Contents

List of Maps viii Preface ix Acknowledgements xvi Abbreviations xviii Maps xxi

1 The Painful Road to Modernity 1 2 The Second Republic (1931–1936): A Brief Essay in Democracy 27 3 The Distorting Mirror:The International Dimension of the Spanish Civil War 60 4 Apocalypse in 1936 Spain 92 5 Breaking the Stalemate (December 1936–March 1938) 125 6 The Republic’s Defeat (March 1938–March 1939): Chronicle of a Death Foretold? 157 7 Epilogue:The Legacy of the Spanish Civil War 184

Notes 194 Select Bibliography 235 Index 249

vii 1 The Painful Road to Modernity

So far this year, more than 20 people have been killed by the Civil Guard . . . In fact, Spain lives in a state of perpetual civil war: on the one hand, the people who fight peacefully for their livelihood and rights, on the other, the authorities that deny them their livelihood and rights at gun-point.1

The fading charm of Spanish Liberalism

The origins of the Spanish Civil War are deeply rooted in the country’s history. The religious fanaticism and fierce rhetoric surrounding the conflict were largely borrowed from the legendary Reconquista, the almost 800-year struggle to expel the Moors from the peninsula. The clash between state centralism and peripheral nationalisms also evoked the War of Succession of the early eighteenth century, when the Bourbons crushed Catalan autonomy. Equally, the cruelty and passion displayed by both sides mirrored the fierce brutality of the nineteenth- century civil wars fought between Carlists and Liberals.2 Nowhere else in Europe had the transition from feudalism to capitalism produced such a protracted and merciless conflict. Closer in time, the failure of the Restoration Monarchy (1874–1931) is of paramount importance in understanding the political radicalism and social polarisation that finally exploded in the carnage of 1936–9. The return of the Bourbons to the throne in December 1874 seem- ingly inaugurated a period of political stability based on a modern constitutional order. Yet elements of the ancien re´gime were still domi- nant in political and civil society, and their persistence, in an era of rapid cultural and economic modernisation, led to the social and political upheaval that in Spain (as elsewhere in Europe) characterised the inter-war years. In this context, the Spanish fratricidal conflict was

1 2 THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR the fiercest battle in a European civil war, which had been raging on the continent since the Bolshevik seizure of power in October 1917, and included, amongst other events, the consolidation of Soviet Russia, the rise of Fascism in Italy, the Nazi takeover in Germany and the establishment of royalist and military dictatorships throughout central and eastern Europe.3 By the end of the nineteenth century, Spain, once the largest colonial empire in the world, was a country relegated to the sidelines of Europe. Her stunning defeat by the United States in 1898 brought to an end the last glimmers of imperial splendour. In an era of Social Darwinism, when the health of nations appeared to be marked by the acquisition of colonies, Spain seemed sick and troubled. The loss in that war of most of the overseas territories (Cuba, the Philippines, Puerto Rico, Guam, etc.) exposed her overall inability to remain on a par with the leading powers of the Western world. In this moment of trauma and decline, the nation seemed united by the new magical formula: Regeneracio´n, or the thorough overhauling of Spain’s social, economic and ideological foundations. With the country enjoying an artistic and literary golden age, it was the intellectuals who, by concentrating their attention on Spain’s maladies, undermined the moral legitimacy of the regime. The so-called ‘Generation of 1898’ was formed by an eclectic group of novelists, poets and philosophers who contemplated Spain’s obscurantism and backwardness with pessi- mism. Their prescribed solutions ranged from Pı´ o Baroja and Miguel de Unamuno’s progressive belief in mobilisation from below to Jose´ Ortega y Gasset’s search for a moral elite and Joaquı´ n Costa’s call for a strong figure, ‘an Iron Surgeon’, to extirpate the corruption of politics and carry out national regeneration from above.4 These approaches constituted the two roads to modernity, the democratic and the authoritarian, whose final clash would take place in 1936. In all external aspects, fin de sie`cle Spain possessed a modern parliamentarian system. Following the restoration of the Bourbons after a military coup in December 1874, the architect of the regime, the Conservative Antonio Ca´ novas del Castillo, brought to an end the strife of previous decades by conceiving a political formula through which the governing elites could enjoy power without the need to resort to praetorian intervention as the only instrument of change. He agreed to alternate in office with another political party, the Liberals, led by Pra´ xedes Mateo Sagasta. The 1876 Constitution consolidated the fundamental freedoms of expression and association; Catholicism was declared the state religion but private practice of other faiths was THE PAINFUL ROAD TO MODERNITY 3 allowed; political parties and trade unions were permitted to exist and to voice their views in a large number of local and national newspapers. With the introduction in 1890 of universal male suffrage and trial by jury, Spain appeared to be in the vanguard of Europe’s modern political orders. In reality, two dynastic or monarchist formations, Conservatives and Liberals, enjoyed a monopoly of power, alternating in office so systematically that the practice was known as turno pacı´fico (peaceful rotation).5 However, they were hardly parties in the modern sense of the word. Apart from timid anticlericalism and a greater emphasis on civil values on the part of the Liberals, there was little difference between them. Both were groups of notables linked by clientelism and endogamy. Stunning levels of nepotism resulted in parliaments resembling committees of friends exchanging verbose speeches and avoiding clashes over real issues.6 This governing elite was linked with the ruling economic classes, the landed and financial elites, while the commercial and industrial bourgeoisie was the junior partner.7 At the apex of the Liberal order was the Crown. In Restoration Spain, the principle of national sovereignty shared by monarch and parliament concealed the potential for autocracy.8 The king was the commander-in-chief of the armed forces and, as head of state, could dissolve parliament, appoint or dismiss governments, veto legislation and sign international treaties. He also possessed vast powers of patron- age with the conferment of titles and rewards. During the Restoration, the alliance of altar and throne was re-created. As religious congrega- tions expanded, the clergy experienced a revival in power and wealth, obtaining almost total control of primary and secondary education, as well as a leading role in social functions such as the operating of charitable trusts and the running of orphanages and hospitals. If the Church was the ideological guardian of the monarchy, the armed forces were its praetorian guard. The second clause of the Law of the Constitution of the Army, of 29 November 1878, stated that the military had as its primary function the defence of the nation from its internal enemies. Thus, any social unrest was followed automatically by the suspension of the constitution and the declaration of martial law, granting the army final control over the maintenance of public order.9 Jose´ Berruezo, a leading Anarcho-syndicalist in 1920s Santa Coloma de Gramenet (Barcelona), experienced the clerical intolerance and police abuse of those who pursued social or political alternatives to the established canon. Aged 14, he was grabbed by a civil guard and branded ‘a son of a whore’ when trying to convince miners to attend classes in the local workers’ institute. In his small town, the most 4 THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR prominent opponent of proletarian cultural centres was none other than the local priest, Don Celeste.10 The functioning of Liberal Spain hinged on electoral falsification, widespread political apathy and, when necessary, physical violence. Elections in Spain did not produce governments: rather each adminis- tration rigged the results in advance and ensured a working majority in the next Cortes or parliament. Fundamental in underpinning the electoral results were the so-called caciques (local political bigwigs). Varying in composition from province to province, the caciques could be made up of moneylenders, landowners or their agents, civil servants and even priests. They were the link between the distant and alien state and the estranged localities.11 They delivered the votes of their con- stituency and, in return, were allowed to run their areas as private fiefdoms and to bend legislation to benefit their clientele and punish the recalcitrant. Caciquismo in the country and the governing oligarchy in Madrid relied upon a background of slow economic development, low political awareness and widespread cultural backwardness. The endurance of that situation was a deterrent to national modernisation and resulted in the unchallenged domination of the vested interests, as well as in a socially and economically fragmented Spain. By leaving education largely in the hands of the Church, the Liberal state did not forge a national mechanism to give a common sense of belonging to the citizenry.12 Nor could the army fulfil this function. It lacked the pres- tige of its Prussian counterpart or the revolutionary tradition of the French army. Social imperialism – successfully used in other European states to divert domestic tension – could not be used in Spain.13 The unfair recruitment system (quintas), by which the wealthy could buy themselves out of the military service, the frequent use of the armed forces to quell social unrest and the slaughter of some 60,000 soldiers from humble origins in the disastrous colonial wars of the 1890s quashed any patriotic sentiment within the working classes. Judged by Western Europe’s standards, fin de sie`cle Spain lagged far behind in terms of economic modernisation. The short-term planning of most administrations, coupled with the need for quick pecuniary relief, led to a significant part of the rich mineral rights falling into the hands of foreign companies. By 1910, 66 per cent of the population were engaged in the primary sector of the economy; rates of illiteracy were around 56 per cent, with only 26 per cent of those aged 18 or under receiving proper school tuition; and infant mortality was about 200 per thousand.14 THE PAINFUL ROAD TO MODERNITY 5

The transition from feudalism to modern capitalist production failed to modernise effectively the agrarian sector. The transformation of the land into a commodity that could be bought or sold freely, the so-called desamortizacio´n, offered the traditional landed elites the opportunity to turn their feudal privileges into capitalist rights of private property, converting former dues into rents and rationalising the overall exploita- tion. This benefited both the landed magnates and those well-off farmers, urban speculators and financiers who took advantage of the situation to buy the land. Thus, an enlarged oligarchy of wheat-growers and wine and olive oil producers closely connected with the country’s financial elites emerged as the new powerful ruling class. Many of them became absentee landowners, who regarded their property as a source of prestige, neglected investment and left administrators to run their estates. Communal and ecclesiastical land was sold in large chunks to the highest bidder at public auction and thereby aggravated even further the unequal distribution of land-ownership in the country. Labourers lost their long-term leases and the ancestral rights that had been enshrined in the feudal order and were left to the mercy of market forces. As a result, agriculture did not produce food surpluses to feed the growing urban population, and seasonal employment and starva- tion wages ensured a lack of demand for manufactured products. These conditions severely restricted the possibility of an industrial take-off on a national scale.15 Furthermore, economic development was an uneven process that exacerbated the structural differences between north and south, city and countryside. The fertile north, with its abundant rain, green pastures and livestock, and the east, with a dynamic, export-oriented market-gardening sector, consolidated a class of small tenants and farmers. Their distrust of the central state made them support political options ranging from Carlism to federal repub- licanism and regionalism. In the poorer, central cereal-growing region of Castilla, the agrarian norm was the co-existence of large landowners with peasant smallholders and farmers. Here, the inherent Catholicism of the peasantry tended to produce more conservative social attitudes and to diminish social conflict. The Church’s pastoral activity and loan provision gained mass support for its Catholic trade union, the Con- federacio´n Nacional Cato´lica Agraria (CNCA). The Castilian peasants would form later the popular echelons of the right-wing parties in the 1930s and the cannon fodder of the Nationalist armies. By contrast, Spain’s southern half (Southern Castilla, Extremadura and Andalucı´ a) was marked by the huge economic gap between landowners and landless peasants. Historically, the best land had been 6 THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR partitioned between the warring nobility and ecclesiastical orders in the last stages of the Reconquista. During the Liberal reforms (1830s– 1850s), the aristocracy (now joined by a class of urban speculators and merchants) confirmed their property rights as owners of the latifundios (large estates) and retained their influence in national politics. The vast majority of the population remained a pool of cheap labour, subject to the whimsical authority of the administrators of the absentee land- owners. Given that monoculture was the norm, peasants were usually dependent on a single source of employment which, even then, was only available for part of the year – at planting and harvesting times. Not surprisingly, the southern braceros (literally, those working with their arms, or brazos)orjornaleros (those working for a fixed salary, or jornal) enjoyed the lowest living standards in Spain, working in terribly hot weather, from sunrise to sunset, for starvation wages. The lack of any substantial rural middle class exacerbated class divisions and the Church was perceived as the institution that legitimised this quasi- feudal oppressive order. Consequently, the south became the centre of an almost primitive type of social conflict, experiencing frequent and violent outbursts of anticlerical and insurrectional Jacqueries that were put down with equally brutal ferocity by the paramilitary police, the Civil Guard.16 By the turn of the century, in contrast, a modern capitalist economy had developed around the cotton-textile industry of Catalun˜ a, the iron and steel factories of the Basque Country and the mining concerns of Asturias. The emergence of these industrial enclaves resulted in a dual economy and underlined the cultural and social differences within Spain. Indeed, the contrast between the progress of urban centres and the backwardness of the countryside was staggering. By 1910, Barcelona and Madrid had surpassed half a million inhabitants, Valencia had over 200,000, and ten other cities had populations of about 100,000. These urban communities enjoyed the accoutrements of a modernising world: trams, cars, the telegraph, the telephone, electricity, gas, etc. Equally, these societies presented a richer social stratum – a commercial and financial bourgeoisie, a middle class made up of the liberal professions, a petty bourgeoisie of artisans and shopkeepers, and a growing pro- letariat. These social divisions often translated into a topographic separation of the residents. The medieval walls of cities were pulled down and ensanches (large extensions) were built to accommodate the rising population. These new areas were designed with all modern facilities to lodge the wealthy classes. By contrast, the workers were pushed into the suburbs or into inner-city slums where they had to pay THE PAINFUL ROAD TO MODERNITY 7 high rents and endure overcrowded tenements that frequently lacked the most basic services. A lack of social legislation, low wages, food shortages and a regressive fiscal system fuelled class conflict.17 Workers’ strikes co- existed with more traditional forms of popular protest, such as motines de subsistencias (food riots) and local revolts against consumos (taxation on foodstuffs) and quintas (military recruitment). However, in an overwhelmingly rural and socially fragmented society, there was no nationwide political movement that could benefit from widespread discontent. Popular unrest hardly went beyond its locale and was, therefore, easily dealt with as a question of public order. Matters began to change, however, by the turn of the century, when the slow but steady growth of social mobilisation, economic modernisation and political awareness threatened the hegemony of the elites and the caciques. After the short-lived experiment of the First Republic (1873–4), Republican parties survived as little more than small rival factions. Yet after 1898 they began to make modest but important strides in some cities where it was becoming increasingly difficult for the dynastic governments to fix the election results. They enjoyed the support of the progressive middle class, saw a large number of intellectuals join their ranks and retained considerable sympathy amongst some working-class sectors. Socially exploited and politically neglected, the proletariat and the peasantry constituted the largest and most obvious dissenting groups. However, their effective organisation only began to take shape in the last quarter of the nineteenth century and their division – both at an ideological and at a geographical level – characterised their evolu- tion. Indeed, a libertarian tendency flourished in the south and east, while Marxism became dominant in the centre and north. Both shared the belief that emancipation had to come through a process of education. Socialist Casas del Pueblo (People’s Houses) and Libertarian Ateneos Racionalistas (Rationalist Centres) sought to raise the class- consciousness of the workers and to dissuade them from harmful pastimes such as gambling and drinking. Yet, the bitter rivalry between Marxists and anarchists made the unity of the proletariat, even in crucial moments, ephemeral. The arrival in 1868 of the Italian Giuseppe Fannelli, a disciple of the leading Russian Anarchist Mikhail Bakunin, gave that political current an early start. Consequently, the two pioneer Spanish workers’ organisations were under Anarchist control: the Spanish Regional Federation (FRE, 1870–81) and the Regional Federation of Spanish 8 THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR

