Political Partisanship and Support for Direct Democracy

Underlying motivations for the support for direct democracy among different electorates

Quita Muis

ANR: 129554

17 July 2017

First-Year Paper

Research Master Social and Behavioral Sciences

Tilburg University

Abstract Research has shown differences in support for direct democracy between new-left and populist right electorates, raising the question of which motivations underlie this support among the different electorates. It was expected that the populist right electorate grounds its support for direct democracy in their preferences for anti-institutionalism and exclusivity, whereas for the new-left electorate it was expected that their support is grounded in the preferences for non-conformity and inclusivity. Based on European Social Survey data for ten European countries it could be concluded that anti- institutionalism indeed motivates the populist right to be in favour of direct democracy, and that the preference for inclusivity underlies this support among the new-left. However, both conclusions are dependent on the definition of direct democracy, which suggests that the understanding of this concept is ambiguous both in the literature and for the different electorates. At the end of the paper, the wider theoretical relevance of the findings are discussed, and recommendations for future research are given.

Direct Democracy Since the 1970s, national survey research has shown undiminished support for referendums among Dutch citizens (Den Ridder, Dekker, van Houwelingen & Schrijver, 2016). The aim of political decision making by referendums, or „direct democracy‟ (Canovan, 1999, p. 2), is giving more power to the public by letting them have direct influence on important political decisions (Canovan, 1999; Kriesi, 2005). Although in general the support for referendums in the Netherlands has not diminished, a remarkable shift has taken place in the political preference of those in favour of direct democracy. Whereas electoral support for binding referendums used to be stronger among voters for new-leftist parties such as D66 and the precursor of GroenLinks, nowadays, stronger support is found among the voters for more populist parties such as the right-winged PVV (Den Ridder et al., 2016). These current findings are in sharp contrast with what is generally believed to be the relationship between political partisanship and support for direct democracy, namely, that particularly the left-winged parties and their followers strive for (more) direct political participation (Inglehart, 1997; Kriesi, 1989). Support for direct democracy among the new-left seems to find its roots in the movement of modernization during the mid-20th century, which has caused changes in the worldviews of the public that reshaped economic, political and social life (Inglehart, 1997). Especially the young, high-educated new-left started to aspire individual freedom, and wanted to liberate themselves from the pressure to conform to Christian traditions and cultural conservatism (Canovan, 1999; De Koster, Achterberg, Houtman & Van der Waal, 2010; De Koster & Van der Waal, 2007). This secular „counter culture‟ gave rise to new social movements that promoted tolerant and progressive views on issues such as homosexuality, family values, gender roles, and euthanasia (Inglehart, 1997; Kriesi, 1989). Criticism on the authoritarian government increased, and the new-left showed more interest in direct democracy by wanting to play an active, direct role in politics. As a result, political parties lost control over their electorates, and forms of direct political participation that challenged the elite became more widespread (Inglehart, 1997; Inglehart, 1999). So, although it is often believed that it is the young, high-educated new-left who supports direct political participation, currently, those in favour are actually the more right-winged and populist voters, of which the majority is older and lower-educated (De Hond, 2016). The contrast between the general perception of the characteristics and political preference of the electorate in favour of direct democracy, and the recent findings of De Ridder et al. (2016) raises some questions about the mechanisms that underlie support for direct democracy. Why do the right-winged populist voters want to make their voices heard through direct political participation? And why is this aspiration not so strong among the new-left electorate? In other words, what motivates these electorates to be in favour of direct democracy? Answers to these questions seem to be at least partly related to the modernization phase as described above. Yet, this cannot be the whole story, since the culturally progressive stances taken during this phase are not only widely adopted by left-winged parties and their followers, but also by

1 those on the right side of the political spectrum as a result of a wave of radical new-right parties that emerged in the late-20th century (Akkerman 2005; De Koster et al., 2014). However, when one visits the Facebook pages of left- and right-winged politicians, this progressiveness regarding several moral and political themes seems to manifest itself in different ways. When, allegedly, two gay men were physically attacked because of their sexuality by a group of Dutch-Moroccan youngsters, Alexander Pechtold (2017), Dutch leader of the new-leftist D66, expressed his solidarity to the couple by walking hand in hand to a formation meeting with male colleague Wouter Koolmees. With his Facebook post, Pechtold emphasized the Dutch values of “…tolerance and freedom. The freedom to be who you want to be”. Populist right-wing leader Geert Wilders (2017) reacted to this post by saying: “what really helps against hate towards homosexuals is not all men walking hand in hand, but removing Islam from the Netherlands”1. Furthermore, on her Facebook page, French right-wing politician Marine le Pen (2017) addressed the public‟s discontent with “the elite from the Parisian salons” , and she emphasized being part of the public by repeatedly talking about “we”: “We are of flesh and blood. We are hopeful and passionate. We are French!”2. Moreover, her political opponent Emmanuel Macron was called a “Trojan horse, brought in by the elite”3 on the Facebook page of the Austrian populist politician Heinz Christian Strache (Strache, 2017). These examples show differences between the new-left and populist right with regard to cultural diversity, the perception of the ruling elite, and their way of governance. In some of the related literature it is stated that these factors are expected to be of influence on the amount of support for direct democracy, and that this influence differs between the new-left and the populist right (Canovan, 1999; De Koster et al., 2014; Rydgren, 2005). Yet, this relationship is rarely tested and/or proven with quantitative data. Therefore, it is aimed to answer the following research question: what motivations underlie the support for direct democracy among new-leftist and populist right electorates? Since the majority of the Dutch public has been in favour of direct democracy for decades, and worries about political unrest are currently intensifying, more needs to be known about what drives people to support direct political participation. Especially now that consulting the people‟s opinion through referendums is on the rise, also internationally, getting more insight in the public‟s motives for participating can be useful. In order to draw conclusions on a broader scale, other European countries besides the Netherlands will be taken into account in this study. In the following section, the research question will be answered by consulting the literature and it will be further investigated whether the above mentioned factors are indeed of influence. Three hypotheses will be formulated and tested with survey data from the European Social Survey in Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden (ESS, 2012). Motivations for including these countries will be elaborated later on.

