State of West Africa

March 2021

OSIWA’s first report of 2021 on the state of West Africa covers recent developments and trends in the region, with specific emphasis on developments in democracy, political governance, the COVID 19 pandemic and prospects for the region in 2021.

Mixed Results: Recent elections in West Africa

Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, , Niger and held presidential and/or general elections in 2020 (with a second round in Niger in early 2021) with mixed results for democracy. In all 6 countries, elections took place amid serious disagreements among political actors due to lack of inclusivity and trust in the main institutions involved in the management of the electoral processes. The common controversies across these 6 countries included contestation over voter registers, the exclusion of credible candidates or the boycott of elections (except in Ghana) and a uniform lack of trust in the election management bodies and democratic institutions such as Electoral Commissions1, and Constitutional/Supreme Courts, etc.

The elections were relatively peaceful even in countries such as Niger and Burkina Faso with serious security challenges and in Ghana, Burkina Faso and Niger, the ruling parties did not win majority seats in parliament with Ghana’s New Patriotic Party losing more than 30 seats. These results confirmed trends observed in the region in recent years with ruling parties losing presidential and/or legislative elections in , Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Cape Verde, Liberia2, Senegal, and The Gambia. That incumbent parties, with all the advantages, do not automatically sweep elections – is a major development in the sub-region.

The 2020 elections were held during the first phase of COVID19 in most of the countries and revealed 3 major issues that require serious consideration. First, electoral legal frameworks have no provisions for situations of force majeure, i.e., to guide situations where elections, especially presidential elections, have to be postponed. As a result, all the presidential elections held as scheduled despite the necessary restrictions which impacted on the duration of electoral milestone processes and infringed on voters and candidates’ rights. Second, the disruption of global supply chains due to the near global lockdown meant EMBs had to find domestic and/or regional solutions for the purchase of electoral materials typically sourced outside of Africa. Third, because of COVID19, all the stakeholders of the electoral processes made more use of ICT and media in general, presenting possibilities to improve the execution of electoral processes with ICT tools.

OSIWA’s interventions address political dialogue and mediation, legal analysis, disinformation, voter information, EMBs regional cooperation, election observation and violence monitoring, dialogue platforms and advocacy. Regular briefings are held with UNOWAS and ECOWAS to share information and plan actions and OSIWA is providing support to a regional experience sharing platform of EMBs through ECONEC and to a group of elder statesmen through the Goodluck Jonathan Foundation. Specific projects by domestic observer groups, women

1 According to the latest Afrobarometer data, citizens’ trust in Electoral Commission is at most 54% in Burkina Faso and about 39% in Cote d’Ivoire. 2 The ruling political coalition lost key seats in the senate during the by elections held in October 2020.

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empowerment organizations, creative industries and local mediators are funded by the Foundation. In addition, a regional CSO advocacy group including the former vice President of The Gambia (Fatoumata Jallow Tambajang) and Alioune Tine has been established.

3rd termism in West Africa

Despite provisions limiting presidential terms in all the constitutions of ECOWAS members (except in The Gambia where the new constitution is expected to be adopted by June 20213), constitutional changes to bypass term limits was another phenomenon observed in 2020. The decisions by President Gnassingbé to run for a fourth term and Presidents Ouattara and Conde to run for third terms created political instability, insecurity, and fatal conflicts around elections in Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea and Togo in 2020. Since the last amendment of Senegal’s constitution in 2019 there are rumours suggesting that President Macky Sall could be looking in the same direction ahead of the 2024 presidential election and the repression against voices condemning the idea of 3rd term lends credence to fears as exemplified in the Senegal protests in early March. In Guinea Bissau, there are concerns over the emerging tensions among political stakeholders around the planned amendment of the Constitution which could lead to another political institutional crisis. The trend around amended constitutions, fast becoming the first step in tenure elongation, in the region and across Africa, raises concerns about the constitutional review processes in The Gambia, Liberia and Sierra Leone.

Technically, 3rd termism should not be a concern for West African countries for several reasons. In addition to the fact that all the constitutions in the region provide for term limits, all West African countries (except Cape Verde and Senegal) have ratified the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG). Article 23 of the ACDEG considers “any amendment or revision of the constitution or legal instruments, which is an infringement on the principles of democratic change of government” as an anti-constitutional means of accession to power. Moreover, term limits have been respected in Benin (2 consecutive times), Cape Verde (3 consecutive times), Ghana (at least 2 consecutive times), Liberia (once), Mali (once), Mauritania (at least once), Niger (once), Nigeria (once) and Sierra Leone (2 consecutive times), that is in 9 countries out of the 16 West African states. Finally, according to Afrobarometer data, the majority of citizens in the sub-region (with a low of 70% in Burkina Faso and ta high of 87% in Togo) are in favour of limiting presidential terms to a maximum of 2.

Trends in insecurity

According to several think tanks and conflict monitoring institutions, the security situation in the Sahel deteriorated in 2020. Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project, (ACLED) and Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS), report that, “Conflict levels in 2020 slightly decreased from 2019 in all regions except Africa” and “…the Sahel has experienced the largest increase in violent extremist activity of any region in Africa” during this period.

3 It’s worth mentioning that the draft constitution, which will be adopted in June 2021, provides for a 2-term (of 5 years each) limit (whether consecutive or not).

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The insecurity afflicting the region occasioned about 2,350 political violence and protest events and about 6,250 reported fatalities accompanied by a soaring humanitarian emergency with more than 2 million displaced and rampant food insecurity. In addition, due to political instability, internal vulnerabilities and social dynamics in border communities, countries like Benin and Cote d’Ivoire are susceptible to the risks of jihadi militant violence.