Workers (FRTE, 1881–8). Socialism arrived later, in December 1871, in the hands of Paul Lafargue, Karl Marx’s son-in-law. The Spanish Socialist Party (PSOE) was not established until 1879, and its trade union, La Unio´n General de Trabajadores (UGT), was founded in 1888. Spanish Socialism experienced a steady but painfully slow development and, unlike its European counterparts, failed to become the clearly dominant force of the labour movement. Both the party and the trade union normally shared the same authoritarian leadership, whose rigid interpretation of Marxism bore little relation to the Spanish situation. They overlooked the agrarian question and their deterministic views led them to an innate belief in the necessity of the class struggle and the inevitability of the final triumph of the proletariat. Yet while the official rhetoric was full of radicalism, in practice they laid more emphasis on questions of organisation and daily social disputes. What was the point, they asked, in planning the destruction of capitalist society – and especially of making sacrifices in readiness for its coming – if it was going to happen anyway?18 Socialism’s gradualist strategy proved successful amongst the so- called ‘labour aristocracy’ of the small-scale concerns and skilled craftsmen of Madrid and other Castilian cities. Patient organisational skills gained the Socialists vital inroads into key industrial areas, such as the Asturian mines and the Basque steel, shipping and iron works, where the local leadership often followed more militant tactics than those prescribed by the Executive Committee.19 Between 1900 and 1913, following its consolidation in the industrial northern areas and its success in organising, at a national level, miners and railway workers, the UGT’s membership shot up from 15,000 to almost 150,000.20 However, the absence of an agrarian strategy prevented its expansion in the rural south. The Socialists’ efforts also failed in Catalun˜ a, the leading industrial region and, by default, in the neighbouring regions of Valencia and Arago´ n. There the Socialists’ dogmatic isolation from other left-wing Republican groups clashed with the more pragmatic approach of a long-established, moderate Catalan trade-unionism. Equally, their reluctance to participate in many strikes, such as the massive general stoppage of 1902, left them alienated from a radicalised proletariat. This feeling of estrangement was greatly enhanced when the Socialists made the glaring mistake, in 1899, of moving the UGT’s headquarters from Barcelona to Madrid, the nation’s political but not industrial capital.21 Furthermore, their fixation with politics led them to enter, albeit with admirable courage, into the electoral contest. However, a political system where ballot falsification was endemic, THE PAINFUL ROAD TO MODERNITY 9 together with the Socialists’ determination to preserve the isolation of the movement from other ‘bourgeois’ forces, led to dismal outcomes. However, Socialist councillors did begin to be elected (in small numbers) in the 1890s in the Basque Country and in Madrid in 1905, when the party’s leader, Pablo Iglesias, and two others obtained seats in the municipal administration. Ironically, though, they had to resort, in the capital, to the same fraudulent methods that their opponents had always used to secure election, including the forging of ballot papers.22 By contrast, the Libertarian movement enjoyed periods of feverish activity followed by others of repression and clandestine activity. Anarchist ‘apostles’ carried the new gospel from village to village. There they converted the downtrodden labourers by heralding the arrival of a new era of justice, liberty and land redistribution. Anarchist ideas seemed to provide an ideological coherence to a tradition in which the popular classes, distrusting the state and politics, relied on direct action to redress their grievances.23 It was, indeed, a more logical appeal than the reformist approach offered by the Socialists. However, the Anarchists’ loathing of organisational issues led to constant and badly planned revolutionary outbursts that were easily quelled and that led to heavy casualties. Also, the Anarchists’ inability (or unwillingness) to overcome a subculture marked by the legendary heroism and violence of the so-called groups of affinity or groups of action (a small number of comrades who shared anarchist goals) proved costly to the proletariat. The activities of these groups, the so-called ‘propaganda by the deed’, facilitated the activities of agents provocateurs and provided the authorities with the excuse to carry out stern reprisals. Thus, in the volatile Andalusian countryside, a spate of crimes led in 1881 to police claims of the existence of a secret society, La Mano Negra (The Black Hand), whose objective was to murder the main landowners. After thousands of arrests and several executions, the southern Anarchist organisations were shattered. In the 1890s, Barcelona saw a spiral of bombings and merciless repression, including widespread torture and falsified charges that sent many innocents to the gallows.24 Addition- ally, workers had to endure a violent offensive by the employers that concluded with the collapse of the moderate textile trade union, Las Tres Clases del Vapor. Soon thereafter the Catalan labour movement suffered a massive setback with the defeat of the General Strike in 1902 and only showed signs of revival with the creation, in 1907, of Solidaridad Obrera. This new organisation adopted the revolutionary syndicalism of the French Confe´de´ration Ge´ne´rale du Travail (CGT) 10 THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR which rejected both electoral politics and anarchist individualist violence. Instead, it attempted to organise workers into strong trade unions (sindicatos) with which to lead the economic struggle by means of direct action, including sabotage, boycotts and strikes. The turn of the century also saw the consolidation of anti-centralist political forces. In the Basque case, the Partido Nacionalista Vasco (Basque Nationalist Party, PNV), founded by Sabino Arana in 1895, was an anti-modernist reaction against the dangers to the alleged ‘purity’ of the Basque race and culture that had been brought about by industrialism and Spanish immigration. It inherited from Carlism its ultra-Catholicism and nostalgia for the past, summed up in the motto ‘God and Ancient Laws’ (Fueros), which was now combined with quasi-separatist positions. Catalan nationalism enjoyed more rapid success to become a hegemonic force locally, and even a considerable factor in national politics. Up to the 1920s, the dominant Catalanist formation was the Lliga Regionalista, founded in 1901 (the year in which it obtained an astounding electoral victory in Barcelona). Having lost their lucrative colonial markets, sectors of the Catalan industrial bourgeoisie moved away from a regime that could not defend their economic interests. Led by Francesc Cambo´ , the Lliga always trod a pragmatic road, oscillating between a fierce criticism of the political monopoly held by the southern and central landed elites to an ambition to be part of the governing class, so as to ensure an axial role for Catalan industrial interests.25 The lethal combination of a radicalised proletariat, a nationalist movement, an intransigent employer class and a restless officer corps resulted in Barcelona, Spain’s largest industrial metropolis, becoming the main centre of political conflict. To add insult to injury, since 1901 the Catalan capital had witnessed the rise of a Republican demagogue, Alejandro Lerroux. A skilful orator and organiser, Lerroux took advantage of the demoralisation of the labour movement to build up a formidable political machinery with which his Radical Party gained a foothold in municipal politics. His skill in mobilising the lower classes, at least until 1914, earned Lerroux the nickname of the ‘Emperor of the Paralelo’, the proletarian quarter of the city. His followers were roused with crude anticlericalism, anti-Catalanism and vague promises of a forthcoming revolution following the establishment of a republic. Lerroux’s incendiary pamphlets, calling among other things for the burning of convents, further polarised the situation. Yet, for all his radicalism, Lerroux’s efforts enjoyed the goodwill of Liberal admin- istrations in Madrid, who were not unwilling to back such a shady THE PAINFUL ROAD TO MODERNITY 11 character if he could help stem the rising tide of Catalanism. Lerroux’s unprincipled opportunism and dubious deals not only underlined the murky foundations of Restoration Spain but would also spell trouble when, in the 1930s, his party became dominant in national politics.26 After 1898 the stability of the regime was jeopardised by the frequent praetorian intervention in politics. In 1900 the Spanish army boasted 499 generals, 578 colonels and over 23,000 officers for some 80,000 troops (six times more officers than in France, which had an standing army of 180,000 soldiers). This represented a cancer for a state that devoted over 40 per cent of its budget to defence. However, 70 per cent of it went on officers’ salaries, thereby hindering the modernisa- tion of the armed forces. Furthermore, by now embittered and trauma- tized by the colonial defeat, the officer corps grew sensitive to any civilian criticism.27 Alienated from society, it began to claim the role of guardian of the sacred values of the nation: that is, the unity of the fatherland and the preservation of social order. The military saw the existing constitutional practices as inadequate to crush the per- nicious effects of regionalism and class conflict. In this it found a ready ally in the new monarch. Crowned in 1902, Alfonso XIII, raised by Catholic and army preceptors, generally sided with his officers in their disputes with the politicians and frequently used his constitutional prerogatives to appoint and dismiss prime ministers, thereby further- ing factionalism.28 In November 1905, some three hundred officers assaulted the offices of the satirical Catalanist journal Cu-Cut, having been enraged by its publication of an anti-militarist cartoon.29 The existing Liberal govern- ment, led by Eugenio Montero Rı´ os, caught between the solidarity of the army corps and widespread Catalan outcries, was dismissed by the King and replaced by another Liberal administration, under Segis- mundo Moret, which was more ready to placate the army. Thus, in March 1906, the Law of Jurisdictions was introduced. Henceforth, any offence against the army, the monarchy or the fatherland was to come under military jurisdiction.30 Civil supremacy had bowed to praetorian pressure, thereby heralding an ominous future. The indigna- tion was such in Catalun˜ a that all political parties, from the Carlists to the Regionalists, sealed a political alliance, the Solidaridad Catalana. The only exception was Lerroux’s faction, which in January 1908 aban- doned the other Republicans to form a separate Radical Party. In the summer of 1909, Spain’s involvement in a new colonial adventure in Morocco triggered days of widespread unrest that sub- sequently became known as the Tragic Week.31 With memories of 1898 12 THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR still fresh, the call-up of reservists to put down a native rebellion led to popular anger. A general strike against the war was easily pre-empted everywhere except in Barcelona, where events exploded: barricades went up and the previous years of violent anticlerical propaganda led to the burning of some fifty churches, convents and religious schools, as well as such macabre scenes as the exhumation of nuns’ corpses. In turn, the state’s response was brutal. Military courts tried 1725 individuals, sentencing 17 to death. Five of them were executed, includ- ing Francisco Ferrer Guardia, the well-known Anarchist director of the rationalist school La Escuela Moderna. This caused a major scandal, both in Spain and abroad. Ferrer was falsely accused of being the mastermind behind the insurrection, and his death sentence was based on the deposition of some Radicals eager to pin the blame on someone else. For many he remained a martyr, a man judicially assassinated for his revolutionary personality and his alleged part in a failed attempt against the King’s life years earlier.32 Although not a political assault against the regime itself, the impor- tance of the Tragic Week cannot be underestimated.33 On a small scale, it foretold the savagery of the civil war: anti-military mutinies and anticlerical violence as an expression of the frustration of the working classes were drowned in the ensuing bloodbath. At the time, it also furthered the internal factionalism of the two ruling parties and strengthened the role of the Crown. So, the Liberals, with the agree- ment of the King, ousted the Conservative prime minister, Antonio Maura, from office in October 1909.34 Maura, the most outstand- ing dynastic politician of the era, had pursued an agenda of political reform, alienating in the process many of the governing classes. According to his son Gabriel, Maura was astounded when the monarch accepted a resignation that he never tendered. Upon Maura’s return from the royal palace, Gabriel even saw his father burst into tears for the first time. In 1913, when he refused to carry on with the turno fiction, Maura was abandoned by the bulk of his party. A minority followed the dismissed leader and created the Maurista movement, thus splitting the Conservatives. The Mauristas never formed a coherent party, but were a broad church united by their devotion to Maura, their monarchism and their bitter criticism of dynastic corruption. Its two currents, a Christian Democratic faction and a nationalist and anti- liberal tendency, could be said to have represented the two alternatives of modern right-wing politics in Spain. The Tragic Week, by debunking its ‘radicalism’, also initiated the eclipse of the Radical Party amongst the Catalan proletariat. THE PAINFUL ROAD TO MODERNITY 13

Solidaridad Obrera decided to expand to the rest of the country in open competition with the UGT. Thus, the Anarcho-syndicalist trade union La Confederacio´n Nacional del Trabajo (CNT) was created in a founding congress in Barcelona (30 October–1 November 1910). The Socialists abandoned their traditional sectarianism and established a conjuncio´n (electoral alliance) with the Republicans, in the hope of establishing a progressive, bourgeois republic. Success came, in May 1910, when Pablo Iglesias became the first Socialist elected to parliament.

