DOCSLIB.ORG

Hedge Funds, Leverage, and the Lessons of Long-Term Capital Management

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Hedge Funds, Leverage, and the Lessons of Long-Term Capital Management Hedge Funds, Leverage, and the Lessons of Long-Term Capital Management Report of The President’s Working Group on Financial Markets Board of Governors of the Securities and Department of Federal Reserve Exchange Commodity Futures the Treasury System Commission Trading Commission April 1999 April 28, 1999 The Honorable J. Dennis Hastert The Speaker United States House of Representatives Washington, D.C. 20515 Dear Mr. Speaker: We are pleased to transmit the report of the President’s Working Group on Financial Markets on Hedge Funds, Leverage, and the Lessons of Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM). The principal policy issue arising out of the events surrounding the near collapse of LTCM is how to constrain excessive leverage. By increasing the chance that problems at one financial institution could be transmitted to other institutions, excessive leverage can increase the likelihood of a general breakdown in the functioning of financial markets. This issue is not limited to hedge funds; other financial institutions are often larger and more highly leveraged than most hedge funds. In view of our findings, the Working Group recommends a number of measures designed to constrain excessive leverage. These measures are designed to improve transparency in the system, enhance private sector risk management practices, develop more risk-sensitive approaches to capital adequacy, support financial contract netting in the event of bankruptcy, and encourage offshore financial centers to comply with international standards. The LTCM incident highlights a number of tax issues with respect to hedge funds, including the tax treatment of total return equity swaps and the use of offshore financial centers. These issues, however, are beyond the scope of this report and are being addressed separately by Treasury. A number of other federal agencies were full participants in this study and support its conclusions and recommendations: the Council of Economic Advisers, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the National Economic Council, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and the Office of Thrift Supervision. We are grateful for their extensive assistance. page 2 We appreciate the opportunity to convey this report to you, and we look forward to continuing to work with you on these important issues. Sincerely, (signed) (signed) Robert E. Rubin Alan Greenspan Secretary Chairman Department of the Treasury Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve (signed) (signed) Arthur Levitt Brooksley Born Chairman Chairperson Securities and Exchange Commission Commodity Futures Trading Commission April 28, 1999 The Honorable Al Gore President of the Senate United States Senate Washington, D.C. 20510 Dear Mr. President: We are pleased to transmit the report of the President’s Working Group on Financial Markets on Hedge Funds, Leverage, and the Lessons of Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM). The principal policy issue arising out of the events surrounding the near collapse of LTCM is how to constrain excessive leverage. By increasing the chance that problems at one financial institution could be transmitted to other institutions, excessive leverage can increase the likelihood of a general breakdown in the functioning of financial markets. This issue is not limited to hedge funds; other financial institutions are often larger and more highly leveraged than most hedge funds. In view of our findings, the Working Group recommends a number of measures designed to constrain excessive leverage. These measures are designed to improve transparency in the system, enhance private sector risk management practices, develop more risk-sensitive approaches to capital adequacy, support financial contract netting in the event of bankruptcy, and encourage offshore financial centers to comply with international standards. The LTCM incident highlights a number of tax issues with respect to hedge funds, including the tax treatment of total return equity swaps and the use of offshore financial centers. These issues, however, are beyond the scope of this report and are being addressed separately by Treasury. A number of other federal agencies were full participants in this study and support its conclusions and recommendations: the Council of Economic Advisers, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the National Economic Council, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and the Office of Thrift Supervision. We are grateful for their extensive assistance. page 2 We appreciate the opportunity to convey this report to you, and we look forward to continuing to work with you on these important issues. Sincerely, (signed) (signed) Robert E. Rubin Alan Greenspan Secretary Chairman Department of the Treasury Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve (signed) (signed) Arthur Levitt Brooksley Born Chairman Chairperson Securities and Exchange Commission Commodity Futures Trading Commission TABLE OF CONTENTS Page EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .................................................. viii I. BACKGROUND ......................................................... 1 Hedge Funds ......................................................... 1 A. General Description ........................................... 1 B. Trading Practices ............................................. 4 C. Disclosure and Monitoring ...................................... 