1 Freely translated from Dutch. 2 Freely translated from French. 3 Freely translated from German. 2

Anti-institutionalism As mentioned in the introduction, a wave of radical new-right parties emerged in the late-20th century. These parties started to look for ways of representing the opinion of the people against the newly established liberal elite, and thus became the primary supporter of populism (Canovan, 1999; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005). What often drives people to vote for new-right populist parties are feelings of political discontent or dissatisfaction with dominant institutions in general: anti-institutionalism (Canovan, 1999; De Koster et al., 2014; Hauptmann, 2001; Rydgren, 2007). There where the new-left primarily aims at changing society, those at the right aim at retaining it (Van der Meer, 2009). The new-right rather focuses on opening up current decision making procedures to the public, and promoting democratic initiatives that challenge the establishment (Hauptmann, 2001). Criticism of right-wing populists on left-wing democratic traditions includes that the democracy is elite-centred (Akkerman, 2005; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005). According to them, the elites are morally corrupt and only represent specific interests, which are not (always) consistent with the interest of the people. Moreover, right-wing populists oppose the way left-wing parties represent the public, by claiming that the vertical distance between the people and the representatives should be minimized (Akkerman, 2005). A popular concept of representation should exist, which can be achieved by „promoting a style, rhetoric and practice that demonstrate that politicians are one with the people‟, or by promoting „institutional reforms such as direct elections of political officials, popular initiatives and recalls‟ (Akkerman, 2005, p. 338), which are all forms of direct democracy (Canovan, 1999). In a popular democracy, the role of representative is often fulfilled by a charismatic leader that is one with the people. A close, direct link between those who govern and those who follow causes personalized leadership, and a personal tie with a leader consequently fosters the feeling that this leader is “one of us” (Canovan, 1999; Kriesi, 2014). The quote from French populist leader Marine Le Pen that is mentioned in the introduction is a practical example of the use of this framework (Le Pen, 2017). By stating “we are French”, and mentioning “despising the Parisian elite”, she distances herself from the establishment, and at the same time shortens the distance between her and the public by stating she is one of them. Lastly, having one charismatic leader who represents the people is related to Mair‟s (as cited in Kriesi, 2014, p. 367) concept of „partyless democracy‟. According to Mair, this can be understood as a popular democracy without parties that can rise when the majority of the people supports populism and is in favour of direct democracy. In a partyless democracy, the political system is neutral and non-partisan, and therefore appealing to a mass electorate. No mediation of political parties takes place, but there is a direct link to the people and the governing actor. To summarize, new-right parties started a strong populist movement against elite- and institution-centred democracy. The right-winged populists opposed the degree of openness of political procedures and the way the public was represented, which resulted in growing support for direct democracy. In general, populists criticize the distance between the (political) decision-makers and the people, and the fact that only the interests of the governing elite are represented. Consequently, they

3 support more close, personalized leadership and popular initiatives that challenge the government. So, populist right electorates seem to be in favour of direct democracy because of discontent with and resistance against the ruling institutions in general: anti-institutionalism. Therefore, the following hypothesis is formulated:

H1. A preference for anti-institutionalism in combination with support for direct democracy leads to a vote for the populist right, rather than a vote for the new-left.

Libertarianism and Authoritarianism A term that was already used in the previous paragraph is liberal or libertarian; a term often used to describe the new-left. However, left and liberal/libertarian are not the same per definition. Whereas the dimension of left and right refers to the pursuit of equality in the socio-economic domain, the dimension of libertarian and authoritarian refers to the pursuit of freedom in the socio-cultural and political sphere (Middendorp, 1989). Yet, research shows that the two dimensions are related, since higher-educated individuals driven by libertarianism often vote for new-leftist parties, whereas lower- educated voters driven by authoritarianism often choose the new-right (Houtman & Achterberg, 2010). So what do these ideologies mean with respect to culture and politics? First of all, libertarianism refers to progressiveness with the emphasis on individual freedom of cultural and political expression (De Koster et al., 2014; Middendorp, 1989). Authoritarianism, on the other hand, refers to the idea that there should be a „strictly ordered society‟ and that trespassing this order should be „punished severely‟ (Mudde, as cited in Spierings, Lubbers & Zaslove, 2017, p. 218). In addition, authoritarianism also implies aversion to ethnic diversity, or discontent about immigration (Blaug & Schwarzmantel, 2016; De Koster et al., 2014; De Koster & Van der Waal, 2007; Spierings et al., 2017). Taking into account the way right-wing populists are described so far in this paper; as progressive and in favour of individual freedom as the new-left, labelling them as authoritarian seems counter-intuitive. Yet, it is not. First of all, according to Middendorp (1989), there is a difference between authoritarian conservatism and the progressive authoritarianism that is expressed by the populist new-right, namely that the conservatives believe that it is impossible to have both full democracy and fundamental social improvement, whereas the new-right does believe this is possible. Secondly, new-right populists support a secular society, but are also in favour of a strictly ordered society. By taking this progressive stance on religion and governance, legitimate guidelines on how to arrange society, which used to be the Christian faith, are missing. Therefore, an authoritative figure is needed to keep society in order. Thirdly, in most European countries, the populists perceive this societal order and their progressive views on secularisation and tolerance to be threatened by ethnic and cultural diversity (Liang, 2016; Spierings et al., 2017). Therefore, there should be an authoritative figure that uses measures of coercion and law and order to deal with problems that arise from this.

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Currently, this discourse mainly involves the tension between Islam and Western society (Liang, 2016; Spierings et al., 2017). Concluding, the libertarian – authoritarian dimension seems to cover two distinctions between the new-left and the populist right, namely the degree of non-conformity and inclusivity. These concepts will be elaborated below.

Non-conformity As shortly discussed in the introduction, growing support for direct democracy among the new-left seems to have resulted from the dissatisfaction with the traditional, conservative Christian values that were imposed by the authoritarian government. This led to the founding of new social movements by the progressive new-left, who strived for secularisation, individual freedom and tolerance with regard to several moral themes, such as homosexuality, gender roles and freedom of speech (Canovan, 1999; De Koster et al., 2010; De Koster & Van der Waal, 2007; Inglehart, 1997; Inglehart, 1999; Kriesi, 1989). The old ways of conforming to conservative governmental rules had to make way for individual liberty. To enable a shift from collective orientations to tolerance and acceptance of different world views, the new-left started to participate more actively and directly in politics. This resulted in less power for political parties and challenges for the established elite (Inglehart, 1997; Inglehart, 1999). Rather than focussing on changing the ruling institutions alone, the new-left aimed at changing society and its norms as a whole. Up until today, this constant desire to transform society and reconstruct its most influential institutions is perceived as typically left-wing (Van der Meer, 2009). Support for direct democracy among the new-left partly arises from the incentive to be able to change the societal status quo. Additionally, the mere act of direct participation, regardless of the outcome, also represents the progressive idea of individualism and self-expression (De Koster et al., 2010; Van der Meer, 2009). In general, the new-left defends the right of individuals to make their own choices and not having to conform to collective norms and values. That it is non-conformity to societal norms in general that underlies the new-leftist support for direct democracy, rather than merely the discontent with the established institutions also shows in the fact that the young, high-educated left themselves eventually became the new liberal elite, to whom the wave of radical new-right parties so strongly opposed (Canovan, 1999). The new-left becoming the new establishment resulted from frustrations of tight labour markets and competition for scarce positions in the political elite. The young, over-educated but under-employed left was promised fast upward social mobility and more educational opportunities, but this could not be realized due to the economic crises of the 1970s and 1980s and the demands of labour markets. As Kitschelt (1988, p. 225) concludes: “The young counter-elites thus proposed an alternative model of societal organization and used left-libertarian parties to realize it”. The new elitist political culture and their new-leftist followers still strongly emphasized liberal values of individualism, internationalism, multiculturalism, permissiveness and belief in progress, which underlie their support for direct democracy (Canovan,

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1999, p.4). This change also explains why for a long time, the populist discourse belonged more to the left, but slowly shifted to the right end of the political spectrum. The new-leftist movements no longer had to stand up against the ruling institutions by voicing their discontent, since they formed the establishment now (Canovan, 1999; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005). To summarize, dissatisfaction with the conservative moral traditions that were imposed by the government led to the rise of new social movements that opposed the ruling institutions with progressive, secular views on society. However, when the new-left became the establishment themselves, populism, ruling based on the voice of the public, became a right-wing political mechanism. What did not change was the aspiration that society would adopt their new-leftist progressive views, which promote individual freedom and thus non-conformity. Therefore, it seems that the support for progressive values and continuous change in society is what characterizes new- leftist support for direct democracy. These findings lead to the following hypothesis:

H2. A preference for non-conformity in combination with support for direct democracy leads to a vote for the new-left, rather than a vote for the populist right.

