State of West Africa March 2021 OSIWA’s first report of 2021 on the state of West Africa covers recent developments and trends in the region, with specific emphasis on developments in democracy, political governance, the COVID 19 pandemic and prospects for the region in 2021. Mixed Results: Recent elections in West Africa Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Niger and Togo held presidential and/or general elections in 2020 (with a second round in Niger in early 2021) with mixed results for democracy. In all 6 countries, elections took place amid serious disagreements among political actors due to lack of inclusivity and trust in the main institutions involved in the management of the electoral processes. The common controversies across these 6 countries included contestation over voter registers, the exclusion of credible candidates or the boycott of elections (except in Ghana) and a uniform lack of trust in the election management bodies and democratic institutions such as Electoral Commissions1, and Constitutional/Supreme Courts, etc. The elections were relatively peaceful even in countries such as Niger and Burkina Faso with serious security challenges and in Ghana, Burkina Faso and Niger, the ruling parties did not win majority seats in parliament with Ghana’s New Patriotic Party losing more than 30 seats. These results confirmed trends observed in the region in recent years with ruling parties losing presidential and/or legislative elections in Benin, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Cape Verde, Liberia2, Senegal, and The Gambia. That incumbent parties, with all the advantages, do not automatically sweep elections – is a major development in the sub-region. The 2020 elections were held during the first phase of COVID19 in most of the countries and revealed 3 major issues that require serious consideration. First, electoral legal frameworks have no provisions for situations of force majeure, i.e., to guide situations where elections, especially presidential elections, have to be postponed. As a result, all the presidential elections held as scheduled despite the necessary restrictions which impacted on the duration of electoral milestone processes and infringed on voters and candidates’ rights. Second, the disruption of global supply chains due to the near global lockdown meant EMBs had to find domestic and/or regional solutions for the purchase of electoral materials typically sourced outside of Africa. Third, because of COVID19, all the stakeholders of the electoral processes made more use of ICT and media in general, presenting possibilities to improve the execution of electoral processes with ICT tools. OSIWA’s interventions address political dialogue and mediation, legal analysis, disinformation, voter information, EMBs regional cooperation, election observation and violence monitoring, dialogue platforms and advocacy. Regular briefings are held with UNOWAS and ECOWAS to share information and plan actions and OSIWA is providing support to a regional experience sharing platform of EMBs through ECONEC and to a group of elder statesmen through the Goodluck Jonathan Foundation. Specific projects by domestic observer groups, women 1 According to the latest Afrobarometer data, citizens’ trust in Electoral Commission is at most 54% in Burkina Faso and about 39% in Cote d’Ivoire. 2 The ruling political coalition lost key seats in the senate during the by elections held in October 2020. 2 empowerment organizations, creative industries and local mediators are funded by the Foundation. In addition, a regional CSO advocacy group including the former vice President of The Gambia (Fatoumata Jallow Tambajang) and Alioune Tine has been established. 3rd termism in West Africa Despite provisions limiting presidential terms in all the constitutions of ECOWAS members (except in The Gambia where the new constitution is expected to be adopted by June 20213), constitutional changes to bypass term limits was another phenomenon observed in 2020. The decisions by President Gnassingbé to run for a fourth term and Presidents Ouattara and Conde to run for third terms created political instability, insecurity, and fatal conflicts around elections in Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea and Togo in 2020. Since the last amendment of Senegal’s constitution in 2019 there are rumours suggesting that President Macky Sall could be looking in the same direction ahead of the 2024 presidential election and the repression against voices condemning the idea of 3rd term lends credence to fears as exemplified in the Senegal protests in early March. In Guinea Bissau, there are concerns over the emerging tensions among political stakeholders around the planned amendment of the Constitution which could lead to another political institutional crisis. The trend around amended constitutions, fast becoming the first step in tenure elongation, in the region and across Africa, raises concerns about the constitutional review processes in The Gambia, Liberia and Sierra Leone. Technically, 3rd termism should not be a concern for West African countries for several reasons. In addition to the fact that all the constitutions in the region provide for term limits, all West African countries (except Cape Verde and Senegal) have ratified the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG). Article 23 of the ACDEG considers “any amendment or revision of the constitution or legal instruments, which is an infringement on the principles of democratic change of government” as an anti-constitutional means of accession to power. Moreover, term limits have been respected in Benin (2 consecutive times), Cape Verde (3 consecutive times), Ghana (at least 2 consecutive times), Liberia (once), Mali (once), Mauritania (at least once), Niger (once), Nigeria (once) and Sierra Leone (2 consecutive times), that is in 9 countries out of the 16 West African states. Finally, according to Afrobarometer data, the majority of citizens in the sub-region (with a low of 70% in Burkina Faso and ta high of 87% in Togo) are in favour of limiting presidential terms to a maximum of 2. Trends in insecurity According to several think tanks and conflict monitoring institutions, the security situation in the Sahel deteriorated in 2020. Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project, (ACLED) and Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS), report that, “Conflict levels in 2020 slightly decreased from 2019 in all regions except Africa” and “…the Sahel has experienced the largest increase in violent extremist activity of any region in Africa” during this period. 3 It’s worth mentioning that the draft constitution, which will be adopted in June 2021, provides for a 2-term (of 5 years each) limit (whether consecutive or not). 3 The insecurity afflicting the region occasioned about 2,350 political violence and protest events and about 6,250 reported fatalities accompanied by a soaring humanitarian emergency with more than 2 million displaced and rampant food insecurity. In addition, due to political instability, internal vulnerabilities and social dynamics in border communities, countries like Benin and Cote d’Ivoire are susceptible to the risks of jihadi militant violence. While security continues to deteriorate in the Sahel, there are initiatives taken by major stakeholders to revamp the fight against violent extremism. For instance, France’s decision to surge troops and scale up operations and more collaboration with local military forces coupled with infighting between militant groups, led to at least 712 militant fatalities in 2020, almost double 2019’s number. During the 23 January 2021 session of the Authority of Heads of States and governments of ECOWAS, Ghana and Nigeria announced their contributions of $50M and $350M respectively for the implementation of the 2020-2024 action plan (adopted in December 2019) to eradicate terrorism in the region. In addition, Presidents Nana Akufo-Addo and Mahamadou Issoufou have been appointed by the Authority to lead the financial and technical resource mobilization efforts. The budget for the implementation of the 2020-2024 action plan is about $2.3 billion. Overall, the current military-heavy approach has not improved the Sahel security crisis, instead, the conflict is expanding into new areas. Key international backers, including some French officials, of French led Sahel stabilization efforts are disappointed and looking for alternative options. France is preparing to reduce its military presence in the Sahel and evolve toward a lighter military footprint, continued internationalization of intervention and more local responsibility. The final communique of the Conference of Heads of State of the G5 Sahel and France, held on February 15, 2021, was clear about the need to go beyond the military approach and tackle the main root causes of the security challenges in the Sahel. The communique also mentioned the need to protect civilians, to tackle issues relating to governance, humanitarian needs and impunity and a “prize of the Sahel for the promotion of the culture of peace”, was also created during the Conference. ECOWAS’ responses to challenges facing West Africa Since the 2019 elections in Guinea Bissau, ECOWAS has faced criticism over its ability to manage threats to democracy and rising insecurity and 2020 was no different, albeit with some encouraging developments. ECOWAS has contributed to the successful resolution of some of the insecurity and political stability challenges confronting the sub-region, and taken initiatives to tackle others. For instance, ECOWAS played