6 D. Counterparty and Credit Relationships ............................. 6 The LTCM Episode ................................................... 10 A. Background ................................................ 10 B. LTCM’s Near Failure ......................................... 12 C. The LTCM Fund Achieved Extraordinary Levels of Leverage and Risk .... 14 D. Counterparty Losses and Market Disruptions That May Have Resulted from a Default of LTCM ......................................... 17 II. PUBLIC POLICY ISSUES ................................................ 23 Leverage and Risk .................................................... 23 A. Measuring Leverage and Risk ................................... 24 B. Private Counterparty Discipline and Government Regulation ............ 25 Bankruptcy Issues .................................................... 26 A. Closeout Netting ............................................. 26 B. Transnational Issues .......................................... 27 III. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ............................... 29 1. Disclosure and Reporting ............................................ 32 2. Supervisory Oversight ............................................... 34 3. Enhanced Private Sector Practices for Counterparty Risk Management .......... 36 4. Capital Adequacy .................................................. 37 5. Expanded Risk Assessment for the Unregulated Affiliates of Broker-Dealers and Futures Commission Merchants .................................... 38 6. Bankruptcy Code Issues ............................................. 40 7. Offshore Financial Centers and Tax Havens ............................... 41 8. Additional Potential Steps ............................................ 42 APPENDIX A: ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON HEDGE FUNDS 1. Hedge Fund Performance Fees, Leverage, and Short-term Outlook ............ A-1 2. Hedge Fund Performance and Survival ................................. A-3 3. Market Impact, Positive and Negative .................................. A-5 APPENDIX B: THE SEC AND HEDGE FUNDS 1. Exemptions from Securities Laws ..................................... B-1 2. Oversight of Broker-Dealer Exposure .................................. B-4 3. Management of Clearing Risks ...................................... B-12 4. Other Issues Raised by LTCM ....................................... B-13 APPENDIX C: THE CFTC AND HEDGE FUNDS 1. Description of CPO and CTA Regulation ............................... C-1 2. Reporting of Exchange-Traded Commodity Positions ...................... C-5 3. Oversight of FCM Exposure to Hedge Funds ............................ C-7 4. Management of Clearance Risks ..................................... C-10 5. LTCM and U.S. Futures Markets .................................... C-12 6. CFTC Analysis of Hedge Fund Data .................................. C-12 7. Conclusion ..................................................... C-15 APPENDIX D: THE SUPERVISION OF BANK EXPOSURE TO HEDGE FUNDS 1. Commercial Bank Relationships with Hedge Funds ........................ D-1 2. Supervision of Bank Credit Exposures to Hedge Funds ..................... D-1 3. Credit Risk Management Issues ...................................... D-12 APPENDIX E: BANKRUPTCY ISSUES 1. Background ..................................................... E-1 2. The U.S. Legal Framework’s Treatment of Derivative Contracts in Insolvencies .. E-2 3. Practical Application of the Bankruptcy Code to a Hedge Fund Failure ......... E-5 APPENDIX F: VOLUNTARY INDUSTRY INITIATIVES 1. The Derivatives Policy Group Initiative ................................. F-1 2. The Counterparty Risk Management Policy Group Initiative ................. F-3 3. International Centralized Credit Database ............................... F-4 4. International Swaps and Derivatives Association 1999 Collateral Review ....... F-5 APPENDIX G: SUPERVISORY EFFORTS AND STATEMENTS POST-LTCM 1. Basle Committee on Banking Supervision ............................... G-1 2. International Organization of Securities Commissions ...................... G-1 3. G-7 Finance
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Kicking the Bucket Shop: the Model State Commodity Code As the Latest Weapon in the State Administrator's Anti-Fraud Arsenal, 42 Wash
    Washington and Lee Law Review Volume 42 | Issue 3 Article 6 Summer 6-1-1985 Kicking the Bucket Shop: The oM del State Commodity Code as the Latest Weapon in the State Administrator's Anti-Fraud Arsenal Julie M. Allen Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr Part of the Securities Law Commons Recommended Citation Julie M. Allen, Kicking the Bucket Shop: The Model State Commodity Code as the Latest Weapon in the State Administrator's Anti-Fraud Arsenal, 42 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 889 (1985), https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol42/iss3/6 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law Review by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. KICKING THE BUCKET SHOP: THE MODEL STATE COMMODITY CODE AS THE LATEST WEAPON IN THE STATE ADMINISTRATOR'S ANTI-FRAUD ARSENAL JuIE M. ALLEN* In April 1985, the North American Securities Administrators Association adopted the Model State Commodity Code. The Model Code is designed to regulate off-exchange futures and options contracts, forward contracts, and other contracts for the sale of physical commodities but not exchange-traded commodity futures contracts or exchange-traded commodity options. Specif- ically, the Model Code addresses the problem of boiler-rooms and bucket shops-that is, the fraudulent sale of commodities to the investing public.