Inclusivity and Exclusivity So, in the socio-cultural domain, or on the libertarian-authoritarian dimension, the new-left is mainly focussed on promoting progressiveness towards traditional moral themes and openness towards cultural diversity, whereas the populist right is mainly concerned with the perceived threat of immigration and ethnic diversity. Because of the dominant ethnocentric anti-immigrant sentiments, the populist right-winged movements are sometimes called „movements of exclusion‟ (Rydgren, 2005, p. vii). This means that their concept of who „the people‟ are, is narrower than for parties on the other side of the political spectrum. According to Rydgren (2005), the need for cultural preservation, nationalistic identities and unification causes populists to want to exclude those who are not considered „the people‟. According to them, the ordinary people form the silent majority whose interests are overruled by those of the elite, corrupt politicians, and ethnic minorities (Canovan, 1999). Moreover, the working class, who often votes for right-winged populist parties, experiences increased economic pressure since immigration has caused competition between their relatively high-cost labour and the low-cost labour of immigrants. This perceived threat increases dissatisfaction with immigration and elicits defensive reactions from the populist right (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005; Liang, 2016). The new-left, on the other hand, is a movement of inclusion (Canovan, 1999; Ottonelli & Torresi, 2012; Taggart, 2016). Their pursuit of individual freedom is aimed at everyone‟s interests, regardless of ethnicity, sexual orientation, or other personal characteristics (Spierings et al., 2017; Taggart, 2016). They are in favour of multicultural immigration policies that include open borders (to some extent) and fast integration for immigrants, based on the liberal egalitarian idea that every human

6 being is equal and belongs to the same community with a shared, inclusive morality (Ottonelli & Torresi, 2012). Hence, they claim that recognizing and tolerating immigrants‟ pursuit of happiness would only be socially just: another concept that fits the new-leftist discourse (Kriesi & Ferrin, 2016; Ottonelli & Torresi, 2012). In general, deciding who are „the people‟ and who are entitled to certain rights should not depend on any morally arbitrary rules regarding individual identity (Ottonelli & Torresi, 2012). Not only culturally, but also politically does the preference for inclusion or exclusion divide the new-left and the populist right. Rather than only representing the voice of the majority of the people (exclusivity), the inclusive view also supports equal representation of minorities (Blaug & Schwarzmantel, 2016; Kriesi & Ferrin, 2016; Van der Meer, 2009). For right-wing populists, it is not about how (direct) democracy can develop consensus, but about how (direct) democracy can legitimately justify decisions that are not unanimous, and impose them on the rest of the people, the minority, who does not agree (Hauptmann, 2001). This difference can also be explained based on the distinction between voice and accountability (Thomassen and Aarts, as cited in Van der Meer, 2009, p.135). First of all, consensus emphasizes voice. Shared political power (for example, in the form of referendums) entails valuable possibilities for all citizens, including minorities, to voice their opinion. For the majoritarian view, the emphasis lies on accountability. This means that the public disproportionately grants all political power to one representative and executive actor. As stated before, this authoritarian figure is the personification of the ideals of the people. Consequently, when the public is dissatisfied with anything, they know exactly who to blame. In addition, when political power is concentrated, there is more incentive for political participation, since the people want to have control over this influential power (Jackman, 1987). To summarize, the new-left is often perceived as a movement of inclusion, as it strives for individual freedom, equality, and social justice for everyone, regardless of personal characteristics. In line with these ideals, the new-left is in favour of direct democracy because it gives everyone, including minorities, the opportunity to voice their opinion. By contrast, right-wing populism is often called a movement of exclusion, since its supporters want to ensure that the interests of the majority, and not those of minorities, are put first. Direct democracy enables the direct representation of the interests and opinions of the ordinary people, and therefore right-wing populists support this form of governance. The following hypothesis is derived from these findings:

H3. A preference for inclusivity in combination with support for direct democracy leads to a vote for the new-left, whereas a preference for exclusivity in combination with support for direct democracy leads to a vote for the populist right.

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Data and Measures In order to test the hypotheses, data from the European Social Survey, Round 6 were used (ESS, 2012). A more recent round could not be used, since Round 6 is the only round that included questions about (direct) democracy. The ESS6 includes cross-national data of individuals older than fourteen, originating from twenty-nine different countries. For this research, only the data for Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden were used. This choice was based on taking the Netherlands as a starting point and including surrounding countries that had at least one (extreme) populist right party with substantial electoral results until 2012 (Mudde, 2013). Although Austria met these criteria, data from this country could not be included, since Austria did not participate in Round 6 of the ESS. This selection led to an initial sample size of 18,411 respondents. In order to reduce sampling error and potential non-response bias, and to account for differences in population size between countries, weights were applied for all analyses, which were created by multiplying the post-stratification weights with the population size weights (which were already included in the dataset). In case of any missing data, listwise deletion was applied. The measure of Electorate was based on the question of whether or not respondents voted in the last national election, and if this was the case, which party they voted for. The survey provided the respondents with several answer options, including the competing parties in the last election and the options „other‟ and „blank‟. The answers were divided into four categories, namely new-left, populist right, other, and blank- or non-voters. This categorization (with the exception of blank- and non- voters) was made based on the ideologies and main goals of the included parties. Descriptions of all possible parties for all countries were retrieved from the official websites of these parties, and the Political Parties Appendix A3 that is included the ESS6 documentation. Additionally, the literature was consulted to decide on what characterizes new-left and populist right parties, but findings were not always consistent (e.g. sometimes socio-democratic parties are characterized as new-left, and sometimes as moderate right (Hooghe, Marks & Wilson, 2002, p. 973; Oesch & Rennwald, 2010, p. 343)). Yet, consensus does exist about the new-left primarily including green and progressive parties that strive for minority rights, and about the populist right including nationalistic and more conservative parties that support independence and anti-immigration sentiments (Hooghe et al., 2002; Kriesi et al., 1992; Oesch & Renwald, 2010). So, rather than focussing on political labels or characteristics such as foundation year, the political parties were categorized bases on their ideologies and main goals. All parties that were not characterized as either new-left or populist right were labelled „other‟. See Appendix I for an overview of this categorization. Furthermore, blank and no votes were both perceived as statement votes, and therefore put together in one category. The fact that some respondents did not vote because of their lack of interest in politics, was controlled for (see control variables). Lastly, all respondents under eighteen years old were not taken into account („not applicable‟), and the „refusal‟, „don‟t know‟, and „no answer‟ options were coded as missing. For this

8 variable, this led to a number of 15,161 respondents. See Table 1 for the distribution of respondents over the categories.

Table 1. Number of respondents per electorate

Vote N

New-left 2385

Populist right 1440

Other 8654

Blank or no vote 2682

Direct Democracy was measured by means of three Likert items concerning referendums, governmental decisions, and policies. Respondents were asked to answer the following questions on a 11-point Likert scale, where 0 indicates „not at all important‟, and 10 indicates „extremely important‟:

1) How important do you think it is for democracy in general that citizens have the final say on the most important political issues by voting on them directly in referendums? 2) How important do you think it is for democracy in general that the government explains its decisions to voters? 3) How important do you think it is for democracy in general that the government changes its planned policies in response to what most people think?

