John Stuart Mill
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AntisLoizides John StuartMill: Individuality,Dignity, and Respect forPersons¹ Abstract: This chapter explores the idea of respect for persons in John Stuart Mill’sthought,focusing on individuality and the sense of dignity.Followinga brief discussion of the grounds for the protection of individuality and self-devel- opment in Mill’s On Liberty (1859), the chapter attempts to bring to the surface the implications of individuality and self-development for social relationships, particularlythose of gender,classand race. But can Mill’sutilitarian theory real- ly incorporate the idea that human dignity oughtnever to be violated, whatever the social gains?The chapter turns for answers to Mill’stheory of an “Art of Life”,his argument on kinds of pleasure, and consequentlyhis views on the re- lationship between justiceand utility.Atthis point the sense of dignity – afeel- ing of self-respect – and its relation to self-development and the life of justice comes to the fore. As the chapter argues, the sense of dignity is the foundation upon which the respect of the rights, liberty and individualityofothers is to be built. In April 1854,justbefore abandoning the experiment of registering at least one “worthy” thoughtper day, John Stuart Mill scribbled down an interesting idea in his “little book” (“Diary” (1854), 8Jan. 1854.In: Mill 1963–1991, vol. XXVII, p. 641)²: All systems of morals agreeinprescribingtodothat,and onlythat,which accords with self-respect.The difference between one person and another is mainlyinthat with which their self-respect is associated. In some it is with worldlyorselfish success.Inothers, with the supposed favour of the supernal powers.Inothers,with the indulgenceofmere self-will. In others,with self-conceit.Inthe best,with the sympathyofthose they respect and ajust regardfor the good of all. (Diary,9Apr. 1854,CW:XXVII.667) Mill made the note at atime when he was workingonessays soon to turn into On Liberty (1859), Utilitarianism (1861), and TheSubjection of Women (1869) and Iwould liketothank Elena Irrera,Georgios Varouxakis,Gregoris Molivas,Giovanni Giorgini, and Sophia Kanaouti for extremelyhelpful comments on earlier drafts of this chapter. All subsequent references to John Stuart Mill’sworks are by title, followed by volumeand page number of the Collected Works (CW). DOI 10.1515/9783110526288-010, ©2017 Jean-Claude Beacco, Hans-Jürgen Krumm et David Little, published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed under the Creative CommonsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs3.0 License. 188 Antis Loizides while he and Harriet Taylor Mill were advocating women’srights (Autobiography (1873), CW:I.249; letter to H. Taylor Mill, 7Feb. and 14 Jun. 1854,CW:XIV.152,212). With aview to fullysketching out the idea in the near future,Mill pointed to two kinds of respect: first,respect associatedwith afeelingofapprobation; second, respect associated with an acknowledgment of what is good for all members of a society,irrespective of approbation. This short note suggests that Mill linked these two kinds of respect to each other,and that he considered the link impor- tant.However,itisnot clear how or why; neither is it clear that such concepts or the link itself made sense in terms of Mill’sutilitarian theory.Inthis chapter,Iat- tempt to clarify these issues. In short,Iexplore the idea of respect for persons in Mill’sthoughtasacon- cern with individuality and the sense of dignity.InSection 1, Ioffer some con- temporary definitions of key terms in the discussion of respect for persons, that is, recognition respect and appraisal respect as well as dignity.These defi- nitions serveasconceptual tools when turning to Mill’sthought. In Section 2, Idiscuss the grounds for the protection of individuality and self-development in Mill’s On Liberty. In Section 3, Iattempt to bring to the surface the implications of individuality and self-development for social relationships, particularlythose of gender, class and race, as worked out in Subjection and PrinciplesofPolitical Economy (1848), among other works.Section 4deals with apotential problem for Mill: can his utilitarian theory incorporate the idea that human dignity ought never to be violated, whatever the social gains?Iturn for answers to Mill’stheory of an “Art of Life”,his argument on kindsofpleasure, and consequentlyhis views on the relationship between justiceand utility. Section 5focuses on the sense of dignity – afeeling of self-respect – and its relation to self-development and the life of justice. Itakethe discussion to an aspect of respect for persons which is not as readilyapparent as Mill’sthesis on individuality: although our character is formed duringour childhood and earlyexperiences,itispossible through appraisal