    [Show full text]
  • 2017 Financial Services Industry Outlook
    NEW YORK 535 Madison Avenue, 19th Floor New York, NY 10022 +1 212 207 1000 SAN FRANCISCO One Market Street, Spear Tower, Suite 3600 San Francisco, CA 94105 +1 415 293 8426 DENVER 999 Eighteenth Street, Suite 3000 2017 Denver, CO 80202 FINANCIAL SERVICES +1 303 893 2899 INDUSTRY REVIEW MEMBER, FINRA / SIPC SYDNEY Level 2, 9 Castlereagh Street Sydney, NSW, 2000 +61 419 460 509 BERKSHIRE CAPITAL SECURITIES LLC (ARBN 146 206 859) IS A LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY INCORPORATED IN THE UNITED STATES AND REGISTERED AS A FOREIGN COMPANY IN AUSTRALIA UNDER THE CORPORATIONS ACT 2001. BERKSHIRE CAPITAL IS EXEMPT FROM THE REQUIREMENTS TO HOLD AN AUSTRALIAN FINANCIAL SERVICES LICENCE UNDER THE AUSTRALIAN CORPORATIONS ACT IN RESPECT OF THE FINANCIAL SERVICES IT PROVIDES. BERKSHIRE CAPITAL IS REGULATED BY THE SEC UNDER US LAWS, WHICH DIFFER FROM AUSTRALIAN LAWS. LONDON 11 Haymarket, 2nd Floor London, SW1Y 4BP United Kingdom +44 20 7828 2828 BERKSHIRE CAPITAL SECURITIES LIMITED IS AUTHORISED AND REGULATED BY THE FINANCIAL CONDUCT AUTHORITY (REGISTRATION NUMBER 188637). www.berkcap.com CONTENTS ABOUT BERKSHIRE CAPITAL Summary 1 Berkshire Capital is an independent employee-owned investment bank specializing in M&A in the financial services sector. With more completed transactions in this space than any Traditional Investment Management 6 other investment bank, we help clients find successful, long-lasting partnerships. Wealth Management 9 Founded in 1983, Berkshire Capital is headquartered in New York with partners located in Cross Border 13 London, Sydney, San Francisco, Denver and Philadelphia. Our partners have been with the firm an average of 14 years. We are recognized as a leading expert in the asset management, Real Estate 17 wealth management, alternatives, real estate and broker/dealer industries.
    [Show full text]
  • Global Macro–Why Now?