Again, the „not applicable‟, „refusal‟, „don‟t know‟, and „no answer‟ options were coded as missing. For this variable, this led to a number of 11,848 respondents. All items were coded in such a way that a higher score indicates a greater preference for direct democracy. The measure of Anti-institutionalism relied on seven Likert items regarding trust, and functioning of the government and the democracy. The items regarding trust had to be answered on a 11-point Likert scale, where 0 indicates „no trust at all‟, and 10 indicates „complete trust‟. The questions about the government and the democracy also had to be answered on a 11-point Likert scale, where 0 indicates „extremely dissatisfied‟ and „extremely bad‟, and 10 indicates „extremely satisfied‟ and „extremely good‟ respectively. The items read as follows:

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Please tell me how much you personally trust each of the following institutions:

1) [Country]‟s parliament? 2) The legal system? 3) Politicians? 4) The European Parliament?

5) Now thinking about the [country] government, how satisfied are you with the way it is doing its job? 6) And on the whole, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in [country]?

Again, the „refusal‟, „don‟t know‟, and „no answer‟ options were coded as missing. For this variable, this led to a number of 16,739 respondents . Eventually, all items were coded in such a way that a higher score indicates a greater preference for anti-institutionalism. Non-conformity was measured based on only one item regarding homosexuality. On a 5-point Likert scale, the respondents were asked to indicate to what extent they agree with the following statement, where 1 indicates „agree strongly‟, and 5 indicates „disagree strongly‟:

1) Gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own life as they wish.

Again, the „refusal‟, „don‟t know‟, and „no answer‟ options were coded as missing. For this variable, this led to a number of 18,279 respondents . Eventually, the item was coded in such a way that a higher score indicates a greater preference for non-conformity. Lastly, the measure of Inclusivity was based on six Likert items which all regarded immigration and ethnic diversity. The first three items had to be answered on a 4-point Likert scale, for which 1 indicated „allow many‟, and 4 indicated „allow none‟. The last three items had to be answered on a 11-point Likert scale, for which 0 indicated a negative stance towards immigration, and 10 indicated a positive stance towards immigration. The items read as follows:

1) To what extent do you think [country] should allow people of the same race or ethnic group as most [country]‟s people to come and live here? 2) How about people of a different race or ethnic group from most [country] people? 3) How about people from the poorer countries outside Europe? 4) Would you say it is generally bad or good for [country]‟s economy that people come to live here from other countries? 5) Would you say that [country]‟s cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries? 6) Is [country] made a worse or a better place to live by people coming to live here from other countries?

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Again, the „refusal‟, „don‟t know‟, and „no answer‟ options were coded as missing. For this variable, this led to a number of 17,517 respondents . All items were coded in such a way that a higher score indicates a greater preference for inclusivity. Because all the included variables are measured on different scales, z-scores were used for all analyses. Besides the above mentioned variables, some control variables were included, namely Interest in politics (measured on a 4-point Likert scale, where a higher score indicates less interest), Gender (where 1 is male and 2 is female), Age (in years), and Education (measured on a scale ranging from 1 to 7, where a higher score indicates a higher level of education). Deleting cases with missing data on one or more control variables led to a number of 17,608 respondents. See Table 2 for a summary of the variables4.

Table 2. Variable descriptives (z-scores presented for the first five variables)

Variable N Range Mean SD

Direct Democracy 11,848 -9.45 – 1,50 -0.08 1.26

Anti-institutionalism 16,739 -3.04 – 2.18 -0.41 0.99

Non-conformity 18,279 -2.97 – 0.85 0.09 0.93

Inclusivity 17,517 -2.78 – 2.11 0.05 0.97

Political interest 18,401 -1.57 – 1.77 -0.02 0.96

Gender (categorical) 18,398 1 – 2 1.51 0.50

Age 17,730 18 – 101 49.95 17.98

Education (categorical) 18,302 1 – 7 3.91 1.85

Valid N (listwise) 10,649

The above mentioned items that form the direct democracy, anti-institutionalism, non- conformity, and inclusivity indexes were extracted by conducting a series of exploratory factor analyses which will now be elaborated (see Table 3 for a summary of the most important findings of these analyses). For the Direct Democracy index, initially seven items were examined on factorability.

4 The means and standard deviations somewhat deviate from 0 and 1 respectively, because the variables were created based on factor scores. 11

The item regarding referendums was taken as a starting point, because this form of direct democracy is most common in the literature. On the basis of the correlation matrix it was already observed that there were only two other items that correlated around or above .3 with the referendum item, namely the item regarding the government explaining its decisions (.35), and the item regarding the government changing its policies in response to the majority (.27). To make sure the right combination of items was selected for the creation of the index, all possible combinations of items (always including the referendum item) were examined, and checked on a KMO-index greater than .6, a significant Bartlett‟s test of sphericity, diagonal anti-image correlations above .5, and communalities greater than .3. Based on these criteria, the three above mentioned items were selected. First of all, the KMO measure of sampling adequacy was .62, and the Bartlett‟s test of sphericity was significant (χ2 (3) = 4131.65, p < .001). Secondly, the diagonals of the anti-image correlation matrix ranged from .606 to .667. Although the communalities of the „referendum‟ and „explaining decisions‟ items were both above .3, the „changing policy‟ item only extracted a value of .210. Yet, without this item, the other criteria would not be met, and therefore the last item was also included. Furthermore, principle axis factoring showed that taking these three items as one index explained 31.5% of the total variance. The factor matrix showed that all three items had factor loadings above .3. None of the residual correlations were greater than .05. Lastly, the reliability of the index was examined, and resulted in a Cronbach‟s alpha of .563, which is not that high. Because some of the criteria are just or not fully met, a robustness check with only the „referendum‟ item was conducted, which will be elaborated later on. To create the Anti-institutionalism index, initially twelve items were tested on factorability in all possible combinations, and compared to the criteria explained above. The correlation matrix showed that all items correlated substantively, except for the item regarding information provided by the media, and the item regarding free and fair elections. Further examination of the items showed that „Trust in the police‟, „Trust in the United Nations‟, and „How democratic do you think your country is overall‟ did not meet the criteria. The remaining seven items gave the following results: the KMO measure of sampling adequacy was .89, and the Bartlett‟s test of sphericity was significant (χ2 (21) = 92062.07, p < .001). Secondly, the diagonals of the anti-image correlation matrix ranged from .834 to .941, and the communalities ranged from .424 to .770. Furthermore, the seven items together explained 58.5% of the total variance, and the factor loadings ranged from .651 to .877, meeting the .3 criterion. Only the residual correlation between the „satisfaction with the government‟ and „satisfaction with the democracy‟ items reached a value above .10 (.15), which might suggest additional association between these two items. Lastly, reliability analysis of the anti-institutionalism index resulted in a Cronbach‟s alpha of .904. For the variable Non-conformity, initially six items were examined on factorability. Because the item regarding homosexuality fits the progressive ideals of non-conformists best, as described in the theory section, this item was taken as a starting point. All possible combinations of items (always including the „homosexuality‟ item) were tested on the basis of the above mentioned criteria. The

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correlation matrix already showed that none of the correlations with the „homosexuality‟ item reached a value of .3, and further examination of the items showed that none of the combinations met the criteria. Because the item concerning homosexuality catches the essence of non-conformity best, it was chosen to let this single item represent the independent variable non-conformity.