respect to initiate self-culture in maturity.AsItry to show, in Mill’sthought the two kinds of respect are inextricablybound: the sense of dignity is the foundation upon which the respect of the rights and liberty of oth- ers is to be built. John Stuart Mill: Individuality,Dignity, and Respect for Persons 189 1 In Section 1, first,drawingfrom Stephen Darwall,³ Idistinguish between “recog- nition respect” and “appraisal respect”.Second, drawingfrom John Rawls and Bernard Williams, Istate the deontological challengetoutilitarian theories: can autilitarian reallyaccommodate the idea of respect for persons, irrespective of losses in social utility?Identifying the essential elements of the idea of respect for persons delineates and,concurrently, tests Mill’sarguments. On one hand,appraisal or evaluative respect,asDarwallputs it,isakind of esteem: apositive or favorableattitude towards aperson as a(moral) agent.That is, appraisalrespect for aperson has to do with some form of evaluation of a person’scharacterorconduct.Toappraise, to evaluate, or to assess aperson means thather/his character,conduct, and achievementsfare well in compari- son with astandard of (moral) excellence. Accordingtohow one fares against the standard the resultinestimation could rangefrom the highest esteem to dis- esteem. However,asDarwallpoints out,not every positive attitude towards an- other person’scharacter traits qualifies for appraisal respect; for Darwall, draw- ing on Kant,appraisal respect involves a “categorical attitude, one which is unconditional on the fact that the traits in question happen to servesome par- ticular purpose or interest of mine” (Darwall 2004,p.44). Forexample, my atti- tude towardsacolleaguemay be positive or negative;whatever it is, that attitude should be in reference to astandard, e.g., merit, work ethic, productivity,how well s/he works with others, etc., which does not vary accordingtomyparticular situation, purposes or goals (e.g., competingfor apromotion). As Stephen Hud- son notes, “[a] person must have reasons for respecting x (in the evaluative sense),and these reasons will be what the person takes to be facts about x in virtue of which x merits the person’srespect” (Hudson 1980,p.72). On the other hand, recognitionrespect involves the acknowledgment of a shared fact or afeature of human beingswhich places restrictions on how to treat another person irrespectivelyofany varianceincharacter traits, merits or accomplishments: human dignity.Rather oversimplifying,human dignity essen- tiallyrefers to human beingshaving an inherent worth by virtue of being human. It does not depend on fulfilling anycriteria other thanbeing human. In Kant’s classic formulation, dignity is “an unconditioned, incomparable worth”,that is, an inner worth which “constitutes the condition under which alone some- thing can be an end-in-itself” (Kant 2002,pp. 53–54). The grounds of human dig- In the discussionwhich follows,IdrawfromDarwall 1977 and 2004 (statingDarwall’snew position). Foracompleteaccount, see Darwall 2006. 190 Antis Loizides nity vary in different conceptions; nevertheless, all agree that dignityisneither earned nor alienated. One mayfail to properlyacknowledge it either in others or in oneself (e.g., treatingothers or one’sown self as means and not as an end-in- itself), but it is never lost. Whereas one cannot demand appraisal respect,one can demand recognition respect; and whereasone’sesteem for an individual mayvary from person to person with no need for uniformity,recognizinghuman dignity places uniform restrictions on actionacross individuals.Toput it simply,itisnot morallyper- missible for anyperson to act without dueacknowledgment of, or without giving appropriate weight to, that fact or feature of human beings. Since for Darwall the object of recognitionrespect is dignity or authority,recognition respect concerns how our relations to abearer of that feature, that is, dignity or authority,are to be governedbyit. Darwall’ssecond-person standpoint thus stresses that to respect dignity in another person is something different from respectinghuman dignity in general. AccordingtoDarwall, the dignity of aperson is the authority to make claims and demands which limit the actions of another person. This means thatdignity provides reasons for that (second) person to complywith the claims or demands of another person (e.g.,not to engageinbehavior thatviolates her/his dignity); in turn, these reasons for acting hold that(second)person accountable when s/ he fails to appropriately takethem into consideration, for whatever reason (e.g., maximizingsocial utility). Being accountable for one’sfailuretoview dignityas areason for acting should not be taken to mean that one is coerced to respect others, e.g. by being shamed or threatened.Itmeans that aperson considers, weighs,and