The making of a revolution

It was the outbreak of the First World War which acted, as it did elsewhere in Europe, as a catalyst and accelerator of unprecedented levels of economic transformation and social mobilisation in Spain. The war heralded the arrival of mass politics, undermining those Liberal orders that hitherto had depended on the subservience of a large percentage of the population. Spain did not enter the war but the war certainly entered Spain – and with a devastating impact. Initially, there was a consensus on neutrality. However, this soon broke down. Most dynastic politicians avoided taking sides, in a vain effort to ignore and be ignored by the events taking place on the continent. However, for other, non-dynastic political forces and for the cultural elites, the European conflict became a question of obsessive concern. For them, the war was perceived as an ideological clash, in which each of the warring factions came to symbolise certain transcendent values. Essentially, the right-wing politi- cal parties (the Mauristas and the Carlists), the landed classes, the court, the army and the clergy identified with the Central Powers: they were regarded as symbols of social order, hierarchical politics and monarchism. In contrast, the intellectuals, the professional middle classes, and those political groups who were against the existing status quo – Republicans, Socialists and Regionalists – were Francophiles: they believed that the triumph of the Entente would bring about democracy throughout Europe.35 The quarrel between the partisans of the Allies and those of the Central Powers generated such a violent debate that it acquired the quality of a moral civil war: a verbal clash between two Spains and a portent of the real civil war that lay a generation in the future.36 This bitterness was exacerbated by the growing interference of the warring 14 THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR sides in the Spanish arena. In particular, shortages of paper gave the combatants the opportunity to fund (or even to buy) newspapers and thereby to influence editorials and public opinion. German intelligence services were certainly the most active. They organised the smuggling of weapons to Morocco to foster a rebellion in the French zone, funded Anarchist engagement in strikes and disruption of industrial produc- tion that was servicing the Entente war effort, hired gunmen to assassinate pro-Allied producers and bribed local officers for informa- tion on vessels carrying cargo to Allied ports (which would then be torpedoed by submarines).37 Not only were Entente ships their prey; in fact, they destroyed over 30 per cent of Spain’s merchant fleet. Parallel to ideological polarisation, the war dramatically altered Spain’s economy. Her neutral status facilitated sales to both camps, generating a period of fabulous profits in commercial and industrial sectors. But the impact of this was uneven and it exacerbated social and structural realities. The explosion in external demand, the drastic cut in imports, the hoarding of staple products, the collapse of the transport system and the increase in the amount of money in circula- tion brought about galloping inflation, shortages and a demographic flood from the depressed countryside to the buoyant cities, where recently-arrived workers had to endure appalling living conditions as well as derisory wages. Salaries could not keep up with mounting prices.38 Thus, the disparity between the gloom of the proletariat and the extravagant lifestyle of the bourgeoisie fuelled food riots and an upsurge in strike activity. The severity of the crisis was such that, responding to grass-roots pressure, the UGT and the CNT sealed a labour pact in July 1916.39 Public sector workers (including army officers), whose economic conditions were equally ravaged by inflation and shortages, also began to organise themselves to defend their living standards. In 1915 the officers began to create the so-called Juntas Militares de Defensa, a kind of officers’ trade union. Incensed by the prospective introduction of reforms and cutbacks in the officer corps, the military had become fiercely critical of the corruption of the ruling system, as well as of the favouritism exhibited by the regime, and the fast promotions which it awarded to the Africanistas – that is, those serving in Morocco.40 Simultaneously, the Catalan industrial bourgeoisie sought to translate its recently gained economic strength into political terms. When the Liberal minister of finance, Santiago Alba, attempted to tax the war- related profits of trade and industry but not those of agriculture, the Lliga led the mobilisation of national industrial interests. In parliament THE PAINFUL ROAD TO MODERNITY 15 it introduced, for the first time, the question of Catalan autonomy and directed with success the opposition to Alba’s projects.41 During 1917, intertwined domestic and international events produced the crisis of authority of the regime. Republicans and the labour movement greeted with enthusiasm the fall of tsarism in March. At the end of the month, the UGT and the CNT signed a manifesto threatening to topple the ruling system with a general strike. In April, the King forced his prime minister, the Liberal Count Romanones, out of office when he attempted to follow the US example and break diplomatic relations with the Central Powers. When replaced by a rival Liberal administration, the Liberals split.42 With the debate over neutrality heating up, a frightened monarch ordered his government to dissolve the Juntas. He could not help but draw parallels with the ‘betrayal’ of Tsar Nicholas II by many of his officers. However, the refusal of the Juntas to disband forced the collapse of the government after less than two months in office, and seemed to open the gates for political change. The widespread impression that the regime had reached a dead-end gained momentum when the King entrusted the Conservative leader, Eduardo Dato, with the task of forming a new administration. In theory, Alfonso was merely abiding by the con- stitution. However, these were not normal times. Endorsing the turno fiction at this critical moment meant the denial of the glaring necessity for reform. The Catalanist leader, Francesc Cambo´ even declared at this time that the most conservative thing to do was to be a revolu- tionary.43 On 19 July the Lliga, with the support of the Republicans and the Socialists, organised an assembly of parliamentarians in Barcelona. Reminiscent of the early days of the French Revolution, it demanded the end of the old system and the summoning of a Constituent Cortes, to be convened by a national government whose members should represent the real will of the nation.44 Following the officers’ defiance and then the parliamentarian rebel- lion, many believed in the summer of 1917 that the Bourbon dynasty was about to follow the fate of the Romanovs. Simo´ Piera, a leading Catalan Anarcho-syndicalist, wrote that everywhere – in cafe´ s, on trams and in markets – a revolutionary atmosphere could be breathed.45 In the summer of 1917 it was far from clear whether Dato was the right man to save the regime. Unlike Maura, who was known for his forceful style and personal charisma, Dato was regarded as a com- promiser and a court lackey and, therefore, not the ideal person to take tough decisions. Yet working in tandem with his minister of the interior, Jose´ Sa´ nchez Guerra, his government was to prove more 16 THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR resourceful than others expected. Bearing in mind the danger posed by a possible collaboration of middle-class parties, the proletariat and the army, the Dato administration took a gamble: it decided to pro- voke the labour movement into an ill-timed revolutionary strike, so as to scare the middle classes and to provide an excuse to use the army to quell the disturbances. The government could then claim to be the saviour of Spain and the guarantor of law and order.46 During the ‘hot summer’ of 1917, the government managed to outwit a Socialist movement which, blinded by euphoric confidence, was willing to forego its traditional prudence and therefore paid the price of its revolutionary inexperience. The outbreak of a transport strike in Valencia in July provided the opportunity. The Socialists went to painful lengths to avoid the expansion of the transport conflict, but they constantly ran into the intransigence of the company – an intransigence which was supported, if not inspired, by the administra- tion. Under pressure from their CNT partners, the PSOE and the UGT Executive Committees agreed to link the transport dispute with a revolutionary general strike. The Socialists believed that if the railway workers went ahead on their own, their organisation – built up so painfully over the previous years – would be destroyed and the whole labour movement would suffer the consequences. Additionally, there was such optimism that – for once – they did not pay heed to Pablo Iglesias, who from his sickbed argued strongly against it. Julia´ n Besteiro and Andre´ s Saborit (for the PSOE) and Francisco Largo Caballero and Daniel Anguiano (for the UGT) were appointed members of the leading strike committee in Madrid. They then communicated the decision to their Republican and CNT allies in the rest of the country. After the stance of the officers and the gathering of parliamentarians, they believed that the regime would collapse like a house of cards.47 This moment represented the baptism of fire for Socialism as a leading political force in Spanish politics. It was, indeed, not only the first serious attempt to usher in democratic modernisation but also the first bid for power of those who had hitherto been perennially forced to remain in opposition. The intensity of the struggle and the hopes of the revolutionaries – as well as the cruelty of the repression – foretold the civil-war confrontation between the two Spains which was still looming on the horizon. However, the general strike of August 1917 failed to spread beyond the main urban centres and, except in Asturias, was crushed in less than a week. Any hopes that the army would refuse to defend the regime were soon dashed. Unlike in Russia, the Spanish peasant soldiers had THE PAINFUL ROAD TO MODERNITY 17 not been demoralised by years of defeats and war weariness. Con- sequently, they obeyed the orders of their superiors who, in turn, forgot all their reformist language of the previous two months. Economic concessions to the military, together with rumours spread by the government that foreign gold was behind the disturbances, removed the army’s last hesitations: it was better to shoot workers in Spain, they concluded, than to dig trenches in France. The military response was shocking in its brutality. Cannons were used against workers’ centres and popular demonstrations were machine-gunned, leaving dozens of casualties across the country.48 Soon thereafter, frightened by the August events, the Lliga performed a sudden about-face and, in November 1917, joined a dynastic coalition government. With this act they effectively killed the reformist hopes that had been raised by the Assembly of July in Barcelona.49

Rehearsal of a civil war

The violent suppression of the revolutionary movement not only dashed democratic hopes but also, ironically, sounded the death-knell of the Liberal regime in Spain. That it had been forced to rely upon military repression to survive underlined both the estrangement of the system from the rest of society and the consolidation of praetorian interference at the centre of decision-making. In fact, with social stability worsening, the constitutional order was effectively subverted as the army was not only increasingly needed to maintain public order but also, in alliance with the Crown, acted as an anti-constitutional force with power of veto over cabinets. Meanwhile, mounting inflation and worsening living standards fuelled constant working-class mili- tancy and political turmoil. Assaults on shops and bakeries and strike activity reached a peak in the years 1919 to 1920. At the same time, in the aftermath of the First World War, Bolshevism threatened to sweep westwards across the continent, thus increasing revolutionary euphoria and initiating the richest period of revolutionary activity in Europe since 1848. Fear of Bolshevism gripped all European governments. The establishment of the Communist International (Comintern) in March 1919, followed by the creation (albeit short-lived) of Soviet Republics in Hungary and Bavaria intensified that panic. In Spain, massive indus- trial and rural unrest rang alarm bells. With the post-war economic recession looming, employers planned to resort to the usual tactics of 18 THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR massive lay-offs and production cuts. Yet this could not easily be carried out in the face of a combative working class. Hence, a miniature civil war was in the offing. The carnage of this social conflict was to be a dress rehearsal of the violent class struggle of the 1930s. From late 1918 many foreigners, in particular Russians and Ger- mans, were being rounded up and deported from Spain.50 Incidentally, Comintern agents, led by the Russian Mikhail Borodin, arrived in Spain in December 1919. Yet their attempts to create a strong Communist organisation met with very poor results.51 Traumatised by the experience of 1917, most Socialist leaders were firmly against embarking upon fresh revolutionary adventures. Only some members of the Socialist Youth were prepared to oppose their seniors and to form a tiny Communist Party in April 1920. A more serious split took place one year later when the PSOE refused to endorse the Moscow International and a minority of its members broke away. Yet the Communists’ membership and influence was fairly limited – even after the creation of a unified Communist Party (PCE) in November 1921. They found it impossible to offer a clear-cut programme to lure workers from the two established traditions of reformist socialism and radical Anarcho-syndicalism.52 Their only significant inroads were in the UGT’s Basque and Asturian strongholds, where the local leadership was split over their strategy against a concerted bour- geois offensive of cutting salaries in mines and factories. Consequently, 1922 and 1923 saw a massive wave of strikes in the coal and iron mines and steel foundries of these regions. Violence often flared between Communists endorsing confrontational tactics and Socialists seeking a negotiated solution. By 1923, after a bitter series of defeats of Communist-led strikes, Socialism was still dominant. It was mainly the CNT that capitalised on the rising discontent of the post-war years. Unlike the Socialists, the Cenetistas concluded, after the defeat of 1917, that workers should intensify direct action at the workplace and abandon compromises with political parties. From mid-1918, rebellion flared up all over the agrarian south. News of the Bolshevik victory and the subsequent expropriation of landed estates in Russia provided the impulse to trigger an upheaval in the restless Spanish countryside. During the so-called Trienio Bolchevique (Three Bolshevik Years), workers’ centres and unions sprang up, land was seized and strikes launched. The movement was only crushed after months of pitched battles in which the full might of the Civil Guard and the army was used.53 Yet, it was in its urban strongholds where the CNT became most formidable. In the summer of 1918, Catalan THE PAINFUL ROAD TO MODERNITY 19