While security continues to deteriorate in the Sahel, there are initiatives taken by major stakeholders to revamp the fight against violent extremism. For instance, France’s decision to surge troops and scale up operations and more collaboration with local military forces coupled with infighting between militant groups, led to at least 712 militant fatalities in 2020, almost double 2019’s number. During the 23 January 2021 session of the Authority of Heads of States and governments of ECOWAS, Ghana and Nigeria announced their contributions of $50M and $350M respectively for the implementation of the 2020-2024 action plan (adopted in December 2019) to eradicate terrorism in the region. In addition, Presidents Nana Akufo-Addo and Mahamadou Issoufou have been appointed by the Authority to lead the financial and technical resource mobilization efforts. The budget for the implementation of the 2020-2024 action plan is about $2.3 billion.

Overall, the current military-heavy approach has not improved the Sahel security crisis, instead, the conflict is expanding into new areas. Key international backers, including some French officials, of French led Sahel stabilization efforts are disappointed and looking for alternative options. France is preparing to reduce its military presence in the Sahel and evolve toward a lighter military footprint, continued internationalization of intervention and more local responsibility. The final communique of the Conference of Heads of State of the G5 Sahel and France, held on February 15, 2021, was clear about the need to go beyond the military approach and tackle the main root causes of the security challenges in the Sahel. The communique also mentioned the need to protect civilians, to tackle issues relating to governance, humanitarian needs and impunity and a “prize of the Sahel for the promotion of the culture of peace”, was also created during the Conference.

ECOWAS’ responses to challenges facing West Africa

Since the 2019 Bissau, ECOWAS has faced criticism over its ability to manage threats to democracy and rising insecurity and 2020 was no different, albeit with some encouraging developments.

ECOWAS has contributed to the successful resolution of some of the insecurity and political stability challenges confronting the sub-region, and taken initiatives to tackle others. For instance, ECOWAS played a crucial role in the “normalization” of the political situation in Guinea Bissau, finalized by the withdrawal of the ECOMIB (ECOWAS Mission in Guinea Bissau). Similarly, in The Gambia, the ECOMIG (the ECOWAS Mission in the Gambia) is progressively being transformed into a Police Mission accompanied by a political mediation mission (led by former Nigeria President, Goodluck Jonathan) to deal with the political dispute ahead of the presidential elections in late 2021.

On health and human rights, ECOWAS, while collaborating with the AU around the COVAX initiative, has adopted several measures including moving ahead with plans for a pooled procurement approach for anti-COVID vaccines,

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setting up a Vaccine Revolving Fund, harmonizing ECOWAS protocol for cross border movement of persons and goods and fixing the cost of COVID19 PCR test for travel within the region at $50. In addition, during its last Conference of Heads of States in January 2021, ECOWAS endorsed the Declaration on Zero Tolerance for Sexual and Gender Based Violence and the Elimination of all sorts of Violence against Women and Girls in the ECOWAS region.

Unfortunately, the regional organization ignored a dangerous precedent with democracy, good governance and vibrant civic spaces when it remained silent about the decision by Presidents Conde and Ouattara to manipulate their countries’ constitutions in order to contest elections for a 3rd term. As attacks on democratic institutions and processes spread i.e., where electoral laws and state institutions (judiciary, police, etc.) are used to exclude credible candidates from competing for elections (like in Cote d’Ivoire, Niger, Benin, Senegal and Burkina Faso), ECOWAS appears powerless. The trend in regularly held but increasingly undemocratic elections with costs to political participation and pluralism, has resulted in a loss of civil liberties and growing intolerance of opposition, free and independent media and a vibrant civil society.

Impact of COVID19 on Human Rights & Economic Justice

As of early April 2021, Africa had recorded 4,395,889 infections and 116,265 deaths with West Africa contributing 9.2% of the infections with a total of 404,364 cases. Despite dire predictions, and a more deadly second phase, Africa has weathered the storm better than most continents through a combination of experience with communicable diseases and past epidemics, proactive enforcement of public health advisory rules and a mix of variables including a large youth population.

The COVID19 pandemic, in addition to affecting disproportionately poor and vulnerable groups, has and continues to be the pretexts for governments in the region to trample on rights, suppress freedoms and violate the rule of law. For instance, the expansion of roles of security forces, resulting from emergency measures, brought with it the abuse of power and disproportionate use of force, and further exposed our struggling judiciaries and oversight bodies. The virus poses a specific risk to persons deprived of their liberty (people arrested during lock-down, existing inmates) and those who are in daily contact with them. In addition, the measures adopted to contain the virus have engendered a significant rise in cases of SGBV as many women and girls have had to remain at home subject to violence, rape, and other forms of domestic violence from those they live with.

The health systems have been affected by the pandemic with soft and hard infrastructure still inadequate to scale prevention, testing, treatment, and follow-through. The questions of domestic and global governance of health systems, preserving the rights of people equally across the globe, and the shared financing responsibilities remain largely unaddressed. Previous experiences, notably around Ebola, indicated the importance of community health management, of better surveillance mechanisms, of better understanding of the sociocultural dimensions of transmission, and of investment in research. A key part of our work in 2021 will be based on the principle of

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equitable access to health care to prevent increased vulnerabilities and to avoid discrimination. This includes access to vaccines for all.

On the region’s economic prospects, many commodity reliant countries saw reductions in revenue, as remittances, a predominant source of external cashflow, went downward. Industries such as tourism, and those reliant on trade continue to be affected by lockdowns and restrictions. While financing support and recovery plans remain one of the biggest hurdles for West African countries, ECOWAS, as a block, has not seized this moment to reignite and cement a broader conversation about development models, and the role of regional integration amidst continental pathways.

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