    Global Macro–Why Now? SOLUTIONS & MULTI ASSET | AIP HEDGE FUND TEAM | INVESTMENT INSIGHT | 2018 Global Macro is an investment CO-AUTHORS style that is highly opportunistic and has the potential to generate MARK VAN DER ZWAN, CFA strong risk-adjusted returns in Chief Investment Officer challenging markets. Against a backdrop and Head of AIP Hedge Fund Team of geopolitical uncertainty and potentially increased volatility,1 we felt it would be timely to share our insights on the space and explain ROBERT RAFTER, CFA Head of Discretionary Global why we believe now could be an opportune Macro, Sovereign Fixed time to make an allocation to Global Macro. Income Relative Value and Emerging Markets Strategies Both equity and fixed income markets have exhibited strong performance in recent years, leading to fully valued stock markets, historically low yields and tight credit spreads. However, substantial U.S. fiscal stimulus through a $1.5 trillion tax cut and a $300 billion increase in government spending,2 amid robust economic growth and inflation readings, have made it difficult for investors to adopt a more cautious, late- cycle posture in their portfolios. Importantly, increasing market volatility levels may result from any of a litany of potential catalysts, including escalating protectionist policies, U.S. midterm elections, central bank policy missteps, Italian debt sustainability, tensions in the Middle East, and political unrest in key emerging markets. We believe that these dynamics have 1 Please see Glossary for definitions. 2 Source: AIP Hedge Fund Team. The statements above reflect the opinions and views of Morgan Stanley Investment Management as of the date hereof and not as of any future date and will not be updated or supplemented.
    [Show full text]
  • Dynamic Strategic Arbitrage∗
    Dynamic Strategic Arbitrage∗ Vincent Fardeauy Frankfurt School of Finance and Managment This version: June 11, 2014 Abstract Asset prices do not adjust instantaneously following uninformative demand or supply shocks. This paper offers a theory based on arbitrageurs' price impact to explain these slow-moving cap- ital dynamics. Arbitrageurs recognizing their price impact break up trades, leading to gradual price adjustments. When shocks are anticipated, prices exhibit a V-shaped pattern, with a peak at the realization of the shocks. The dynamics of market depth and price adjustments depend on the degree of competition between arbitrageurs. When shocks are uncertain, price dynamics depend on the interaction between arbitrageurs' competition and the total risk-bearing capacity of the market. JEL codes: G12, G20, L12; Keywords: Strategic arbitrage, liquidity, price impact, limits of arbitrage. ∗I benefited from comments from Miguel Ant´on,Bruno Biais, Maria-Cecilia Bustamante, Amil Dasgupta, Michael Gordy, Martin Oehmke (discussant), Matt Pritsker, Jean-Charles Rochet, Yuki Sato, Kostas Zachariadis, Jean-Pierre Zigrand and seminar and conference participants at LSE, INSEAD, FRB, the University of Zurich and the 2013 AFA meetings in San Diego. I am grateful to Dimitri Vayanos and Denis Gromb for supervision and insights. Jay Im provided excellent research assistance. This paper is the first part of a paper previously circulated as \Strategic Arbitrage with Entry". All remaining errors are my own. yDepartment of Finance, Frankfurt School of Finance and Management, Sonnemannstrasse 9-11, 60314 Frankfurt am Main, Germany. Email: [email protected]. 1 1 Introduction Empirical evidence shows that prices recover slowly from demand or supply shocks that are unre- lated to future earnings and that these patterns are due to imperfections in the supply of capital.
    [Show full text]
  • Optimal Convergence Trading with Unobservable Pricing Errors
    OPTIMAL CONVERGENCE TRADING WITH UNOBSERVABLE PRICING ERRORS SÜHAN ALTAY, KATIA COLANERI, AND ZEHRA EKSI Abstract. We study a dynamic portfolio optimization problem related to convergence trading, which is an investment strategy that exploits temporary mispricing by simultane- ously buying relatively underpriced assets and selling short relatively overpriced ones with the expectation that their prices converge in the future. We build on the model of Liu and Timmermann [22] and extend it by incorporating unobservable Markov-modulated pricing errors into the price dynamics of two co-integrated assets. We characterize the optimal portfolio strategies in full and partial information settings both under the assumption of unrestricted and beta-neutral strategies. By using the innovations approach, we provide the filtering equation that is essential for solving the optimization problem under partial information. Finally, in order to illustrate the model capabilities, we provide an example with a two-state Markov chain. 1. Introduction Convergence-type trading strategies have become one of the most popular trading strate- gies that are used to capitalize on market inefficiencies, or deviations from “equilibrium,” especially with the rapid developments in algorithmic and high-frequency trading. For a typical convergence trade, temporary mispricing is exploited by simultaneously buying rel- atively underpriced assets and selling short relatively overpriced assets in anticipation that at some future date their prices will have become closer. Thus one can profit by the extent of the convergence. A prime example of a convergence trade is a pairs trading strategy that involves a long position and a short position in a pair of similar stocks that have moved together historically and hence an investor can profit from the relative value trade arising arXiv:1910.01438v2 [q-fin.PM] 7 Oct 2019 from the cointegration between asset price dynamics involved in the trade.