Anarcho-syndicalists abandoned the old craft trade unions and instead adopted the model of modern industrial unions (Sindicatos Unicos). Well-organised strikes, undertaken by fewer but much larger unions, soon resulted in astonishing victories for the proletariat. The turning- point took place in February 1919, when a dispute broke out at the Anglo-Canadian hydroelectric concern known as La Canadiense. The authorities and the employers were stunned by the strength of the Catalan proletariat. In a general strike lasting for 44 days, Barcelona was totally paralysed. To add insult to injury, the trade union of graphic artists even introduced ‘red censorship’ – the prevention of any publication hostile to the workers’ position. The CNT’s victory was unprecedented: the government promised an eight-hour working day and the company agreed both to accept the rehiring of its employees without penalties of any kind and to raise wages.54 When the CNT held a congress at the Teatro de la Comedia in Madrid in December 1919, the organisation was at the peak of its power. By then, it claimed over 700,000 members, three times more than the UGT. The structure of the Sindicato Unico was adopted nationally and, amidst revolu- tionary optimism, the CNT voted for provisionally adhering to the Comintern.55 From 1919, social conflicts turned into veritable class warfare, as an alliance between the bourgeoisie, para-military groups and the army was sealed behind the back of a series of impotent governments in Madrid. In April 1919, Jaime Mila´ ns del Bosch, Captain General of Barcelona, with the enthusiastic endorsement of the local economic elites, ordered the civil governor and his chief of police, whom he deemed to be ‘too soft’, to catch the train for Madrid. An old bourgeois rural militia dating from medieval times, El Somate´n, was established in the cities and its members were granted permission to carry weapons, patrol the streets and arrest strikers. Meanwhile, industrialists hired gangs of thugs, whose task was to beat up, harass and even shoot leading Anarcho-syndicalists. In November 1919 the Catalan employ- ers launched a massive lockout that lasted two months and left 200,000 workers jobless. One month later, a group of mostly Carlist workers founded the so-called Sindicatos Libres. Favoured by the local author- ities, they were on a collision course with the CNT.56 With social disputes being solved by naked violence, many Spanish cities became battlefields. The carnage in Barcelona was such that it was dubbed the ‘Chicago of the Mediterranean’. In this atmosphere of terror, the action groups began to take control of the CNT. Indus- trialists, foremen and rival trade-unionists were targets for their guns 20 THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR and bombs. In turn, CNT members were rounded up and deported to distant provinces (making the journey on foot and in chains) or were assassinated. The appointment of General Severiano Martı´ nez Anido as civil governor of Barcelona in November 1920 marked the climax of this repression. For two years he ran Barcelona as his private fiefdom and counter-terrorism received official protection. Gunmen of the Libres were armed in military barracks and the notorious Ley de Fugas (that is, the shooting of captured Anarcho-syndicalists ‘while trying to escape’) was introduced. The CNT was decimated as hundreds of its best cadres were imprisoned or assassinated. Not surprisingly, most of them were the best-known ‘moderate’ Anarcho-syndicalist leaders. In March 1923 the most charismatic Catalan labour activist, Salvador Seguı´ , reputed for his opposition to the unrestrained activities of the groups, was killed. In this cycle of tit-for-tat retaliations, Prime Minister Dato, the Archbishop of Zaragoza and two former civil governors, amongst others, were shot dead. Seldom did a day pass without the newspapers reporting fresh assassinations or new acts of violence.57 To make matters worse, devastating news from the half-forgotten Moroccan adventure shocked the country in the summer of 1921. After the Spanish army had been defeated at Annual by the natives, the hasty retreat of its troops soon became a rout. Some 9,000 soldiers were killed and hundreds were taken prisoner. In a few days, all the territory conquered since 1909 was lost and the natives were at the gates of Melilla. Massive reinforcements were called up in an initial reaction of patriotism and revenge. However, as the troops became bogged down in a bloody campaign and politicians argued about the long-term strategy to follow, those feelings turned, in 1922, into calls for the heads of those responsible for this new disaster. The publication of the investigation undertaken by General Juan Picasso confirmed massive political and military flaws. A parliamentary commission was formed to discuss the issue of responsibilities. Its two Socialist members, Indalecio Prieto and Julia´ n Besteiro, became leading voices in the criticism of a regime that had presided over the debacle. The close relationship between the King and Africanista officers (in particular his alleged encouragement of General Manuel Silvestre, the commander- in-chief of the forces at Annual) even personally implicated Alfonso.58 In this unabated climate of social violence and colonial mishap, the ruling economic classes began to demand an authoritarian solution as right-wing editorials praised the rise of Fascism in Italy and the Europe-wide political reaction which had followed the revolutionary push of the previous years. When, in September 1923, Miguel Primo de THE PAINFUL ROAD TO MODERNITY 21

Rivera, Captain General of Barcelona, staged a military coup, the Liberal regime collapsed without resistance.

Regeneration from above

The pronunciamiento was the ultimate outcome of both growing praetorian meddling and military criticism of the Liberal order. Now the officers no longer seized power as the representative of a political faction but claimed to be above partisan politics: they saw themselves as defenders of the sacred values of the nation (unity of the fatherland, public order and property) which were being imperilled by the mismanagement of politicians in a moment of revolutionary danger. This therefore established a dangerous precedent for the future: that of the anti-liberal road to modernity in which the army assumed the role of national saviour. Indeed, Primo de Rivera claimed for himself the role of ‘Iron Surgeon’, the strong leader prepared to adopt drastic measures in order to cure the maladies destroying the fatherland.59 The King (who had toyed with the idea of fulfilling that role himself ) did not prevent the collapse of the old order. If technically innocent of being behind the military rebellion, Alfonso was well aware of its preparations. The possibility of being incriminated in the colonial disaster confirmed his opinion that the sterile dynastic parties offered him no protection against the enemies of the throne. Consequently, in the crucial hours of the night of 13 September, the monarch took a deliberately long time to arrive in Madrid, refused to back any exceptional measures against the coup and made it clear that his primary allegiance was to ‘his army’. Once in the capital, he rapidly dismissed the cabinet and invited Primo de Rivera to form a military government.60 The dictatorship was, above all, a solution demanded by the frightened dominant classes in a society that was in transition between oligarchic and democratic politics.61 It was Spain’s formula of social control when traditional liberalism crumbled, much as had been the case in Italy in 1922. As Captain General of Barcelona in 1923, Primo became the hero of the Catalan bourgeoisie, who endorsed enthusias- tically his bid for power and accompanied the general in his triumphal departure from the train station, bound for Madrid, to form a new administration.62 Spain’s agrarian and industrial bodies and chambers of commerce, as well as the Catholic Church, were not far behind and greeted the new regime with joy.63 In return, the dictatorship granted 22 THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR high protectionist tariffs to shield national production from external competition and to enforce social peace. With Martı´ nez Anido in charge of the Ministry of the Interior, martial law lasted until May 1925. The PCE and the CNT were banned and hundreds of their militants were imprisoned. State repression, although quite moderate in terms of bloodshed compared with the previous years, did not solely explain the decline in labour unrest that was witnessed in these years. The economic bonanza and active interventionism in the economy ensured an era of industrial expansion in the 1920s. Financed by an extraordinary budget, the dictatorship invested heavily in public works, such as road construction, railways and other infrastructures. Substantial economic modernisation co-existed with original social initiatives. Far from being persecuted, the UGT was drawn into collaboration with the state. The opposition of sectors of the PSOE, headed by Indalecio Prieto, was defeated by the alliance between the leader Pablo Iglesias and, after his death in 1925, Julia´ n Besteiro, and the trade-unionist wing led by Francisco Largo Caballero. They welcomed the opportunity to establish socialist hegemony in the labour movement and, consequently, UGT members accepted paid jobs in the bureaucratic machinery of the regime.64 Industrial workers in general benefited from growing economic development and from state paternalism.65 Borrowed from fascist corporatism, the establishment of the so-called comite´s paritarios (arbitration committees of employers’ and workers’ representatives) to promote social legislation and to solve conflicts was the most far- reaching social experiment. Yet, unlike in Italy, trade-union freedom was respected and a single fascist union did not represent workers. In fact, the UGT acquired the lion’s share of labour representation, above the Libres or the Catholic trade unions. Moreover, while em- ployers bore the burden of financing the committees and had to abide by decisions largely favourable to the workers, the proletariat still had the right to resort to strike action. Even the CNT’s old guard, led by Angel Pestan˜ a, contemplated the idea of participating in the regime’s corporatism and accepting its arbitration machinery. However, this was furiously opposed by the Anarchist hard-liners. The latter founded, in a secret meeting in Valencia in July 1927, the Federacio´n Anarquista Ibe´rica (FAI), with the objective of capturing the leadership of the organisation once it could resume its activities legally.66 The restoration of social peace, the fierce criticism of the corruption of the discredited previous regime and the successful pacification of Morocco ensured a certain popularity for the dictatorship.67 However, THE PAINFUL ROAD TO MODERNITY 23 lacking any ideological coherence or solid political foundations, the regime soon began to disintegrate. In an attempt to turn his rule from a military- into a civilian-based system, in 1924 Primo founded a political party, Unio´n Patrio´tica and, one year later, several civilians joined the government. Yet, unlike the dynamism of Italian Fascism, the Unio´n Patrio´tica never went beyond being an artificial imposition from above that was mostly joined by careerists thirsty for jobs and official protection.68 As political uncertainty mounted, widespread censorship, constant arbitrary decisions and a clear favouritism towards the Catholic Church led to growing opposition amongst intellectuals and students. The 1920s brought about a significant acceleration in the process of cultural modernisation, with the beginnings of mass production, the introduction of radio, and widespread attendance in cinemas, which affected the middle classes in particular. Feeling alienated and unrepresented, they began to move in droves towards the Republican camp. In Catalun˜ a, repressive measures banning its language and its symbols saw the hegemony of Catalan Nationalism passing from the Lliga to left-wing groups, including the quasi-separatist Estat Catala´, led by Francesc Macia´ . Also, sectors of the army which were enraged by Primo’s attempts to cut the military budget and to deal with the promotion system began to conspire. Most of these plots, involving politicians of the old regime, were easily dismantled. Yet they revealed the glaring divisions within the armed forces, who were the ultimate guarantor of the monarchy.69 By 1929, the King had grown tired of a regime in which he played a secondary role. The onset of the world economic depression, added to military discontent, provided Alfonso with the excuse to exert pressure on Primo to retire quietly. Landowners and industrialists rejected a fiscal policy that would have paved the way for more progressive taxation and, in a clear vote of no confidence, refused to contribute the loans that the regime was desperate to raise.70 The same groups who had hailed the coup in 1923 now became its outspoken detractors. A sick and isolated Primo de Rivera finally resigned on 28 January 1930. Three months later he died in Paris.

The twilight of an era

In vain, the Crown sought to disassociate itself from the dictatorship. By having cast his lot in with the praetorian takeover, Alfonso had 24 THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR thought that he was securing his throne. In fact, he was destroying his constitutional underpinnings and joining his fate with that of Primo. The monarchy had readily accepted the military coup in 1923 because the oligarchic system could no longer function. However, in 1930 the attempt to bring back the old Liberal order as if nothing had happened proved ludicrous. The impact of the previous seven years could not be erased overnight. In that period, the dictatorship had presided over a period of rapid economic and cultural modernisation that significantly altered Spain’s social fabric. Between 1923 and 1930, over a million people migrated from the countryside to large cities such as Barcelona, Madrid, Valencia, Bilbao and Zaragoza. Agriculture, although still the largest employment sector of the economy, fell from 57.3 to 45.5 per cent of the workforce, while the industrial and service sectors grew from 21.9 and 20.8 to 25.6 and 27.9 per cent respectively. Increasing urbanisation was accompanied by a similarly dramatic rise in literacy, a spectacular development of the railway and road system and the production of telephones, radios and other signs of modernity.71 The obvious consequence was that the old elitist system, which had already proven moribund in 1923, was a total anachronism in the much more modern and advanced Spain of 1930.72 Having become fragmented long before Primo’s pronunciamiento, and then being kept out of public office and vilified in the press during the dictatorship, the old dynastic parties were in total disarray. More- over, only some of the monarchist notables responded with enthusiasm to their sovereign’s call to save the throne. Many others either joined the Republicans or avoided backing a monarch who had identified himself with a regime that denigrated them. By contrast, Republican- ism had never seen better days. According to the former Maurista Angel Ossorio, even his cat was now a Republican.73 The dictatorship’s censorship, as well as its other arbitrary measures mobilised thousands of small entrepreneurs, intellectuals and members of liberal professions who had not previously revealed any interest in politics. They agreed that, far from being a guarantee of stability, the continuity of the monarchy was a source of conflict and clerical obscurantism.74 While Monarchists soon engaged in squabbling over spheres of power, Republicans were marked by their coherence and unity. On 17 August 1930, representatives of different Republican groups, including Catalans, and (in a private capacity) the Socialists Indalecio Prieto and Fernando de los Rı´ os held a crucial meeting in the northern town of San Sebastia´ n, where they agreed to collaborate in an electoral campaign to bring about a Constituent Cortes that would lead to the THE PAINFUL ROAD TO MODERNITY 25 proclamation of a republic and the granting of autonomy to Catalun˜ a. With the full incorporation of the Socialists into the Pact in October, a provisional government was established, in which the Socialists were given three portfolios. However, in order to dissipate the fear among the middle classes that a Republican takeover would mean a thorough social revolution, the crucial posts of prime minister and minister of the interior were left to two well-known former monarchists, Niceto Alcala´ Zamora and Antonio Maura’s son, Miguel.75 While members of the CNT, legalised in April 1930, were conspiring with Catalan Republicans and a small number of discontented young army officers, chastened by the bitter memories of 1917, Socialists and Republicans were treading with extreme caution. After many post- ponements, they agreed to stage an insurrection on 15 December 1930. Predictably, following the usual dismal record of Spanish rebellions, it was an utter disaster. Three days before the accorded date, the impulsive Captain Fermı´ n Gala´ n rose up in the isolated northern garrison of Jaca (Huesca) in the belief that his daring action would be the spark to ignite an all-embracing revolutionary movement. The authorities acted rapidly, arresting most members of the provisional government. Most compromised officers remained passive, with the exception of a minority who took over the airbase of Cuatro Vientos outside Madrid and confined their actions to flying over the capital and dropping some anti-monarchist leaflets before escaping abroad. Gala´ n himself was captured and, together with his second in command, was summarily executed within 24 hours.76 The Republic now had its martyrs and the monarchy could be presented as a cruel regime. The subsequent trial of the provisional government, in March 1931, revealed in full how dramatically the times had changed since 1917. The president of the military court, General Burguete, had been one of the fiercest repressors of the revolution of 1917 in Asturias. Now he allowed the accused to travel to the courthouse from prison in private cars and during the trial never contained the cheering of a vast pro- Republican audience. The verdict was a virtual acquittal: the minimum sentence of six months and one day was imposed but the accused were then set free and greeted as heroes by enthusiastic crowds. Burguete even commented that he, personally, had voted for their total absolution.77 In order to have time to rebuild its networks, the government decided to organise municipal elections for 12 April 1931, but the results stunned the nation. The Monarchists obtained overwhelming majorities in the countryside but 47 out of the 52 provincial capitals 26 THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR voted for the Republican–Socialist coalition. Clearly, where public opinion could be expressed freely it had voted massively against the regime. The rural vote had no serious meaning, being just a case of the traditional sheep-like obedience orchestrated by the still omnipotent local caciques.78 It was not so much Republican strength as Monarchist defeatism that proved decisive. During the following crucial 24 hours, the regime simply collapsed. Unlike so often in the past, there was not even any attempt to present the manufactured overall majority as a proof of victory. The bewildered Monarchists conceded defeat and deserted en masse. As jubilant crowds celebrated the proclamation of Spain’s Second Republic in the streets of the main cities, Alfonso, identified as the main obstacle to modernity, fled the country, abandoned by his politicians and by an army reluctant to intervene, as it had in 1923.79 Index