Table 3. Communalities and factor loadings per item, and reliability of the indexes

Index/Items Communalities Factor loadings Cronbach’s alpha Direct Democracy: .563

Citizens have the final say on political issues by voting .365 .604 directly in referendums (E8)

The government explains its decisions to voters (E14) .370 .608

Important for democracy: government changes policies in response to what most people think (E37) .210 .458

Anti-institutionalism: .904

Trust in country's parliament (B2) .712 .844

Trust in the legal system (B3) .454 .674

Trust in politicians (B5) .770 .877

Trust in political parties (B6) .723 .850

Trust in the European Parliament (B7) .424 .651

How satisfied with the national government .523 .723 (B22)

How satisfied with the way democracy works in country .491 .701 (B23)

Inclusivity: .833

Allow many/few immigrants of same race/ethnic group .569 .754 as majority (B29)

Allow many/few immigrants of different race/ethnic .716 .846 group from majority (B30)

Allow many/few immigrants from poorer countries .597 .773 outside Europe (B31)

Immigration bad or good for country's economy (B32) .549 .741

Country's cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants (B33) .523 .723

Immigrants make country worse or better place to live (B34) .581 .762

13

To create the Inclusivity index, initially twelve items were analysed for factorability, in all possible combinations and by following the criteria explained above. The correlation between the item regarding immigrants‟ right to vote was negative in combination with all items after recoding it, which shows that the interpretation is ambiguous. The correlations with the last three opinion items regarding personal importance did not exceed the .3 criterion, and also the correlations of the „protection of minority rights‟ and „equal treatment of courts‟ items were low. Further investigation showed that all of these items did not meet the other criteria. Eventually, six items remained, resulting in the following outcomes: the KMO measure of sampling adequacy was .86, and the Bartlett‟s test of sphericity was significant (χ2 (15) = 78546.61, p < .001). Secondly, the diagonals of the anti-image correlation matrix ranged from .808 to .897, and the communalities ranged from .523 to .716. Furthermore, principle axis factoring showed that the seven items together explained 58.9% of the total variance, and that the factor loadings ranged from .723 to .846. Yet, most of the residual correlations were above .05, which indicates that there probably is additional association between the items that is not explained by this model. Lastly, reliability analysis of the inclusivity index resulted in a Cronbach‟s alpha of .833.

Results In order to test the hypotheses and thus answering the research question, multilevel multinomial logistic regression analyses have been conducted. Electorate was used as the dependent variable, with the following categories: new-left (reference category), populist right, other, and blank- or non-voters. The results of the hypotheses testing will now be elaborated, followed by an explanation of the outcomes of the robustness check.

Hypotheses testing To check and account for differences between countries, first, a random effect of country was added. This showed that the variance between countries was significantly different from zero for blank- and non-voters (0.777, p < .05), „other‟ voters (0.315, p < .05), and populist right voters (2.739, p < .05), in comparison to new-left voters. After controlling for all effects explained below, the variance between countries was still greater than zero, indicating that the differences in electorates between countries are not fully explained by any of the models included in this study. Secondly, the control variables were added to the model, showing significant effects of all four control variables on electorate. Thirdly, a fixed effect of direct democracy was included in de model, showing a significant positive effect for the populist right (t(10881) = 2.18, p < .05), but no significant effects for the other electorates. This means that, in general, the more in favour a person is of direct democracy, the more likely he or she is to vote populist right over new-left. Then, for every independent variable separately (without controlling for the others), the main- and interaction effects with direct democracy were analysed (see Table 4 to Table 6). At the end, all main- and interaction effects were included in one model, controlling for one another (see Table 7).

14

Overall, anti-institutionalism had a significant effect on electorate, and including this effect made that the fixed effect of direct democracy is no longer significant. Per electorate, it showed that anti-institutionalism only had a significant positive effect on blank- and non-voters and populist right voters. This means that having a higher preference for anti-institutionalism increases the odds of not voting or voting blank, and voting populist right over new-left. Furthermore, a significant positive interaction effect with direct democracy was found for the populist right electorate, indicating that the positive effect of direct democracy on voting populist right over new-left strengthens when a higher preference for anti-institutionalism exists. This confirms the first hypothesis that a combination of anti-institutionalism and support for direct democracy leads to a vote for the populist right, rather than a vote for the new-left.

Table 4. Blank or no vote, voting other, or voting populist right (versus new-left); multilevel multinomial logistic regression analysis - Anti-institutionalism Independent variables Log-odds (SE) Log-odds (SE) Log-odds (SE)

Blank or no vote Other Populist right

Constant 2.24 (0.66)*** 1.47 (0.57)*** 0.19 (1.11)

Political interest 0.66 (0.09)*** 0.11 (0.08)** 0.12 (0.10)*

Gender (1=male, 2=female) -0.26 (0.16)** -0.37 (0.14)*** -0.36 (0.17)***

Age -0.01 (0.01)*** 0.02 (0.01)*** 0.00 (0.01)

Education (highest level versus lowest level) -1.70 (0.41)*** -1.02 (0.38)*** -1.52 (0.44)***

Direct Democracy -0.01 (0.06) 0.01 (0.06) -0.01 (0.08)

Anti-institutionalism 0.30 (0.09)*** -0.02 (0.08) 0.50 (0.10)***

Anti-institutionalism*Direct Democracy 0.01 (0.06) 0.03 (0.05) 0.08 (0.07)*

AIC = 130452.29

BIC = 130473.99

*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.

The main effect of non-conformity was negative and significant for all electorates in comparison to the new-left electorate. After including this effect, the fixed effect of direct democracy was still significant for the populist right electorate. The results indicate that a greater preference for non-conformity increases the odds of voting new-left over voting any other direction. Furthermore,

15

although overall the interaction effect between non-conformity and direct democracy on electorate was significant (F(3,10810) = 6.02, p < .001), no significant effect was found between the new-left and all other electorates5. Interestingly, the interaction effect was positive for the blank- and non-voters and the populist right electorate (yet, not significant at the 5% level), meaning that in general, when someone is in favour of direct democracy and holds progressive views on homosexuality, this person is more likely to not vote, vote blank, or vote for the populist right than for the new-left. So, although a preference for non-conformity underlies a vote for the new-left, rather than a vote in any other direction, the combination of this preference with support for direct democracy does not lead to a vote for the new-left over the populist right, which leads to rejection of the second hypothesis.

Table 5. Blank or no vote, voting other, or voting populist right (versus new-left); multilevel multinomial logistic regression analysis – Non-conformity

Independent variables Log-odds (SE) Log-odds (SE) Log-odds (SE)

Blank or no vote Other Populist right

Constant 2.45 (0.66)*** 1.53 (0.55)*** 0.43 (1.14)

Political interest 0.71 (0.09)*** 0.08 (0.08)** 0.16 (0.09)**

Gender (1=male, 2=female) -0.18 (0.15)* -0.26 (0.14)*** -0.27 (0.17)**

Age -0.01 (0.01)*** 0.01 (0.01)*** -0.00 (0.01)

Education (highest level versus lowest level) -1.70 (0.40)*** -0.82 (0.37)*** -1.49 (0.43)***

Direct Democracy 0.01 (0.07) 0.03 (0.06) 0.14 (0.07)***

Non-conformity -0.57 (0.11)*** -0.51 (0.10)*** -0.68 (0.11)***

Non-conformity*Direct Democracy 0.01 (0.08) -0.02 (0.07) 0.06 (0.08)

AIC = 140732.28

BIC = 140754.14

*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.

5 Using the populist right electorate as the reference category would lead to significant differences for the blank- and non-voters and the „other‟ electorate. 16

For all electorates, inclusivity showed a significant negative effect, indicating that, in general, the more inclusive a person is, the more likely he or she is to vote for the new-left compared to any other voting direction. Adding this effect removed the fixed effect of direct democracy, except for the populist right electorate, where this effect was still significant. Furthermore, the interaction effect between inclusivity and direct democracy was significant and, contrary to the main effect, positive for the populist right electorate. This means that, although a preference for inclusivity underlies a vote for the new-left, this preference in combination with support for direct democracy leads to a vote for the populist right, rather than for the new-left, contrary to what was hypothesized.