    [Show full text]
  • Europe's Largest Single Managers Ranked by a Um
    2013 IN ASSOCIATION WITH IN ASSOCIATION 5O EUROPEEUROPE’S LARGEST SINGLE MANAGERS RANKED BY AUM EUROPE50 01 02 03 04 Brevan Howard Man BlueCrest Capital Blackrock Management 1 1 1 1 Total AUM (as at 30.06.13) Total AUM (as at 30.06.13) Total AUM (as at 01.04.13) Total AUM (as at 30.06.13) $40.0bn $35.6bn $34.22bn $28.7bn 2 2 2 2 2012 ranking 2012 ranking 2012 ranking 2012 ranking 2 1 3 6 3 3 3 3 Founded Founded Founded Founded 2002 1783 (as a cooperage) 2000 1988 4 4 4 4 Founders/principals Founders/principals Founders/principals Founders/principals Alan Howard Manny Roman (CEO), Luke Ellis (President), Mike Platt, Leda Braga Larry Fink Jonathan Sorrell (CFO) 5 5 5 Hedge fund(s) 5 Hedge fund(s) Hedge fund(s) Fund name: Brevan Howard Master Fund Hedge fund(s) Fund name: BlueCrest Capital International Fund name: UK Emerging Companies Hedge Limited Fund name: Man AHL Diversified plc Inception date: 12/2000 Fund Inception date: 04/2003 Inception date:03/1996 AUM: $13.5bn Inception date: Not disclosed AUM: $27.4bn AUM: $7.9bn Portfolio manager: Mike Platt AUM: Not disclosed Portfolio manager: Multiple portfolio Portfolio manager: Tim Wong, Matthew Strategy: Global macro Portfolio manager: Not disclosed managers Sargaison Asset classes: Not disclosed Strategy: Equity long/short Strategy: Global macro, relative value Strategy: Managed futures Domicile: Not disclosed Asset classes: Not disclosed Asset classes: Fixed income and FX Asset classes: Cross asset Domicile: Not disclosed Domicile: Cayman Islands Domicile: Ireland Fund name: BlueTrend
    [Show full text]
  • Securities Transaction Tax Introduced in the House of Representatives
    Edited by Charles E. Dropkin December 8, 2009 in this issue Economic Crisis Securities Transaction Tax Introduced in the House of Response Group Representatives Securities Transaction On December 3, a group of 23 representatives introduced a bill to tax various types of Tax Introduced in securities transactions. If enacted, the legislation would impose a transaction tax on the the House of following types of securities: Representatives ....... 1 Federal Reserve Board n Shares of common and preferred stock (25 basis points), Adopts Final Rule to n Determine Eligibility of Futures contracts (2 basis points), Credit Rating Agencies n Swap agreements (2 basis points), to Issue Credit Ratings on TALF Loans ........ 1 n Credit default swaps (2 basis points), and House Financial n Option contracts (taxed at the rate of the underlying asset). Services Committee Passes New Financial The transaction tax would apply to securities transactions in excess of $100,000 and Legislation ................ 2 would exempt certain types of accounts. The Senate is expected to propose a similar bill Congressional next week. The Obama administration has not stated whether it will support the bill; Committees Hold however, Treasury Secretary Geithner previously has expressed concern that such a tax Hearings on Regulation would adversely affect financial markets by increasing the costs of capital and affecting of OTC Derivatives .. 2 the ability of U.S. companies to compete in international markets. Federal Reserve Board Resumes Operation of Reverse Repurchase Federal Reserve Board Adopts Final Rule to Determine Agreements.............. 3 Eligibility of Credit Rating Agencies to Issue Credit Ratings on TALF Loans On December 4, the Federal Reserve Board announced the adoption of a final rule to determine the eligibility of credit rating agencies to issue credit ratings on certain types of asset­backed securities (“ABS”) to be accepted as collateral for the Term Asset­Backed Securities Loan Facility (“TALF”).
