Vol. 148, No. 2-3 · Research article Brazil’s Belo Monte Dam: Lessons of an Amazonian resource DIE ERDE struggle Journal of the Geographical Society of Berlin Philip M. Fearnside National Institute for Research in Amazonia (INPA), Av. André Araújo, 2936, Manaus, Amazonas, CEP 69067-375, Brazil, [email protected] Manuscript submitted: 6 April 2016 / Accepted for publication: 24 March 2017 / Published online: 27 September 2017 Abstract The struggle to stop Brazil’s Belo Monte Dam, whose reservoir was filled in December 2015, has lessons for other resource struggles in Amazonia and beyond. Among the impediments that failed to halt the dam were the resistance efforts of both indigenous and non-indigenous victims of the dam’s impacts, as well as the non- governmental organizations and other actors supporting their cause. The pro-dam side had massive political and financial support from the top levels of the Brazilian government, including vigorous involvement of the country’s president. At the same time, achievements of the anti-dam side, particularly the local grassroots organizations, have provided inspiration for resource struggles elsewhere (although the victories of the resis- tance are significantly less definitive than was thought by many at the time). Zusammenfassung Die Auseinandersetzungen um einen Stopp des Belo Monte Staudamms in Brasilien, dessen Stausee im Dezem- ber 2015 geflutet wurde, beinhalten Lehren für andere Ressourcenkonflikte in Amazonien und darüber hinaus. Zu den Kräften, denen es letztendlich nicht gelungen war, den Staudammbau aufzuhalten, gehörten vor allem- die Widerstandbemühungen der indigenen und nicht-indigenen direkt vom Staudammbau Betroffenen, die von- Nicht-Regierungsorganisationen und anderen Akteuren in ihrer Sache unterstützt worden waren. Die Befür worter des Staudammbaus konnten ihrerseits auf die massive politische und finanzielle Unterstützung höchs- ter Kreise der brasilianischen Regierung zählen, inklusive der energischen Einmischung der Präsidentin des Landes. Allerdings wirkten die Errungenschaften der Staudammgegner, insbesondere der lokalen Basisbewe gungen, durchaus inspirierend für andernorts stattfindende Ressourcenkonflikte (auch wenn die Erfolge des KeywordsWiderstandes deutlich weniger klar ausfallen als zunächst von Vielen gedacht). Hydropower, indigenous peoples, hydroelectric dams, Amazonia, social movements, development impacts Philip M. Fearnside 148 2017: Brazil’s Belo Monte Dam: Lessons of an Amazonian resource struggle. – DIE ERDE (2-3): 167-184 DOI: 10.12854/erde-148-46 DIE ERDE · Vol. 148 · 2-3/2017 167 Brazil’s Belo Monte Dam: Lessons of an Amazonian resource struggle 1. Introduction - Fig. 1 will also be great.Fearnside Logical, legal and ethical arguments were cast aside as the Belo Monte construction pro Brazil’s 11,233-MW Belo Monte Dam ( ) now- ject advanced ( 2017). blocks the Xingu River, displacingribeirinhos approximately 25,000 people in the city of Altamira and 18,000 tra Local actors and a wide range of outside support ditional riversideVillas-Bôas dwellers ( ) along the groups struggled against the Belo Monte plans but stretch of this Amazon tributary that is flooded by the were unable to convince the Brazilian government to reservoir ( et al. 2015: 12-13). When all of- change course. Amazonia and other developing areas- the turbines are installed in 2019 a 100-kmribeirinho stretch face many resource struggles, of which hydroelectric of river below the main dam will lose 80% of its wa dams represent one important example. Such strug ter flow, destroying the livelihoods of the gles are likely to become even more common with population that depends on fishing in this area as well continued expansion of society’s appetite for resources as indigenous people in two “indigenous lands” in this- and of its capacity to extract them. Learning lessons- “reduced-flow” stretch and one on the Bacajá River, a from the Belo Monte struggle is therefore relevant to tributary of the Xingu. Officially denied plans for ad a wide variety of development issues. The present pa ditional dams upstream of Belo Monte would flood 55°perW examines the Belo Monte struggle50°W and its lessons. vast areas of indigenous land. Environmental impacts ´ *#Belo Monte Dam Babaquara (Altamira) Dam*# Iriri Dam *# S S 5° 5° *# Ipixuna Dam *#Kakraimoro Dam *# Jarina Dam S S 10° 10° Fig. 1 Dams and outlines of reservoirs originally planned for the Xingu River basin. Indig- enous areas are crosshatched. The ques- tion of whether dams upstream of Belo Monte will later be built, which Brazilian government authorities currently deny, is Indigenous land km a critical part of the debate. Source: Own 0175 50 300 elaboration 55°W 50°W DIE ERDE · Vol. 148 · 2-3/2017 168 Brazil’s Belo Monte