ABC, El 120 refuses to give power to Gil Robles, Accio´n Nacional, 41, 206 n.67 52, 209 nn.115–16 Accio´n Republicana, 30, 32 and elections of February 1936, ACNP (Asociacio´n Cato´lica Nacional 53 de Propagandistas), 34 and quick transfer of power to Africanistas, 14, 20, 35, 51–2, 58, 80, Azan˜ a, 209 n.129 111, 113, 120, 126, 161, 188, is impeached, 57 200n.69 Alca´ zar deToledo,75, 121, 222 n.118 see also Army of Africa Alfonso XIII, King of Spain Agrarian Party, 42, 44, 51–2, 206 n.68 is crowned, 11 Agrarian Reform, 31–2, 35–6, 40 survives assassination attempt, 12, Aguirre, Jose´ Antonio, 117, 147, 149 197 n.32 Aizpu´ n, Rafael, 49 dismisses Maura in 1909, 12 Ajuariaguerra, Juan, 149 and crisis of 1917, 15 Alba, Dukeof (Jacobo Stuart and colonial war in Morocco, 20 Fitzjames y Falco´ ), 162, 170 and coup of September 1923, 21 Alba, Santiago, 14–15, 32, 53 dismisses Primo de Rivera, 23 Albornoz, Alvaro de, 213 n.40 flees Spain, 26 Alcala´ Zamora, Niceto in exile, 27 and San Sebastia´ n Pact, 25 writes to Mussolini on behalf of and elections of April 1931, 29 military rebels, 68 becomes first President of Republic, abdicates, 127 32 Alianza Republicana,32 after Casas Viejas, 42 Almerı´ a (German shelling of), 154 dismisses Azan˜ a, 44, 207 n.82 Allies, see also France; Great Britain and elections of November 1933, 45 and Spanish supporters during and Radicals in power, 46–7 First World War, 13 mistrusts CEDA, 47 resolution tested by Hitler, 68 agrees to cabinet with 3 CEDA and Stalin’s prudent stance, 77 ministers in October 1934, 49 and Hitler’s strategy in 1936, 83 and repression following October and British threat to end alliance, 1934, 51, 208 n.109 213 n.41 and corruption scandals of 1935, and Negrı´ n’s strategy, 144 52, 208 n.113 passivity emboldens Hitler, 153

249 250 INDEX

Allies (continued) Arago´ n and sinking of merchant fleet in Anarcho-syndicalist stronghold, 8, Mediterranean in 1937, 155 37 and Negrı´ n’s attempt to win them revolutionary events of December over in 1938, 166 1933, 47 and Franco’s reassurances during and military uprising, 99 Sudetenland crisis, 169 and establishment and dissolution and Stalin’s rapprochement with of Council of Arago´ n, 103, Germany in 1939, 171 117, 145 and guerrillas in post-war Spain, and Republican offensive of 189 September 1937, 149 Allen, Jay, 112 and Nationalist advanceof March Alto Llobregat (Anarchist 1938, 150 Insurrection in January 1932), Arana, Sabino de, 10 39 Army of Africa, 50, 61, 67, 69, 74, 80, Alvarez del Vayo, Joaquı´ n, 71, 87, 82, 95, 99, 101, 111–13, 116, 121 160, 175 Arnedo (Massacre of), 36 Anarchism, see also CNT; FAI Arraza Monasterio, Captain origins in Spain, 7–10 Francisco, 66 and First World War, 14 Ascaso, Francisco, 202 n.9 and Bolshevik Revolution, 18 Ascaso, Joaquı´ n, 117, 145 and social warfareafterFirst World Asensio, General Jose´ , 135 War, 20 Assault Guard, 38, 42, 59, 61, 98, 139, and opposition to Second Republic, 142, 205 n.55 37–8 Asturias and internal struggle within CNT, growth of mining industry, 6 38 Socialist stronghold, 8 and land collectivisation, 103 and 1917 revolutionary strike, 16, and impact of war on its ideological 25 tenets, 104–5 and Communism, 18, 37 and anti-Francoist guerrillas, 190 and Gil Robles’s speech in Anarchist Federation, see FAI September 1934, 48 Anarcho-syndicalism and Anarcho- and revolution of October 1934, 50, syndicalist tradeunion, see CNT 57, 119, 208 n.105 Andalucı´ a and emergence of rival sources of regional conditions, 5–6 power in 1936, 102 and La Mano Negra, 9 and establishment of Council of Anarchist stronghold under threat Asturias y Leo´ n, 117 by Socialists, 61 falls to Nationalists in 1937, 147 and outbreak of war, 74 Auriol, Vincent, 70, 82 and Army of Africa, 74, 111–12 Ayguade´ , Artemı´ , 139 Anguiano, Daniel, 16 Azan˜ a, Manuel Annual (Battleof), 20 military reforms, 30 Antonov-Ovseenko, Vladimir, 77 becomes Prime Minister, 33–4, 46 Aranda, General Antonio, 99, 107 anti-clerical agenda, 34 INDEX 251

and CNT, 38 Barcelona dismissed from Premiership, 44 demographic growth during and October 1934, 50–1 nineteenth century, 6 and Popular Front, 54–5 and UGT’s departure for Madrid, 8 and PCE, 55 terror in 1890s, 9 returns to power in February 1936, and impact of Alejandro Lerroux, 56 10, 196–7 n.26 becomes President of Republic, 57 and Tragic Week, 12 overwhelmed by outbreak of war, and creation of CNT, 13 96 and Assembly of 1917, 15, 17 appoints Giral as PrimeMinister, and Canadiense strike, 19 96 and social conflict after First World and terror, 113 War, 19–20 message of peace, 113, 193 and coup of 1923, 20–1, 200 n.62 and Horacio Prieto, 222, n.104 demographic growth in 1920s, 24 during May events of 1937, 139–41 and radicalisation of CNT after happy to oust Largo Caballero, 1931, 39, 205 n.61 143 and local Radical Party in 1930s, 49 backs Juan Negrı´ n for Premiership, and October 1934, 50 143 and social peace in 1936, 56 and Jose´ Antonio Aguirre, 149 and military uprising, 61, 98, 100, despairs at role played by Britain, 107 152 organises alternative Olympic demoralisation by course of war, games in 1936, 76 158 receives Errol Flynn in 1937,76 and fateof AndreuNin, 226 n.93 welcomes Soviet Consul, 77 hopes for a compromise solution to observed by George Orwell, 103 conflict, 159 and CNT’s hegemony in 1936, 105, relations with Negrı´ n, 159–60, 177 113, 116–17 resigns his post of President, 175 and Republican infighting after hated by Nationalists, 178 July 1936, 136–9 disagrees with Besteiro’s stance, 179 and May 1937, 139–42 believes Franco regime is not under aerial bombardment, 139, Fascist, 187, 232 n.1 163–4, 228–9 n.26 Aznar, Admiral Juan Bautista, 201 experiences demonstration against n.79 Indalecio Prieto, 159 Azorı´ n, Antonio, 194 n.4 spared Franco’s offensive in 1938, 161 Badajoz (Massacreof), 112, 148 provides farewell to International Baguenas, Martı´ n, 52 Brigades, 168 Bakunin, Mikhail, 7 falls in 1939, 172–4 Balbo, Marshall Italo, 68 experiences popular exodus, 157, Baldwin, Stanley, 63, 65, 70 176 Banque Commerciale de l’Europe du Barea, Arturo, 109 Nord, 87, 156 Baroja, Pı´ o, 2, 194 n.4 252 INDEX

Barroso, Antonio, 62, 217 n.119 Blomberg, General Werner von, 67 BasqueCountry Blum, Le´ on, 62–3, 69–71, 82, 87, 156, industrial modernisation, 6, 164, 211 nn.6–7, 213 nn.40, 45 and Carlism, 128, 194, n.2, BlueDivision, 186 becomes a Socialist stronghold, 8–9 Bohle, Ernst, 66 experiences emergence of Bolı´ n, Luis, 68–9 Nationalism, 10 Bonaccorsi, Arconovaldo (Conte and Communism, 18 Rossi), 74 and Catholicism, 30 Boncour, Joseph-Paul, 164, 229 n.33 and elections of February 1936, 53, Bonnet, Georges, 165–6, 170, 173, 209 n.117 229 nn.33, 36 and military uprising, 98, 102 Borodin, Mikhail, 18, 199 n.51 obtains statuteof autonomy, 56, Bravo Portillo, Manuel, 198 n.37 117 Brunete (Battle of), 148–50 and hegemony of PNV, 103, 117–18 Bullejos, Jose´ ,37 oasis of safety for Catholic Church, Burbach, Friedhelm, 66 108 Burgos y Mazo, Manuel, 19 becomes war front in 1937, 146–9 BasqueNationalist Party, see PNV Cabanellas, General Miguel, 95, 99, Batalla, La, 140 101, 113 Batet, General Domingo, 106 Caciquismo, 4, 7, 26 Belchite (Battle of), 149 Calvo Sotelo, Jose´ , 41, 59, 94, 100, Be´ rard, Le´ on, 174 120, 210 n.142 Bernhardt, Johannes, 66 Cambo´ , Francesc, 10, 15 Berruezo, Jose´ ,3 Campı´ ns, General Miguel, 106 Berti, General Mario, 168 Canadiense, La (Ebro Power and Besteiro, Julia´ n Irrigation) strike, 19 and revolutionary strike of 1917, 16 Canaris, Admiral Wilhem Franz, 73, criticises war of Morocco, 20 83 succeeds Pablo Iglesias as Socialist Ca´ novas del Castillo, Antonio, 2 leader, 22 Ca´ rdenas, La´ zaro, 75 attitudetowards Republic,29, 202 Carlism n.9 and nineteenth-century wars, 1, 194 loses power in Socialist movement, n.2 43, 206–7 n.77 vehicle of social protest, 5 spiritual agony during war, 104, and BasqueNationalism, 10 179 and Solidaridad Catalana, 11 seeks compromise solution in May and First World War, 13 1937, 158 and Sindicatos Libres, 19 opposes Negrı´ n, 158, 178–9 opposes Second Republic, 28–9 joins Casado’s plot, 179, 181, 187, and its militias, 41 231 n.91 stronghold in Navarra, 53 Bilbao, 24, 98, 148–9 receives military aid from Italy, 68 Bilbao, Crescenciano, 159 and military uprising, 97, 99, 101 Blanco, Segundo, 160 and Catholicism, 102 INDEX 253

expands during war, 127–8 faces internecine Republican and dismissal of Fal Conde, 128 struggle, 102, 136–9 and Franco’s enforced political and May Days of 1937, 139–42 unification, 130–1 and Nationalist offensive of spring part of Franco’s governing 1938, 157, 161 coalition, 132 falls to Nationalists, 172–4 and abrazo deVergara,179–80 Catholic Church Cartagena (uprising in March 1939), and 1876 constitution, 2–3 180–1 and peasantry, 5 Casado, Colonel Segismundo, and CNCA, 5 178–82, 231 n.91 and PNV, 10–11 Casas Viejas (Anarchist rebellion in), and Alfonso XIII, 11 42–3 backs Primo deRivera,21 Casares Quiroga, Santiago, 57, 59, 60, mobilises against Second Republic, 96, 205–6 n.63, 209 n.120 33–5, 203 nn.25–6 Castilla, 5, 8, 34, 44, 55, 61, 97 and burning of convents, 203 n.28 Castillo, Lieutenant Jose´ , 59, 210 supports CEDA, 41–2 n.142 and women’s vote, 202 n.18 Castillblanco (Massacreof), 36 supports Nationalists, 61, 75, 89 Catalun˜ a victim of Republican atrocities, autonomy crushed by Bourbons, 1 103, 107–8 economic industrialisation, 6 blesses Franco’s crusade, 112, and Carlism, 194, n.2 122–3 and failureof Socialism, 8 condones repression, 112, 191, 234 and labour defeat in late nineteenth n.23 century, 9 becomes backbone of Nationalist and development of Nationalism, regime, 130–2 10 after civil war, 184–5, 191 and impact of Lerroux, 10 CEDA (Confederacio´n Espan˜ola de and Cu-Cut incident, 11 Derechas Auto´nomas) and Tragic Week, 11–12 creation and objectives, 41–2 and First World War, 13–14 expands in 1933, 42 and growth of CNT, 19 and elections of November 1933, and social violence after First 44–5 World War, 19–20 and Radical Party, 46–7 and Primo deRivera,21, 23 demands representation in obtains homerule,31, 34, 40, 202 government, 48–9 n.17 and aftermath of October 1934, and tensions within CNT, 37, 39 50–1, 208 n.109 and revolution of October 1934, 50 and scandals of 1935, 51 and military uprising, 98 fails to seize power, 51 experiences revolutionary terror, and elections of February 1936, 108, 110 55 and Anarcho-syndicalist in decline, 58, 94, 127 hegemony, 103, 105 and Serrano Sun˜ er, 126 254 INDEX