    [Show full text]
  • January 19,2006 Rule 10A-1
    SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP BElJlNG GENEVA SAN FRANCISCO 787 SEVENTH AVENUE BRUSSELS HONG KONG SHANGHAI NEW YORK. NY 10018 CHICAGO LONDON SINGAPORE 2128395300 DALLAS LOS ANGELES fOKYO 212 839 5599 FAX NEW YORK WASHINGTON. DC I FOUNDED 1866 January 19,2006 Rule 10a-1; Rule 200(g) of Regulation SHO; Rule 10 1 and James A. Brigagliano, Esq. 102 of Regulation M; Section Assistant Director, Trading Practices ll(d)(l) and Rule lldl-2 ofthe Office of Trading Practices and Processing Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Division of Market Regulation Securities and Exchange Commission 100 F Street, N.E. Washington, DC 20549 Re: Request of DB Commodity Index Tracking Fund and DB Commodity Services LLC for Exemptive, Interpretative or No-Action Relief from Rule 10a-1 under, Rule 200(g) of Regulation SHO under, Rules 101 and 102 of Regulation M under, Section ll(d)(l) of and Rule lldl-2 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended Dear Mr. Brigagliano: We are writing on behalf of DB Commodity Index Tracking Fund (the "Fund"), a ~elawkestatutory trust and a public commodity pool, and DB Commodity Services LLC ("DBCS"), which will be the registered commodity pool operator ("CPO) and managing owner (the "Managing Owner") of the Fund. The Fund and the Managing Owner (a) on their own behalf and (b) on behalf of (1) the DB Commodity Index Tracking Master Fund (the "Master Fund"); (2) ALPS Distributors, Inc. (the "Distributor"), which provides certain distribution-related administrative services for the Fund; (3) the American Stock Exchange ("'AMEX") and any
    [Show full text]
  • California's Angelides to Lead Financial Crisis Probe
    California’s Angelides to Lead Financial Crisis Probe Bloomberg By Jesse Westbrook and James Rowley July 15, 2009 July 15 (Bloomberg) -- Former California Treasurer Philip Angelides will lead a panel charged by Congress with investigating causes of the financial crisis following public anger at the $700 billion taxpayer rescue of Wall Street banks. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi and Senate Democratic Leader Harry Reid today announced the appointment of Angelides, 56, who lost to Republican Arnold Schwarzenegger in the 2006 California gubernatorial race. House and Senate Republicans named former U.S. Representative Bill Thomas as the panel’s vice chairman. “The commission will conduct a thorough, systemic and non- partisan examination of the failures in both government and financial markets,” Pelosi, a California Democrat, said in a statement. “The American people deserve nothing less than a full explanation of why so many people lost their homes, their life’s savings and their hard-earned pensions.” The panel, with six members appointed by Democrats and four by Republicans, has subpoena power and may identify firms and individuals judged responsible for contributing to the deepest recession since the Great Depression. Congress modeled the commission on a 1930s panel headed by Senate staff member Ferdinand Pecora that led to the creation of agencies and laws that policed financial firms for seven decades. Since September, the government has been forced to prop up firms including Citigroup Inc., Bank of America Corp., American International Group Inc., General Motors Corp. and housing finance companies Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Brooksley Born Democratic leaders also appointed Brooksley Born, former chairman of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission; former U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • Ex-Commonwealth PM Set to Launch $500M Macro Fund LAUNCH
