Georgia Between the European Union and Russia Does Russia Constitute an Obstacle to Georgian Europeanization?

C.E.S.I. Centro Einstein di Studi Internazionali sul Federalismo, la Pace, la Politica del Territorio Roberta Carbone Georgia between the European Union and Russia Does Russia constitute an obstacle to Georgian Europeanization? November 2012 C.E.S.I. Via Schina, 26 - 10144 Torino – Italia Tel. e Fax (011) 473.28.43 Codice fiscale: 96512760016 www.centroeinstein.it E-mail: [email protected] 2 Contents Introduction 4 A brief historical excursus 6 The EU ‘Enlargement-lite’ policy 7 Russia: a troublesome neighbour 10 Achievements and setbacks 12 Conclusion 14 References 15 3 Introduction On October, 1 the Georgian people has voted for the Parliamentary elections. OSCE electoral observers reported that there was a strong animosity during the electoral campaign, but also that the scrutiny was conducted regularly on the whole.1 For a young democracy like Georgia, always under pressure because of the internal secessionist conflicts, and in turmoil for the September revelations about the tortures in the Georgian prisons, this can be considered a very positive outcome. Besides, the elections could be analysed also from a (geo)political point of view: as the majority of international scholars and analysts were almost sure that the result would have confirmed the United National Movement – President Saakashvili‟s party – as the first party in the Georgian Parliament, it was the main opposition party, Georgian Dream, led by Bidzina Ivanishvili, which won the elections, and thus the possibility to create a new government. Also in this case we should acknowledge that the democratic procedures have been respected enough to bring a new party to power, for the first time after the 2003 „Rose Revolution‟. On another level of analysis, though, the outcome of this election raises another kind of concern: Mr Ivanishvili, the richest person in the country and now Georgian Prime Minister, is also known to be in favour of a rapprochement with Russia. The relationship between Russia and Georgia has degenerated since the „Rose Revolution‟, which 4 brought the incumbent President Saakashvili to power, and completely changed the course of history for Georgia: Saakashvili set up a government of young professionals, and launched the reform of the whole national system, starting from liberalisation and the fight against corruption. The diplomatic relations between the two countries have increasingly worsened until 2008, when they got to their lowest level, and brought to the beginning of a short armed conflict on the issue of the independence of the Georgian region of South Ossetia. Notwithstanding the ceasefire agreement, Russia has kept its military forces on the Georgian territory, in the two secessionist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which declared their independence after the war in 2008. Their declaration was recognized by Russia, thus exacerbating the conflict between the latter and Georgia, which did not accept the unilateral declaration. Therefore, Mr Ivanishvili‟s election as Prime Minister could constitute a turning point in the relationship between Russia and Georgia, and consequently also a change in the country‟s alliances choice: a possible reorientation toward East, renouncing to the sense of belonging to the (Western) European family, which President Saakashvili so often refers to. This paper will try to analyse by which means the European Union and Russia have tried to influence the Georgian system, and which one of the two international actors has prevailed. Thence, 1 International Election Observation, Georgia – Parliamentary elections, 1 October 2012, OSCE URL: http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/94593 the conclusion will be an open question on Georgian future according to the latest Parliamentary elections, which could affect the next course of Georgian politics in a meaningful way, but also change the geopolitical balance in the South Caucasus. Our hypothesis is that we could actually talk about a kind of „Europeanization‟ in Georgia, as the cooperation instruments put in place by the European Union have effectively influenced the Georgian institutional system; nonetheless, the European „stick and carrot‟ policy has not always functioned in the Georgian case, as in that framework the use of conditionality could sometimes be counterproductive or difficult to put in place. In certain conditions, the Russian way of approaching the Georgian issue has been more efficient in terms of outcomes, even though in Georgia more than in other South Caucasus countries Russia had to resort to the use of hard power. This does not mean that Russia and the EU act on two completely different levels, the former resorting to hard power, the latter to soft power: in South Caucasus Russia learned to use the European tools against Europe itself, for example financing civil society NGOs and news media that promote a pro-Russian political message, even though this is partially true in the Georgian case, where the parties are constantly clashing and there is little possibility for Russia to creep into the Georgian society. 5 A brief historical excursus The main political linkages between Georgia and Russia date back to the 19th century, when tsarist Russia invaded the Georgian territory, and made it part of the empire. According to some scholars, at that time Russia was perceived by the Georgian elite as a „bridge to Europe‟, thus the source of a Europeanization of the country, and therefore also a source of modernisation. Thence, it dates back to that time also the cultural and social linkage, as several Georgian generations studied in Russia, and merged the two cultures. All this, though, also made a nationalist sentiment spring among the Georgian elites, which after the creation of the USSR began to feel that the European side of Russia had been left behind with the Bolshevik revolution. Indeed, Georgia was one of the few territories inside the Soviet Union to leave some freedoms to its citizens. 2 It was after the end of the Cold War, and the declaration of independence, that Georgia began to look westward, in order to recover that link with Europe and the West which had been severed during the soviet period. The seal to this new course was the membership to the Council of Europe accorded in 1999. Only with the „Rose Revolution‟, a peaceful shift in power in 2003 which gave birth to the new government led by Mr Sakaashvili, there was a radical change, which led the Georgian elite to abandon not only the political relations with Russia, but above all to leave behind the Russian 6 culture, trying instead to find a common path with Western democracies. This change was pushed also by the US administration, already active in the country from 2001 – year of the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington – which at that time was fighting its „War on Terror‟ worldwide, and on the field in Afghanistan and Iraq. Indeed, Georgia took part to the mission in Afghanistan and also to the „coalition of the willing‟ in Iraq, where it was the most important per capita contributor in terms of military forces. The influence of the United States was particularly strong on the economic level, as one of the first reforms in the country was the liberalisation of economy, in order to make Georgia an attractive pole for FDI. Meanwhile Georgia was also trying to create new linkages with Europe, both with the individual countries and with the EU. In order to understand the importance accorded, at least publicly, to the cooperation with Europe, the new President Saakashvili decided to officially use both the Georgian and the European flag, justifying this move with the fact that the blue flag with twelve stars was the flag of the Council of Europe, thus, as a member, Georgia had the right to use it. The political message of using the flag that the Council of Europe and the European Union share is clear though: Georgia wants to be perceived as a fully European country, therefore as part of the Western world. 2 Silvia SERRANO, Vue des marges : la Russie, un pont vers l’Europe ? L’exemple de la Géorgie, colloque « La Russie et l‟Europe : autres et semblables », Université Paris Sorbonne – Paris IV, 10-12 mai 2007 [en ligne], Lyon, ENS LSH, mis en ligne le 26 novembre 2008. URL : http://institut-est-ouest.ens-lsh.fr/spip.php?article127 The EU ‘Enlargement-lite’ policy The formal relationship between the European Union and Georgia began in 1999, when the two countries signed the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), which is still the main framework policy for bilateral cooperation between the EU and Georgia. The PCAs have been signed by ten countries, including Russia, with the EU: the main objectives are the strengthening of democracy and human rights, and the market liberalisation. Moreover, in 2004 the South Caucasus was included in the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), started in 2003 and including both the Mediterranean and the Eastern neighbouring countries. The ENP is a framework programme for bilateral agreements between the EU and the neighbouring countries: it is structured on the „Action Plans‟ which are written by mutual consent, and which delineate the priorities of each country. The ENP is the framework programme for the different aspects of cooperation between the EU and Georgia. It implies: the creation of a market economy and the strengthening of commercial relations between the two; the implementation of the rule of law and democracy in the country, thanks to some initiatives such as the Parliamentary Cooperation Committee, but also to an

Load more