Negotiating Work in the Liberal Age. Unions, the State, and Labour Market Reform in Restoration Spain. 1875-1923
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London School of Economics and Political Science Department of Economic History Negotiating work in the Liberal age. Unions, the state, and labour market reform in Restoration Spain. 1875-1923. Jordi Domenech September 2003 UMI Number: U615840 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. Dissertation Publishing UMI U615840 Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author. Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. ProQuest LLC 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 T M I' \o\z°t\e) To Rocfo. Abstract: This thesis studies the expansion of workers’ collective action and collective bargaining over working conditions in the context of the Spanish Restauracion (1875-1923), in an institutional setting characterised by the absence or little enforcement of legislation concerning industrial conflict and the regulation of working conditions. The thesis addresses two of the main issues in the contemporary and historical debate. The first one addresses the causes of labour unrest and the existence of a weak and politically radical labour movement. A second related issue argues that, had Spanish unions adopted the outlook of more conservative British or German unions, they would have been able to advance the interests of workers more effectively. In the first part of the thesis, I offer a narrative of union development based in coalition-formation. My main argument is that state policy was crucial in shaping the outlook of Spanish unions. I argue that in strike waves, workers in large cities had some degree of political power and were able to obtain the (often only temporary) protection of state officials from employers’ counterattacks. Since the state was able to monopolise the repression of the labour movement up to 1919, ‘public’ lobbying to attract the support of the state radicalised the positions of employers and unions. Severely contested union rights brought about a system of industrial relations that was fragmented and organisationally weak, dependent on state policy to be shaped effectively. Up to 1920, the state, however, hesitated to expand its authority to regulate more thoroughly the relations between workers and their employers. The second part of the thesis asks if the Spanish system of industrial relations hindered the reaching of co-operative solutions to social problems. In other words, was the prevailing system of collective bargaining efficient in the fulfilment of the rapidly changing preferences of workers in the period? To answer this question, the thesis offers three case studies of collective bargaining over workplace public goods. The main conclusion of these exercises is that the supply of public goods was more neutral than expected with respect to the institutional setting. Weak unions and the absence of local or regional collective bargaining did not prevent workers to modify working conditions according to their changing preferences for a shorter workday, a safer workplace, stable wages and income smoothing during economic downturns. 1 Index of contents. Pages List of tables 4 List of graphs 6 Aknowledgements 7 List of abbreviations. 9 Chapter 1. Introduction 10 1.1. The strike threat and workers’ militancy 13 1.2. Workplace public goods. 16 1.3. Limits of this investigation. 30 1.4. Summary. 34 PART I. INSTITUTIONS. Chapter 2. The rise of syndicalism, 1869-1923. 39 2.0. Introduction. 39 2.1. Theories of collective mobilisation. 41 2.2. Unions and strikes. 45 2.3. Strike waves. 48 2.4. Union recognition. 52 2.5. Conclusions. 71 Chapter 3. A coalition for reform? Political responses to labour 72 militancy, 1875-1923. 3.0. Introduction. 72 3.1. Responses to labour militancy. 74 3.2. A coalition for reform? 98 3.3. The failure of strike arbitration. 113 3.4. Conclusions. 115 2 Chapter 4. Winning Spanish strikes. Public order and state 118 intervention in industrial conflict, 1900-1920. 4.0. Introduction. 118 4.1. Strike outcomes, 1905-1920. 120 4.2. Protecting the freedom to work. 127 4.3. Conclusion. 133 Appendix 134 PART II. WORKPLACE PUBLIC GOODS. Chapter 5. The decline of the workday, mid 1880s to 1920. 144 5.0. Introduction. 144 5.1. The historical evolution of the working day in Spain. 145 5.2. Winning the eight-hour day. 179 5.3. Conclusions. 183 Appendix 184 Chapter 6. The collective negotiation of piece rates. A case study on 187 the management of piece rate lists in the Catalan textile sector, 1880-1913. 6.0. Introduction. 