos para 19-41 Bôas, A., B.R. Garzón, C. Reis, L. Amorim and L. Leite o Dossiê Belo Monte: Vozes do Xingu. Annex to: 2014: Profanação hidrelétrica de Btyre/ de Oliveira, J.P. and C Cohn - (eds.): Xingu. Fios condutores e armadilhas (até setembro de - Dossiê Belo Monte: Não há condições para a licença de 2012). – In: . (eds.): Belo Mon - operação. – Instituto Socioambiental (ISA), Brasília, DF, te e a questão indígena. – Associação Brasileira de An Brazil: 161-163. – Online available at: www.socioambien tropologia (ABA), Brasília, DF, Brazil: 170-205. – Online tal.org/sites/blog.socioambiental.org/files/dossie-belo- available at: www.abant.org.br/file?id=1381 – accessed Rapoza, K. Sevá Filho, A.O G. Switkes - monte-site.pdf – accessed 08/03/2016 08/03/2016 2011: Over a million people sign petition . and (eds.) 2005: Tenotã-mõ: Aler against Brazil’s ‘Pandora Dam’. – Forbes, 20 December tas sobre as conseqüências dos projetos hidrelétricos no - 2011. – Online available at: www.forbes.com/sites/ Rio Xingu, Pará, Brasil. – International Rivers Network,

kenrapoza/2011/12/20/over-a-million-people-sign- São Paulo, SP, Brazil. – Online available at: www.xingu petition-against-brazils-pandora-dam/#53a020844a86 vivo.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/Tenotã-Mo. Rosa, L.P. Siciliano, A.L - – accessed 08/03/2016 pdf – accessed 08/03/2016 2001: O Apagão: Por que veio? Como sair dele? – . 2011: O caso de Belo Monte na Comissão Inter Rosenn, K.S. Editora Revan, Rio de Janeiro, RJ, Brazil americana de Direitos Humanos: Análise em dois níveis. 1971: The jeito: Brazil’s institutional bypass – Paper presented at III Simpósio de Pós-Graduação em DIE ERDE · Vol. 148 · 2-3/2017

183 Brazil’s Belo Monte Dam: Lessons of an Amazonian resource struggle

- - - Relações Internacionais do Programa “San Tiago Dan br/2011/02/18/funai-afirma-que-nao-fez-oitivas-indi tas” (UNESP, UNICAMP e PUC/SP) 8 a 11 de Novembro genas-sobre-belo-monte/ http://t.co/zjnVPhPecW – ac Xingu Vivo - de 2011. – Online available at: www.santiagodantassp. cessed 08/03/2016 locaweb.com.br/br/simp/artigos2011/andre_siciliano. 2011b: Belo monte de asneiras, por Curt Trenne Villas-Bôas, A., B.R. Garzón, C. Reis, L Amorim and L. Leite pdf – accessed 08/03/2016 pohl. – Youtube, 15 July 2011. – Online available at: www. . youtube.com/watch?v=EUp-Mn4UkmQ&noredirect=1 – Xingu Vivo - 2015: Dossiê Belo Monte: Não há condições para a licença accessed 08/03/2016 de operação. – Instituto Socioambiental (ISA), Brasília, 2013: Funcionário de Belo Monte é flagrado es DF, Brazil. – Online available at: http://t.co/zjnVPhPecW pionando Xingu Vivo para informar ABIN. – Xingu Vivo, Xingu Vivo - – accessed 08/03/2016 25 February 2013. – Online available at: www.xinguvivo. - - 2011a: Em video, Funai garante que reuniões org.br/2013/02/25/funcionario-de-belo-monte-e-fla com indígenas não foram oitivas. – Xingu Vivo, 18 Feb grado-espionando-reuniao-do-xingu-vivo-para-infor ruary 2011. – Online available at: www.xinguvivo.org. mar-bin/ – accessed 08/03/2016

DIE ERDE · Vol. 148 · 2-3/2017

184