Centan˜ o, Colonel Jose´ , 179 joins Largo government, 114–15 CGT (Confe´de´ration Ge´ne´rale du and reconstruction of Republican Travail), 9, 76, 79 state, 135 Chamberlain, Neville, 151, 155, and power struggle in Barcelona, 162–3, 165, 169–72 116–17, 136–8 Chatfield, Admiral Lord, 70 and May 1937, 139–42 Chautemps, Camille, 82, 156 and aftermath of May 1937, 142, Chilton, Sir Henry, 64, 75 145 Churchill, Winston, 70, 155 and Negrı´ n, 146 Ciano, Count Galeazzo, 68–9, 155, and unity pact with UGT in 1938, 163, 168–9, 172–3, 183, 233 n.13 160 Civil Guard, 1, 3, 35–6, 38, 40, 42, 56, abandons talks of revolution, 160, 61, 98, 189, 205 n.55, 210 n.142 166 Clerk, Sir George, 71 demoralisation in 1939, 177 CNCA (Confederacio´n Nacional Codovilla, Victorio, 204 n.45, 215 Cato´lica Agraria), 5, 36, 41 n.70, 228 n.15 CNT (Confederacio´n Nacional del Comillas (Azan˜ a’s speech), 54 Trabajo) Comintern, 17–19, 37, 55, 78, 90, 136, foundation, 13 140, 144, 146, 160, 181, 204 n.45, and Labour Pact (July 1916), 14 210, n.131, 215 n.70, and First World War, 198 nn.35–7 228, n.15 in March 1917, 15 Comorera, Joan, 138 and revolutionary strike of August Communism and Communist Party 1917, 16 see PCE expansion and class struggle after Communist International, see First World War, 18–20 Comintern and Comintern, 18–19 Companys y Jover, Lluis, 48, 50, 105, and Primo deRivera,22 141, 189, 202 n.17, 208 n.100 legalised in 1930, 25 Condor Legion, 83–4, 89, 147–8, 154, and Second Republic, 36–40, 205 161, 172 n.57 Conde´ s, Captain Fernando, 210 n.142 internal struggle and split, 37–9, Corbin, Charles, 70, 154, 211 n.6 205 n.61, 207 n.78 Cornford, John, 84 follows insurrection path, 39–40, 43 Costa, Joaquı´ n, 2, 194 n.4 in December 1933, 47 Cot, Pierre, 62–3, 71, 82 and revolution of October 1934, Cousin, Gaston, 82 50 Covadonga (Gil Robles’s speech), 48 and Popular Front, 55 Cowan, Denys, 180 in 1936, 56–7 CTV (Corpo di Truppe Volontarie), and military uprising, 98–9, 102–3 83, 85–6, 89, 147, 150, 161 internal tensions fuelled by war, Cu-Cut (Incident), 11 104–6 Cuenca, Victoriano, 210 n.142 collaborates with Catalan Czechoslovakia, 88, 163, 165, government, 105–6 168–71, 175 and social terror, 109–10 see also Sudetenland INDEX 255

Daladier, Edouard, 62, 165, 169, 171, Fal Conde, Manuel, 128 173, 229 nn.33, 36 Falange, 41, 53, 58, 97–101, 126–30, Dato, Eduardo, 15, 20 187 Darlan, Admiral Franc¸ois, 70 Falange Espan˜ola Tradicionalista y de Da´ vila, General Fidel, 127, 148 las JONS (FET), 130–2, 185 Debate, El,34 Fanelli, Giuseppe, 7 Delbos, Yvon, 62–3, 71, 162–3 Fanjul, General Joaquı´ n, 51, 98, 100, Delgado, Jose´ ,58 107, 120 desamortizacio´n (disentailment), 5–6 Faupel, Wilhelm, 224 n.61 Deutschland (attack on German Ferrer Guardia, Francisco, 12, 197 battleship), 154 n.32 Dı´ az, Jose´ , 37, 209 n.125 Flynn, Errol, 76 Dietrich, Marlene, 52 First World War, 13–15, 17, 197–8, Dollfuss, Engelbert, 47, 214 n.57 n.35, 198 n.37 Domingo, Marcelino, 41, 44, 202 n.9, FNTT (Federacio´n Nacional de 206 n.65, 209 n.120 Trabajadores de la Tierra), 36, 43, Dos Passos, John, 76 48, 56, 204 n.40 Duclos, Jacques, 55 Fox, Ralph, 84 Durruti, Buenaventura, 81, 105–6, France 204 n.46 and First World War, 14 and Morocco, 13–14, 200 n.67 Ebro (Battleof the),167–8, 170, and origins of Popular Front, 178–9 54–5 Eden, Anthony, 62, 65, 87, 153–6, polarised about intervention in 158, 162–3, 213 n.45 Spain, 62–3, 69–71, 213 n.40 Esquerra Republicana, 40, 44, 136–9, and British pressure in summer of 142, 202 n.17, 208 n.100 1936, 63–5, 70–1, 211 n.6 Estadella, Jose´ ,45 economic investments in Spain, 212 n.23 FAI (Federacio´n Anarquista Ibe´rica) endorses non-intervention, 70–1, foundation, 22 213 n.45 opposition to Second Republic, and smuggling of weapons, 71, 73, 37–8 88 takeover of CNT, 38–9, 137, 204 bans volunteers,79 n.46, 205 n.49 and del Vayo’s opinion, 87 and January 1933 uprising, 42 purchases gold from Spain, 87 and Popular Front, 55, 209 n.127 and Spanish child refugees, 147 and Communist conspiracy, 93 and naval patrol, 152 and military uprising, 104–6 and Ribbentrop’s opinion, 154–5 and revolutionary terror, 108–9 and Nyon Conference, 155 collaborates in government, 114, and relaxed non-intervention, 156 116–17, 138 and Franco’s offensive in spring of and POUM, 138 1938, 161 and May 1937, 139–40 and resignation of Eden, 163 and Azan˜ a’s opinion, 140 and Negrı´ n’s plea for weapons, 164 256 INDEX

France( continued) and Don Juan, 127 and British opposition to second and Serrano Sun˜ er, 126–7 Blum cabinet, 164–5 and execution of Jose´ Antonio, 129 under British pressure to close imposes unification of all frontier, 165–6, 229 n.36 Nationalist groups, 127–30 and Sudetenland crisis, 165, 169–70 and foundations of his new order, and Negrı´ n’s last plea in 1939, 173 130–32 recognises Franco,174 and war in North, 148 in Second World War, 185 and Battle of Brunete, 148–9 and Spanish refugees, 157, 174, and Battle of Teruel, 150 188–9 and blitzkrieg of Spring 1938, 150 and Spanish guerrillas, 189–90 requests Mussolini’s aid in France-Navigation, 156 Mediterranean, 155 Franco y Bahamonde, General boasts of masterminding May Francisco events in Barcelona, 224 n.61 early days in Morocco, 118–19 diverts offensive to Valencia, 161 and Second Republic, 119 appoints Dukeof Alba to London, in October 1934, 50 162 and Gil Robles, 51–2 and British government looks and Popular Front, 56 forward to his victory, 163, 165 hesitant plotter, 119–20 orders intensification of aerial and Dragon Rapide, 94, 120 campaign in 1938, 165 viewed by British diplomacy in and Battleof theEbro, 167–70 1936, 64 and Axis’s dismay at his conduct of requests British aid, 65 war, 168 sends emissaries to Hitler, 66–7 reassures Allies of his neutral seeks Italian assistance, 68 stance, 169 viewed by Admiral Chatfield, 70 captures Catalun˜ a, 172–4 his Army of Africa is airlifted to recognised by Allies, 174 mainland, 73–4 opposes any compromise peace, fails to captureMadrid, 80–1 158, 176, 178, 187 requests more aid from Fascist and Casado rebellion, 182–3 powers, 82–3 declares victory in war, 183 and Battleof Guadalajara, 86 and Largo’s opinion of his military and initial chaos in Nationalist skills, 184–5 camp, 101, and Hitler’s derision of his victory, and natureof Nationalist 89, 125, 222 n.1 repression, 106, 111–13 and myth of invincibleCaudillo, becomes Nationalist leader, 114, 184–5 120–2 and Second World War, 185–6 and Alca´ zar of Toledo, 121–2 and Cold War, 186 hailed by Catholic Church, 122–4, and Pact of Blood, 132, 187 130–2 and vindictive nature of his regime, and his military strategy under 95, 187, 188, 190–1, 233 n.13 criticism, 125–6 in 1950s, 191–2 INDEX 257

Franco, Nicola´ s, 65, 120, 126 extracts economic concessions from Friends of Durruti, 139–41, 145 Franco, 172–3 and Second World War, 185–6 Gala´ n, Captain Fermı´ n, 25 and domestic repression, 186, 233 Gala´ n, Colonel Francisco, 180 n.13 Garcı´ a Lorca, Federico, 30 and Spanish Republicans in Garcı´ a Oliver, Joan, 37–8, 93, 105, occupied Europe, 189 108, 110, 114, 202 n.9, 209 n.127 Gil Robles, Jose Marı´ a Garton, Sir Orme, 73 leads CNCA, 36 Generation of 1898, 2, 194 n.2 and emergence of CEDA, 41–2 Geraud, Andre´ (Pertinax), 211 n.6 attends Nazi rallies in 1933, 49, 207 Germany n.84 activities in Spain during First outmanoeuvres Lerroux, 46 World War, 14, 198 nn.37, provokes sacking of Martı´ nez 42 Barrios, 46–7 initial rejection of Nationalist pleas, speaks in Covadonga in September 66 1934, 48–9 and Hitler’s decision to support and aftermath of October 1934, 51, Franco, 66–8 208 n.109 and crucial airlift of Franco’s joins government in 1935, 51–2 troops, 68 promotes Africanistas, 52, 113 and non-intervention, 73, 214 n.55 clashes with Alcala´ Zamora, 52, 209 creates Axis with Italy, 73 n.115 increases aid to Franco, 73–4 defeated in February 1936, 55–6, sends Condor Legion, 82–3 209 n.120 and del Vayo’s opinion, 87 and killing of Calvo Sotelo, 59 seeks economic gains in Spain, 88 and military uprising, 210 n.140 total amount of aid to Nationalists, helps Nationalists from Portugal, 89 65 criticises Franco’s military strategy, and Serrano Sun˜ er, 126 125 shunned by Nationalists, 100, and Jose´ Antonio, 128 127 flouts non-intervention, 73, 77, Gime´ nez Ferna´ ndez, Manuel, 49, 152–5 51–2 aerial bombing in northern Giral, Jose´ , 62, 96, 113, 143, 188 campaign, 148, 153 Goded, General Manuel, 52, 98, 100, and naval patrol, 154–5 107, 120 and Italian submarineactivities, Goicoechea, Alejandro, 148 155 Goicoechea, Antonio, 68, 206 n.69 and anti-Comintern Pact, 161 (Go´ mez) Jordana, General Francisco, aggressive foreign policy in 1938, 127, 172 163–4 Gonza´ lez Pen˜ a, Ramo´ n, 57, 60, and Sudetenland crisis, 169–70 176 rapprochement with Soviet Union, Go¨ ring, Hermann, 67, 88, 172 171 Grandi, Count Dino, 162 258 INDEX

