Political Partisanship and Support for Direct Democracy
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Political Partisanship and Support for Direct Democracy Underlying motivations for the support for direct democracy among different electorates Quita Muis ANR: 129554 17 July 2017 First-Year Paper Research Master Social and Behavioral Sciences Tilburg University Abstract Research has shown differences in support for direct democracy between new-left and populist right electorates, raising the question of which motivations underlie this support among the different electorates. It was expected that the populist right electorate grounds its support for direct democracy in their preferences for anti-institutionalism and exclusivity, whereas for the new-left electorate it was expected that their support is grounded in the preferences for non-conformity and inclusivity. Based on European Social Survey data for ten European countries it could be concluded that anti- institutionalism indeed motivates the populist right to be in favour of direct democracy, and that the preference for inclusivity underlies this support among the new-left. However, both conclusions are dependent on the definition of direct democracy, which suggests that the understanding of this concept is ambiguous both in the literature and for the different electorates. At the end of the paper, the wider theoretical relevance of the findings are discussed, and recommendations for future research are given. Direct Democracy Since the 1970s, national survey research has shown undiminished support for referendums among Dutch citizens (Den Ridder, Dekker, van Houwelingen & Schrijver, 2016). The aim of political decision making by referendums, or „direct democracy‟ (Canovan, 1999, p. 2), is giving more power to the public by letting them have direct influence on important political decisions (Canovan, 1999; Kriesi, 2005). Although in general the support for referendums in the Netherlands has not diminished, a remarkable shift has taken place in the political preference of those in favour of direct democracy. Whereas electoral support for binding referendums used to be stronger among voters for new-leftist parties such as D66 and the precursor of GroenLinks, nowadays, stronger support is found among the voters for more populist parties such as the right-winged PVV (Den Ridder et al., 2016). These current findings are in sharp contrast with what is generally believed to be the relationship between political partisanship and support for direct democracy, namely, that particularly the left-winged parties and their followers strive for (more) direct political participation (Inglehart, 1997; Kriesi, 1989). Support for direct democracy among the new-left seems to find its roots in the movement of modernization during the mid-20th century, which has caused changes in the worldviews of the public that reshaped economic, political and social life (Inglehart, 1997). Especially the young, high-educated new-left started to aspire individual freedom, and wanted to liberate themselves from the pressure to conform to Christian traditions and cultural conservatism (Canovan, 1999; De Koster, Achterberg, Houtman & Van der Waal, 2010; De Koster & Van der Waal, 2007). This secular „counter culture‟ gave rise to new social movements that promoted tolerant and progressive views on issues such as homosexuality, family values, gender roles, and euthanasia (Inglehart, 1997; Kriesi, 1989). Criticism on the authoritarian government increased, and the new-left showed more interest in direct democracy by wanting to play an active, direct role in politics. As a result, political parties lost control over their electorates, and forms of direct political participation that challenged the elite became more widespread (Inglehart, 1997; Inglehart, 1999). So, although it is often believed that it is the young, high-educated new-left who supports direct political participation, currently, those in favour are actually the more right-winged and populist voters, of which the majority is older and lower-educated (De Hond, 2016). The contrast between the general perception of the characteristics and political preference of the electorate in favour of direct democracy, and the recent findings of De Ridder et al. (2016) raises some questions about the mechanisms that underlie support for direct democracy. Why do the right-winged populist voters want to make their voices heard through direct political participation? And why is this aspiration not so strong among the new-left electorate? In other words, what motivates these electorates to be in favour of direct democracy? Answers to these questions seem to be at least partly related to the modernization phase as described above. Yet, this cannot be the whole story, since the culturally progressive stances taken during this phase are not only widely adopted by left-winged parties and their followers, but also by 1 those on the right side of the political spectrum as a result of a wave of radical new-right parties that emerged in the late-20th century (Akkerman 2005; De Koster et al., 2014). However, when one visits the Facebook pages of left- and right-winged politicians, this progressiveness regarding several moral and political themes seems to manifest itself in different ways. When, allegedly, two gay men were physically attacked because of their sexuality by a group of Dutch-Moroccan youngsters, Alexander Pechtold (2017), Dutch leader of the new-leftist D66, expressed his solidarity to the couple by walking hand in hand to a formation meeting with male colleague Wouter Koolmees. With his Facebook post, Pechtold emphasized the Dutch values of “…tolerance and freedom. The freedom to be who you want to be”. Populist right-wing leader Geert Wilders (2017) reacted to this post by saying: “what really helps against hate towards homosexuals is not all men walking hand in hand, but removing Islam from the Netherlands”1. Furthermore, on her Facebook page, French right-wing politician Marine le Pen (2017) addressed the public‟s discontent with “the elite from the Parisian salons” , and she emphasized being part of the public by repeatedly talking about “we”: “We are of flesh and blood. We are hopeful and passionate. We are French!”2. Moreover, her political opponent Emmanuel Macron was called a “Trojan horse, brought in by the elite”3 on the Facebook page of the Austrian populist politician Heinz Christian Strache (Strache, 2017). These examples show differences between the new-left and populist right with regard to cultural diversity, the perception of the ruling elite, and their way of governance. In some of the related literature it is stated that these factors are expected to be of influence on the amount of support for direct democracy, and that this influence differs between the new-left and the populist right (Canovan, 1999; De Koster et al., 2014; Rydgren, 2005). Yet, this relationship is rarely tested and/or proven with quantitative data. Therefore, it is aimed to answer the following research question: what motivations underlie the support for direct democracy among new-leftist and populist right electorates? Since the majority of the Dutch public has been in favour of direct democracy for decades, and worries about political unrest are currently intensifying, more needs to be known about what drives people to support direct political participation. Especially now that consulting the people‟s opinion through referendums is on the rise, also internationally, getting more insight in the public‟s motives for participating can be useful. In order to draw conclusions on a broader scale, other European countries besides the Netherlands will be taken into account in this study. In the following section, the research question will be answered by consulting the literature and it will be further investigated whether the above mentioned factors are indeed of influence. Three hypotheses will be formulated and tested with survey data from the European Social Survey in Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden (ESS, 2012). Motivations for including these countries will be elaborated later on. 1 Freely translated from Dutch. 2 Freely translated from French. 3 Freely translated from German. 2 Anti-institutionalism As mentioned in the introduction, a wave of radical new-right parties emerged in the late-20th century. These parties started to look for ways of representing the opinion of the people against the newly established liberal elite, and thus became the primary supporter of populism (Canovan, 1999; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005). What often drives people to vote for new-right populist parties are feelings of political discontent or dissatisfaction with dominant institutions in general: anti-institutionalism (Canovan, 1999; De Koster et al., 2014; Hauptmann, 2001; Rydgren, 2007). There where the new-left primarily aims at changing society, those at the right aim at retaining it (Van der Meer, 2009). The new-right rather focuses on opening up current decision making procedures to the public, and promoting democratic initiatives that challenge the establishment (Hauptmann, 2001). Criticism of right-wing populists on left-wing democratic traditions includes that the democracy is elite-centred (Akkerman, 2005; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005). According to them, the elites are morally corrupt and only represent specific interests, which are not (always) consistent with the interest of the people. Moreover, right-wing populists oppose the way left-wing parties represent the public, by claiming that the vertical distance between