    The long and the short of it www.hfmweek.com ISSUE 497 3 MAY 2018 INFRAHEDGE CEO BRUCE KEITH DEPARTS AFTER 7 YEARS HFM EUROPEAN 2018 $30bn MAP co-founder to be replaced by Andrew Allright PEOPLE MOVES 03 PERFORMANCE AWARDS DEUTSCHE PUTS PRIME FINANCE BUSINESS UNDER REVIEW HF head Tarun Nagpal to leave bank after 15 years PRIME BROKERAGE 07 EX-GRUSS CAPITAL PROS PREP EVENT-DRIVEN FUND HFMWEEK REVEALS ALL Indar Capital expected to launch later this year LAUNCHES 10 THE WINNERS AWARDS 23 Ex-CommonWealth PM set to launch $500m macro fund Christopher Wheeler readies between 2013 and 2016. London-based CJW Capital CommonWealth closed BY SAM MACDONALD down last year as Fisher depart- ed to join $26bn Soros Fund FORMER CITADEL AND Management. CommonWealth Opportunity From November 2016 until Capital portfolio manager Chris- March this year, Wheeler is topher Wheeler is set to launch a understood to have traded a sub- LAUNCH macro fund with at least $500m stantial macro sleeve for Citadel. initial investment, HFMWeek He previously spent five years has learned. with London-based liquid multi- ANALYSIS Wheeler is starting London- asset business Talisman Global NUMBERS SURGE IN 2017 based CJW Capital Management Asset Management. He earlier with backing from a large asset worked at Morgan Stanley. manager and is looking to begin CJW Capital could become trading this year, HFMWeek one of this year’s largest HFM Global’s annual survey shows understands. European start-ups, amid a num- He registered the firm with ber of prominent macro hedge equity strategies remained most in UK Companies House on 23 fund launches.
    [Show full text]
  • IC 23-2-6 Chapter 6. Indiana Commodity Code IC 23-2-6-1
    IC 23-2-6 Chapter 6. Indiana Commodity Code IC 23-2-6-1 "Board of trade" defined Sec. 1. As used in this chapter, "board of trade" refers to a person or group of persons engaged in: (1) buying or selling a commodity; or (2) receiving a commodity for sale on consignment; whether the person or group of persons is characterized as a board of trade, an exchange, or any other type of marketplace. As added by P.L.177-1991, SEC.10. IC 23-2-6-2 "Commissioner" defined Sec. 2. As used in this chapter, "commissioner" refers to the securities commissioner appointed under IC 23-19-6-1(a). As added by P.L.177-1991, SEC.10. Amended by P.L.27-2007, SEC.20. IC 23-2-6-3 "CFTC Rule" defined Sec. 3. As used in this chapter, "CFTC Rule" means a rule, regulation, or order of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission that is in effect on July 1, 1991, and any subsequent amendment, addition, or revision to the rule, regulation, or order unless the commissioner disallows the application to this chapter of the amendment, addition, or revision not later than ten (10) days after the effective date of the amendment, addition, or revision. As added by P.L.177-1991, SEC.10. IC 23-2-6-4 "Commodity" defined Sec. 4. As used in this chapter, "commodity" means, except as otherwise specified by a rule, regulation, or order of the commissioner, any of the following: (1) An agricultural, a grain, or a livestock product or byproduct.
    [Show full text]
  • Corporate and Financial Weekly Digest)
    June 4, 2010 SEC/CORPORATE SEC Chairman Issues Statement on GAAP-IFRS Convergence Project On June 2, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) announced modifications to their timetable for, and prioritization of, standards being developed by these boards in connection with improving U.S. generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) and International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and achieving convergence of GAAP and IFRS. According to the joint statement issued by the FASB and IASB, these boards had previously set June 2011 as the target date for completing all major convergence projects. During the past few months, stakeholders voiced concerns about their ability to provide input on the large number of exposure drafts of standards planned for publication in the second quarter of this year. In response, the FASB and IASB are developing a modified strategy to take account of these concerns that would prioritize certain major projects and stagger publication of exposure drafts, resulting in the extension of the target completion dates for some convergence projects to the second half of 2011. The Securities and Exchange Commission’s Chairman, Mary Schapiro, issued a statement on June 2 in which she indicated that the modification by the FASB and IASB to the timing for completion of certain convergence projects should not impact the SEC staff’s analyses under the Work Plan issued by the SEC in February 2010, the results of which will aid the SEC in its evaluation of the impact that the use of IFRS by U.S. issuers would have on the U.S.
    [Show full text]