Dam: Lessons of an Amazonian resource struggle 2. A brief history of the Belo Monte struggle A Fig. 2 - n inventorySevá of the Filho Xingu River Basin proposed six - large damsCNEC ( ), including “Kararaô” (now Belo Planning for a series of dams on the Xingu River be Monte)Brazil, ELETRONORTE(e.g. 1990). Viability studies were gan in 1975 during Brazil’s 1964-1985 military dicta prepared ( 1980), and environmental studiesCon- torship. InFearnside 1975 this author was living in one of the sórcio( Nacional de Engenheiros nd [2002]) Consultores were done by the Transamazon Highway colonization areas 50 km from National Consortium of Consulting Engineers ( Altamira ( 1986). In a visit to the Altamira = CNEC), office of the National Institute for Colonization and- a consulting firm in São Paulo that, during the. course Agrarian Reform (INCRA) I was given a map showing of the study, was bought by Camargo Corrêa, the main the areas to be flooded by the Babaquara (later re construction firm preparing to build the dams named “Altamira”) Dam, the first planned upstream of Belo Monte. That someagrovila of the colonization area Field studies on environmental impactsSaracura began in 1985,- would be flooded provoked understandable dismay for which the CNEC consulting firm that had done the- among colonists in the (planned agricultural viability study was contracted ( 2015). Aca village) where I lived, but during the dictatorship any demics from various universities and research insti sort of objection70°W or protest was out60°W of the question. 50°Wtutions were hired as consultants to collect data for ´ 10°N 10°N Uatumã River Pará 0° 0° *# Santarém .! 2 .! Belém Manaus .! *#.!*#1 r Altamira *#3 Amazon River *# 7 *# 9 y r 10 pajós*# River MadeiraTa Rive8 Porto Velho *#.! ansamazon Highwa *# BR-364 TrHighwa 5 Xingu Rive *# 4 10°S 6 10°S Fig. 2 Rondônia Locations mentioned in the text. cantins River y To Dams: River o 1.) Belo Monte .!Cuiabá c 2.) Balbina 3.) Tucuruí 4.) Jirau São Francis 20°S 20°S 5.) Santo Antônio 6.) Cachoeira Riberão (Guajará-Mirim) *# Planned dam *# 7.) Babaquara (Altamira) Existing dam 8.) Chacorão .! Cities 9.) São Luiz do Tapajós Rivers km 10.) Jatobá Highways 05250 00 1000 30°S 30°S Source: Fearnside 2017: 15 70°W 60°W 50°W DIE ERDE · Vol. 148 · 2-3/2017 169 Brazil’s Belo Monte Dam: Lessons of an Amazonian resource struggle - use by CNEC in drafting the report. The consultants- The year 1989Instituto saw the Brasileiro creation do of Meiothe Brazilian Ambiente In e signed contracts committingFearnside themselves 2001; Pintoto secrecy, 2002: dosstitute Recursos for the Naturais Environment Renováveis and Renewable Natural which has been a serious limitation since the begin Resources ( ning of such reports (see Assis and = IBAMA), giving Forline56). Problems also included pressuring researchers moreEstudo institutional de Impacto capacity Ambiental for the licensing process, regarding the content of their submissions ( including vetting the Environmental Impact Study- 2004). Centrais Elé- ( = EIA) that had been a tricas Brasileiras - requirement for projects like dams since 1986. How In 1987 Brazilian Electrical Centers ( ever, proponents of Amazonian development projects = ELETROBRÁS), a Brazilian gov were still testing the limits as to how little they could ernment holding company, produced the “2010 Plan” get away with considering Fearnsidein these reports, and some listing dams expected toBrazil be built, ELETROBRÁS by the year 2010 major development projects were even going forward as well as other dams without a limit on the date of without the required EIA ( 1989a). - planned construction ( 1987). The report was released only after it had leaked to the The year 1989 also saw the release of the Portu- public. The complete Fearnsidelist indicates 79 large dams in guese-language version of a book edited by Cultural Brazil’s Legal Amazonia region, with a total area of 10 Survival and the Pro-Indian Commission ofSantos São Pau and million hectares (see 1995).Brazil ,Kararaô ELETROBRÁS (Belo lode showingAndrade the disastrous impacts that the Xingu Monte) was indicated for construction by 2000 and dams would have on indigenous peoples ( - Babaquara (Altamira) by 2005 ( 1990). In February of the same year the 1987: 153–154). Brazil’s finances have not permitted “Altamira demonstration” (officially the “First En dam construction at anything like the rate expected counter of the Indigenous Peoples of the Xingu”) was in the 2010 Plan. The 2010 Plan sparked a storm of- held, led by the Kaiapó, with significant national and criticism, and the Brazilian government never again- international press coverage. The event was marked- released its complete plans for Amazonianplanos decenais dams inde by Tuíra, a