Table 6. Blank or no vote, voting other, or voting populist right (versus new-left); multilevel multinomial logistic regression analysis – Inclusivity

Independent variables Log-odds (SE) Log-odds (SE) Log-odds (SE)

Blank or no vote Other Populist right

Constant 2.32 (0.68)*** 1.50 (0.59)*** 0.40 (1.09)

Political interest 0.68 (0.09)*** 0.04 (0.08) 0.05 (0.10)

Gender (1=male, 2=female) -0.24 (0.16)** -0.32 (0.14)*** -0.35 (0.17)***

Age -0.01 (0.01)*** 0.01 (0.01)*** -0.01 (0.01)

Education (highest level versus lowest level) -1.30 (0.43)*** -0.56 (0.34)** -1.02 (0.46)***

Direct Democracy 0.05 (0.07) 0.04 (0.06) 0.18 (0.08)***

Inclusivity -0.75 (0.09)*** -0.64 (0.08)*** -1.04 (0.10)***

Inclusivity*Direct Democracy 0.05 (0.07) -0.03 (0.06) 0.07 (0.07)*

AIC = 135252.82

BIC = 135274.59

*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.

17

Including the main effects of all variables in one model showed significant effects for all four variables, including direct democracy. First of all, for blank- and non-voters, there was a positive effect of anti-institutionalism, and a negative effect of non-conformity and inclusivity. This means that having a preference for anti-institutionalism increases the odds of not-voting or voting blank, while having a preference for non-conformity and/or inclusivity increases the odds of voting new-left over not voting or voting blank. Secondly, for „other‟ voters, the effects were the same as for blank- and non-voters, except for the effect of anti-institutionalism, which was negative for this electorate. This indicates that the smaller the preference for anti-institutionalism, the greater the odds of voting „other‟ than new-left. Lastly, the negative significant effect of anti-institutionalism for the populist right electorate indicates that, in general, the higher someone‟s preference for anti-institutionalism, the more likely that person is to vote for populist right over new-left, while the odds of voting populist right over new-left decrease as the preference for non-conformity and/or inclusivity increases. Adding all three interaction effects to the model resulted in significant interaction effects with anti-institutionalism and inclusivity, but a non-significant interaction effect with non-conformity. Looking at the interaction effects separately, the two effects are only significant for the populist right electorate in comparison with the new-left. The results show that having a preference for anti- institutionalism and being in favour of direct democracy at the same time, increases the odds of voting populist right, rather than voting new-left. Again, it seems that although a preference for inclusivity on itself increases the odds of voting new-left, when this preference is combined with support for direct democracy, a vote for the populist right is more likely. The main effect of direct democracy is no longer significant in the last model. With regard to the hypotheses, the same conclusions can be drawn for the model including all main- and interaction effects, as for the separate models.

18

Table 7. Blank or no vote, voting other, or voting populist right (versus new-left); multilevel multinomial logistic regression analysis , log-odds and standard error (SE) presented

MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3

Independent variables Blank or no Other Populist right Blank or no Other Populist right Blank or no Other Populist right vote vote vote

Constant 2.27 (0.69)*** 1.35 (0.55)*** 0.30 (1.14) 2.41 (0.66)*** 1.70 (0.64)*** 0.40 (1.09) 2.39 (0.66)*** 1.70 (0.65)*** 0.33 (1.10)

Political interest 0.75 (0.09)*** 0.11 (0.08)** 0.20 (0.09)*** 0.60 (0.10)*** 0.04 (0.09) -0.02 (0.10) 0.61 (0.10)*** 0.04 (0.07) -0.01 (0.10)

Gender (1=male, -0.28 (0.15)*** -0.36 (0.13)*** -0.40 (0.17)*** -0.17 (0.16)* -0.28 (0.14)*** -0.23 (0.18)* -0.17 (0.16)* -0.27 (0.14)*** -0.23 (0.18)* 2=female)

Age -0.01 (0.01)*** 0.02 (0.01)*** 0.00 (0.01) -0.02 (0.01)*** 0.01 (0.01)*** -0.01 (0.01)* -0.02 (0.01)*** 0.01 (0.01)*** -0.01 (0.01)*

Education (highest level -1.90 (0.39)*** -0.97 (0.36)*** -1.76 (0.42)*** -1.16 (0.44)*** -0.53 (0.41)* -0.82 (0.48)** -1.14 (0.45)*** -0.54 (0.41)* -0.77 (0.48)** versus lowest level)

Direct Democracy -0.02 (0.06) 0.01 (0.05) 0.07 (0.07)* 0.05 (0.07) 0.06 (0.06)* 0.11 (0.07)** 0.07 (0.07) 0.06 (0.07) 0.09 (0.09)

Anti-institutionalism 0.16 (0.10)** -0.17 (0.08)*** 0.26 (0.11)*** 0.15 (0.10)** -0.17 (0.08)*** 0.24 (0.11)***

Non-conformity -0.43 (0.12)*** -0.36 (0.11)*** -0.50 (0.12)*** -0.43 (0.12)*** -0.36 (0.11)*** -0.51 (0.12)***

Inclusivity -0.60 (0.10)*** -0.63 (0.09)*** -0.91 (0.11)*** -0.61 (0.10)*** -0.63 (0.09)*** -0.92 (0.11)***

19

Table 7. Continued

Anti-institutionalism 0.02 (0.07) 0.01 (0.06) 0.14 (0.08)*** *Direct Democracy

Non-conformity*Direct -0.01 (0.08) -0.00 (0.08) 0.05 (0.09) Democracy

Inclusivity*Direct 0.06 (0.07) -0.02 (0.07) 0.08 (0.08)* Democracy

AIC 138622.37 129181.99 129795.22

BIC 138644.25 129203.58 129816.81

*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.

20

Robustness check Because the three items and the direct democracy index they formed did not meet or just met the criteria used for the factor analysis, a robustness check of the findings was conducted with only the item regarding referendums (see Table 8). After the random effect of country, and the four control variables, the fixed effect of support for referendums was added, showing an overall significant effect (F(3,15477) = 16.19, p < .001). However, when looking at the electorates in comparison with the new- left, it showed that this effect was only significant for blank- or non-voters and „other‟ voters, but not for populist right voters, which is contrary to the findings for the direct democracy index. Furthermore, where adding the direct effect of anti-institutionalism removed the overall significant effect of the direct democracy index, for the referendum item this was only the case for the populist right electorate. Additionally, the interaction effect between support for referendums and anti- institutionalism was not found to be significant (F(3,14442) = 0.56, p = .64), again contradicting the findings for the direct democracy index. On the other hand, significant positive interaction effects with non-conformity were now found for the blank- and non-voters and the populist right voters, indicating that having a preference for referendums and non-conformity at the same time, increases the odds of voting blank or not-voting and voting populist right over new-left. In addition, after controlling for this interaction effect, the effect of support for referendums was no longer significant for the populist right electorate. Lastly, adding a main effect of inclusivity did not change the significance level of the direct democracy index, while it resulted in a non-significant effect of preference for referendums for the populist right electorate. Moreover, the interaction effects of preference for referendums and inclusivity was now negative for every electorate, contrary to the direct democracy index. This indicates that, in general, the more in favour a person is of referendums and inclusivity, the more likely he or she is to vote for the new-left. Although this effect was overall significant (F(3,14837) = 7.09, p < .001), in comparison with the new-left electorate it was only significant for „other‟ voters, and not for blank- or non-voters and the populist right. Including all main- and interaction effects in one model also resulted in some differences in findings. Firstly, after controlling for all direct effects, the effect of support for referendums was no longer significant for the populist right electorate, which was not the case for the direct democracy index. Secondly, adding all interaction effects to the model showed a negative but non-significant interaction for support for referendums with anti-institutionalism (F(3,13924) = 0.92, p = .43), but significant interaction with non-conformity (F(3, 13924) = 3.43, p < .05) and inclusivity (F(3, 13924) = 7.83, p < .001). Moreover, for the populist right electorate, the interaction with non-conformity and support for referendums showed a positive association, meaning that being tolerant towards homosexuality and being in favour of referendums increases the odds of voting populist right over new-left. Lastly, the interaction effect of support for referendums with inclusivity was negative for the populist right electorate, indicating that being inclusive and in favour of referendums makes it more likely to vote new-left than populist right. Yet, this effect was not significant at the 5% level.