Great Britain Hedilla, Manuel, 129–30 opposes French intervention in Hemingway, Ernest, 76 Spanish Civil War, 62–3, 70–1, Herrera y Oria, Angel, 34 211 n.6 Herriot, Edouard, 63 reaction to military uprising, 64, Hess, Alfred, 66 211 n.11 Hess, Rudolf, 66 sympathises with Nationalists, 64–5 Hidalgo, Diego, 50–1, 119 and Mussolini’s intervention, 69 Hidalgo Cisneros, General Ignacio, embraces non-intervention, 71–3, 171 poised to recognise Nationalists HISMA (Compan˜ı´a Hispano- when Madrid falls, 75 Marroquı´ de Transportes), 88 and del Vayo’s opinion of her role, Hitler, Adolf 87 ignores Spain in Mein Kampf,66 and Azan˜ a’s opinion of her role, decides to support Franco, 66–8 152 increases military aid (Operation and economic interests in Spain, Otto), 74 153, 212 n.23 dispatches Condor Legion, 83 signs Gentlemen’s Agreement with economic tally from Spanish Italy, 153 adventure, 88 bent on appeasing dictators, 153–5, meets Lord Halifax in Berlin, 162 214 n.55 and Sudetenland crisis,169–70 agrees to mediation role in 1937, and Montana Project, 172 158 derides Franco’s victory, 89, 125, and Italian submarineattacks in 222 n.1 Mediterranean, 155–6 and Second World War, 185–6 recognises Duke of Alba, 162 and domestic repression, 186, 233 experiences splits in cabinet, n.13 162–3 Hoare, Sir Samuel, 153, 185 opposes Blum cabinet of 1938, 164 Hodgson, Sir Robert, 153, 162 puts pressure on French to close border with Spain, 165–6 Ibarruri, Dolores (La Pasionaria), 80, and Sudetenland crisis, 169–70 110, 168–9 and cabinet looks forward to a Iglesias, Pablo, 9, 13, 16, 22 Nationalist victory, 170 Ilundaı´ n, Bishop Eustaquio, 34 recognises Franco, 174 International Brigades, 78–81, 84, and surrender of Menorca, 180 89–90, 117, 149, 168–9, 210–11 and Second World War, 185 n.1 Guadalajara (Battleof), 85–6, 147 IRA (Instituto de Reforma Agraria), Guernica, 147–8, 154 41, 45 Gurney, Jason, 79, 84–5 Irujo, Manuel de, 146 Italy Hailsham, Lord, 170 supports anti-Republican activities Halifax, Lord, 163–5 before 1936, 68 Hankey, Sir Maurice, 65 agrees to help Nationalists, 68–9, Hassell, Ulrich, 227 n.121 213 n.32 INDEX 259 planes crash in French North and Second World War, 185 Africa, 70 domestic repression, 187, 233 n.13 awareof British attitude,70 plays a crucial rolein outcomeof JAP (Juventudes de Accio´n Popular), war, 66, 73, 125 42, 49, 58, 126 and Non-Intervention Agreement, Jarama (Battleof), 84–5 73, 77 Javier, Don (Javier de Borbo´ n), 130 seals Axis with Germany, 73 Jeanneney, Jules, 63 increases aid to Franco, 74 Jime´ nez de Asua, Luis, 58, 70, 213 sends expeditionary force to n.40 Mallorca, 74 JSU (Juventudes Socialistas recognises Franco, 82–3 Unificadas), 55, 57, 134 sends CTV, 83–4 Juan, Don (Juan deBorbo´ ny captures Ma´ laga, 85 Battenberg), 127 defeated in Guadalajara, 85–6 Juntas Militares de Defensa, 14–15 and del Vayo’s opinion, 87 generosity in her military aid, 88 Kindela´ n, General Alfredo, 120, 161 at war with Second Republic, 89–90, 153 Lamoneda, Ramo´ n, 143–4, 176 criticises Franco’s military strategy, Langeheim, Adolf, 66 125 Lara, Antonio, 46 and war in north, 147 Largo Caballero, Francisco captures Santander, 149 and revolutionary strike of 1917, and Basque surrender, 149 16 and blitzkrieg of spring 1938, 150 and Primo deRivera,22 and Azan˜ a’s opinion, 152 becomes Minister of Labour, 29 signs Gentlemen’s Agreement with introduces social legislation, 30–1 Britain, 153 increasingly unhappy with Second tests determination of Allies, 153 Republic, 43 boasts in NIC, 154 displaces Besteiro from Socialist attacks merchant fleet in leadership, 43–4, 206–7 n.77 Mediterranean, 155 radicalised by course of events, 43, and Nyon Conference, 155–6 207 n.83 joins Anti-Comintern Pact, 162 and elections of November 1933, 44 clashes with Eden, 162–3 dubbed Spanish Lenin, 47 signs treaty in Easter 1938 with and October 1934, 50, 208 nn.102, Britain, 162–3, 165 103 aerial bombardment of and Popular Front, 54–5 Barcelona,163, 228–9 n.26 clashes with Prieto, 57 dismay during Battleof theEbro, and internal tensions of Socialism, 168–9 57–8, 210 n.37 committed to see through her and alleged Communist conspiracy Spanish adventure, 172 of 1936, 92–4 and Catalan campaign of early becomes Prime Minister, 114–15 1939, 173 flees Madrid, 80, 133 260 INDEX

Largo Caballero, Francisco Leclerc, General Jacques Philippe, (continued) 189 decides to ship gold to Soviet Le´ ger, Alexis, 70 Union, 216 n.106 Lerroux, Alejandro and reconstruction of state, 115, Emperor of Paralelo, 10–11 133 and Tragic Week, 11 alienates Socialists and greets Republic, 27, 201 n.1 Republicans, 133–4 joins provisional government, 32 clashes with PCE, 134–5 shady reputation, 196–7 32, n.26, hangs on to war ministry, 135 202 n.19 and General Miaja, 135, 224 n.38 shifts towards a conservative and May Days, 141–2 position, 32 ousted from office, 142–4 expects Premiership in 1931, 32 mocks Franco as military leader, opposes Azan˜ a government, 32, 209 184 n.21 in a German concentration camp, and coup of August 1932, 40, 189 205–6 n.63 laws and Casas Viejas, 42 Ley de Congregaciones (Law of calls for a Republican-dominated Congregations), 203 n.25 Republic, 44 Ley Constitutiva del Eje´rcito (Law becomes Prime Minister, 45 of theConstitution of the outmanoeuvred by CEDA, 46–7 Army), 3 and October 1934 and its Ley de Cultivacio´n Obligatoria aftermath, 49 (Law of Obligatory forced to resign, 51–2, 208–9n.113 Cultivation), 31 Lister, Enrique, 145, 167 Ley por la Defensa de la Repu´blica Lliga Regionalista, 10, 14–15, 17, 23, (Law for the Defence of the 44, 48, 196 n.25, 199 n.49, 200 Republic), 39 n.62, 202 n.17 Ley de Fugas, 20, 39 Longo, Luigi, 78 Ley de Jurisdicciones (Law of Lo´ pez, Juan, 114 Jurisdictions), 11, 30 Luccardi, Giuseppe, 68, 213 n.32 Ley de la Reforma de la Reforma Agraria (‘Law for Reforming Macia´ , Francesc, 23, 40, 208 n.100 theAgrarian Reform’),52 Mackensen, Hans George von, 163 Ley de Responsabilidades Polı´ticas Madrid (Law of Political demographic growth in nineteenth Responsibilities), 176 century, 6 Ley de Te´rminos Municipales (Law Socialist stronghold, 8–9 of Municipal Boundaries), 31, and revolutionary strike of 1917, 16 43, 48 attracts immigrants in 1920s, 24 Ley de Vagos y Maleantes (Law and revolution of December 1930, against Vagrants and Idlers), 25 205 n.57 burning of convents in 1931, 203 Lebrun, Albert, 63, 70 n.28 INDEX 261

and coup of August 1932, 40 Martı´ n, Antonio, 139 and CNT’s inroads in construction Martı´ nez Anido, General Severiano, sector, 43, 207 n.78 20, 22, 132 Largo Caballero’s stronghold, 54 Martı´ nez Barrios, Diego, 45–7, 96, Azan˜ a’s speech in 1935, 54 175, 205–6 n.63 experiences labour clashes in 1936, Martı´ nez de Velasco, Jose´ , 206 n.68 56–7 Marty, Andre´ , 78, 80 and military rebellion, 61, 98–9 Maura, Antonio, 12, 15 visited by Andre´ Malraux, 71 Maura, Gabriel, 12 and advanceof Army of Africa, Maura, Miguel, 25, 32, 34, 49, 53, 203 74–5, 86 nos.26 and 28, 210 n.137 receives Soviet ambassador, 78 Maurismo, 12–13 and Franco’s diversion to seize first Maurı´ n, Joaquı´ n, 137–8 Alca´ zar, 121 May 1937 events, 139–42 under a Defence Council after Medina, Diego, 179 departure of government, 133 Menorca (surrender of), 180 repels Nationalist offensive, 79–82 Mera, Cipriano, 178, 182 remains besieged, 85–6 Merriman, Robert Hale, 85, 90 becomes symbol of resistance Mexico, 63, 75, 80, 88, 188 against Fascism, 80, 210–11 Miaja, General Jose´ , 80, 135–6, 177, n.1 224 n.38 experiences revolutionary terror Mila´ ns del Bosch, General Jaime, 19 and political turmoil, 96, militia, 74, 76, 80, 96, 99, 102–3, 109, 102–3, 108–10, 113, 116 112, 115–18, 139, 145, 167 clandestine city, 110 Milla´ n Astray, General Jose´ , 119, and dissolution of Defence Council, 123–4, 127 135 Misiones Pedago´gicas,30 experiences Republican infighting, Moch, Jules, 70, 82 136 Modesto, Juan, 167 and return of Negrı´ n in 1939, 175 Mola, General Emilio demoralised by course of war, promoted by Gil Robles in 1935, 52 176–7 director of military rebellion, 59 and activities of fifth column, 178 receives funds from CEDA, 66 and Casado conspiracy, 181–2 requests aid from Italy, 68 Maeztu, Ramiro, 194 n.4 demoralised by failure of coup, 73 Magaz, Count Antonio, 169 rejects Martı´ nez Barrios’s attempt Maiskii, Ivan, 72, 154 to prevent war, 96 Ma´ laga, 85, 112, 133, 135 boasts of taking Madrid, 79–80 Mallorca (Italian military expedition), and Nationalist chaos after 74 uprising, 100 Malraux, Andre´ , 71, 76, 97, 117, 217 and Carlists, 101 n.116, 217, n.1, 221 n.91 and repression, 110, 112 Manteco´ n, Jose´ Ignacio, 145 cannot rival Franco’s claim for Maran˜ o´ n, Gregorio, 126 leadership, 120 Margesson, David, 70 and Hitler’s praise, 125 262 INDEX

Mola, General Emilio (continued) mediates in Sudetenland crisis, and northern campaign, 99, 147–8 169–70 dies in plane accident, 148 reassures Franco of help until end Montana Project, 172 of conflict, 172 Montan˜a, La (military fortress), 98, boasts heis readyto takeon 107 France, 173 Montero Rı´ os, Eugenio, 11 and Second World War, 185 Montseny, Federica, 114 and domestic repression, 187, 233 Moors, 1, 61, 80, 84–5, 89, 111–12, n.13 119, 121, 123, 128, 132, 150, 174, 299 n.46 Nationalists Morel, Colonel Henry, 164 confident of quick success of their Moret, Segismundo, 11, 196–7 n.26 coup, 95 Morocco, 11–12, 14, 20, 22, 60, 66–7, at outbreak of war, 61, 218 n.6 69, 91, 96, 119–20, 197 n.31, 200 and their mainland strongholds, 5, nn.67, 69, 213 n.32 97 Morral, Mateo, 197 n.32 during first days of hostilities, 98–9 Moscardo´ , General Jose´ , 121 initial chaos, 100 Moulin, Jean, 82 establish Junta of National Defence Mu´ gica, Bishop Mateo, 34, 223 n.24 in Burgos, 101 Mundo Obrero, El,80 useof terror,106–8, 110–3 Munich (Agreement), 157, 169–71, and rise of General Franco, 118, 173, 176–7 120–2 Mussolini, Benito and Catholic Church, 122–4, supports anti-Republican activities 131–2, 184–5, 191, 234 n.23 before 1936, 68 viewed by British diplomacy, 64 first rejects and later decides to and favourableinternational support Nationalists, 68–9 response, 65 awareof British attitude,69–70 helped by Portugal, 65–6 seals Axis with Germany, 74 helped by Germany, 68 increases aid to Nationalists, 83–6 helped by Italy, 68–9 displays generosity in his aid, 88 initial despair turns into hope of dismayed by Franco’s military quick victory, 73–4 strategy, 125 advancetowards Madrid, 74–5 plays crucial rolein Nationalist backed by Catholic and victory, 151 conservative world opinion, described as a gangster by Eden, 75–6 153 and Battleof Madrid, 80–2 orders attack of merchant fleet in receive increased Axis aid, 82–3 Mediterranean, 155 and Battleof Jarama, 84 boasts of captureof Santander,155 and Battleof Guadalajara, 86 and negotiations with Britain in and non-intervention, 86–7 1937–38,162–3 total tally of aid received, 88–91 despairs of Franco’s leadership and Franco’s unification of forces, during Battleof theEbro, 168 130 INDEX 263

and consolidation of National- and theBattleof theEbro, 168–70 Catholicism, 131–2, 191 requests military aid from Stalin, and northern campaign, 146–8 171–2 and Battle of Brunete, 148–9 and fall of Catalun˜ a, 174 and Battle of Belchite, 148–9 presides at last council of ministers and Battle of Teruel, 150 before crossing Pyrenees, 174 reach Mediterranean, 150 returns to Spain to continue advancetowards Valencia,161 resistance, 175–7 and Battleof theEbro, 168–70 faces revolt and flees Spain, 177–82 captureCatalun˜ a, 172–4 Nenni, Pietro, 79 seize Menorca, 180 Neurath, Constantin, 227 nn.121, 126 achieve final victory, 182 Neves, Mario, 112 Pact of Blood, 132, 187 Nicholas II Romanov, Tsar of Russia, propaganda and myths, 122–4, 15 184–6 NIA (Non-Intervention Agreement) and post-war repression, 187–88, first proposed by French, 70–1 190–1, 233 nn.13, 14, 234 n.23 and Blum’s initial hopes, 71 Navarra, 31, 41, 44, 55, 59, 61, 97, embraced by European powers, 71, 128, 130, 194 n.2 becomes a diplomatic charade, Negrı´ n, Juan 71–3, 154 opposes mob terror, 110 flouted by Axis powers, 77, 89 and shipment of gold, 216 n.106 and Blum’s relaxed stance, 82, 156 minister of Finance in Largo emboldens Axis aggression, 86, 153, government, 143 155 becomes Prime Minister, 143 harms Republic, 86–7, 151–2, 154, backed by Azan˜ a and Prieto, 143–4 174–5 and Comintern, 143–4, 225 n.75 and Eden’s isolated stance in war strategy, 144, 156 British cabinet, 153, 155, 162–3 forms a new cabinet, 145–6 NIC (Non-intervention Committee) faces adverse international arena, creation, 72 151 flaws and shortcomings, 72–3 travels to Paris in July 1937, 156 and Soviet stance, 77 tells Azan˜ a about Nin’s fate, 226 ignores increasing international n.93 intervention, 82 and Orwell’s opinion, 226 n.94 emboldens Axis aggression, 86, 153, object of Besteiro’s grudge, 158 155 centre of staunch resistance in 1938, harms Republic, 86–7, 151–2, 154, 158–60 174–5 clashes with Prieto, 159–60 becomes a surreal farce, 151–2, reshuffles cabinet in April 1938, 160 154–5, 163 seeks Blum’s support, 163–4 and destruction of Guernica, 154 launches diplomatic offensive in compared to Munich by Alvarez 1938, 166 del Vayo, 175 announces unilateral withdrawal of Nin, Andreu, 137–8, 226 n.93 foreign troops, 168 Nyon (Conference), 155–6 264 INDEX