187 6.1. Piece rates and working conditions in the Catalan cotton textile 189 industry 6.2. Institutions governing pay. 193 6.3. Data. 196 6.4. Price and quantity adjustments, 1880-1910. 200 6.5. Causes of piece rate rigidity. 212 6.6. Conclusions. 221 Appendix. 223 Chapter 7. Workplace health and safety. 229 7.0. Introduction. 229 7.1. The debate over workplace risks. 230 3 7.2. Accident prevention and sanitary conditions. 243 7.3. Unions and professional risk. 249 7.4. Conclusions. 264 Appendix 266 Chapter 8. Conclusions 267 References and bibliography. 277 4 List of tables. Page 1.1. Workers’ demands in Barcelona, 1903. 18 1.2. CNT programme for the general strike of 1917. 19 1.3. Factors explaining the reduction of the working week in the US, 23 1914-1919. 1.4. Real wage indexes for selected sectors, 1913-1920 (1913=100). 34 2.1. Union densities in Barcelona, 1903-1906. 55 3.1. Effects of unions and employers’ associations on strikes, 1912- 88 1915. 4.1. Strikes by type of settlement, 1905-1915. 123 4.A1. Factors determining the probability of winning strikes, 1912- 137 1915. 4.A2. Factors determining the probability of winning strikes, 1905-9. 139 4.A3. Factors determining government intervention in strikes, 1905- 141 1915. 5.1. Hours of work, 1880s. 153 5.2. Hours of work in the province of Barcelona, 1884 and 1899. 155 5.3. Hours of work in Barcelona, early 20th century. 160 5.4. Relationship between hours and wages, 1904-1909. 163 5.5. Hours of work in 1910. 169 5.6. Elasticity of nominal wage with respect to hours, 1909-1914. 171 5.7. Distribution of hours among sales workers in 1912. 174 5.8. Correlation of hours of work with share of women in the labour 177 force (by age groups), 1909-1914. 5. Al. Nominal wage functions, 1909-1914. 184 6.1. Behaviour of firms in economic downturns (hypotheses). 192 6.2. Piece rate changes, self-acting mule and ring spining. 201 6.2A. La Espana Industrial, 1880-1886. 201 5 6.2B. Sedo, 1901-1910. 201 6.2C. Almeda, Alamany y Cia, 1886-1910. 201 6.3. Piece rate changes, cotton weaving. 203 6.3A. La Espana Industrial, 1880-1886. 203 6.3B. La Espana Industrial, 1890-1910. 203 6.3C. La Espana Industial, 1890-1910 (averages). 203 6.3D. Sedo, 1895-1910. 203 6.4. Wage and labour input adjustment to output fluctuations. 205 6.5. Adjustment to output declines, cotton spinning 1880-1910. 209 6.5A. La Espana Industrial, mule spinning, 1880-1886. 209 6.5B. La Espana Industrial, ring spinning, 1891-1910. 209 6.5C. Almeda, Alemany y Cia, ring spinning, 1886-1910. 209 6.5D. Sedo, ring spinning, 1901 -1910. 209 6.6. Adjustment to output fluctuations, cotton weaving, 1889-1910. 210 6.6A. Sedo, weaving, 1901-1910. 210 6.6B. La Espanya Industrial, weaving, 1889-1910. 210 6.7. Physical productivity of self-acting mule spindles, 1860s-1885. 215 6.A l. Cost-of-kiving indices, 1880-1914. 223 6.A2. Fixed effects regressions, cotton spinning, 1880-1910. 224 6.A3. Quantity and wage adjustments, 1880-1910. 225 7.1. Accidents during the workday, 1905-1909. 237 7.2. Accidents by day of the week, 1905-1909. 238 7.3. Sources of occupational risk, Catalan provinces 1910. 243 7.4. Warning and fining probabilities, labour inspection 1909-1922. 247 7.5. Yearly fatality rates per 1,000 workers in coal mining, 1900-1920. 252 7A1. The impact of collective bargaining in coal mining accident rates, 244 1900-1930. 6 List of graphs and maps. Page 2.1. Strike activity in Spain, strikers (thousands) 1905-1923. 40 2.2. Strikers in Barcelona (thousands), 1899-1923. 50 2.3. Unions existing in Barcelona in 1904 by year of creation. 54 2.4. Union members (thousands), UGT (General Workers’ Union), 1896-1923. 66 2.5. Year of creation of agricultural unions applying to IRS elections in 1919. 70 Garment industry. 2.6. Year of creation of unions in the garment industry applying to participate in 70 IRS elections in 1919. Agriculture. 4.1. Strike outcomes in Spain, 1905-1920. 122 4.2. Factors affecting the probability of winning strikes, Catalan strikes 124 4.3. Determinants of civil governor intervention, 1905-9. 125 4.4. Determinants of civil governor intemvention in Catalan strikes, 1912-1915. 125 4.5. The effect of size of city and of strike size on strike outcomes, 1905-1915. 127 5.1. Hours of work and nominal wages in Valencia, mid 1900s. 168 Map 6A.1. Geographical distribution of the Catalan textile sector. 228 7.1. Reported workplace fatalities, 1902-1930. 230 Acknowledgements. This dissertation has benefited from the help of academics, colleagues and friends. My greatest debts are to my dissertation supervisor Max Schulze, who has read, commented on and criticised various drafts of chapters with infinite patience and rigour, and above all with good humour.