21

Table 8. Blank or no vote, voting other, or voting populist right (versus new-left); multilevel multinomial logistic regression analysis , log-odds and standard error (SE) presented

MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3

Independent variables Blank or no Other Populist right Blank or no Other Populist right Blank or no Other Populist right vote vote vote

Constant 2.34 (0.69)*** 1.30 (0.52)*** -0.02 (1.14) 2.44 (0.67)*** 1.52 (0.61)*** -0.08 (1.09) 2.44 (0.66)*** 1.52 (0.61)*** -0.08 (1.09)

Political interest 0.76 (0.08)*** 0.07 (0.07)* 0.17 (0.08)*** 0.57 (0.08)*** -0.02 (0.07) -0.09 (0.09)* 0.57 (0.08)*** -0.02 (0.07) -0.09 (0.09)*

Gender (1=male, -0.28 (0.13)*** -0.28 (0.11)*** -0.33 (0.14)*** -0.15 (0.14)* -0.19 (0.12)** -0.13 (0.15) -0.15 (0.14)* -0.19 (0.12)** -0.13 (0.15) 2=female)

Age -0.01 (0.01)*** 0.02 (0.00)*** 0.00 (0.01) -0.02 (0.01)*** 0.01 (0.00)*** -0.01 (0.01)* -0.02 (0.01)*** 0.01 (0.0)*** -0.01 (0.01)*

Education (highest level -2.15 (0.32)*** -0.94 (0.29)*** -1.70 (0.34)*** -1.33(0.36)*** -0.43 (0.33)* -0.62 (0.38)** -1.30 (0.36)*** -0.42 (0.33)* -0.61 (0.38)** versus lowest level)

Referendums -0.12 (0.07)*** -0.10 (0.06)*** 0.07 (0.08) -0.13 (0.07)*** -0.09 (0.06)** 0.02 (0.08) -0.14 (0.09)** -0.11 (0.08)** -0.00 (0.10)

Anti-institutionalism 0.22(0.08)*** -0.17 (0.07)*** 0.32 (0.09)*** 0.22 (0.08)** -0.17 (0.07)*** 0.32 (0.09)***

Non-conformity -0.44 (0.10)*** -0.34 (0.09)*** -0.46 (0.10)*** -0.45 (0.10)*** -0.34 (0.09)*** -0.47 (0.10)***

Inclusivity -0.57 (0.08)*** -0.59 (0.07)*** -0.92 (0.09)*** -0.57 (0.08)*** -0.59 (0.07)*** -0.92 (0.09)***

22

Table 8. Continued

Anti-institutionalism -0.00 (0.07) -0.04 (0.06) -0.03 (0.09) *Referendums

Non- 0.08 (0.10) 0.12 (0.09)* 0.14 (0.10)** conformity*Referendums

Inclusivity*Referendums 0.03 (0.08) -0.08 (0.07)* -0.06 (0.08)

AIC 198982.52 183331.17 183344.65

BIC 199005.46 183353.79 183367.27

*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.

23

Conclusion and Discussion Differences in support for direct democracy between the new-left and populist right electorates have been present for decades, raising the question of which motivations underlie this support among the different electorates. Since the use of referendums for political decision-making, a form of direct democracy, is currently on the rise in Europe, further investigation can add to the understanding of (the support for) this phenomenon. Although scholars have frequently noted the influence of the progressive ideas on individual freedom of the new-left on this support, the fact that more and more right-wing voters have adopted these stances as well, shows that this cannot be the only explanation. More potential motivations for supporting direct democracy were mentioned in the literature, which eventually led to the formation of three hypotheses for this study. First of all, it was expected that a vote for the populist right, rather than one for the new-left, can be predicted by support for direct democracy in combination with a preference for anti- institutionalism: right-wing populists‟ lack of trust in the established elite, and discontent with the way they represent the people increases the support for direct democracy, since it enables opposing decisions made by the ruling institutions. Secondly, for the new-left rather than for the populist right electorate, it was expected that they combine their support for direct democracy with their preference for non-conformity: new-leftists‟ progressive values of individual freedom and continuous aspiration to change society make them in favour of direct democracy, since it enables resistance against automatic conformity with collective norms and orientations. Thirdly, for the new-left it was also expected that their support for direct democracy is derived from their preference for inclusivity, whereas for the populist right this support is grounded in their preference for exclusivity: new-leftists strive for social justice and a voice for everyone, including minorities, which can be achieved by direct democracy, whereas right-wing populists support this form of democracy because it enables the direct representation of the interests of the majority: the ordinary people. Analyses of the European Social Survey (2012) data for ten countries did not lead to clear-cut results regarding these expectations. Namely, if we understand direct democracy in terms of referendums, explanations of decisions by the government, and changing policies in response to what most people think, the combination of support for direct democracy and the preference for anti- institutionalism indeed leads to a vote for the populist right, rather than one for the new-left. Furthermore, the opposite of what was expected was found regarding inclusivity and support for direct democracy. The results suggest that when strong support for direct democracy exists, this can overrule the preference for inclusivity and lead to a vote for the populist right, rather than a vote for the new- left. A possible explanation for this is that in general, the populist right parties are perceived as the ultimate representatives of free speech and influence on governance (the findings show that when support for direct democracy is strong without interference of any other preference, a vote for the populist right is most likely), and thus they attract voters who have this as their main priority above all other preferences. In addition, no clear conclusion can be made with regard to non-conformity, but the