October Revolution (1934), 49–51 embraces Popular Front, 54–5, 209 O’Duffy, Eoin, 89 n.25 Olaechea, Bishop Marcelino, 112 after elections of February 1936, ‘Operation Magic Fire’, 67 56, 210 n.31 Operation Otto, 74 accused of international Orda´ s, Gordo´ n, 44, 47 conspiracy, 92–3 Oriol y Anguera de Sojo, Jose´ ,49 favours reconstruction of state, 104, Ortega, Antonio, 146 117 Ortega y Gasset, Eduardo, 58 and fifth regiment, 117 Ortega y Gasset, Jose´ , 2, 194 n.4 experiences massive growth, 134–5 Orwell, George, 76, 103, 140, 145, clashes with Largo, 134–5 152, 226 n.94 and aftermath of May 1937, 142–3 Ossorio, Angel, 24 and Negrı´ n, 143–4 clashes with Prieto, 159–60 Partido Radical Republicano after fall of Catalun˜ a, 177–9 early days in Catalun˜ a, 10–11 and revolt against Negrı´ n, 180–2 and Tragic Week, 11 excluded from Republican and elections of April 1931, 28–9 government in exile, 188 electoral constituency, 32, 203 n.20 abandons guerrilla strategy against clashes with PSOE, 33 Franco, 190 endorsed by Patronal, 35 Peiro´ , Joan, 110, 114, 189, 205 nn.49, after coup of August 1932, 40, 206 61 n.73 Pestan˜ a, Angel, 22, 37, 39, 55, 93, 198 wins municipal elections in 1933, n.37, 205 nn.49, 61 1933 Phipps, Sir Eric, 164–5 seeks Azan˜ a’s dismissal, 44 Picasso, General Juan, 20 and elections of November 1933, 45 Picasso, Pablo, 148 internal factions, 45 Piera´ , Simo´ , 15, 39 and CEDA, 46–7 Pin˜ o´ n, Camil, 39, 104, 205 n.49 and split of Martı´ nez Barrios, 47 Pla y Deniel, Bishop Enrique, 122–4, in October 1934, 49 131 losing ground to CEDA, 51–2 Plymouth, Ivor Earl of, 72, 153–4 and scandals of 1935, 52, PNV (Partido Nacionalista Vasco) 208–9n.113 foundation of, 10 led by Santiago Alba, 53 joins right-wing Basque-Navarrese wiped out in elections of February coalition, 29 1936, 56 moves towards accommodation Partido Sindicalista, 39, 55 with Popular Front, 53, 209 Pascua, Marcelino, 77, 229 n.36 n.117 PCE (Partido Comunista de Espan˜a) joins warring Republican camp in foundation of, 18 two Basqueprovinces,102 fails to makeinroads in labour ensures defence of Church and movement, 18 property, 103 banned by Primo de Rivera, 22 leads autonomous government, against Second Republic, 37 117 INDEX 265

and northern campaign of 1937, Primo deRivera,Jose ´ Antonio, 41, 147–8 58, 100, 120, 128–9 negotiates surrender, 149 Primo de Rivera, General Miguel, Polo deFranco, Carmen,123–4 20–4, 27, 31, 179, 197–8 n.35, Polo, Zita, 126 PSOE (Partido Socialista Obrero Popular Army, 117–18, 134, 149, 160, Espan˜ol) 167 foundation and slow growth of, Popular Front, 53–5, 78, 93, 104, 8–9 108–9, 133, 137–8, 144, 160, fails in Catalun˜ a, 9 176 seals alliance with Republicans in Portela Valladares, Manuel, 52–3, 56 1909, 13 Portugal, 65, 73–4, 100, 127, 152 and First World War, 13 POUM (Partido Obrero de and Assembly of 1917, 15 Unificacio´n Marxista), 55, 137–9, and revolutionary strike of August 140, 142, 146, 226 n.93 1917, 16–17 Pozas, General Sebastia´ n, 56 and Communism, 18 PRRS (Partido Republicano Radical and war in Morocco, 20 Socialista), 32, 44, 47, 203–4 and Primo deRivera,22 n.29, 209 n.120 and municipal elections of April Prieto, Horacio, 116, 222 n.104 1931, 25–6 Prieto, Indalecio joins government, 29 criticises war in Morocco, 20 and elections of June 1931, 29 and Primo deRivera,22 and social reforms, 30–1 joins San Sebastia´ n Pact, 24 clashes with Radicals, 33, 203 forms part of Republican n.21 government, 29 and loss of power of Besteiro, 29, clashes with Lerroux, 203 n.21 43 opposes Besteiro, 206–7 n.77 supports Azan˜ a, 33 and October 1934, 208 n.103 electoral defeat in 1933, 44–5 supports coalition with and radicalisation of Largo, Republicans in 1935, 53–4, 209 43–4 n.21 and October 1934, 49–50 clashes with Largo, 57–8 internal polarisation and Popular fails to become Prime Minister, 57, Front, 54–5 210 n.37 and elections of February 1936, warns of coup, 59 55–6 in aftermath of coup, 104 internal split in 1936, 57 speaks against revolutionary terror, and outbreak of war, 104 110 and revolutionary terror, 109 backs Negrı´ n’s riseto power,143 and Largo Caballero seizes proposes to attack German fleet in Premiership, 114, 133–4 1937, 155 and fall of Largo Caballero, 143 clashes with PCE, 159 and Negrı´ n, 144, 176 falls out with Negrı´ n, 159–60, 228 and Besteiro’s opposition to n.14 Negrı´ n, 178–9 266 INDEX

PSUC (Partido Socialista Unificado de Rı´ os, Fernando de los, 24, 29, 30–1, Catalun˜a), 134, 136–9, 145, 224 202 n.9, 206 n.72 n.44 Rivas Cheriff, Cipriano, 179 Puente Bahamonde, Ricardo de la, Roatta, General Mario, 73, 83, 86, 106 149 Rodezno, Count (Toma´ s Domı´ nguez Queipo de Llano, General Gonzalo, Are´ valo), 128 99, 101, 107, 112, 120, 127 Rodrı´ guez Salas, Eusebio, 139 Rodrı´ guez, Melchor, 110 Radical Party, see Partido Radical Rojo, General Vicente, 80, 148, 167 Republicano Romanones, Count (Alvaro de Reconquista, 1, 6, 49, 123, 131–2, 185, Figueroa y Torres), 15, 19, 32, 188 198 n.42, 200 n.69, 201 n.79, Renovacio´n Espan˜ola, 41, 58 202 n.5 Republicans Romerales, General Manuel, 106 after First Republic, 7 Rosenberg, Marcel, 77, 134 and Lerroux’s split, 11 Rossi del Lion Nero, Pier Filippo del, alliancewith PSOE in 1909, 13 68, 213 n.32 and First World War, 13 ROWAK (Rohstoff-Waren- and Assembly of 1917, 15 Kompensation Handelgesellschaft and revolutionary strike of 1917, 16 AG), 88 expansion after Primo de Rivera, 24 Russia, see Soviet Union and San Sebastia´ n Pact, 24–5 and municipal elections of April Saborit, Andre´ s, 16 1931, 25–6 Sagasta, Pra´ xedes Mateo, 2 and their weakness in 1930s, 28, Salazar, Antonio, 65–6 46 Salazar Alonso, Rafael, 46, 48 emphasis on education, 29–30 Samper, Ricardo, 47–9 and right of women to vote, 202 San Sebastia´ n (fall of), 74 n.18 San Sebastia´ n (Pact of), 24–5, 28, and countryside, 32 32–3 anti-clerical agenda, 33–4, 203 Sa´ nchez Guerra, Jose´ , 19, 32, 200 n.69 nn.25, 28, 203–4 n.29 Sangroniz, Jose´ Antonio, 120 and Masonry, 35, 204 n.32 Sanjurjo, General Jose´ , 40, 58–9, 65, public order and economic policies, 100, 119–20, 201 n.79 389, 205 n.57 Sanz, Ricardo, 202 n.9 and Popular Front, 53–5 Sargent, Sir Orme Garton, 73 overwhelmed by war, 96, 102 Seguı´ , Salvador, 20 and revolutionary terror, 109–10 Segura, Cardinal Pedro, 33–4 and Largo Caballero’s downfall, Serrano Sun˜ er, Ramo´ n, 126, 129, 133, 143 130–2 war-weariness, 158, 177 Sese´ , Antonio, 142 in disarray in exile, 188 Silvestre, General Manuel Ferna´ ndez, Restoration Monarchy, 1–2, 11, 94 20 Ribbentrop, Joachim, 76, 154 Sindicato Unico,19 INDEX 267

Sindicatos Libres, 19–20, 22 welcomes non-intervention, 77 Sindicatos de Oposicio´n, 39, 137, 205 agrees to supply Republic, 78 n.61 and economic side of Spanish Socialist Party, see PSOE conflict, 91 Socialist tradeunion, see UGT opposes Republican bombing of Socialist Youth, 18, 51, 54 German fleet, 227 n.125 Socialista, El, 96, 110 against PCE joining government in Solidaridad Catalana,11 1937, 160 Solidaridad Obrera (tradeunion), attends Negrı´ n’s plea for weapons, 9–10, 13 171 Solidaridad Obrera (Anarcho- Steer, George L., 154 syndicalist newspaper), 110, 198 Stevenson, Ralph, 154 n.37, 205 n.61 Sternberg, Eric von, 52 Somate´n, El,19 Stohrer, Eberhard von, 168 SOMA (Sindicato Obrero Minero Straperlo (scandal of), 208 n.113 Asturiano), 43 Sudetenland, 163–5, 168–71, 175 Soviet Union fall of Tsarism, 15 Tagu¨ en˜ a, Manuel, 167 and spread of Bolshevism, 17–18 Tedeschini, Monsignor Federico, 34 endorses Popular Fronts, 55, 77 Teruel (Battle of), 150 follows prudent stance towards Togliati, Palmiro, 160, 228 n.15 intervention in Spain, 76–7 Tragic Week, 12 embraces non-intervention, 77 Tribunal de Garantı´as dispatches aid to Republic, 77–8, Constitucionales, 31, 44 153 Trienio Bolchevique, 18 crucial deliveries in Battle of Turno Pacı´ fico, 3, 12, 15 Madrid, 80, 86 and Spanish gold, 87, 216 n.106 UGT (Unio´n General de Trabajadores) total material aid, 88–9, 91 creation of, 8 and Largo Caballero, 134–5 moves headquarters to Madrid, 8 opposes Prieto’s plan to attack faces challenge of CNT, 13 German fleet, 155, 227 n.125 seals Labour Pact with CNT and Italian submarinecampaign, (July 1916), 38 90–1, 155–6 subscribes manifesto with CNT in and fall of Prieto, 160, 228 n.14 March 1917, 15 and Sudetenland crisis, 170 and revolutionary strike of 1917, 16 and Negrı´ n’s plea for aid in late and Primo deRivera,22 1938, 171–2 massiveexpansionand change,36, seals agreement with Germany in 204 n.40 August 1939, 171, 230 n.58 benefits from state arbitration, 39, and Second World War, 186 43, 45 and Republican refugees, 188 loses ground in Madrid, 43, 207 Stalin, Joseph n.78 and dilemma presented by Spanish and rural strikeof June1934, 48 conflict, 76–7 joined by Communists, 55 268 INDEX

UGT (continued) and POUM, 146 becomes Largo Caballero’s and Nationalist offensive of 1938, fiefdom, 54, 206–7 n.77 161, 164, 167 and war collectivisation, 202–3 experiences food shortages, 171 springboard for Largo Caballero’s in 1939, 175 Premiership, 114–15, 134 Valledelos Caı ´ dos, 190–1 expands in Catalun˜ a from 1936, Vansittart, Sir Robert, 174 136–7 Varela, General Jose´ Enrique, 80–1 and May Days of 1937, 139–42 Va´ zquez, Mariano, 176 and fall of Largo Caballero, 143 Velayos, Nicasio, 52 signs pact with CNT in March Vidal i Barraquer, Cardinal Francesc, 1938, 160 110, 223 n.24 and Negrı´ n, 176 Vigo´ n, General Juan, 161 and Besteiro’s delusions, 179 Villalobos, Filiberto, 51 UME (Unio´n Militar Espan˜ola), 59 Viriatos, 65, 89 Unamuno, Miguel de, 2, 123–4, 194 Vizcaya, 37, 102, 147, 209 n.117 n.4 Voroshilov, Marshall Kliment, 227 Unio´n Republicana,47 n.125 United States, 2, 72, 186 UP (Unio´n Patrio´tica), 23 Welczeck, Johannes von, 177 Uribe, Vicente, 117 World War, Second 185–6, 189

Valencia Yagu¨ e, Colonel Juan, 112 demographic growth by 1910, 6 Yagu¨ e, Pablo, 136 and Anarcho-syndicalism, 8 and Carlism, 194 n.2 Zabalza, Ricardo, 48 and transport conflict in 1917, 16 Zaragoza and foundation of FAI, 22 demographic growth in 1920s, 21 and demographic growth in 1920s, and social peace in 1936, 36 24 and military uprising, 61, 99, 101 and Sindicatos deOposicio´ n, 37, 39 and advanceof Durruti column, and military rebellion, 61, 98 105 militias in Arago´ n, 99 holds on against Republicans, 115, and establishment of autonomous 149 council in 1936, 102 site of military academy under becomes capital of Republican Franco, 119 Spain, 80, 133 and Serrano Sun˜ er, 126 and collectivisation, 103, 116 Zay, Jean, 63, 156 experiences armed clashes, 136 Zugazagoitia, Julian, 96, 101–2, 144, and May 1937, 139–40 146, 159, 175, 189