24 results again hint at the support for direct democracy overruling this preference. Yet, it has to be taken into account that non-conformity was measured by only one item regarding tolerance towards homosexuality, and that in many European countries both new-left and populist-right take progressive stances on this issue. However, when we understand direct democracy only in terms of referendums, results indeed indicate that being in favour of referendums and taking progressive stances on homosexuality leads to a vote for the populist right, rather one for the new-left, but none of the conclusions mentioned above can be drawn based on this definition of direct democracy. Interestingly though, the results do shed a light on some of the differences between the new-left and populist right electorate with regard to direct democracy. The differences in findings namely seem to suggest that the populist right has a strong preference for anti-institutionalism, and that this is related to them wanting the government to explain decisions to the public and to change policies when the majority of people wants this, rather than only wanting a voice through referendums. A possible explanation for this is that their distrust in the government makes them believe referendums can be organised but not lived up to, or they may take the difference between binding and advisory referendums into account. Furthermore, the new-left seems to be in favour of referendums (but not so much of policy changes and explanations) because of their preference for inclusivity: referendums give everyone, regardless of any personal characteristics, an equal opportunity to voice their opinion. Moreover, the new-left themselves are currently the ruling elite, which may explain why they do not prefer direct democracy in terms of policy changes and explanations. Concluding, where anti-institutionalism seems to motivate the populist right electorate to support direct democracy, the new-left electorate seems to ground their support in the preference for inclusivity. However, both conclusions are dependent on the definition of direct democracy. Future research is needed to make up for some of the limitations of this research. First of all, non-conformity was represented by only one item, which questions the reliability of this measure. Additionally, testing non-conformity based on tolerance towards homosexuality seems no longer adequate. This used to be non-conform to the widely held Christian beliefs until the mid-20th century, but being homosexual or tolerating it is no longer in sharp contrast with universal European norms and values. In the future, measures of non-conformity should be more focussed on changing society and not conforming to present day rules and orientations. Furthermore, three items were used to measure direct democracy which together created a somewhat unreliable index. The findings also show that it is not at all clear cut what direct democracy actually entails, and that this can differ between different electorates. Yet again, this could be due to the low internal consistency of the index. Other recommendations for future research are investigating the differences between countries. Because it was not the main focus of this research, no further attention was paid to these results, but they indicate that there are differences in electorates and their motivations between countries which could be further explored. Moreover, the findings of Den Ridder et al (2016), which indicate that the Dutch populist right is more in favour of referendums than the Dutch new-left,

25 contradict the findings of the current study, and could be explained by the differences between countries. However, it could also be possible that the four-year time difference in measurement (2012 versus 2016) has caused this contradiction, or that there are other motivations besides anti- institutionalism and/or exclusivity in which the populist right grounds its support for referendums. Lastly, the results regarding the „other‟ electorate and the blank- and non-voters were also not thoroughly discussed, because the focus laid on the new-left in comparison with the populist right electorate. Yet, the results for the blank- and non-voters were often similar to those of the populist right electorate, which may indicate that they have corresponding motivations, such as discontent and/or distrust with and in the government. More research can be done into differences and similarities between these voters, and, for example, religious or populist left electorates could be disentangled and analysed separately from electorates now labelled as „other‟.

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Appendix I – Votes categorized by electorate, per country

Belgium

1. Green! NEW-LEFT 2. Flemish Christian Democrats OTHER 3. New Flemish Alliance OTHER 4. List Dedecker POPULIST RIGHT 5. Socialitist Party OTHER 6. Labour Party (Flemish) OTHER 7. Flemish Interest POPULIST RIGHT 8. Open Flemish Liberals and Democrats OTHER 9. Humanistic and Democratic Centre OTHER 10. Ecologists NEW LEFT 11. National Front POPULIST RIGHT 12. Reformist Movement OTHER 13. Socialist Party OTHER 14. Labour Party (French) OTHER 15. People‟s Party POPULIST RIGHT

Switzerland

1. Swiss People's Party POPULIST RIGHT 2. Socialist Party OTHER 3. The Liberals OTHER 4. Christian Democrats OTHER 5. Green Party NEW_LEFT 6. Green Liberal Party NEW_LEFT 7. Bourgeois (Conservative)-democratic Party OTHER 8. Evangelical People's Party OTHER 9. Federal Democratic Union OTHER 10. Ticino League POPULIST RIGHT 11. Swiss Labour Party OTHER 12. Movement of the Citizens POPULIST RIGHT of French-speaking Switzerland 13. Christian Social Party OTHER 14. Alternative Left NEW-LEFT 15. Swiss Democrats POPULIST RIGHT 16. Pirate Party Switzerland OTHER 17. Swiss Nationalist Party POPULIST RIGHT

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Germany

1. Social Democratic Party OTHER 2. Christian Democratic Union OTHER 3. Green Party NEW-LEFT 4. Liberal Democratic Party OTHER 5. The Left Party of Democratic Socialism OTHER 6. Republican Party POPULIST RIGHT 7. National Democratic Party POPULIST RIGHT 8. Pirate Party OTHER

Denmark

1. The Social Democrats OTHER 2. The Radical Liberal Party OTHER 3. Conservative People's Party OTHER 4. Socialist People's Party NEW-LEFT 5. Danish People's Party POPULIST RIGHT 6. Christian Democrats OTHER 7. The Liberal Party OTHER 8. Liberal Alliance OTHER 9. Unity List - The Red-Green Alliance NEW-LEFT

Finland

1. National Coalition Party OTHER 2. Swedish People's Party OTHER 3. Centre Party OTHER 4. True Finns POPULIST RIGHT 5. Christian Democrats OTHER 6. Freedom Party POPULIST RIGHT 7. Change 2011 POPULIST RIGHT 8. Pirate Party OTHER 9. Senior Citizens' Party OTHER 10. Independence Party OTHER 11. For the Poor OTHER 12. Green League NEW-LEFT 13. Social Democratic Party NEW-LEFT 14. Left Alliance NEW-LEFT 15. Communist Party OTHER 16. Communist Workers' Party OTHER 17. Workers' Party OTHER

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France

1. New Centre OTHER 2. National Front POULIST RIGHT 3. The Radical Party OTHER 4. New Anti-capitalist Party NEW-LEFT 5. Workers' Fight OTHER 6. Left Front OTHER 7. Left party NEW-LEFT 8. The Movement for France OTHER 9. Socialist party OTHER 10. Union for a Popular Movement POPULIST RIGHT 11. Democrat Movement OTHER 12. The Greens - Europe Ecology NEW-LEFT 13. Other green movements NEW-LEFT

Italy

1. Democratic Party OTHER 2. Left, Ecology and Freedom NEW-LEFT 3. Civil Revolution NEW-LEFT 4. Five Star Movement POPULIST RIGHT 5. Civic Choice OTHER 6. Union of the Centre OTHER 7. Future and Freedom OTHER 8. The People of Freedom OTHER 9. Northern League POPULIST RIGHT 10. Brothers of Italy OTHER 11. Radicali Italiani OTHER 12. FARE – Giannino OTHER 13. The Right OTHER

The Netherlands

1. People's Party for Freedom and Democracy OTHER 2. Labour Party NEW-LEFT 3. Party for Freedom POPULIST RIGHT 4. Christian Democratic Appeal OTHER 5. Socialist Party OTHER 6. Democrats 66 NEW-LEFT 7. Green Left NEW-LEFT 8. Christian Union OTHER 9. Reformed Political Party OTHER 10. Party for the Animals NEW-LEFT 11. Pirate Party OTHER 12. 50PLUS - 50PLUS OTHER

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Norway

1. The Party Red OTHER 2. Socialist Left Party NEW-LEFT 3. Norwegian Labour Party OTHER 4. Liberal Party NEW-LEFT 5. Christian Democratic Party OTHER 6. Centre Party OTHER 7. Conservative Party OTHER 8. Progress Party POPULIST RIGHT 9. Coast Party OTHER

Sweden

1. Centre party OTHER 2. Liberals OTHER 3. Christian Democrats OTHER 4. Green party NEW-LEFT 5. Conservatives OTHER 6. Social Democrats OTHER 7. Left party NEW-LEFT 8. Feminist Initiative NEW-LEFT 9. The Pirate Part OTHER 10. Sweden Democrats POPULIST RIGHT

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